historical research and study the uss maine assignment

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History Resources

Remember the Maine, 1898

A spotlight on a primary source by harper's weekly.

The Harper’s Weekly article featured here represents a more balanced view of the event, noting:

the fate of the Maine will continue an unsolved mystery for historians to wrangle over. Meanwhile all that we shall positively know is that the explosion occurred forward, and hence that the seamen rather than the officers were the sufferers; that not more than 26 of the men remained uninjured; 57 being wounded and 246 killed, and that two of the 24 officers are certainly lost. If the disaster were the result of design and not of accident, it is considered probable that the blow would have been dealt the ship on the very spot where the explosion occurred—not because it would be more desirable to destroy the men than the officers, but because the magazine is always a preferable point of attack.

The cause of the Maine ’s sinking remains the subject of speculation. Suggestions have included an undetected fire in one of her coal bunkers, a naval mine, and sabotage to drive the US into a war with Spain.

A pdf of the article is available here .

Questions for discussion.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

Read the introduction and examine the four pages from Harper’s Weekly . Then apply your knowledge of American history to answer the following questions:

Note : It is beneficial for students to be familiar with the term “yellow press” and to have an understanding of the influence of Harper’s Weekly .

• Briefly explain what took place aboard the Maine .
• In the second paragraph of the Harper’s Weekly article, published a little over a week after the explosion aboard the Maine , it is noted that “the cause . . . is a mystery, the belief is growing that it was purely accidental.” The headline in Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World on February 17, two days after the explosion, was: “MAINE EXPLOSION CAUSED BY BOMB OR TORPEDO?” The headline in William Randolph Heart’s New York Journal of the same day was: “DESTRUCTION OF THE WAR SHIP MAINE WAS THE WORK OF AN ENEMY.” How did the Harper’s Weekly article differ from the headlines in the “yellow press” newspapers controlled by Hearst and Pulitzer?
• Why is the Harper’s Weekly article considered a more balanced view of the destruction of the Maine ?
• What role did the tragedy aboard the Maine play in the decision of the United States to go to war with Spain?

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Photo Credit: Created solely from the artist’s imagination, this chromolithograph was issued to meet the Ameri- can public’s demand for revenge against Spain for the destruction of the USS Maine.

The USS Maine

The USS Maine exploded in Havana Harbor and left an intelligence mystery to this day.

This article appears in: April 2003

By VanLoan Naisawald

Darkness had settled over the harbor, the lights along the shoreline casting a faint glow on the murky harbor water. It was almost 9:30 pm, February 15, 1898, and the outline of a large warship—the USS Maine—was clearly visible as she rode at anchor at Buoy No. 4. A few crewmen might have been visible on deck but the ship showed no warlike evidence. Her captain was in his cabin writing a letter. It appeared that it would be just another quiet night. The ship was being hosted on a peaceful state visit, and had been sitting quietly in the harbor since January 25.

Then, with startling suddenness, an immense red, orange, and yellow flash lit the entire harbor. A second or so later a thundering crash and concussion shook everything around. The USS Maine had blown up!

The mystery over the cause of the blast has never been officially solved despite two formal naval boards of inquiry and the passage of over a hundred years. At the time of the tragedy it was immediately assumed by many and much of the press that it had been an act of sabotage by Spaniards or Spanish sympathizers, or even by Cubans trying to provoke the United States into a war with Spain. Indeed, at this moment relations between Spain and the United States were not of the most friendly nature. The United States was in an expansionist attitude, feeling its newfound strength, and also in an altruistic mood, determined to rid Spanish-held Cuba of what was seen as cruel imperialism.

The William Randolph Hearst newspapers had been screaming for action against the Spanish, and the American public had begun to heed. It was an accepted fact that the Spanish had resented America’s more than 30 years of quasi-benevolent and openly expressed sympathy toward the native Cubans revolting against their Spanish colonial masters. But the official position of the U.S. government was one of neutrality and hope for peaceful change. Thus, a friendly visit by a U.S. warship had been scheduled—much against the better judgment of U.S. Consul General Fitzhugh Lee, nephew of Robert E. Lee and former Confederate cavalry leader. But the State Department insisted. Thus the Maine had sailed into Havana harbor at 9:30 am on January 25, 1898, the first friendly U.S. Navy visit to that port in three years.

The ship had been a picturesque sight as she sailed slowly past centuries-old Morro Castle at the harbor mouth, her long, white hull and ochre-colored superstructure glistening in the morning sun. The Maine was not originally termed a battleship but an armored cruiser of 6,650 tons. She would later be termed a second-class battleship. But she was a new ship—just three years old—and she was the first U.S. warship designed by naval architects and built in a government shipyard.

Her power was supplied by coal-burning steam engines that turned her two screws for a top speed of some 171/2 knots. Her main armament was four 10-inch guns paired in two turrets, one forward and one aft. But these turrets were placed radically differently—one was offset to port and the other to starboard. The idea was to increase their lateral area of fire. Each turret would have an arc of 180 degrees to its outboard side and a small 64-degree arc to its inboard side. They were not placed amidships as was the conventional method. In addition to her main armament she carried six 6-inch guns and 15 other guns of assorted caliber. An inventory taken the previous June showed her carrying a full ammunition load.

As the Maine approached Havana harbor her captain, Charles D. Sigsbee, unsure of what the reception would be and aware of the possibility—not probability—of hostile acts, still had his ship discreetly prepared for action. However, much of the on-deck gear that would normally be removed if a ship were “cleared for action” remained visible. Crew could easily be seen on her decks in dress uniform and, while her guns were not loaded, ammunition had been passed to the mounts. Outwardly the Maine showed no warlike preparations.

Just outside the harbor a pilot dispatched by the harbor captain was taken aboard. The pilot showed Captain Sigsbee a plot of the harbor. Buoy No. 4 was vacant—Would this be acceptable? Sigsbee replied that it would. He later testified that the actual position of Buoy No. 4 differed from that shown him on the plot but he had not been alarmed by this—such a shifting could have occurred for perfectly innocent reasons. Sigsbee then asked the pilot if the Maine had been expected; no, she had not, came the reply. However, it would later be learned that Consul General Lee had advised the authorities that she was arriving on the evening of January 24.

In any event, the Maine anchored at about 10 am, for the last time, at Buoy No. 4, 400 yards off the Machina Wharf and the vicinity of the Customs and Court Houses. As the American ship secured her lines her officers and seamen on deck no doubt noticed a large Spanish warship some 250 yards northwest of the Maine and a German ship—the Gneisenau—some 400 yards to the north. Sigsbee would state later that friends had told him Buoy No. 4 was a little-used one and none could recall a man-o’-war ever using it.

Nevertheless, Buoy No. 4 is where the Maine came to rest. The ship secured, Sigsbee undertook the protocol-required visits to the appropriate Spanish civil and naval authorities. He saw neither nervousness nor signs of concern on their parts. For almost a month the Maine lay tied up. Captain Sigsbee and his officers had infrequent contact with Spanish officials and the populace, and the crew was not given shore leave. Recollections of the tenor of the Spanish ashore were that it was of reserved politeness.

Only two isolated instances gave any indication of impending trouble. In the first, an unknown person had shoved an inflammatory anti-American Spanish-language circular into Sigsbee’s hand during a shore visit. The second was simply a few derisive calls from a ferryboat full of Spanish military and Cuban civilians returning from a bullfight in nearby Regla. These events were taken as isolated instances and of no great concern.

Yet despite the absence of widespread open hostility, the Maine’s skipper ordered that an unusually sharp lookout be maintained at night. Instead of the normal reduced in-port watch, Sigsbee required a quarter-watch for night hours so that one quarter of the crew was instantly available to man the Maine’s secondary batteries—with 6-inch ammunition beside the guns. Although visitors were allowed aboard, very few came, and those who did were carefully watched and followed discreetly lest any package be left behind. But so quiet was the situation that Sigsbee wrote the Secretary of the Navy in early February that he was confident of the ship’s safety.

At 9:10 pm, February 15, the Maine’s bugler sounded Taps, its mournful, long notes echoing across the placid but foul-smelling harbor waters. The day had been another quiet, uneventful one. As darkness settled, the watch was strengthened per Sigsbee’s orders. The lights of Havana flickered along the shoreline as the crew, unquestionably bored with their long confinement aboard ship, turned into their bunks.

Thirty minutes later Sigsbee had just completed a letter to his family and was placing it in an envelope when he was suddenly “jarred by a bursting rending, crashing roar of immense volume.” He rushed from his cabin. Fire, smoke, intense structural damage—particularly in the forward part of the ship—greeted his eyes. The ship was slowly settling by the bow into the mud of the harbor. It was immediately obvious to all on board and those ashore that some sort of huge explosion had torn the ship apart. But Sigsbee’s well-trained crew did not panic, though some crewmen trapped by fire or wreckage began to dive overboard. Then cries for help began to pierce the night. Sigsbee quickly saw conditions out of human control. There was no power, fires were spreading, and there was obvious danger of more explosions. Thus he gave the command to abandon ship.

Help came rapidly from several directions. Crewmen were able to launch several of the Maine’s boats, which began rescuing men in the water. Then a boat from the nearby steamer City of Washington arrived as well as several manned by Spaniards. All joined in rescuing wounded and swimming men from the water. But smoke, flames, and sporadic small explosions continued throughout the night.

With dawn all that remained visible of the Maine was a mass of twisted and charred metal poking above the dark harbor water. Only the rear or mainmast, with its circular crow’s nest still intact, remained erect to indicate that the pile of bent metal had been a ship. That mast now stands in Arlington National Cemetery as a memorial to those who lost their lives; today, beneath the Arlington mast rest the remains of 229 crewmen, 167 of whom are marked as “Unknown.” More than 250 officers and men were lost. The later-recovered foremast stands today at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Md.

Just over an hour after his ship had literally blown up under him, Sigsbee telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy telling him of the disaster, crew losses as he knew them, and the fact that Spanish authorities had already expressed what he believed to be genuine concern and sorrow. He carefully included the statement that “public opinion should be suspended until further report.” Unfortunately, regulation of public opinion was not within the capability of the Secretary of the Navy.

In the hours immediately following, Sigsbee maintained a public silence, but in another telegram to the secretary he asked that divers be sent immediately to recover the ship’s code book, as well as any evidence that might bear on the cause. He then ventured: “The Maine was probably destroyed by a mine. It may have been done by accident. I surmise that her berth was planted previous to her arrival; perhaps long ago. I can only surmise this.”

Six days later a U.S. Navy court of inquiry went into session aboard the U.S. lighthouse tender Mangrove in Havana harbor. From the record there does not appear to have been any preconceived ideas as to the cause of the explosion. The court’s investigators looked at what they believed was every conceivable possible cause. Evidence was taken from survivors and witnesses, and observations by Navy and contract divers. The court concluded that the explosion had been forward of her bridge and a little to the port side, an area that included coal bunkers and full powder magazines.

Because the Maine was a coal-burning ship, the court sought evidence of undetected fire in one or more of the coal bunkers. Testimony stated that most of the bunkers near the site of the explosion, as well as those that still contained coal, had been checked within 24 hours of the explosion. Most of the bunkers near the site of the explosion had been empty. Bunker A-16 on the port side had been full, filled in November 1897 at Norfolk, Va., with 40 tons of coal and untouched since.

In front of A-16 were two empty bunkers. A-16, the crew testified, was not normally readily accessible; also, it was usually the first to be filled and the last to be emptied. Access to A-16 was through the other two or by an emergency hatch. The two empty ones had been painted the day before and their doors were then kept shut. Coal had been taken from the starboard-side bunkers. The court carefully questioned the engineering personnel about inspection of the bunkers, especially A-16. Inspections had been carried out on schedule and nothing untoward detected. The last inspection had been at 7:45 on the night of the explosion.

The court turned to the boilers. It was discovered that only two were in use—the two aft ones, and these with but 100 pounds of pressure rather than the at-sea loading of 120. No evidence of cause was found here. What about paint? Testimony revealed that all paint was in the aft section of the ship, where no explosion had occurred. Even medical supplies of an inflammable type had been stored aft.

The magazines where Maine’s full store of powder and projectiles were stored came under scrutiny. Again, no evidence of cause was found. Sigsbee had been strict about crewmen wearing slippers on entering the magazines and access was rigidly controlled. Temperature checks were diligently carried out and all systems were in working order. Further, divers discovered that the entire contents of the forward magazines had not exploded nor had the projectiles detonated.

At this point the court turned its focus to possible outward causes. Evidence emerged that seemed to indicate that possibly here lay the cause. A diving team testified that part of the keel was at one point found to be within 18 inches of the surface and bent upward in the form of an inverted V. One of the team contended that he believed some of the plates on the port side had been bent inward, though some were bent outward. But the divers confessed they could see but 12 to 18 inches at any one time—their electric lamps proving no better in the murky harbor waters.

Two pieces of evidence that hinted at sabotage were presented but were given little credibility by the court. The first was testimony of an anonymous Spanish-speaking civilian who contended he had heard three Spanish military men talking with a civilian about blowing up the Maine. The second was an anonymous letter received by the American consul after the fact that told of a plot by several Cubans to blow up the ship for monetary reward. But it was later found that these were fictitious and without credibility. Further, the court found no evidence of neglect or culpability by the ship’s officers and crew.

The court took testimony for 18 days, deliberated for four more, then, on the 23rd day—Monday, March 2l, at 10 am—announced its verdict: The Maine had been destroyed by a mine, the detonation of which caused a partial explosion of two or more forward magazines—a conclusion reached in part by testimony of several witnesses who claimed they heard two distinct and separate explosions.

But meeting concurrently with the American court was a Spanish one, and its findings disagreed with those of the American court—they contended the cause was internal. They, too, had evidence from divers. One Spanish diver stated the starboard forward side of the vessel was bulged outward and that the bilge and keel “throughout its entire length extant, were buried in the mud, but did not appear to have suffered any damage.” Another testified that “the entire vessel forward appears open, having undoubtedly burst toward the outside.”

Other witnesses pointed out the lack of any waterspout one could have assumed to have been present if a mine had detonated. Also, there was a sharp crack to the explosion rather than a muffled report of an underwater type. And, there was no evidence of dead or stunned fish from an underwater explosion. The Spanish divers also reported the lack of any electrical wires that could have been used to send an impulse to a submerged mine.

But what today seems to be equally important is that two factors were not discussed by either court. First was lack of reason for a mine to have been present at that buoy. This anchoring station was within the confines of an enclosed harbor, with shipping always close about, not a logical place to set a mine for defensive purposes. A more logical site would have been outside or at the entrance to the harbor. Indeed, it later emerged that the Spaniards had not mined the other major port—Santiago—until after war had been declared by the United States. The second factor was the lack of any discussion of gas.

While the Spanish court’s findings seemed to factually challenge those of the United States, they were peremptorily rejected by the American public. The Hearst press screamed for war, and war it would be—what became known as that “splendid little war.” The loss of the Maine did not cause the Spanish-American war but it was certainly a catalyst and it provided a catchy battle cry—“Remember the Maine” much as did “Remember Pearl Harbor” 43 years later.

In any event, the war ended and 12 years passed. The United States became the owner of large overseas colonies and an international power. In its exuberant youthful strength it forgot much of its antagonism toward Spain that the memory of the Maine had once engendered. But then a growing number of requests and petitions began to reach official Washington to have the Maine raised and the bodies of lost men recovered. Further, it was found that her tangled remains had become a hindrance to shipping. Then there was always the lingering question as to whether raising the ship would reveal any new evidence to confirm or refute the mine theory.

So in 1910 Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to raise the Maine. A large cofferdam was erected about the remains and pumps went to work. With the emergence of the battered, slime-covered hulk in November 1911, the Navy convened a second court. But the findings of this one were about the same as those of the original: The Maine had been destroyed by an exterior explosion. A minor difference was that the second court believed the site of the explosion was more aft, and this had been of a low order but had detonated the 6-inch reserve ammunition. That seemed to settle the matter for all time, though the source of the initial explosion was never found nor determined with certainty.

The question of intent also remained. If the explosion was accidental, a latent mine was possible. So, too, was an internal accidental cause. But the courts found no evidence of such. If the explosion was deliberate, was it sabotage, and if so, by whom? An explosion of that magnitude would certainly have required prior planning and its execution certainly more than one individual. The Maine’s watch had never spotted any person swimming toward the ship pushing a bundle ahead, nor had a small boat approached her in the manner of the recent attack on the USS Cole.

A submersible vessel of the type of the CSS Hunley was within the realm of possibility, but the existence of such a craft would surely have been known to the U.S. authorities and thus would have led to precluding the Maine’s visit to Havana harbor. As for a member or members of the crew being guilty, there was never the slightest evidence of dissatisfaction or disloyalty. It also seems a bit odd that over the years, even up to the present time, if there had been persons responsible, either as individuals or acting on the part of a foreign government, that this would not have emerged.

Significantly missing from review by both courts was the subject of gas. According to experts in the U.S. Department of Interior’s Bureau of Mines, in 1898 knowledge of coal gases was very scant. Today it is known that coal gives off the very deadly and highly inflammable methane gas, an odorless and tasteless gas which, when present in the air in a ratio of but 5 to 14 percent, is extremely dangerous. But in 1898 this was not common knowledge.

At that time, ships often lay at anchor with the below-decks temperature running over 100 degrees, with crude electrical systems by modern safety standards, no forced air ventilation, and no devices present to detect the presence of dangerous gas. Moreover, the Maine’s crude (again, by modern standards) electrical power-generating system was located adjacent to Bunker A-16. Such were the conditions aboard the Maine—a spark, fire, and explosive condition if ever there was one.

Oddly, while the American courts failed to address any gas theory, the Spanish one did. In its summation, that court noted the proximity of ammunition storage to the coal bunkers, a fact it said should have required “ventilation sufficient to prevent the accumulation of gases and the development of caloric….” The Spanish court leaned heavily toward spontaneous combustion of coal as the base cause, which then ignited the ammunition. The Spaniards apparently had come close. With the benefit of hindsight and modern technology, today it seems most likely that methane gas was the culprit for the loss of the Maine.

In reviewing all the factors available today it seems quite certain the explosion was internal and accidental. There was no evidence of disloyal action by any U.S. crewman. Evidence of sabotage would certainly have surfaced by now, the more so with the several changes in governments of the countries involved. There was no valid reason for a mine to have been placed in such a harbor location. But all the conditions for a methane explosion were present in quantity. There was the full-for-some-time and untouched Bunker A-16. It was located in close proximity to an active electrical-generating plant where sparks can be a way of life, particularly in that era of crude electrical technology. In the language of a popular cliché, it was an accident waiting to happen.

This writer became interested in the fate of the Maine in the late 1960s and had begun research in the National Archives. With the benefit of limited technical training, I began to seriously question the external theory. Taking the evidence I had accumulated, I visited the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Mines. Discussions with several of their senior engineers brought forth the belief on their part that methane gas had been the probable culprit. I wrote a rather lengthy article on this and sent it in 1971 to the U.S. Naval Institute for possible publication in their Proceedings magazine. A greatly reduced version of the article was subsequently published in their February 1972 issue.

That article was followed in 1976 by Admiral Hyman Rickover’s book on the explosion of the Maine. His consultants leaned toward the spontaneous combustion of gas theory. They concluded that external cause did not seem to fit the evidence. But there are still those who question the spontaneous explosion theory, contending that such combustion would have been detected. The more one reads, the more methane gas seems to appear as the guilty culprit.

It was with fitting ceremony, on March 16, 1912, that the remains of the USS Maine, with the Stars and Stripes, were towed out to sea and allowed to settle to the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico. n

The author, being of Army service, has little knowledge of Navy ceremonial protocol, and is unaware of any surrounding the resting site of the Maine. But it would seem an appropriate gesture, if one does not already exist, for every U.S. war vessel passing close by to have a ship’s party on deck and the colors dipped in salute of the Maine’s fallen men.

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Sinking of the Maine: Topics in Chronicling America

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Breaking residential windows and shaking the city of Havana to its core, a mysterious explosion sinks the USS Maine to the bottom of the Havana Harbor on the evening of February 15, 1898. The American "yellow press" blame Spain in banner headlines, outraging the public and inciting the rallying cry, "Remember the Maine! To hell with Spain!" Over 260 crew members perish in this event, which was a contributing factor in the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. Read more about it!

The information in this guide focuses on primary source materials found in the digitized historic newspapers from the digital collection Chronicling America .

The timeline below highlights important dates related to this topic and a section of this guide provides some suggested search strategies for further research in the collection.

• ~[123]~: Dec 28, 2023 10:35 AM
• ~[124]~: https://guides.loc.gov/chronicling-america-sinking-maine

A Special Report: What Really Sank the Maine?

After a period of uneasy peace, Cuban rebels in 1895 renewed their struggle against the Spanish rulers of the island. To quell this latest insurrection, Spain sent General Valeriano Weyler, who forced thousands of Cubans into concentration camps. Joseph Pulitzer's New York World and William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal thundered with demands for U.S. intervention to aid the Cuban guerrillas. The sensationalist newspapers dubbed Weyler "the Butcher" and published stories—some true, some not—about his atrocities against Cubans. Spain, reacting to U.S. loathing of Weyler, removed him, temporarily easing tension between the two nations. But in January 1898, anti-American rioting broke out, and U.S. Consul Fitzhugh Lee (nephew of Confederate General Robert E. Lee and himself a Major General in the Confederate Army) urged official Washington to protect the lives of U.S. citizens on the volatile island. President William McKinley ordered the Maine to Cuba. On 25 January 1898, the battleship steamed into Havana Harbor. McKinley, trying to still the war drums, wanted the Maine to show the flag, prove that U.S. warships had the right to enter Havana, and then get out. On 15 February the Maine was to head for New Orleans in time for Mardi Gras. By then, McKinley hoped, anti-Spain fervor should have died down. But at 2140 on the night of 15 February, a massive explosion tore through the ship, killing 250 men and two officers. (Mortal injuries raised the final toll to 266.) A Court of Inquiry questioned survivors—including commanding officer Captain Charles D. Sigsbee—and interpreted the reports of divers. The theory that a mine had destroyed the ship stemmed primarily from eyewitness testimony. The report of diver W. H. F. Schluter was particularly significant. He said he could see green paint on a bottom plate that was "all torn ragged and it looked to be inward." Bottom plates on the outside were painted with antifouling green paint. So this produced the image of a plate being blasted from the outside and turned inward. "You are sure they were not bent out?" the court asked Schluter. "Yes, sir; I am sure," he replied. "And the green paint you saw was on the part bent inward?" "The green paint was on the part bent inboard. . . . My opinion is, I believe that she was blown up from the outside and in, because there was no explosion from the inside [that] could make a hole like that, from the way them plates stood around in different directions." The Court concluded that the extensive damage "could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine." But it was "unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility . . . upon any person or persons." After the court's finding was revealed in March, McKinley no longer could ignore the call for war. "Remember the Maine and the hell with Spain" became a rallying cry. But was it a mine? The question lingered until 1911, after the U.S. Corps of Engineers, in an unprecedented feat, built a cofferdam around the ship, pumped out the water, and exposed the wreckage. A Board of Inquiry based much of its analysis on photographs of physical evidence that the previous investigation had sensed but not seen: bottom plates that were bent inward, presumably by an external force, such as a mine. The board focused on a section of outside plating that "was displaced inward and aft and crumpled in numerous folds." Although the 1911 report placed the location of the explosion farther aft, the 1911 inquiry's conclusion agreed with that of 1898: "The board believes that the condition of the wreckage . . . can be accounted for by the action of gases of low explosives such as the black and brown powders with which the forward magazine were stored. The protective deck and hull of the ship formed a closed chamber in which the gases were generated and partially expanded before rupture." The question disappeared. Historians writing after 1911 took for granted that someone—Spanish sympathizers, perhaps, or disgruntled guerrillas hoping to goad the United States into war—had set a mine that blew up the Maine. After reading a newspaper story in 1974 about the sinking of the Maine, Admiral Hyman G. Rickover decided to reexamine the issue. He recruited historians, archivists, and two Navy experts on ship design: Robert S. Price, a research physicist at the Naval Surface Weapons Center at White Oak, Maryland, and Ib S. Hansen, assistant for design applications in the Structures Department at the David W. Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center at Cabin John, Maryland. Among Price's Navy projects had been an analysis of the wreckage of the nuclear-propelled submarine Scorpion (SSN-589), which was lost in May 1968. The Hansen-Price analysis, as Rickover called it, was the heart of a short book published in 1976. The 23-page analysis reached this conclusion: "We found no technical evidence . . . that an external explosion initiated the destruction of the Maine. The available evidence is consistent with an internal explosion alone. We therefore conclude that an internal source was the cause of the explosion. The most likely source was heat from a fire in a coal bunker adjacent to the 6-inch reserve magazine. However, since there is no way of proving this, other internal causes cannot be eliminated as possibilities." Again, historians rallied around the Rickover solution, and after 1976 most discussions of the Spanish-American War concluded that there was no mine. As the 100th anniversary of the sinking of the Maine approached, David W. Wooddell, senior researcher on the editorial planning council of National Geographic magazine, suggested that the magazine commission an analysis of the disaster based on computer modeling not available to Rickover and his team. Advanced Marine Enterprises (AME), a marine engineering firm often used by the U.S. Navy, accepted the mission. The AME analysis, which was announced in the February 1998 issue of National Geographic, examined both the mine and the coal bunker theories. The report declared that "it appears more probable, than was previously concluded, that a mine caused the inward bent bottom structure and detonation of the magazines." Some experts, including Rickover's researcher Hansen and respected analysts in AME itself, do not accept the conclusions of the AME report. Following are excerpts, published in cooperation with National Geographic, to give readers a chance to judge for themselves.

1. Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover: Controversy and Genius (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

2. H. G. Rickover, How the Battleship Maine Was Destroyed (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976). A revised edition was published in 1995 by the Naval Institute Press, with a new foreword by Francis Duncan, Dana M. Wegner, Ib S. Hansen, and Robert S. Price. A new appendix gives details of World War II ship damage not available in 1976. The authors use this data to bolster their findings that a mine did not destroy the Maine.

3. Handbook 1081, Primer On Spontaneous Heating And Pyrophoricity (U.S. Department Of Energy (DOE).

4. Environment Safety and Health Bulletin EH-93 -4, The Fire Below: Spontaneous Combustion in Coal; U.S. Department Of Energy.

5. Handbook 1081 (U.S. DOE).

6. William H. Garzke Jr., David K. Brown, Arthur D. Sandiford, John Woodward, and Peter K. Hsu, "The Titanic And Lusitania: Final Forensic Analysis," Marine Technology, October 1996.

7. Fire Protection Handbook, 16th edition (National Fire Protection Association [NFPA]).

9. Handbook 1081 (U.S. DOE).

10. Fire Protection Handbook (NFPA).

11. The Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry Upon the Destruction of the United States Battleship Maine in Havana Harbor February 15, 1898, Together With Testimony Taken Before the Court (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898-Library of Congress).

12. The Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, 1898.

13. Report on the Wreck of the Maine, 14 December 1911.

14. All figures in table from Cooper and Kurowski, Introduction to the Technology of Explosives (VCH Publishers, 1996) or Explosives and Demolitions (Department of the Army, FM 5-25, Feb. 1971).

15. T. L. Davis, The Chemistry of Powder and Explosives (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1941).

16. Cooper and Kurowski, Introduction to the Technology of Explosives.

17. Sax and Lewis, Hazardous Chemicals Desk Reference (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1987).

18. N. Cary, Head, Curator Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

19. S. Hering, M. Mat. Sci., B. Met. E., Advanced Marine Enterprises, Arlington, Virginia.

20. D. A. Fisher, The Epic of Steel (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) Chapter 18.

21. D. Wegner, Curator of Models, Carderock Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Bethesda, Maryland.

22. H. Keith, Ph.D., Forensic Metallurgist, Marathon, Florida; T. Foecke, Materials Scientist, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland.

23. The Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry; Rickover.

24. Robert H. Cole, Underwater Explosions, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948).

25. Rickover analysis.

Thomas B. Allen

Mr. Allen is a prolific writer and military historian and is the author of "Remember the Maine?" which appears in the February 1998 issue of National Geographic magazine. Mr. Allen and the U.S. Naval Institute gratefully acknowledge National Geographic—particularly the magazine's Senior Researcher, David W. Wooddell—for allowing Mr. Allen to adapt its Maine report for publication in Naval History.

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Yellow journalism and the explosion of the uss maine, lesson plan, grade levels, course, subject.

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Evaluate the interpretation of historical events and sources , considering the use of fact versus opinion , multiple perspectives, and cause and effect relationships.

Evaluate how conflict and cooperation among groups and organizations in the U.S. have influenced the growth and development of the world.

• Ethnicity and race
• Working conditions
• Immigration
• Military conflict
• Economic stability

Evaluate the role groups and individuals played in the social, political , cultural, and economic development throughout world history.

• Big Ideas Historical context is needed to comprehend time and space. Historical interpretation involves an analysis of cause and result. Perspective helps to define the attributes of historical comprehension. The history of the United States continues to influence its citizens, and has impacted the rest of the world. World history continues to influence Pennsylvanians, citizens of the United States, and individuals throughout the world today.
• Concepts Biography explores the life of an individual. Biography is a historical construct used to reveal positive and/or negative influences an individual can have on civilization. Biography is a historical construct used to reveal positive and/or negative influences an individual can have on world history. Comprehension of the experiences of individuals, society, and how past human experience has adapted builds aptitude to apply to civic participation. Conflict and cooperation among social groups, organizations, and nation-states are critical to comprehending society in the United States. Domestic instability, ethnic and racial relations, labor relation, immigration, and wars and revolutions are examples of social disagreement and collaboration. Conflict and cooperation among social groups, organizations, and nation-states are critical to comprehending the American society. Historical causation involves motives, reasons, and consequences that result in events and actions. Historical causation involves motives, reasons, and consequences that result in events and actions. Some consequences may be impacted by forces of the irrational or the accidental. Historical comprehension involves evidence-based discussion and explanation, an analysis of sources including multiple points of view, and an ability to read critically to recognize fact from conjecture and evidence from assertion. Historical literacy requires a focus on time and space, and an understanding of the historical context of events and actions. Historical literacy requires a focus on time and space, and an understanding of the historical context, as well as an awareness of point of view. Historical skills (organizing information chronologically, explaining historical issues, locating sources and investigate materials, synthesizing and evaluating evidence, and developing arguments and interpretations based on evidence) are used by an analytical thinker to create a historical construction. Human organizations work to socialize members and, even though there is a constancy of purpose, changes occur over time. Learning about the past and its different contexts shaped by social, cultural, and political influences prepares one for participation as active, critical citizens in a democratic society. Social entities clash over disagreement and assist each other when advantageous. World history can offer an individual discerning judgment in public and personal life, supply examples for living, and thinking about one’s self in the dimensions of time and space. World history can offer an individual judicious understanding about one’s self in the dimensions of time and space.
• Competencies Articulate the context of a historical event or action. Construct a biography of a non-American and generate conclusions regarding his/her qualities and limitations. Contrast how a historically important issue in the United States was resolved and compare what techniques and decisions may be applied today. Contrast multiple perspectives of individuals and groups in interpreting other times, cultures, and place. Evaluate cause-and-result relationships bearing in mind multiple causations. Summarize how conflict and compromise in United States history impact contemporary society. Synthesize a rationale for the study of a non-American individual in world history.

Common Core Standards

Use technology, including the Internet, to produce, publish, and update individual or shared writing products in response to ongoing feedback, including new arguments or information.

Yellow Journalism

William Randolph Hearst

Joseph Pulitzer

Spanish-American War

In studying the Spanish-American War, students will be able to:

List and analyze the events that led to US involvement in Cuba during the Spanish-American War.

Evaluate the cause behind the explosion of the USS Maine.

Define yellow journalism and illustrate its connnection to United States involvement in the Spanish-American War.

Identify William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer and their connections to the Spanish-American War and the USS Maine explosion.

Construct a piece of yellow journalism based on the cause of the USS Maine's explosion.

Lesson Essential Question(s)

What role do multiple causations play in describing a historical event?

Student-Centered Essential Question: How does media influence the value and importance of news?

Four 45 minute periods

2 sensationalist newspapers such as the National Enquirer

Articles from the "National Briefs" and "World Briefs" sections of local newspapers such as the Pittsburgh Post Gazette or Tribune Review (at least one article per student)

Yellow Journalism PowerPoint Yellow Journalism.pptx

Spanish-American War PowerPoint The Spanish-American War.pptx

Yellow Journalism Activity Worksheet - copy for each partner group of two Yellow Journalism Activity.docx

USS Maine Activity Worksheet - copy for each student USS Maine activity.docx

Essay Quiz - copy for each student Essay Quiz.docx

Computers for each student  

Suggested Instructional Strategies

Instructional Procedures

Begin class with the yellow journalism PowerPoint and the journal prompt on slide one.  Have the journal prompt on the board when students enter the room and instruct them to begin answering the questions in their journal.  Give students several minutes to answer the questions in their journal; the instructor should float around the room to check for completion and prompt students to remain on task. After several minutes, have students share their responses with a neighbor; responses will then be shared with the class through a discussion. 

After the discussion, the instructor will proceed through the PowerPoint presentation that defines yellow journalism.  Students will learn the strategies of yellow journalism through direct instruction and then watch a short video clip that addresses the origins of yellow journalism, connecting it to the Spanish-American War.  After the video, students will be asked to identify present-day examples of yellow journalism.  The instructor will write student responses on the board. 

The instructor will present students with a current issue of the National Enquirer newspaper.  The teacher will display an article from the newspaper and identify the techniques utilized in the article that make it an example of yellow journalism.  Students will then be divided into groups of two.  Each partner group will receive one copy of the Yellow Journalism Activity worksheet and will have the opportunity to choose one article from the National Enquirer .  The instructor will move to the next slide that provides the directions for Activity One.  The partner groups will work through the worksheet, identifying the yellow journalism techniques in their article.

Students will use the remaining time in class to finish the worksheet with their partner.

To begin class, any groups that were unable to finish the Yellow Journalism Activity worksheet will receive five minutes to complete it.  Those groups that have finished will meet with a different group and share the articles each selected and why they are considered yellow journalism.

After those five minutes, the instructor will choose two groups to share their articles with the class.  Groups will summarize the contents of their article and then why it is considered a piece of yellow journalism.

The instructor will move on to the last slide in the yellow journalism PowerPoint entitled Activity Two.  The instructor will use a National Brief article from a local newspaper to provide students with an example.  The instructor will read the article to the class and then ask students to brainstorm headlines for the article as well as picture ideas.  Students will select a headline for the article and the instructor will write the headline on the board.  Students will then be asked to brainstorm a way to take the 'brief' containing simple facts and turn it into a sensationalist piece of yellow journalism.  The instructor will write the ideas on the board and then verbally construct the new piece of news (if the instructor desires, this can be done before class and handed to students as an example; students can then go over this example with the class.)

Students will then have the opportunity to create their own piece of news.  Provide students with both national and world briefs from the paper.  Students will have the opportunity to choose one article.  Using the directions listed on the Activity Two slide, students will turn their brief into a piece of yellow journalism.  Students will use a computer to complete the activity.  The new article must contain a headline, picture and sensational text to draw in the reader.  Although students may not contradict the facts of the brief, they may expand on its content to fulfill the criteria of a yellow journalism piece.  The article should fill an 8.5x11 sheet of paper--students may adjust the font size to 16 point font. 

Students will have the remainder of the period to complete the activity.  Students must turn in their original brief with their new interpretation.

Begin class by asking a few students to share their news brief/yellow journalism activity.  Have students summarize the brief and then explain what they did to turn it into a piece of yellow journalism.  Then collect each students news brief/yellow journalism piece.  Ask students if they had any difficulties with the activity. Address those concerns and issues with the class.

The instructor will then cover the events that led to the US involvement in Cuba and the beginning of the Spanish-American War by utilizing the the Spanish-American War PowerPoint and direct instruction.  The instructor will incorporate discussion into the PowerPoint by utilizing the questions in the slideshow.

After the PowerPoint, each student will receive the USS Maine Activity worksheet .  The instructor will inform students that they will now create their own piece of yellow journalism as they attempt to determine the cause behind the explosion of the USS Maine.  The instructor will read through the directions with the class and then the grading scale for the assignment; any questions concerning the assignment will be addressed at this point during the lesson.

Students will have the remaining time in class to begin working on the assignment.  The assignment will be due the following day at the beginning of class.

Students will turn in their USS Maine article at the beginning of class.  After the articles have been collected, students will discuss what they believe to be the cause behind the USS Maine explosion.  The instructor will facilitate the discussion to ensure that all students provide a response and a rationale for their response.

After ten minutes, each student will receive a copy of the essay quiz as well as lined paper.  The instructor will read through the directions of the quiz and answer any questions.  Students will have the rest of the period to finish the essay quiz and turn their responses into the instructor.

Formative Assessment

Provide feedback to ensure student understanding through the group discussions and the relatve activities on yellow journalism.

Collect actvities for individual assessment.

Collect essay quiz for individual assessment.

Related Materials & Resources

USS Maine  - This website provides information on the events leading up to the USS Maine explosion as well as the impact of the explosion. http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq71-1.htm

Crucible of Empire: The Spanish American War - This website addresses the Spanish-American War and the role of yellow journalism. https://www.pbs.org/crucible/

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Alternative versions of assessment, opposition to the philippine-american war, the kkk in the 1870s, clay's american system, the rockefeller foundation, the role of women, mexican immigration in the 1920s, haitian revolution, united farm workers, women's liberation, explosion of the uss maine.

To successfully complete this assessment, students must examine the source information and consider the context in which these documents were created. To answer Question 1, students must conclude that a Navy inquiry into the explosion of the Maine provides evidence that there was confusion over the explosion of the USS  Maine . For Question 2, students should explain how a front-page article covering the investigation is also evidence of confusion about the  Maine . 

Level: Proficient

Student addresses a relevant aspect of the documents and explains how each provides evidence of confusion over why the Maine exploded.

Level: Emergent

Student addresses a relevant aspect of the documents but does not offer a complete explanation of how each document provides evidence of confusion over why the Maine exploded.

Level: Basic

Student does not explain how each document provides evidence of confusion over why the Maine exploded.

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In my high school history classes, the fate of the USS Maine is usually described as a boiler-room accident or a deliberate "false-flag attack" to provoke war with Spain. What is the current academic consensus on the disaster?

New Interpretations of How the USS Maine Was Lost

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• Dana Wegner  

Part of the book series: The Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute Series on Diplomatic and Economic History ((WOOROO))

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T he U.S. battleship Maine exploded in H avana H arbor at 9:40 p . m . on February 15, 1898. Within six days of the explosion a U.S. naval court of inquiry was convened to establish the cause of the explosion. One month later the court found that the ship, in all probability, was destroyed by an underwater mine that ignited parts of the forward magazines. The act had been done by unknown persons. Relations between the United States and Spain were tense during a period of Cuban colonial rebellion and Spanish repression. On April 25, 1898, the United States declared war on Spain and “Remember the Maine ” became a familiar call to arms. Between 1910 and 1912 the wreck of the Maine was raised from Havana Harbor and the Navy briefly reexamined the case, essentially rubber-stamping the 1898 findings.

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Allen, Thomas B. “Remember the Maine?” National Geographic 193, no. 2 (Feb 1998): 92–111.

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Blow, Michael. A Ship to Remember (New York: William Morrow, 1992).

Crawford, Michael J., Mark L. Hayes, and Michael D. Sessions. The Spanish-American War: Historical Overview and Selected Bibliography (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1998).

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Remesal, Augustin. El Enigma del Maine (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes Editores, 1998).

Rickover, H. G. How the Battleship Maine Was Destroyed (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995). Includes new information not found in the original 1976 edition published by the Naval Historical Center. Also, Como Fue Hundido ElAlcorazado Maine (Madrid: Editorial Naval, 1985). Spanish-language translation of the 1976 edition.

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Allen, Thomas B. Review of Remembering the Maine, by Peggy and Harold Samuels. Naval Engineers Journal 107, no. 5 (Nov 1995): 98–102.

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Wegner, D. (2001). New Interpretations of How the USS Maine Was Lost. In: Marolda, E.J. (eds) Theodore Roosevelt, the U.S. Navy, and the Spanish-American War. The Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute Series on Diplomatic and Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-05501-9_2

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Historical Research and Study: The USS Maine

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Test: U.S. History Historical Research and Study: The USS Maine Quiz

10 multiple choice questions.

Term The photo shows a newspaper report from 1898 on the sinking of the USS Maine. How could a new point of view help historians understand this report? Choose matching definition It could help them record new evidence related to the event. It could help them develop a better understanding of past ideas. It could help them preserve older evidence in a new way. It could help them disprove all the eyewitness accounts. Don't know? 1 of 10

Term Historians base interpretations of past events on Choose matching definition evidence they collect. interviews with citizens. opinions they have heard. historical novels. Don't know? 2 of 10

Term Soon after the USS Maine sank, yellow journalists Choose matching definition completed a great deal of research. were the ones who found the truth. exaggerated the truth about the event. questioned witnesses and survivors. Don't know? 3 of 10

Term If a question addresses a specific goal, that means the question is Choose matching definition focused. factual. relevant. feasible. Don't know? 4 of 10

Term The first investigators determined the USS Maine sank because of Choose matching definition a bomb onboard the ship. spies on the ship. a mechanical error. an outside mine. Don't know? 5 of 10

Term Pilar is doing research on the USS Maine for a paper. What would be the best choice as a source for information? Choose matching definition a history textbook with a chapter on life in the late 1800s a historical novel about the sinking of the USS Maine a design book with a chapter devoted to shipbuilding a nonfiction book written by an expert on the USS Maine Don't know? 6 of 10

Term Which kind of source is most likely to be correct? Choose matching definition an unusual source an ancient source a reliable source a relevant source Don't know? 7 of 10

Term Eyewitnesses often have different accounts of events, so historians must Choose matching definition believe every account they read to be true. determine only one account to be the truth. evaluate each account to discover the truth. not consider any of the accounts to be true. Don't know? 8 of 10

Term Which can help historians decide if a source is reliable? Choose matching definition determining how many people agree with the source determining the amount of information within a book determining the author's point of view on the subject determining how many people know about the source Don't know? 9 of 10

Term Which statement best describes a relevant question? Choose matching definition A relevant question relates to the topic at hand. A relevant question is interesting, unusual, or unique. A relevant question can be studied and investigated. A relevant question is connected to a particular goal. Don't know? 10 of 10

Ince 1877 A-CR Historical Research and Study: The USS Maine Assignment Active Yellow Journalism Which are characteristics of yellow journalism? Check all that apply. sensational language well-supported, fact-based arguments O exaggeration eye-catching headlines telling both sides of a story

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Final answer:

Yellow journalism is characterized by sensational language, exaggeration, eye-catching headlines, and a lack of well-supported, fact-based arguments.

Explanation:

Yellow journalism is a type of journalism that is characterized by sensational language, exaggerated claims, eye-catching headlines, and a tendency to prioritize entertainment over accurately reporting the news. It often uses emotional appeals to readers rather than well-supported, fact-based arguments, and may not present both sides of a story.

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