political values essay

• Search Menu
• Sign in through your institution
• Browse content in Arts and Humanities
• Browse content in Archaeology
• Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
• Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
• Archaeology by Region
• Archaeology of Religion
• Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
• Biblical Archaeology
• Contemporary and Public Archaeology
• Environmental Archaeology
• Historical Archaeology
• History and Theory of Archaeology
• Industrial Archaeology
• Landscape Archaeology
• Mortuary Archaeology
• Prehistoric Archaeology
• Underwater Archaeology
• Urban Archaeology
• Zooarchaeology
• Browse content in Architecture
• Architectural Structure and Design
• History of Architecture
• Residential and Domestic Buildings
• Theory of Architecture
• Browse content in Art
• Art Subjects and Themes
• History of Art
• Industrial and Commercial Art
• Theory of Art
• Biographical Studies
• Byzantine Studies
• Browse content in Classical Studies
• Classical History
• Classical Philosophy
• Classical Mythology
• Classical Literature
• Classical Reception
• Classical Art and Architecture
• Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
• Greek and Roman Epigraphy
• Greek and Roman Law
• Greek and Roman Papyrology
• Greek and Roman Archaeology
• Late Antiquity
• Religion in the Ancient World
• Digital Humanities
• Browse content in History
• Colonialism and Imperialism
• Diplomatic History
• Environmental History
• Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
• Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
• Historical Geography
• History by Period
• History of Emotions
• History of Agriculture
• History of Education
• History of Gender and Sexuality
• Industrial History
• Intellectual History
• International History
• Labour History
• Legal and Constitutional History
• Local and Family History
• Maritime History
• Military History
• National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
• Oral History
• Political History
• Public History
• Regional and National History
• Revolutions and Rebellions
• Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
• Social and Cultural History
• Theory, Methods, and Historiography
• Urban History
• World History
• Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
• Language Learning (Specific Skills)
• Language Teaching Theory and Methods
• Browse content in Linguistics
• Applied Linguistics
• Cognitive Linguistics
• Computational Linguistics
• Forensic Linguistics
• Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
• Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
• History of English
• Language Acquisition
• Language Evolution
• Language Reference
• Language Variation
• Language Families
• Lexicography
• Linguistic Anthropology
• Linguistic Theories
• Linguistic Typology
• Phonetics and Phonology
• Psycholinguistics
• Sociolinguistics
• Translation and Interpretation
• Writing Systems
• Browse content in Literature
• Bibliography
• Children's Literature Studies
• Literary Studies (Asian)
• Literary Studies (European)
• Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
• Literary Studies (Romanticism)
• Literary Studies (American)
• Literary Studies (Modernism)
• Literary Studies - World
• Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
• Literary Studies (19th Century)
• Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
• Literary Studies (African American Literature)
• Literary Studies (British and Irish)
• Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
• Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
• Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
• Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
• Literary Studies (History of the Book)
• Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
• Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
• Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
• Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
• Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
• Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
• Literary Studies (War Literature)
• Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
• Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
• Mythology and Folklore
• Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
• Browse content in Media Studies
• Browse content in Music
• Applied Music
• Dance and Music
• Ethics in Music
• Ethnomusicology
• Gender and Sexuality in Music
• Medicine and Music
• Music Cultures
• Music and Religion
• Music and Media
• Music and Culture
• Music Education and Pedagogy
• Music Theory and Analysis
• Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
• Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
• Musicology and Music History
• Performance Practice and Studies
• Race and Ethnicity in Music
• Sound Studies
• Browse content in Performing Arts
• Browse content in Philosophy
• Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
• Epistemology
• Feminist Philosophy
• History of Western Philosophy
• Metaphysics
• Moral Philosophy
• Non-Western Philosophy
• Philosophy of Science
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Perception
• Philosophy of Action
• Philosophy of Law
• Philosophy of Religion
• Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
• Practical Ethics
• Social and Political Philosophy
• Browse content in Religion
• Biblical Studies
• Christianity
• East Asian Religions
• History of Religion
• Judaism and Jewish Studies
• Qumran Studies
• Religion and Education
• Religion and Health
• Religion and Politics
• Religion and Science
• Religion and Law
• Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
• Religious Studies
• Browse content in Society and Culture
• Cookery, Food, and Drink
• Cultural Studies
• Customs and Traditions
• Ethical Issues and Debates
• Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
• Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
• Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
• Sports and Outdoor Recreation
• Technology and Society
• Travel and Holiday
• Visual Culture
• Browse content in Law
• Arbitration
• Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
• Commercial Law
• Company Law
• Browse content in Comparative Law
• Systems of Law
• Competition Law
• Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
• Government Powers
• Judicial Review
• Local Government Law
• Military and Defence Law
• Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
• Construction Law
• Contract Law
• Browse content in Criminal Law
• Criminal Procedure
• Criminal Evidence Law
• Sentencing and Punishment
• Employment and Labour Law
• Environment and Energy Law
• Browse content in Financial Law
• Banking Law
• Insolvency Law
• History of Law
• Human Rights and Immigration
• Intellectual Property Law
• Browse content in International Law
• Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
• Public International Law
• IT and Communications Law
• Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
• Law and Politics
• Law and Society
• Browse content in Legal System and Practice
• Courts and Procedure
• Legal Skills and Practice
• Primary Sources of Law
• Regulation of Legal Profession
• Medical and Healthcare Law
• Browse content in Policing
• Criminal Investigation and Detection
• Police and Security Services
• Police Procedure and Law
• Police Regional Planning
• Browse content in Property Law
• Personal Property Law
• Study and Revision
• Terrorism and National Security Law
• Browse content in Trusts Law
• Wills and Probate or Succession
• Browse content in Medicine and Health
• Browse content in Allied Health Professions
• Arts Therapies
• Clinical Science
• Dietetics and Nutrition
• Occupational Therapy
• Operating Department Practice
• Physiotherapy
• Radiography
• Speech and Language Therapy
• Browse content in Anaesthetics
• General Anaesthesia
• Neuroanaesthesia
• Browse content in Clinical Medicine
• Acute Medicine
• Cardiovascular Medicine
• Clinical Genetics
• Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
• Dermatology
• Endocrinology and Diabetes
• Gastroenterology
• Genito-urinary Medicine
• Geriatric Medicine
• Infectious Diseases
• Medical Toxicology
• Medical Oncology
• Pain Medicine
• Palliative Medicine
• Rehabilitation Medicine
• Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
• Rheumatology
• Sleep Medicine
• Sports and Exercise Medicine
• Clinical Neuroscience
• Community Medical Services
• Critical Care
• Emergency Medicine
• Forensic Medicine
• Haematology
• History of Medicine
• Browse content in Medical Dentistry
• Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
• Paediatric Dentistry
• Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
• Surgical Dentistry
• Browse content in Medical Skills
• Clinical Skills
• Communication Skills
• Nursing Skills
• Surgical Skills
• Medical Ethics
• Medical Statistics and Methodology
• Browse content in Neurology
• Clinical Neurophysiology
• Neuropathology
• Nursing Studies
• Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
• Gynaecology
• Occupational Medicine
• Ophthalmology
• Otolaryngology (ENT)
• Browse content in Paediatrics
• Neonatology
• Browse content in Pathology
• Chemical Pathology
• Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
• Histopathology
• Medical Microbiology and Virology
• Patient Education and Information
• Browse content in Pharmacology
• Psychopharmacology
• Browse content in Popular Health
• Caring for Others
• Complementary and Alternative Medicine
• Self-help and Personal Development
• Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
• Cell Biology
• Molecular Biology and Genetics
• Reproduction, Growth and Development
• Primary Care
• Professional Development in Medicine
• Browse content in Psychiatry
• Addiction Medicine
• Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
• Forensic Psychiatry
• Learning Disabilities
• Old Age Psychiatry
• Psychotherapy
• Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
• Epidemiology
• Public Health
• Browse content in Radiology
• Clinical Radiology
• Interventional Radiology
• Nuclear Medicine
• Radiation Oncology
• Reproductive Medicine
• Browse content in Surgery
• Cardiothoracic Surgery
• Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
• General Surgery
• Neurosurgery
• Paediatric Surgery
• Peri-operative Care
• Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
• Surgical Oncology
• Transplant Surgery
• Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
• Vascular Surgery
• Browse content in Science and Mathematics
• Browse content in Biological Sciences
• Aquatic Biology
• Biochemistry
• Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
• Developmental Biology
• Ecology and Conservation
• Evolutionary Biology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Microbiology
• Molecular and Cell Biology
• Natural History
• Plant Sciences and Forestry
• Research Methods in Life Sciences
• Structural Biology
• Systems Biology
• Zoology and Animal Sciences
• Browse content in Chemistry
• Analytical Chemistry
• Computational Chemistry
• Crystallography
• Environmental Chemistry
• Industrial Chemistry
• Inorganic Chemistry
• Materials Chemistry
• Medicinal Chemistry
• Mineralogy and Gems
• Organic Chemistry
• Physical Chemistry
• Polymer Chemistry
• Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
• Theoretical Chemistry
• Browse content in Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Computer Architecture and Logic Design
• Game Studies
• Human-Computer Interaction
• Mathematical Theory of Computation
• Programming Languages
• Software Engineering
• Systems Analysis and Design
• Virtual Reality
• Browse content in Computing
• Business Applications
• Computer Security
• Computer Games
• Computer Networking and Communications
• Digital Lifestyle
• Graphical and Digital Media Applications
• Operating Systems
• Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
• Atmospheric Sciences
• Environmental Geography
• Geology and the Lithosphere
• Maps and Map-making
• Meteorology and Climatology
• Oceanography and Hydrology
• Palaeontology
• Physical Geography and Topography
• Regional Geography
• Soil Science
• Urban Geography
• Browse content in Engineering and Technology
• Agriculture and Farming
• Biological Engineering
• Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
• Electronics and Communications Engineering
• Energy Technology
• Engineering (General)
• Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
• History of Engineering and Technology
• Mechanical Engineering and Materials
• Technology of Industrial Chemistry
• Transport Technology and Trades
• Browse content in Environmental Science
• Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
• Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Environmental Sustainability
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
• Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
• Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
• Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
• History of Science and Technology
• Browse content in Materials Science
• Ceramics and Glasses
• Composite Materials
• Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
• Nanotechnology
• Browse content in Mathematics
• Applied Mathematics
• Biomathematics and Statistics
• History of Mathematics
• Mathematical Education
• Mathematical Finance
• Mathematical Analysis
• Numerical and Computational Mathematics
• Probability and Statistics
• Pure Mathematics
• Browse content in Neuroscience
• Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
• Development of the Nervous System
• Disorders of the Nervous System
• History of Neuroscience
• Invertebrate Neurobiology
• Molecular and Cellular Systems
• Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
• Neuroscientific Techniques
• Sensory and Motor Systems
• Browse content in Physics
• Astronomy and Astrophysics
• Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
• Biological and Medical Physics
• Classical Mechanics
• Computational Physics
• Condensed Matter Physics
• Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
• History of Physics
• Mathematical and Statistical Physics
• Measurement Science
• Nuclear Physics
• Particles and Fields
• Plasma Physics
• Quantum Physics
• Relativity and Gravitation
• Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
• Browse content in Psychology
• Affective Sciences
• Clinical Psychology
• Cognitive Psychology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Criminal and Forensic Psychology
• Developmental Psychology
• Educational Psychology
• Evolutionary Psychology
• Health Psychology
• History and Systems in Psychology
• Music Psychology
• Neuropsychology
• Organizational Psychology
• Psychological Assessment and Testing
• Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
• Psychology Professional Development and Training
• Research Methods in Psychology
• Social Psychology
• Browse content in Social Sciences
• Browse content in Anthropology
• Anthropology of Religion
• Human Evolution
• Medical Anthropology
• Physical Anthropology
• Regional Anthropology
• Social and Cultural Anthropology
• Theory and Practice of Anthropology
• Browse content in Business and Management
• Business Strategy
• Business Ethics
• Business History
• Business and Government
• Business and Technology
• Business and the Environment
• Comparative Management
• Corporate Governance
• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Entrepreneurship
• Health Management
• Human Resource Management
• Industrial and Employment Relations
• Industry Studies
• Information and Communication Technologies
• International Business
• Knowledge Management
• Management and Management Techniques
• Operations Management
• Organizational Theory and Behaviour
• Pensions and Pension Management
• Public and Nonprofit Management
• Strategic Management
• Supply Chain Management
• Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
• Criminal Justice
• Criminology
• Forms of Crime
• International and Comparative Criminology
• Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
• Development Studies
• Browse content in Economics
• Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
• Asian Economics
• Behavioural Finance
• Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
• Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
• Economic Systems
• Economic History
• Economic Methodology
• Economic Development and Growth
• Financial Markets
• Financial Institutions and Services
• General Economics and Teaching
• Health, Education, and Welfare
• History of Economic Thought
• International Economics
• Labour and Demographic Economics
• Law and Economics
• Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
• Microeconomics
• Public Economics
• Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
• Welfare Economics
• Browse content in Education
• Adult Education and Continuous Learning
• Care and Counselling of Students
• Early Childhood and Elementary Education
• Educational Equipment and Technology
• Educational Strategies and Policy
• Higher and Further Education
• Organization and Management of Education
• Philosophy and Theory of Education
• Schools Studies
• Secondary Education
• Teaching of a Specific Subject
• Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
• Teaching Skills and Techniques
• Browse content in Environment
• Applied Ecology (Social Science)
• Climate Change
• Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environment)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
• Browse content in Human Geography
• Cultural Geography
• Economic Geography
• Political Geography
• Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
• Communication Studies
• Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
• Browse content in Politics
• African Politics
• Asian Politics
• Chinese Politics
• Comparative Politics
• Conflict Politics
• Elections and Electoral Studies
• Environmental Politics
• European Union
• Foreign Policy
• Gender and Politics
• Human Rights and Politics
• Indian Politics
• International Relations
• International Organization (Politics)
• International Political Economy
• Irish Politics
• Latin American Politics
• Middle Eastern Politics
• Political Methodology
• Political Communication
• Political Philosophy
• Political Sociology
• Political Behaviour
• Political Economy
• Political Institutions
• Political Theory
• Politics and Law
• Politics of Development
• Public Administration
• Public Policy
• Quantitative Political Methodology
• Regional Political Studies
• Russian Politics
• Security Studies
• State and Local Government
• UK Politics
• US Politics
• Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
• African Studies
• Asian Studies
• East Asian Studies
• Japanese Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Middle Eastern Studies
• Native American Studies
• Scottish Studies
• Browse content in Research and Information
• Research Methods
• Browse content in Social Work
• Addictions and Substance Misuse
• Adoption and Fostering
• Care of the Elderly
• Child and Adolescent Social Work
• Couple and Family Social Work
• Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
• Emergency Services
• Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
• International and Global Issues in Social Work
• Mental and Behavioural Health
• Social Justice and Human Rights
• Social Policy and Advocacy
• Social Work and Crime and Justice
• Social Work Macro Practice
• Social Work Practice Settings
• Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
• Welfare and Benefit Systems
• Browse content in Sociology
• Childhood Studies
• Community Development
• Comparative and Historical Sociology
• Economic Sociology
• Gender and Sexuality
• Gerontology and Ageing
• Health, Illness, and Medicine
• Marriage and the Family
• Migration Studies
• Occupations, Professions, and Work
• Organizations
• Population and Demography
• Race and Ethnicity
• Social Theory
• Social Movements and Social Change
• Social Research and Statistics
• Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
• Sociology of Religion
• Sociology of Education
• Sport and Leisure
• Urban and Rural Studies
• Browse content in Warfare and Defence
• Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
• Land Forces and Warfare
• Military Administration
• Military Life and Institutions
• Naval Forces and Warfare
• Other Warfare and Defence Issues
• Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
• Weapons and Equipment

• < Previous chapter
• Next chapter >

16 Political Values

Loek Halman is Associate Professor of Sociology at Tilburg University.

• Published: 02 September 2009
• Cite Icon Cite
• Permissions Icon Permissions

This article discusses political values. The first section provides a working definition of the terms values and political values. This is followed by a discussion of old and new political values. The article also examines modernization and political value changes. The article ends with a section on critical and discontented citizens.

The empirical study of political values has gained momentum since Almond and Verba's (1963) seminal study on the Civic Culture . They introduced the concept of political culture to understand various political systems. They argued that in addition to the institutional and constitutional features of political systems, the political orientations of the individuals who constitute the political system are also relevant. Up to then, students of politics were mainly concerned “with the structure and function of political systems, institutions, and agencies, and their effects on public policy” (Almond and Verba 1963, 31) .

Almond and Verba's pioneering work redirected empirical enquiry from an exclusive preoccupation with institutions and structure and their concept of political culture bridged the gap between macro‐level politics and micro‐politics. “We would like to suggest that this relationship between attitudes and motivations of the discrete individuals who make up the political systems and the character and performance of political systems may be discovered systematically through concepts of political culture” (Almond and Verba 1963, 32) . The concept of political culture refers to “a particular pattern of orientations to political actions” (Pye 1973, 65–6) , and these orientations have major implications for the “way the political system operates—to its stability, effectiveness and so forth” (Almond and Verba 1963, 74) . Carol Pateman (1980) criticized this assumed relationship between people's orientations and political outcomes, arguing that it remained unclear how the values of people should affect the political system. Indeed, as Barry (1978) pointed out, political culture may better be viewed as the effect and not as the cause of political processes. A correlation between civic culture attitudes and democracy does not say anything about the causal chain. The presumption that a civic culture is conducive to democracy can also be interpreted the other way around, but such a conclusion would be less exiting, namely that “ ‘democracy’ produces the ‘civic culture’ ” (Barry 1978, 51–2) . However, Almond and Verba did not consider political culture as determining political structure, but they regarded them as interconnected, mutually dependent, and dynamically interacting. “Political culture is treated as both an independent and a dependent variable, as causing and as being caused by it” (Almond 1980, 29) . Beliefs, feelings, and values are the product as well as the cause of a political system.

The Civic Culture was one of the first empirical studies using the recently developed research technology “of sample surveys, which led to a much sharper specification and elaboration of the subjective dimensions of stable democratic politics” (Almond 1980, 22) . For the first time in history it was possible to “establish whether there were indeed distinctive nation ‘marks’ and national characters; whether and in what respects and degrees nations were divided into distinctive subcultures; whether social class, functional groups, and specific elites had distinctive orientations towards politics and public policy, and what role was played by what socialization agents in the development of these orientations” (Almond 1980, 15) .

The rise of the political culture concept during the 1950s and 1960s was part of the more general ascension of the idea that culture is a prominent explanatory power in the social sciences and history. “Culture was given causal efficacy as well as being caused and political culture … acquired the same traits” (Formisano 2001, 397 quoting Berkhofer) . As such, the recent emphasis on the importance of the cultural factor, and the growing awareness that culture in general and values in particular play an important role in human life is far from new. The idea that culture matters was prominent in Weber's intriguing work on the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism more than a century ago and earlier, de Tocqueville wrote about the importance of culture in his Democracy in America . During the 1940–50s, a rich literature was developed by scholars like Mead, Benedict, McCelland, Banfield, Inkeles, and Lipset, who regarded culture as “a crucial element in understanding societies, analyzing differences among them, and explaining their economic and political development” (Huntington 2000, xiv) .

However, during the 1960s and 1970s, interest in culture as a determining factor declined and rational choice theories became dominant. Following the logic of economics, social phenomena were explained as the result of rational calculations made by self‐interested individuals who aim at maximizing their own individual utility. Such theories claim that people anticipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and then decide which of these alternatives will yield the best outcome for them. People choose the alternative that is likely to produce the greatest satisfaction.

In more recent years, interest in the cultural factor rose again, not in the last place because rational choice models appeared to have limited explanatory power, for example, to understand collective action (why do individuals join many groups and associations?), or to understand the survival of social norms such as altruism, reciprocity, and trust. Apparently people are not driven by a narrowly conceived self‐interest and thus are not purely rationally calculating and maximizing their own interests. The renaissance of culture as an important factor and the rediscovery of the cultural approach to politics can be seen as a way of counterbalancing the rational choice approach that dominated the sixties and seventies (Lane and Ersson 2005, 2) .

The cultural factor was also rediscovered because of the failure of economic factors to explain cross‐cultural differences and the differential trajectories of cultural changes over time. As Inglehart (1988, 1203) noted, “there is no question that economic factors are politically important, but they are only part of the story.” He referred to the importance of political attitudes, beliefs, orientations, preferences, and priorities that “have major political consequences, being closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions”. Culture was again regarded as an important source in human life and treated as a powerful active agent. As a proponent of this view, Wildavsky argued that people's basic orientations, their preferences, beliefs, and interests in particular should be taken into account. He stated, “I wish to make what people want [his italics]—their desires, preferences, values, ideals—into the central subject of our inquiry” because preferences “in regard to political objects are not external to political life; on the contrary, they constitute the very internal essence, the quintessence of politics: the construction and reconstruction of our lives together” (Wildavsky 1987, 5) .

The unexpected and rapid collapse of communist or socialist authoritarian regimes in central and eastern European countries and the rash unification of both Germanies have further triggered the idea that culture really matters. These events marked the end of the “Cold War” and evoked new or renewed contacts and relationships between East and West. Above all they “have drawn attention to the way regimes legitimate themselves and the way citizens identify themselves, both processes which suggest an important mediating role for culture” (Street 1994, 96) . Salient examples in this respect are of course the dramatic events that took place in Yugoslavia and many of the former Soviet countries. Such events are a sad illustration of what can happen when hidden forces and large differences in values within the collective consciousness of people explode into hatred and violence.

The importance of the cultural factor has also been demonstrated more recently in the European process of unification. The integration of nation‐states into one Europe has mainly been confined to the political and economic dimensions and this process is not welcomed with great enthusiasm by all Europeans. As soon as the cultural dimension is included, citizens become more reluctant regarding their support for Europe and the European ideal. Many people fear that a further European integration beyond economic and political cooperation undermines the role of the nation‐state and that “national” identities, habits, and cultures will slowly disappear. Recent analyses of data collected within the framework of the European Values Study suggest, however, that Europe is far from a cultural unity. European unity appears to be a unity of diversity. There remain significant differences in the basic value orientations of the Europeans ( Arts, Hagenaars, and Halman 2003 ; Arts and Halman 2004 ; Halman, Luijkx, and Van Zundert 2005 ). So it will be a demanding task of European leaders to ensure that the European project is in harmony with and reflection of the values of European citizens. That the European project is endangered from this cultural diversity is recognized. Recently, the President of the European Commission installed a reflection group on the Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe. In their concluding remarks this group writes that “because an economic order never evolves in a value‐free environment … an effective and just economic order must also be embedded in the morals, customs, and expectations of human beings, as well as in their social institutions. So the manner in which the larger European economic area—the common market—is in harmony with the values of European citizens, as varied as these may be, is no mere academic problem; it is a fundamental and political one” (Biedenkopf, Geremek, and Michalski 2004, 7) .

The discussion on values is also triggered by the recent influx of migrant minorities and the multicultural society that is developing in many advanced industrial societies. These provoked in many European countries an open debate on the consequences of value diversity and what exactly comprises the cultural entity and identity of nation‐states. Also, the disappearance of internal borders between European Union member states, the demise of communism in the east, and the enlargement and further integration of the European Union in the center and the west have put the issues of identity and the survival of national cultures high on the European agenda. The European project seems to have awakened nationalistic sentiments and movements from their slumber and massive migration waves into Europe seem to have triggered exclusionist reactions toward new cultural and ethnic minorities and increased intercultural and interethnic conflict.

Apart from this, globalization of society makes sometimes painfully clear that people around the globe are not the same and adhere to very distinct values. Cultural conflicts over basic human values are frequently in the news and seem to confirm what Huntington predicted in his Clash of Civilizations . Major dividing lines in the contemporary world are defined by culture and no longer by ideological, economic, and political features. “In the post‐Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural … The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocs of the Cold War but rather the world's seven or eight major civilizations” (Huntington 1996, 21) .

The discussion of values is often fuelled by a growing preoccupation with the decline of values, in particular those values that make us good citizens and make society and human life good. “Widespread feelings of social mistrust, citizens turning away from prime institutions and political authorities, and engaging less in informal interactions are seen as indicators of the decline of the traditional civic ethic” ( Ester, Mohler, and Vinken 2006: 17 ; Bellah et al. 1992 ; Etzioni 1996 ; 2001 ; Fukuyama 2000 ; Putnam 2000 ; 2002 ). In the current, sometimes heated, debate, the discussion is not so much on the decline of values as such, but more on the decline of decent, (pro‐) social behavior. Many politicians and society watchers claim that a growing number of citizens is indifferent and skeptical about politics, and too narrowly focused on pure self‐interest. They consider this a severe threat for respect for human rights and human dignity, liberty, equality, and solidarity. In their view, the “good” values have declined or have even vanished and the wrong, “bad” values triumph in today's highly individualized society.

Major causes for this decline are found in modernization processes of individualization, secularization, and globalization that are assumed to have had severe consequences for the values, preferences, beliefs, and ideas that people adhere to. It is also in this vein that we look at political values and will decide on what old and new political values are. But before we enter into that discussion, it seems necessary to shed some light on the concept of values, for it remains unclear what values are. Therefore we start our discussion on old and new values with a short introduction of the concept of values in general and political values in particular.

1 What are Values and What are Political Values?

Since little theory has developed on values (Dietz and Stern 1995, 264) , the concept is not very clear. It is more or less a commonplace to state that values are hard to define properly. The sociological and psychological literature on the subject reveals a terminological jungle. To a large extent, this conceptual confusion is grounded in the nature of values. One obvious problem in (social) research is that values can only be postulated or inferred, because values, as such, are not visible or measurable directly. As a consequence, a value is a more or less open concept. There is no empirically grounded theory of values, which stimulated efforts to distinguish values from closely‐related concepts like attitudes, beliefs, opinions and and other orientations. The common notion, however, is that values are somehow more basic or more existential than these related concepts. Attitudes, for example, are considered to refer to a more restricted complex of objects and/or behaviors than values (Reich and Adcock 1976, 20) . This type of theoretical argument assumes a more or less hierarchical structure in which values are more basic than attitudes. “A value is seen to be a disposition of a person just like an attitude, but more basic than an attitude, often underlying it” (Rokeach 1968, 124) . The same applies to the relations between values and theoretical concepts such as norms, beliefs, opinions, and so on. Most social scientists agree that values are deeply rooted motivations or orientations guiding or explaining certain attitudes, norms, and opinions which, in turn, direct human action or at least part of it. Adhering to a specific value constitutes a disposition, or a propensity to act in a certain way ( Halman 1991, 27 ; Ester, Mohler, and Vinken 2006, 7 ; van Deth and Scarbrough 1995 ). Such a definition of values is a functional one and although it is more a description of what values do rather than what they actually are , it enables us to measure values as latent constructs, that can be observed indirectly, that is, in the way in which people evaluate states, activities, or outcomes.

Having made clear what values are, we need to define political values. Rokeach (1973, 25) argued that values can be classified in domains or institutional spheres. Accordingly, political values can be defined as the category of values that pertain to the political sphere. In line with our values concept, political values can be seen as the foundations of people's political behaviors such as voting and/or protesting or as Almond and Verba (1963) indicated, political values are people's orientations towards political objects. Hence, the individual's concrete political behavior can (at least partly) be explained from his or her political values or orientations. Thus, political values can be seen as perceptions of a desirable order (van Deth 1984) , and determining “whether a political situation or a political event is experienced as favorable or unfavorable, good or bad” (Inglehart and Klingemann 1979, 207) . Political values enable us to make political judgments.

2 Old and New?

It is not easy to decide what is old and new when it comes to values. If “old” means that certain values have been emphasized in the past, while “new” refers to the values that have more recently gained prominence, it remains a question if such a qualification makes sense. Old in the sense that in the past certain values were investigated does not mean that other values or orientations did not exist at that moment in time. It may simply mean that these other orientations were not an object of study because no one was interested in these orientations while in more contemporary settings such values have drawn attention and have become fashionable to focus on. For instance, a popular theme nowadays is sustainable development and many studies focus on issues of pollution, saving energy, climate changes, or water management. In times that the environment becomes an important issue, for whatever reason, environmental values come to the fore.

The distinction between old and new may be seen in terms of former versus contemporary, or in terms of traditional versus modern. Former values are those that have been recognized and focused on in the past, while “new” refers to orientations that have been identified recently and that dominate the current discourse. In that sense, “old” does not necessarily imply old and forgotten, but “old” would mean that these values have lost attention or have become less attractive to focus on, while “new” would apply to those values that match the emerging new issues and phenomena in contemporary society.

However, “old” and “new” in the sense of traditional versus modern may be understood in terms of changing values and shifting value adherences among populations. These value changes are linked to significant transformations of economic and social structures and the idea is that the values that prevailed during feudalism are not the same as those associated with industrialism or post‐industrialism. In such a view, the distinction between old and new is connected with the themes of modernization and post‐modernization. The traditional orientations stressing security, order, respect for authority, and conformity are considered to slowly shifting away whereas values stressing personal autonomy, individual freedom, self‐fulfillment, independence, and emancipation are assumed to be on the the rise ( Inglehart 1977 , 1990 , 1997 ; van Deth 1995 ).

Certain political values may turn out to be more resistant than others and have not vanished. Thus, in the Civic Culture , Almond and Verba identified a number of democratic attitudes that were already identified as important by de Tocqueville, and that are considered (again or still) highly relevant today. Such attitudes of trust, political partisanship, and societal involvement are key concepts of what is recognized as social capital, a notion that regained prominence since the recent works of Putnam, Fukuyama, and others.

3 Old Political Values?

Since the Enlightenment, liberalism was one of the dominant political forces. Socialism and social democracy are the two other classical ideological schools of thought which have dominated social and political behaviors of people and politics (see also Rush 1992, 190) . Classic themes in politics are of course freedom versus authoritarianism, equality versus inequality, the cleavage of labor and capital in society in general, and the class conflict in particular. It has become more or less common practice to classify political opinions on these issues in terms of left and right. The concepts of left and right are “generally seen as instruments that citizens can use to orient themselves in a complex political world” (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989, 203) ; they “summarize one's stands on the important political issues of the day. It serves the function of organizing and simplifying a complex political reality, providing an overall orientation toward a potentially limitless number of issues, political parties, and social groups. The pervasive use of the Left–Right concept throughout the years in Western political discourse testifies to its usefulness” (Inglehart 1990, 292–3) .

In the beginning left and right referred to the distinction between “the clergy (right) and the nobility (left)” (Nevitte and Gibbins 1990, 29) . With industrialization, the left–right continuum became associated with the cleavage of labor and capital in general and the class conflict in particular and the core issue in the left–right distinction became equality (Bobbio 1996, 60) . Left represents the part of society that stresses greater equality, whereas right is supportive of a “more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change toward greater equality” (Lipset et al. 1954, 1135) . Both notions became increasingly associated with issues like the (re‐) distribution of income and wealth and the role of the government in the economy and society. “Left” favors a more just distribution of income and wealth and welcomes state intervention to achieve this, while “right” stresses the principles of a free market economy and independent individuals, and thus strongly favors a reduction of state control. Such cleavages between left and right are still highly relevant in today's society.

The polarization between left and right not only applies to political conflicts; the different outlooks also appear in all kinds of social, moral, and ethical issues, like abortion, euthanasia, nuclear energy, etc. Particularly the development of modern welfare states resulted in a growing number of social issues that are interpreted in terms of the left and right polarity, despite the fact that these issues are not associated with the traditional class conflicts. Issues like the quality of life, environment, nuclear energy, disarmament, foreigners, asylum seekers, and various moral issues have become important topics where left and right express fundamentally different views. Left is regarded to take the sides of the poor, the disadvantaged, the deprived, and minority groups; they are most concerned about the environment and opposed to nuclear energy and arms, and in moral issues left represents the liberal stances. Right is commonly seen as more restrictive and in favor of traditional standpoints. They are the strongest proponents of authority, order, maintaining the status quo, and a strong moral society.

Knutsen argues that the basic conflicts embedded in what he called old left–right were economic in nature, “referring in particular to the role of government in the economy” ( Knutsen 1995, 161 ; 2006, 115 ). These emerged particularly in industrial society. The main conflict centered around state control and improving equality versus freedom of enterprise and individual achievement. New dividing lines circle around conflicts emerging from advanced industrial and post‐industrial society and relate to conflicts between conservative moral and social beliefs versus individual and social freedom ( King 1987 ; Levitas 1986 ; Knutsen 1995 ; 2006 ).

Thus, also with regard to contemporary controversial issues, the left–right schema appears a useful tool to classify people's opinions. However, the left–right distinction is increasingly understood in terms of progressive versus conservative. For example, political parties, their adherents are often described in terms of left–right distinctions. It seems that an “old” concept has survived and can still be applied in contemporary society. In fact, the terms left and right remained popular in political discourse and in the mass media, but in political studies the interest in this left–right dimension appears to have declined.

4 New Political Values?

The main reason for the decreased interest in the left–right schema is the claim that a large number of new phenomena cannot be fitted into the ideological struggle between left and right. New issues have emerged on the political agenda and “the simple concepts ‘left’ and ‘right’ are too general for analyzing change in value orientations as between industrial and advanced industrial society” (van Deth 1995, 10) . Energy, the Cold War, the collapse of communism, the environment, sustainable development, welfare state, the European unification, globalization and internationalization, gay rights, equality for women, international migration, flows of refugees, became topics that increasingly needed serious attention, often resulting in new cleavages: the struggle between the sexes (men against women), active versus inactive people, the division of rich and poor countries, natives versus (im)migrants. These new topics that attracted widespread attention were not the core of the “old” traditional political ideologies that emerged from the French Revolution—that is, conservatism, liberalism and socialism. The old ideologies and traditional values lost their attractiveness and much of the political values inquiries focused on the value orientations that were connected with what is commonly denoted new politics. “New politics, various scholars argued, could only be understood as the reflection of new values” (Lane and Ersson 2005, 258) , which center around conflicts emerging from post‐industrial society and issues about the meaning of life in such a society (Knutsen 2006) . What values classify as new? An even more important question is why these new values have emerged?

The central values of old politics largely relate to economic growth, public order, national security, and traditional lifestyles, conformity, and authority, while the values of new politics emphasize individual freedom, social equality and in particular quality of life ( Inglehart 1977 , 1990 , 1999 ; and chapter in this volume). For Knutsen (2006) , both the materialist–postmaterialist value orientation and libertarian/authoritarian values can be regarded as value orientations associated with new politics. The materialist–postmaterialist dimension reflects the “shift from a preoccupation with physical sustenance and safety values towards a greater emphasis on belonging, self‐expression and quality of life issues” ( Knutsen 2006, 116 ; Inglehart 1977 , 1990 , 1997 ). Similarly, the libertarian‐authoritarian dimension distinguishes between an emphasis on “autonomy, openness, and self betterment” (Knutsen 2006, 116) on the libertarian side and “concerns for security and order, … respect for authority, discipline and dutifulness, patriotism, and intolerance for minorities, conformity to customs, and support for traditional religious and moral values” (Flanagan 1987, 1305) on the authoritarian side. The latter dimension reflects the shift of values from authoritarian to libertarian. More and more people turn away from traditions, the traditional authoritarian institutions, and the prescribed values and norms and increasingly they want to decide for themselves and determine on their own how to live their own lives.

Why have these modern orientations gained prominence? The answer can be found in the major social and political changes that gradually transformed society into postmodern society. There is widespread acceptance of the idea that modernization processes such as individualization, secularization, and globalization have had profound impact on people's (political) values.

5 Modernization and Political Value Changes

Most perspectives on value changes begin with the observation that there are fundamental qualitative differences between modern industrialized society and late modern, advanced industrial, postmodern society. Further, most perspectives link structural transformations to fundamental shifts in basic value orientations. As for the structural features, most advanced societies have recently experienced unprecedented increases in levels of affluence, growth of the tertiary economic sector at the cost of the first and secondary sectors, improving educational opportunities and rising levels of education, growing use of communication‐related technologies, and all have experienced what is known as the “information revolution”. Further, these changes resulted in expanding social welfare networks and increasing geographic, economic, and social mobility, specialization of job‐related knowledge, and professionalization.

These fundamental structural changes are related with or accompanied by a process in which individuals are increasingly able and willing to develop their own values and norms that do not necessarily correspond to the traditional, institutional (religious) ones. This process seems to be a universal (western) process that brings about not only more modern views, but also more diversity, and it is triggered and strongly pushed by rising levels of education of the population. More education increases people's “breadth of perspective” (Gabennesch 1972, 183) , their abilities and cognitive and political skills, which makes them more independent from the traditional suppliers of values, norms, and beliefs, and more open to new ideas and arguments, other providers of meanings, values, and norms. People's actions and behaviors are increasingly rooted in and legitimized by their own personal preferences, convictions, and goals. There is an unrestrained endeavor to pursue private needs and aspirations, resulting in assigning top priority to personal need fulfillment. Self‐development and personal happiness have become the ultimate criteria for individual actions and attitudes. Individualization thus entails a process in which opinions, beliefs, attitudes, and values grow to be matters of personal choice. As such, it denotes increasing levels of personal autonomy, self‐reliance, and an emphasis on individual freedom and the Self (Giddens 1991) . Individualized persons no longer take for granted the rules and prescriptions imposed by traditional institutions which means that the traditional options are less likely to be selected by an increasing number of people. This process of de‐traditionalization is characterized by a decline of traditional views in a variety of life domains. The “disciplined, self‐denying, and achievement‐oriented norms … are giving way to an increasingly broad latitude for individual choice of lifestyles and individual self‐expression” (Inglehart 1997, 28) .

People's values, beliefs, attitudes, and behavior are based increasingly on personal choice and are less dependent on tradition and social institutions. In other words, a process of privatization causes individual choices to be based increasingly on personal convictions and preferences. Waters (1994, 206) portrayed this as follows: “We may no longer be living under the aegis of an industrial or capitalist culture which can tell us what is true, right and beautiful, and also what our place is in the grand scheme, but under a chaotic, mass‐mediated, individual‐preference‐based culture of post‐modernity.” Voting, for instance “is no longer the confirmation of ‘belonging’ to a specific social group but becomes an individual choice …, an affirmation of a personal value system: the ‘issue voter’ tends to replace the traditional ‘party identification voter’ ” (Ignazi 1992, 4) . Since the saliency of ideology has diminished, the once strong ties between party and voter have weakened significantly. The modern voter has become an “issue voter” and politics has become “issue politics” which appears from the gradual shift that has occurred from membership of older style or traditional social movements, such as churches, ethnic groups, unions, or political parties towards membership of issue movements to protect or fight for certain causes, such as sexual liberties, feminism, environment, or even stopping the expansion of an airport or the building of a railroad or road (Barnes 1998, 122) . In modern or postmodern societies, old cleavages have disappeared, but increasingly new arenas of conflict have emerged, quite often related to concrete causes (Barnes 1998, 122) . Economic development increases this interest in new issues. Inglehart (1997) similarly maintains that economic development and the development of the modern welfare state has led to increasing interest in new issues dealing with the quality of life. People are less concerned with material wealth, and more and more concerned with the environment, emancipation, and personal interests. New groups and organizations will develop to protect these new interests.

The individual in advanced postmodern society also faces a multitude of alternatives as a consequence of internationalization, transnationalization, and globalization. Today's world is a “global village,” denoting that the world is a compressed one, and that the consciousness of the world as a whole has intensified tremendously (Robertson 1992, 8) . The globalization of social reality is a main effect of the rapid evolution of modern communication technology. Technological developments and innovations in telecommunications, the spread and popularity of computers, and also the increased mobility of major companies and people, as well as the growing exposure to television, radio, video and movies have intensified worldwide social relations and flows of information. In the modern world people encounter a great variety of alternative cultural habits and a broad range of lifestyles and modes of conduct. As such, globalization, “exhausted the old ideas, the traditional ideas, which had therefore lost their truth on the power to persuade” (Rush 1992, 187) . Globalization makes people aware of an expanding range of beliefs and moral convictions and thus with a plurality of choices. Because it has been argued that individualized and secularized people are liberated from the constraints imposed by traditional institutions (e.g. religion), globalization implies that people can pick and choose what they want from a global cultural marketplace. Globalization, thus, may be favorable to pluralism because people's choices are increasingly dependent upon personal convictions and preferences.

The emancipation of the individual, the growing emphasis on personal autonomy and individual freedom, the de‐unification of collective standards and the fragmentation of private pursuits seem advantageous to “a declining acceptance of the authority of hierarchical institutions, both political and non‐political” (Inglehart 1997, 15) . Thus, citizens are increasingly questioning the traditional sources of authority and no longer bound by common moral principles. From this, a society emerged where people are mainly concerned in their private matters and they feel no longer committed to the public case. As Fukuyama (2000, 14) says, “a culture of intense individualism … ends up being bereft of community.” The calculating citizen chooses to “bowl alone” and is increasingly disconnected from the once strong social ties. Because social responsibilities have declined and individual citizens are less embedded in associative relations, a process of deinstitutionalization has occurred appearing as weaker social bonds, people being detached from society, non‐affiliated, and without any loyalty to the wider community. Such a society is threatened by disintegration and the individual is threatened by anomie. Durkheim recognized this problem a long time ago, and, more recently, among others Fukuyama warned about the dangers of an individualized society. “A society dedicated to the constant upending of norms and rules in the name of increasing individual freedom of choice will find itself increasingly disorganized, atomized, isolated, and incapable of carrying out common goals and tasks” (Fukuyama 2000, 15) .

This unbridled pursuit of private goals and the erosion of collective community life concerns not only many politicians, but also many social scientists. The current debate on the future of citizenship and civil society is directed strongly towards the negative effects of these developments. Individual freedom is “held responsible for rising criminality, political apathy, lack of responsibility, hedonism and moral obtrusion” (Arts, Muffels, and ter Meulen 2001, 467) . Communitarians also have expressed their concern for the ultimate consequences of this development towards hedonism, privatism, consumerism, and the “I” culture. They fear a trend towards radical individualism and ethical relativism and the withdrawal of the individual from community life. The only way to solve the problem of individualistic, modern society is, according to proponents of the communitarian theories, the re‐establishment of a firm moral order in society by (re‐)creating a strong “we” feeling and the (re‐)establishment of a “spirit of community” (Etzioni 1996 ; 2001) . What present society needs, they argue, is “a strong moral voice speaking for and from a set of shared core values, that guides community members to pro‐social behavior” (Ester, Mohler, and Vinken 2006, 18) .

6 Critical and Discontented Citizens

Apart from pursuing their own interests, being disengaged, and disconnected, contemporary publics are said to be more critical (e.g. Norris 1999) . In advanced modern welfare state, people's basic needs are satisfied, which according to some resulted in rising levels of postmaterialism (cf. Inglehart 1997) , but which also resulted in increasing demands from citizens towards government. The unprecedented high levels of subjective well‐being and wide range of welfare state provisions for unemployment, income maintenance, health, housing, and old age allowed people to take survival and security for granted. Because they can take survival and security for granted, postmaterialist value priorities are rising. These values emphasize individual self‐expression and quality of life issues and these bring “new, more demanding standards to the evaluation of political life and confront political leaders with more active, articulate citizens” (Inglehart 1997, 297–8) .

The expanded role of the state to protect the individual's interest undermined private initiative and individual responsibility while welfare provisions are increasingly regarded as self‐evident and considered a right and entitlement. Unrestrained self‐interest makes people not only more demanding but also makes the demands more diverse. It becomes more and more difficult for the government to satisfy all these competing, conflicting, and incompatible demands and needs. The economic crisis has reduced the capacity of the state to guarantee social provisions for all people in society and satisfy their needs. In fact, most welfare states have turned into overloaded political economies, meaning that governments cannot meet both public and private claims. Increasingly there is what Dalton calls a representation gap: the differences between citizens preferences and government policy outputs (Dalton 2004, 66) . Such a gap between what people expect from their government and what the government can provide easily results in growing dissatisfaction, public doubts about government, widespread disillusionment with political representatives and political parties, and declining public support. The rise of support for extremist leaders and extremist political parties is often regarded to reflect these feelings of discomfort with government, the current policy, and governing parties.

The economic crisis, the reduction of social security, and the declining levels of public support not only threaten democracy, they also threaten humanitarian solidarity. Fuelled by the process of individualization which induces egocentric, hedonistic, individualistic, and consumeristic behavioral patterns, it is often assumed that cleavages emerge between the employed and unemployed, the older and young people, the sick and disabled versus the healthy people, and between natives and foreigners. Historical processes such as ongoing globalization, the collapse of communism, increasing rates of immigration, and the enlargement of the European Union have been the occasions of a revival of nationalist sentiments, the rise of racial discrimination and ethnic prejudice (Arts and Halman 2005) . These have become of great concern to national as well as European Community politicians. The ethnic conflicts in Russia and the Balkans, the increased support for extreme right‐wing political parties, the growing popularity among the young of racist and fascist movements in many European countries, and hostilities and assaults towards immigrants delineate major problems contemporary Europe has to cope with and seem to have rapidly fostered feelings of intolerance, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and nationalistic sentiments. Issues of ethnicity, identity, and nationalism have come to dominate European politics because they are considered to be the most explosive and divisive cleavages for the future of European integration (Berglund, Aarebrot, and Koralewicz 1995, 375) . Such diversities are regarded as important sources of miscommunication, misunderstandings, intolerance, polarization, intergroup conflict, and violence. The immigration flows are assumed to have triggered ethnocentric and xenophobic counteractions of not only extreme nationalists but also of established populations. If the latter would be the case, bitter cultural (and hence social and political) conflicts could come into being.

7 Conclusions

The aim of this article was to write about old and new political values put in context. It appeared difficult, not only to decide what values and thus what political values are, but also to define what is old and what is new in this regard. I argued that “old” should not be understood in terms of forgotten and vanished, but more in terms of traditional, while “new” should no be seen as values that are replacing the old ones, but denote values that prevail in contemporary society. Defined in such a way, old and new reflect the changes in values and value priorities. These changes are embedded in broader fundamental societal transformations that often are referred to as modernization of society.

The central claim of modernization theory is that contemporary, modern, post‐industrial society differs in many respects from traditional and industrial society, and political values are no longer grounded in political cleavages based on social class conflict but on cleavages based on cultural issues and quality of life concerns. Economic conflicts are likely to remain important, but they are increasingly sharing the stage with new issues that were almost invisible a generation ago: environmental protection, abortion, ethnic conflicts, women's issues, and gay and lesbian emancipation are heated issues today.

As a result, a new dimension of political conflict has become increasingly salient. It reflects a polarization between modern and postmodern issue preferences. This new dimension is distinct from the traditional left–right conflict over ownership of the means of production and distribution of income. A new political cleavage pits culturally conservative against change‐oriented progressive individuals, groups, and political parties.

The trajectories of modernization in general and processes of individualization, secularization, and globalization in particular, have transformed the value orientations and priorities in the political realm. In contemporary, highly individualized, secular and globalized order, the “grand world views” have become irrelevant for political orientation. The significance of traditional structures and ties, such as religion, family, class, has receded, enlarging the individual's freedom and autonomy in shaping personal life. People have gradually become self‐decisive and self‐reliant, no longer forced to accept the traditional authorities as taken for granted. The absoluteness of any kind of external authority, be it religious or secular, has eroded. Authority becomes internalized and deference to authority pervasively declined (Inglehart 1999) .

The unrestrained striving to realize personal desires and aspirations, giving priority to individual freedom and autonomy and the emphasis on personal need fulfillment are assumed to have made contemporary individualized people mainly interested in their own lucrative careers and devoting their lives to conspicuous consumption, immediate gratification, personal happiness, success, and achievement. Such people neglect the public interests and civic commitment to the common good is eroding. Evidence of this development is found in increasing crime rates, marital breakdowns, drug abuse, suicide, tax evasion, and other deviant behaviors and practices and the increasing disconnection from family, friends, neighbors, and social structures, such as the church, recreation clubs, political parties, and even bowling leagues (Putnam 2000) . Because civic virtues, such as trust, social engagement, and solidarity are on the decline, and since these virtues are considered basic requirement for democracy to survive or to work properly (Putnam 1993) , contemporary society suffers a democratic deficit. Democracy is endangered because people are less and less inclined to engage in civic actions.

In Europe, the further integration and intended enlargement of the European Union have fuelled nationalistic sentiments and movements. The recent migration waves into Europe have advanced exclusionist reactions toward new cultural and ethnic minorities and fostered intercultural and interethnic conflicts. These gave rise to new and acute cultural cleavages; and it is precisely because the nations of Europe have failed to become genuine melting pots that so much of European politics now revolves around issues of multiculturalism. Not perpetual peace but nationalist, ethnic, and religious conflicts will occur. So, the ghosts of the past, such as nationalism and racial or religious struggle, still haunt Europe's darker corners, reappear everywhere. In this respect one could speak about the “return of history” ( Joffe 1992 ; Rothschild 1999 ) for European history is a story of conflicts. Such issues generated interest in and studies on multicultural society (European and multiple) identity, tolerance, and patriotic, nationalistic, ethnocentric, and xenophobic attitudes.

Such orientations are far from new and have been studied before extensively. For example, Stouffer's (1955) classic study of tolerance in America dates back to the fifties, while Sumner (1906/1959) introduced the term ethnocentrism already early in the twentieth century (also see chapter in this volume by Gibson). The question therefore is whether such orientations classify as “new” or “old.” It seems better to conclude that there is a renewed interest in such orientations. The same counts for attitudes of trust, civic actions, and societal involvement. Such orientations were already identified as important for democracy in the Civic Culture by Almond and Verba (1963) . Again, there is nothing really new under the sun. The types of issues that are most salient in the politics of the societies define the values at that moment.

Thus, it seems that it does not make much sense to define and distinguish old and new political values. Old orientations are not replaced by new ones, but value orientations are changing as a result of the transformations of society and modernization processes like individualization, secularization, and globalization. People in modern post‐industrial society are no longer constrained in their choices and they favor personal autonomy, individual freedom, and self‐direction, quality of life, and the pursuit of subjective well‐being. This centrality of the individual generated the rise of values such as emancipation, self‐expression, postmaterialism, gender equality, environmentalism, feminism, and ecologism etc. As van Deth (1995, 8) concluded, these new orientations have risen in addition to traditional value orientations.

Almond, G. A.   1980 . The intellectual history of the civic culture concept. Pp. 1–26 in The Civic Culture Revisited , ed. G. A. Almond and S. Verba . Boston: Little, Brown & Company.

Google Scholar

Google Preview

—— and Verba, S.   1963 . The Civic Culture . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Arts, W. , Hagenaars, J. , and Halman, L. eds. 2003 . The Cultural Diversity of European Unity . Leiden: Brill.

—— and Halman, L. eds. 2004 . European Values at the Turn of the Millennium . Leiden: Brill.

—— ——  2005 . National identity in Europe today.   International Journal of Sociology , 35: 69–93. 10.2753/IJS0020-7659350404

——  Muffels, R. , and ter Meulen, R.   2001 . Epilogue: the Future of solidaristic health and social care in Europe. Pp. 473–7 in Solidarity in Health and Social Care in Europe , ed. R. ter Meulen , W. Arts , and R. Muffels . Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Barnes, S. H.   1998 . The mobilization of political identity in new democracies. Pp. 117–38 in, The Postcommunist Citizen , ed. S. H. Barnes and J. Simon Budapest: Erasmus Foundation and IPAS of HAS.

Barry, B.   1978 . Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bellah, R. N. , Madsen, R. , Sullivan, W. M. , Swidler, A. , and Tipton, S. M.   1992 . The Good Society . New York: Vintage Books.

Berglund, S. , Aarebrot, F. , and Koralewicz, J.   1995 . The view from EFTA. Pp. 368–401 in Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance , ed. O. Niedermayer and R. Sinnott . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Biedenkopf, K. , Geremek, B. , and Michalski, K.   2004 . The Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe . Vienna/Brussels: Institute for Human Sciences and European Commission.

Bobbio, N.   1996 . Left & Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Dalton, R. J.   2004 . Democratic Challenges: Democratic Choices . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268436.001.0001

Dietz, T. , and Stern, P. C.   1995 . Toward a theory of choice: socially embedded preference construction.   Journal of Socio‐Economics , 24: 261–79.

Ester, P. , Mohler, P. , and Vinken, H.   2006 . Values and the social sciences: a global world of global values? Pp. 3–29 in Globalization, Value Change, and Generations , ed. P. Ester , M. Braun , and P. Mohler . Leiden: Brill.

Etzioni, A.   1996 . The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society . New York: Basic Books.

——  2001 . The Monochrome Society . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Flanagan, S. C.   1982 . Changing values in advanced industrial societies: Inglehart's silent revolution from the perspective of Japanese findings.   Comparative Political Studies , 14: 403–44. 10.1177/0010414082014004001

——  1987 . Value changes in industrial societies.   American Political Science Review , 81: 1303–19.

Formisano, R. P.   2001 . The concept of political culture.   Journal of Interdisciplinary History , 31: 393–426. 10.1162/002219500551596

Fuchs, D. , and Klingemann, H. D.   1989 . The left–right schema. Pp. 203–34 in Continuities in Political Action , ed. J. W. van Deth and M. K. Jennings . Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Fukuyama, F.   2000 . The Great Disruption . New York: Touchstone.

Gabennesch, H.   1972 . Authoritarianism as world view.   American Journal of Sociology , 77: 857–75. 10.1086/225228

Giddens, A.   1991 . Modernity and Self‐Identity . Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Halman, L.   1991 . Waarden in de Westerse wereld . Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.

——  Luijkx, R. and van Zundert, M.   2005 . Atlas of European Values . Leiden: Brill.

Huntington, S. P.   1996 . The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order . New York: Simon & Schuster.

——  2000 . Cultures Count. Pp. xiii–xvi in Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress , ed. L. E. Harrison and S. P. Huntington . New York: Basic Books.

Ignazi, P.   1992 . The silent counter‐revolution: hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right‐wing parties in Europe. Pp. 3–34 in, European Journal of Political Research, Special Issue: Extreme Right‐Wing Parties in Europe , ed. P. Ignazi & C. Ysmal . Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Inglehart, R.   1977 . The Silent Revolution . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

——  1988 . The renaissance of political culture.   American Political Science Review , 82: 1203–30. 10.2307/1961756

——  1990 . Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

——  1997 . Modernization and Postmodernization . Princeton: Princeton Universy Press.

——  1999 . Postmodernization erodes respect for authority, but increases support for democracy. Pp. 236–56 in Critical Citizens , ed. P. Norris . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/0198295685.003.0012

—— and Klingemann, H. D.   1979 . Ideological conceptualization and value priorities. Pp. 203–14 in Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies , ed. S. M. Barnes , M. Kaase , et al. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Joffe, J.   1992 . The new Europe: yesterday's ghosts.   Foreign Affairs , 72: 29–43.

King, D. S.   1987 . The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship . Basingstoke: Macmillan Education Ltd.

Knutsen, O.   1995 . Left‐right materialist value orientations. Pp. 160–96 in, The Impact of Values , ed. J. W. van Deth and E. Scarbrough . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

——  2006 . The end of traditional political values?. Pp. 115–50 in Globalization, Value Change, and Generations , ed. P. Ester , M. Braun and P. Mohler . Leiden: Brill.

Lane, J.‐E. , and Ersson, S.   2005 . Culture and Politics . Aldershot: Ashgate.

Levitas, R. ed. 1986 . The Ideology of the New Right . Oxford: Polity Press.

Lipset, S. M. , Lazarsfeld, P. F.   Barton, A. H. , and Linz, J.   1954 . The psychology of voting: an analysis of political behavior. Pp. 1124–76 in The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II , ed. G. Lindzey and A. H. Barton . Reading, Mass.: Addison‐Wesley.

Nevitte, N. , and Gibbins, R.   1990 . New Elites in Old States: Ideologies in the Anglo‐American Democracies . Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Norris, P. ed. 1999 . Critical Citizens . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/0198295685.001.0001

Pateman, C.   1980 . The civic culture: a philosophic critique. Pp. 57–102 in The Civic Culture Revisited , ed. G. A. Almond and S. Verba . Boston: Little, Brown & Company.

Putnam, R.   1993 . Making Democracy Work . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

——  2000 . Bowling Alone . New York: Simon & Schuster.

—— ed. 2002 . Democracies in Flux . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/0195150899.001.0001

Pye, L. W.   1973 . Culture and political science: problems in the evaluation of the concept of political culture. Pp. 65–76 in The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences , ed. L. Schneider and C. M. Bonjean . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reich, B. , and Adcock, C.   1976 . Values, Attitudes and Behaviour Change . London: Methuen.

Robertson, R.   1992 . Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture . London: Sage.

Rokeach, M.   1968 . Beliefs, Attitudes and Values . San Francisco: Jossey‐Bass Inc. Publishers.

——  1973 . The Nature of Human Values . New York: Free Press.

Rothschild, E.   1999 . Who is Europe? Globalization and the return of history.   Foreign Policy , 115: 106–17. 10.2307/1149496

Rush, M.   1992 . Politics and Society. An Introduction to Political Sociology . New York: Prentice Hall.

Stouffer, S.   1955 . Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties . New York: Doubleday.

Street, J.   1994 . Political Culture: From Civic Culture to Mass Culture.   British Journal of Political Science , 24: 95–113. 10.1017/S0007123400006803

Sumner, W. G.   1906 /1959. Folkways . New York: Dover Publications.

van Deth, J. W.   1984 . Politieke waarden . Amsterdam: CT Press.

——  1995 . Introduction: the impact of values. Pp. 1–18 in The Impact of Values , ed. J. W. van Deth and E. Scarbrough . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—— and Scarbrough, E.   1995 . The concept of values. Pp. 21–47 in The Impact of Values , ed. J. W. van Deth and E. Scarbrough . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Verba, S. , and Nie, N.   1972 . Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality . New York: Harper & Ro.

Waters, M.   1994 . Modern Sociological Theory . London: Sage.

Wildavsky, A.   1987 . Choosing preferences by constructing instititions: a cultural theory of preference formation.   American Political Science Review , 81: 3–22. 10.2307/1960776

• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

How Political Values and Social Influence Drive Polarization

Americans are increasingly polarized, with more aligned partisanship, identities, and ideology.  Bob  Lupton  finds  that our views and identities have become more tightly associated through deeply-held values like moral traditionalism and egalitarianism. But only among those with conservative values, due to distinct messages from each side’s elites. But perhaps some of us are just repeating what we hear, following friends and leaders more than our inner values.  Elizabeth  Chase Connors  finds  that people with more ideologically aligned discussion networks are more likely to link their values and partisanship and people who monitor how others see them can be convinced to endorse values when they hear them from political elites. They agree that our values and social relationships increasingly go together, limiting conflicts between partisanship, views, and identities. The true ideologues among us can enforce conformity on both sides of the political divide.

Studies: “ Values and Political Predispositions in the Age of Polarization ” and “ The Social Dimension of Political Values .”

Guests:  Robert Lupton , University of Connecticut;  Elizabeth Chase Connors , University of South Carolina

Matt Grossmann: How political values and social influence drive polarization, this week on the science of politics. For the Niskanen Center, I’m Matt Grossmann. Americans are increasingly polarized with more aligned partisanship identities and ideology, suggesting that differences over deeply held values may drive us apart. But we may instead be repeating what we hear in our clustered social networks and information environments, following friends and leaders more than our inner values, or some people may be more likely to trust their values while others want to conform to group norms. Today, I talk to Bob Lupton of the University of Connecticut about his British Journal of Political Science article with Steven Smallpage and Adam Enders, Values and Political Predispositions in the Age of Polarization. He finds that partisanship and ideological self identification have become increasingly tightly associated through values like social traditionalism and egalitarianism, but only among those with conservative values due to distinct messages from each sides elites.

I also talk to Elizabeth Chase Connors of the University of South Carolina about her political behavior article, The Social Dimension of Political Values. She finds that people with more ideologically aligned social networks are more likely to link their values and partisanship as networks enforce conformity and people who monitor how others see them can be convinced to endorse values when they hear them from political elites. They agree that our values and social relationships increasingly go together, limiting conflicts between partisanship, views and identities. Lupton finds core values help align views with partisanship, at least among conservatives.

Robert Lupton: Our goal in the article was to examine the role of core values in the process of sorting citizens ideology in partisanship. A good deal of American politics scholarship shows that individuals ideological self identifications are more closely connected to their party affiliation, meaning self-identified liberals are more likely to call themselves Democrats and self-identified conservatives are more likely to call themselves Republicans now relative to the past. And we want to know of core values, citizens’ fundamental principles that define what is good and bad in the world influence the sorting process that has brought individuals ideological identities to their natural partisan homes. And our key finding was that the alignment or the sorting of ideological partisan identities since 1988 has been driven largely by individuals who possess conservative core values, specifically toward egalitarianism and moral traditionalism.

Matt Grossmann: He says core values should be durable public views.

Robert Lupton: Values generally are important to the political realm because they transcend specific situations and thus they’re more stable than ordinary political attitudes or opinions, which for many or most people are transient. So for example, someone’s core value orientations, what we call them, should be more durable than the person’s attitude toward for example whether government spending should be increased or decreased, or what the level of defense spending should be, for example, or tax policy. And we examine egalitarianism and moral traditionalism specifically because evidence and experience show that these values are prominent in American political culture. Egalitarianism is measured as a six item scale capturing the extent to which the individual believes that social, economic and political equality is a problem in need of government redress, or if inequality is a natural and perhaps even a preferred societal state.

So the egalitarian scale includes questions such as our society should do whatever’s necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed. And if people were treated more equally in this country, we’d have many fewer problems. So they are agree disagree format. And moral traditionalism captures the culture war division between individuals who are tolerant of different lifestyles and moral codes and those who believe that newer lifestyles are contributing to moral decay and that traditional family arrangements foster healthier society. Questions in this four item scale, also in agree to disagree format, include statements such as the world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to these changes. Decades of research demonstrates that these two values are important for understanding individual subsequent political attitudes, attachments, and behavior. We show the value orientations exist on a continuum ranging from egalitarian and morally progressive to anti-egalitarian and morally traditional.

Matt Grossmann: But Connors wanted to challenge the notion that political values are grounding.

Elizabeth Chase Connors: Political scientists for decades have worried about the ability of everyday citizens to make rational political choices given little political knowledge, and then findings that people shift their attitudes seemingly randomly or in response to framing effects. So among the saviors of the everyday citizen was these political values. Political scientists believed that, yes, people are not entirely knowledgeable, somewhat easily persuadable by the elites, by the media, and their social context, but political values can ground them. If people believe in equality, for example, they can use that value to guide them to make sound political choices. What I find doesn’t fit with that rosy picture. Instead, I find that political values can’t be these guideposts because they themselves are guided by or are a function of social contexts. Democrats say they value equality because that’s what Democrats are supposed to value, and Republicans say they value moral traditionalism because that’s what Republicans are supposed to value. And so my results suggest that political values are not these stable guideposts and that we can’t rely on them to save or guide the everyday citizen.

Matt Grossmann: And social networks could matter for the alignment of values and partisanship.

Elizabeth Chase Connors: I argue that this occurs because people have an innate desire to impress others or to fit in, and that this desire plays out in politics, including in people’s value expressions. I find evidence of this in a few different ways. First I’ll talk about the observational that you said, but then I’m going to quickly touch on some of the experimental stuff because I think it speaks to sort of the question of why this occurs. First, I not only find that people with more ideologically aligned social networks are more likely to link their values to their partisanship, but this is true even if people sort of assigned social networks, meaning their work colleagues and their neighbors. I’ll give you an example to help explain this. I find, for example, that a Democrat who has all Democratic neighbors and coworkers in their social network is more likely to endorse equality than is a Democrat who has Democratic and Republican neighbors and coworkers in their social network, all else being equal.

This gives me a bit more leverage to say that it’s not people choosing their networks based on these values in their partisanship, but that it is more of a social influence story of people adopting the values they think they’re supposed to be adopting. But beyond the social network effects, I also use an individual level treat called self-monitoring to get at this mechanism of the why this occurs, why people are adopting their party’s political values. This trait is a measure of how willing people are to morph themselves into social contexts. So this means that people higher in the trait are more willing to succumb to social desirability or to social pressure. And what I find is that when I tell people that a socially desirable group endorses compromise, those higher in this trait are more likely to also endorse compromise. So together these network and self-monitoring results suggest that it is this desire to impress others that is guiding people’s adoption of political values.

Matt Grossmann: Overall, as Lupton finds, Americans now have more aligned partisanship and ideology.

Robert Lupton: By sorting, it just means again that individuals who think of themselves as, for example, a conservative when people are asked, do you identify, do you think of yourself as liberal or conservative? And so someone who says I’m a conservative, who attach that label to themselves, they’re more likely to also call themselves a Republican, to identify with that political party and think of themselves as Republican now more than the past. And so core values then are these enduring abstract principles that drive citizens evaluations of world and guide their behavior.

Matt Grossmann: And polarization has helped this process along.

Robert Lupton: To your point, I think political elites are crucial to the story because their communication strategies connect citizens values, ideology, and partisanship. So more generally as elites have become more polarized and adopted rhetoric accordingly, they’ve resonated with citizens core values and rendered values cleavages more salient to political competition. And so in the article, as you know, we measured this elite polarization using DW-NOMINATE score showing that as congressional polarization, as measured by roll call votes, has increased, so too has this sorting. In future work, I would like to test experimentally directly how elite rhetoric connects to citizens core values.

Matt Grossmann: Conservative elites especially have helped lead the alignment.

Robert Lupton: Our theory was that individuals with conservative value orientations, that is those who are anti-egalitarian and morally traditional are driving the sorting process. So the alignment of ideological and partisan identifications and our thinking was that because conservative political elites, elected officials, party activists, and the media use more ideological language than their liberal counterparts, this would help connect core value orientations to the appropriate ideological label and party attachment among the mass public. And so we thought that this process would mean that conservative value orientations would be the driver of this process. In other words, I think our results testified to the different communication strategies among Democrats and Liberals versus Republicans and Conservatives.

Matt Grossmann: And liberals may now be following.

Robert Lupton: One way to think about it is I think in recent years, especially since the last year, even the we exam 2012, liberal identification has increased sharply among Democrats, perhaps due to Trump backlash on the Republican agenda. I think updating this, I would expect to see a greater connection between democratic partisanship and liberal ideology among liberal values holders now, relative to the past. Although I still might expect to see a stronger connection among conservative values holders for the reasons I mentioned, it is true that it seems in recent election cycles, Democrats really seem to be endorsing the liberal label more. It explains a lot of among, whites at least, among people who have left the Democratic Party or who did during this previous time.

Matt Grossmann: Connors’ experiment shows how elite standards can move voters through group norms.

Elizabeth Chase Connors: The experimental setup was sort of a maneuver to deal with the fact that the world already knows that Democrats endorsed equality and that Republicans endorsed moral traditionalism, for example. So what I did was I took a value that could be political, but that people didn’t necessarily associate with a party when I pretested this. But I decided on compromise from these pretests and compromise would be as opposed to standing your ground. So the value of compromise versus standing your ground. And I also took a socially desirable group or a group that people would want to associate with. I also pre-tested this and found that the most socially desirable group are the ones that I looked at was those that listened to new sources that support both political parties, which I thought was interesting on its own.

So I pick this group that would endorse the compromise end of this compromise versus standing your ground value. And what I did was I randomly assigned people to either be … Simply asked which they value more, compromise or standing your ground? Or be asked this after they were told that the socially desirable group, those that listen to news sources that support both political parties, endorses compromise. And what I found is that when people were told that the socially desirable group endorses compromise, endorsement of compromise went up. And it went up even more so among those higher in self-monitoring, the trait that I mentioned earlier, suggesting that the mechanism behind this adoption of compromise is these self-presentation desires or the desire to impress others that I talked about.

Now, of course, all political values, aren’t the same. So there may be some that are harder to move with a simple social cue because people have internalized these values more, even if they were originally adopted through the process that I’m talking about, they just might be more stable. And this could also differ by person and likely does differ by person. Some people may deeply believe in compromise or another political value while others just don’t have a strong feeling towards it, and they’re thus more able to be swayed by the social cue.

Matt Grossmann: And social influence can come from any group or elite norm.

Elizabeth Chase Connors: I think the main idea is that as long as you create social norm within a group, it doesn’t necessarily matter if the origin of the social pressure is from political elite. So for example, political elites deciding that equality is the value of the Democratic Party, as long as that becomes like the norm within Democrats. The social influence story could originate from political elites and it could originate from, like I said, people actually believe it. Democrats actually believe in equality, but it’s exacerbated once this norm is created. Once everyone knows that Democrats endorsed equality and Republicans endorsed moral traditionalism, and thus to be a good Democrat, you have to endorse equality and to be a good Republican, you have to endorse moral traditionalism.

Matt Grossmann: The people who are high in self-monitoring are the most likely to be influenced. Connors explains what that means.

Elizabeth Chase Connors: Everyone can perceive if something is socially desirable or not, those that are higher in self-monitoring are those that are more willing to change themselves to fit that socially desirable norm. So for example, it could be a social norm or a socially desirable norm to exercise regularly. And everyone could witness that this is the case, but high self-monitors are more willing to lie and say that they exercise more to fit that norm. Whereas low self monitors would say, yes, it’s socially desirable, but I only exercise once a month, and I’m willing to tell you that.

The way that it’s measured, our research on this trait goes back from Snyder in the seventies, and it was originally measured I think with like 24 questions, it went down to 18, I think. Now it’s three questions. Adam Berinsky is looked into how to get the three best measures to create this construct. The questions are, when you are with other people, how often do you put on a show to impress or entertain them? And then when you are in a group of people, how often are you the center of attention? And then, how good or poor of an actor would you be?

They give five different response options from good to bad. And so you put these three measures together and then create a construct called self-monitoring. That’s a 13 point scale. In observational data, they certainly do pay more attention to everything. They vote more. They’re more interested in politics. They watch news all the time. But given research that I’ve done in past research, I don’t believe this to be the case. I’m actually, at some point in the future, it’s kind of this project that keeps moving down the line, but I want to look at how to better validate these measures because obviously there’s so much social desirability within them.

And just briefly what I’ve found is that, yeah, the high self-monitors are basically lying about paying attention. They say they read news more, for example, but they don’t have higher political knowledge. And for low self-monitors, reporting paying attention to news, predicts political knowledge, but for high self-monitors it doesn’t, probably because they are lying about paying attention.

Matt Grossmann: Polarization, she finds, increases social influences.

Elizabeth Chase Connors: One outcome of polarization is basically that it makes social influence within parties easier. And this is both because social polarization and effective polarization. Imagine a world of less social polarization in which half of my friends are Republicans and half are Democrats. In this world I’m getting social signals from both parties. Now imagine a world that we live in today in which all of my friends are Democrats.

In the non-polarized world, social cues are constantly competing with each other, and so it’s harder for me to see what is socially desirable. But in the polarized world, I get the same social cues over and over again from my democratic friends. It’s abundantly obvious what is socially desirable. And not only from my friends, but also my day-to-day life. In the polarized world that we live in today, people can even figure out who is a Democrat and who’s a Republican by looking at the car they drive, for example. So I’m again, getting more social signals about what Republicans and what Democrats do.

Another part of this polarization story is the effective side. So Democrats liking Democrats more than Republicans and vice versa. This also can make signaling easier because the more I like a group or the more I like a person, the more social influence they can have over me. So just like I explained in the experiment, a socially desirable group is able to guide people, especially high self-monitors. So when I like my fellow party members, that means they have more power. If I like them less, for example, in a world of no effective polarization, they wouldn’t have this power. And as you’ve noted, there is research that shows people’s political values have become more polarized during this time of partisan polarization. And I would argue that at least some of this value polarization is just the result of social influence and of polarization.

Matt Grossmann: Lupton says there is reciprocal causation among partisanship and values, but core values still matter.

Robert Lupton: Core values such as egalitarianism, moral traditionalism, and predisposition such as ideological self-identification and party identification, are indeed difficult to untangle, as you suggest. All these constructs are important for understanding citizens’ approach to politics and many accounts consider partisanship the fundamental lens through which citizens see the political world. Unraveling these interconnected concepts is made more difficult through data limitations, fortunately, but most panel data analysis that have investigated these relationships, including in my own work, show that core value shape party identification, especially more than the reverse over time. So, I do not believe that one can deny that these relationships are in some sense reciprocal, but the bulk of the evidence, which I’m aware, supports theoretical accounts of values, primacy in citizens belief systems, that they are the bedrocks that more so than the reverse shape ideology and party identification.

Matt Grossmann: And core values may help lead many other aspects of polarization.

Robert Lupton: This article is one component of my agenda investigating the role of core values for understanding polarization of contemporary American politics. As you know, in egalitarian and morally traditional postures, especially the former were important to the Southern Republican realignment. And my most recent article shows the core value extremity promotes disdain for one’s opposing party and its candidates and affiliated ideological groups.

More generally, I believe that values despite a rich, theoretical and empirical history in political science are too often overlooked in current scholarly portraits of polarization. I find inescapable, the role of egalitarianism and moral traditionalism in elite political rhetoric and in how ordinary citizens talk about politics.

To me, this country is divided fairly, obviously between those who believe that social, political and economic equality plagues our society, and those who feel that unequal resources are the uniquely American outcome of differences in talent, ingenuity, and effort. These fundamental differences extend to debates concerning redistributive tax policy, racial and gender equality, environmental justice. And more similarly, we disagree about tolerance for alternative lifestyles and modes of conduct, which now most squarely impinges on LGBTQ plus issues, but also still very much, for example, includes the abortion issue.

Matt Grossmann: Polarization is about real differences in views, but not necessarily on policy specifics.

Robert Lupton: Values underline many of the identities and political attitudes that are commonly viewed as drivers of political polarization. So a simple, but a poignant quote in a recent Evans and Neundorf article is, “It seems unlikely that people randomly attach themselves to parties.” And so similarly, I find values important for aligning citizens’ social and political identities, which I do not believe occurs spontaneously due to for example, some empty form of tribalism.

And so I don’t think that core values render citizens more “ideological” per se, than we usually believe, because I don’t believe that values produce consistent political attitudes across domains for example. They don’t shape a far-flung or complex belief system, but I do think that citizens possess coherent value orientations that provide them with a clear map of the political world than we often suggest.

So my early work, for example, I show that polarization’s not produced any appreciable increase in ideological thinking among vast swaths of the electorate. Those increases have been confined instead to interested, involved and knowledgeable citizens. But I do think that value orientations do promote more crystallized political thinking than we ordinarily consider, I think.

Matt Grossmann: Values are also important in explaining group identity alignment.

Robert Lupton: I do not view core values as an alternative to narratives focus on racial, gender, religious influences, on political attitudes, attachments to behavior. Instead, I view them as complimentary. I believe that values, for example, are important for understanding identity alignment. Some of the best recent political scholarship, including pathbreaking work by Liliana Mason and others highlights that polarization can be pernicious precisely because it aligns citizens’ political identities with their racial, gender, and religious identities, for example, and the loss of cross cutting attachments undermines empathy and the potential for political compromise.

Much of my current work seeks to understand core values role in the sorting of these identities or this identity alignment. In other words, I endeavor to see if there’s a there there to polarization. And I do think that values are important for understanding this identity alignment. And I should say, yeah, that questions of equality, especially in American politics are racialized although we still see a role for egalitarianism across many issues on attachment, even controlling for racial resentment for example, or racial attitudes,

Matt Grossmann: But Connor finds that social influence on group identity is also strong.

Elizabeth Chase Connors: Identities matter in social influence, at least in so far as if people are identifying with something they’re potentially a part of that group and they also then are more easily influenced by that group, both because they interact with them more often and because they want to appease them. So for example, we’ll just talk about partisanship since we have been. If you identify as a partisan, you are a part of that group and you likely surround yourself with other Democrats if you’re a Democrat and you also want to seem like a good Democrat to other Democrats.

So the social influence story there is not necessarily how much you identify with the group, but as long as you’re a part of that group and you want to appease them and you spend time with them, their social influence stories should sort of be the same. So I look in the values piece that we’re talking about, but also in a more recent polarization piece, I actually test if the treatments work differently, not just by self-monitoring, which is what I hypothesize to be important, but also by a partisan strength with the idea that potentially it’s that the stronger these identities are to people the more easily they are to be socially influenced by that group.

But I don’t find that to be the case. So it seems to be just that as long as you’re a part of that group and you associate with that group, you can be socially influenced by them. And the variation is not dependent on how much you identify with them, but how much you’re willing to change yourself to appease them.

Matt Grossmann: Lupton says campaign context and discussions can matter for values, especially their expression.

Robert Lupton: I think the core values are socially constructed in that political rhetoric and competition help align citizens with certain value orientations on opposite sides of the political spectrum. Additionally, plenty of work, including Elizabeth’s excellent Political Behavior article shows that values are not totally immutable or immune from social context or campaign effects, for example.

Robert Lupton: So indeed even in my own work, in my own early work, coauthors and I show that discussion network disagreement can attenuate the connection between core values and partisanship, for example. So I definitely see the potential social influences on values.

Matt Grossmann: But he says social influence doesn’t undermine the influence of values.

Robert Lupton: I think it could be potentially for some people. So for these high self-monitors, people who are particularly conscientious or are joiners potentially, but I think the evidence is too strong over time regarding values influence on not only political attitudes, but again, fundamental predispositions, such as partisanship and ideology for values to be entirely just this process of individuals becoming egalitarians or morally traditionalist because they believe that these are the positions they’re supposed to adopt. So I would say that’s much too strong of a interpretation of those [inaudible 00:27:54].

Matt Grossmann: And Connor says social influence could make the true values voters more important by spreading their messages.

Elizabeth Chase Connors: There are very different people. There are some people that are going to hear that as a good Democrat, you’re supposed to endorse equality and so they’ll do so, but there are also people that really believe in equality and they might have picked the Democratic Party because of that. I mean, those people are probably guiding the ones who are then adopting those values.

Matt Grossmann: Both stories can be true because individuals vary.

Elizabeth Chase Connors: I think that while values could certainly matter for some people in aligning political ideology and partisanship as Bob finds, all of these contracts have some level of social influence within them. So for some people potentially the politically interested or politically sophisticated or some other variable, this social influence could be negligible.

So they could be a Democrat, really care about equality and align their ideology, all these things kind of work together because they care about these things. For others, especially high self monitors like I find it could be the only thing tying these three constructs together, meaning a high self-monitor for example, a high self-monitor Republican could only be a conservative who endorses moral traditionalism because they’ve received cues that this is what they’re supposed to do as a Republican. It’s the only thing tying these three constructs together.

And actually in their more recent piece that I think is building off the one that you were originally talking about in PSRM, they also find that value extremity predicts polarization. And I actually find in a more recent piece that I mentioned before that polarization, or at least effective polarization is also guided by social context, just like values are.

So again, I think a lot of these constructs can work together for some people, just from a social influence story. And for other people they could work together because they actually do care about these things and they have aligned their partisanship to the values that they really believe in.

So there are different people in the world. Some are more likely to follow my story and some are more likely to follow Bob’s story.

Matt Grossmann: Lupton says the Trump era has likely kept polarization on values growing.

Robert Lupton: I can only imagine that the Trump era rendered values more salient given the sharp divisions that his administration evoked. So one value that’s potentially more potent now relative to the pre-Trump era is authoritarianism. Although I believe that links closely to egalitarianism. For example, folks who are willing to estew political norms to gain power on who believe in strict racial and political hierarchies and are almost certainly anti-egalitarian. And ultimately to our earlier discussion of value alignment, I believe that the Trump administration only served to heightened the connection between core value orientations and subsequent political attachments, attitudes, and behaviors. So I think it would be a further polarization along these lines, fault lines.

Matt Grossmann: And class D alignment is not making egalitarianism any less important.

Robert Lupton: I think that particularly [inaudible 00:31:07] is only more salient now than in the past because the Republican elite posture on that is that democratic elites are trying to social engineer to tell people in the lower class that they’re not good enough and that somehow they need government assistance, but that really we just want government to leave us alone. And it also implicitly also speaks to people’s fear of equality, so that people who are receiving this message can still say, “Well I’m still above the below even if I’m below the upper.” So I think that egalitarianism is only more relevant now than ever before as a division in the parties. And so for example, one existing project about which I’m excited and ongoing project examines the role of egalitarianism specifically in the Democratic party.

So existing work shows that the Democrats are not as overtly ideological as Republicans, because the former is more a collection of organized interests than an ideological movement. So this scholarship channels the famous Will Rogers quip, “I’m not a member of any organized political party, I’m a Democrat.” However, our evidence suggests that egalitarianism is in fact arguably the central organizing principle of the contemporary Democratic party. And so it is exactly these high income, high educated, sophisticated voters who do not stand necessarily to benefit from Democratic policy priorities that nonetheless endorsed them on account of their egalitarian postures.

Matt Grossmann: Connors says Trump showed that elite influence can change opinion through social norm.

Elizabeth Chase Connors: Elite rhetoric can potentially create a social norm about what is desirable within that party. So for example, Trump could create the norm that it’s socially desirable to say that there was election fraud. I actually in recent work do find that to be the case that Republicans believe it is socially desirable for them to say that there is election fraud. And Democrats say that it’s the opposite. And that likely originated from Trump, that was likely an elite story, but an elite story that eventually became a social influence story. So I think all these things are tied together. Elite rhetoric matters in as much that it can create socially desirable norm within a party.

Matt Grossmann: Lupton is pursuing a lot more to understand core values.

Robert Lupton: I’m eager, again, just to examine the role of value divisions in the Biden era. I think that the electorate’s only become more divided over these central core values. I think it shapes policy debates. And I’m also interested in the comparison of value profiles among party activists. So those individuals who attend the Democratic and Republican national party conventions and the mass public, and I’m also engaged in current work with Adam Enders examining how consistent value orientations promote what we call political constraint or crystallized political thinking.

And so people who are consistent in their posture toward egalitarianism and moral traditionalism demonstrate higher levels of ideological constraint relative to other citizens. And they also are more likely to place the parties and candidates correctly in ideological space. And they have stronger effect of orientations toward the parties, candidates, and ideological groups. And these results hold even after controlling for factors such as education, income, political interest, and knowledge. And so that’s one thing that I’m continually interested in exploring is how value consistently promotes a type of political sophistication, independent of traditional predictors of complex thinking. Because I think core value orientations, again, provide people with a clear map of the political world.

Matt Grossmann: And Connors is doing a lot more work on social influence, including where it might be a positive.

Elizabeth Chase Connors: Where I’m going from here is a lot of work tied to what we’ve been discussing. The polarization piece that I was talking about, basically a lot of work looking at partisan social pressure or the desire to fit in with your partisan group could influence reports of polarization or belief in election fraud or attitudes and values, et cetera. But I’m also trying to balance this out, still staying in my line of research on social influence and looking at what I’ve been finding thus far, which is somewhat depressing results or depressing implications from my results. I’m trying to look at how social interactions and social context and social cues can actually be helpful to normative democracy rather than contributing to polarization or over-reporting polarization. So actually one piece that I’m really excited about, and it’s not necessarily tied to the 2020 election or Biden, et cetera, but it’s about social interactions with people and how these social interactions can potentially save us from the world that we’ve been living in in the recent years.

So I look at how, in one piece, I look at how tone can matter and how people disagree and that people expect politics to be heated and they don’t like that, or most people don’t like that understandably. And so what they do is they turn off from engaging in political discussions with people with which they might disagree. And we know that these interactions are normatively beneficial. And so people disengaging from them is a problem for the reasons that we know and then also for reasons like creating even worse effective polarization and social polarization, just like separating the world into Republicans versus Democrats. And so I am trying to move towards normatively helpful research that could maybe give us recommendations about how we should be interacting with each other and how we can make the world a better place. Maybe a place where Republicans don’t feel social pressure to say that they endorse election fraud or a place where partisans don’t feel pressured to say that they hate the other party and like their own.

Matt Grossmann: There’s a lot more to learn. The science of politics is available biweekly from the Niskanen Center and part of the Democracy Group network. I’m your host, Matt Grossman, thanks to Bob Lupton and Elizabeth Chase Connors for joining me. Please check out values and political predispositions in the age of polarization and the social dimension of political values. And then listen in next time.

Share on Mastodon

• Accessibility Statement
• Introduction, Awards, and Recognitions
• Table of Contents with Critical Media Literacy Connections
• Updates & Latest Additions
• Learning Pathway: Racial Justice and Black Lives Matter
• Learning Pathway: Influential Women and Women's History/Herstory
• Learning Pathway: Student Rights in School and Society
• Learning Pathway: Elections 2024, 2022, & 2020
• Learning Pathway: Current Events
• Learning Pathway: Critical Media Literacy
• Teacher-Designed Learning Plans
• Topic 1. The Philosophical Foundations of the United States Political System
• 1.1. The Government of Ancient Athens
• 1.2. The Government of the Roman Republic
• 1.3. Enlightenment Thinkers and Democratic Government
• 1.4. British Influences on American Government
• 1.5. Native American Influences on U.S. Government
• Topic 2. The Development of the United States Government
• 2.1. The Revolutionary Era and the Declaration of Independence
• 2.2. The Articles of Confederation
• 2.3. The Constitutional Convention
• 2.4. Debates between Federalists and Anti-Federalists
• 2.5. Articles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
• Topic 3. Institutions of United States Government
• 3.1. Branches of the Government and the Separation of Powers
• 3.2. Checks and Balances Between the Branches of Government
• 3.3. The Roles of the Congress, the President, and the Courts
• 3.4. Elections and Nominations
• 3.5. The Role of Political Parties
• Topic 4. The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens
• 4.1. Becoming a Citizen
• 4.2. Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens and Non-Citizens
• 4.3. Civic, Political, and Private Life
• 4.4. Fundamental Principles and Values of American Political and Civic Life
• 4.5. Voting and Citizen Participation in the Political Process
• 4.6. Election Information
• 4.7. Leadership and the Qualities of Political Leaders
• 4.8. Cooperation Between Individuals and Elected Leaders
• 4.9. Public Service as a Career
• 4.10. Liberty in Conflict with Equality or Authority
• 4.11. Political Courage and Those Who Affirmed or Denied Democratic Ideals
• 4.12. The Role of Political Protest
• 4.13. Public and Private Interest Groups, PACs, and Labor Unions
• Topic 5. The Constitution, Amendments, and Supreme Court Decisions
• 5.1. The Necessary and Proper Clause
• 5.2. Amendments to the Constitution
• 5.3. Constitutional Issues Related to the Civil War, Federal Power, and Individual Civil Rights
• 5.4. Civil Rights and Equal Protection for Race, Gender, and Disability
• 5.5. Marbury v. Madison and the Principle of Judicial Review
• 5.6. Significant Supreme Court Decisions
• Topic 6. The Structure of Massachusetts State and Local Government
• 6.1. Functions of State and National Government
• 6.2. United States and Massachusetts Constitutions
• 6.3. Enumerated and Implied Powers
• 6.4. Core Documents: The Protection of Individual Rights
• 6.5. 10th Amendment to the Constitution
• 6.6. Additional Provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution
• 6.7. Responsibilities of Federal, State and Local Government
• 6.8. Leadership Structure of the Massachusetts Government
• 6.9. Tax-Supported Facilities and Services
• 6.10. Components of Local Government
• Topic 7. Freedom of the Press and News/Media Literacy
• 7.1. Freedom of the Press
• 7.2. Competing Information in a Free Press
• 7.3. Writing the News: Different Formats and Their Functions
• 7.4. Digital News and Social Media
• 7.5. Evaluating Print and Online Media
• 7.6. Analyzing Editorials, Editorial Cartoons, or Op-Ed Commentaries
• Index of Terms
• Translations

Fundamental Principles and Values of American Political and Civic Life

Choose a sign-in option.

Tools and Settings

Questions and Tasks

Citation and Embed Code

Standard 4.4: Fundamental Principles and Values of American Political and Civic Life

Define and provide examples of fundamental principles and values of American political and civic life. (Massachusetts Curriculum Framework for History and Social Studies) [8.T4.4]

FOCUS QUESTION: What are the Fundamental Principles and Values of American Political and Civic Life?

Modules for this Standard Include:

Rule of law.

• Limited Government
• MEDIA LITERACY CONNECTIONS: Online Messaging by Special Interest Groups
• SPECIAL TOPIC BOX: John Adams, The Boston Massacre, and the Right to an Attorney at Trial
• UNCOVER: The Importance of the 14th Amendment
• ENGAGE: What Are and Should Be Students’ Rights at School?

1. INVESTIGATE: Fundamental Principles and Values of American Life

Equality, Rule of Law, Limited Government, and Representative Government are examples of fundamental principles and values in American political and civic life.

The word "equality" did not appear in the Constitution of 1787 or the Bill of Rights of 1789. While the Constitution guaranteed rule of law to all citizens and provided security of liberty under the law, the existence of slavery and inequalities in the status of women contradicted the idea of equal rights.

It was not until after the Civil War that equality was deliberately addressed in the Constitution through a series of amendments:

• The 13th Amendment (1865) banned slavery.
• The 14th Amendment (1868) guaranteed equal rights of citizenship to all Americans, with the special intention of protecting the rights of former slaves.
• The 15th Amendment (1870) provided voting rights of all citizens.

Learn more about the efforts toward equality for marginalized groups:

• The African American Struggle For Equality  provides background on the history of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments.
• The website  Equal Rights Amendment  discusses efforts to expand the concept of equality to women.
• Black Lives Matter is an organization dedicated to overcoming violence and oppression of African Americans.
• Human Rights Watch works to ensure the equal rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals.

The concept of the rule of law is taken from Alexander Hamilton's Federalist 33 where he wrote: "If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct." 

According to the United States Courts, "the Rule of law is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities are accountable to laws that are:

• Publicly promulgated
• Equally enforced
• Independently adjudicated
• And consistent with international human rights principles" ( Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, n.d., para. 5 ).

Special Topic Box: John Adams, the Boston Massacre, and the Right to an Attorney at Trial

The right to a trial when accused of a crime is one of the foundations of the rule of law in United States society. Guaranteed to all by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, it means that defendants have:

• the right to speedy trial,
• the right to a lawyer to defend them,
• the right to an impartial jury, and
• the right to confront one’s accusers and to know the charges being brought against them ( National Constitution Center ).

Before the Constitution and its Sixth Amendment was passed, the right to trial and the right to have a lawyer for those charged with a crime faced a stern test in the aftermath of the events of March 5, 1770 on King Street in Boston, Massachusetts when British soldiers fired their guns into a crowd of protesters , killing 5 people in what has become known as the Boston Massacre .

One of those who lost his life was a Black man, Crispus Attucks, who is regarded as the first person killed in the American Revolution. What actually happened that night and why is still debated by historians and the event has parallels to modern-day responses by police officers to Black and Brown Lives Matter protesters .

Watch the Boston Massacre Scene from the TV mini-series John Adams

In colonial Boston, immediately afterwards, popular emotions were high and people wanted instant punishment for the soldiers and the commander. John Adams , a 34 year-old Boston attorney and later the second President of the United States, agreed to defend the soldiers despite possible threats to himself and his family. Adams believed every person deserved a trial in court and a lawyer to defend them, no matter how clear and obvious someone’s guilt may seem.

Going against the immense pressure of popular opinion, John Adams took a courageous action, one that helped establish the concepts of what would be the Sixth Amendment in American law.

Adams’s efforts resulted in acquittal of the British commander, Captain Thomas Preston and six of the soldiers; two others were convicted of manslaughter. Of his legal work, Adams later said, “It was, however, one of the most gallant, generous, manly and disinterested Actions of my whole Life, and one of the best Pieces of Service I ever rendered my Country.” 

Still, it took till the 1963 landmark Supreme Court case Gideon v. Wainwright to ensure that the state must provide an attorney to any defendant who cannot afford to hire their own lawyer, thereby guaranteeing the right to counsel to anyone accused of a crime.

Suggested Learning Activities

• Analyze Adams' Defense ( Adams' Argument for the Defense, December 1770 )
• Write or draw a picture book (for children) or graphic novel (for teens) which explains the history of the right to a trial and a lawyer to defend you.

Limited government

In the United States political system, the national government is given limited but not supreme or total powers. After the struggle of the American Revolution to be free from rule by a king, people in the colonies were very wary of a tyrannical ruler or an overbearing government. In the Constitution, limited government relates to free markets and classical liberalism, drawing on Adam Smith's philosophy of the "invisible hand" and self-regulating economies.

The 9th and 10th amendments of the Bill of Rights further express the concept of limited government. Those amendments state that the rights of people do not have to be expressly written in the Constitution and that delegated powers of the Federal government are only to be performed if expressly mentioned in the Constitution. The Constitution also limits government intervention in other key areas of political life, including thought, expression, and association.

Representative democracy

Representative democracy is the principle that people elect individuals to represent them in the government. This is a fundamental element of the governmental system of the United States. Voters elect representatives to a ruling body (the Congress) who acts on behalf of the people's best interests. Learn more from this video: Representative Democracy .

Media Literacy Connections: Online Messaging by Special Interest Groups

Advocacy organizations  (also known as  special interest groups ) are groups that support a political issue or cause ( What is an Advocacy Group? ). These organizations engage in fundraising, conducting public awareness and information campaigns, lobbying legislators, and contributing to political campaigns. They make extensive use of social media. 

In these activities, you will explore how civil rights and social justice advocacy organizations use social media and online messaging to promote equality in society and then you will design your own!

• Activity 1: Evaluate the Social Media Messaging of Advocacy Organizations
• Activity 2: Analyze Persuasion Techniques in Advocacy Groups' Websites

Suggested Learning Activity

• Does American political and civic life exemplify the fundamental principles and values of equality, rule of law, limited government, and representative government?
• Conduct research and then create a video that educates others. 
• What personal qualities, education, and background should an elected representative have?
• How would that representative best stay in touch with you and other constituents?
• What problems do you want that representative to focus on solving?
• What type of person do you want representing you in government at the local, state, and national level?

Online Resources for Fundamental Principles of American Political Life

• Fundamentals of Representative Democracy , Lesson Plans for High School Civics, Government, and U.S. History Classes
• Learning Plans That Help Students Learn About Democracy 

2. UNCOVER: The Importance of the 14th Amendment

John Bingham , a now mostly forgotten Congressman from Ohio, wrote these famous words of the 14th Amendment :  

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The 14th Amendment is a landmark in United States law. The Bill of Rights protected citizens from infringements on their rights by the federal government. This amendment extended people's constitutional protections to actions by state governments that would deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process under the law.

Passed on July 9, 1868 and based on the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 , the amendment had five sections:

• State and federal citizenship for everyone, no matter of race, who were born or naturalized in the United States.
• States are not permitted to limit "privileges and immunities" of citizens.
• No citizen is denied life, liberty, or property without "due process of law."
• No citizen can be denied "equal protection of the laws."
• Congress has the power to enforce these laws ( Faragher, et. al., 2011, p. 505 ).

Historian Eric Foner (2019) characterized the three post-Civil War amendments as “sleeping giants . . . that continued to inspire those who looked to the Constitution to support their efforts to create a more just social order” (p. xxviii).

The 14th Amendment transformed law and society in the United States. As New York Times opinion writer Magliocca (2013) noted:

This sentence would be the legal basis for the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions desegregating the public schools, securing equality for women, and creating the right to sexual privacy. Bingham also said that his text would also extend all of the protections of the Bill of Rights to the actions of state governments, which is largely, though not completely, the law today ( para. 15 ).

Brown v. Board of Education (1954), school desegregation; Mapp v. Ohio (1961), prevention of illegal search and seizure; Gideon v. Wainwright (1965), the right to a lawyer; Loving v. Virginia (1967), the right to interracial marriage; and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the right to gay marriage were among the landmark Supreme Court decisions based on the 14th Amendment.

The 14th Amendment was one of three post-Civil War or Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution, the others being the 13th Amendment that abolished slavery and the 15th Amendment gave all citizens the right to vote regardless of race, color, or previous position of servitude. Voting rights for women, however, were not guaranteed.

The 14th Amendment was a direct response to the  " Black Codes, " laws passed by White southern state legislators after the Civil War to maintain the unequal position of African Americans in the former Confederate states. The 14th Amendment, observed historian Heather Cox Richardson, declared that "state governments could not pass laws that threatened some people worse than others" ( Letters to an American , July 8, 2022).

A less well-known part of the 14th Amendment is Section 3, its disqualification clause that prevents anyone who had engaged in an insurrection against the government from ever running or holding political office again.

In  December 2023, the Colorado Supreme Court cited that section of the amendment to prevent former president Donald Trump from appearing on the state's 2024 Presidential primary ballot. In a 4 to 3 decision, the Court held that Trump had engaged in an insurrection through his actions leading up to and on January 6, 2021. Read the Court's decision here .

The issues raised center around two key constitutional questions, noted University of Massachusetts Amherst professor Paul Collins: "did Trump engage in an insurrection" and "does the 14th Amendment apply to the president" (quoted in MacDougall, Greenfield Recorder, December 21, 2023, p. A10). The Supreme Court will be asked to resolve those questions.

• Brown v. Board of Education ( 1954): School desegregation
• M app v. Ohio (1961): Illegal search and seizures
• Gideon v. Wainwright (1963): Right to access to an attorney
• Griswold v. Connecticut (1965): Right to privacy
• Loving v. Virginia (1967): Interracial marriage
• Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978): Affirmative action

The National Constitution Center has overviews of more Supreme Court cases involving the 14th Amendment.

Online Resources for the 14th Amendment

• The Meaning of the 14th Amendment , PBS Learning Media
• How Supreme Court Decisions Affect History , Thirteen.org
• Congress Debates the Fourteenth Amendment , Facing History and Ourselves

3. ENGAGE: What Are and Should Be Students' Rights at School?

Students "do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate" declared the Supreme Court in the 1969  Tinker v. Des Moines  case (the details of the case are in Topic 5/Standard 6 of this book).

At the same time, the law permits schools to set their own rules and policies about what students can and cannot do in school buildings ( First Amendment Rights for Student Protesters ). As a result, in many instances, students do not have the same rights in school buildings that they have outside them ( Student Rights at School:  Six Things You Need to Know ). Under current law:

• Schools can restrict students' rights to free speech when student language and action can cause a "substantial disruption" to school activities or impinge on the rights of others.
• Schools can also restrict student speech that is lewd, happening at school-sponsored events, or promotes illegal drug use (Johnson, 2021).
• Students do not have a right to wear racially or religiously threatening images (such as swastikas or confederate battle flags) in school nor can they post racist or degrading comments about classmates on their outside-of-school social media accounts ( National Education Association, 2018 ).
• Student actions can be restricted by school officials when those officials believe there is a significant threat to orderly educational practices or other peoples' legal rights.

Minnesota High School Students Walked Out of School to Demand Changes to Gun Laws, March 7, 2018 by A1Cafel is licensed by CC BY 2.0

The rights of students are subject to shifting legal interpretations and intensified political debates over the ongoing issues of speech, privacy, social media, dress codes, discipline procedures, disability rights, gender expression, bathroom access, health, pregnancy, and more. Viewing recent history, legal scholar Catherine J. Ross (2015) contended that courts have retreated from the broad protections that were granted to student speech in the 1940s through the 1960s.

Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L . (2021)

You can learn more about student legal rights involving speech and social media, including the landmark 2021  Mahanoy Area School District vs. B.L . Supreme Court decision (the so-called school cheerleader free speech case) in Topic 5.6 of this book .

Students' Rights in Public vs. Private Schools

Students attending private schools (that is, schools not funded by local, state, or federal government) do not automatically have the same rights as their peers in public schools. Constitutional protections do not necessarily apply. Instead, student rights are determined by the legal contract that families sign to send children to those schools ( Student Rights in Private Schools ). Private schools therefore have broad discretion about the rules and behaviors they want to enforce and students must follow them or they can be punished or expelled for violating the contract signed by their families to attend.

Ban on Hairstyle Discrimination in Schools

A recent focus on students' rights in schools revolves around efforts to ban hairstyle discrimination . In July 2022, Massachusetts passed the CROWN Act (Creating a Respectful and Open World for Natural hair) - the 18th state to adopt similar protections. The law defines natural and protective hairstyles as "braids, locks, twists, bantu knots, and other formations." The law in Massachusetts stems from the case of two twin Black 15-year-olds who were punished for wearing extensions at their charter school, although no White students had received penalties for violating hairstyle rules. A bill to ban hairstyle discrimination nationally has been introduced in the House of Representatives (2022).

Explore the following series of Do You Know Your Rights as a Student scenarios from the ACLU.

What additional rights should students have at your school?

• Conduct a class poll: What do students in your class or school believe are their rights in school?
• Conduct research on what legal rights students have in school (see Student Rights at School: Six Things You Need To Know ).
• Compare and contrast the findings from the poll with the findings from your research.
• The Rights of the Child , Teaching Tolerance
• 11 rights that all students (should) have from the Student Bill of Rights
• Student Bill of Rights , National Youth Rights Association
• Create a video or podcast that summarizes students rights in schools. 
• Freedom of Speech -  The First Amendment in Schools:  A Resource Guide , National Coalition Against Censorship
• Dress Codes -  School Dress Codes &  School Dress Code Pamphlet, ACLU of Rhode Island
• School Discipline - School Discipline Pamphlet , ACLU of Rhode Island
• Social Media -  Student Social Media Rights , ACLU Northern California
• Student Protests - Student Walkouts and Protest at School , ACLU Maine
• Write an proposed new amendment to the US Constitution, in plain English, that spells out the rights of the government in regards to modern media (ex. Social media, tv news, Internet, etc.)
• Explain if your amendment will expand or lessen the power of the government regulation in regards to media and publishing rights. 

Online Resources for Student Rights at School

• Boston Student Rights , Board & Boston Student Advisory Council
• My School My Rights: Know Your Rights , ACLU of California
• Know Your Rights: Students' Rights Scenarios , ACLU
• Legal Guidance on Students Rights: Discrimination and Harassment Based on Race, Religion, National Origin, and Immigration Status , National Education Association (March 2018)

Standard 4.4 Conclusion

American political and civic life rests on a series of fundamental principles and broadly shared values. INVESTIGATE explored the meanings of four of those principles and values: equality, rule of law, limited government, and representative government. UNCOVER discussed how the 14th Amendment to the Constitution has over time extended America’s fundamental principles and values to African Americans and other marginalized individuals and groups. ENGAGE asked what are the protections and limits of students’ rights at school. 

This content is provided to you freely by EdTech Books.

Access it online or download it at https://edtechbooks.org/democracy/principles .

Exploring US Political Culture: An In-Depth Essay

American political culture, introduction.

Political culture is the invisible hand that guides the conduct of political affairs in a society. It represents an amalgamation of beliefs, values, practices, and traditions that define how political and governmental affairs are conducted. In the United States, the political culture is a complex tapestry that has evolved significantly from its colonial origins to the present day. It serves not only as a window into the national ethos but also as a mechanism that influences political behavior and policy decisions. This essay seeks to dissect the intricacies of American political culture, tracing its roots and understanding its prevailing values, while also assessing its impact on the nation’s political and civic life.

Historical Foundations of American Political Culture

Colonial influence and the revolutionary spirit.

The seedbed of American political culture was undoubtedly the period of colonial America. Governed by the British Crown, the colonies were subject to a political culture that was, at its core, an extension of England’s own. Yet, the distance from the Crown and the diversity of the colonial population brewed a unique variant of political practice. The Enlightenment ideas percolating through Europe about self-governance, natural rights, and republicanism began to take root in the fertile intellectual soil of America. This cultural milieu set the stage for the Revolutionary War, which would be as much a clash of arms as a clash of political cultures.

The Constitution and Federalism

The adoption of the Constitution marked a revolutionary shift in American political culture. The document codified a balance between liberty and order, embedding the principles of federalism , checks and balances, and separation of powers into the national psyche. The Federalist and Anti-Federalist debates reflected deep-seated convictions about governance and personal freedoms, which were eventually reconciled through the inclusion of the Bill of Rights. These first ten amendments secured the individual liberties that remain central to American political identity to this day.

The Expanding Frontier and American Individualism

As the nation expanded westward, the frontier became a symbol of American ingenuity and individualism. The ideal of Manifest Destiny encapsulated the belief that Americans were divinely ordained to spread democracy and capitalism across the continent. This expansionist zeal was not only a physical journey but also a cultural one, reinforcing a sense of rugged individualism and self-reliance that would become hallmarks of the American political spirit.

The Civil War and Reconstruction

The Civil War was a pivotal moment in the history of American political culture, raising profound questions about federal authority versus states’ rights and the nature of union and liberty. The post-war Reconstruction era saw an expansion of federal power and civil liberties, albeit contested and incomplete, attempting to reconcile a fractured nation. The legacy of the Civil War and Reconstruction continues to influence American political discourse, particularly around issues of race, justice, and the distribution of power within the federation.

Core Values of American Political Culture

Liberty and freedom.

The twin pillars of American political culture, liberty and freedom, are enshrined in the nation’s founding documents and public consciousness. The concept of individual rights, safeguarded by the rule of law, underpins the political ethos of the United States. It informs the legal framework that protects freedoms ranging from speech and assembly to the pursuit of economic enterprise. The American Dream, an embodiment of economic freedom, promotes the idea that prosperity and success are accessible to all who are willing to work hard, regardless of their origins.

While liberty and freedom emphasize the rights of the individual, equality addresses the moral and legal foundations of American society. The pursuit of equality in the United States has been a long and often tumultuous journey, highlighting the distinction between legal equality, as granted by the Constitution, and social equality, which has been fought for through social movements and policy reforms. The Civil Rights Movement of the 20th century and the ongoing struggle for gender equality exemplify the continuous efforts to bridge the gap between the country’s egalitarian ideals and the realities of social stratification.

The value of democracy lies at the heart of American political life, emphasizing the role of citizens in the governing process. Representative democracy is facilitated by relatively broad suffrage rights and the accountability of public officials to the electorate. Yet, voter participation and the efficacy of the electoral system are subjects of ongoing debate, with controversies surrounding electoral reforms and voting rights indicating that democracy is a living, evolving system that must be continually nurtured and defended.

Civic Duty and Responsibility

American political culture is also characterized by a strong sense of civic duty and responsibility. This encompasses a commitment to community service, volunteerism, and the active engagement in political and civic affairs. The prevalence of civil society organizations and the tradition of activism reflect the belief that citizens are not just passive recipients of government actions but are active participants in the shaping of public policy and community welfare.

Political Socialization and Cultural Transmission

The role of education and family.

Education serves as the primary vehicle for political socialization, instilling civic values and knowledge about the political system. Schools, from elementary to higher education, play a crucial role in shaping the political consciousness of American citizens. The family also acts as a fundamental agent, often transferring partisan loyalties and ideological leanings to the younger generation through discussion and participation in political activities.

Influence of Media and Technology

In contemporary society, media and technology have emerged as dominant forces in political socialization. The mass media, with its extensive reach, shapes perceptions and opinions about political issues and actors. Meanwhile, digital platforms and social media have revolutionized the way information is disseminated, creating new spaces for political engagement and discussion, albeit with the challenge of echo chambers and misinformation.

Religious and Ethnic Influences

Religion and ethnicity continue to impact American political culture significantly. Religious beliefs inform the moral and ethical perspectives of individuals and groups, influencing their political views and behaviors. Ethnic identity also plays a role in political affiliation and policy preferences, with the increasing diversity of the American populace contributing to a more multifaceted political landscape.

The Impact of Economic and Social Class

Economic and social class contribute to political socialization by delineating different interests and perspectives within society. These class distinctions can influence individuals’ political priorities, with economic status often correlating with certain policy preferences and voting patterns.

Political Ideologies and Partisanship

The american two-party system.

The United States is known for its two-party system, dominated by the Democratic and Republican parties. This system shapes the political debate and provides a clear dichotomy in political ideologies, with each party representing a broad coalition of interests and beliefs. The two-party dynamic fosters a sense of identity and belonging among voters but also poses challenges in representing the full spectrum of political opinions.

Conservative and Liberal Ideologies

Conservative and liberal ideologies represent the main spectrums of political thought in the United States. Conservatives generally advocate for limited government, free-market principles, and traditional social values. Liberals tend to support a more active government role in the economy, progressive social policies, and individual liberties. These ideologies are not static and have evolved over time, influenced by cultural, social, and economic changes.

The Rise of Partisanship and Polarization

Recent decades have seen an intensification of partisanship and political polarization, with ideological divides becoming increasingly pronounced. Partisan loyalty often overrides compromise, leading to gridlock in governance and a polarized electorate. This polarization raises concerns about the health of the democratic process and the ability of the political system to effectively address complex challenges.

Third Parties and Independent Movements

While the two-party system prevails, third parties and independent movements periodically emerge, reflecting diverse viewpoints and dissatisfaction with the dominant parties. These groups struggle for recognition and influence within the political system, often bringing attention to specific issues or perspectives that are not adequately represented by the major parties.

Challenges to American Political Culture

Political apathy and voter disengagement.

One of the most pressing challenges to American political culture is the issue of political apathy and voter disengagement. With many citizens feeling that their voices are not heard or that their votes do not make a difference, there is a significant disconnect that threatens the core democratic principle of active citizenry.

Media Fragmentation and the Information Echo Chamber

The fragmentation of media and the proliferation of information echo chambers create environments where individuals are rarely exposed to diverse viewpoints, leading to a segmented society and the solidification of preexisting beliefs. This phenomenon hampers constructive political discourse and the healthy exchange of ideas.

The Influence of Money in Politics

The influence of money in politics, particularly in the form of campaign contributions and lobbying, presents a significant challenge to the democratic process. It raises questions about the equality of voice and representation, with concerns that the interests of the few may outweigh the needs of the many.

Partisan Polarization and Legislative Gridlock

Partisan polarization leads to legislative gridlock, where the inability to reach bipartisan compromise stymies effective governance. This gridlock not only affects policy-making but also fosters cynicism among the electorate about the functionality of their political institutions.

The Future of American Political Culture

Adaptation and reform.

The future of American political culture will likely require adaptation and reform. Acknowledging and addressing the challenges of polarization, political engagement, and the role of money in politics are critical to ensuring that the political system remains representative and effective.

Technological Innovation and Political Engagement

Technological innovation offers new avenues for political engagement and may serve to reinvigorate the democratic process. The potential for digital platforms to enhance citizen participation, education, and dialogue is substantial, albeit with the need for vigilance against the spread of misinformation.

The Evolving American Identity

As the United States becomes increasingly diverse, the American identity and its political culture will evolve. This diversification has the potential to enrich the political landscape with new perspectives and ideas, leading to a more inclusive and representative polity.

American political culture is a complex and ever-evolving construct. It is shaped by historical events, influenced by a set of core values, and constantly challenged by changing societal norms and technological advancements. As the United States continues to confront internal and external pressures, the resilience of its political culture will be tested. However, the adaptability that has characterized American political development offers hope for the future. By addressing the pressing issues of today, and by striving to uphold the principles of liberty, equality, and democracy, American political culture can continue to evolve in a manner that affirms the nation’s founding ideals while embracing the changes of the modern world.

Class Notes, Discussion Questions, and Outline on American Political Culture

Instructional Objectives

political culture – the inherited set of beliefs, attitudes, and opinions Americans have about how their government ought to operate.

1. Define what scholars mean by political culture, and list some of the dominant aspects of political culture in the United States. ( answer )

2. Discuss how American citizens compare with those of other countries in their political attitudes. ( answer )

3. List the contributions to American political culture made by the Revolution, by the nation’s religious heritages, and by the family. Explain the apparent absence of class consciousness in this country. ( answer )

4. Define internal and external feelings of political efficacy, and explain how the level of each of these has varied over the past generation. ( answer )

Text Outline

I. Political culture

A. Tocqueville on American democracy 1. No feudal aristocracy; minimal taxes; few legal restraints 2. Westward movement; vast territory provided opportunities 3. Nation of small, independent farmers 4. “Moral and intellectual characteristics” – today called “political culture”

B. Definition of political culture

1. Distinctive and patterned way of  thinking about how political and economic life ought to be  carried out. 2. For example, stronger American belief in political than in economic equality

C. Elements of the American political system

1. Liberty 2. Equality 3. Democracy 4. Civic duty 5. Individual responsibility

D. Some questions about the U.S. political culture

1. How do we know people share these beliefs? -before polls, beliefs inferred from books, speeches, etc.

2. How do we explain behavior inconsistent with these beliefs

-beliefs still important, cause changes in behavior

3. Why has there been so much political conflict in U.S. history?

-beliefs contradict one another, are not consistently prioritized

Historians have debated the degree to which basic political values are shared in the United States. “Consensus” historians (like Louis Hartz) contend that Americans agree on political values based on the principles articulated by John Locke. “Conflict” historians (like Vernon Parrington) discern a liberal-conservative dimension to American values and dispute the existence of a unified culture.

4. Most consistent evidence of political culture

-use of terms “Americanism,” “un-American”

E. The Economic System

1. Americans support free enterprise , but see limits on marketplace freedom 2. Americans prefer equality of opportunity over equality of result 3. Americans have a shared commitment to economic individualism (1924 /1977 Poll on Personal Responsibility shows that high school students feel that we are personally responsible)

II. Comparing US Political Culture to Other Nations

A. Political System and Ideology 1. Americans tend to be assertive and participatory 2. Other nations citizens, Sweden for example, tend to “trust the experts” and advocate “what is best” as opposed to “what people want.” 3. Japanese stress group harmony and community more. Americans are much willing to buck trends and disrupt the status quo. 4. Americans stress individualism, competition, equality and “following the rules.” 5. Americans vote less but participate in other ways more. 6. Americans have more faith in their national institutions then other nations.

B. Economic Systems

1. American concept of Capitalism and fair competition firmly entrenched. 2. America more of a “meritocracy.” We accept some income inequality but not class division. 3. Other nations more socialistic.

C. Religious Belief

1. Americans are much more religious 2. Religion plays a much more important role in politics – both liberals and conservatives use religion to promote their political agenda.

III. The source of political culture

A. Historical roots 1. Revolution essentially over liberty; preoccupied with asserting rights 2. Adversarial culture due to distrust of authority and a belief that human nature is depraved 3. Federalist-jeffersonian transition in 1800 a. Legitimated role of opposition party; liberty and political change can coexist

B. Legal-sociological factors

1. Widespread (not universal) participation permitted by Constitution 2. Absence of an established national religion a. Religious diversity a source of cleavage b. Absence of established religion has facilitated the absence of political orthodoxy c. Puritan heritage (dominant tradition) stress on personal achievement: (1) Work (2) Save money (3) Obey secular law (4) Do good works (5) Embrace “Protestant ethic” (work ethic)

d. Miniature political systems produced by churches’ congregational organization, so civic and political skills could develop

3. Family instills the ways we think about world and politics

a. Greater freedom of children and equality among family members leads to belief in rights and acceptance of diverse views in decision-making

4. High degree of class consciousness absent

a. Most people consider themselves middle class b. Even unemployed do not oppose management c. Message of Horatio Alger stories is still popular

C. The culture war

1 . Two cultural classes in America battle over values 2. Culture war differs from political disputes in three ways: a. Money is not at stake b. Compromises are almost impossible c. Conflict is more profound

3. Culture conflict animated by deep differences in people’s beliefs about private and public morality

4. Culture war about what kind of country we ought to live in

5. Simplify by identifying two camps

a. Orthodox: morality more important than self-expression with fixed rules from God b. Progressive: personal freedom more important than tradition with changing rules based on circumstances of modern life

6. Orthodox associated with fundamentalist Protestants and progressives with mainline Protestants and those with no strong religious beliefs

7. Culture war occurring both between and within religious denominations

8. Current culture war has special historical importance due to two changes:

a. More people consider themselves progressives than previously b. Rise of technology makes it easier to mobilize people

IV. Mistrust of government

A. Evidence of increase since mid-1960s 1. Jimmy Carter speech in 1979 on American malaise 2. Polls showed people believed… a. “Quite a few” crooks in government b. Government run for a “few big interests” c. “Lots” of tax money wasted d. Government does right only “some of the time”

1. Watergate 2. Vietnam

C. Necessary to view context

1. Mistrust of specific leaders and policies, not of system mainly 2. Present view closer to historical norm 3. Mistrust shared with most other institutions

D. In summary

1. No loss of confidence in Americans themselves or in their system 2. But people less ready to support leaders than in 1950s

V. Political efficacy

A. Definition: citizen’s capacity to understand and influence political events B. Parts 1. Internal efficacy a. Confidence in one’s ability to understand and influence events b. About the same as in 1950s

2. External efficacy

a. Belief that system will respond to citizens b. Not shaped by particular events c. Declined steadily through 1960s and 1970s d. Government becoming too big to respond to individual

C. Comparison: efficacy still much higher than Europeans’

D. Conclusion

1. Americans today may not be more alienated but simply more realistic

VI. Political tolerance

A. Crucial to democratic politics 1. Free discussion of ideas 2. Select rulers without oppression

B. Levels of American political tolerance

1. Most Americans assent in abstract but would deny rights in concrete cases 2. Most are willing to allow expression by those with whom they disagree 3. Becoming more tolerant in recent decades

C. Question: How do very unpopular groups survive?

1. Most people do not act on beliefs 2. Officeholders and activists more tolerant than general public 3. Usually no consensus exists on whom to persecute 4. Courts are sufficiently insulated from public opinion to enforce protection

D. Conclusions

1. Political liberty cannot be taken for granted 2. No group should pretend it is always more tolerant than another

Discussion Questions

1. Alexis de Tocqueville noted that democracy as it exists in America rarely thrived in other nations. Why do you think this is so?

2. How is political culture different from political ideology?

3. Of the five important elements in the American view of the political system (Liberty, Equality, Democracy, Civic Duty and Individual Responsibility) are any more or less important than the others?

4. What are the two most important aspects the political culture that you have learned? (Individualism and equality)

5. To what extent is their agreement in America over these values?

6. What are our basic economic values as a nation?

7. How are we different from other nations?

8. How has gender and upbringing effect the learning of political culture?

9. How has our Puritan heritage effected our political culture? To what extent do you think it still has impact?

10. To what extent do you think America is “class conscious?”

11. What is the culture war, what are the sides involved and how has it impacted on the political socialization?

12. How has mistrust of government become part of our political culture?

13. To what extent is tolerance a part of our political culture?

Important Terms

Americanism A belief that Americans consider themselves bound by common values and common hopes.

civic competence A belief that one can affect government policies.

civic duty The belief that citizens have an obligation to participate in civic and political affairs.

class consciousness The tendency to think of oneself as a worker whose interests are in opposition to those of management and vice versa.

culture war A split in the United States reflecting differences in people’s beliefs about private and public morality, and regarding what standards ought to govern individual behavior and social arrangements.

efficacy Self esteem, competence or mastery.

equality of opportunity An economic value in American culture which maintains that all people should have the same opportunity to get ahead but that people should be paid on the basis of ability rather than on the basis of need.

external efficacy The belief that the political system will respond to citizens. This belief has declined in recent years because of public sentiment that the government has become too big to be responsive.

internal efficacy Confidence in one’s own ability to understand and to take part in political affairs. This confidence has remained stable over the past few decades.

orthodox (social) One of two camps in the culture war that believes morality is as important (or even more so) than self-expression and that moral rules are derived from God.

political ideology A comprehensive set of political, economic, and social views or ideas concerned with the form and role of government.

political culture A distinctive and patterned way of thinking about how political and economic life ought to be carried out.

political efficacy The sense that citizens have the capacity to understand and influence political events.

progressive (social) One of two camps in the culture war that believes personal freedom is more important than traditional rules and that rules depend on the circumstances of modern life.

rights A preoccupation of the American political culture that has imbued the daily conduct of politics with a kind of adversarial spirit.

secular humanism The belief that moral standards do not require religious justification.

work ethic A tradition of Protestant churches that required a life of personal achievement as well as religious conviction; a believer had an obligation to work, save money, obey the secular law, and do good works. Max Weber attributed the rise of capitalism, in part, to this ethic.

Frequently Asked Questions about American Political Culture

American political culture is defined by several core characteristics that have been embedded into the nation’s consciousness since its founding. These include a commitment to individual liberty, political equality, democracy, the rule of law, and civic duty. Liberty, particularly, is a central tenet that champions individual freedoms and limits on government power, ensuring that citizens have the right to express themselves, practice their religion, and pursue their own economic interests. Political equality holds that all citizens are equal in the eyes of the law and have equal voting rights and opportunities to participate in the political process. Democracy in the American context is anchored in the belief that government should be by the people and for the people, emphasizing the importance of public opinion, elections, and representative governance. The rule of law suggests that society should be governed by laws, not by individuals, and that those laws should be applied equally to all. Lastly, civic duty encompasses the belief that citizens are not only rights-holders but also bear the responsibility to engage in public affairs, uphold the laws, and contribute to the common good.

The American education system contributes to the country’s political culture primarily through the process of political socialization, by which individuals acquire their political beliefs, values, and behaviors. From a young age, American students are taught about the country’s historical struggles for freedom and justice, the significance of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and the roles and responsibilities of citizens within a democracy. Civics education plays a pivotal role, offering students a deeper understanding of their government’s structure and function, the importance of voting, and the means by which they can participate in political life. Additionally, the fostering of critical thinking skills encourages students to analyze and engage with political issues independently. The educational system also reinforces the ideals of equality and the belief in the American Dream — the notion that all individuals, regardless of background, have the opportunity to succeed through hard work. Through these teachings, the education system nurtures the next generation of citizens who are informed about, and capable of contributing to, the political culture of the United States.

Recent technological advancements, especially the rise of the internet and social media, have significantly impacted American political culture. These technologies have changed how information is disseminated and consumed, how political campaigns are run, and how elected officials communicate with constituents. Social media platforms have enabled citizens to engage more directly with political discourse, participate in community organizing, and mobilize for social movements. They have also made political information more accessible, though not without challenges; the prevalence of misinformation and echo chambers can distort public perception and debate. The 24-hour news cycle and the rapid spread of information (and misinformation) can lead to political polarization, as individuals become entrenched in their ideological bubbles. However, technology has also empowered grassroots movements and allowed for more significant civic engagement and advocacy, as seen with various online petitions and fundraising campaigns. Despite these advancements posing certain challenges to American political culture, they have undoubtedly democratized aspects of political participation.

Immigration and diversity have fundamentally shaped American political culture by bringing in a multitude of perspectives, values, and beliefs. As a nation of immigrants, the United States has a unique identity that is continually reshaped by the influx of people from around the globe. This diversity has expanded the range of political issues and influenced the creation and adaptation of policies, particularly those related to civil rights, immigration, and multiculturalism. The interplay of different cultures has led to a more inclusive definition of what it means to be American, one that goes beyond a single ethnic or racial identity to embrace a more pluralistic view of citizenship and national belonging. Diversity has also introduced new ideas and traditions into the American political system, enriching the democratic process by incorporating varied voices and experiences. Nonetheless, this diversity has also led to debates over assimilation, the role of bilingualism, and the balance between accommodating diversity and maintaining a cohesive national culture. Overall, immigration and diversity continue to be a source of vitality as well as tension within American political culture, reflecting the nation’s ongoing endeavor to define its identity in an ever-changing world.

The American Dream, the national ethos of the United States, suggests that freedom includes the opportunity for prosperity and success through hard work. This concept influences American political culture by promoting the ideals of progress, meritocracy, and the belief that upward mobility is accessible to all. It affects policy debates, particularly those related to economic issues, taxation, education, and immigration. Politicians across the spectrum often invoke the American Dream to garner support for policies intended to provide equal opportunities for success. However, the reality of achieving the American Dream is subject to considerable debate, particularly in discussions about income inequality, systemic barriers to success, and the varying definitions of what constitutes ‘success’ in American society. The enduring power of this concept lies in its aspirational nature and its ability to shape the collective hopes and motivations of the American people.

Political parties play a central role in American political culture, organizing political action, and expressing collective ideologies. They provide a structure for political debate, policy formulation, and the electoral process. The United States’ two-party system, dominated by Democrats and Republicans, structures much of the political dialogue around a left-right spectrum, though the parties themselves are coalitions of various interest groups and ideological factions. Parties help to mobilize voters, facilitate political participation, and serve as a means for the average citizen to identify with larger political trends and movements. They also act as gatekeepers, influencing which issues gain national attention and which candidates are presented to the electorate. While parties are crucial to the functioning of American democracy, they also contribute to political polarization and the challenges of achieving bipartisan consensus in governance.

Federalism , the constitutional division of power between the national government and the state governments, shapes American political culture by fostering a sense of localism and regional identity alongside national identity. It allows for a diversity of policies and political cultures to exist within the country, accommodating the vast geographic and demographic differences across states. Federalism promotes political innovation, as states can act as “laboratories of democracy,” experimenting with policies before they are adopted at the national level. It also encourages political participation by bringing government closer to the people, allowing for more accessible and localized avenues for citizens to influence their governance. On the other hand, federalism can lead to inconsistencies in the rights and services provided across states, creating a complex tapestry of laws and regulations that can be both a strength and a challenge within American political culture.

Social movements have had a profound impact on American political culture by driving progress and reform. These movements—from the civil rights movement to the women’s suffrage movement, from LGBTQ+ advocacy to environmental activism—have raised awareness about issues that are sometimes neglected by mainstream politics and have pushed for legislative and social changes. They have mobilized citizens, influenced public opinion, and ultimately led to significant changes in laws and societal norms. Social movements have also enriched American democratic practices by demonstrating the power of collective action and civic engagement. They remind policymakers of the ongoing struggles for equality and justice and serve as a catalyst for political and social transformation. Furthermore, social movements have historically played a role in redefining the values and priorities of American political culture, emphasizing the importance of grassroots efforts in a functioning democracy.

What is a Political Value? Political Philosophy and Fidelity to Reality

--> Sleat, M. (2016) What is a Political Value? Political Philosophy and Fidelity to Reality. Social Philosophy and Policy, 33 (1-2). pp. 252-272. ISSN 0265-0525

This essay seeks to defend the claim that political philosophy ought to be appropriately guided by the phenomenon of politics that it seeks to both offer a theory of and, especially in its normative guise, offer a theory for. It does this primarily through the question of political values. It begins by arguing that for any value to qualify as a value for the political domain, it must be intelligible in relation to the constitutive features of politics as a human activity. It then examines the extent to which the preconditions for the realization of values in practice ought to figure in our considerations as to whether they are values that fit or belong to our social world. We can understand these parts of the essay as responding to two related questions, respectively: (i) Is this a political value at all? — which is to ask, is it a value that is appropriate for the political realm?; and then (ii) Is this a political value for us? The final section responds to the often-made complaint that political philosophy ought not to make any concessions to the actual world of politics as it really is, arguing that attending to the realities of politics, and in particular the constitutive conditions of political activity, gives meaning to the enterprise as the theorization of politics (and not something else). Furthermore those same conditions provide the limits of intelligibility beyond which ideals and values can no longer be, in any meaningful sense, ideals and values for the political sphere.

Accepted Version

Filename: Sleat%20What%20is%20political%20value%20-%20social%20philosophy%20and%20policy%20article%20may%202016.pdf

Licence: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0

• What Are The 3 Common Political Values In The US?

• Liberty, equality, and democracy are the 3 most common political values all Americans share.
• Liberty establishes the freedom of our actions, but only if those actions are not detrimental to the freedom of other people.
• No two people are the same, but they should always be treated equally in the light of the law.

The political culture of the United States of America consists of several core ideas that reflect the need of an individual in a socially constructed system of meaning. These ideas mirror the objective need of every individual in society but ultimately reflect our stance towards what we think we need. In other words, these values are the relationship between the entire society and a group, or an individual.

The majority of Americans share or agree with the common values of democracy, equality, individualism, diversity, etc. and most of the time the political quarrel is about how to achieve these values. 

The 3 Core Political Values 

Liberty, equality, and democracy and the 3 core values in the United States of America, and even though they have not been there for everyone in the same way in the past (and even now), they are shared among Americans ever since the founding of the country. Liberty is concerned with our rights and our freedom of action.

Many people believe that liberty means that they can do what they want but restrictions are needed for the society to function stably and healthily. For that reason, it is useful to conceptualize freedom in a way that we are indeed free to do whatever we want but only if our freedom does not hurt the freedom of others. Because of this value, people are free to choose their religion and express themselves however they see fit (freedom of speech for example).

People are different, and we all know and experience this in our daily lives. However, they need to be equal when confronted with the law of the country. There are many minorities in the United States of America , with a different culture, belief, and a way of life, but they all need to have the same fundamental right and be treated the same way.

These rights are exemplified by voting, equal treatment of law, entitlement to legal representation, equality of opportunity and outcome, etc. Unfortunately, this is not always the case in real life. Democracy is believed to be the best form of government by many Americans because it is supposed to be governed by people themselves, and the political figures act according to the opinion of the people. One of its most important characteristics is the majority rule.

Knowledge Is The Key To Sucess

It is paramount that the citizens of the country become more informed about the inner workings of politics and the effects it has on everyone because without being informed it is hard to make good and wise choices. The values most people have are often taken for granted, but they can also be much better because they do not always work the same for everyone.

This does not mean that you have to be the most politically informed individual there is, but knowledge will make you a better person, and a better citizen, and will ultimately help you and your community.

More in Politics

What are ‘Red Flag’ Laws And How Can They Prevent Gun Violence?

The Most and Least Fragile States

What is the Difference Between Democrats and Republicans?

The Black Codes And Jim Crow Laws

Iroquois Great Law of Peace

United States-Iran Conflict

The War In Afghanistan

The United States-North Korea Relations

Numbers, Facts and Trends Shaping Your World

Read our research on:

Full Topic List

Regions & Countries

Publications

• Our Methods
• Short Reads
• Tools & Resources

Read Our Research On:

International Political Values

How young adults want their country to engage with the world.

Though younger people tend to be more internationally oriented than older adults, they differ from one another over how they want their country to engage with the world.

In U.S. and elsewhere, most say their country will be better off embracing changes over sticking to traditions

Social media seen as mostly good for democracy across many nations, but u.s. is a major outlier, what makes someone a good member of society, sign up for our global newsletter.

Delivered twice a month

Americans are less likely than others around the world to feel close to people in their country or community

A median of 83% across 24 nations surveyed say they feel close to other people in their country, while 66% of Americans hold this view.

How People in 24 Countries Think Democracy Can Improve

We asked over 30,000 people what would help democracy work better in their country. Key themes in their responses were addressing basic needs and improving or rebuilding the political system.

What Can Improve Democracy?

Amid growing discontent with the state of democracy globally, we asked over 30,000 people what changes would make their democracy work better.

Representative Democracy Remains a Popular Ideal, but People Around the World Are Critical of How It’s Working

A 24-country survey finds a median of 59% are dissatisfied with how their democracy is functioning, and 74% think elected officials don’t care what people like them think.

Language and Traditions Are Considered Central to National Identity

Across more than 20 countries surveyed, a median of 91% say being able to speak their country’s most common language is important for being considered a true national. And 81% say sharing their country’s customs and traditions is important for true belonging.

Attitudes on an Interconnected World

How close do people feel to others around the world? How much do they want their countries involved in international affairs? How do people’s experiences with travel and feelings of international connectedness relate to their views about the world? A recent 24-nation survey explores these questions.

Poles and Hungarians Differ Over Views of Russia and the U.S.

People in Hungary and Poland have different views on the future of the economic sanctions that the European Union and the U.S. have imposed on Russia. Roughly half of Hungarians believe these sanctions should be decreased, while just 3% of Poles say the same. Most Polish adults (67%) prefer instead to increase sanctions against Russia.

Israelis have polarized views of Netanyahu, reflecting conflicts many see in Israeli society

Israelis viewed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu slightly more unfavorably (52%) than favorably (47%) in a spring survey, but opinions varied widely.

Ahead of U.S. visit, about 6 in 10 Italians view Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni favorably

Nearly six-in-ten Italians (57%) have a favorable opinion of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, while 41% have a negative one.

How Americans’ views of the U.S. compare with international views of the U.S.

People around the world see both strengths and flaws in the U.S., but they generally view the U.S. positively, according to a new survey of 24 countries.

REFINE YOUR SELECTION

Research teams.

1615 L St. NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 USA (+1) 202-419-4300 | Main (+1) 202-857-8562 | Fax (+1) 202-419-4372 |  Media Inquiries

Research Topics

• Email Newsletters

ABOUT PEW RESEARCH CENTER  Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of  The Pew Charitable Trusts .

Copyright 2024 Pew Research Center