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• Published: 06 November 2020

Envisioning a “science diplomacy 2.0”: on data, global challenges, and multi-layered networks

• Simone Turchetti   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1834-2503 1 &
• Roberto Lalli   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-5854-3484 2  

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume  7 , Article number:  144 ( 2020 ) Cite this article

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• Politics and international relations
• Science, technology and society

The term “science diplomacy” broadly identifies interactions between scientific and foreign policy communities connected to the promotion of international scientific exchanges (also as a way to establish constructive relations between countries), and the provision of scientific advice on issues of relevance to more than one nation. Science diplomacy initiatives have been positively portrayed by practitioners, while recent scholarship has underscored the need for these actions to more directly address social and global challenges. In what follows we sketch the contours of a data-driven “science diplomacy 2.0” that could actually be seen as more directly tackling these challenges in two important ways. First, we outline a multi-layered approach that integrates data and meta-data from various disciplines in order to promote greater awareness about what kind of research should actually be prioritized in science diplomacy actions. Second, we argue for the creation of responsible innovation observatories for operationalizing such a methodology at both national and global levels.

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As advanced societies become more reliant on expert advice, its administrators increasingly look for scientists to offer solutions to complex global challenges (e.g., climate change, food security, poverty, energy consumption, nuclear disarmament, and more recently a pandemic). In turn, practitioners, in Europe and elsewhere, underline the merits of “science diplomacy” as a device that could bring them closer to addressing these global societal issues (Gluckman et al., 2017 ). In particular, they underscore that the promotion of scientific exchanges, and of scientific collaborations across borders, can stimulate both innovative research capable to tackle these issues, and to establish constructive relations between nations (Fedoroff, 2009 ; Royal Society/AAAS, 2010 ; Ruffini, 2017 , p. 11).

Scholars have been less enthusiastic, however. They stress that the concept of science diplomacy is still in a “fluid state” and its practice does not offer a single and ready-made approach. In particular, its origins have yet to be comprehensively explored (Turchetti et al., 2020 ) and its present adoption does not clarify enough about how it concretely translates into science policy actions (Flink and Schreiterer, 2010 ) or how it brings scientists and diplomats into constructive relations (Fähnrich, 2015 ). The science diplomacy discourse has been dubbed as “sensationalist” as it promises a great deal more than what it actually demonstrates to deliver (Flink, 2020 ).

So can science diplomacy really be effective in tackling global challenges, and if that is the case, what would make it more successful? Recent scholarly work has put considerable emphasis on the “relational” aspect of science diplomacy, and especially the merits of better coordinating at strategic, operational and support levels specific actions within and outside Europe (Van Langenhove, 2016 ). A paper currently circulating identifies more interpersonal measures (mainly applicable to Europe but elsewhere too), including strengthening a dialog between stakeholders through meta-governance structures allowing bringing “actors together” in a reflexive mode, i.e., “to let them reflect on and co-construct their positions, different truths, norms and values, concerns and interests” (Aukes et al., 2019 ). While these approaches focussing on coordination have merits, it is equally appropriate to consider whether specific actions could further define science diplomacy to direct decision-makers in charge of developing national policies and international negotiations centered on better investments in international scientific collaborations. From within the scientific community, the general answer is often too simplistic, claiming that an investment in truly original science is always beneficial (Haynes, 2018 ). In contrast with this view, specific policies and strategies that demonstrate these societal and global impacts of novel research are not always easy to elaborate especially given that (responsible) research and innovation is perceived differently in different national contexts (Doezema et al., 2019 ) and evidence of societal impact is often asserted rather than truly demonstrated (Kuhlmann and Rip, 2018 ; Flink and Kaldewey, 2018 ).

In this article, we sketch instead tangible measures that could potentially make science diplomacy interactions more effective at local and global levels. In particular, we look at the global circulation and integration of scientific data to suggest a key area for improvement in shaping a data-driven “science diplomacy 2.0.” Data are undoubtedly at the center of many studies, but most focus on their availability. In contrast, in this paper we focus on their integration, especially as data and “meta-data”. Sets of data about datasets (or “meta-data”) provide critical information often disregarded in the literature. One important exception is a recent article (Özdemir et al., 2014 ) that connects “meta”-data and global issues claiming that meta-data are decisive in better harmonizing the production of new knowledge to responsible innovation through meta-data-oriented studies of social priorities. Science diplomacy, Özdemir et al. argue further, should thus be mobilized to propel setting up of “innovation observatories”, responsible for meta-data production.

This paper draws on this proposal to more concretely outline the integrated production of (meta-)data through science diplomacy with the ambition of providing the relevant policy-making organizations, especially at European level, with ideas for future actions. In particular, we discuss how a “science diplomacy 2.0” should not only promote the establishment of responsible innovation observatories, but also equip them with personnel endorsing a multi-layered approach operationalizing data integration. In this way the observatories would also feedback useful information about further investments in international scientific collaboration. We conclude that science diplomacy should lead to more investments in interdisciplinary approaches combining “hard” and social sciences.

Science diplomacy and responsible innovation

In order to address the question of whether science diplomacy could more consistently align the circulation of new data to global challenges and social demands, it is first necessary to consider what science diplomacy actually entails. The relevant literature points towards synergies that the interactions between scientific and foreign policy communities can produce, from the provision of advice on international issues with a scientific component (on environment, nuclear disarmament, etc.), to the elaboration of exchanges and international collaborative projects as a way to establish positive, constructive relations between countries. The underlying assumption in this literature is that all the stakeholders involved will benefit from science diplomacy initiatives; countries will produce relations that are more cordial, science will advance and through that advancement the society at large will benefit too (see Royal Society/AAAS, 2010 ). For instance Jorge-Pastrana et al. ( 2018 ) have recently documented the strengthening of relations between the U.S. and Cuba after years of tensions through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Cuban Academy of Sciences. It notably established an important collaboration in scientific and medical research, and especially in the search for treatments of epidemic diseases. The outcome of exercises such as this one would thus seem at first sight a “win-win” option in which scientists, decision-makers and the society at large benefit from the “science diplomacy” initiative. Gual Soler and McGrath ( 2017 ) also report that a large international collaborative project such as the Square Kilometer Array (SKA) in South Africa envisages a number of important social benefits for African countries including “to develop human capital, bring about local and regional innovation and expand capacity for data science.” However, while the SKA’s political and human capital benefits cannot be underestimated, there is no specific analysis showing the data put together in the collaborative exercise to have more societal impacts than other scientific datasets.

Moreover, the study of past science diplomacy exercises, provides a more comprehensive understanding of these exercises’ progeny and underlying ambitions. While the historical study of science diplomacy is still in its infancy, it appears that many past schemes aimed instead at strengthening bilateral and multilateral relations thus giving precedence to initiatives that would contribute to propel them, whether socially oriented or not (Turchetti et al., 2020 ). The uses of science diplomacy during key periods in recent history, such as the Cold War, led to particularly problematic schemes stimulating scientific exchanges with the view of securing control over foreign science programmes and resources, or using science diplomacy projects as a vehicle for covert intelligence-gathering and espionage missions (see Smith III, 2014 ; Adamson, 2016 , 2017 ; Adamson and Turchetti, 2020 ). They also aimed to foster political allegiance to hegemonic countries (hence within the realm of colonial and imperial projects) through the device of scientific and technological collaboration (see Krige, 2006 ; Wolfe, 2018 ). On the whole, new studies are now showing that the current science diplomats’ ancestors used the promotion of scientific exchanges as a way to generate or extend asymmetrical power relations across borders and continents.

This (still unfolding) historical study adds to a number of critical reviews emphasizing how the practitioners’ enthusiastic adoption of science diplomacy as a rhetorical device has led them to overlook some of its problematic features, including that it encompasses a wide spectrum of different (and competing at times) initiatives (Flink and Schreiterer, 2010 ) and takes for granted the constructive, positive nature of the dialog between scientists and diplomats (Fähnrich, 2015 ; Ruffini, 2017 ; Kaltofen and Acuto, 2018 ). Science diplomacy literature also does not provide sufficient indications for decision-makers with regards to approaching international negotiations, especially in the realm of scientific collaborations.

To make science diplomacy a force for change, at the global level, it is thus important that we first acknowledge its historical legacy and present problematic conceptualization. We should also recognize that directing science diplomacy towards societal and global challenges would represent a paradigmatic shift in foreign relations rather than something further extending past and present science diplomacy actions. In particular, we would need to consider how to instil new ambitions in science diplomacy schemes and practices at the levels of individual administrations, bilateral collaborations and multilateral agreements.

What models of positive engagement can be taken as example? The EU has recently sponsored important projects such as InsSciDE and S4D4C paving the way to a greater understanding of the science diplomacy phenomenon through collaborative engagements across European borders and disciplines. It is clearly decisive to their success as EU-sponsored collective endeavors that critical awareness in individual and joint analyses prevails over simplistic or hagiographic descriptions of a complex phenomenon. Footnote 1

We also see recent EU science diplomacy schemes to have promise in so far as, taking stock from the experience of multilateral European collaboration in science and technology, seek to open this collaboration to non-European countries thus breaking up with the hegemonic model distinctive of the Cold War period (see, for instance, Moedas, 2016 ). We also commend initiatives, such as that for a Commission exploring the history of science, technology and diplomacy under the aegis of the Division of History of Science and Technology of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, seeking to provide a perspective on science diplomacy from non-“Western” perspectives and viewpoints. Footnote 2 We are also appreciative of “bottom-up” approaches in which national administrations echo in their initiatives the propositions set forward by the scientists themselves, especially when novel studies align to their activism thus combining genuine research interests to grassroots political projects for social change. For example, some statisticians have recently envisaged the merits of a “statactivist” (“statistical activism”) approaches in which the “use [of] numbers, measurements and indicators” informs “collective action” (Erickson et al., 2020 ). These forms of political engagement, when applied to the scientists’ involvement in the international arena, offer effective solutions, since they do not prioritize an alignment of national and supra-national interests; they configure instead efforts to transcend a national agenda in light of social and global needs.

The recently published Madrid Declaration on Science Diplomacy has extended this ambition to re-think about the foundations of science diplomacy reiterating that while it “has long been a tool to develop bilateral and multilateral relationships, [its] definition and applications […] broadened considerably in recent years. This conceptual broadening coincides with the growing understanding that science and technology underpin so many of the challenges and opportunities that current societies face, whether as a driver or a potential solution.” The declaration was equally explicit in aligning this ambition to global challenges as recently configured in the UN context; namely to “facilitate the identification of common global challenges” especially through “efforts to achieve the ‘Sustainable Development Goals’” (“The Madrid Declaration on Science Diplomacy”, 2019 ; see also United Nations, 2020 ).

In what follows, we identify data circulation and integration as key items in this transformation of the science diplomacy device. Data have not regularly featured in science diplomacy studies and only fairly recently have come to occupy a space in the analysis of how to address societal and global challenges. The importance of promoting opportunities for scientific research that is socially desirable and undertaken with public interest in mind is traditionally reiterated in “responsible innovation” analyses (for an overview see Stilgoe et al., 2013 ). Moreover, the study of these opportunities has led to consider mainly the production of scientific data in laboratories and fieldwork, rather than its circulation and integration . So for instance late 1960s scholarly literature emphasized how pressure from industrial concerns (e.g., Ravetz, 1971 ) or the military (e.g., Forman, 1987 ) warped scientific production away from social ambitions setting priorities in exploring new research issues and themes. The debate on the production of scientific knowledge overlapped that on the development too, with many scholars in Latin America debating if in order for science to address societal issues it was necessary to move beyond a Western model of knowledge production or applying the same model in different ways (Vasen, 2016 ).

From the 1980s onwards there has been a significant shift in emphasis in scholarly analyses from knowledge production to knowledge circulation. The spreading of information technologies (and the internet) has focussed the attention of many researchers to the centrality of data circulation and integration to responsible innovation discourses. The main effect of the growing interconnectedness of distant places was to reconsider social and global needs in terms of access to scientific data produced elsewhere. It is a turn that has informed many fields of research, also paving the way to the development of “transnational” and “global” studies (see for instance Iriye, 2013 ).

Notably, the next generation of scholars propounding the need for responsible innovation focussed on how regions and nations can gain access to scientific datasets, and if this access can actually be of importance in shaping societal and developmental challenges. One key catalyst for this analysis was the rise of Open Access (Suber, 2012 ), and the emergence of the Open Science movement (Vicente-Saez and Martinez-Fuentes, 2018 ). As recently noted in a UN document “the basic and applied sciences in particular, in addition to being central in our daily lives, are the main triggers of technological innovations […] In this context, it is essential that science and technology be rendered more accessible worldwide, in both training and in practice” (through open access, open science and open data initiatives) (UNESCO, 2015 ).

In light of this shift in emphasis from production to circulation, it would appear desirable for newly designed science diplomacy schemes to address issues regarding data access and integration at global and regional levels, while the connections between the Open Science movement and science diplomacy has so far been very weak. Footnote 3 In what follows we focus on how science diplomacy could have an impact on the circulation of scientific data.

From data to meta-data (and back)

We typically refer to data as information or knowledge organized in some suitable form, initially collected as “raw”, and then processed to elaborate theories, principles and products. Data are inevitably at the core of scientific research as scientists delve to collect, elaborate and use datasets accordingly to their needs. Since the late twentieth century, datasets have become so large that we have even started to adopt the term “big data.” Big data are relevant to a number of scientific issues regarding the natural world on things as different as the structure of the DNA and the structure of oceans and mountains (Aronova et al., 2017 ). According to a report of the International Data Corporation what makes “big data” markedly different from traditional datasets is the so-called four Vs: volume, velocity, variety, and veracity; all elements of novelty that compel -at times- to elaborate new processing practices and techniques, which also become themselves useful knowledge in interpreting complex scientific phenomena (Gantz and Reinsel, 2011 ). The availability of these large datasets thus becomes critical to address a number of research tasks, especially (but not only) in the environmental field. It was recently shown, for instance, that scientific assessments on ecological impacts of oil spills are becoming increasingly reliant on access to datasets of various kinds (Reichman et al., 2011 ).

This raises the issue of accessibility to (big) data, which has even led to the development of a new “data” diplomacy concerned with negotiating access. For instance, a recent report resulting from a European project defines data diplomacy in terms of using big data as a new tool for diplomacy, as a defining topic in the diplomatic agenda, and as an element hanging the environment in which diplomats operate (Jacobson et al., 2018 ). Boyd et al. ( 2019 ) have argued that effective global actions require finding new ways to promote a more productive circulation of scientific data and exercising greater control over data fruition so as to prevent the unlawful dissemination of restricted information, while making more data available to users’ communities.

While greater availability (and/or control) of (big) data may have a positive impact in addressing development challenges, it is somewhat problematic that data diplomacy literature treats data in terms of a “deficit model” (Wynne, 1991 ). It suggests that more data and datasets will “foster evidence-based decision making” (United Nations, 2015 , p. 10) and that more data will stimulate rational choices without really considering social and global issues outside this data-driven perspective. This literature emphasizes “an enormous need for collection and analysis of data” without actually recognizing that is the elaboration of an analytical framework and the selection for specific data that allows for its interpretation that gives them value and that without such a framework data have no value at all if not potentially (Jacobson et al., 2018 , p. 32).

Integration between data and “meta-data” offers instead a novel outlook on specific issues that datasets alone cannot address. The merits of this integration have been emphasized fairly recently especially in connection with the study of the genome, or the genetic material of an organism as defined by the DNA (Özdemir et al., 2014 ). Much of the current work within the field of genetics consists of putting together the data that relate to the code and in particular those that have to do with the sequences that are decisive in the synthesis of molecular structures (proteins, etc.). There are many institutes, worldwide, carrying out sequencing work that typically results in advances in genetics regularly reported in academic literature. While the genetic data provides critical information on the synthesis of life constituents such as proteins, there is equally critical information clustered in meta-data that tells us a great deal more about the mechanisms of expression in the creation of organic structures. Genomics , the discipline that focuses on meta-genetic data, is now considered as important as genetics when exploring growth and variation in living organisms. In addition, genomic-type analyses have become more important even outside biology, as proven by the proliferation of “–omic” study areas (or “omics” revolution), which emphasize the merits of integrating data and meta-data in the study of complex phenomena. A new journal, OMICS , has even promoted the understanding of how such integration can stimulate a fruitful dialog across disciplines.

Its wider appeal is partly associated with the recognition amongst scholars that social and global problems with a science and technology component cannot be addressed exclusively from a disciplinary-oriented data-driven perspective and need greater understanding and appreciation for the social and human conditions associated with the scientific and technical solutions envisaged for these problems. This is firstly because ignorance of specific circumstances (environments, habits, values, local knowledge) for foreseeing solutions often leads to controversial or even plainly erroneous solutions. In the 1980s an assessment about the radioactivity of soils in the Lake District (UK) carried out by Ministry of Agriculture experts failed to recognize what was instead fully known to local farmers thus erroneously attributing above average levels of radioactivity to the Chernobyl disaster rather than to the impact of the much nearer nuclear station of Sellafield (Wynne, 1998 ).

The crucial importance of the ready availability of a great diversity of data has emerged with particular gravity in the scientific uncertainties underlying the different national responses to the recent spread of the new coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) initially hitting the Chinese city of Wuhan. The rapidity with which the COVID-19 epidemics has triggered a medical, economic and social crisis worldwide encouraged the adoption of new scientific practices for making immediately available, in an open access fashion, research products and data (Apuzzo and Kirkpatrick, 2020 ; Fox, 2020 ; Zastrow, 2020 ). Scientists are thus trying to work with a high production of diverse data to answer unsolved issues related to the COVID-19 pandemics, which include finding the causes of the high variability in mortality rates across different countries or regions (e.g., Bayer and Kuhn, 2020 ), evaluating the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions to decelerate the spread of the disease (Flaxman et al., 2020 ; Lai et al., 2020 ), as well as their effects on social and economic well-being. Footnote 4 It also entails investigating the role of environmental factors and social norms in the effective reproduction number of the disease (Qiu et al., 2020 ; Xu et al., 2020 ). At the same time, the current crisis shows the many issues in terms of science diplomacy of a too restricted view of what are considered the relevant scientific data in relation to epidemic modeling’s assumptions in informing national and international sanitary policies (Fuller, 2020 ; Ioannidis, 2020 ).

Likewise, climate change issues are aptly (but somewhat simplistically) synthesized in terms of efforts to reduce CO 2 locally and globally and put in place mitigation measures, and this synthesis often entails a problematic sponsorship for geoengineering solutions; something that has raised controversy especially on the occasion of the publication of the 4th IPCC Report. The report was criticized as “legitimizing” geoengineering rather than helping to produce an integrative understanding of what solutions could be viable (Stilgoe, 2013 ). It is notable that the rapporteurs rejected several requests for reviewing the final draft grounded on works presenting substantial historical evidence about the problems associated with geoengineering. In particular, the work of Jim Fleming ( 2010 ) on the subject, emphasizing the hubristic nature of geoengineering interventions, was not integrated in the final report making space only for hazier point that geoengineering solutions might make things worse or result in inequalities (IPCC, 2014 , pp. 36–38 and 41). In the end the historical datasets were mothballed and not integrated with the climatological data.

The merits of genomics and the shortcomings of non-integrated examinations of climate change issues suggest introducing a virtuous model for convincingly integrating in a structured way data and meta-data. Moreover, it supports the view that independent analyses by different cohorts of scientists specializing in different fields should integrate to produce truly trans-disciplinary analyses combining data about the natural world and human society as a way to address global societal challenges. This strategy allows taking the best from both these analyses also providing decision-makers with a range of options in implementing responsible innovation locally and globally. In what follows, we provide details of a specific approach that could successfully cater for this integration.

Data vs. meta-data interactions: a Linked-data multi-layered approach?

We propose here that recent advances in two areas of scholarship, network theory and computing, create both the formal basis for the feasibility of an approach and a theoretical framework that allows connecting and interpreting a variety of data of different kinds thus catering for data/meta-data integration. This framework is based on two methods. The first one is the Linked-Data method that has been developed in connection with the evolution of Web technologies (Berners-Lee, 2009 ). The second one is the multi-layer approach in network theory, which allows for an analysis of different kinds of entities ( nodes in network jargon) and of the relations between them ( links ) within one and the same formal framework, both conceptual and mathematical (Bianconi, 2018 ). Altogether, these approaches allow overcoming the data/meta-data divide and direct us towards an analysis of interlinked data.

The Linked-data framework is based on the continuously increasing availability of interlinked data in the Web, which dismantle the hierarchical structure upon which rests the data/meta-data divide. Within the Linked-Data approach, data are built using technological frameworks so that they can be read by machines through semantic queries—a structure that has been called the Semantic Web (European Semantic Web Symposium, 2004 ). At least in principle, through these queries researchers can retrieve a set of interlinked data from different sources. A globally standardized framework to build structured datasets based on the Linked-data method poses the formal basis to connect a diverse range of data all linked between them. In this way, the definition of what is data and what meta-data depends on the specific enquires of the analysts, allowing for a multitude of flexible approaches to the issues of interest. In other words, the division of scientific data (data) and contextual data (meta-data) of a different nature (cultural, social, political, economic) can be flexibly set by the analysts once all different kinds of data are structured in a formal (interlinked) way. A proposal for standardized data taking based on the Linked-data framework has, e.g., recently been proposed in the emerging field of computational history of science (Damerow and Wintergrün, 2019 ; Wintergrün, 2019 ). In addition, internationally standardized tools for meta-data description of bibliographical and cultural items—such as the CIDOC Conceptual Reference Model (Doerr, 2003 )—are increasingly shifting toward the adoption of the Linked-Data canon (Schilling, 2012 ). We see in this movement toward the standardization of meta-data modeling with the Linked-data framework a possible strategy for the elaboration of the more complex analysis of data/meta-data interaction here proposed.

Taking into consideration a great variety of (big-)data modules is an enormous challenge, but there are advances in graph theory and complex systems analysis that are designed to cope with this challenge. The Linked-data framework is intrinsically related to network theoretical approaches, both at the conceptual and methodological levels (Wintergrün, 2019 ). The relevance of links in meta-data modeling naturally leads to interpret the specific data in relation to the set of data related to it. So that meaning is retrieved through the analysis of the structural position of specific elements within a net of relations with other entities. As we are proposing to put more emphasis than has been done so far on contextual data related to specific scientific data, one also needs a reliable model to quickly analyze this complex set of relations between different entities and draw some statistically reliable conclusions.

The multi-layer network theory allows for this analysis. Developed especially in the field of sociology to quantitatively analyze the interrelations between different kinds of social relations and their dynamical evolution (Dickison et al., 2016 ; Lazega and Snijders, 2016 ), the multi-layer approach has been, very recently, formalized as a specific branch of graph theory. This formalization has permitted a robust application of the multi-layer network theory to other fields, so that one has now a full set of mathematical rules that effectively allow to carry out what we are proposing to do in this essay: to analyze, at least in principle, how different elements have interacted with each other in the past and create dynamical network models that can inform policy-makers about the incidence of specific science and technological innovations in connection with the social, cultural, political, economic spheres in different local contexts.

The fact that multi-layer modeling of the interrelated dynamics of very different kinds of entities is, in principle, feasible has led to the emergence of the problem of how to model interactions between sub-systems of different nature, especially with the explicit goal to assess the global challenges of the Anthropocene in the framework of earth-system sciences (Subramanian, 2019 ). Donges et al. ( 2018 ), for instance, have put forward a taxonomy for modeling global environmental change based on three levels: the biophysical level, the socio-metabolic level, and the socio-cultural level. Crucial element of the taxonomy is the hypothesized set of interactions (links) connecting each layer to the others as well as of feedback loops one might expect from these interactions. This approach provides an example of advanced multi-layer modeling that takes into account disciplinary divisions in the definition itself of the analytical levels. In this way, a multi-disciplinary collaboration is explicitly embedded in the model itself, as the data come from different disciplinary domains.

Similar kinds of schematic taxonomies of multi-layer analyses have also been employed in the history of science to assess the relations between social actors (the social layer), material representations of knowledge (the semiotic layer), and more abstract knowledge elements (the semantic layer) in the dynamics of knowledge systems (Renn et al., 2016 ; for applications to historical cases see Valleriani et al., 2019 ; Lalli et al., 2020 ). This kind of approach necessarily implies the development of alternative working practices in the humanities based on close multi-disciplinary collaborative environments (Laubichler et al., 2019 ).

We have then the technological framework, the mathematical apparatus, and proposed taxonomies to analyze multiple interrelated datasets in order to identify those research projects that can effectively bring science diplomacy to assess more effectively global challenges. Indeed, exercises to evaluate research practices and methods have grown intensely with the goals to promote robustness in science against the mushrooming of novel disciplines, each with different standards and practices. The inspiration to build a robust “science of science” has been one of the motors behind Derek J. de Solla Price’s intellectual activity, duly recognized by his public designation as the father of scientometrics (De Solla Price, 1963 ). However, in line with the “statactivist” approach, we argue for a critical evaluation of numbers, statistics and graph descriptions that while catering for integrative analyses, do not necessarily configure new numerical evidence as prompting imperatives in the social domain, but rather offer elements for further investigating solutions and debate the potential of different solutions within the wider society.

This is partly because we are familiar with how, in the last decades, quantitative evaluation of researchers’ scientific outputs has problematically informed national academic and funding policies (see, e.g., Baccini et al., 2019 ). Moreover, we know that providing quantitative rules based on scientific outputs for individuating the emergence of scientific innovation and novel fields has been difficult. Various attempts at providing such rules (see, e.g., Bettencourt et al., 2006 , 2008 , 2009 ) had little impact in the science policy domain. The focus on data of scientific outputs is not sufficient to assess the role of research in the human society, and a more complex approach is needed. Moreover, to do that, an interdisciplinary approach based on relevant meta-data can be valuable (Ioannidis, 2018 ). We conclude that science diplomacy could be made more effective by promoting the integrative analyses sketched so far in this article. In essence a “science diplomacy 2.0” should have the ambition to propel responsible innovation across the world through a data-driven examination of research with potential to addresses social priorities and global demands. Who should provide this data-driven approach? In our view, this should be the task for purposefully designed “observatories” that science diplomacy initiatives should more emphatically promote.

Science diplomacy 2.0? Promoting the observatories

If science diplomacy, as many practitioners claim, can be a device to propel scientific collaborations across borders, then its ambition to tackle global challenges greatly depends on what kind of collaboration it promotes. We thus see a science diplomacy 2.0 to pay greater attention to societal and global challenges by providing instruments that allow policy-makers to better decide between competing collaborative research. One critical instrument informing this choice would be the responsible innovation observatory. Such an observatory would pool together data (and meta-data) from various disciplines and integrate them through the linked-data, multi-layered approach. The deriving results would be thus elaborated with the ambition of understanding what kind of research areas should receive priority in a world-region depending on local social demands, or even at a global level, depending on challenges to humankind and its environment.

The most cited example of an observatory of this kind is the WHO Global Observatory on Health R&D. Since 2013, the observatory has sought to identify health R&D priorities based on public health needs, by “consolidating, monitoring and analyzing relevant information on the health R&D needs of developing countries; building on existing data collection mechanisms; and supporting coordinated actions on health R&D” (WHO, 2014 ). The underlying justification for such an observatory is that the availability of contextual knowledge (or meta-data) about the incidence of epidemics and diseases can actually guide governments and sponsors in making decisions about future allocations of funding. It is important to stress that this is not an approach necessarily “warping” funding opportunities. If any, would allow anyone who is in a relevant funding position to make informed choices when selecting specific projects. Equally, researchers would not prevent from freely exploring what they wish, but this approach would entail the observatory to make funding recommendations for prioritizing some research areas that demonstrate social impact.

The WHO observatory is not the only relevant example of how one can promote responsible innovation through the accumulation of meta-data. Another recent example is the EU Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Observatory (RIO). This is outlined as a policy support facility aiming to regularly report on national R&I systems and to produce cross-country analyses too. There are equally important examples at the national and local level of institutes seeking to make greater sense of research impacts. For instance, the Oslo Institute for Research on the Impact of Science (OSIRIS) in Norway seeks to develop meta-data-driven research analyses to improve research systems and inform science policy.

This is not to say that responsible innovation observatories exist only at the international level. Advanced nations such as France and Germany, for instance, been equipped with similar observatories, also through the use of European funds. Footnote 5 However, we suggest here to place their promotion at the center of international science diplomacy initiatives rather than within the context of national efforts, and, as the next paragraph shows, we also argue for the merit of connecting transnational observatories at local and global levels.

Science diplomacy could play a positive role in several, interconnected, ways to the growth of data-driven responsible innovation observatories. First, science diplomacy could openly embrace the global challenges agenda by sponsoring the adoption of these observatories in a number of countries across the world. It could also promote a more structured approach to international scientific collaboration that is not the result of individual initiatives (at times supported by government sponsors in light of unstated interests), but rather as a way to embrace a trans-disciplinary and integrative research culture. Those involved in science diplomacy schemes would thus work towards promoting the setting up and development of innovation observatories and their staffing with scholars and scientists of different disciplines eager to identify research priorities for one country or one world-region. In turn, they would also promote ways to advance further discussions between those elaborating this new knowledge and the local stakeholders to verify if the results of these trans-disciplinary and integrative research exercises match what they foresee as research priorities. Once this is ascertained, were-to-be “science diplomats” would work with their own governments and international organizations to pool the resources needed to take prioritized international collaborative projects to completion. We see these efforts as more targeted interventions resulting from an analysis of what are the societal priorities at local and global level. This work could display the importance of integrative, pluralistic scientific analyses that do not single out one specific set of data as decisive in defining R&D trajectories or even social interventions, but rather promote a truly engaging relationship between experts in a variety of fields.

We also foresee that the observatories could be of different types and responding to different challenges depending on their reach and thematic areas. Global responsible innovation observatories could be set up on specific themes of international/global reach to promote worldwide integrative analysis (on health, climate change, etc.) and inform with their integrated data analyses networks of regional observatories more concerned with data integration at local levels. Whatever their type and range of activities, such observatories will need to tackle a series of challenges in order to implement the proposed methodology to support the production of data. In particular, this production is still modest in the social sciences and the humanities in comparison to other sciences, so an imbalance in data integration will have to be addressed. Moreover, observatories will have to deal with the legal, ethical and political issues associated with data privacy and develop robust strategies for data protection. Finally, they will have to support the necessary training in educational settings, and promote some form of data acquisition standardization on top of meta-data integration.

As for the last point, rather than with some degree of automation through the use of machine learning techniques, we propose such an integration to be achieved through close international infrastructural coordination of the proposed observatories both at the local and global levels. In fact, it would be important that observatories do not re-produce monolithic models of data production through traditional academic indicators (bibliometrics, patent databases, clinical trials, etc.) or so as to replicate traditional expert vs. lay dynamic, but rather pursue approaches based on the “co-productionist” framework herewith outlined. Moreover, we would think of local, indigenous knowledge to be represented in the observatories at two important levels. First, in trying to find ways to integrate the results of different approaches to knowledge into the multi-layered network approach so as to emphasize aspects of local knowledge that are traditionally overlooked in expert-based analyses. Moreover, also to present the results of observatories’ multi-layered analysis to local/regional stakeholders to as to get a much better sense if the research priorities of social and global impact envisaged through research match what is perceived within the local population. While local indigenous knowledge might not necessarily be always available, the co-productionist approach employed by the observatories will result in greater efforts to collect such data at the same time overcoming the ethical and political issues of the unregulated reuse of indigenous data (Radin, 2017 ).

What science diplomacy really was in the past is the subject of ongoing historical research yet to accomplish. How it is presently being advertised seems to contradict the preliminary results of this research, envisaging science diplomacy as a “win-win” option in international affairs benefitting scientists, decision-makers and stakeholders alike. We have shown in this paper that in the future science diplomacy will only realize the promise of being the transformative tool in international relations that its advocates want only if key policy provisions and directions are elaborated. In particular, we see the actual aligning of science diplomacy exercises and responsible innovation analysis as decisive to this transformation so that the practical benefits to local and global communities deriving from international scientific collaborations can be fully appreciated. We have offered in this article some general ideas about how future science diplomacy initiatives could more readily demonstrate their social impacts by recalling the centrality of data analysis and integration. Drawing on recent “omics”, “linked-data” and “multi-layered” approaches we have thus emphasized that a “science diplomacy 2.0” should be construed as the promotion of integrative data analyses grounded on trans-disciplinary scientific work helping to envisage research priorities globally and locally. It should also be outlined as promoting the infrastructures needed, i.e., the innovation observatories, for these studies to be completed. It should finally be understood as facilitating the implementation of the schemes that are prioritized in this trans-disciplinary and integrative research. On the whole, the transformative qualities of science diplomacy will truly come to the fore when, rather than coming into support of one group of states or disciplines, they will promote the social and global transformations that the integration of hard and social sciences promises, and that original collaborative schemes outlined by the responsible innovation observatories would deliver.

Data availability

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.

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Turchetti, S., Lalli, R. Envisioning a “science diplomacy 2.0”: on data, global challenges, and multi-layered networks. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 7 , 144 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00636-2

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Science Diplomacy to Promote and Strengthen Basic Research and International Cooperation: Proceedings of a Workshop–in Brief (2021)

Chapter: science diplomacy to promote and strengthen basic research and international cooperation: proceedings of a workshopin brief.

Proceedings of a Workshop

SCIENCE DIPLOMACY TO PROMOTE AND STRENGTHEN BASIC RESEARCH AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Proceedings of a workshop—in brief.

The Global Research Council (GRC) brings together heads of science and engineering funding agencies from around the world to promote data sharing and best practices, and to support high-quality collaboration. 1 The GRC plays an important role in science diplomacy, namely by promoting and strengthening basic research and international collaboration. To further define the broader role of the GRC in this space and to identify opportunities to advance science diplomacy, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (the National Academies) convened a virtual workshop on March 12, 15, and 16, 2021 , with the goals of:

• Describing the institutional goals and structures currently available or being proposed for international basic research cooperation in the framework of science diplomacy;
• Considering the areas of basic research worth exploring in greater depth to better connect research funders and science diplomacy practitioners (e.g., diplomats, researchers);
• Exploring opportunities for the GRC and funder communities to work together; and
• Discussing roles that multilateral organizations might play in contributing to international basic research cooperation.

This Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief provides a high-level summary of the workshop discussion, including ways in which science diplomacy can promote basic research. Workshop discussions and presentations also addressed challenges to science diplomacy, proposed strategies to address them, and future opportunities to advance science diplomacy.

WELCOME AND GOALS FOR THE WORKSHOP

E. William Colglazier , senior scholar at the American Association for the Advancement of Science and editor-in-chief of Science & Diplomacy , served as committee chair of the workshop and provided the opening remarks. The concept of science diplomacy has gained popularity, he noted. It was initially conceived as a tool for bringing together scientists and diplomats to accomplish concrete goals (which could be scientific or diplomatic). The GRC, which is viewed as an institution of science diplomacy, has accomplished several concrete scientific objectives by bringing together large national funders and removing barriers to international scientific cooperation. In addition to the workshop goals highlighted above, Colglazier noted that the workshop will explore opportunities for the GRC and funder communities to work together to build capacity and create new partnerships in support of science diplomacy.

Vaughan Turekian , executive director of Policy and Global Affairs at the National Academies, emphasized the critical need for science diplomacy, particularly during a time when so many global challenges are confronting humankind. The GRC has demonstrated the value of bringing together science funders around the world to examine major international basic research projects. The current workshop, stated Turekian, is intended to focus discussion on opportunities for the GRC and its members to engage the broader community of science and policy experts on these important issues.

__________________

1 See: https://www.globalresearchcouncil.org .

INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBAL RESEARCH COUNCIL AND WORK IN SCIENCE DIPLOMACY

Katja Becker , GRC governing board chair and president of the German Research Foundation, introduced the GRC as an organization, including its efforts and role in science diplomacy. GRC participants are key actors in national science systems, serving as intermediaries between the scientific communities and political frameworks. Science diplomacy is a complex issue, Becker noted. The Royal Society (UK) and American Association for the Advancement of Science distinguish three types of science diplomacy: diplomacy for science, science in diplomacy, and science for diplomacy. Diplomacy for science involves facilitating international science cooperation and advocating for multilateral and interdisciplinary science. The GRC is well suited facilitating such activities. Secondly, science in diplomacy , refers to the act of informing foreign policy objectives with scientific advice. This area has proven to be of major importance when examining the science related to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, which has required joint scientific efforts, and importantly, science rooted in curiosity-driven fundamental research. Thirdly, science for diplomacy is the use of science to improve diplomatic relations. This type appears to be the most challenging, Becker said. The GRC is critical to promoting science diplomacy, as it focuses on the common values of science and research, develops standards of scientific practice, and promotes common understanding of diverse regional efforts.

NATIONAL FUNDERS’ PERSPECTIVES OF BASIC RESEARCH AND SCIENCE DIPLOMACY

Molapo Qhobela , former CEO, National Research Foundation of South Africa, moderated a panel of national funders from several countries to gather perspectives on basic research and science diplomacy.

Susumu Satomi , GRC governing board member and president of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), stated that his agency is a major research funding agency in Japan and places high value on mobilizing researchers through research autonomy, diversity, and curiosity-driven research. The agency conducts multilateral joint research, supports a robust international research network, and has developed an invitational fellowship program 2 to support basic research. With 10 global offices to support its work, JSPS has also promoted an international research exchange program. It also supports bilateral cooperation, with and without memoranda of understanding, with the goal of promoting academic cooperation between highly qualified Japanese and overseas researchers. Satomi said that the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for science diplomacy, as scientists all around the world have needed to work closely to identify solutions and advance scientific research through research networks.

Jinghai Li , GRC governing board member and president of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), noted that science requires joint action to address global challenges and that good science policies are essential in promoting the development of global science and building relationships within the scientific community. Globally, we are facing common challenges that require joint international efforts along with a science paradigm shift. There is a need to examine the 17 United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 3 in a systematic way that will allow for joint international action (see Figure 1 ).

2 The JSPS carries out “invitational fellowship programs,” which bring in overseas researchers to conduct collaborative research, discussions, and opinion exchanges with researchers in Japan. See: https://www.jsps.go.jp/english/e-inv/index.html .

3 See: https://sdgs.un.org/goals .

The interaction between different research and development activities is currently linear, stated Li, beginning with basic research, moving to applied research, followed by experiments and development. However, a new non-linear model should be established. Promoting open and innovative international cooperation to adapt to the paradigm shift to address common science challenges is needed. Intensifying cooperation among international funding partners is needed to improve and strengthen science policy, Li added.

Mark Ferguson , GRC governing board member, director general of Science Foundation Ireland asked: What are we trying to achieve through science diplomacy that goes beyond collaboration in science? Science diplomacy takes us beyond the benefits of scientific collaboration. Describing Ireland’s science diplomacy efforts, Ferguson noted that Science Foundation Ireland is a lead agency program that fosters scientific cooperation and collaborative projects with over $100 million in funding for global research. Ireland is significantly involved in overseas efforts to expand science and innovation, particularly in Africa, also funding projects that support peacekeeping missions. Ferguson discussed opportunities to further science diplomacy, including opportunities to develop international science prizes and expanding collaborative funding with international agencies to address global scientific challenges. He said we need to think carefully about where international systems can be put in place to take on key scientific challenges.

Vladimir Kvardakov , board deputy chairman at the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR), explained that science diplomacy work at his organization involves the promotion of national scientific priorities, sharing scientific ideas, and addressing international scientific challenges. Funding agencies can serve as science diplomacy actors by opening areas of common interest in basic research, supporting the development of international rules and regulations, among other areas. For example, he noted, in April 2020, the RFBR launched an interdisciplinary initiative to support international scientific collaboration to address the COVID-19 pandemic. The organization is also working to develop global security programs to support scientific diplomacy and has also published a special issue of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research Journal describing its experience in science diplomacy, which has been translated into English. 4

Andrew Thompson , GRC governing board member and international champion of UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), described the UKRI’s range of mechanisms designed to foster science diplomacy initiatives, including funding mechanisms, research infrastructures, and multilateral fora. The Fund for International Collaboration, for example, includes more than 20 partner countries engaged in research. The Global Challenges Research Fund works to support organizations in addressing the UN SDGs. There is also significant UK involvement in international research infrastructures, such as the European Organization for Nuclear Research, or CERN. Describing the UKRI’s multilateral engagement, Thompson noted that the organization offers policy fora between funding agencies as well as wider stakeholders, engages in multilateral funding initiatives, such as the Belmont Forum, and demonstrates leadership in intergovernmental multilateral initiatives, such as the G7 Summit. He said we should think about multilateral engagement as one way of driving scientific interests and promoting international cooperation and coordination.

Luiz Eugênio Mello , GRC governing board member and scientific director of the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP), discussed the work of his agency in supporting basic and applied research. FAPESP, for example, has created opportunities for researchers in Brazil to cooperate with international partners all over the world. International collaborations make it possible to harness complimentary scientific knowledge across institutions and countries, allows for the sharing of costs (and risks) of taking on large and more challenging projects, and provides access to a diversity of assets. FAPESP has worked to develop an extensive network of international partners to share scientific expertise and resources, and is involved in several multilateral initiatives, such as the Global Alliance for Chronic Diseases. 5 The foundation has also been participating in and co-funding international basic research initiatives, such as the Large Hadron Collider and Sirius. 6 Mello noted that there is a constellation of institutions and networks aiming to develop research-based solutions to scientific, social, and economic problems. Many of these have a mixed composition of scientific academies, funding agencies, government agencies, science ministries, private foundations, and research institutes; however, few are truly global.

The GRC, however, has a wide global outreach with members from all continents and is solely constituted of funding agencies with a worldwide presence. The GRC plays an important role in helping link the existing multinational research initiatives and institutions of countries that lie outside of these collaborating networks. The GRC could liaise with existing international institutions, for example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), by facilitating the participation of funding agencies and scientists from a myriad of countries. Mello noted that it may be appropriate to ask whether the GRC should become a mechanism for coordinating international funding for research, or rather, an instrument to facilitate the inclusion of multiple research funding agencies and re-

4 Panchenko, V. et al. 2018. Russian Foundation for Basic Research Journal. 1(97). https://www.rfbr.ru/rffi/download/%E2%84%96_1%2C_%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8C%E2%80%93%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%82_2018_%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0.pdf?objectId=2059986 .

5 See: https://www.gacd.org/ .

6 See: https://home.cern/science/accelerators/large-hadron-collider and https://section-mpc.web.cern.ch/content/sirius .

search bodies within existing international structures and institutions.

PERSPECTIVES OF U.S. GOVERNMENT FUNDERS AND PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS ON SUPPORTING BASIC RESEARCH AND SCIENCE DIPLOMACY

Chris Fall , former director of the U.S. Department of Energy, moderated a panel of U.S. government funders and private foundations to discuss their perspectives on supporting basic research and science diplomacy.

Kendra Sharp , director of international science and engineering at the National Science Foundation (NSF), which is the only U.S. federal agency that funds basic science research and education across all fields of science and engineering, discussed the agency’s efforts to enable and support international collaboration. While NSF does not have a formal definition of science diplomacy, the agency considers it a tool to advance its vision. A key building block for collaboration, whether between government agencies or between individual investigators, is trust. Science diplomacy is about building trust at all levels and is fundamental to international collaboration, stated Sharp. NSF has developed agreements for collaboration with counterpart funding agencies and works closely with U.S. diplomats to advance its scientific mission, building a strong science-based relationship with other nations—for example, through the bilateral Joint Commission on Science and Technology. NSF, along with the United States Agency for International Development, also funds collaborative research programs for students relevant to development issues. Additionally, the agency has launched a multiplier program that sends subject matter experts overseas to meet with scientists and government officials to explore targeted opportunities for international collaboration. The GRC offers a global platform by which national science funding agencies can increase cooperation, Sharp said. There are opportunities to consider how to expand these partnerships to cover all regions of the globe.

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) also has a strong international focus, with a broad range of efforts related to international health, stated Christine Sizemore , director of the division of international relations at the Fogarty International Center, NIH. She noted that Francis Collins, director of NIH, has emphasized the importance of engaging with other countries in discussions about global health research. Much of the collaborative work that happens is through relationships among investigators; however, the agency also fosters this collaboration through targeted opportunities, including trainings offered at NIH laboratories, strategic bilateral science programs, and international workshops and conferences, among other opportunities. Sizemore provided an example of a large biomedical research funders collaboration in which global biomedical research is contributed from research institutions and captured in a database called “World Report.” 7 Through this effort, an investigator can examine data as well as identify research funders in a particular country or region. This allows for opportunities to identify complimentary or overlapping funding priorities and further opportunities to collaborate.

Ali Sayir , program manager at the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), began by noting that the agency focuses on basic research, for example, investing in areas such as nanotechnology applications for medicine. The agency funds research all over the world, including 271 international research efforts in 37 countries, with funding ranging from $150,000 to $400,000 over a 3-year period. Of critical importance for AFOSR is the connection between principal investigators. Sayir added that the GRC could expand its efforts in science diplomacy by further engaging mission-oriented funding organizations.

Similarly, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is the largest federal supporter of basic research in the physical sciences, stated Helena Fu , director of international and technology cooperation and trusted research at DOE. The office of science is the steward of 10 of the 17 total DOE laboratories, supporting more than 33,000 researchers and some of the most advanced tools in modern science, such as accelerators, colliders, and supercomputers. The overarching goal of DOE’s international approach is to pursue mutually beneficial collaborations to advance and accelerate scientific discovery. Trust in terms of intellectual and financial contributions as well as sharing scientific credit, offering openness, transparency, and reciprocity are all critical to the agency’s international work. With its overseas presence, the DOE works closely with the U.S. Department of State to achieve its science goals through diplomacy.

Fu discussed an international project, called the Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE), which is based in the U.S. and supported by the DOE. 8 The project is a combination of the world’s most intense neutrino beam, a deep underground site, and a massive liquid argon detector that enables research to address some of the most fundamental questions in particle physics. DUNE includes 1,180 collaborators from 184 institutions in 32 nations, offering an example of how the agency leverages financial resources, expertise, facilities, and the capabilities of international partners. DUNE serves as an example for basic science and science diplomacy connecting to advance and accelerate

7 See: https://worldreport.nih.gov .

8 See: https://lbnf-dune.fnal.gov .

scientific discovery.

Cynthia Friend , president of the Kavli Foundation, described the mission of the private foundation as advancing science for the benefit of humanity. With a strong international presence, the Kavli Foundation has more than 20 research institutes funded worldwide, largely concentrated on fundamental science. The foundation also has a public engagement program that focuses on expanding public understanding of science, which Friend indicated is a critical need. Differences in cultural norms across borders can create funding challenges, as each country has different mechanisms for funding research and thus, gaps in funding vary significantly by country. Philanthropy often has the benefit of being more flexible and can provide much needed support for international research, for example, by supporting longer term and higher risk projects. Friend discussed a key coalition of philanthropic organizations called the Science Philanthropy Alliance, which is dedicated to supporting fundamental research and which includes 30 funders and $1 billion in private funding. This alliance has worked to identify and fill gaps in science funding and has fostered international talent development. It has also taken on issues of diversity, equity, and inclusion in science. Informal science diplomacy can be a key tool in addressing international challenges. Investing in diplomatic relations is necessary to advance science and to promote a healthy scientific research enterprise, said Friend. Friend added that it is critical for government, philanthropy, academia, and industry to commit to continuing to work together for the benefit of humankind.

SUMMARY DISCUSSION: PERSPECTIVES OF NATIONAL FUNDERS, U.S. GOVERNMENT FUNDERS, AND PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS OF BASIC RESEARCH AND SCIENCE DIPLOMACY

Alice Abreu , professor emerita at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and committee member of the workshop, summarized the discussion from national funders, U.S. government funders, and private funders related to basic research and science diplomacy. National funders highlighted the importance of trust in science diplomacy, including discussing mechanisms for building trust and finding a common ground to pursue science initiatives. As Ferguson emphasized, partnerships are formed based on a need to build on the scientific expertise of others. Size, geography, political missions, and diversity were also identified as important factors that impact science diplomacy. The GRC plays an important role in bringing together diverse funders to support science across these factors. Funders in the U.S. and elsewhere also discussed the important role government and philanthropic institutions play in supporting and driving science.

Mike Bright , GRC executive secretary and deputy director of international (global partnerships) at UKRI, stated that the GRC itself is both an object of science diplomacy and a platform for science diplomacy. Through the GRC’s convening power, it can help foster and strengthen key relationships. Ferguson stated that a good first step for the GRC to further advance science diplomacy would be to agree on a single topic of focus. Once selected, the next step would be to identify a simple mechanism for funding the selected focus area, perhaps through a lead agency. This approach would help to move beyond the traditional national funneling or the existing mechanisms for funding science, requiring all to be engaged on one issue and building research around it. Colglazier added that there are many political hurdles that are challenges to international scientific cooperation and dialogue. Science communities and countries should engage in candid dialogue on what actions are needed to ease or moderate these challenges and facilitate stronger collaboration.

Colglazier added that one of the strengths of science funded in the U.S. it that it is largely decentralized and driven from the bottom up; however, this can create its own challenges to developing a cohesive plan and response. The COVID-19 pandemic is an example of this type of challenge. While science rapidly contributed to the development of vaccines, the political apparatus in the U.S. and other countries has not done as well in distribution.

REPORTS ON THE CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE BY THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES: BOLD AMBITION FOR LARGE-SCALE SCIENCE

Colglazier moderated a session focused on reports from the Challenges for International Scientific Partnership Initiative, which is an initiative by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 9 The Challenges for International Scientific Partnerships project aims to articulate the benefits of international collaboration and recommend solutions to the most pressing challenges associated with the design and operation of partnerships. Two working groups within this effort include the Large-Scale Science working group, which approaches international collaborations through the lens of

9 See: https://www.amacad.org/project/CISP .

issues particular to large-scale science (as opposed to peer-to-peer or small-scale international work), and the Emerging Science Partners working group, which explores issues particular to U.S. scientific collaborations with countries seeking to boost their scientific capacity. 10

Arthur Bienenstock , professor emeritus of photon science, special assistant to the president for federal research policy, and director of the Wallenberg Research Link at Stanford University, is the co-chair of the Challenges for International Scientific Partnerships project. He stated that large-scale science facilities make science possible, citing the example of the discovery of the Higgs Boson particle at the Large Hadron Collider in CERN. This facility and others like it allow researchers from institutions with limited infrastructure to perform cutting edge science, bringing scientists from different organizations and nations together. However, facilities must be maintained, require political support over an extended period, and must be effectively managed. While a report by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Bold Ambition: International Large-Scale Science , provides several characteristics of large-scale projects necessary for success, Bienenstock stressed the importance of project reviews and developing stages in a project. He noted an example of next-generation gravity wave detectors, a multi-billion-dollar project that will require several detectors around the world as well as significant international collaboration. UNESCO could play a role in registering the commitments and providing some organizational capabilities for this project and others like it. The GRC might consider how these large-scale research endeavors can be supported most effectively.

Co-chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Emerging Science Partners working group, Shirley Malcom , director of Education and Human Resources Programs at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, stated that peer-to-peer collaboration is essential and has generally been under-appreciated and undervalued in science. There is a need to utilize global scientific talent and strengthen the international collaboration that already exists as well as support more equitable collaboration across and within countries. Malcom highlighted a lack of understanding in the U.S. around the framing of research internationally, including the focus on the UN SDGs. This has resulted in differing research priorities, approaches, and a mismatch in capacity. The working group discussed ways the U.S. could become a stronger partner in research and international collaboration, for example by supporting funding for collaborations and providing credit appropriately in publications and patents, etc. Recognition of the need for fundamental science, for example, projects such as the H3Africa initiative, 11 was also identified along with the need for targeted efforts to address gender equality and engage young scientists.

PERSPECTIVES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL NATIONAL SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS

John Hildebrand , National Academy of Sciences Foreign Secretary, moderated and presented during a panel addressing the perspectives of non-governmental national scientific institutions on strategies to encourage science diplomacy and international collaboration.

Ashok Singhvi , former vice president of the Indian National Science Academy (INSA), noted that the Indian approach to science has been to share and collaborate through cooperative, bilateral, and multilateral engagement and research contributions with other countries. INSA represents India in international science fora as well as bilateral exchanges with other academies. Singhvi discussed INSA efforts around science and diplomacy, including the agency’s creation of frameworks to support partnerships in areas related to the ocean, space, and health, among others. Education and human capital are also critical for science and diplomacy, along with the need to strengthen open access, mentorship, and foster socially responsible science, stated Singhvi. Developing shared goals, a focus on global equity, and supporting efforts to ensure the safety of scientists from international conflict, are essential to moving science diplomacy forward.

Jonathan Jansen , president of the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf), began by highlighting the perspective of social science in discussions about science diplomacy. He noted that the Global Research Council paper on science diplomacy 12 was focused on the different types of science diplomacy, and he was concerned that the paper lacked political and social context. He discussed the race to develop and distribute COVID-19 vaccines and the existence of vaccine nationalism, an example of a barrier to international cooperation and science diplomacy. Vaccine distribution is also an example of an area in which science diplomacy is critically needed, Jansen noted. COVID-19 vaccines are more readily available in the West and are arriving in far too small quantities for all nations. He said there is a serious

10 Two reports by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences are forthcoming in 2021 on these initiatives, Bold Ambition: International Large-Scale Science and Global Connections: Emerging Science Partners. See: https://www.amacad.org/news/challenges-international-scientific-partnerships .

11 See: https://h3africa.org .

12 See: https://www.globalresearchcouncil.org/fileadmin/documents/GRC_Publications/Discussion_Paper_on_Science_Diplomacy-_The_Role_of_Research_Councils_and_the_Global_Research_Council.pdf .

lack of trust in science right now, which should prompt us to take a step back to ask more foundational questions about health equity, social justice and commercial interests, and common humanity above national interests.

Luiz Davidovich , president of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences, described the pillars that define his organization’s understanding of science diplomacy. The first pillar is identifying the big challenges for science-based global governance, including climate change and global health, among others. The second pillar is the recognition of widespread inequality between countries and within countries, which is strongly correlated to the research and development expenditure of countries. Science diplomacy should pay attention to this inequality as well as work to mitigate it. The third pillar includes the UN SDGs. Science diplomacy should be based on these goals, which would require additional U.S. involvement and a strengthening of international institutions, including the United Nations. The Brazilian Academy of Sciences is working to address the SDGs, for example, through efforts to further the science of poverty eradication in line with the SDGs. The Brazilian Academy of Sciences also supports multilateral cooperation and is working to address critical sustainable development issues with an emphasis on the BRICS countries, 13 which comprise 40 percent of the world’s population. Davidovich also discussed the importance of encouraging open science, including data collection repositories, peer review knowledge sharing, and integration of research publications. We have learned important lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting the need to ensure that the benefits of science are accessible to all, Davidovich said.

Hildebrand described the U.S. National Academies’ efforts to foster international cooperation, collaboration, and research, particularly around empowering young scientists and professionals. He described the Kavli Frontiers of Science Symposia 14 which began about 30 years ago, and which offers an opportunity to convene outstanding young scientists from around the globe. The Partnerships for Enhanced Engagement in Research (PEER) Program, another example, was established in 2011 to fund scientists and engineers in developing countries who partner with U.S. government-funded researchers to address global development challenges. 15 The benefits of the PEER program model, stated Hildebrand, include that it provides funds directly to the institutions of the international researchers, empowering them with resources they need to be full partners in collaborative research. The program also helps to build international goodwill. Hildebrand also discussed the Academies’ Arab-American Frontiers of Science, Engineering and Medicine, initiated in 2011, which convenes young scientists (under the age of 45) from the U.S. and 22 Arab League countries to discuss advances and opportunities in their field. 16 The goals of the program include exchange and dialogue among young researchers in Arab countries and the U.S. These examples demonstrate the value of supporting young researchers by investing in capacity building in their countries, Hildebrand noted.

PERSPECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS THAT CONDUCT RESEARCH AND/OR REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY

Colglazier moderated a panel of international scientific institutions on issues related to institutional structures and goals for international basic research cooperation within a framework of science diplomacy.

Science for diplomacy is scientific cooperation to support or improve international diplomatic relations and underpins the work of the International Science Council (ISC) as a global membership-based organization, said Heide Hackmann , CEO of ISC. Science diplomacy, however, is science that informs and supports foreign policy objectives. The ISC focuses on 3 areas relevant to science diplomacy. These include the need to (1) catalyze and support relevant research and scholarship, including through large international programs, priority projects, and strategic actions; (2) integrate science in global policy; and (3) further develop science systems, such as essential capacities, safeguards, and enabling conditions for international scientific collaboration. The GRC should support research and action on science diplomacy, Hackmann said. This includes leveraging influence with relevant political communities, including the ISC and other international scientific bodies, to strengthen the case for science globally.

Segenet Kelemu , director general and CEO at the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (icipe) in Nairobi, Kenya, noted that in addition to ongoing research projects, the Centre also has major capacity building program to support the work of graduate students, including through partnerships with 43 universities globally. Highlighting the importance of international collaboration, Kelemu stated that international partnerships were crucial to addressing a massive locust invasion in East Africa in 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic has also highlighted the power of science, as described previously. We need to work collectively to educate policymakers and government around the important role of science, Kelemu added. Inequities in research, particularly in Africa, where funding is less available than in Europe or the U.S., is of particular concern. While there has been progress, developing stronger research partnerships

13 BRICS is an acronym representing the major emerging economies and includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

14 See: http://www.nasonline.org/programs/kavli-frontiers-of-science/ .

15 See: https://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/PEER/index.htm .

16 See: https://www.nationalacademies.org/our-work/arab-american-frontiers-of-science-engineering-and-medicine .

would benefit all, and clear communication is necessary to build these collaborations.

Albert van Jaarsveld , director general and CEO of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), discussed several key challenges we face globally, for example, global poverty, wealth inequities, and climate change ( Figure 2 illustrates the complexity of global scientific challenges). There are difficulties addressing these challenges as part of the UN SDGs due to funding instruments that are not structurally aligned. Global multilateral scientific cooperation is urgently needed, particularly as science efforts are primarily national and fragmented, he said.

van Jaarsveld added that about $70 billion is distributed on an annual basis through funding agencies associated with the GRC, and much of that funding is directed in-country for science (see Figure 2 ). Our current funding system is not equipped to address these global priorities; the GRC can be a force for this agenda. Global research priorities and objectives cannot be unilaterally achieved without collaboration. Also, there is a need to fund multilateral mission-driven global priority research efforts at scale.

Charlotte Warakaulle , director for international relations at CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research, reinforced previous comments about the importance of transparency, openness, and the need for partnerships in advancing science diplomacy. She also discussed the need to address funding challenges on issues of inclusion and equality. CERN itself is a product of science diplomacy, initially established by 12 European nations, and currently bringing together a community of more than 17,000 scientists, physicists, engineers, technicians from around the world. CERN’s efforts in science diplomacy are primarily through its daily work in conducting fundamental research, as well as its efforts in capacity building and educating the next generation of scientists. Science diplomacy has an important role promoting the values of openness, equity in access to information, and access to education. It is also imperative to keep in mind the underlying values of science and how they can drive collaboration, said Warakaulle.

SUMMARY DISCUSSION: PERSPECTIVES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL NATIONAL SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS

Alik Ismail-Zadeh , senior research fellow at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and research professor at the Russian Academy of Sciences, and workshop committee member, summarized themes identified by panelists from nongovernmental national scientific and international scientific institutions related to advancing basic science and science diplomacy. Workshop participants discussed the definition of science diplomacy, which was described as either a formal or informal process. Panelists also discussed how science for diplomacy and diplomacy for science work together. Discussions also highlighted the scientific infrastructure needed to support science, including the challenges in developing the infrastructure facilities for scientists. The need to increase the collaboration between the social sciences and natural sciences was also identified.

Workshop discussions also focused on COVID-19 vaccine equity, and the role that science diplomacy can play

in providing a foundation for communication between scientists and policymakers on this issue and other global challenges. Communication on the value of science was discussed by workshop participants as an important need, including its vital role in addressing global challenges, such as climate change. Participants also discussed the need for the GRC in developing clearly articulated goals that society must achieve with aligned research objectives.

CHALLENGES TO SCIENCE DIPLOMACY FOR BASIC RESEARCH AND SUGGESTED STRATEGIES

Abreu moderated a panel addressing possible strategies to address or overcome issues related to open science; cybersecurity; security and visas; and diversity, equity, inclusion, and gender as they relate to strengthening basic research through science diplomacy.

Shamila Nair-Bedouelle , assistant director-general for natural sciences at UNESCO, spoke about strategies to address open science, data rights, intellectual property rights, and material transfer agreements. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the important role of open science, particularly in terms of timely and free access to scientific data, publications, and information. UNESCO is working to make scientific information, data, and outputs more widely accessible, particularly as open science is increasingly being recognized as an accelerator of the SDGs. Despite its potential, there is also a lack of understanding about the opportunities and challenges of open science. To address this, the organization is developing an international standard setting instrument on open science. Specifically, UNESCO has identified the potential of open science of democratizing knowledge, reducing inequalities between and within countries, promoting peace and collaboration, and in supporting cultural diversity. Open science, however, requires a profound change in scientific culture across borders, moving from competition to collaboration through information sharing. Nair-Bedouelle added that UNESCO promotes science diplomacy through several mechanisms, including the organization’s work on the ground and capacity building through international cooperation.

Rebecca L. Keiser , chief of research security strategy and policy at the National Science Foundation (NSF), discussed strategies to address research security and cybersecurity, stressing the importance of training a robust science and technology workforce to support international collaboration. A key priority should be to ensure that international students and scholars continue to contribute significantly to the U.S. research enterprise. However, it is necessary to balance the open environment with the needs of research and security. To address concerns related to research security, NSF is coordinating with other U.S. government interagency partners as well as international colleagues, particularly working toward guidance related to “trusted research.” As part of this effort, there is a need for continued communication and awareness with the scientific community on these research security issues as well as clarity from the government perspective on requirements, including why it is important to disclose information about sources of research support. Keiser said that NSF has found that non-disclosure issues are apparent in about 5 percent of the proposals that the agency has funded. Keiser reiterated that while we need to actively encourage international collaboration, we need to simultaneously encourage full disclosure.

Amy Flatten , director of international affairs at the American Physical Society (APS), discussed challenges to science diplomacy related to security and visas, and strategies to address them. APS, a professional organization for physicists, undertook research to better understand why fewer international physics students pursued a Ph.D. in the U.S. in 2019 and 2020. The resulting report, Building America’s STEM Workforce, 17 indicated that more than 70 percent of students surveyed reported difficulties in obtaining a visa, and more than 50 percent reported experiencing stress and anxiety related to dealing with the U.S. visa immigration system (see Figure 3 ). Flatten noted that the APS asked international members to advocate for changes to U.S. visa policy. When the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposed a rule change in September 2020 that eliminated “duration of status” guidelines and no longer allowed F-visa students and J-visa scholars to remain in the U.S.—despite compliance with their terms of admission—APS members took action to submit more than 1,500 comments to DHS. Flatten added that this is an example of science diplomacy, speaking more loudly with a common voice. To address challenges related to visas, Flatten noted the need for communication, both to policymakers to highlight the national benefits of international science and technology collaboration, as well as to international scientists themselves. To address security issues, Flatten added that there is a need to continue Track II diplomacy through identification of mutually beneficial and joint projects, along with addressing areas of regulatory and security concern. Convening global science leaders to create ongoing dialogue about security concerns is also needed.

17 American Physical Society. 2021. “Building America’s STEM Workforce: Eliminating Barriers and Unlocking Advantages.” https://www.aps.org/policy/analysis/stem-workforce.cfm .

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the extent of gender inequality at a global scale, stated Dorothy Ngila, project specialist at the National Research Foundation of South Africa. A working group of the GRC on diversity, equity, inclusion, and gender—with a focus on promoting the status and equality of women in research—highlighted the need to utilize science diplomacy to advocate for change on gender equality. The GRC has developed a statement of principles and actions around promoting the equality and status of women in research. Similarly, the GRC is supporting science diplomacy on gender equity in science through mechanisms such as peer learning and ensuring that the voice of the GRC as a collective is included in other international initiatives promoting the equality of women in research. The practice of science diplomacy can effectively integrate equality, diversity, and inclusivity, Ngila said.

FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SCIENCE DIPLOMACY AND HOW TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE OUTCOMES

Ismail-Zadeh moderated a panel addressing areas within basic research that can better connect research funders and science diplomacy practitioners. The panel discussants also addressed opportunities for the GRC and funder communities to work together on major science themes that cross borders.

Craig McLean , acting chief scientist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), noted that the agency works collaboratively with international bodies, for example, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (or IOC, which is part of UNESCO), the World Meteorological Organization, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The IOC is a 150-member body that has been productive in organizing science across many countries to protect the health of the ocean. The U.S. government has supported IOC programs by providing funding and tools and devices to support basic research. 18 McLean discussed the Seabed 2030 program, which aspires to complete mapping of the world’s ocean floor by 2030. 19 He also discussed an international initiative, the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development, which is gathering ocean stakeholders worldwide behind a common framework to ensure ocean science can fully support countries in creating improved conditions for sustainable development of the ocean. McLean stated that we will need these international collaborative efforts to tackle the challenges facing the ocean, which is critical to human security and the ability to sustain the world.

Rajib Shaw , chair of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction’s Scientific and Technical Advisory Group, noted that global science advocacy needs to be desegregated into regional perspectives. Also, multi-stakeholder science diplomacy should not occur with scientists only but should also be broadened to other stakeholders. Additionally, Shaw noted that there has been much discussion around increasing the presence of young researchers in science diplomacy, but there are few mechanisms currently available for this to happen. Shaw reiterated that the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the importance of science and research, particularly noting the rapid development of COVID-19 vaccines that occurred in 1 year.

Virginia Murray , consultant in global risk reduction at Public Health England, discussed opportunities for science diplomacy, with a focus on disaster risk reduction and COVID-19 research. Murray discussed the adoption of the Sendai Framework in 2015, in which 38 indicators were defined to measure progress in achieving seven global

18 See: https://ioc.unesco.org/node/2 .

19 See: https://seabed2030.org/ .

targets (see Figure 4 ). 20 The Sendai Framework states that there is a need to strengthen technical and scientific capacity to capitalize on and consolidate existing knowledge. The Framework also notes the need to develop and apply methodologies and models to assess disaster risks. In 2019, there was an effort to review the Framework’s hazard definition and classification. 21 Subsequent recommendations from more than 40 participating organizations included the need to facilitate the development of a multi-hazard information system; engage with users and sectors for greater alignment and consistency of hazard definitions; conduct further work to operationalize parameters for exposure, vulnerability, and capacity; and address cascading and complex hazards and risks, among others.

Turning to COVID-19, Murray added that science collaboration has been at the heart of its response. The World Health Organization and other partners developed a Coordinated Global Research Roadmap, which includes principles such as coordination of research and the need for fair and equitable access to research. Murray also discussed another example of international funding collaboration, the Global Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease Preparedness, a network of research funding organizations in infectious disease preparedness research that has funded 8,569 projects through 132 funders in 136 countries. 22

Abdalah Mokssit , secretary of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), began by noting that the IPCC provides a strong example of the interface between science and policy, including supporting science diplomacy. It produces a comprehensive assessment on climate every 5 to 7 years along with a special report and methodology report. The IPCC’s assessments have been instrumental in informing policy; for example, the second assessment was foundational to supporting the Kyoto Protocol. The role of the IPCC is to not only bring science to policymakers, but also to make science as accessible as possible to the public. In 2019 the IPCC published a Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate. The report included information for policymakers about the impact of climate change on human health, water supplies, food security, and ecosystems. Through this and other efforts, the IPCC serves as the voice of climate science, contributing to the evidence base of policymaking over the past three decades. The next assessment, while delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, will have a more regional focus than past assessments.

Solid, transparent, and open science is critical to informing policy, said Ana María Hernández Salgar , chair of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. Science diplomacy must be able to showcase, with conviction, research findings that constitute the priorities arising from research at different scales. Science diplomacy also depends on the development of common agendas that have support from development sectors. One of the most important ways that governments and scientists can prioritize issues and encourage scientific progress is to identify existing information and highlight research gaps. Because of international efforts supporting research on ecosystems and biodiversity, there has been action to make changes at the political level. There is no viable future if we do not manage to understand through science the impacts generated by the loss of biodiversity.

20 See: https://www.undrr.org/publication/sendai-framework-disaster-risk-reduction-2015-2030 .

21 See: https://www.undrr.org/publication/hazard-definition-and-classification-review .

22 See: https://www.glopid-r.org/about-us/ .

SUMMARY DISCUSSION: SCIENCE DIPLOMACY TO PROMOTE AND STRENGTHEN BASIC RESEARCH AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Several key themes were discussed during the workshop, particularly related to the important role that science diplomacy can play in addressing global challenges, including COVID-19 and climate change. The international research communities that are collaborating on these issues are also elevating the research at a global policy level. These communities simultaneously depend and build upon international research networks that have been developed over decades. This also affects the way that research is translated and transmitted into helping inform several key global policy drivers, whether it is the IPCC process, or otherwise.

Other areas of focus included discussions about the UN SDGs. Turekian stated that the sustainable development goals themselves represent an accumulation of thinking around a broad range of topics that are both defined by and informed by advances in science and technology. Basic research has helped to inform these connections, supporting translation into an international body such as the UN. Turekian noted that while there is overlap between international science cooperation and science diplomacy, there are also key differences and distinctions that allow these areas to operate within their sphere of connectivity.

Colglazier highlighted workshop discussions about the unique role of the GRC in basic research and science diplomacy. The GRC network is itself a science diplomacy institution and has strengthened the equitable partnership between the global North and South. Scientific institutions, especially national science academies in both the North and the South, highlighted how they have their own priorities and aspirations for addressing the major challenges that face their nations, discussing topics such as the importance of trust in science, disseminating the values and ethics of science, and informing the decisions of policymakers and the public on important issues.

To expand the GRC’s role in science diplomacy, participants highlighted the need to continue to learn from one another, exploring partnerships and initiatives, including joint calls and specific areas of common interest, as well working to promote the importance of basic research to policymakers, at both the national and global level.

Bright noted that there is a need to acknowledge the important role of the GRC as a mechanism for science diplomacy in and of itself and to clarify the distinction between science diplomacy and international collaboration. The global challenges we face require a coordinated effort among stakeholders, funders, and researchers. There is also a need to balance opportunities of open science with research security to ensure we can maximize opportunities and minimize risks.

Other areas discussed by participants included the need to bring social science to the table; a greater focus on issues related to diversity, equity, inclusion, and gender; and assessing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the careers of young scientists.

Colglazier highlighted the importance of basic, fundamental research as the foundation of the science enterprise. He encouraged participants to tell their foreign ministries that one of the strongest diplomatic initiatives they can engage in is supporting their basic research institutions; these institutions are working to further international scientific collaboration around the world.

DISCLAIMER: This Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief was prepared by Jennifer Saunders as a factual summary of what occurred at the meeting. The statements made are those of the rapporteur(s) or individual meeting participants and do not necessarily represent the views of all meeting participants; the planning committee; or the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE DIPLOMACY TO PROMOTE AND STRENGTHEN BASIC RESEARCH AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: E. WILLIAM COLGLAZIER (Chair), Editor-in-Chief of Science & Diplomacy and Senior Scholar, American Association for Advancement of Science; ALICE ABREU , Professor Emerita, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and ALIK ISMAIL-ZADEH , Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Applied Geosciences of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany, and Chief Scientist/Research Professor at the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Earthquake Prediction Theory and Mathematical Geophysics. STAFF: ROBERT GASIOR , Staff Officer; NICOLE CERVENKA , Research Associate; FLANNERY WASSON , Senior Program Assistant.

REVIEWERS: To ensure that it meets institutional standards for quality and objectivity, this Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief was reviewed by E. William Colglazier , American Association for the Advancement of Science; Alik Ismail-Zadeh , International Science Council; Cherry Murray , University of Arizona; and Richard Catlow , University College London. Marilyn Baker , National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, served as the review coordinator.

SPONSORS: This workshop was supported by the National Science Foundation.

For more information, visit http://www.nas.edu/pga .

SUGGESTED CITATION: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Science Diplomacy to Promote and Strengthen Basic Research and International Cooperation: Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief (2021). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: https://doi.org/10.17226/26182 .

Policy and Global Affairs

Copyright 2021 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

The Global Research Council (GRC) brings together heads of science and engineering funding agencies from around the world to promote data sharing and best practices, and to support high-quality collaboration. The GRC plays an important role in science diplomacy, namely by promoting and strengthening basic research and international collaboration. To further define the broader role of the GRC in this space and to identify opportunities to advance science diplomacy, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine convened a virtual workshop on March 12, 15, and 16, 2021. Participants explored ways in which science diplomacy can promote basic research; addressed challenges to science diplomacy; and considered future opportunities to advance science diplomacy. This Proceedings of a Workshop-in Brief provides a high-level summary of the workshop discussion.

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The primary purpose of this research project is to broaden the understanding of science diplomacy in the context of the wider field of public diplomacy. Science diplomacy provides an opportunity for scientists and researchers around the world to work collaboratively on projects that address humanity’s most pressing problems, including sustainable development, managing water resources, peace preservation, and fighting disease and hunger. By studying and discussing contemporary and historical examples of science diplomacy in action, we begin to assemble a conceptual framework through which science diplomacy can be applied to resolve current and future foreign policy challenges.

Indiana Senator Richard Lugar has called science diplomacy "a vital component of our nation’s public diplomacy." For the United States, the realm of science and technology remains one of the most attractive elements of American society. Government recognition of this component provided the impetus for science diplomacy throughout the Cold War, and has more recently resulted in the creation of a science envoy program, announced by Secretary of State Clinton on November 3, 2009. In this announcement, Secretary Clinton proclaimed that these envoys will "travel to North Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia to fulfill President Obama’s mandate to foster scientific and technological collaboration."

In February 2010, the USC Center on Public Diplomacy hosted a conference on Science Diplomacy and the Prevention of Conflict to explore the merits and challenges of science diplomacy - not solely as conducted by the United States, but across the world. Our conference showcased science diplomacy practitioners and researchers who discussed their individual experiences, current and past projects in the field of science diplomacy, and their hopes for the future of the practice. By hosting a forum for experts in this field to share ideas, we move toward a better understanding of the potential and limits of science diplomacy, and consequently, how, when, and where it can be used effectively as public diplomacy.

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Perspective article, building a science diplomacy curriculum.

• 1 Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy, University College London, London, United Kingdom
• 2 The World Academy of Sciences, Trieste, Italy

Science diplomacy is a fast-growing field of research, education, and practice dedicated to better understanding and reinforcing the connections between science, technology, and international affairs to tackle national and global challenges. Interest from early career scientists and young diplomats to learn more and engage at the science-diplomacy nexus is growing all around the world. However, as a relatively new and multidisciplinary field, we show that science diplomacy has so far been largely taught through extracurricular courses and workshops, often self-organized by university student groups or international scientific organizations, targeting specific disciplinary and geographic audiences. Given this fragmented landscape, we map and categorize current science diplomacy educational offerings in higher education. Despite some coverage of science diplomacy within general science policy programs or courses focused on an issue area (e.g., water diplomacy or environmental diplomacy), a structured foundational course addressing the commonalities of all the scientific and technological issues relevant to international affairs is still lacking. Hence, we first suggest knowledge and key skills scientists and diplomats can learn from each other to bridge the disciplinary divide and engage in science diplomacy scholarship and practice. Building upon it, we then propose cross-cutting, core concepts that can inform the establishment and consolidation of science diplomacy curricula at universities. These aim to be useful to teach science diplomacy to advanced undergraduate and graduate students of all backgrounds and to be adaptable to a wide range of degree programs and disciplines.

Science Diplomacy: a Growing Field in International Relations

Science diplomacy is a growing field of study and practice seeking to understand and promote the linkages between science, technology and international affairs to address national and global challenges ( Turekian, 2018 ). As the field matures and expands across the world, there is increasing demand for education and training. Yet higher education institutions offer few opportunities to bridge traditional departmental silos to embed a global policy understanding in science education, or introduce science, technology and innovation in international affairs curricula 1 . Furthermore, no academic institution offers yet a class solely dedicated to the theory and practice of science diplomacy.

While a clear definition of science diplomacy remains elusive, we consider it here broadly as all the processes that inform or influence international relations in science and technology, noting that “ the scientific and international relations worlds [.] are more and more one 2 .” Hence while the field is more of a “boundary” object ( Kaltofen and Acuto, 2018 ), from a pedagogical standpoint and for simplicity, this article separates the two main components of “science” on one hand and “diplomacy” on the other. Here we define science in its broadest sense, as the general knowledge of natural and social sciences, both basic and applied, including technology and innovation. We approach diplomacy as the art and practice of conducting international relations between governments through dialogue, negotiation, and cooperation ( Berridge, 2010 ). Even though this dichotomy is an over-simplification 3 , it reflects the existence of two distinct communities – scientists and diplomats – with different cultures, values, knowledge, and skills. Educating in science diplomacy requires exploring the knowledge and skills the two communities of scientists and diplomats should learn from and about each other to work closer together.

The practice of science diplomacy encompasses a spectrum of roles, organizational configurations and professional profiles that remain fluid and do not align with a traditional career path in science or international relations. Science diplomats conduct a range of activities (also occasionally, part-time or full-time) from promoting international cooperation in science and technology out of an embassy, diplomatic mission or international organization, providing scientific advice to a foreign minister, negotiating a multilateral agreement, or navigating scientific collaborations between countries under political strain. These functions are performed by scientists, diplomats, and other professionals most frequently without specific training and no defined career path, thus limiting their potential impact.

Because scientists and diplomats have been siloed both educationally and professionally for a long time, it is urgent to bridge the divide between current and future professionals by developing common capacity within specialists in each community ( Moomaw, 2018 ).

To bridge the two communities, there is a need for educational opportunities for students and practitioners with backgrounds in science and in diplomacy. Current training offerings, described in section “A Fragmented Landscape of Science Diplomacy Education Around the World,” might meet the needs of practitioners, but do not generally target students. This article presents a university-level syllabus to create an introductory class for the new generation of students interested in science diplomacy. It responds to the increasing interest in science diplomacy education and training that the authors have witnessed over the last decade teaching science diplomacy across the world. This demand was recently documented through a needs assessment survey conducted by the European S4D4C research consortium ( Croce, 2019 ). Natural and social sciences students are eager to understand how science, technology, and innovation intersect with foreign policy and global governance to shape and address cross-border challenges. Similarly, international relations students are increasingly attuned to the scientific and technical issues impacting their work, and welcome the addition of science, technology, health, and environmental issues into the toolkits and agendas of 21st century diplomacy ( Stanzel, 2018 ).

This article lays out the core elements and building blocks of a foundational curriculum to support the next generation of science diplomacy leaders and equip scientists and diplomats with the tools and skills sets to work at the intersection of science and international relations. We first map the current landscape of science diplomacy educational offerings around the world (section “A Fragmented Landscape of Science Diplomacy Education Around the World”) and then categorize the types of courses currently available in higher education (section “Current Science Diplomacy Offerings in Higher Education”). We then suggest content-based knowledge and skills useful to help bridge the gap between scientists and diplomats (section “A Content and Skills-Based Framework for Teaching Science Diplomacy”), and propose cross-cutting, core content subjects and topics that can be used in an introductory science diplomacy class offered at the university undergraduate or graduate level, and tailored to a wide range of degree programs and disciplines (section “Building a “Theory and Practice of Science Diplomacy” Course”).

A Fragmented Landscape of Science Diplomacy Education Around the World

While science diplomacy has been practiced for centuries, the landmark American Association for the Advancement of Sciences (AAAS)-Royal Society report “New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy” (2010) gave science diplomacy an initial definition and conceptual framework. The report’s theoretical approach and practical examples formed the basis of the first trainings to expose early career scientists to the concept, history and practice of science diplomacy. As pointed out by Holford and Nichols (2017) , the creators of the first science diplomacy graduate seminar at Rockefeller University 4 , graduate students in the natural sciences work in a highly specialized, narrow field at the frontiers of knowledge, often lacking an understanding of the global issues science and technology are rapidly transforming, such as geopolitics, sustainable development, trade, economics, national security, global health or international law.

Despite some efforts at universities, detailed in section “Current Science Diplomacy Offerings in Higher Education,” the majority of science diplomacy training has been conducted by international scientific organizations like the AAAS, The World Academy of Sciences (TWAS), and the International Network of Government Science Advice (INGSA), among others. The AAAS Center for Science Diplomacy, established in 2008, was the first organization to offer dedicated training in science diplomacy in partnership with TWAS. The annual AAAS-TWAS science diplomacy summer course 5 in Trieste (Italy) was launched to expose scientists, policymakers, diplomats and other professionals from the Global South to how science and technology impact international policies, and the different ways the diplomatic system can harness science and technology to advance national and global goals.

More recent programs, such as the AAAS Science Diplomacy & Leadership Workshop 6 or the São Paulo Science and Innovation Diplomacy Summer School, have emphasized knowledge transfer but also skills development ( Hobin and Galbraith, 2012 ), building networks, and designing national or regional science diplomacy strategies 7 . These courses have all been very successful, receiving hundreds or thousands of applications for a few dozen spots, but participation is often restricted to specific disciplinary and geographic audiences. To meet the growing demand, in 2017 AAAS launched the first science diplomacy online course 8 and S4D4C launched a European Science Diplomacy virtual course in 2020 9 .

Over the last decade, many foreign ministries and diplomatic academies have also recognized the need to incorporate science, technology and innovation in their foreign policy structures ( Turekian and Kishi, 2017 ). While the United States, Japan, Russia, China, or the United Kingdom have a long tradition of science advice to foreign policy, most countries only recently began adopting the concept of science diplomacy. Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Panama, Spain, South Africa, and the European Union are among the countries that have more recently incorporated science, technology and innovation in their diplomatic training structures. This is not only due to the need to understand the diplomatic implications of scientific innovations ( Leijten, 2017 ) such as artificial intelligence ( Hone, 2019 ), cryptocurrencies, or big data, but also to the emergence of multilateral and multi-stakeholder forums such as the Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution of the World Economic Forum or the United Nations Science, Technology & Innovation Forum for the Sustainable Development Goals. These require skilled professionals capable of navigating the science-diplomacy interface.

Current Science Diplomacy Offerings in Higher Education

The Science, Technology, and International Affairs (STIA) program at Georgetown University is one of the few university degrees fully dedicated to the nexus of international policy, science, and technology. At the postgraduate level, science diplomacy academic offerings can be classified into three broad categories: (1) issue-area courses exploring the intersection between a specific scientific discipline and diplomacy, (2) seminar series and workshops with invited speakers (mostly practitioners) introducing students to their own area of expertise and career path in science diplomacy, and (3) science policy courses that incorporate elements of science diplomacy when covering international science policy and global governance.

1) Issue-area science diplomacy courses: Given that science diplomacy is a new term that emerged in the early 21st century, it intersects with fields with a long tradition of research and scholarship that already examine the diplomatic dimensions of a particular scientific or technical field within the boundaries of its own discipline. These include environmental diplomacy, energy diplomacy, water diplomacy, health diplomacy, digital diplomacy or nuclear diplomacy, among many others. Notable examples are the “Global Health Diplomacy” course at The George Washington University 10 or the “Science Diplomacy: Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean” at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University 11 .

2) Seminar series: Graduate seminars and workshops expose students to different topics in science diplomacy. They usually consist of guest speaker series offering personal perspectives and career experiences, and do not focus on analyzing, comparing, extracting and highlighting the commonalities across disciplines nor building core science diplomacy knowledge and skills. Some are led by students or early career researchers themselves, such as New York University’s “Science Diplomacy: The Role of Science in International Relations and Global Development” 12 . These courses often include a capstone field trip to embassies, international institutions or United Nations offices or conferences.

3) Science policy courses: While science policy operates mostly within the national context, university science policy courses increasingly incorporate elements of science diplomacy, as international policies underpinned by science can be a result of science diplomacy processes. Examples of these courses include “Science and Technology in Domestic and International Policy” 13 at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and “The Practice of Science Policy & Diplomacy” 14 at Dartmouth College.

While these educational opportunities enrich and broaden students’ perspectives, they do not fully encompass the cross-cutting, foundational knowledge and skills needed to navigate the many 21st century global challenges underpinned by science and technology. Before we propose core concepts that could be used to develop such a general science diplomacy course at universities (Section “Building a “Theory and Practice of Science Diplomacy” Course”), we first start by exploring the content knowledge and skills that may be lacking in both communities in the next section.

A Content and Skills-Based Framework for Teaching Science Diplomacy

What should scientists know about diplomacy, and vice versa? What skills should they learn to be able to work together? In Table 1 , we propose a set of science diplomacy knowledge and skills that students or early career professionals in science and in international relations can acquire. We suggest examples of topics and skills for each community to learn about the other and we list common subjects and issues they can explore together.

Table 1. A framework for science diplomacy education (content and skills-based) for scientists and diplomats.

From a content perspective, scientists should be provided with an overview of the humanities (history, economics, politics, and international relations). They should also develop a basic understanding of multilateral organizations, the principles of international law that govern international spaces and the global commons, and the transnational issues where science plays a key role. For future diplomats, developing an understanding of the epistemic culture of scientific research ( Haas, 1992 ) and its associated methods (publication, peer-review, and funding mechanisms) is necessary to help establish international research collaborations. Understanding how to access and use scientific expertise and facts in international negotiations will also be key. In addition, scientists and diplomats would benefit from joint education in cross-cutting issues, such as a deeper understanding of global scientific governance and the interaction between science, technology, and innovation and its repercussions onto the economy, trade, defense, and geopolitics.

Teaching approaches must include not only theory but also skills development. There has surprisingly been little published on science diplomacy skills, despite the field now being a decade old. Gual Soler et al. (2017) and Bednarek et al. (2018) describe science diplomats as “boundary-spanning professionals” acting as expert intermediaries between the worlds of science and international affairs. In order for science diplomats to perform their functions effectively, skills development ( Paschke and Zurgilgen, 2019 ) can in fact prove even more important than content knowledge.

For scientists, these skills include negotiation, communication and leadership skills, navigating protocol, building coalitions, partnerships, and networking, and heightened cross-cultural, cross-disciplinary awareness in dealing with counterparts from different cultures and backgrounds. Another crucial aspect is to be able to distinguish science advice from advocacy when dealing with policymakers ( Gluckman, 2016 ). For diplomats, key skills include data analysis, critical thinking, risk analysis, understanding and navigating scientific uncertainty, and identifying and accessing experts.

The cultures and values of science and diplomacy can be so different that they might seem opposite at first, as noted by Copeland (2009) : while science is rooted in transparent experimentation, promotes objective discussions and value-neutral propositions, diplomacy is about balancing power, negotiating and influencing others, all the while operating in a highly hierarchical structure, often in secret. Hence the best way to bridge the two cultures and practices is to train scientists and diplomats together using experiential learning methods such as role play simulations and interactive case studies to understand how the intersection between science and diplomacy plays out in the real world ( Stokes and Selin, 2016 ).

Building a “Theory and Practice of Science Diplomacy” Course

In Table 2 we present a catalog of cross-cutting subjects and topics that, combined, cover the knowledge and skills framework described in Table 1 . These can be incorporated into a general introductory science diplomacy course delivered as a stand-alone class or as part of a specialized degree in one of the issue areas (e.g., nuclear diplomacy, environmental diplomacy or global health diplomacy). The course would be most useful at a late undergraduate or early graduate level for students from STEM and international relations programs, taken separately or together. Instructors should design the syllabus depending on their academic home and prior course requirements to avoid redundancy and overlap with existing knowledge, although some overlap will be inevitable in a mixed-background class (with students from natural and social sciences as well as arts and humanities).

Table 2. Suggested catalog of subjects and topics for an introductory science diplomacy course.

A “Theory and Practice of Science Diplomacy” course would be structured in three modules: (1) Science policy and diplomacy fundamentals; (2) International engagement in science and technology; and (3) Science diplomacy in practice. These are meant to be sequential, yet exploratory and adaptable in duration and depth. Skills development (as identified in Table 1 ) should happen throughout these modules, particularly the last two, via experiential learning.

The syllabus will include (and give more emphasis to) different elements depending on students’ backgrounds and academic itineraries. In principle, it should begin with a general overview of science policy, science advice, science advocacy and science diplomacy as distinct domains within the general science-policy-society nexus to ensure an understanding of the boundaries, however diffuse, of these concepts and activities. It should introduce the diverse set of actors of a science diplomacy ecosystem and the broader political, economic, and societal context in which they operate (major contemporary science and technology issues and the current global governance framework). It is also important to cover prominent topics in the field such as science, technology and innovation for the sustainable development goals, science advice to governments or scientific capacity building and technology transfer issues. An important component is to demonstrate how science diplomacy is designed and implemented in practice through examples and case studies, which is done both at the high-level around scientific and technical issues of political importance, but also through “technology” and “innovation” diplomacy that focus on horizon-scanning activities and national economic priorities ( Ittelson and Mauduit, 2019 ).

Finally, we consider necessary to equip the students with practical skills such as the ones described in the last row of Table 1 . These will be dependent on the instructor, the context and academic home of the course, and the background of the students. However, it is important to note that these skills benefit from constant practice and as such will not necessarily appear redundant. Practical science diplomacy skills such as negotiation, cross-cultural awareness, data analysis, and communication can be acquired or honed through experiential learning methods, including role play simulations or mock briefings involving scientific uncertainty and pressure for rapid decision-making. Simulations of science-intensive negotiations (for example water and environmental negotiations 15 ) allow participants to identify points of friction between science and diplomacy. Scientists may experience first-hand the nuances between advising, advocacy, and activism, or balancing scientific and political considerations. Diplomats and other non-scientists are confronted with assessing the credibility and legitimacy of various sources of technical information and how to deal with issues of uncertainty in science. All participants experience different value systems and perspectives and get to understand how to best reconcile them.

As science, technology and innovation become increasingly intertwined with international relations on cross-border issues such as climate change or global pandemics, there is an immediate need to bridge the gap between the scientific and diplomatic communities. Yet, science diplomacy still lacks a formal educational path and training opportunities remain limited. A first step is to consider what knowledge and skills each community can learn from the other, as described in the first part of this paper. The next step is to work toward better preparing the next generation of scientists, diplomats, and boundary-spanning professionals for global challenges requiring multidisciplinary collaboration. A quick landscape analysis of the current educational offerings in science diplomacy shows that little is currently available at the university level. We propose knowledge and skills modules that could be part of a “Theory and Practice of Science Diplomacy” course at the graduate or undergraduate level that can be adapted by any university and academic program in the world. As an important point of comparison, we anticipate that science diplomacy as a field will consolidate its educational offerings and pathways similar to the evolution of science policy as a field over the last decades 16 . We hope that the framework presented there will spark further thinking and new developments at universities and higher education institutions interested in offering science diplomacy education across the world.

Author Contributions

J-CM led the writing, wrote the first draft, created the content of the core two tables, and led the rewriting of the subsequent drafts. MG provided comments and insights to the initial draft, provided initial edits, and contributed to the writing and editing throughout. Both authors contributed to the combined writings of most sections.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Acknowledgments

We would like to acknowledge Mahlet Mesfin for an early review of this work, as well as Ernesto Fernandez Polcuch and referees for their comments and feedback which significantly improved the manuscript.

• ^ The Science, Technology, and International Affairs (STIA) program at Georgetown University is one of the few educational offerings at the nexus of international policy, science, and technology. Students are trained in the science and technology underpinning key issues in international affairs, such as internet governance, nuclear weapons technology, climate science, biotechnology and artificial intelligence. Interdisciplinary coursework combines training from the natural sciences and engineering with the social sciences and international policy. https://stia.georgetown.edu/academics/major/
• ^ Wang, Tom, Science Diplomacy: A State of Mind, 2018, https://medium.com/sciencediplomacy/science-diplomacy-a-state-of-mind-4f724b7e2819
• ^ Douglas, Molly and Gruver Barr, Patricia, Fostering Inclusion in Science Diplomacy, 2018, https://medium.com/sciencediplomacy/fostering-inclusion-in-science-diplomacy-618df1b073ca
• ^ The Hurford Science Diplomacy Initiative at Rockefeller University http://www.rockefeller.edu/graduate/ScienceDiplomacy
• ^ AAAS-TWAS Science Diplomacy Course https://twas.org/science-diplomacy
• ^ AAAS Science Diplomacy & Leadership Workshop https://www.aaas.org/news/future-science-diplomats-receive-range-training-aaas
• ^ São Paulo Framework of Innovation Diplomacy, 2019 https://2019.innscidsp.com/sao-paulo-framework-of-innovation-diplomacy/
• ^ Gual Soler, Marga and Wang, Tom, Introduction to Science Diplomacy online course, 2017 https://www.aaas.org/programs/center-science-diplomacy/introduction
• ^ S4D4C European Science Diplomacy online course, 2020 https://www.s4d4c.eu/european-science-diplomacy-online-course-now-ready-for-you/
• ^ Global Health Elective Course at The George Washington University https://publichealthonline.gwu.edu/academics/elective-courses/global-health/
• ^ Science Diplomacy: Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean https://fletcher.tufts.edu/academics/courses/divisions/dhp/dhp-p259
• ^ Science Diplomacy course at New York University https://nyuscidip.blogspot.com/2017/02/spring-science-diplomacy-course-at-nyu.html
• ^ Science and Technology in Domestic and International Policy at Harvard Kennedy School of Government https://www.hks.harvard.edu/courses/science-and-technology-domestic-and-international-policy
• ^ The Practice of Science Policy and Diplomacy http://dartmouth.smartcatalogiq. com/current/orc/Departments-Programs-Undergraduate/Environmental-Studies -Program/ENVS-Environmental-Studies/ENVS-80-08
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Keywords : science diplomacy, education, transdiciplinary, curriculum-undergrad and postgrad, international relations (IR)

Citation: Mauduit J-C and Gual Soler M (2020) Building a Science Diplomacy Curriculum. Front. Educ. 5:138. doi: 10.3389/feduc.2020.00138

Received: 03 March 2020; Accepted: 08 July 2020; Published: 11 August 2020.

Reviewed by:

Copyright © 2020 Mauduit and Gual Soler. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Jean-Christophe Mauduit, [email protected]

This article is part of the Research Topic

Science Education in Public Diplomacy

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Article Contents

1. introduction, 2. science diplomacy—a victim of its own success.

• 3. Coming to terms: towards evaluating science diplomacy

4. Conclusion and forward-looking remarks

Conflict of interest statement..

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Taking the pulse of science diplomacy and developing practices of valuation

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Tim Flink, Taking the pulse of science diplomacy and developing practices of valuation, Science and Public Policy , Volume 49, Issue 2, April 2022, Pages 191–200, https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scab074

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Science diplomacy has caught remarkable attention in public policy and academic research over the last fifteen years. However, the concept is plagued by a huge talk–action discrepancy: its public discourse has reached a problematic state of dazzling self-adulation, while it is unclear if and how the actual policies and associated organizations live up to these expectations. The article reconstructs three structural causes to explain the recent hype about science diplomacy. It further encourages actors to organize evaluations that ask whether and how actions of science diplomacy can be valuable. In this regard, a first set of fundamental principles is proposed for setting up an evaluative framework. In conclusion, the article advises science diplomacy actors from democratic states and institutions, from both academic research and public policy, to stop dreaming about soft power influence on authoritarian states and regimes but rather face new geopolitical realities.

With the concept of science diplomacy, a new public policy discourse has started to raise awareness among various groups of actors at the intersecting zones of science, technology, innovation (STI), higher education (HE), and foreign policy: that their actions greatly matter to each other. On this basis and tallying with a discourse on other concepts, such as grand societal challenges ( Flink and Kaldewey 2018 ), actors called upon others to develop responses to exigent problems of cross-border reach. But science diplomacy goes beyond that calling. Actors invoke that dedicated international STI and HE collaborations should help nurture the international relations between actors even to the point of alleviating their tensions. Moreover, its proponents have promised either to accompany or to reform traditional diplomacy, encouraging official diplomatic actors to adapt to a style of communication cultivated within the science system or to integrate academic researchers as part of diplomatic missions, to win foreign societal favour by calling upon common scientific values and promoting common interests as well as to incorporate scientific expertise whenever necessary in complex scenarios. While these calls may well suggest an increase of scientific relevance to international relations, the discourse on science diplomacy equally stresses the importance of diplomatic work as an enabler, if not even a necessary condition of cross-border science collaborations.

For about twenty years, various governments of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development world have engaged in the discourse on science diplomacy ( Berg 2010 ; Flink and Schreiterer 2010 ; Ruffini 2020a ; Schütte 2008 ; Yakushiji 2009 ). 1 In the USA, to provide a prominent example, the public discourse of science diplomacy meant converting the positive reputation of science into soft power, as it was supposed to be exerted on societies abroad ( Nye 2008 ), in particular to rehabilitate the US image that had been squandered by the Bush administration’s previous approach to foreign affairs ( Bollyky and Bollyky 2012 ; Gerges 2013 ). Thus, science diplomacy in the USA was mainly translated into an image campaign and into influencing activities. 2 For other states, science diplomacy was rather about marketing and branding their own STI and HE institutions internationally and—with it—yielding partnerships for bilateral and multilateral funding (mostly projects but also institutes and big research infrastructures) or attracting attention and foreign direct investment as well as overseas student (for empirical and comparative research, see Flink and Schreiterer 2010 ).

In these regards, governments started to reorganize their staff and programmes in the name of science diplomacy and by reframing existing actions according to the promises of this new discourse. Or at least policymakers and science funding managers from many states enjoyed that accustomed STI and HE activities gained more weight in lieu of the new discourse, and so it made perfect sense to some actors, especially HE-exchange as well as STI-performing and STI-funding organizations, that their marketing and branding activities received the additional label of science diplomacy ( Flink and Schreiterer 2010 ; Epping 2020 ; Raev 2020 ).

In addition, following the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 and the European Union (EU)’s strategy towards consolidating its foreign policy ( Misiroli 2010 ), the European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation (DG Research) and the then newly founded European External Action Service (EEAS) as the EU’s diplomatic corps also realized that aligning STI and foreign policy actions had much strategic potential on offer ( Flink and Rüffin 2019 ; Rüffin 2020 ): to win partners for the tackling of grand challenges and co-organizing complex and costly scientific undertakings together with the EU member states or to show coherence against other powerful states and regions in what seems to constitute a new multipolar and tensioned world order.

After the public discourse on science diplomacy was initiated, science diplomacy has arguably been stabilized by an ensemble of dedicated projects, organizations, and individual scholars as well as science managers. 3 These have been fostering awareness-raising and training activities via symposia, open days, workshops, scholars-in-residence programmes as well as face-to-face and online trainings. In addition, these actors succeeded in plateauing a discourse on science diplomacy via numerous case studies, publications and dedicated communication media as well as definitional work, coming rather from the realm of STI and HE policy than from foreign politics ( Flink 2020 ; Ruffini 2020a ; Rungius and Flink 2020 ).

In the light of these sustained activities, now running for about fifteen years by explicit reference to the concept, science diplomacy has made it astonishingly far. However, as will be argued in this article, the reformative powers of the concept are likely to exhaust if actors remain on their current course. First, the inflationary use of science diplomacy will kick it into the long grass, i.e. the more it gets applied, the more it will dissolve into an anything-goes formula, mainly serving political window-dressing activities. Second, despite its stupendous campaigning and marketing of feel-good topics by charismatic and enthusiastic actors, science diplomacy is missing essential issues of STI and foreign affairs. In this regard, the public discourse with its campaigning for science diplomacy is decoupling from the actual actions of science diplomacy carried out by governmental actors, the latter of whom have to deal with more concrete geopolitical issues that hardly need specific marketing.

Following this argumentation, the article will elaborate that actors with governmental and management responsibilities are advised to having their concrete science diplomacy strategies and programmes evaluated. At the same time, those actors expediting the discourse on science diplomacy are advised to (re)turn to more pressing issues, in particular how actors should position themselves to patterns of international scientific collaborative and competitive behaviour vis-à-vis authoritarian states and regimes that violate human rights, democratic values and international norms of scientific interactions.

Many scholars and policy practitioners that are working with the concept of science diplomacy agree to have witnessed a story of success in recent years, as many individual academic researchers, students, managers and policymakers as well as their various organizations could be reached via numerous activities. Therefore, these actors responded that they would have become aware as to why STI and international relations would increasingly matter to each other. At the same time, science diplomacy tells the narrative of science offering joint learning to defective politics bounded in national egoisms, while science diplomacy as its tool and driving forces should be popularized ( Rungius and Flink 2020 ). To understand the development of such growing perspective, the institutionalization of the discourse on science diplomacy must be taken into account in the light of three structural properties: how (1) globalization dynamics have specifically shaped the thinking in foreign, STI and HE policy, while (2) the logics of political agenda-setting have on their own terms unfolded effects on the discourse coalitions that (3) enjoyed vindication by actors using their scientific reputation and definitional as well as case-study work to verify that science diplomacy deserves to be supported.

2.1 Structural effects of globalization on STI and IR policies

Science diplomacy can be understood as a merger of a discursive development that in the late 1990s began moulding aspects of foreign, STI and HE policy into one conceptual fabric, which had been separated before. Until then, corresponding theories and empirical research on and concrete practices of foreign policy had been predominated by state-centrism, defining national security and socio-economic stability as the two priorities in settings that depended on structures of international collaboration, competition and conflict ( Adler-Nissen 2015 ; Der Derian 1987 ; Sharp 2009 ). Accordingly, actors were distinguishable along specific functions within the boundaries of and functions for their states (and only sometimes did they go beyond these boundaries).

In parallel, until the late 1980s, the predominant STI policy discourse expressed and reaffirmed a rather state-centrist and market protectionist perspective. In scholarly communities of STI research, this thinking was best conceptualized by the concepts of National Innovation Systems ( Freeman 1995 ; Nelson 1993 ), by the linear model of innovation ( Balconi et al. 2010 ; compare Godin 2006 ) and particularly by the social contract for science (next to many other writings, see Guston and Keniston 1994 ). Often undergirded by the idea of societal functional differentiation, the science system was modelled and expected to produce basic and applied scientific knowledge or to educate students, while its main actors enjoy privileges of funding, societal reputation and non-intervention from the state, guaranteed by a repertoire of distributive and redistributive policies rather than regulative ones ( Lowi 1972 ).

But the certainties of state-centrism and linear thinking as regards innovation processes fell increasingly apart for various reasons: the oil crises in the 1970s and stagflation in Western states, decreasing welfare state revenues, political crises of European integration, the end of colonial/imperial patronage and—with it—a balkanization of states and regions, a surprisingly swift erosion of the Eastern Bloc, and the maximum credible accident of Chernobyl, to name some causes. Thus, while the world society in the late 1980s had already gone ahead with offering and facing plenty of unpredictabilities ( Skocpol et al. 1999 ), in the 1990s, these forces of change became even more apparent, hurling societies into an awareness of acceleration and incertitude ( Beck 1992 ; Rosa 2013 : 118, 132). Moreover, these developments were accompanied by the massive appearance of new actors on the level of policymaking, as novel social coordination mechanisms were introduced to govern changing societies, such as by new corporatist and network arrangements of actors, market-type competitions and hybrid variations of old steering and new coordination within, among and beyond nation states (see Kooiman 2003 ).

To these developments, the twenty-first century has added new information and communication technologies that seem to reaffirm a general societal consciousness that living in a global village also increases the likelihood of being affected by whatever happens even in the world’s most remote places ( Robinson 2009 ). These turbulent times (and attempts to answer them), challenging social taken-for-granted assumptions and certainties ( Bauman 2013 ; Beck et al. 1994 ), also found expression in a wellspring of new concepts that have described an increasing diversification of actors and blurring of actors’ categories. Transferred to STI and foreign policy, governmental actions do not get clearly distinguished anymore from non-governmental responsibilities, while scientific expertise has spawned and can be sought after almost at discretion. At the same time, actors of both spheres have started to promote the idea that their core elements, i.e. STI and international relations, matter to each other and to other fields due to the cross-cutting nature of internationalization and science ( Drori et al. 2003 ). While new concepts like science diplomacy or grand challenges express such awareness of cross-cuttingness, they also invoke the immediate overcoming of functional systemic and national boundaries, if pressing issues were to be successfully solved. In other words, these concepts argue that in the light of exigent global circumstances, it is almost irresponsible to rest comfortably among members of one’s own peer group, such as academic researchers, managers or policymakers ( Flink 2020 ; Flink and Kaldewey 2018 ; Irwin et al. 2021 ).

2.2 The agenda-setting powers of science diplomacy

The discursive success of science diplomacy can be attributed to the fact that the concept has become an integral part of pivotal agenda setting by various governments and international organizations ( Fedoroff 2009 ; Flink and Rüffin 2019 ; Ruffini 2020a ). In many cases, the concept served as a means of legitimizing existing as well as new international STI and HE programmes. Particularly, the European Commission has promoted the concept via research and development activities, as is being showcased by the Horizon 2020 consortia EL-CSID, S4D4C and InSsciDE that have been running in overlapping sequences from 2016 to 2022 as well as by their newly founded European Alliance on Science Diplomacy.

While agenda setting is generally known to be a crucial phase in policymaking ( Baumgartner et al. 2006 ; Kingdon 1995 )—because issues must make it to the point of winning decision-makers’ attention— the use of language in such phases often entails discursive spill-over effects. 4 In the case of science diplomacy, agenda setting by US and European actors triggered a much broader discourse than expected: learned societies and academies, research and mobility funding agencies, universities, public research institutes as well as individual academic researchers (especially formerly active academics that now engage in science policy/management) keep highlighting and campaigning for the relevance of science diplomacy by discussing its many cases of alleged success on numerous events reaching from small national and multilateral workshops to huge international conferences. 5 Moreover, the three afore-mentioned EU-funded projects offered massive training in various formats, while others were designed as interactive workshops on issues of international STI.

This massive outreach to the STI management and policy community allows for questioning the actual impact of this discourse on policies. Whereas it is astonishing how easily STI concepts travel across organizations ( Flink and Peter 2018 ; Irwin et al. 2021 ), hitherto science diplomacy has not stirred significantly more actions in the field of international STI policymaking and administration. Almost all interviewed science attachés and counsellors on both national and EU levels, thus staff that are mainly responsible for the actual science diplomacy activities ( Flink and Rüffin 2019 ; Flink and Schreiterer 2010 ), do not even associate with the rather affirmative calls of the public discourse ( Degelsegger-Marquez et al. 2019 ; Ruffini 2020b )—some do not even think of themselves as science diplomats. Rather, they point to their traditional role as matchmakers for preparing bilateral and multilateral exchange and funding in STI, which primarily serves national interests in innovation and HE: prosperity and security. Only few staff admit that the recent public discourse has been welcomed but only primarily as a means of networking and for governmental window-dressing purposes vis-à-vis other organizations. Thus, it remains unclear whether recent agenda setting by the community of self-proclaimed science diplomats can win over governmental and EU decision-makers as well as other public servants in the fields of STI, HE and foreign policy, to keep the flow of discourse and deliver on its promise of changing modes of international science and diplomacy.

2.3 Academic reification of public discourse on science diplomacy

The first hype of the science diplomacy discourse was accompanied by attempts of policy entrepreneurs to define the concept and, therewith, set the playing field of its public discourse ( Flink 2020 ; Penca 2018 ; Rungius and Flink 2020 ). In succession of a gathering of policymakers and consultants from foreign and STI policy, the Royal Society (2010) concluded that science diplomacy should be best subdivided into three dimensions that ultimately call for integrating three means–ends relationships between science and politics: (1) science in diplomacy translates into expertise and science-based advice to issues of international affairs and thus relevant for diplomacy; (2) diplomacy for science essentially means international political activities that help actors of science and science policy operate across borders and (3) science for diplomacy circumscribes soft power, track-2 and civil society activities carried out by scientific individuals and organizations, for example during tensioned political relations, for branding reason and for winning the favour of others abroad by use of the positive and apolitical image of science. Originating from and spreading in the Anglo-American context first, this report is believed to have unfolded a major impact on the public discourse about science diplomacy ( Ruffini 2020a ).

A second typology that gets used in researchers’ and practitioners’ contexts on science diplomacy was borne by the first comparative empirical research on states’ approaches in science diplomacy ( Flink and Schreiterer 2010 ). Borne by mixed methods, i.e. document research, interviews and on-site observations, this research found that governmental and other publically funded administrative actors (i.e. research funding and performing entities) at the intersection of foreign and international STI policymaking are mainly following three strategic approaches: to gain access to other resources abroad (knowledge, finances and talent), to engage in promotion activities (i.e. branding one’s own performance and institutions of STI and HE) and to exert influence on other actors by use of STI and HE. These actual policy activities do not fully correspond with all three aspirational dimensions laid out by the Royal Society (2010) . In fact, the mainstream of governmental actors is using science diplomacy to advance its national innovation capacities, while competing with other states. In this regard, governmental actors promote their activities to hedge foreign direct investment or to encourage partners abroad to invest in joint STI activities. Countries such as Great Britain also try to attract overseas students so that universities can make a profit from their fees or to compensate for lack of domestic talent. In addition, actors often employ science diplomacy measures to influence other governments and societies abroad (ibid.; Flink and Rüffin 2019 ; Sabzalieva et al. 2021 ; Szkarłat 2020 ).

These definitions and heuristics of science diplomacy might have helped actors navigate through a wide range of initiatives or to connect with other actors and reframe as well as showcase their own activities as part of a larger science diplomacy movement ( Aukes et al. 2019 ). Hence, acts of defining science diplomacy reified the concept as part of the intersecting discourse of STI and foreign policy, while widening its frame almost to the point that it has become an anything-goes formula integrating almost everything that is related to international STI and HE. In tacit accordance with these and other definitional attempts (see also Gluckman et al. 2017 ), numerous showcases—often these are written in the style of scientific case studies—have repeatedly highlighted the importance of science diplomacy: for the sake of evidence-based foreign affairs, for promoting international STI and HE as well as for advancing an ersatz diplomacy by academic channels across regional and especially national borders (see Davis and Patnam 2015 ; Giovani et al. 2020 ; Polejack 2021 ; Tanczer et al. 2018 ; Young et al. 2020 ). Most authors frame their individual cases as success stories that ease tensions and overcome ideological boundaries. They avail themselves of scientific communication means and media and a scientific style of writing ( Billig 2008 ; Ogbor 2000 ). In this regard, an image of august scientificness gets mythified and reified to underline the wholeheartedness of actors’ ventures in science diplomacy.

3. Coming to terms : towards evaluating science diplomacy

Pointing to exigent conditions and calling for change belongs to the standard ‘framing repertoire’ of discourse coalitions ( Hajer 1993 ), in particular in phases of agenda setting that might be followed by proposals for new policies or an institutional reconfiguration. In these phases, the accompanying of academic writing, such as via commentaries 6 and other media outlets ( Weingart 1998 ), often provides temporary stabilization of public attention to such coalitions, so that academia inevitably becomes part of a discourse coalition. But whether changes on actors and their actions within and across their very functional systems actually occur in the light of a new agenda-setting discourse can only be answered empirically ( Bauer et al. 2012 ). In political systems, indications of change are often provided when field-specific policies alter financially or programmatically and certainly when new policies are established or existing ones are terminated. These indications of change are not only interesting for political science and adjacent research fields, but they are most relevant for policymakers themselves: because decisions on how to take further actions must be embosomed in a veil of rationality ( Drori et al. 2003 ; Meyer and Rowan 1977 ), granted that ‘rationality’ is a social construct in itself that is granted by actors in their institutional fields who dispense legitimacy to each other ( Phillips et al. 2000 ).

Crafting international STI policies is challenging, at least due to four structural properties. First, scientific outputs are borne by serendipity. In this regard, STI funding and regulations become no more than bets into an often non-projectable future ( Gillies 2015 ; Sarewitz and Pielke 2007 ), while policymakers are expected to promise certainties and societal improvement. Second, due to the independence and unruliness of actors from the science system that self-regulates its professional standards, normative principles of scientific valuation and communication can only hardly be set by actors from the political system ( Braun 1998 ; van der Meulen 1998 ). Thus, public science can hardly be steered by external actors and logics. Third and specifically important for science diplomacy, the structural properties of international relations provide even less certainties for actors to plan policies, despite facilitating institutions of diplomacy and regardless of an almost uninhibited cross-border communication (see Rathbun 2007 ), particularly between members of academic research ( Schott 1991 ). Fourth, while cooperative and non-cooperative (e.g. competitive) patterns of behaviour can be observed among actors in science and in other systems, these patterns often coexist in complementary or conflicting ways (in this context, see Schunz et al. 2018 ). For example, scientific actions and aspirations, aiming to tackle a common problem of international if not global dimensions, can be undermined by national governmental self-interests, in which STI is employed as a source of competitive advantage vis-à-vis other national rivals ( Archibugi and Filippetti 2015 ). Just the other way round, scientific research can be highly competitive even to pathological levels, although academic researchers and their institutions were funded by policies that aim to foster cross-border integration and collaboration.

To reduce these uncertainties, actors often take to evaluations and assess their own as well as other actors’ positions and policies in the light of previous and current performance or as regards future scenarios ( Sanderson 2002 ). In STI policymaking, evaluations are either employed to distribute new or to redistribute existing resources ( Whitley 2003 ; Biester and Flink 2015 ), to realign programmes and rearrange staff, or to encourage intra-organizational learning ( Mytelka and Smith 2002 ).

Since the discourse on science diplomacy was hardly backed by empirical evidence about the actual functioning and logics of its actions and organizations—as was also lamented by policy actors in various expert interviews—there is a growing need for evaluations that can support further decisions. Thus and beyond the common catch-cry that there are ‘no more international affairs without S&T, and no S&T without internationality’ ( Flink and Rüffin 2019 : 104), a set of four evaluation principles will be outlined, followed by a concluding outlook of further topics that science diplomacy actions may be well applied to.

3.1 Proper evaluations based on organized scepticism

Whereas the public discourse on science diplomacy has delivered ample cases that are supposed to verify and showcase its own marvels, policy actors will learn more from having science diplomacy evaluated in non-affirmative, impartial, distanced and organized sceptical ways ( Merton 1973 ). Similar to surveying the impact of marketing 7 initiatives, these evaluations can ask about the potential effects that the public discourse on science diplomacy has on its actors and policies: ministries or research funding agencies that publically position themselves to science diplomacy might want to know what reactions their activities evoke, no matter if these reverberate from external actors or from their own staff. Alternatively, such evaluations can assess the functioning of actors and policies that concretely perform acts of science diplomacy without necessarily meaning the afore-mentioned marketing activities.

However, assessing science diplomacy actions is complex, not least because it must be essentially designed comparatively in order to better target at conclusive points of interest: assessing effectiveness and efficiency with regard to resource investments that are dedicated to strategic goals in science diplomacy ( Flink and Schreiterer 2010 ; Gluckman et al. 2017 ; the Royal Society 2010 ) can only work if time sequences, specific targets and other units are used as comparative references: what a sufficient amount of staff actually means can only be answered relative to past development, to specific goals or to similar others that are operating in the same field. For example, are other actors, no matter if regarded as competitors, collaborators or simply those alongside deploying more and differently qualified and equipped staff for similar tasks and for pursuing similar goals? Do comparable actors actually follow similar goals or different ones? Has an actual increase in staff or international funding led to the fulfilment of strategic goals? Are actions anticipative and innovative or do they mainly follow beaten tracks?

Whereas these types of questions, i.e. concerning resource investments and instruments in the light of strategic goals and vis-à-vis comparable reference points, might reverberate the standard repertoire of summative or formative evaluations, their actual realization requires sophisticated evaluative performance. Institutional arrangements and scales of investments can be entirely different, and thus, they are hard to compare. For example, the political coordination of scientific organizations can be hard to compare in a country specifically for the sake of assessing the coherence of national science diplomacy strategies. In some states, the steering of scientific organizations, no matter if performing or funding actors are concerned, is allowed, while it would mean an affront to the constitutionally guaranteed independence of science in other states. Stating that one science diplomacy initiative or approach is well or poorly coordinated compared to others would require deep knowledge and qualitative assessments about many national institutional STI policy arrangements at once.

Similar challenges of comparison would need to be tackled when assessing science advice mechanisms in foreign policy. Whether these should take the form of personal chief science advisors or of organizational bodies, such as dedicated agencies, and how these advice mechanisms should be actually operating is hard to assess comparatively, as entire systemic settings would need to be compared too.

Nonetheless, for policymaking in the nexus of international STI and foreign affairs, it is worth having these and similar questions evaluated.

3.2 Questions of reciprocity and fair distribution

Diplomacy is regarded a tool that helps mediate actors’ interests across borders ( Jönsson and Hall 2005 ). Actors keep promising that science diplomacy nurtures cross-border collaborations in specific, because it would establish a nexus between an overarching system of values that is believed to be inherent to the moral economies of science—disinterestedness and universalism are usually invoked as its prime values—and the quasi-cosmopolitan ideal of actors paying mutual respect to each other’s positions regardless of different provenance, beliefs and interests (deconstructed by Rungius and Flink 2020 ). Apart from the fact that such affirmations present a motley collection of incommensurable actors’ categories, i.e. academic researchers, diplomats, managers and policymakers, evaluating science diplomacy cannot presuppose that these systems actually provide for specific norms that get internalized by actors to structure their behaviour. Rather, science diplomacy actions must be assessed empirically as regards the question if they are held fair by all involved participants.

Yet, while fairness is one of the most complex issues in both practice and justice theory (see, e.g., Rescher 2002 ), at least a minimum, i.e. an economic level of fairness can be applied: that no involved sovereign actor should experience disadvantages concretely resulting from an activity that can be associated with science diplomacy. If such a principle is applied, the second question is, if at least one involved party should profit more from a science diplomacy activity than the other. In collaborative encounters that run more than once and allow tit-for-tat games, this principle can be regarded fair by the involved parties. In competitive settings, however, it can mean relative advantages for one vis-à-vis the other and might be regarded as unfair. On a third level, all involved parties would benefit from a science diplomacy activity, no matter if collaborative or competitive settings are concerned (see also Rabin 1993 ). Subjects of these considerations can be all sorts of actors (policy, science and other parts of society) from at least two states (or international organizations). In addition, the likely consequences of actions—positive and negative ones—can be estimated as immediate output (e.g. reputation gains, establishment of multilateral funding programmes or concrete scientific evidence/technology applied to tackling international challenges) and further outcome/impact (future gains from cross-border funding programmes, implications of scientifically informed decisions, etc.). However, the most important aspect is that actions would never thrust any involved actor into an unfavourable position, in particular not when interactions are founded on an asymmetrical basis of resources, e.g. in collaborative settings between actors from the Global North and the Global South. Here, asymmetry needs to be differentiated: On the structural level of national STI systems, it relates to the fact that research performing actors and beneficiaries of HE do not possess the same resources than others. Especially in competitive settings, some countries, i.e. their governments and their STI actors are in a less favourable position to attract and seize international attention than others, to ameliorate their STI capacities via foreign investment and international collaborations and ultimately to use STI in foreign affairs. But how far do we get in comparing states as regards questions of fair distribution via science diplomacy activities, if organizations and individuals are not even taken into account? Looking at the international STI relations of a country from the Global South does not mean that its very researchers or universities are necessarily in an underprivileged position ( Boshoff 2009 ; Parker and Kingori 2016 ). Again, evaluations and comparative empirical research are much needed in the field of science diplomacy, the latter of which is almost inexistent. 8

3.3 Between collaboration and competition

Amidst the public promises that science diplomacy should foster collaboration and offer concerted solutions to grand challenges, evaluators of its actions cannot ignore the competitive (and sometimes even conflicting) sides of international STI policy, while only some have ( Flink and Rüffin 2019 ; Flink and Schreiterer 2010 ; Watermeyer and Olssen 2016 ). Nowadays, it is almost politically incorrect to acknowledge the competitive side of national innovation systems and international governance systems such as the EU’s research policy, which still primarily aims to boost its companies’ industrial competitiveness ( Flink 2016 ; Mitzner 2020 ).

With regard to evaluating science diplomacy, actors should clarify to themselves whether they want to assess (their own and others’) actions in order to gain competitive advantages, foster collaborations, yield both at the same, or if one can serve as a means to the other’s end. It is essential for actors to acknowledge that competition and collaboration often structure policy and scientific actions simultaneously (e.g. aiming at collaborations with partners abroad while being in competitive rivalry with others who want the same). In addition, while policymakers can opt for competitive strategies of action, funded academics might not buy into such strategic goal but reinterpret it as a way of collaborating with others. Even the contrary is possible: policy actions can be designed to strengthen international scientific collaborations, while they get reinterpreted by academics to serve their competitive and reputational ends ( Anderson et al. 2007 ; Flink and Peter 2018 ). In this respect, assessing science diplomacy actions should not encourage actors to cherish false illusions, e.g. believing in altruistic solutionist collaborations, whilst wishing away competition which is structuring international relations just as well.

3.4 Towards a more careful use of STI concepts

As a concept, science diplomacy finds itself embedded next to many other programmatic descriptions in the vector of STI, HE and foreign policies. Actors assessing current or future policy actions in this zone are well advised to consider if it is worthwhile to label and frame actions as science diplomacy. Because introducing concepts often triggers more than strategic frontstage talk that actors use for boundaring and tailoring purposes ( Calvert 2006 ; Flink and Peter 2018 ; e.g. Maasen and Weingart 2000 ). Concepts also make inroads into the identity work of individuals and collective groups ( Flink and Kaldewey 2018 ). In this regard, using science diplomacy—just as well as other popular concepts in STI and foreign policymaking—should always meet concerns that concepts can unfold structuring and sometimes unintended effects on individual and collective behaviour, which can be systemically risky: while academic researchers can also engage as concerned citizens and experts in exigent issues that societies undoubtedly face, their key function is to produce scientific knowledge and not to serve as ersatz diplomats. Commending a more careful use of concepts, thus, follows the observation that contemporary STI concepts unfold more affirmative appeal, i.e. they provide less opportunities for scientific actors to abnegate calls for societal and political engagement. The introduction of adjacent concepts such as innovation diplomacy or knowledge diplomacy points into the same problematic direction of raising expectations of SIT-related actions (HE, and innovation-oriented research and entrepreneurship) by appealing to the allegedly superior values of related groups of actors.

Science diplomacy, as was argued, will lose conceptual strength if advocates keep revving up their marketing engines and expand the scope and ambit of the concept, such as for promising an alleged empowering of the Global South or for using it as a means of expressing increased relevance of science education in both domestic and international politics. Too many promises in the name of science diplomacy cannot be lived up to anymore, neither by actors of the science system nor by actors from the political system ( Flink 2020 ; Penca 2018 ; Rungius and Flink 2020 ). To provide a bold example: if science diplomacy was taken seriously according to the normative principles that its proponents have laid out, for example, in the Madrid Declaration on Science Diplomacy (2019), many bilateral and multilateral STI funding initiatives would have to be stopped instantly, as some of the involved parties disrespect liberal democratic and scientific norms ( Tang 2019 ). 9 In addition, it is more than doubtful that collaborations with systematically fraudulent scientific actors, authoritarian states or dubious private companies are successful acts of science diplomacy, let alone that these actions would transplant august scientific or liberal democratic values into these actors. Rather, they seem to be perilous Faustian bargains ( Tiffert 2020 ; see also Flink 2020 ). One should not forget that normatively stylized concepts, such as science diplomacy, can get easily used by non-democratic and dubious corporate actors for reasons of front-stage talk, i.e. to seize public legitimacy, to spread disinformation and whitewash actions. For example, on 20 April 2021, the international magazine Foreign Policy wanted to invite to a ‘virtual dialogue on science diplomacy’, but as it turned out, the tobacco company Philip Morris had intended to sponsor the event and to send its international vice president of strategic and scientific communications on the panel who describes her job as ‘to translate the robust science behind the company smoke-free alternatives into information policymakers and the public can easily understand’. 10 While the science diplomacy community immediately reacted to the event and put this liaison of a journal and a tobacco company to shame until the event was cancelled, one can also argue that it had been the massive expansion of the concept of science diplomacy in the first place that paves the way for such dubious actors. In particular, this is possible when agenda setting uses topics that turn out to be popular anyway: calling for international collaborations among enthusiastic scientists, philanthropists and responsible policymakers as well as STI managers might not need an extra motivation in the name of science diplomacy, while it is unclear if implementing science advice mechanisms in foreign policy relies much on the public discourse about science diplomacy.

With this in mind, the article suggested that decision-makers, in particular with executive and administrative powers, are advised to assess the value of science diplomacy actions rather than engaging improvidently in its public discourse, granted that the latter can be part of the former (e.g. as a means of influencing and promotion). Taking stock and assessing the quality of concrete governmental science diplomacy actions and their organizational conditions is what matters now. Because it is the concrete diplomatic wheeling and dealing as well as the public financing of international STI for collaborative scientific and competitive market purposes that provides the necessary condition and breeding ground of any further action associated with science diplomacy. This is the most central aspect of a functioning science diplomacy or to put it upfront: if responsible organizations do not check whether they invest sufficiently into resources, competent staff, training and inter-organizational coordination in the light of strategically set goals, their science diplomacy actions will run the risk of being dysfunctional. The danger is that there will be a growing gulf between talk and action, in which responsible actors can be disrespected as unreliable partners. Thus, the main challenge for policy actors is to organize unadorned evaluations of resource investments, while clarifying their strategic goals correspondingly. In this regard, the discussion of a set of evaluations principles in this article was to demonstrate that assessments of science diplomacy structures are value-laden themselves, and therefore, actors are advised to bethink themselves of what they actually want from the concept and what they can expect from their own organization. Needless to say, these assessments provide an orientation to actors where they stand internationally and if their institutional arrangement makes sense.

In order not to waste the conceptual potential of science diplomacy, policy actors need to address political challenges that democratic states are facing now and in the near future: authoritarianism and new international threats of conventional and new hybrid types ( Conrad 2021 ; Fouskas and Gökay 2018 ) pose a problem for STI policymaking and, in particular, for scientific collaborations ( Baykal and Benner 2020 ). First, because one should not forget that international research collaboration can also help advance the technological capabilities of authoritarian governments to remain powerful, to control and oppress their own citizens, and build up agency and resilience against foreign influence, not least by increasing their economic market shares worldwide ( Edler et al. 2020 ). Second, because issues of research integrity 11 cannot be addressed without risking political affronts ( Anderson and Steneck 2011 ). While state governments already face these challenges, science diplomacy actions and its discourse should be employed more to work out better strategies and engage in joint reflections between policymakers and the science community on how to position themselves. Political realism, i.e. upholding STI funding to being wired and connected with societies in foreign countries, or scientific idealism, i.e. a quasi-cosmopolitan idea of collaboration irrespective of provenance, should not be used as normative blanket clauses but must remain essentially contested anchor points for those who engage in and discuss science diplomacy. Needless to say, the much-trumpeted tackling of the world’s grand societal challenges, in particular climate change, cannot be discussed separately from pressing issues of authoritarianism. Because the ultimate question confronting advocates of science diplomacy is whether or not and how to deal and even collaborate with tyrants in a world that is conjointly facing existential deterioration.

This research has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 770342.

None declared.

In recent years, it has numerously been highlighted that science diplomacy was a centuries-old practice coevolving with scholars that cross national borders and represent their country of origin. Apart from the fact that such truisms are articulated with strategic intent, i.e. conjuring a legacy of the concept itself, actors’ explicit bearing on the concept of science diplomacy, let alone a dedicated discourse using this or similar terms, cannot be traced before the millennial years ( Flink 2020 ).

One should not underestimate that science diplomacy also helped reaching out to states and scientific actors in order to start joint STI collaborations, as organizations such as the AAAS, the National Academy of Sciences and policymakers from the US governmental departments sincerely believe in the values of international scientific collaborations and scientific advice to foreign policymaking ( Fedoroff 2009 ; Holdren 2009 ).

In Europe, the first research project on science diplomacy was funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research from 2008 to 2010, comparing the governmental approaches to science diplomacy in six highly industrialized countries. Almost 10 years later, the European Commission funded the three collaborative projects: EL-CSID ( www.el-csid.eu ; 2016–2019), InsSciDE ( https://www.insscide.eu ; 2018–2021) and S4D4C ( www.s4d4c.eu ; 2018–2021). While the first project was to compare the German take on science diplomacy with that of other states, the latter three projects are also supposed to showcase and promote science diplomacy activities of the EU.

For example, Flink (2016) reconstructed how the institutionalization process of the European Research Council (ERC) required supressing the use of the concept ‘basic research’, which until the first millennial years had still been a clear political no-go in EU research policy. But while a discourse coalition managed to circumnavigate ‘basic research’ by introducing ‘frontier research’ and arguing during legislative decision-making for its European added value, the term itself became programmatic, shaping the ERC’s policy ever since and influencing researchers in the way they design and present their actual research undertakings.

Few weeks after its launch in September 2020, a massive open online course, developed by the S4D4C consortium, was taken by more than 5,000 participants worldwide. Further on-site and virtual workshops, summer schools and conferences of the two EU projects S4D4C and InsSciDE attracted another couple of thousand people from academic research (mostly on doctoral and postdoctoral level), from public science management and policymakers, altogether from around 160 countries and international organizations. These numbers result from impact assessments and online surveys of the two projects, which include demographic data of persons that took part in workshops, online training and conferences.

In a post-structuralist understanding of discourse (e.g. Jäger 2001 ), it makes no difference if academic contributions are borne by affirmative or critical positions towards specific subjects.

Marketing research has shown numerous times, however, that effects, such as changing attitudes towards products and services, or buyers’ decisions, can hardly be assessed and causally attributed to marketing or concrete advertisement activities ( Pergelova et al. 2010 ).

The social dimensions of international research collaborations and their political conditions, in particular with respect to integrating the Global South to the world society of academia, are per se severely uncharted by academic research ( Collyer et al. 2019 ; Kraemer-Mbula et al. 2020 ; Skupien 2019 ). This is also reflected in the debate on science diplomacy, where the Global South has only been broached recently. Recently published in 2021, a special issue of the journal Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics entitled ‘Science Diplomacy and Sustainably Development: Perspectives from Latin America’ is featuring 15 articles on all sorts of STI policy-related topics, reaching from countries’ perspectives towards the financing of women in science ( Bonilla et al. 2021 ; Echeverría King et al. 2021 ; Jarquin-Solis and Mauduit 2021 ; Soler 2021 ). Yet, the special issue rather uses science diplomacy as an umbrella term, a token and makeshift for raising political awareness about all kinds of STI and HE issues, rather than a concept that offers substantial eigenvalue or that really touches upon concrete foreign policymaking. Last but not least, Science and Public Policy announced the launch of a special issue on science diplomacy and the Global South, which will be co-edited by Pierre-Bruno Ruffini and Derya Buyuktanir Karacan.

However, some funding programmes and organizations for ‘refugee scientists’, ‘displaced scientist’ or ‘scientists in exile’ often require a minimum cooperation with those governments that had actually given the unfortunate reason of these programmes.

The original invitation that the author and other scholars and activists on science diplomacy received cannot be found on the magazine’s website anymore, as the event was cancelled due to immense public pressure. Next to a storm of protest on Twitter, a blog post can be found that deconstructs the tobacco company’s strategy; see https://blogs.bmj.com/tc/2021/04/17/who-should-we-trust-on-science-diplomacy-and-covid-recovery-not-big-tobacco/ (last access on 4 August 2021).

To name some aspects, the challenges for integer research are concealments of scientific data production, non-collegial behaviour, misconduct and fraud, issues all of which are continuously problematic to the entire science system, no matter if democracies or non-democratic states are concerned.

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Science diplomacy

What it is, projects and steps towards developing a European framework for science diplomacy

Science diplomacy in the Global Approach to Research and Innovation

Science Diplomacy is part of the EU’s priority of making Europe stronger in the world. The Global Approach to Research and Innovation ,  the EU’s strategy for international cooperation in research and innovation, advocates that a stronger focus on science and technology in the EU’s foreign and security policies in terms of science diplomacy would help the EU to project soft power and pursue our economic interests and fundamental values more effectively, meeting demand and interest from partner countries and playing to the EU’s strengths as a research and innovation powerhouse.

In its Conclusions on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation , the Council highlighted  the importance of integrating the Global Approach in research and innovation in the EU's external action and called on the Commission and the European External Action Service to develop a European Science Diplomacy Agenda.

In addition, an increasing number of recent EU policy documents in the foreign and security policy domain have made explicit or implicit reference to Science Diplomacy and the need for foreign policy to be based on the best possible evidence.

Examples include:

• Joint Communication on strengthening the EU’s contribution to rules-based multilateralism  
• Joint Communication on a stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic  
• Council conclusions on Climate and Energy Diplomacy
• Council Conclusions on EU Digital Diplomacy ( July 2022 , June 2023 )

Horizon 2020 projects

The Horizon 2020 programme funded 3 dedicated research projects on science diplomacy:

• Using Science for/in Diplomacy for Addressing Global Challenges (S4D4C)
• Inventing a Shared Science Diplomacy for Europe (InsSciDE)
• European Leadership in Cultural, Science and Innovation Diplomacy (EL-CSID)
• Council Conclusions on Green Diplomacy

These projects enhanced our understanding of European science diplomacy, explored options and developed training material as well as position papers such as the  Madrid Declaration on Science Diplomacy . This has led to the establishment of the  EU Science Diplomacy Alliance , gathering some of the most important academic players in the field.

Further input was delivered by the Science Diplomacy Task Force of the  Strategic Forum for International Scientific and Technological Cooperation (SFIC) ,  which in early 2020 prepared an  Input Paper  proposing to  “ promote a clearer and more strategic role of EU Science Diplomacy ” , and suggesting among other things, the development of an EU Science Diplomacy Platform and Roadmap.

Developing a European framework for science diplomacy

The first Biennial report on the implementation of the Global Approach to research and innovation  acknowledged that science diplomacy efforts in the EU remain largely uncoordinated, lacking synergies and an EU-wide approach. Such shortcomings create vulnerabilities in a rapidly changing geopolitical, scientific and technological environment, with other international actors using science diplomacy in a much more targeted manner.

The need to act was underlined by EU Research Ministers at their meeting in Santander, Spain, on 28 July 2023, when science diplomacy was discussed for the first time at ministerial level.

Supported by the ERA Forum Sub-Group on the Global Approach and a Steering Team consisting of the main stakeholder communities, the Commission in consultation with the  European External Action Service is currently developing a potential European framework for science diplomacy.

Four work strands emerged from discussions held with different groups of stakeholders:

• How to use science diplomacy strategically to tackle geopolitical challenges in a fragmented, multipolar world
• How to make European diplomacy more strategic, effective, and resilient through scientific evidence and foresight
• How to strengthen science diplomacy in EU and Member State diplomatic missions and foster the EU’s global science diplomacy outreach
• How to build capacity for European science diplomacy

These issues were discussed at the first European Science Diplomacy Conference that was held on 18-19 December 2023 in Madrid, in cooperation with the Spanish Presidency of the European Council. The conference gathered more than 350 stakeholders present and online from across the science and diplomacy fields. Report from the conference  and  main outcome document .

Following an open call for expressions of interest, to which almost 600 experts applied, the Commission has established 5 Science Diplomacy Working Groups – each one co-chaired by a scientist and a diplomat – which will develop until the end of June 2024 concrete recommendations for a potential future European framework for science diplomacy.

The Working Groups tackle the above-mentioned 4 work strands as well as a cross-cutting one on definition, principles, and EU added value of European science diplomacy. Working Group co-chairs and members .

• News article
• 6 December 2023

On 6 October the European Commission published a call for expressions of interest to participate in five different working groups. The main aim of the WGs is to bring together relevant stakeholders in an innovative format, to develop jointly recommendations in a co-creation process.

• 25 October 2023

On 20 October 2023, the European Science Diplomacy Roundtable on tackling the food-water-energy nexus in the Mediterranean was held in Cité de la Culture in Tunis, Tunisia.

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Science diplomacy

Science diplomacy has the potential to help us address some of the most pressing challenges of our time such as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. In both cases science diplomacy has already illustrated its potential. Yet, we are still very far from achieving our global goals.

Science diplomacy has become somewhat of a buzzword and is used in many different ways by different actors. So in the following, let us unpack the concept of science diplomacy and highlight some of its practices. 

• Read publication on  Science Diplomacy Capacity Development: Reflections on Diplo’s 2021 online course and the road ahead
• Watch the recording from the science diplomacy webinar

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What is science diplomacy?

There are three types of science diplomacy (AAAS and Royal Society, 2010): 

• Science in diplomacy is about the use of scientific advice for foreign policy decision-making. The  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of the United Nations is an important example. Established in 1988, the IPCC brings together the latest scientific advice on climate change.
• Diplomacy for science  often include large-scale research facilities, which given their cost and resource intensity can only be built through collaboration among a number of countries. The most  example of diplomacy for science is the  European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) , which was established in 1954 after negotiations between 12 founding member states.  
• Science for diplomacy is the promotion of a more peaceful world through scientific cooperation. CERN is also an example of science for diplomacy. A commonly cited recent example of science for diplomacy   is the  Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME) , a research facility based in Jordan. It’s members are Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine, and Turkey. This is very notable as the diplomatic relationships between some of the members are very strained. Iran54 and Israel, for example, have not had direct diplomatic relationships since 1979.

How is science diplomacy conducted?

• Development and management of international cooperation
• Negotiations
• Diplomatic reporting

A good example of the practice of science diplomacy is CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research CERN. Its founding reveals two different aspects of practising science diplomacy. Have a sneak peak into our science diplomacy online course  and learn more about CERN’s origin story. 

Why does science diplomacy matter?

Science diplomacy mirrors the importance of science for modern society from the fight against pandemics to nuclear non-proliferation and the fight against climate change. Science for diplomacy can also contribute towards more international cooperation and, ultimately, more peaceful international relations.

Who are science diplomats?

States and their representatives.

The main actors are states. According to Flink and Schreiterer (2010) they are motivated to participate in science diplomacy by the following main goals:

• Access:  Ensure access to ‘researchers, research findings and research facilities natural resources and capital’ (Flink and Schreiterer, 2010, p. 669)
• Promotion:  Promote the country’s research and development achievements
• Influence:  Impact public opinions abroad and the opinion of foreign decisionmakers
• Research cooperation:  Support participation in large-scale research efforts that would otherwise not be realistic or possible
• Addressing global challenges:  Work towards addressing global challenges such as climate change

When it comes to putting these goals into practice, diplomats and official representatives are called upon.

Scientists serving as science attachés

Some of the first science attachés were scientists who were sent abroad to represent their country. We already mentioned the zoologist Charles Wardell Stiles, the US science attaché in the 19th century. The USA maintained one of the biggest networks of science attachés, including 24 attachés at the height of the science attachés programme in 1987 (Linkov et al., 2014).

The appointment of science attachés often follows broader strategic interests.77 In 2009, former US president Obama appointed three science attachés to Muslim-majority countries following his outreach efforts to the Muslim world (El-Baz, 2010).

Many examples of science attachés come from the Global North.78 However, looking more closely, we can identify cases of scientists acting as state representatives from the Global South. The term ‘science attaché’ is often not used in these cases, and does not strictly apply, but parts of the practice of these individuals do fit within a broader understanding of the work of science attachés. Hornsby and Parshotam (2018) looked at the participation of states from sub-Saharan Africa in international food standard-setting. They found that some ‘scientists act as state representatives, advancing an interest-based position in negotiations around scientifically based international standards’.

Scientists who serve in this role need to have a good understanding of diplomacy and international relations. More often than not, their science communication skills are called upon. They also need to navigate a fine line between their role as scientists and their role as envoys. Science advisors working with foreign ministries have a global network called the   Foreign Ministries S&T Advice Network (FMSTAN) .

Officials from other ministries and national institutions

If we look at current case studies, we see that some science attachés are seconded from other ministries, national scientific institutions, and other relevant domestic stakeholders. Looking at the case of France, for example, Flink and Schreiterer (2010) found that science attachés ‘are seconded from different institutional stakeholders according to their individual agenda with respect to the region’ that they are sent to.

It is also worth noting that in some cases, other ministries, such as the ministry for the economy or science and innovation, take the lead on science diplomacy efforts. For example, South Africa created the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, which became the Department of Science and Technology in 2002, and was later renamed the  Department of Science and Innovation (DSI) . It aims to pursue a ‘concerted science diplomacy strategy’ (Pandor, 2012). Different institutional cultures and perspectives on the main goals of science diplomacy can, in these cases, complicate finding a coherent and sustained approach.

Diplomats with a portfolio that includes science and technology

Diplomats who serve as official representatives of their countries also practice science diplomacy. Some simply touch upon science diplomacy practices as part of their work. For example, trade negotiators might need to liaise and collaborate with scientists back home on specialised questions. Diplomats based in Geneva might find themself in meetings at CERN regarding their countries’ membership.

In addition, career diplomats are also appointed to specific roles that give their practice a clear focus on science diplomacy. These include: special ambassadors or envoys for science diplomacy, scientific counsellors, and tech ambassadors.

Networks abroad

There are also outreach posts of states or groups of states for diplomatic and scientific interactions. They engage in science diplomacy, but do not have the status of an embassy. Sometimes they have the status of a consulate85, but only perform consular work in major emergency situations. Examples include:

• Switzerland’s  Swissnex  network
• The  Ibero-American Programme for Science, Technology and Development (CYTED)  (Gual Soler, 2014)
• The UK  Science and Innovation Network (SIN)
• Open Austria in Silicon Valley

Where is science diplomacy performed?

International organisations (IOs) are the main multilateral venue for science diplomacy. Examples of IO activities are: 

• The  UNESCO Science Report  (every five years)
• The  World Science Forum  (every two years)
• A number of  international science programmes
• The  World Academy of Sciences (TWAS) , which focuses on advancing science and scientists in developing countries

FAQs on Science Diplomacy

Are cyber diplomacy and digital diplomacy equivalent terms.

Cyber diplomacy and digital diplomacy can be interchangeable, with cyber diplomacy focusing more on security issues. Digital diplomacy involves implementing digital foreign policy and using tools like social media. Geopolitical changes impact diplomacy, with new topics like cybersecurity and tools such as social media being incorporated.

They can often be interchanged.   There are however some patterns emerging in their usage. Cyber diplomacy is used more to refer to diplomatic activities related to cyber security issues. There is more confusion about digital diplomacy being used to implement digital foreign policy (new topics in diplomatic agenda) and the use of new tools in diplomatic practice like social media, websites and online meeting platforms.

It is possible to avoid confusion in the current, transitory phase of terminology settling.

– The evolving geopolitical ENVIRONMENT for diplomacy: impact of digital technology on sovereignty distribution of power, and global interdependence among other issues.

– The emergence of new TOPICS in diplomatic agenda: cybersecurity.   internet governance, e-commerce, online human rights, and more than 50 other policy topics.

– Use of new TOOLS in diplomatic practice: social media, AI, big data, online meetings, virtual and augmented reality.

You can read more on terminological confusion and other aspects of digital diplomacy.  

How should governments prepare for the metaverse?

Governments must prepare for the evolving metaverse, focusing on data protection, cybersecurity, digital identity, and digital policy issues. Balancing physical, virtual, and augmented realities is crucial in readiness for the metaverse.

The future of the metaverse is still not clear.

Facebook has the network, financial and technical capabilities to make this happen. The government should be ready to address data protection, cybersecurity, digital identity, and other digital policy issues.   These issues need to be addressed in a way that balances “real” reality (physical), virtual realities, and augmented realities.

Is digital diplomacy different from cyber/e/net/tech/online diplomacy?

The text discusses how terms like cyber, digital, e, net, tech, and online are often used interchangeably in diplomacy, emphasizing the importance of understanding their specific nuances in the context of digital geopolitics.

It all comes down to semantics and context usage. These prefixes are frequently used in interchangeable ways. It is crucial to determine if a specific usage of cyber diplomacy/digital diplomacy or even e-diplomacy refers only to digital geopolitics, topics, or tools. You can learn more about different usages of prefixes in digital diplomacy .

Is online diplomatic representation permitted?

The Vienna Convention does not dictate specific forms of diplomatic representation, allowing for various options like online diplomacy. Its legality is acknowledged, and the trend’s future prevalence remains uncertain.

The Vienna convention (1961) on diplomatic relations does not specify how countries will be represented.   They are typically represented in another country by an embassy or other types of diplomatic missions.   However, there are many other options available such as rowing (nonresident Ambassadors).  Online diplomatic representation can be considered legal.   It is yet to be seen if this practice will increase in popularity over the next few years.

Is science diplomacy a form of public diplomacy?

Science diplomacy is sometimes seen as a part of public diplomacy, focusing on positive country image. Public diplomacy involves transparent communication with foreign publics to promote national interests, influenced by the concept of soft power by Joseph Nye. However, science diplomacy extends beyond public diplomacy and should not be simplified as such, as it often involves public diplomacy elements for many countries, like the US.

Some approaches subsume science diplomacy under public diplomacy. In this sense, science diplomacy is about winning hearts and minds; it is about creating a positive image of one’s country.

For clarity, let us look at a definition of public diplomacy. According to the USC Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD) , it is defined as ‘the transparent means by which a sovereign country communicates with publics in other countries aimed at informing and influencing audiences overseas for the purpose of promoting the national interest and advancing its foreign policy goals. […] The concept of soft power coined by international relations scholar Joseph Nye has, for many, become a core concept in public diplomacy studies. Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”‘.

From this description and the examples on this page, we can see that science diplomacy is much more than public diplomacy and the one should not be reduced to the other. Having said this, it is important to recognise that for many countries, and in particular the USA, the practice of science diplomacy often has strong elements of public diplomacy.

Is science diplomacy a new phenomenon?

Science diplomacy is not a new concept, with roots tracing back to the 17th century, encompassing scientific cooperation across borders. The term gained prominence around 2005, though examples predate this. The Royal Society’s foreign secretary position in 1723 exemplifies early science diplomacy efforts. By the late 19th century, states were sending science envoys abroad. Nationalism led to challenges in global cooperation, but science remained a tool for national reputation building. Science attachés were stationed in the 19th century, with increased prominence in the 1950s and 1960s.

Science diplomacy is not a new practice. Yet, the term itself only came into general use relatively recently. While there is not one specific point at which the term emerged in its current use, its prominence in publications and various discourses began around 2005 (Flink and Rüffin, 2019).

Yet, examples of science diplomacy can be identified much earlier. Scholars Flink and Rüffin trace science diplomacy, understood as ‘scientific cooperation across borders’, back to the 17th century and the emergence of ‘modern’ science (Flink and Rüffin, 2019). They argue that communication and collaboration among scientists across borders finds its origin there. For example, in 1723, the British Royal Society created the position of ‘foreign secretary’ of the Royal Society.

This person was ‘to maintain regular correspondence with scientists overseas to ensure that the Society’s Fellows remained up-to-date with the latest ideas and research findings’ (Royal Society, 2010, p. 1). The emergence of modern nation states in the 19th century and rising nationalism, however, challenged cooperation across borders. Some scientific cooperation across borders, for example in the field of astronomy, still flourished during that time. Nationalism also gave new impetus to scientific progress as a means to foster a nation’s reputation 17and thus emphasised competition.

If we focus on science diplomacy as a set of activities and policies pursued by state actors, then the practice of sending representatives abroad to act as ‘science envoys’ or ‘science attachés’ can be traced back to at least the late 19th century (Linkov et al., 2014). In 1898, the USA stationed a science attaché, the zoologist Charles Wardell Stiles, at its Berlin embassy. As part of US diplomacy, science attachés became more prominent in the 1950s and 1960s.

What are hybrid meetings?

Hybrid meetings allow participants to attend either in person or remotely, ensuring equal opportunities for everyone to engage in discussions.

Hybrid meetings let people join both in person and online, giving everyone a fair chance to talk and take part in the meetings’ discussions.

What are the different meanings of 3 writings of diplomacy – Diplomacy – DIPLOMACY?

Three writings of diplomacy detail varying perspectives on the concept: diplomacy in lowercase letters relates to daily conflict resolution and representation; Diplomacy in uppercase signifies the professional realm of negotiations and treaties; DIPLOMACY, all in capital letters, embodies a glamorous, aristocratic facade associated with flags, receptions, and protocol, reminiscent of a historical aristocratic profession.

3 writings of diplomacy illustrate different ways in which diplomacy is perceived today:

diplomacy  – written in lower-case letters – reflects our daily experience. At home, at work, and on the street, we deal with conflicts through negotiations, engagement, and ultimately, compromise. In addition, we represent our family, our communities, and our companies. We often speak on behalf of others. This is what diplomacy is about. Most people would not use the term ‘diplomacy’ to describe these activities. Yet, these activities are at the core of diplomacy.

Diplomacy  – with a capital ‘D’ – is a profession and a system of representation for states. This is how diplomacy is seen in the news. It is about negotiations and international treaties, among other elements. Traditionally, Diplomacy is performed by diplomats and international officials working in embassies, ministries of foreign affairs, and international organisations. A lot has been written about Diplomacy; and you can read more about it on  Diplo’s website .

DIPLOMACY  – fully written in upper-case letters – is how diplomacy is often perceived by the general public. This is the diplomacy of  flags , receptions, black limousines, and protocol. DIPLOMACY looks glamorous and aristocratic. This perception can be traced back to the history of diplomacy, when it was a profession reserved for aristocrats.

What is cybersecurity?

Cybersecurity entails safeguarding information systems from threats through policies, procedures, and technical solutions, protecting against cyberwar, terrorism, and cybercrime.

Cybersecurity is a protection of the Internet and other information systems from malicious threats, misuse and malfunctioning. Cybersecurity covers wide area including protection from cyberwar, terrorist attack and cybercrime, among others. Cybersecurity is implemented through policies, procedures and technical solutions.

What is digital diplomacy?

Digital diplomacy encompasses the influence of digital technology on diplomatic activities in terms of changing geopolitical and geoconomic landscapes, new items on the diplomatic agenda, and innovative tools for diplomatic endeavors such as social media and big data.

Digital diplomacy refers to the impact of digital technology on diplomacy in three realms:

• changing digital geopolitical and geoconomic ENVIRONMENT for diplomatic activities (sovereignty, power redistribution, interdependence)
• emerging digital TOPICS on diplomatic agenda (e.g. cybersecurity, e-commerce, privacy protection, and
• new TOOLS for diplomatic activites (e.g. social media, big data, AI).

What is digital divide?

The digital divide refers to social inequalities stemming from varying access to computers and the Internet, evident between developed and developing countries, as well as within different demographics and professions.

Digital divide refers to social inequalities created by the introduction of computers and the Internet into human society. It is manifested in differences in number of computers, access to the Internet and available applications. Digital divide is most commonly used to describe the difference between developed and developing countries in the use of digital technology and the Internet. However, divides exists on various levels, including between young and old, urban and rural, and among different professions. 

What is diplomacy?

Diplomacy is the peaceful conduct of international relations through communication, representation, and negotiation between states and international actors to prevent conflict and achieve shared goals. This regulated process involves effective communication as a vital component to ensure successful diplomatic relations.

In its broadest sense, diplomacy is the conduct of international relations by peaceful means .

More restrictive is this definition: diplomacy is the peaceful conduct of international relations by official agents of states, international organisations, and other international actors .

Even more restrictive is the definition of diplomacy as the conduct of relations between sovereign states by members of their respective foreign services . There are also a wide range of definitions based on functions of diplomacy:

Representation is one of the most important functions of diplomacy.   Costas Constantinou blends the concepts of representation and communication in his definition :

“At its basic level, diplomacy is a regulated process of communication between at least two subjects, conducted by their representative agents over a particular object.”

The next set of definitions is focused on communication and the sharing of information .   In The International Law of Diplomacy, B.S.   Murthy defines diplomacy as,

“the process of transnational communication among the elites in the world arena.” Brian White defines diplomacy, both as “a communication process between international actors that seek through negotiation and dialogue to resolve conflicts” and as “one instrument that international actors use to implement their foreign policy”.

Tran Van Dinh’s most concise explanation of the importance communication has for diplomacy is:  

“Communication is to diplomacy as blood is to the human body.   Whenever communication ceases, the body of international politics, the process of diplomacy, is dead, and the result is violent conflict or atrophy.” Constantiou describes diplomacy as “a regulated process of communication” (Constantinou) and James Alan as “the communication system of the international society”.

The third approach focuses on the definition of diplomacy as negotiation . Quincy Wright defines diplomacy as:

“the art of negotiation, in order to achieve the maximum of group objectives with a minimum of costs, within a system of politics in which war is a possibility.”

Hendely Bull defines diplomacy as

“the management of international relations by negotiations.”

Learn more on diplomacy in general , digital diplomacy , science diplomacy , and other types of diplomacy

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What is e-polite language?

Online politeness is dwindling as language becomes more divisive and offensive. To maintain e-politeness, use language carefully and avoid sarcasm to prevent causing offense.

Unfortunately, online politeness is declining.   Language is divisive and offensive.

It’s possible to regain your e-politeness with careful language usage. Sarcasm should be avoided as it can easily lead to offence.

What is internet governance?

Internet governance encompasses the collaborative efforts of governments, the private sector, and civil society to establish shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making processes, and programs that influence the development and utilization of the Internet, as outlined by the World Summit on Information Society in 2005.

Internet governance is defined by the World Summit on Information Society (Tunis Agenda, 2005) as “the development and application by Governments, the private sector, and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.”

What is online diplomacy?

The use and importance of online diplomacy are decreasing.

Term online diplomacy is loosing its relevance and traction.

What is the definition of e-politeness

E-politeness refers to demonstrating respect and courtesy in online interactions, mirroring proper behavior expected in face-to-face communication.

E-politeness is about online behaviour that reflects respect and courtesy, just as it should be in real life.

What is the difference between digital diplomacy and public diplomacy?

Digital diplomacy encompasses more than just social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook, including new technology, agenda-setting, and geopolitical shifts. Despite this broad scope, it is often mistaken for public diplomacy due to the emphasis on these platforms in international relations.

Public diplomacy only covers one aspect of digital diplomacy related to the use of TOOLS for diplomacy including Twitter, Facebook and other social media. Other aspects of digital diplomacy include new TOPICS on diplomatic agenda and changing geopolitical or geo-economic ENVIRONMENT.

However, digital diplomacy may sometimes be seen as just public diplomacy because of high media visibility of the use of Twitter and Facebook in international politics.

What is the difference between science and technology?

Science and technology are the pillars of modern society. While science involves knowledge and research, often not focused on solving practical issues, technology is the application of scientific principles. However, the lines between them are increasingly blurred, as they are interconnected and often complement each other. This distinction has become less clear in recent years.

Science and technology are both considered the foundations of modern society. These terms are often used in modern parlance.  The fundamental difference between science and technology is that it can be viewed as “disinterested knowledge and research” but not necessarily aimed at solving a practical problems.   Technology is commonly referred to in this way as “applied science”.

But, it’s difficult to discern such clear distinctions in practice.   Technology and science are often interconnected.   It is not easy to tell the difference between scientific discoveries in mathematics, and the development of computers.   Science and technology have been complementing one another.   This distinction has become more blurred in the last ten years.

What is the importance of agenda setting in diplomacy?

Agenda setting in diplomacy is crucial for placing important issues on global diplomatic agendas. Just like in media, there is a competition for attention in diplomacy. States aim to advance their interests by influencing international organizations to include their agenda items. With various unresolved matters regarding Internet governance, different actors are strategically maneuvering to ensure their issues are prioritized on the emerging Internet diplomatic agendas.

In the complex interplay of multiple issues and actors in diplomacy, the key challenge is to place certain issues on global diplomatic agendas. Similarly to the media in general and the world of the Internet, a fight for attention takes place, in this case diplomatic attention. Kehone and Nye suggest that states “struggle to get issues raised in international organisations that will maximise their advantage by broadening or narrowing the agenda.”

Currently, there are many unresolved issues related to Internet governance. As a result, extensive manoeuvring by different actors trying to place their own issues on emerging Internet diplomatic agendas is taking place. 

What was the role of science attachés in addressing COVID-19?

Science attachés played a crucial role in addressing COVID-19, providing support in crisis response, repatriation efforts, medical technology advice, and information collection. However, they mainly focused on national efforts and faced challenges in collaborating internationally. The experience has led to suggestions for improving science attachés’ work. More details can be found in the article “Science Attachés in a Post-COVID-19 World: Taking Stock of the Crisis from Science Diplomacy”.

Science attachés played an important role in the response to COVID-19. In the cases of France and the UK, the science attaché network was particularly important as part of the initial crisis response. This included supporting repatriation efforts and giving advice in the area of medical technologies to colleagues from other fields, such as trade. Later, science attachés were important in collecting information on initiatives and publications in their geographic region.

It is interesting to observe, though, that they mainly supported national efforts while Unsurprisingly, science attachés played an important role in the response to COVID-19. In the cases of France and the UK, the science attaché network was particularly important as part of the initial crisis response. This included supporting repatriation efforts and giving advice in the area of medical technologies to colleagues from other fields, such as trade.

Later, science attachés were important in collecting information on initiatives and publications in their geographic region. It is interesting to observe, though, that they mainly supported national efforts while struggling to maintain contact and collaborate with colleagues from other countries.

Based on this experience, a number of suggestions have been made on how to improve the work of science attachés. You can read more in the article Science Attachés in a Post-COVID-19 World: Taking Stock of the Crisis from Science & Diplomacy.

When did diplomacy start?

The concept of diplomacy dates back to ancient civilizations, evolving over time to become a structured practice involving negotiation and communication between nations. Diplomacy has been utilized for centuries to manage international relations, facilitate agreements, prevent conflicts, and promote cooperation among countries. Its origins can be traced to ancient Greek and Roman times, where envoys were tasked with conducting diplomatic missions and resolving disputes peacefully. Over the centuries, the practice of diplomacy has continued to develop and adapt to the changing global landscape, playing a crucial role in international affairs to this day.

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A global innovation hub: Science, tech, and diplomacy in Boston

25 Jun 19 -

[WebDebate] Science Diplomacy: Preparing the next generation

07 May 19 -

Embedding science and technology in international relations education and diplomatic training

16 Feb 19 -

[WebDebate] Science diplomacy: approaches and skills for diplomats and scientists to work together effectively

07 Feb 17 -

Diplo and the GIP at COBISS 2016 Conference

22 Nov 16 - 23 Nov 16

How computers really work: Outsmart your smartphone!

04 Nov 16 - 25 Nov 16

Switzerland

Fundamental Science and Society

07 Jul 16 - 07 Jul 16

Internet Research Fair: Stimulating academia to uncover the Internet’s unknowns

Second international conference on knowledge and diplomacy.

11 Feb 00 - 13 Feb 00

International Conference on Knowledge and Diplomacy

29 Jan 99 - 31 Jan 99

About tech diplomacy

There is still no established definition of the term ‘tech diplomacy’, neither academically nor in practice. Several other related types of diplomacy are widely used and are seemingly competing or overlapping with the term. These include ‘e-diplomacy’, ‘cyber... Read more...

Delivering Diplo’s 2021 Science Diplomacy online course 

Diplo has a track record of more than 20 years of capacity development in diplomacy. Given the increasing relevance of science diplomacy, expanding our program to include aspOur Science Diplomacy course builds on a number of conversations in our Diplo WebDebate format ... Read more...

Traversing biomedical science, technology & innovation, policy, and diplomacy

Traversing biomedical science, technology & innovation, policy, and diplomacy.... Read more...

Boundary Spanning at the American Association for the Advancement of Science

There are risks of oversimplifying and idolizing Science Diplomacy, particularly when confusing what Science Diplomacy should be with what it is able to achieve in practice. ... Read more...

Science Diplomacy opportunities to address infectious disease

In the field of infectious diseases research, Science Diplomacy is applied widely and plays a pivotal role globally on a macroscale, as well as in the day-to-day work of individual scientists.... Read more...

Science Diplomacy for Diplomats: the journey of a Cambodian diplomat

Science Diplomacy is incredibly valuable and essential for the future of the world. As a diplomat, one should at least be able to grasp the concept and the practice of Science Diplomacy, even if not directly involved.... Read more...

Using Science Diplomacy to achieve health goal

Engaging scientists, diplomats, and policy-makers in the development of science-informed policies through exchanges and joint construction of knowledge is crucial for addressing current and future challenges. This highlights the importance of a science-policy interface... Read more...

Science diplomacy at work: UNESCO, Latin America, and the Caribbean

Science Diplomacy could be defined as the art of using scientific knowledge and evidence to deal with complex social, economic and environmental issues of importance to human societies, as well as promoting agreements and cooperation within and among countries.... Read more...

Diplo: Effective and inclusive diplomacy

Diplo is a non-profit foundation established by the governments of Malta and Switzerland. Diplo works to increase the role of small and developing states, and to improve global governance and international policy development.

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SCIENCE DIPLOMACY CENTER TM

Building long-term capacity to enable international, institutional and individual collaboration when science matters.

Educate  next-generation science diplomats to operate short-to-long term with lifelong learning about informed decisionmaking and common-interest building

Enhance  next-generation science diplomats with inquiry and analytical skills to transform data into evidence for informed decisions

Empower next-generation science diplomats as brokers of dialogues among allies and adversaries alike for sustainable development at local-global levels

"Our vision is a world where science is a cornerstone of international relations, driving collaboration and mutual understanding among nations and fostering solutions to global challenges. We envision a future where science diplomacy is a central tool in building peace, resolving conflicts, and advancing the well-being of all people on Earth."

To enhance understanding and applications of science diplomacy with informed decisionmaking and common-interests building for sustainable development.

SCIENCE DIPLOMACY TRAINING WITH INFORMED DECISIONMAKING

By science diplomacy center™ | may 23, 2024.

United Nations – STI Forum 2024

By science diplomacy center™ | may 16, 2024.

OPEN SCIENCE IS AKIN TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH

By science diplomacy center™ | may 1, 2024.

As the only community foundation for the ocean, The Ocean Foundation’s mission is to improve global ocean health, climate resilience, and the blue economy. We create partnerships to connect all peoples in the communities in which we work to the informational, technical, and financial resources they need to achieve their ocean stewardship goals.

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• Capacity Building Offering technical tools, training and expert guidance. Carbon Offsets Supporting coastal habitats. Networks, Coalitions and Collaboratives Pushing the envelope with like-minded individuals. Sustainable Blue Economy Pursuing economic growth in a sustainable blue way.
• Supporting Island Communities Enhancing local work with global relevance. Ocean Science Diplomacy Building bridges to create change. Investing in Ocean Health Restoring ocean health and abundance. Research and Development Supporting the needs of the ocean community.

Find out ways to be a part of the ocean conservation community, because the ocean needs all of our passion and resources.

• Fiscal Sponsorship Program We reduce the complexity of operating a project or organization. We’ll provide you the infrastructure and expertise of an NGO, so you can focus on your mission. Ways to Give When it comes to making a donation, we give you power to make choices – so you can support the ocean cause you care about most.
• Volunteer, Career, and RFP Opportunities Looking to make an impact in the marine conservation community? We have the resources you need to get started. For Corporations Your company or cause can join the effort to protect our ocean and those who depend on it. A partnership with us means working together on strategic ocean solutions.

We house blog posts and newsletters written by our staff and community, featured news, press releases, and Requests for Proposals.

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We strive for up-to-date, objective and accurate knowledge and information on ocean issues. As a community foundation, we provide our Knowledge Hub as a free resource.

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Finding Solutions to the Ocean’s Problems

Watch our video, tapping into our networks to build bridges, networks, coalitions and collaboratives, providing the right tools for monitoring our changing ocean.

• Ocean Science Equity

“It’s a big Caribbean. And it’s a very linked Caribbean. Because of ocean currents, every country is relying on the other… climate change, sea level rise, mass tourism, overfishing, water quality. It’s the same problems that all countries are facing together. And all of those countries don’t have all of the solutions. So by working together, we share resources. We share experiences.” FERNANDO BRETOS | PROGRAM OFFICER, TOF

We tend to organize things as a society. We draw state lines, create districts, and maintain political boundaries. But the ocean disregards any lines we draw on a map. Across the 71% of the earth’s surface that is our ocean, animals cross jurisdictional lines, and our oceanic systems are transboundary in nature.  

Lands that share waters are also affected by similar and shared sets of issues and environmental factors, like algal blooms, tropical storms, pollution, and more. It only makes sense for neighboring countries and governments to work together to achieve common goals.

We can establish trust and maintain relationships when we share ideas and resources around the ocean. Cooperative efforts are critical in the ocean sciences, which include ecology, ocean observing, chemistry, geology, and fisheries. While fish stocks are governed by national limits, fish species move constantly and cross national jurisdictions based on foraging or reproductive needs. Where one country may lack certain expertise, another country can help support that gap.

What is Ocean Science Diplomacy?

“Ocean science diplomacy” is a multi-faceted practice that can occur on two parallel tracks. 

Science-to-science collaboration

Scientists can come together through multi-year joint research projects to find solutions to the ocean’s biggest problems. Leveraging resources and pooling expertise between two countries makes research plans more robust and deepens professional relationships that last for decades.

Science for policy change

Through applying the new data and information developed through scientific collaboration, scientists can also educate decision makers about the state of changing coasts — and encourage them to ultimately change policies for a more sustainable future.

When pure scientific inquiry is the common goal, ocean science diplomacy can help build long-lasting relationships and increase global awareness around the ocean issues that affect us all.

Our team is multicultural, bilingual, and understands the geopolitical sensitivities of where we work.

Collaborative Scientific Research

We can’t protect what we don’t understand.

We lead with scientific inquiry and foster nonpartisan coordination to address common threats and protect shared resources. Science is a neutral space that promotes continued collaboration between countries. Our work strives to ensure a more equal voice for less represented countries and scientists. By tackling science colonialism head on, and by ensuring science is conducted respectfully and iteratively, resulting data is stored in countries where research is being conducted and the outcomes benefit those same countries. We believe science should be undertaken and managed by host countries. Where that is not possible, we should focus on building that capacity. Highlights include:

Trinational Initiative

We bring together practitioners across the Gulf of Mexico and Western Caribbean Region to share information and coordinate on transboundary migratory species conservation. The Initiative acts as a neutral platform for scientists, government officials, and other experts primarily from Mexico, Cuba, and the United States to chart a course for ocean science free from the specter of politics.

Coral Research in Cuba

Following two decades of collaboration, we supported a group of Cuban scientists from the University of Havana to conduct a visual census of elkhorn coral to evaluate the health and density of corals, substrate coverage, and presence of fish and predator communities. Knowing the state of health of the ridges and their ecological values will make it possible to recommend management and conservation measures that will contribute to their future protection.

Coral research collaboration between Cuba and Dominican Republic

We brought scientists from Cuba and the Dominican Republic together to learn from one another and collaborate on coral restoration techniques in a field setting. This exchange was intended as a south-south collaboration, whereby two developing countries are sharing and growing together to decide their own environmental future.

Ocean Acidification and the Gulf of Guinea

Ocean acidification is a global issue with local patterns and effects. Regional collaboration is key to understanding how ocean acidification is affecting ecosystems and species and to  mounting a successful mitigation and adaptation plan. TOF is supporting regional collaboration in the Gulf of Guinea through the Building Capacity in Ocean Acidification Monitoring in the Gulf of Guinea (BIOTTA) project, which works in Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria. In partnership with focal points from each of the countries represented, TOF has provided a roadmap for stakeholder engagement and assessment of resources and needs for ocean acidification research and monitoring. Additionally, TOF is providing significant funding for the purchase of equipment to enable regional monitoring.

Marine Conservation and Policy

Our work on Marine Conservation and Policy includes marine migratory species conservation, marine protected areas management, and ocean acidification frameworks. Highlights include:

Sister Sanctuaries Agreement between Cuba and United States 

The Ocean Foundation has been building bridges in places like Cuba since 1998, and we are one of the first and longest running U.S. nonprofits working in that country. The presence of government scientists from Cuba and the U.S. led to a groundbreaking sister sanctuaries agreement between the two countries in 2015. The agreement matches U.S. marine sanctuaries with Cuban marine sanctuaries to collaborate on science, conservation, and management; and to share knowledge about how to evaluate marine protected areas.

Gulf of Mexico Marine Protected Network (RedGolfo)

Building off the momentum from the Sister Sanctuaries Agreement, we created the Gulf of Mexico Marine Protected Area Network, or RedGolfo, in 2017 when Mexico joined the regional initiative. RedGolfo provides a platform for marine protected area managers from Cuba, Mexico, and the U.S. to share data, information and lessons learned to better prepare for and respond to changes and threats the region might face.

Ocean Acidification and the Wider Caribbean 

Ocean acidification is an issue that also transcends politics as it affects all countries regardless of the scale of a country’s carbon emissions. In December 2018, we received unanimous support at the Cartagena Convention’s Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife meeting for a resolution to address ocean acidification as a regional concern for the Wider Caribbean. We are now working with governments and scientists throughout the Caribbean to implement national and regional policy and science programs to address ocean acidification.

Ocean Acidification and Mexico 

We train legislators on key topics affecting their coasts and ocean in Mexico, leading to opportunities to draft updated laws. In 2019, we were invited to provide educational programming to the Mexican Senate about the ocean’s changing chemistry, among other topics. This opened up communication about policy and planning for ocean acidification adaptation and the importance of a nationally centralized data hub to facilitate decision making.

Climate Strong Islands Network 

TOF co-hosts with the Global Island Partnership (GLISPA) the Climate Strong Islands Network, to promote just policies that support islands and help their communities respond to the climate crisis in an effective way.

Human and Coral Resilience Go Hand in Hand

Our BRI team hosted a workshop in Cuba from June 15-16 to advance our Caribbean resilience efforts.

The Largest Mangrove Restoration Project in the United States

In our latest newsletter, we’re highlighting updates from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Mexico – including a 695-acre mangrove restoration project.

Your TOF Debrief on the March International Seabed Authority Meetings

We’re sharing key moments from the meetings on DSM, including Underwater Cultural Heritage updates, the “what-if” discussion, and a check-in on TOF’s goals.

More Resources

Ocean Science Equity Initiative | Blue Resilience Initiative  | Supporting Island Communities | Networks, Coalitions and Collaboratives  | Capacity Building | EquiSea

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Amendment 19: D.18 Euclid General Investigator Program: Names must be omitted from References.

D.18 Euclid General Investigator Program (EGIP) solicits proposals for basic research focused on data from the ESA Euclid mission to which NASA contributed infrared detectors. The EGIP solicits research based on the analysis of data from the Euclid mission that is publicly available by the start of the selected project. See Section 1.3 for more information on types of proposals solicited.

ROSES-2024 Amendment 19 adds new text to Section 2.7 of D.18 EGIP to specify that names must be omitted from the references and citations. This supersedes the default instructions in the "Guidelines for Anonymous Proposals". New text is in bold.

The due dates remain unchanged: Mandatory NOIs are due July 15, 2024, and proposals are due August 22, 2024

On or about June 7, 2024, this Amendment to the NASA Research Announcement "Research Opportunities in Space and Earth Sciences (ROSES) 2024" (NNH24ZDA001N) will be posted on the NASA research opportunity homepage at https://solicitation.nasaprs.com/ROSES2024

Questions concerning D.18 EGIP may be directed to Doris Daou at [email protected] .

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Outstanding Senior Spotlight: Ashley Bilbrey

• by College of Engineering Communications
• June 07, 2024

For Ashley Bilbrey, who will be graduating with a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science this spring, engineering is a way to combine her passion for computers and technology with helping people.   

“I love to learn about the world around me, and I am constantly seeing how engineers make people’s lives better with technology,” she said.   

Earlier this year, Bilbrey led the Cyber Security Club at UC Davis to place fourth overall and third in defense among 22 teams at the Western Regional Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition. Teams are given a simulated corporate network and must work together to keep different services, such as websites and email, up and running while hackers are trying to attack the network. Bilbrey detailed her the club’s involvement in the competition and the benefits of its collaborative working environment in a blog post earlier this year.   

With her computer science and cybersecurity experience, Bilbrey will go on after graduation to join the industry and protect computer systems as a security engineer.   

During her time at UC Davis, Bilbrey worked on research at the Center for Mind and Brain with neuroscience professor Lee Miller creating a new advanced hearing aid. She says that experience taught her how powerful it is to tackle problems as a team.   

In addition to getting hands-on with projects as soon as possible in your college career, Bilbrey says the most valuable lesson she learned at UC Davis was that there is so much one can do when tackling a problem as part of a team.   

“Working on projects helps you be more experienced with design thinking and teamwork,” she said. “There's a limited amount of good an individual can achieve by themselves, and working in a group allows people to leverage each other to achieve big goals.”   

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