flint water crisis essay

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Flint Water Crisis: What Happened and Why?

Susan j. masten.

Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Michigan State University, 428 Shaw Ln., East Lansing, MI 48824 USA

Simon H. Davies

Research engineer in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Michigan State University

Shawn P. Mcelmurry

Associate professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich

THE FLINT RIVER IS A VARIABLE WATER SOURCE AND THUS A CHALLENGE TO TREAT; OVERSIGHTS AND MISSTEPS COMBINED WITH INHERENT CHEMICAL CONDITIONS SET THE STAGE FOR THE HISTORIC WATER CRISIS IN FLINT, MICH.

There has been much in the news about the water crisis that began in 2014 in Flint, Mich., and the length of time it took for government officials to react. The elevated levels of lead found in the drinking water of residences in Flint have had a profound effect on the level of trust within the community and the state, the economy of the region, and the health and well-being of the residents of Flint and the surrounding communities. As Eric P. Rothstein so aptly stated, “Flint matters because the water utility industry can do better. The crisis, tragic in so many respects, also presents an opportunity for lasting benefit-benefit from recognizing that we are Flint” ( Rothstein 2016 ). We have investigated the chemistry and engineering behind what happened to Flint’s water, why it was corrosive, and the extent to which the system appears to be recovering. This analysis is based on an extensive review of the monthly operating reports (MORs) and other reported documents from the water treatment facilities, and from personal communications with plant operators and managers.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The first water distribution system in Flint was privately owned and incorporated as the Flint Water Works Company in 1883 ( Dunbar & May 1995 ). On July 8, 1897, the City of Flint passed an ordinance requiring lead pipes: “all connections with any water mains shall be made with lead pipe” ( Anon. 1897 ).

The City of Flint purchased the Flint Water Company in 1912. By 1930, Flint River water was being treated using alum coagulation before sand filtration, with the plant rated at 28 mgd ( Hardin 1932 ). Construction on a new treatment plant for the City of Flint began in 1952 and was completed in 1954. At that point, treatment of the Flint River included prechlorination, coagulation with alum, lime-soda ash softening, recarbonation, filtration, the addition of polyphosphate for corrosion control, and postchlorination. Taste-and-odor-causing compounds were removed using activated carbon, along with the addition of ammonia and sodium chlorite. The plant was rated at a capacity of 59 mgd, with a maximum overload capacity of 86 mgd. The 50th percentile pH, color, and turbidity of the finished (tap) water were 10.3, 2, and 0.1 ppm (silica scale; approximately equivalent to 0.02 Jtu), respectively. The total and noncarbonate hardness were 86 and 49 mg/Las CaC0 3 (calcium carbonate), respectively ( Wiitala 1963 ).

In 1967, Flint began purchasing wholesale treated water from the Detroit Water and Sewage Department (DWSD). While the water quality of the Flint River was poor as a result of unregulated discharges by industries and municipalities ( Leonardi & Gruhn 2001 ), the principal reason for the switch was to ensure a sufficient quantity of water for the growing population ( Carmody 2016 ). After 1967, the Flint Water Service Center (FWSC) was maintained as a backup water treatment facility, treating Flint River water two to four times a year for periods of only a few days. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit allows the treated water to be discharged back into the Flint River. In 2012, the Board of Water Commissioners for the City of Detroit approved a resolution that would allow the DWSD director to enter into contractual arrangement to allow blending of treated Flint River water with that purchased from DWSD as a cost-saving measure ( City of Detroit 2012 ). While DWSD and the City of Flint never entered into a contractual agreement, it is unclear whether blending of these two different waters actually occurred.

With the goal of reducing the costs for treated water ( Felton 2016 ), Flint officials decided in 2013 to join the newly formed Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA), which was constructing its own pipeline to transmit raw water from Lake Huron. In the interim, the City of Flint had the option to continue to purchase treated water from DWSD (whose source was Lake Huron) or treat Flint River water at its own facility. After failing to come to an agreement on a short-term contract with DWSD, Flint decided to use water from the Flint River and treat it at the FWSC.

Many warnings and concerns were voiced regarding the use of the Flint River as a community water source. For example, Brian Larkin, then associate director of the (Michigan) Governor’s Office of Urban and Metropolitan Initiatives, foretold the crisis in a Mar. 14, 2014, e-mail message to several others in the governor’s office: “The expedited time-frame is less than ideal and could lead to some big potential disasters down the road.” Mike Glasgow, laboratory and water quality supervisor at the plant, warned in an Apr. 25, 2014, e-mail to the State of Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), “I do not anticipate giving the OK to begin sending water out anytime soon. If water is distributed from this plant in the next couple weeks, it will be against my direction.” Despite concerns, the FWSC switched from purchasing and distributing water from DWSD to treating water at its facility in Flint. In doing this, the source water changed from Lake Huron to the Flint River.

Within a few weeks of the switch, residents started complaining about the color, taste, and odor of their drinking water. In May 2014, they informed officials that the water was causing rashes, especially in children (MDEQ e-mail records). During this time, red water and discoloration were observed throughout the distribution system ( Veolia North America 2015 , Felton 2014 ), and there was an unusually large number of water main breaks ( Fonger 2015 ). General Motors Corporation complained about the corrosiveness of the water on its engine parts and in October 2014 switched to using water from Flint Township instead of from Flint.

Starting in summer 2014, a number of violations occurred. Escherichia coli (E. coli) and total coliform violations resulted in the issuance of three boil-water alerts within a 22-day period during summer 2014 ( Emery 2016 ; Fonger 2014a , 2014b ). As shown in Table 1 , total trihalomethane (TTHM) concentrations at several sampling locations exceeded the 80 μg/L regulatory limit during May and August 2014 ( Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman 2015 ). As a result, the MDEQ requested a preemptive operational evaluation in September 2014 and notified Flint of an initial quarterly violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Disinfection/Disinfection Byproducts (D/DBP) Rule in December 2014 ( Flint Water Advisory Task Force 2016 ; Table 1 ).

Total trihalomethane (TTHM) concentrations in the Flint distribution system

In February 2015, the City of Flint sampled Flint resident Lee Ann Walters’ home and found lead in her water at a concentration of 104 μg/L (e-mail correspondence between US Environmental Protection Agency [USEPA] Region 5 and MDEQ dated Feb. 26, 2015; Flint Water Advisory Task Force 2016 ). By Aug. 31, 2015, Marc Edwards, a professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, had analyzed 120 samples from Flint homes. He found that 20% of the samples had lead levels that exceeded the 15 μg/L action level and that the 90th percentile was 30 μg/L ( Roy 2015a ). In September, a team led by a local pediatrician, Mona Hanna-Attisha, published data showing that blood lead levels (BLLs) in children increased significantly after the switch to the Flint River as a water source ( Hanna-Attisha et al. 2016 ; Kennedy et al. 2016 ). In the area of Flint that had the highest lead levels in the watei; the BLLs in children who were tested increased by a factor of about 2.5.

The city was required by the SDWA Lead and Copper Rule to conduct sampling for lead and copper in Tier 1 premise plumbing over six-month periods. Although not all of the homes sampled were Tier 1 sites ( City of Flint 2016 ), the first round of sampling revealed that the 90th percentile lead concentration was greater than that observed during the previous five rounds of testing ( Figure 1 ); by the end of the second six-month sampling period, the 90th percentile lead level was almost three times greater than that observed in the previous 15 years ( Figure 1 ).

Historical data for lead concentrations in the Flint distribution system

After much publicity regarding the lead problem, on Oct. 16, 2015, the source water for the City of Flint was switched back to treated Lake Huron water supplied by DWSD, with approximately 1 mg/L phosphorus to inhibit corrosion. Because the lead levels measured in the water remained high in some houses, on Dec. 9, 2015, the concentration of the phosphate corrosion inhibitor was increased by adding an additional ~2.5 mg/L phosphoric acid (P) at the FWSC.

Finally, in February 2016, information on the increase in the number of cases of Legionellosis that occurred in Flint in the summers of 2014 and 2015 was released. Ninety-one cases and 12 deaths have been confirmed in the Flint area, up from six to 13 cases a year before the switch to Flint River water ( Anderson 2016 ). The source of the outbreak has not been definitively determined or directly connected to the Flint water system, but as noted by Anderson (2016) , the illnesses began after Flint changed its water supply. Given the low residual disinfectant levels (chlorine in this case) and the presence of iron in the water in the distribution system ( Veolia North America 2015 , Felton 2014 ), along with high concentrations of assimiliable organic carbon that would have likely formed during the ozonation of the high total organic carbon (TOC) Flint River water, conditions could have been conducive to biological growth and the propagation of Legionella in the distribution network.

WATER TREATMENT AT THE FLINT WATER TREATMENT PLANT

During the period from April 2014 to October 2015, the turbidity of the raw Flint River water at the FWSC plant ranged from 1.5 to 45.2 ntu (according to the MORs). The chloride level in the raw water ranged from 3 8 to 82 mg/L, with the monthly average values ranging from 38 to 54 mg/L. The TOC of the Flint River was reported to be 10.3 mg/L on May 22, 2014 ( Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman 2014 ). The FWSC raw water intake is upstream of most development in Flint, but there is still some concern about industrial contaminants and sewage ( Fonger 2014c ).

Although numerous changes were made to the treatment process over the course of the 1.5 years of treatment, as of November 2014, when the draft Operational Evaluation Report (OER) was published, the treatment train was as shown in Figure 2 ( Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman 2014 ). Water was drawn from the Flint River through raw water screens, then pumped into the ozonation basin. Sodium bisulfate was added in the last cell of the ozone contactor to destroy any residual ozone left in the water. The water then flowed into a rapid mix tank, where ferric chloride was added. From there, the water entered a three-stage flocculation unit followed by plate settlers. From the settling unit, water flowed into an upflow clarifier, where lime and anionic and cationic polymers were added. Fluoride was added at the outlet of the clarifier. From there, water moved into the recarbonation unit, where carbon dioxide was added to lower the pH. Chlorine was added just before dual media (sand/anthracite) filtration and again before flowing into a 3-mil-gal clearwell ( Figure 2 ).

Schematic of the Flint Water Treatment Plant

Before the switch to Flint River water, Laboratory and Water Quality Supervisor Mike Glasgow sent MD EQ staff engineers an e-mail message on Apr. 17, 2014, stating, “I do not anticipate giving the OK to begin sending out water anytime soon.” While the message sounded the alarm that staffing and monitoring plans were inadequate, it has not been reported how poorly equipped the plant was. It is clear from the MOR that the plant was woefully unprepared for full-time operation on Apr. 25, 2014. The May 2014 MOR reveals that the plant had only four to five days of polymer available to “use as a trial on two different occasions.” Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) upgrades were incomplete and out for bid. Filter headloss meters were not operational on the SCADA system. Also, chlorine residual monitoring equipment at the point of entry into the distribution system had not been installed, so chlorine levels would have had to have been measured by taking grab samples from the clearwell as well as from a tap in the laboratory. It appears that, on the basis of the MORs, chlorination after filtration was not used until May 17, 2014. Fluoridation was not implemented until July 2, 2014. The water utility did not have a corrosion-control plan, and it had not installed corrosion control equipment when the water was switched back to DWSD on Oct. 16, 2015. On the basis of the comments in the MORs, the filter headloss meters were never made operational.

Figures 3 and ​ and4 4 illustrate the variability in the chemical dosages that were used during the treatment process. Bench-scale jar testing for trihalomethane (THM) removal was not completed until sometime between January and August 2015 ( City of Flint 2015 ). Without any treatability studies on which to determine chemical dosages until late August 2015 ( City of Flint 2015 ), it appears that plant personnel were left to attempt to address the plethora of complex water quality issues and complaints by trial and error. Significant changes were made to chemical dosages, and the reasons for these changes were often not apparent. For example, the dosage of the anionic polymer (P-142PWG) added to the lime softening process to enhance settling was initially 0.05 mg/L; the anionic polymer dosage was later increased significantly, with concentrations approaching or exceeding the maximum dosage of 1. 0 mg/L as recommended by NSF International (2016) . The OER issued in August 2015 ( Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman 2015 ) states that “feeding coagulation/flocculation polymer aids” do not have “a meaningful benefit.” However, while there was a slight decrease in polymer use in March 2015, both anionic and cationic polymers were used continuously until the plant was shut down in October 2015. The reasons for the increase in the lime dosage in November 2014 and then the decrease in February and March 2015 are unknown.

Variability in the monthly average ferric chloride (as Fe 3 +) and lime dosages used at the Flint water treatment plant for 1.5 years

Variability in the monthly average ozone and polymer dosages used at the Flint water treatment plant for 1.5 years

It is unclear what ozone dosage was used over the majority of the treatment period because it was not recorded in the MORs until March 2015. The OER ( Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman 2015 ) states that the ozone system was not feeding optimally until “corrective modifications” were made in January 2015. The corrective modifications appear to have been “repairs to gauges and programming” to produce “proper ozone under manual operation.” Repairs were planned for the first quarter of 2015 to “allow automatic operation,” but it is unclear if those were made.

Bromate is a disinfection by-product formed by the reaction of bromide ion with ozone. Monthly bromate monitoring for the first year of operation was required by the D/DBP Rule and were ordered by MDEQ staff on Sept. 11, 2014. The first bromate sample was to be taken by the end of that month. The 2014 consumer confidence report ( City of Flint 2014 ) states that the bromate levels varied from 0 to 23 μg/L, and that no violation occurred. However, as the reporting limit for bromate was 5 μg/L ( Stark 2016 ), the bromate levels actually varied between <5 and 23 μg/L.

The maximum contaminant level (MCL) for bromate is 10 μg/L, as a running annual average (RAA), determined at the point of entry. No data for bromate concentrations are provided in the 2015 consumer confidence report ( City of Flint 2016 ); however, e-mail correspondence on Apr. 6, 2015, between MDEQ staff members indicate that the RAA was “hovering just above the MCL of 10 ppb.” E-mail correspondence between FWSC staff and MD EQ staff indicates that bromate results were not reported for five of the 13 months after September 2014, even though ozone was used continuously at the plant.

Disinfection was accomplished using gaseous chlorine which, as shown in Figure 2 , was to be added both before and after filtration. The total chlorine dosage varied from ~5 mg/L in the winter months to > 7 mg/L in the summer months ( Figure 5 ). Not surprisingly, the chlorine demand, calculated by subtracting the chlorine residual leaving the treatment plant from the applied chlorine dosage, increased during the summer and decreased during the winter. The location of chlorine application varied significantly during the treatment period, with no post-filtration chlorination until May 17, 2015, and then no prefilter chlorination after Aug. 3, 2015. No justification for these changes was documented in the MORs. The softening bypass stream had been reduced to no greater than 20% in November 2014 in an attempt to reduce chlorine demand. The minutes of the Nov. 7, 2014, TTHM Response Planning Meeting (MDEQ e-mail correspondence) state that the bypass was discontinued “and it appears that the chlorine demand has dropped by 0.5–1.0 mg/L.” However, as shown in Figure 5 , this drop appears to be a part of a downward trend that occurred before this change. In summer 2015, the chlorine demand was somewhat lower than in summer 2014, but it is not clear whether this is due to eliminating the softening bypass stream or to other causes.

Applied chlorine dosages and chlorine demand of treated Flint River water

Difficulties were encountered in maintaining chlorine residuals throughout the distribution system throughout the 1.5 years of treatment and continues to be problematic, even after the change back to DWSD water. As shown in Figure 6 , chlorine residuals in the treated Flint River water were low during the first few months of operation. In response to this and the detection of E. coli , the post-filtration chlorine dosages were increased from 0.0 to 2.9 mg/L in June 2014 and then to ~3.8 mg/L in July–October 2014, resulting in a decrease in the number of distribution system samples with no detectable chlorine residual. However, as shown in Table 1 , increasing the chlorine dose resulted in increased concentrations of TTHMs. Although the FWSC reported increases in chlorine residuals after Oct. 2014, Marc Edwards reported that in August 2015, 41 % of the samples his group collected had no detectable chlorine ( Roy 2015b ). This team’s sampling and analysis in late October 2015 revealed that 16 of the 30 samples collected had chlorine residuals less than 0.2 mg/L and 10 had chlorine levels less than 0.1 mg/L. The US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) Safe Drinking Water Task Force remains concerned about chlorine residual levels in Flint’s water ( Emery 2016 ).

Chlorine residuals at monitoring sites in the Flint distribution system

The 24-month source water sampling for Cryptosporidium, E. coli , and turbidity to determine bin placement required by the SDWA Long-Term 2 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule was not done before the switch to Flint River water, apparently because MDEQ staff believed the Flint River was only a temporary source (MDEQ e-mail conversations), despite the fact that construction on the 80-mi KWA pipeline had not even begun in April 2014.

Attempts to address the TTHM exceedances included first eliminating the softening bypass stream in an attempt to increase TOC removal ( Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman 2014 ). However, TTHM exceedances continued, so the anthracite media in the filters was replaced with granular activated carbon, and the ozonation system was repaired in summer 2015 (MDEQ Construction Permit W151055). TTHM levels were finally reduced, and in August 2015, only one of the eight samples taken exceeded the 80 μg/L TTHM limit ( Table 1 ).

QUALITY OF TREATED FLINT RIVER WATER

In attempting to understand what happened in Flint, it is necessary to look not only at specific contaminants but also the general quality of the treated water. As shown in Figure 7 , the pH and alkalinity of the finished water varied significantly over the 1.5 years of treatment, and for much of the time, both were quite low, especially in summer 2015. The decreases in alkalinity from June to July 2014 and over the course of the period from March to May 2015, both correspond to increases in the lime dosage ( Figure 3 ). The reason for the change in alkalinity and pH after June 2015 is unknown, as the lime and ferric chloride dosages were fairly constant during this period. The carbon dioxide dosage may have changed during recarbonation, but the carbon dioxide dosages were not provided in the MORs.

Monthly average pH and alkalinity in the treated Flint River water

Treatment for softening and turbidity removal, along with disinfection, reduced the alkalinity by as much as 204 mg/L as CaC0 3 and the pH by up to one log unit. The Langelier saturation index (LSI) is a measure of calcium carbonate solubility described as

where K a is the acid dissociation constant for bicarbonate, γ is the activity coefficient, [] denotes the molar concentration, and K sp is the solubility product of CaC0 3 . An LSI value greater than zero indicates that the solution is supersaturated and the precipitation of calcium carbonate is favored and that corrosion is less likely. An LSI value less than zero indicates that the solution is undersaturated and calcium carbonate dissolution is favored, and that the water could be corrosive if no other measures were taken to control corrosion. As a result of reductions in pH, alkalinity, and hardness during treatment, the finished water was undersaturated with respect to calcium carbonate ( Figure 8 ). As the temperature of the water is likely to change in the distribution system (warms during winter, cools during summer), the LSI is also likely to change, suggesting that the water became more under-saturated during summer and less undersaturated during winter. The LSI would have approached −1.5 during August 2015, when the water temperature was predicted to be 15°C in the distribution system.

Langelier saturation index of the treated Flint River water at various times during the treatment period

As shown in Table 2 , the chloride content of the treated water ranged from 62 to 95 mg/L (median of 83 mg/L). The chloride level in the treated water was significantly higher than in the river water, predominantly due to the addition of ferric chloride as a coagulant. Calculations using dosing data show that the chloride levels in the treated water increased by 28–100 % as a result of the addition of ferric chloride.

Parameter concentrations used to characterize the likelihood of corrosion and associated CSMR and Larson-Skold indexes in the treated Flint River water

CaCO 3 —calcium carbonate, Cl − —chloride, CSMR—chloride-to-sulfate mass ratio, SO 4 2− —sulfate

The turbidity of the raw Flint River water varied seasonally ( Figure 9 ). The turbidity of the finished water did not vary greatly (0.08–0.16 ntu), demonstrating that the filters were operating successfully. However, it can be observed that the turbidity of the water applied to the filters varied greatly, indicating the challenges plant opera tors had in achieving consistent performance in the upflow clarifiers. The changes in lime and polymer dosages, shown in Figures 3 and ​ and4, 4 , likely reflect attempts to optimize the removal of turbidity.

Variability in turbidity within the Flint water treatment plant

CORROSIVE INDEXES

Although a number of indexes have been developed to provide an indication of the likelihood that corrosion or deposition will occur, none are able to predict the rate at which corrosion might occur. Nevertheless, they can be used to assess the potential effects of water quality changes on the likelihood of corrosion.

The Larson-Skold index was developed to evaluate the potential for the corrosion of cast-iron pipes transporting water from the Great Lakes ( Roberge 2006 ). It can be used to determine the effect of chloride, sulfate, and bicarbonate/carbonate ions on the corrosivity of the treated water toward iron pipes in the distribution system. The Larson-Skold index is calculated as

where the concentrations are given in units of equivalents per liter. A Larson-Skold index of (1) less than 0.8 suggests that chloride and sulfate levels are unlikely to cause corrosion, (2) between 0.8 and 1.2 suggests higher than desired corrosion rates may occur, and (3) greater than 1.2 is indicative of high corrosion rates ( Roberge 2006 ).

Unfortunately, as the sulfate concentrations were determined on only six occasions, the Larson-Skold index can be calculated only for those six days ( Table 2 ). Of those six days, the Larson-Skold index suggests that high (sometimes very high) rates of iron corrosion should have been expected. While the number of dates are limited, the sulfate concentration was fairly constant over the 1.5 years; therefore, the values of the Larson-Skold index shown in Table 2 are likely to be indicative of the treated water during the time when the Flint River supplied the FWSC plant.

The chloride-to-sulfate mass ratio (CSMR) has been shown to be an effective tool to identify where corrosion is likely ( Hill & Cantor 2011 ). An extensive survey of water utilities showed that 100% of utilities with a CSMR <0.58 met USEPA action limit for lead (15 μg/L) ( Edwards 1999 ). On the contrary, only 3 6 % of utilities with a CSMR >0.58 met the USEPA action limit (15 μg/L). If the alkalinity is less than 50 mg/L as CaC0 3 , then Nguyen et al. (2010) suggested that the goal should be to achieve a CSMR in the finished water of less than 0.2. Table 2 shows that the CSMR for the treatment period was very high in all six samples. The high values of the CSMR and Larson-Skold indexes of water entering the Flint distribution system should have raised serious concerns about the possibility of corrosion, especially given prior experience by water utilities. For example, in Columbus, Ohio, the 90th percentile lead levels in the water increased by almost 360% after a change in coagulant from alum to ferric chloride, which resulted in an increase in the CSMR by up to 170% ( Hill & Cantor 2011 ).

SO WHAT WENT WRONG IN FLINT?

The previous discussion demonstrates the complexity of treating a variable water source. Flint River water was considered to be a challenge to treat, with “high bacteria and high carbon concentrations” that “fluxuate [sic] depending on rain events” (Mar. 20, 2012, meeting minutes, MDEQ meeting on KWA water issues). The only pilot testing that appears to have been completed before the switch was in 2002—a treatability study by Alvord, Burdick, and Howson LCC (AB&H)—and is mentioned in the OER ( Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman 2015 ). The author of the study describes the water source as “particularly difficult to treat with seasonal variation between high organic load and high magnesium hardness” ( Lawrence 2012 ). The treatment train recommended in the AB&H report differs significantly from that used at the Flint water treatment plant, which meant that in 2014 the plant operators lacked important information about the treatability of the water that was necessary for proper plant operation.

AWWA ( Muylwyk et al. 2014 ) recommends that “if a municipality is considering changing how its source water is treated, the potential effects on the corrosivity of the treated water and the need for corrosion control should be evaluated.” However, sufficient pilot testing and corrosion studies were not commissioned and completed before the April 2014 switch of source waters. Furthermore, since the Flint plant had not been fully operational in almost 50 years, was understaffed, and some of the staff were undertrained, it is not surprising that it was difficult to achieve effective treatment.

Muylwyk et al. (2014) warn that any of the following treatment changes could affect corrosion or corrosion control in the distribution system:

• Process changes that result in pH or alkalinity changes
• Process changes that affect the CSMR
• Change in coagulant (the Lake Huron plant uses alum)
• Introduction of a new acid to the process (the Lake Huron plant does not use recarbonation; the Flint plant did)
• Introduction of a new base (the Lake Huron plant does not use lime; the Flint plant did)

These changes were made when Flint switched to treating the Flint River water; however, as mentioned previously, corrosion control was not used at the plant, and there was no plan for corrosion control.

As shown in Figure 7 , the monthly average pH and alkalinity of the treated water were highly variable. Not shown in the figure are the changes on a daily basis. The daily pH measurements varied from 7.00 to 8.46 over the first three months of treatment. Daily fluctuations often varied between ±0.2 to 0.3 pH units, and as high as 1.1 log units in late April 2014. By contrast, the pH of the DWSD water varied no more than 0.34 log units over the course of a month. Changes in pH more than 0.2 units per week are not recommended ( Hill & Cantor 2011 ), as such rapid changes in water chemistry (as experienced in the Flint system) may adversely affect system equilibrium and the passivation layer and scales on the insides of the pipes.

The red color of the water observed by Flint residents is evidence of the corrosion of iron distribution pipes. While FWSC flushed the mains by opening fire hydrants, it never seemed to address the root cause of the colored water, namely the corrosion of the iron pipes. Changes in pH and alkalinity can result in the softening of iron tubercles and therefore result in increased iron corrosion ( Hill & Cantor 2011 ). As discussed previously, in all six samples, the Larson–Skold index was close to or greater than 1.2, indicating potentially high iron corrosion rates should have been expected. On the basis of this and the fact that no corrosion inhibitor was used, it is not surprising that significant iron corrosion was observed. In addition, bacteria are known to contribute to the corrosion of iron pipes, so it is possible that the corrosion problem was exacerbated by bacterial regrowth as a result of low chlorine residual and the likely presence of low molecular weight/easily metabolized compounds formed from the reaction of ozone with naturally occurring organic matter.

Commonly used indexes could have predicted that the treated Flint River water would likely corrode lead pipes. For example, the decision tool shown in Figure 10 uses the CSMR to predict the corrosivity of water toward lead piping. As shown in Figure 7 , before July 2015, when the alkalinity of the water was greater than 50 mg/L as CaC0 3 , the CSMR values of the treated Flint River water exceeded the 0.5 cutoff, so the corrosivity of water would have been a significant concern. After this time, the alkalinity of the water was less than 5 0 mg/L and the CSMR greatly exceeded 0.2, indicating that lead corrosion was an even more serious concern than earlier. The addition of phosphate as an inhibitor to prevent lead corrosion is commonly used in the industry ( Hill & Cantor 2011 ), and while the possible use of phosphate as a corrosion inhibitor was suggested ( WadeTrim 2009 ), the reason corrosion control was not implemented is still unknown. No preliminary corrosion estimates using simple indexes appear in any of the engineering reports, and they do not appear to have been considered during the design process. Journalistic reports of the Flint disaster have often stated that the failure to add phosphate was the primary cause of the lead corrosion problem. However, it should be recognized that the CSMR of the treated Flint River water was so high that, even with the addition of phosphate, the water may have been so corrosive that lead levels in the system might have still exceeded the action level. The failure to recognize the corrosivity of the water and to add a corrosion inhibitor had devastating effects.

Decision tool to assess corrosion potential based on CSMR

In the wake of the lead exposure, the MDEQ finally conducted extensive sampling and analysis of the Flint water. As of June 28, 2016, a total of 23,119 samples have been collected and analyzed for lead since September 2015. The highest lead levels measured exceeded 23, 100 μg/L. On the basis of the Sentinel samples and this more extensive data set collected by the MD EQ, it appears that a significant number of premises still have high lead levels in their water ( Figure 11 ). It has been suggested that in many cases, the high lead levels now seen in homes are due to the presence of particulate lead ( USEPA 2016 ). This may be the case, although at this time there appears to be limited publicly available evidence to support this supposition.

Percentage of samples exceeding the lead AL of 15 μg/L and the 90th percentile lead concentration a

There are plans to replace all lead pipes in the Flint system. As of July 2016, lead pipes have been replaced in about 30 premises ( Thomas 2016 ). In the case of Madison, Wis., the utility and homeowners worked together for several years to fully replace the lead service lines in every home in their service area ( Corley 2016 ). High lead levels were found in a number of samples four years after all of the lead pipes were replaced in Madison, Wis. ( Cantor 2006 ), suggesting that even after all the lead pipes are replaced, it may take years for the lead levels in Flint to reach a point at which the concentrations of all samples are below the action level. Clearly there is much to be done before the water crisis in Flint is over.

AWWA RESOURCES

• Lead Resource Community. AWWA webpage. www.awwa.org/resources-tools/water-knowledge/lead.aspx .
• Law & Water—The Failure of Cooperative Federalism in Flint, Michigan. Fewell, B., 2016. Journal AWWA , 108:3:12. Product No. JAW_0083222.
• Roundtable—The Flint Crisis. McGuire, M.J.; Beecher, J.A.; Hanna-Attisha, M.; Masten, S.J.; & Rose, J.B., 2016. Journal AWWA , 108:7:26. Product No. JAW_0083783.
• Statement From AWWA CEO David Lafrance Concerning Flint Water Quality Crisis. Press release, Jan. 19, 2016. www.awwa.org/resources-tools/public-affairs/press-room/press-release/artideid/3993/statement-from-awwa-ceo-david-lafrance-concerning-flint-water-quality-crisis.aspx .

These resources have been supplied by Journal AWWA staff. For information on these and other AWWA resources, visit www.awwa.org .

Acknowledgments

Research reported in this publication was supported by National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) under award number 1R21 ES027199-01. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the NIH.

Many of the e-mails cited in this article were obtained online from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, where they were posted as part of the investigations related to the crisis in Flint, Mich. Additional e-mails were obtained from Governor Rick Snyder’s page on the Michigan.gov website.

Susan J. Masten has 35 years’ experience in water treatment and 27 years at Michigan State University. She holds a patent on a hybrid ceramic membrane filtration system and has conducted extensive research on the use of this technology for the control of disinfection by-products, nanoparticles, bromate, and pharmaceuticals in drinking water. Masten earned a BS degree in biochemistry from Fairleigh Dickinson University, Teaneck, N.J.; an MSE degree in environmental engineering from West Virginia University in Morgantown, W.V.; and a PhD degree in environmental engineering from Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Contributor Information

Susan J. Masten, Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Michigan State University, 428 Shaw Ln., East Lansing, MI 48824 USA.

Simon H. Davies, Research engineer in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Michigan State University.

Shawn P. Mcelmurry, Associate professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich.

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• Introduction

The creation of a crisis

Detection of lead and conflicting messages about safety, state of emergency, blame, and criminal charges.

Flint water crisis

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Flint water crisis , human-made public health crisis (April 2014–June 2016) involving the municipal water supply system of Flint , Michigan . Tens of thousands of Flint residents were exposed to dangerous levels of lead , and outbreaks of Legionnaire disease killed at least 12 people and sickened dozens more.

Although it was once a thriving industrial centre, the city of Flint, in southeastern Michigan, struggled economically following the closing of several General Motors automobile manufacturing plants in the 1980s and ’90s. In 2002 Michigan Gov. John Engler declared a state of financial emergency in the city, and for the next two years, executive power in Flint was wielded by a manager selected by Engler. The city’s financial doldrums continued, however, and in 2011 Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder appointed the first of a series of unelected emergency managers to run the city. Those managers, who reported directly to the Michigan state treasury department and not to the citizens of Flint, decided to switch the city’s water supply from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) to the Flint River as a cost-savings measure. That change was made in April 2014, and residents immediately registered their concerns about water quality.

Over the following months, residents were twice advised to boil water because of the presence of dangerous levels of bacteria, and General Motors announced that the use of Flint River water at its plant was causing corrosion on newly machined engine parts. A spike in the incidence of Legionnaire disease in Flint led Genesee county health officials to question whether the outbreak might be connected to contamination of the water supply, but attempts to investigate the matter were met with resistance at the city and state level. In January 2015 the city informed residents that elevated levels of carcinogenic trihalomethanes had been detected in Flint’s water but insisted that it remained safe to drink. Later that month, dangerous levels of lead were detected in two water fountains on the University of Michigan–Flint campus. The DWSD offered to reconnect Flint to its system, but Flint’s emergency manager declined, and communications within Snyder’s administration revealed that cost remained the primary decision driver as public health concerns began to mount.

In March 2015 a test of the drinking water in one Flint home uncovered concentrations of lead more than 25 times higher than the level deemed actionable by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); subsequent testing found lead levels that far exceeded the EPA’s criteria for classifying water as hazardous waste . The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) stressed that there was no “safe” level for lead exposure and that the consequences of lead poisoning were lifelong and often debilitating. Flint’s elected city council held an almost entirely symbolic vote to return the city to the DWSD as its water provider, but the measure was rejected as “incomprehensible” by the emergency manager. As early as April 2015 EPA regional manager Miguel Del Toral had expressed his concerns about the absence of any corrosion control measures in Flint’s water treatment process, but Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) insisted that no additional steps were necessary to mitigate the levels of lead and copper in Flint’s water.

In September 2015 Marc Edwards, a Virginia Tech professor of environmental engineering and an expert on municipal water systems, determined that the corrosiveness of insufficiently treated Flint River water was causing lead to be leached from aging pipes, and doctors at a Flint hospital told residents not to drink city water after blood tests of area children revealed high levels of lead. After confirming those results, on October 1 Genesee county declared a public health emergency in Flint, urging residents not to drink any water drawn from the Flint River, but the following day Snyder’s office issued a press release claiming that Flint’s water was safe to drink and that elevated lead levels were caused by lead pipes in household plumbing. Within a week, however, Snyder had announced a $12 million plan to switch back to the DWSD as Flint’s water supplier. Experts noted that such a move would do nothing to address the damage already done to Flint’s water supply infrastructure by more than 18 months of exposure to corrosive water. Even after the water supply was reconnected to the DWSD on October 16, officials advised against drinking Flint water. In late October Snyder announced the creation of an independent task force to review the events leading up to the crisis.

In December 2015 Flint’s newly elected mayor declared a state of emergency, and Snyder’s task force released its initial report, in which primary blame for the public health disaster in Flint was assigned to the MDEQ. Snyder declared a state of emergency for Genesee county in January 2016 and activated the National Guard to assist with water distribution. On January 16 U.S. Pres. Barack Obama declared a state of emergency in Flint, immediately releasing $5 million in federal funds to assist in relief efforts and authorizing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to coordinate the state and local response. The U.S. House Oversight and Government Reform Committee convened a series of hearings in February to investigate the debacle in Flint. The conclusions drawn from those hearings largely broke down along political lines: House Democrats found fault with Snyder—a Republican —and House Republicans criticized the EPA for its failure to intervene in a timely manner.

The matter of blame appeared to be settled conclusively in March 2016, however, when Snyder’s nonpartisan task force released its blistering final report. Primary responsibility for the crisis in Flint was placed on the state, and particularly on the MDEQ, and task force members called for a thorough review of the emergency manager system. The report also characterized the crisis as a clear-cut example of environmental injustice, as evidenced by the fact that Flint’s poor, largely African American population “did not enjoy the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards as that provided to other communities.” The CDC determined that nearly 100,000 residents of Flint had been exposed to lead in the period between April 2014 and October 2015. Scientists also conclusively linked the deadly 2014 Legionnaire disease outbreak in Genesee county to Flint’s water. The switch from the DWSD to the Flint River had sharply lowered chlorine levels in the municipal water supply, which allowed Legionella pneumophila bacteria to flourish and caused Legionnaire infection rates to skyrocket.

The Michigan attorney general brought criminal charges against two MDEQ employees and the Flint city utilities administrator in April 2016 and promised that additional cases would be brought over time. In June 2016, more than two years after the switch to Flint River water and eight months after the return to DWSD water, the EPA announced that water in Flint was once again safe to drink, provided that a National Science Foundation-approved filter was used to remove the remaining traces of lead.

As the criminal investigation progressed, more than a dozen state and local officials were indicted on a raft of charges, including obstruction of justice , lying to police, and involuntary manslaughter . While prosecutors were able to secure misdemeanor convictions against seven defendants through plea bargains , the most-serious charges were dropped in 2019. However, a new team of prosecutors stressed that evidence of wrongdoing in connection with the Flint crisis continued to be evaluated and that these charges could be brought again at any time. In January 2021 prosecutors unveiled a fresh round of indictments that targeted some of the highest-ranking members of the former governor’s administration. Snyder himself was charged with two counts of willful neglect of duty, a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in prison. Nick Lyon, Snyder’s health director, and Eden Wells, Snyder’s chief medical executive, were each charged with nine counts of involuntary manslaughter in connection with the Legionnaire disease deaths. Six other officials were charged with crimes that ranged from misconduct to perjury to extortion . However, in 2022 the Michigan Supreme Court invalidated the indictments, ruling that they had been issued improperly.

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• 10 years on, Flint still faces consequences from the water crisis

Awaiting justice, residents continue to grapple with serious physical and mental health issues

By priyanka runwal, may 6, 2024 | a version of this story appeared in volume 102, issue 14.

Credit: Brittany Greeson | Flint resident Jamie Davis’s son Clayton was 1½ years old when the water crisis unfolded in Flint, Michigan. Like many other children exposed to lead during the environmental disaster, Clayton struggles to focus in school and is hyperactive.

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A decade ago, one of the worst human-caused environmental disasters in recent US history unfolded in the city of Flint, Michigan. Amid financial turmoil, the city switched its source of drinking water and thereby unleashed a crisis that exposed tens of thousands of residents to lead—a potent neurotoxin—and potentially carcinogenic compounds called trihalomethanes. The switch also led to outbreaks of Legionnaires’ disease. Despite community protests and reports of skin rashes and hair loss, officials insisted that the water was safe to drink. Independent testing by scientists proved otherwise, forcing the city to eventually acknowledge the problem and act. Ten years later, Flint residents are still awaiting justice as they continue to grapple with serious health issues caused by the water crisis.

Seeing people drink from a water fountain or directly from a tap fills Jamie Davis with anxiety. “I’m like, ‘Oh my goodness.’ I want to stop them,” she says.

For Davis—like many other residents of Flint, Michigan—memories of living through one of the most egregious human-made environmental and public health disasters in recent US history haven’t faded. “I don’t think I’ll ever get to the point where I’m comfortable [using the water] without it being filtered,” she says.

About a decade ago, during a financial crisis, a state-appointed emergency manager made a cost-saving decision involving the city of Flint’s drinking-water source. Instead of continuing to purchase Lake Huron water provided by the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department, the city resorted to the Flint River. The move was estimated to save the city roughly $5 million over 2 years until a new pipeline, under construction at the time, would make it cheaper to bring Lake Huron water to Flint.

“We should have waited till we had the good-quality water,” says Scott Dungee, Flint’s water plant supervisor. But “we were in financial distress, so everything was about money.”

Flint officials had failed to properly treat the highly corrosive river water, which leached lead and other metals from the city’s aging lead and galvanized iron service pipes and solder joints . Between April 2014 and October 2015, thousands of Flint residents were exposed to dangerous lead levels that made children particularly sick. The water switch also fueled an uptick in Legionella pneumophila , a waterborne bacterium that caused an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease—a potentially life-threatening form of pneumonia—that killed at least 12 residents.

When community members—largely poor and mostly Black—raised concerns about the tainted water, state officials repeatedly dismissed them and maintained that the water was safe. In testimony delivered on Feb. 3, 2016 , Joel Beauvais, the acting deputy assistant administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Water Office, told Congress that “what happened in Flint was avoidable and should never have happened.”

Victims of the water crisis, including Davis and her sons, are still waiting to receive their shares of a $626 million settlement—the bulk of which will be paid by the State of Michigan. Many residents are also waiting for their yards and sidewalks to be restored after crews excavated and replaced their lead and galvanized iron service lines. Meanwhile, several homeowners are still waiting to have their pipes changed. In March, a federal judge held the City of Flint in contempt for repeatedly missing deadlines to complete this work.

The erosion of public trust over the years means Davis and many other Flint residents still use only bottled water for drinking. “If we run out of water at 10:00 at night and there’s nothing to drink, we go thirsty until we’re able to go get bottled water,” Davis says. A decade later, community members continue to grapple with the long-term physical and mental health problems unleashed by the water crisis, including elevated blood pressure levels and high rates of depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among adults, and frequent diagnoses of learning disabilities and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder among children.

“It’s been devastating,” Davis says. “More needs to be done.”

The water crisis in Flint, Michigan, unfolded in 2014, when a state-appointed emergency manager decided to switch the city’s drinking-water source from Lake Huron to the Flint River. The city’s failure to properly treat the highly corrosive river water made residents sick, and at least 12 people died. Credit: Brittany Greeson

After the water switch in 2014, many residents of Flint, Michigan, noticed discolored water coming out of their taps. Credit: Flintwaterstudy.org

During the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, corroded lead and galvanized iron service pipes leached lead and other metals into the drinking water, making residents sick. Credit: Flintwaterstudy.org

A heel-prick blood test is commonly used as a first step to detect lead in blood. Credit: Brittany Greeson/Getty Images

At the peak of the water crisis, many residents of Flint, Michigan, relied on bottled water for drinking, cooking, cleaning, and bathing. For at least one household, that meant about 150 bottles of water per day, according to a 2016 CNN article . Credit: Brittany Greeson

How the crisis unfolded

A few weeks after the water switch on April 25, 2014, Flint residents noticed funky-smelling, discolored water coming out of their taps. Children, including Davis’s son Clayton, who was 1½ years old at the time, developed skin rashes. It looked like frog skin, she recalls. “It was a bunch of bumps all over his neck, his arms, and back.” Many adults and some children also experienced hair loss.

Around the same time, Flint’s water plant staff noticed an uptick in total coliform bacteria, including Escherichia coli , which is linked to gastrointestinal illnesses. What the staff didn’t know was that the chlorine typically added to drinking water to kill these bacteria became unavailable as some corroding pipes leached iron that reacted with the disinfectant.

Related: Podcast: Ongoing tragedies in Flint and East Palestine

In August 2014, city officials issued boil-water advisories and added more chlorine to kill the pathogens. Over time, the excess chlorine drove up levels of total trihalomethanes (TTHMs), a disinfection by-product that’s associated with cancer risks and reproductive problems such as low birth weight and preterm birth. By January 2015, TTHM levels had exceeded acceptable limits under the US Safe Drinking Water Act.

To reduce TTHMs, plant authorities added ferric chloride to the water to coagulate and remove organic matter, which is essential for TTHM production. But as concentrations of TTHMs dropped, chloride levels in the water rose and caused more corrosion in the pipes. “I hate to say it, but we were learning as we went,” Dungee says. “We were only trained to run this [Flint water plant] as a backup plant 2 weeks out of a year.”

This chloride-rich water was stripping off the passivation layer that lines the interior of the pipes and prevents contact between the metallic surface and water. Corrosion-control measures that should have been in place when the city switched to the Flint River—which naturally has high chloride—were still lacking.

“When you look at the inside of those distribution pipes, they’re no longer smooth, and the whole surface is this yellow, rust orange, dark red color,” says Shawn McElmurry, a civil and environmental engineer at Wayne State University. Corroded galvanized iron pipes sometimes look like swiss cheese, he adds.

In February 2015, as community reports of discolored water mounted, a city-conducted test revealed 104 ppb of lead in Flint resident LeeAnne Walters’s home. A follow-up test in March found 397 ppb lead . The EPA’s regulatory limit for lead is 15 ppb. In April, a blood lead test showed that Walters’s 4-year-old had been exposed to the heavy metal.

Meanwhile, Virginia Tech researchers tested 252 water samples, 42 of which had lead levels exceeding 15 ppb . In several samples, the lead concentration was higher than 100 ppb. The state disputed these findings and continued to deny that there were problems with lead in the drinking water.

In September 2015, a study led by a Flint pediatrician, Mona Hanna-Attisha, showed that the number of children aged 5 and younger with elevated blood lead levels increased from 2.4% to about 5% after the water switch . The spike was 6.6% in neighborhoods where Virginia Tech scientists had detected particularly high lead content in the water.

Unlike Flint, the rest of Genesee County didn’t experience such increases. “It validated concerns that folks had been raising for a year and a half,” says Richard Sadler, a medical geographer at Michigan State University and coauthor of the study.

On Sept. 25, 2015, the city issued a lead advisory, recommending flushing cold-water pipes before using them to drink, cook, and make baby formula and using filters for removing lead from water. On Oct. 16, Flint finally switched back to Detroit water.

Slow progress then and now

In the months that followed, fewer kids had elevated blood lead levels , and 90% of the drinking-water samples tested had lead concentrations below 15 ppb. “It still means that there could be [at least] one home that has a serious lead problem, and that’s not acceptable to me,” McElmurry says. “From my perspective, there should be no lead in drinking water.” Similarly, according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, no level of lead is considered safe in children .

After lawsuits filed by community and environmental groups seeking access to safe drinking water, Flint started replacing lead and galvanized iron pipes. Officials had committed to completing this work by 2020, but to date, several dozen homes still have not had their service lines checked and replaced. The city attributes the delay to the COVID-19 pandemic and issues with getting consent from some homeowners to inspect and replace their pipes. But a 2023 Scripps News investigation found that in some cases the city had failed to act even though residents completed the necessary paperwork and repeatedly contacted officials.

Others, like Benjamin Pauli, who moved to Flint in 2015 to join Kettering University as a social scientist, are dealing with yards that were disturbed and never repaired when service lines were dug up. Pauli’s line was replaced in 2017, but the city still hasn’t restored his yard. “They filled in the hole, but there was still a patch of dirt [now covered in weeds and other plants], and they didn’t reseed it with grass,” he says. “Some people don’t want to say yes to the pipe replacement because they don’t want their yard never to be fixed.” The city has missed several deadlines to complete this cleanup work.

Related: Editorial: The clock is ticking on lead pipes

Many homes still use only bottled water for drinking, despite the state’s ending its free bottled water program in 2018. “I have not drunk from the tap in over 10 years,” says 22-year-old Jordan Brown, a Flint resident and biochemistry major at the University of Michigan–Flint. “We still buy cases of water.”

Flint pediatricians continue to encourage children to eat fresh fruits and vegetables rich in calcium, iron, and vitamin C to reduce lead absorption into body tissues and bones. But health impacts from exposure to dangerous levels of lead and potentially to TTHMs still loom.

Grappling with long-term impacts

Davis recalls receiving her son Clayton’s blood lead test results in 2015 and feeling heartbroken and terrified about potential consequences. A few years after the water crisis, she started noticing behavioral issues. Clayton was hyperactive and struggled to focus in school. Retaining information was sometimes challenging for him.

Her son is now 11 years old and still navigating these learning challenges. “Because of that, I can’t get him into the charter schools I want him to go to,” Davis says, “so he’s staying in Flint public schools for now.”

In a 2019 survey of caregivers of nearly 250 Flint children, 44% reported that the kids were hyperactive, 39% reported emotional agitation in the children, and 29% reported comprehension issues and learning delays in kids. In a 2022 study , researchers documented a 9% increase in the proportion of Flint children with what the authors termed “special educational needs” after the water crisis.

It’s hard to prove definitively that lead is the culprit, given that the half-life of lead in blood is about 30 days. Blood samples collected after the peak of the water crisis may not indicate the actual lead levels children were exposed to, which is likely higher than the measured values. To solve this problem, researchers from Michigan State University in collaboration with Hanna-Attisha at Hurley Children’s Hospital are collecting baby teeth shed by Flint kids born between 2011 and 2015.

“Teeth grow layer by layer, like the growth rings in a tree,” says Danielle Land, a postdoctoral research associate on the Flint Tooth FAIRY (Flint Assessment of In-utero and at-Risk Young) Study . “We can time-stamp and see how much lead they were exposed to at what point.”

So far, the team has received 376 teeth from 137 children, and research collaborators at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai have analyzed about 90 teeth. Early results show a spike in lead levels in several teeth that match the timing of the water crisis. The spike seems to be particularly prominent among children who were fed formula prepared using Flint tap water, Land says, though she emphasizes that these are still preliminary findings. The plan is to match the teeth lead levels with information about the kids’ health outcomes and with other data.

Meanwhile, years of research in animals and humans have uncovered how lead causes cognitive impairment, especially in children. “The blood-brain barrier in children is not fully developed,” says Tomás Guilarte, a cognitive neuroscientist at Florida International University. “You get holes that lead can get through.”

His research shows that lead binds to and inhibits the functioning of a cell receptor called the N -methyl-d-aspartate (NMDA) receptor, which is crucial for brain development, learning, and memory formation. Inhibiting NMDA impairs the production of a protein called brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), which plays an important role in cognitive function, learning, and memory. “If [BDNF] is disrupted, it’s known to cause a lot of different neurological disorders,” Guilarte says.

Community organizer and lifelong Flint resident Kenyetta Dotson noticed that her younger daughter, who was 6 years old during the water crisis, had become more withdrawn and quieter. “She just seemed different to us,” Dotson says. “She needed some support.”

Dotson’s children are enrolled in the Flint Registry , which was launched in 2018 to track long-term community health and assist residents in accessing health care, food, housing, and transportation. Dotson is cochair of the community advisory board for the Flint Registry.

The focus is lead, says Nicole Jones, who directs the registry. Her team estimates that about 100,000 Flint residents may have been exposed to lead during the water crisis, along with 30,000 more people who lived elsewhere but worked in Flint, as well as out-of-town children who attended school or day care in the city.

Nearly 22,000 adults and children are enrolled in the registry, and folks can still join, Jones says. “We ask about physical health. We ask about mental health and lots of different things that could potentially be associated with lead,” she adds.

Related: Benzene found in the water supply of fire-ravaged Paradise, California

A 2018–20 survey of caregivers of about 1,200 Flint children enrolled in the registry indicated anxiety and depression in Flint kids at higher rates than those reported nationally. In a follow-up 2020–22 survey, the caregivers reported a decline in the overall mental well-being of these children from the previous survey.

Several studies have also documented the prevalence of depression and PTSD in Flint adults. A study conducted between 2019 and 2020 , for example, estimated that one in five Flint adults may have experienced major depression, and one in four may have had PTSD in the year before the study.

The psychological damage caused by the water crisis still needs to be addressed, Davis says. For her, it’s a lot about the guilt she still carries for not having done more to shield her son from the tainted water. Despite knowing that it wasn’t her fault, “I feel a little bit responsible,” Davis says. She wonders how Clayton would have fared in school and the kind of person he would have become had he been spared the exposure to lead.

Davis also feels a lot of frustration, anger, and sadness because of the way people in power betrayed and abandoned the community they were elected to serve and protect. She’s not alone in harboring those sentiments. “I’d love to see accountability,” Dotson says.

Surveys through the registry have also indicated the prevalence of high blood pressure among Flint adults. That has been most striking, Davis says.

Elevated blood levels of lead and TTHMs also prompted scientists to assess impacts on reproductive outcomes. In comparisons of birth-record data between 2008 and 2015 from Flint and other US cities, one study found a 12% decrease in fertility rates among Flint women, and another study showed a 15.5% increase in the frequency of low-birth-weight babies born in Flint after the water crisis. “It’s a huge impact,” says Xi Chen, a health policy researcher at the Yale School of Public Health and coauthor of the birth-weight study. Because of systemic disadvantages, “Black mothers were more affected than White mothers,” he adds.

Meanwhile, community activist Arthur Woodson had been rallying scientists to determine if cancer is a serious issue in Flint and whether it is linked to the water switch. His efforts led to the formation of the Flint Community Cancer Consortium in 2022, which includes cancer researchers, representatives from cancer centers in the region, and community members. The group’s aim is to assess if unusual cancer patterns exist in Flint. If they do, Woodson hopes that the Flint community will have access to resources to get timely treatment. Sixty-six-year-old Roy Fields Sr., a Flint resident who was recently diagnosed with multiple myeloma—a rare type of blood cancer—agrees.

A decade after the water crisis unfolded, many Flint residents and community activists continue to fight for justice for the people of their city. Brown hopes that this environmental disaster won’t be Flint’s lasting legacy. “I feel like we deserve more than that,” he says.

CORRECTION:

This story was updated on May 9, 2024, to correct Jordan Brown's affiliation. He's a biochemistry major at the University of Michigan–Flint, not Michigan State University.

This article was updated on June 5, 2024, to clarify the time frame in which several dozen homes had not had their service lines checked and replaced. It was as of the C&EN publication date.

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It's been 10 years since the start of a devastating water crisis in Flint, Mich.

Steve Carmody

This month marks the 10th anniversary of the event that led to the Flint water crisis. The question remains 10 years later: "Is Flint's water safe to drink?"

Copyright © 2024 NPR. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.npr.org for further information.

NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by an NPR contractor. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record.

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Sample essay about the water crisis in flint, michigan.

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Water is one life’s most precious resources. In some organisms, water comprises as much as 90% of personal body weight, in humans, this ratio is 60%. Hence, when water is contaminated or sparse, life quality can be expected to drop dramatically. This sample environmental science essay explores the Flint Michigan water crisis that has been unfolding for two years ever since the city began to use water from the local Flint River (Foley). The case of Flint is a precautionary one and one worthy of intense public attention, both writing and speeches , as it may herald the need for a significant shift in America’s water management plant.

Background on the Flint, Michigan water crisis

Flint Michigan’s water crisis is a national crisis of eroding proportion. For two years, the locals have been continuously subjected to the ill effects of poisonous waters stemming from a recent change over in supply. Up until about April 2014, Flint had been totally reliant upon the water from Lake Huron purchased through Detroit (Foley). Due to the importance of food and water safety , plans to create a new regional water system that could bring tap water from the Lake Huron were then instated to set up a water harvesting system that could bring it into Flint at a better price were then initiated. Despite the well-meaning intentions, the project’s two-year delay caused a significantly unexpected turn of events when the temporary alternative water resource, the Flint River, was found to be highly contaminated.

The polluted water

The dissatisfactory nature of the water was realized nearly as soon as it was pumped from the river. The litany of complaints included that the water smelled, like metal, tasted, like metal, and looked ‘funny’ (Foley). Residents of flint pulled from their tap not clean and fresh water like that which is experienced almost universally across the united states but large jugs of brownish and foul liquid that may even be questionable to swim in (Bosman, Davey, Smith). Resident Bethany Hazard states that when she filled up her water from the faucet it came out not only brown but smelling of a sewer (Semuels).

The river itself has been a source of considerable pollution with a dead body being found in the river in addition to an abandoned car as well as abnormally high levels of trihalomethanes, and copper (Semuels). The mere fact, however, that such findings were only accidentally leaked underscores a lack of concern for the safety of Flint’s residents. The first tests on the water confirmed that indeed, something was quite wrong. The Environmental Protection Agency (the agency responsible for enforcing environmental policies in the U.S. ) for instance, leaked in a memo that in the water were trace amounts of the E. Coli bacteria, a serious health hazard for people of all ages (Foley unfortunate dimension of the Flint Michigan water crisis, the economic one.

How does Flint's water crisis affect the economy?

About 41% of the 100,000 residents who live in Michigan exist below or at the nation’s poverty line which makes this a socio-political issue as much as it is an environmental one (Foley). Indeed, the city actually was motivated to make the water switch over in the first place by financial concerns which held that an upgraded water resource could make serious improvements in the city’s strained budget. Unfortunately, the financial maneuver has ended up costing them several million more dollars than it saved.

It is this economic disparity that most likely contributed to the failing of the state authorities to properly address the issues in the time and manner due to the risk inherent to the contamination. Indeed, the first activist groups to call attention to the issue were labeled as no importance “anti-everything group” while other outspoken individuals were called rabble rousers playing “political football” (Bosman, Davey, Smith). All this backlash was made, in addition, in spite of increasingly worrisome findings concerning the water quality coming from scientists.

Only after months and months of complaints, of the grievous nature already once described, that the state officials began to conduct the logistical and technical response proper to the severity and vulnerability of the environment and population in question. Roughly a year after the citizens of Flint had been contending with their suspect water source that the state declared the public health emergency (like the emergency declared with the Zika virus ) proper to the situation at hand (Bosman, Davey, Smith). The local and state authorities shortly thereafter moved the water supply back to Lake Huron through Detroit however this still could not prevent or reverse the damage done.

Sociological and health impact

The water crisis in Flint Michigan is of epidemic proportions. Near the end of 2015, the state began to realize the trouble they were so direly in. Tests were conducted on the afflicted populations to discover that indeed, many a number were critically infected lead in the blood which could likely result in lasting and chronic health problems, especially in children who are more susceptible to toxins. The list of ailments from the contaminated water resource are astounding and cautionary. Rashes, hair loss, and numerous other health ailments provide a most undesirable account of the cost not only of environmental devastation but poverty as well (Foley).

The sum effect of this water pollution on top of the poverty is the literal dying away of the home. In Flint, one in 14 homes is vacant (Mallory Sidner). This means that all around the neighborhood, houses go without occupants and thus neighborhoods go without the life they need to be at maximum functioning and appreciation. As is usually the case, poverty is matched by equally disfavored social conditions. Many business have begun to close or at least shrink causing a massive shortage in available jobs and thus income for residents (Mallory Sidner).

This has the town incredibly worried not only for the longevity not only of the town but the children as well. Children are the city’s most vulnerable population who has been affected by the tap water crisis (Mallory Sidner). A prime example of the loss that has transpired within Flint’s youth is that of eighteen year old Dominque Absell. Although possessing a common and lively appearance, Dominque has begun to experience chronic headaches, passing out, seizures, and general sickness that are cutting into his life plans severely (Mallory Sidner). It is expected that the Flint water contamination is at the root of the problem and that if not properly taken care of it could prevent Dominque from graduating and going on to his desired service in the military shortly thereafter. The only proof they have that the water is the cause is that once his mother stopped using the contaminated water, her son stopped passing out (Mallory Sidner).

Government assessment and possible solutions

Flint is filled with such charged human emotion stories. Residents frequently report feelings of abandonment by their government and much hopeless for the future of their city. Such accounts are hardly unwarranted. The government had ample suspicion and evidence to act sooner than they did however they refrained from the appropriate action, no doubt lacking the compassion and urgency necessary to make the difference. Nevertheless, the government has made some progress in assisting the city, namely a $28 million dollar request from the governor which was approved by the Michigan House a few weeks ago to aid the city (Bosman, Davey, Smith). Surely the recent storm of media coverage in Flint helped to secure the recent assistance bill. Obama himself met with Karen Weaver, the Flint Michigan mayor, stating to reports that he would:

“Be beside myself” if he were a parent in Flint and that “the notion that immediately families were not notified, this were not shut down – that shouldn’t happen anywhere” (Bosman, Davey, Smith).

Unfortunately, besides having a river contamination problem contributing to the contaminated water, there is also the suspicion aging pipes are a part of the cause (Connor and Rappleye). The dying infrastructure of Flint had prevented the necessary upgrades to the city sewer system which further contributed to the disastrous sewer effects (Semuels). Despite the rising news coverage in Flint concerning water problems, there is a general trend through the U.S. in depreciatory water quality. In 2013 for instance, America received a failing grade ‘D’ in their drinking water score from the American Society for Civil Engineers’ Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (Semuels). This most undesirable metric indicates that the infrastructure in America is approaching the final stage of its utility and is likely to widely become a liability throughout much of the U.S. It is suspected that an innovation initiative totaling more than $1 trillion dollars is needed to reverse this grade into the passing (Semuels).

It may be estimated what the costs will be if the project is not quickly instated thanks to the sobering example that is Flint Michigan’s water crisis. People throughout the nation, starting most likely in the poorest cities and districts, will begin to feel the effects of subtlety being poisoned in increasing damage until they, and their regional county, will have to individually face the disaster before them. However, if taken seriously as a country, these effects may be largely circumvented through the proposal leading to improved safety and water quality across the nation. It is no doubt that this incident will spark academic analysis from essays to dissertations for years to come even if it does not translate into much needed public policy.

Concluding thoughts on the Flint, Michigan water crisis

Flint, Michigan has gone through quite the ordeal over the past two years as they transitioned to the temporary Flint River water source. The mere fact, however, as news reports and research papers have shown, that the river was polluted in the first place is a suspect as the state’s fiscal and environmental response to the issue. Perhaps instead of letting this failure go to total waste, the nation will readily accept the lesson given and set forth the initiative to improve America’s infrastructure as a country. Indeed, this would be a most positive use of tax-payers dollars that could have lasting returns on the country’s health unlike other spending programs like that of war.

Bosman, Julie, Davey, Monica, Smith, Mitch. As Water Problems Grew, Officials Belittled Complaints from Flint. NY Times . Web. Mar. 9, 2016.

Connor, Tracy, Rappley, Hannah. NBC News. 2016. Web. Mar. 9, 2016.

Foley, Kaye. The Flint Water Crisis Explained. Yahoo.com , 2016. Web. Mar. 9, 2016.

Mallory, Simon, Sidner, Sara. Children of Flint: Inheriting anxiety and giving up hope. CNN.com . Web. Mar. 9, 2016

Semuels, Alana. Aging Pipes are Poisoning America’s Tap Water. The Atlantic , 2015. Web. Mar. 9, 2016.

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An Essay on the Water Crisis in Flint, Michigan

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This paper explores the water crisis issue that crippled the community of Flint (Michigan) in early 2014, through 2015. Research findings attributed the root cause of the problem to the switch in the source of Flint water from River Huron in Detroit to the Flint River. This switch in the City’s water source came in response to Flint’s inability to continue to purchase water from Detroit because of the critical economic recession in which it found (and still finds) itself. The high rates of iron corrosion from using the Flint River water as a drinking water source was damaging the Flint water distribution system (Edwards, 2015, para. 8). The presence of huge amounts of lead in the Flint River is what contaminated the Flint drinking water, making it impossible for drinking. The lead water contamination greatly impacted the environmental, economic and health conditions of the residents of Flint. The children of Flint (especially those >5 years of age) presented high lead blood levels due to the lead water contamination problem, especially in socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods (Hannah-Attisha et al., 2015, p.283-290). The decision by the Dayne Walling (Mayor of Flint) in October 2015 to switch back the water system of Flint to its original source in Detroit provided a short term solution to the water crisis. Keywords: Water contamination, lead, City of Flint

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'We Fear the Water'

• Emily Anne Epstein
• February 7, 2016

Brittany Greeson began photographing the Flint water crisis in the spring of 2015, when what is now a nationally-recognized health emergency was a local Michigan headline. As an intern for The Flint Journal , Greeson documented the small protests outside City Hall, talking to frustrated residents asking for clean and affordable drinking water. “ The only thing I could do to help would be to pick up my camera,” she said. Greeson teamed up with The Ground Truth Project to produce her essay, "We Fear the Water," which shows how residents' daily lives have been impacted by this man-made disaster . In Flint, people have to drag suitcases of water down snow-covered streets, children have to have their fingers regularly pricked for lead testing and families bathe in baby wipes for fear of rashes. Who is to blame? What are the long-term effects of exposure to contaminated water? These questions are luxuries to the citizens of Flint, who have to decide if they can buy food or bottled water. “ This story isn’t finished yet,” Greeson said . “ So naturally, I’m not finished yet either.”

• Email/span>

Gladyes Williamson smells a jar of water from her tap on January 13, 2016. Williamson has been recording her struggle with Flint's water crisis since the city switched water sources in early 2014. #

Journey Jones, 3, sits on the kitchen floor in her family's home as her brother Iveon Jones, 2, reaches for a bottled water on January 17, 2016. The pair are two of six children living in the home, all of whom have had elevated levels of lead in their blood. #

A message illuminates the Genesee County jail during a protest by the Detroit Light Brigade in downtown Flint on January 8, 2016. #

Earlene Love, 64, prays alongside her peers as protestors gather outside the Romney building, which houses the office of Governor Rick Snyder, in Lansing, Michigan, on January 14, 2016. #

The Flint River weaves through downtown from the University of Michigan-Flint's Northbank Center on January 6, 2016. The river was the city's main water source since the spring of 2014, following a switch from the Detroit Department of Water and Sewerage. #

Local residents wait in line to pick up Brita water filters at the Flint Fire Department on January 15, 2016. Following the declaration of a state of emergency, local fire stations began acting as water resource centers where residents could pick up filters, lead testing kits, and cases of bottled water. #

A man drags a suitcase full of bottled water away from Firehouse #3, where the Red Cross distributed supplies on January 12, 2016. Many citizens lack viable transit options, which means they must use the city's meager bus system to get heavy cases of bottled water home to their families. #

Janice Berryman, 71, cries while sitting in her bedroom after being asked what the most difficult part of Flint's ongoing crisis was. She said it was loneliness, as members of her family visit less often due to the state of the water in the city. Berryman has lived in the city of Flint her entire life. #

Ti' Nisha Norman, 11, gets her blood tested at Freeman Elementary School's Family Fun and Lead Testing night on January 12, 2016. #

Protestors circle around a balcony at the Michigan State Capitol building chanting for Governor Rick Snyder's resignation during a demonstration in Lansing, Michigan, on January 14, 2016. #

A woman carries a case of bottled water to her car outside of Firehouse #3 in Flint, Michigan, on January 12, 2016. Families were alotted one to two cases, which some residents said was not enough. #

Aireal Sweet, 10, and Amaria Dirrell, 8, brush their teeth using bottled water in the bathroom of their family's home on January 17, 2016. The girls and their siblings were blood tested for lead and all came back with elevated levels. #

A man looks at a protestor dressed as Michigan Governor Rick Snyder during a demonstration organized by the Detroit Light Brigade in front of Flint City Hall on January 8, 2016. #

Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha at her office in the Hurley Children's Center in Flint on January 15, 2016. Dr. Hanna-Attisha, a pediatrician, organized a team of researchers to see if lead was poisoning Flint's children. “What we found was contrary to everything that’s been going on in the country and in the city of Flint. The percentage of children with lead poisoning had increased,” Dr. Hanna-Attisha said. “Here we are in 2016, in the middle of the Great Lakes, and we don’t have access to safe drinking water and we have just given an entire population lead.” #

Flint's Mayor Karen Weaver answers questions from the media as Flint Police Chief James Tolbert looks on from behind an American flag during a press conference announcing Gov. Rick Snyder's approval for a state of emergency in Genesee County on January 1, 2016. #

Stephanie Webber, 20, bows down her head in frustration after hearing that if she is to test positive for lead, she will no longer be able to donate blood in Flint, Michigan, on January 13, 2016. Webber is an active blood donor who recently reached a gallon of blood donated. #

We want to hear what you think about this article. Submit a letter to the editor or write to [email protected].

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The Flint Water Crisis From Marxist Perspective Essay

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Introduction

Peoples’ behaviors and decisions are often the central scope of sociological inquiry. Flint (Michigan) water crisis can be seen as an illustration of such decisions and behaviors that have led to severe issues with multiple implications. To understand the causes of the crisis and ways to prevent such problems in the future, it is possible to employ the Marxist approach. The class concept of this paradigm best fits into the analysis of the situation as a conflict between two major groups is apparent.

Flint (Michigan): Demographics

In the middle of the twentieth century Flint (Michigan) was a rapidly developing and prosperous city that hosted such giants as General Motors. However, in the 1980s, the town started to degrade due to the severe oil crisis that hit the automotive industry (Pauli, 2020). The city saw tremendous demographic shifts because thousands of people left searching for better employment and living conditions. At present, the city’s population is slightly over 96 thousand people (Data USA, 2021). The majority of residents are Black, and a third is White. The poverty rate is relatively high and reached 39% in 2020, while the median age is quite low (35,5 years). These figures suggest that the socio-economic situation in Flint is alarming, and significant changes are needed.

Water Crisis in Flint (Michigan)

The crisis started in 2014, and officials in collaboration and supervision of the public and scientists could not solve it until 2019. In 2014, officials had to change the water source due to the difficulties with maintaining the existing infrastructure (Krings et al., 2018). No rapid measures to improve the infrastructure were implemented. The same year, people addressed officials due to their dissatisfaction with water quality, which remained unattained. After several studies and data publications regarding extreme violation of water quality standards (high lead level, harmful bacteria), the officials were forced to take action. As a result, pipes were replaced, and the necessary improvement to the infrastructure was made with the help of the federal budget funds.

Water Crisis in Flint (Michigan): Causes

One of the central issues that caused the crisis was the city’s constraints related to infrastructure. Flint’s budget could hardly ensure proper maintenance of pipes and other infrastructure components (Pauli, 2020). Due to the economic situation in the city, the public had less control over the actions and decisions of an emergency manager and Governor Rick Snyder. Residents addressed the authorities, but their claims received little attention as the authorities concentrated on the economic development of the city rather than public health or safety.

Flint Water Crisis: Social Concept Applied

When addressing the causes of the crisis, it is necessary to apply the concept of class. Although various scholars note that class is a subjective construct created for analytical purposes, this notion is a relevant component of population stratification (Neilson, 2017). People identify with a particular group, such as workers (proletariat) or big business owners (bourgeoisie). In Flint, this stratification is relevant as there is almost no middle class. Apparently, officials concentrated on the needs of big businesses rather than workers.

Marxist Theory: Class

According to the Marxist theory of class, human society is mainly divided into the proletariat (laborers) and bourgeoisie (those who usurp laborers’ resources). The former are working people with little resources as they are taken over by the rich (Neilson, 2017). These two groups are in constant conflict, and their resolution can be achieved by revolution. The revolution can be implemented peacefully in terms of the coalition with a part (minority) of bourgeois and proletariat or due to violent struggle. Marx believed in the victory of the proletariat and the establishment of communism with its justice and proper distribution of resources.

Marxist Perspective Regarding the Crisis

In the situation in Flint, the officials took the side of the bourgeoisie, paying no attention to potential outcomes. Authorities made some decisions to allocate funds to boost the development of the economy supporting business. However, the proletariat was the class deprived of higher living standards as poor people had to live in older communities with old water pipes contaminated considerably. Water was the resource that became central to the conflict between the two classes. Proletariat won the struggle, which could be explained by the success of the peaceful revolution with the coalition of workers and some part of business owners.

Marxist Perspective Regarding the Crisis (Social Concepts)

The discussion of the crisis from the Marxist theory of class perspective makes it possible to take a closer look at such concepts as civil society and race. Civil society is regarded as a construct bringing society to balance and ensuring that all groups’ interests are addressed (Neilson, 2017). Race is another social concept that can be applied as most of the city’s residents are Black. The poverty rate in this population is also the highest (Data USA, 2021). This group has the lowest access to proper living conditions (good neighborhoods), employment, and health care. This is the most vulnerable group that was the primary force empowering the civil society, which led to considerable improvements and crisis resolution.

The Crisis from Bourdieu’s Perspective

The Flint water crisis can be viewed from Bourdieu’s perspective based on the idea that classes are analytical constructs. Instead, different groups, with individuals joining and leaving these clusters, collaborate or find themselves in a conflict. There was no clear-cut working class in Flint, and the big business struggled for resources. However, workers, unemployed people, small business owners, big business owners, officials, scientists, and others were communicating and collaborating. These interactions helped the groups solve an issue that had adverse effects on all of them.

Marxist and Bourdieu’s perspectives can be both applied to analyze the Flint Water crisis. It becomes clear that classes are objective constructions, although they are not clear-cut. Workers, entrepreneurs, big business owners, merchants, scientists, and employees have diverse interests, and they may sometimes be in conflict. However, the needs of people pertaining to different groups can be achieved by collaborating. The Flint Water Crisis is an illustration of the conflict and its resolution. Although the focus was initially on the interest of businesses and economic growth at the expense of public health, people managed to force officials to make the right choices and address the water issue. The representative of different classes and clusters of society formed the civil society that became the power bringing the solution. The authorities had to implement appropriate measures to solve the problem. It is clear that civil society can be a supervisory force to ensure that officials make proper decisions.

Data USA. (2021). Flint, MI . Web.

Krings, A., Kornberg, D., & Lane, E. (2018). Organizing under austerity: How residents’ concerns became the Flint Water Crisis . Critical Sociology, 45 (4-5), 583-597. Web.

Neilson, D. (2017). In-itself for-itself: Towards second-generation neo-Marxist class theory. Ca pital & Class, 42 (2), 273-295. Web.

Pauli, B. J. (2020). The Flint water crisis. Wires Water, 7 (3), 1-14. Web.

• Marx’s Thesis on the Fetishism of Commodities
• Social Construction of Reality
• Marx, Weber, and Bourdieu on Societal Stratification
• Bourdieu’s Concept of Habitus, Capital and Field
• America’s Growing Clean Water Crisis and the Resulting Diseases
• Review of “Making Social Change: Engaging a Desire for Social Change” Chapter 9
• Analysis of Social Change Ways
• Culture and Society Through the Babylonian Sufferer
• Social Inequity in "The Hunger Games" by Collins
• Social Impacts of Hosting Large Scale International Events
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2023, January 12). The Flint Water Crisis From Marxist Perspective. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-flint-water-crisis-from-marxist-perspective/

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IvyPanda . 2023. "The Flint Water Crisis From Marxist Perspective." January 12, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-flint-water-crisis-from-marxist-perspective/.

1. IvyPanda . "The Flint Water Crisis From Marxist Perspective." January 12, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-flint-water-crisis-from-marxist-perspective/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "The Flint Water Crisis From Marxist Perspective." January 12, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-flint-water-crisis-from-marxist-perspective/.

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How the Problem Happened

• Harris, C. Pritchard, M. Rabins, M. James, R. Englehardt E. "Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases-Case 16: Hurrican Katrina". Wadsworth, Cengage Learning. 2014. 5th Edition. Text.
• Sills, G. Vroman, N. Wahl, R. Schwanz, N. "Overview of New Orleans Levee Failures: Lessons Learned and Their Impact on National Levee Design and Assessment". JOURNAL OF GEOTECHNICAL AND GEOENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING ASCE. 2008. Pg 556-565. Web.
• Mittal, A. "Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project." United States Government Accountability Office. 2005. Web.

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