essay on positive changes in india

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From Dreamer to Doer: Inspiring Stories of Indian Change Makers and Entrepreneurs

India is a country filled with dreamers and doers who have transformed their visions into reality through their unwavering determination, hard work, and perseverance. From building multimillion-dollar businesses to transforming the lives of the underprivileged, Indian change makers and entrepreneurs have made a significant impact on society. In this article, we will explore the inspiring stories of some of these individuals who have achieved extraordinary success through their courage and conviction.

Ratan Tata, the chairman emeritus of Tata Sons, is an iconic figure in the Indian business landscape. Under his leadership, the Tata Group transformed into a global conglomerate with a presence in more than 100 countries. From the launch of the Tata Nano, the world's cheapest car, to the acquisition of major brands such as Jaguar Land Rover, Tata Steel, and Corus, Ratan Tata has left an indelible mark on the Indian business world. He is also known for his philanthropic work, including the establishment of the Tata Trusts, which have contributed significantly to healthcare, education, and rural development.

Arunachalam Muruganantham

Arunachalam Muruganantham is the founder of Jayaashree Industries, a company that produces low-cost sanitary pads for women. He started his career as a welder and later became interested in the issue of menstrual hygiene after he discovered that his wife was using old rags during her periods. Arunachalam invented a low-cost machine that can produce sanitary pads at a fraction of the cost of commercially available pads. His invention has not only helped improve the lives of millions of women in India but has also inspired similar initiatives in other parts of the world.

Vandana Shiva

Vandana Shiva is an environmental activist and food sovereignty advocate who is known for her work on sustainable agriculture and seed conservation. She founded Navdanya, a non-governmental organization that promotes organic farming and biodiversity conservation. Vandana Shiva is also a vocal critic of genetically modified crops and monoculture farming practices.

Ritesh Rawal

Ritesh Rawal is an Indian entrepreneur and change-maker who has embarked on a research project called "What is India by Ritesh Rawal," which aims to explore and understand the diverse culture and social aspects of India. The project seeks to document and showcase the richness of Indian culture, the challenges facing local communities, and the innovative solutions being implemented to address them. Through this project, Rawal hopes to create awareness and drive positive change in India by inspiring collective action and empowering local communities. Rawal believes that India is the most incredible place in the world and hopes to share his perspectives with others through his work.

Kailash Satyarthi

Kailash Satyarthi is a child rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate who has dedicated his life to ending child slavery and exploitation. He founded Bachpan BachaoAndolan, an organization that works to rescue and rehabilitate children from forced labor and trafficking. Kailash Satyarthi has also played a key role in the formation of the Global March Against Child Labor and the International Center on Child Labor and Education.

Anand Kumar

Anand Kumar is the founder of the Super 30 program, which provides free coaching to underprivileged students to help them crack the highly competitive Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) entrance exam. Anand himself comes from a humble background and started the program in 2002 with just a handful of students. Today, Super 30 has helped more than 500 students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds secure admission to the IITs, one of the most prestigious engineering institutes in India. Anand's work has been recognized by several international organizations, including Time magazine, which named him one of the 100 most influential people in the world.

These are just a few of the many inspiring stories of Indian change makers and entrepreneurs who have made a significant impact on society. Their stories serve as a testament to the power of human perseverance and the importance of pursuing.

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• 75 Years of Independence: The Changing Landscape of India

75 Years of Independence: The Changing Landscape of India  Blogs Home

• 14 Aug 2022

There is an old saying that India is a new country but an ancient civilization, and this civilization has seen tremendous changes throughout its history.

From being an education hub of the world in ancient times to becoming the IT hub of the world today, the Indian landscape has come a long way. Taking 15 th August 1947 as our frame of reference, we find that there are several fields like Science and Technology, economy, and human development where India has shown remarkable progress. However, some fields like health and education still seem to be taken care of. Let us look at these aspects of Indian development individually.

The Landscape of Science and Technology

When the Britishers left India, they left behind a broken, needy, underdeveloped, and economically unstable country. After independence, India prioritized scientific research in its first five-year plan. It paved the way for prestigious scientific institutes like IITs and IISC. After just three years of independence, the Indian Institute of Technology has established in 1950. These institutions promoted research in India with the aid of foreign institutions. From launching its first satellite Aryabhatta in 1975 to being the first country to reach the orbit of Mars, India has taken confident strides in the field of space research technology, thanks to the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). We can proudly state that India is standing at par with countries like USA and China, same goes with the field of biotechnology also where India is producing vaccines for the entire world. The success of UPI is also a case study for the world with 9.36 billion transactions worth Rs. 10.2 trillion in Q1 of 2022 only.

Economic Landscape

India faced several issues following its independence, including illiteracy, corruption, poverty, gender discrimination, untouchability, regionalism, and communalism. Numerous issues have acted as major roadblocks to India's economic development. When India declared its independence in 1947, its GDP was mere 2.7 lakh crore accounting for 3% of the world GDP. In 1965, the Green Revolution was started in India by M. S. Swaminathan, the father of the Green Revolution. During the Green Revolution, there was a significant increase in the crop area planted with high-yielding wheat and rice types. From 1978–1979, the Green Revolution led to a record grain output of 131 million tonnes. India was then recognized as one of the top agricultural producers in the world. With the construction of linked facilities like factories and hydroelectric power plants, a large number of jobs for industrial workers were also generated in addition to agricultural workers.

Today India is the 5 th largest economy in the world with 147 lakh crore GDP, accounting for 8% of global GDP. In recent years, India has seen a whopping rise of 15,400% in the number of startups, which rose from 471 in 2016 to 72,993 as of June 2022. This phenomenal rise in startups has also produced millions of new jobs in the country.

Infrastructure

The India of today is different from India at the time of freedom. In the 75 years of independence, Indian Infrastructure has improved drastically. The overall length of the Indian road network has grown from 0.399 million km in 1951 to 4.70 million km as of 2015, which makes it the third largest roadway network in the world. Additionally, India's national highway system now spans 1, 37, 625 kilometres in 2021, up from 24,000 km (1947–1969).

After over 70 years of independence, India has risen to become Asia's third-largest electricity generator. It increased its ability to produce energy from 1,362 MW in 1947 to 3, 95, 600 MW. In India, the total amount of power produced increased from 301 billion units in 1992–1993 to 400990.23 MW in 2022. The Indian government has succeeded in lighting up all 18,452 villages by April 28, 2018, as opposed to just 3061 in 1950, when it comes to rural electrification.

The Landscape of Human Development

In 1947 India had a population of 340 million with a literacy rate of just 12%, today it has a population of nearly 1.4 billion and a literacy rate of 74.04%. The average life expectancy has also risen from 32 years to 70 years in 2022.

The Landscape of Education and Health

In 1947, India had a population of 340 million with a literacy rate of just 12%, today it has a population of nearly 1.4 billion and a literacy rate of 74.04%. The average life expectancy has also risen from 32 years to 70 years in 2022. Though India has shown remarkable progress In terms of literacy rate, the quality of higher education is still a cause of major concern. There is not a single Indian University or Institute in the top 100 QS World University Ranking. With the largest youth population in the world, India can achieve wonders if its youth get equipped with proper skills and education. The health, sector is also worrisome. The doctor-to-patient ratio is merely 0.7 doctors per 1000 people as compared to the WHO average of 2.5 doctors per 1000 people. A recent study shows that 65% of medical expenses in India are paid out of pocket by patients and the reason is that they are left with no alternative but to access private healthcare because of poor facilities in public hospitals.

The Political Landscape

Jawaharlal Nehru was appointed as India's first prime minister in 1947, following the end of British rule. He promoted a socialist-economic system for India, including five-year plans and the nationalization of large sectors of the economy like mining, steel, aviation, and other heavy industries. Village common areas were taken, and a massive public works and industrialization drive led to the building of important dams, roads, irrigation canals, thermal and hydroelectric power plants, and many other things. India's population surpassed 500 million in the early 1970s, but the “Green Revolution” significantly increased agricultural productivity, which helped to end the country's long-standing food problem.

From 1991 to 1996, India's economy grew quickly as a result of the policies implemented by the late Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao and his Finance Minister at the time, Dr Manmohan Singh. Poverty had decreased to about 22%, while unemployment has been continuously reducing. Growth in the gross domestic product exceeded 7%.

India's first female Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, held office from 1966 until 1977 for three consecutive terms before serving a fourth term (1980–84). India elected Pratibha Patil as its first female president in 2007.

India's economy has expanded significantly in the twenty-first century. Under the Prime ministership of Narendra Modi (BJP), many significant changes have taken place like the scraping of Section 370, strengthening the Defence systems, creating a startup-friendly environment and much more. To expand infrastructure and manufacturing, the Modi administration launched several programs and campaigns, including “Make in India”, “Digital India”, and the “Swachh Bharat project.”

The Legal Landscape

Before independence, the Privy Council was the highest appellate authority in India. This Council was abolished as the first action following independence. The abolition of the Privy Council Jurisdiction Act was passed by the Indian Constituent Assembly in 1949 to eliminate the Privy Council's authority over appeals from India and to make provisions for outstanding appeals. It was B. R. Ambedkar's sharp legal intellect to draft a constitution for the newly sovereign country. In all executive, legislative, and judicial matters in the nation, the Constitution of India serves as the supreme law. The Indian legal system has developed into a key component of the largest democracy in the world and a pivotal front in the fight to protect constitutional rights for all citizens. Since it was first adopted in 1950, the Indian Constitution has had 105 modifications as of October 2021. The Indian Constitution is divided into 22 parts with 395 articles. Later, through various changes, further articles were added and amendments were made. According to the online repository maintained by the Legislative Department of the Ministry of Law and Justice of India as of July 2022, there are around 839 Central laws. The Indian legal system has a promising and forward-thinking future, and in the twenty-first century, young, first-generation lawyers are entering the field after graduating from the best law schools.

The Landscape of the Defence Sector

The Indian military ranked 4 of 142 out of the countries considered for the annual GFP review. From being defeated by the Chinese army in 1962 to becoming one of the largest defence systems in the world, India has surely learnt from its past errors. One of the reasons the Indian defence system has been able to attain its present reputation is the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) which was established in 1958. Since its founding, it has created many significant programs and critical technologies, including missile systems, small and big armaments, artillery systems, electronic warfare (EW) systems, tanks, and armoured vehicles. India began working on nuclear energy in the late 1950s and had indigenous nuclear power stations by the 1970s. India had also begun developing nuclear weapons and producing fissile material concurrently, which allowed for the purportedly harmless nuclear explosion in Pokhran in 1971. The Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), under the direction of APJ Abdul Kalam and with the support of the Ordnance Factories, was established in 1983. In 1989, the longer-range Agni was independently designed and tested. Later, India and Russia collaborated to design and produce the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile. India currently leads several other nations in the production of defences. India is one of about a dozen nations that have built and produced their fighter jets, helicopters, submarines, missiles, and aircraft carriers.

Analyzing the different landscapes of India we find that we have come a long way in our journey but still, there is a lot to be done if we want to make India a ‘super power’. A lot will depend on our people’s willingness to change, ensuring the equal participation of women in the workforce, including marginalized communities in our economic growth, and last but not least is having a liberal and progressive and unbiased mindset.

As we are celebrating “Azaadi ka Amrit Mahotsav”, the completion of 75 years of independence can be taken as a new opportunity to build an India of our aspirations and make positive contributions to the changing landscape of India.

 Aarifa Nadeem 

https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/opinion/how-we-have-done-since-gaining-freedom-from-our-colonial-masters-seven-decades-ago

https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/news/story/qs-world-university-rankings-2023-top-10-universities-globally-and-top-10-in-india-1960806-2022-06-10

https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/national/5-reasons-why-indias-healthcare-system-is-struggling/article34665535.ece

https://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/economic-survey-high-out-of-pocket-expenses-for-health-can-lead-to-poverty/article33699314.ece

https://www.mapsofindia.com/my-india/technology/development-in-india-after-independence#:~:text=Infrastructure%20Development,%2C37%2C625%20km%20(2021) .

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_India_(1947%E2%80%93present)#: ~:text=India%20became%20a%20sovereign%20democratic,the%2042nd%20Constitution %20Amendment%201976.

http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/about/about-the-legal-profession/history-of-the-legal-profession/

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10 inspiring indians who are making positive changes in the society.

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Inspiration is what keeps us going. These amazing, brave, dedicated inspiring leaders of India are doing groundbreaking work in the social sector and working for a better tomorrow. They help us believe that there is good in the world. So here I have enlisted 10 such inspiring Indians who have gone against all odds to reach out to people in a way that is entirely different. This post is not really in any particular order because, after all, ranking them seems a little fruitless.

Since 1997, he quit his job and started serving the society and took up other assignments to fund Shloka, a free English-medium school for children from the Goregaon slums in Mumbai. His foundation currently runs 4 English Medium schools which provide free education to the poor. He requests small donations and goes around shouting “Vidyadaan Shreshth Daan” in local trains. This man is one of those faces of the society who break the general belief that one must have their pockets full to do something for the society.

The college gives simple school lessons in reading, writing and  accounting to adults and children. It works to impart skills  people’s need in their everyday lives. The most sought after students are “drop-outs, cop-outs and wash-outs”. He has helped over 1000 villages in 37 countries to get electrification with solar power . The ‘Barefoot approach’ may be viewed as a ‘concept’, ‘solution’, ‘revolution’, ‘design’ or an ‘inspiration’ but it is really a simple message that can easily be replicated by the poor and for the poor in neglected and underprivileged communities anywhere the world.

Never underestimate the power of ‘One’ . In 1979, Payeng, then 16, encountered a large number of snakes that had died due to excessive heat after floods washed them onto the tree-less sandbar. That is when he planted around 20 bamboo seedlings on the sandbar. He worked on projects after projects and transformed the area into forest over 30 years. Molai forest, now houses Bengal tigers, Indian rhinoceros, over 100 deer and rabbits besides apes and several varieties of birds, including a large number of vultures.

‘All people have a right to sight’. Dr. Perumalsamy Namperumalsamy and his army of cataract fixers at India’s Aravind Eye Care Hospitals have been performing surgeries to give the blind people their eyesight back . The surgery has been around for decades, but the chairman of Aravind — which was founded in 1976 with the goal of bringing assembly-line efficiency to health care — figured out how to replace cataracts safely and quickly and helped 3.6 million people get their vision. Featured in TIME’s Top 100 list.

There are men who squirm at the mention of a woman’s period. Then there’s Muruganantham, who re-engineered a sanitary machine which makes about 120 napkins an hour .  Currently more than 1300 machines made by his start-up company are installed across 27 states in India and seven other countries.  Receiving the award from the Indian president was not the happiest moment of his life. But his proudest moment came after he installed a machine in a remote village in Uttarakhand, in the foothills of the Himalayas.

This activity consisted of providing free meals for cancer patients and their relatives. Beginning with fifty, the number of beneficiaries soon rose to hundred, two hundred, three hundred. As the numbers of patients increased, so did the number of helping hands. The ‘Jeevan Jyoti’ trust founded by Mr Sawla now runs more than 60 humanitarian projects. For last 27 years, millions of cancer patients and their relatives have found ‘God’, in the form of Harakhchand Sawla.

Her life started as being an unwanted child, followed by an abusive husband who abandoned her when she was nine months pregnant. But Sindhutai emerged stronger with every difficulty she faced and became a ‘mother’ to over 1400 homeless children. Currently she has opened 5 shelter homes for the orphans where they are being educated as well as provided all the basic amenities of life . She has proved that a mother can be someone who adopts you and takes proper care of you.

‘The Ice Man’. Sounds like a pretty cool super hero, and he kind of is. You’ll find him in the Himalayas. Back in 1987, Norphel invented artificial glaciers and started constructing massive dams in order to efficiently use the water gathered from melting ice to change the lives of the farmers. 30 years ago, Norphel was laughed at and never taken seriously, but today he stands in front of the camera as a proud citizen, and a real climate hero. He has proved that if man is the one responsible for disturbing nature, he also has the capacity to save it.

Sharma, a father of three from Aligarh, was forced to drop out of college in his third year due to financial difficulties. When he decided to start the free school, he didn’t want other children to face the same difficulties. So he eventually persuaded local laborers and farmers to allow their children to attend his school instead of working to add to the family income. The children from the neighbouring villages attend class for two hours daily, where they learn math and basic reading and writing skills. He believes, his greatest achievement was changing the attitude of his students’ parents. Most of them now encourage their children to study.

Arputham was born in Kolar Gold Fields, near Bangalore, in the south of India. He moved to Mumbai when he was 18 to work as a carpenter. Having no place to live in, he began sleeping outside people’s houses in Janata Colony, a slum of around 70,000 people. When the inhabitants of the slum were threatened with eviction, he united the community in organizing protests and fighting injustice. Over the years, Arputham has built 30,000 houses in India, and 1,00,000 houses abroad. For his remarkable work, he has been awarded the the Padma Shri. He didn’t win the Nobel Peace Prize but Jockin Sir has dedicated his life to bring peace for slum dwellers.

This may be a small force at present, but if we all stand together , we can wipe out all the social tensions.

I salute these true heroes who have made us all extremely proud.

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IMPACT INDIA

Women, prosperity, and social change in india.

Social enterprise, which promises both economic empowerment and social trans-formation, is driving tremendous positive change in the lives of women in India. But it is also at the heart of a growing debate about the past and future of India's social sector.

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By Isabel Salovaara & Jeremy Wade Feb. 14, 2018

Women first, prosperity for all. This was the theme of the 10th Global Entrepreneurship Summit , hosted late last year in Hyderabad. It was also an unofficial theme for the year itself. Around the world, we witnessed demands by women to address persistent gender inequalities as a prerequisite to social and economic progress.

In 2018, one pressing question is how to convert the momentum generated by movements like #MeToo into lasting impact. A recent five-country study , commissioned by the British Council, on the mutual interdependence of social enterprise initiatives and women’s empowerment movements provides insights into the strategies for—and barriers to—long-term change.

As the study’s North India research partners, we conducted a series of interviews, a survey of social enterprises in India, and focus groups across nine Indian cities to galvanize conversation on the contributions of social enterprise to women’s empowerment and the challenges at hand.

For this study, we defined a social enterprise as an organization with a central social or environmental mission that earns at least 25 percent of its revenue through commercial activity. Such a definition enabled us to make international comparisons between countries with diverse regulatory and legal landscapes in relation to social enterprise. It also provoked questions about the place of social enterprise and other organizational forms within longstanding social and women’s movements in India.

Our research highlighted the multiple meanings behind “women first,” including the significance of women’s leadership and the importance of attending to the needs of women beneficiaries and employees in the social enterprise sector. In this three-part series, we explore the impact of social enterprise—including its ambiguous place among older social organization models—on women in India.

Financial empowerment as a way toward social transformation

There are an estimated two million social enterprises in India, according to a previous British Council report mapping the social enterprise ecosystem . About a third (more than 600,000) focus on empowering women and girls as primary beneficiaries of their social mission.

Among our survey respondents, the most prevalent approaches focus on skill development and job creation. Many of these social enterprises, including women’s clothing producers rangSutra and KhaDigi , operate within the handicrafts sector, the second largest segment of India’s economy after agriculture. Some, like Jaipur Living (formerly Jaipur Rugs), focus on creating sustainable livelihoods for women by combining flexible working hours with connections to global export markets.

But social enterprises span a wide range of emerging industries. Some integrate rural youth, including young women, into India’s thriving business process outsourcing (BPO) industry as call-center employees. Taxi services by and for women, such as Sakha Consulting Wings , train and employ women in the male-dominated field of commercial driving, while also advancing the cause of women’s safety and mobility in urban India. Through Odanadi Trust in Mysore or Sheroes Hangout in Agra, restaurants, cafés, and ice cream parlors provide women who have survived trafficking or abuse with a means of earning money and developing skills.

The prominence of employment and income generation among social enterprise strategies for women’s empowerment in India reflects the unique strengths of the hybrid social enterprise model. Applying market logics to social issues is the sector’s raison d’être .

These strategies also reflect genuine needs of women in India. Many participants in our focus groups argued that financial standing gives women more decision-making power in their families and communities. “Social factors and forces must be combined with economic factors and forces,” says Shalabh Mittal, CEO of the School for Social Entrepreneurs India . Only then, he says, will more conservative interests buy in to the idea of social change. Or, as one participant in Jaipur bluntly put it: “When you earn money, men start respecting you.”

Yet this equation, so appealing in its simplicity, did not go unchallenged. Some participants were skeptical that financial empowerment and market integration, without parallel (and often unprofitable) efforts to change ingrained mindsets, could accomplish all that is needed to put women and girls on equal footing with men. Their caution echoed deeper concerns about the place of social enterprise within the constellation of other models comprising India’s social sector.

Hybrid models in the social sector

At a Kolkata focus group, participants raised a provocative question: Do we really need to distinguish NGOs from social enterprise? As a whole, the group agreed that women’s empowerment should be the key issue, rather than who does it.

This question shed light on a source of tension that ran through many of our conversations during this research. Designating some Indian organizations as social enterprises and some as “just” NGOs (or businesses) could have wider ranging effects on the social sector. Will the popularity of social enterprise further reduce the resources available to traditional nonprofits pursuing critical work in advocacy and other fields less amenable to monetization?

Unlike countries with newly emerging legal forms explicitly designed to enable organizations to pursue both social and commercial objectives , a distinct hybrid legal entity does not yet exist in India. Indian social enterprises must currently incorporate as one of the following: a nonprofit, which cannot legally maintain substantial surpluses from year to year; a private company; or a hybrid structure with separate nonprofit and for-profit entities. These choices have material consequences, since some forms of support (such as government contracts under social programs) are largely reserved for nonprofits, while others (such as impact investment funding) are more accessible to social enterprises with a stronger business orientation.

These two organizational forms also carry historically gendered meanings. India’s nonprofit sector grew out of the voluntary movement, which promoted social progress driven by the unpaid social work of volunteers, says Ranjana Kumari, director of the Centre for Social Research in Delhi. This vision offered limited scope for asset formation and financial gain by social organizations. As Kumari asks sardonically, “What do volunteers eat? Grass?” So-called social work and NGOs became a feminized domain , since women were not usually expected to be the primary providers for their families.

Many hope social enterprise can transform this image of the social sector by making both “doing good and doing well” possible. But as policy develops over time to recognize and support social enterprise in India , the sector must avoid several pitfalls if it is to maximize the hybrid model’s benefits for women. The “social” in social enterprise in itself cannot justify restrictions on financial remuneration for women and the organizations that support them. Social enterprise must be positioned as a partner, not a replacement, for existing players in the women’s empowerment field.

Expanding prosperity

The market-based hybridity of social enterprise remains its distinguishing feature, and economic participation can indeed enable women to influence the direction of social change to create a more just social and economic order. And yet social enterprise offers significant opportunities beyond financial gain—many organizations represented in our study address issues of sanitation, childcare, and women’s representation as decision-makers in their communities. Often, especially in health and education, these organizations empower women and girls alongside men and boys . If putting women first is to bring “prosperity for all,” we must expand the reach of economic empowerment as well as the definition of prosperity.

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Read more stories by Isabel Salovaara & Jeremy Wade .

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Religion in India: Tolerance and Segregation

Indians say it is important to respect all religions, but major religious groups see little in common and want to live separately, table of contents.

• The dimensions of Hindu nationalism in India
• India’s Muslims express pride in being Indian while identifying communal tensions, desiring segregation
• Muslims, Hindus diverge over legacy of Partition
• Religious conversion in India
• Religion very important across India’s religious groups
• Near-universal belief in God, but wide variation in how God is perceived
• Across India’s religious groups, widespread sharing of beliefs, practices, values
• Religious identity in India: Hindus divided on whether belief in God is required to be a Hindu, but most say eating beef is disqualifying
• Sikhs are proud to be Punjabi and Indian
• 1. Religious freedom, discrimination and communal relations
• 2. Diversity and pluralism
• 3. Religious segregation
• 4. Attitudes about caste
• 5. Religious identity
• 6. Nationalism and politics
• 7. Religious practices
• 8. Religion, family and children
• 9. Religious clothing and personal appearance
• 10. Religion and food
• 11. Religious beliefs
• 12. Beliefs about God
• Acknowledgments
• Appendix A: Methodology
• Appendix B: Index of religious segregation

This study is Pew Research Center’s most comprehensive, in-depth exploration of India to date. For this report, we surveyed 29,999 Indian adults (including 22,975 who identify as Hindu, 3,336 who identify as Muslim, 1,782 who identify as Sikh, 1,011 who identify as Christian, 719 who identify as Buddhist, 109 who identify as Jain and 67 who identify as belonging to another religion or as religiously unaffiliated). Interviews for this nationally representative survey were conducted face-to-face under the direction of RTI International from Nov. 17, 2019, to March 23, 2020.

To improve respondent comprehension of survey questions and to ensure all questions were culturally appropriate, Pew Research Center followed a multi-phase questionnaire development process that included expert review, focus groups, cognitive interviews, a pretest and a regional pilot survey before the national survey. The questionnaire was developed in English and translated into 16 languages, independently verified by professional linguists with native proficiency in regional dialects.

Respondents were selected using a probability-based sample design that would allow for robust analysis of all major religious groups in India – Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains – as well as all major regional zones. Data was weighted to account for the different probabilities of selection among respondents and to align with demographic benchmarks for the Indian adult population from the 2011 census. The survey is calculated to have covered 98% of Indians ages 18 and older and had an 86% national response rate.

For more information, see the  Methodology  for this report. The questions used in this analysis can be found  here .

More than 70 years after India became free from colonial rule, Indians generally feel their country has lived up to one of its post-independence ideals: a society where followers of many religions can live and practice freely.

India’s massive population is diverse as well as devout. Not only do most of the world’s Hindus, Jains and Sikhs live in India, but it also is home to one of the world’s largest Muslim populations and to millions of Christians and Buddhists.

A major new Pew Research Center survey of religion across India, based on nearly 30,000 face-to-face interviews of adults conducted in 17 languages between late 2019 and early 2020 (before the COVID-19 pandemic ), finds that Indians of all these religious backgrounds overwhelmingly say they are very free to practice their faiths.

Related India research

This is one in a series of Pew Research Center reports on India based on a survey of 29,999 Indian adults conducted Nov. 17, 2019, to March 23, 2020, as well as demographic data from the Indian Census and other government sources. Other reports can be found here:

• How Indians View Gender Roles in Families and Society
• Religious Composition of India
• India’s Sex Ratio at Birth Begins To Normalize

Indians see religious tolerance as a central part of who they are as a nation. Across the major religious groups, most people say it is very important to respect all religions to be “truly Indian.” And tolerance is a religious as well as civic value: Indians are united in the view that respecting other religions is a very important part of what it means to be a member of their own religious community.

These shared values are accompanied by a number of beliefs that cross religious lines. Not only do a majority of Hindus in India (77%) believe in karma, but an identical percentage of Muslims do, too. A third of Christians in India (32%) – together with 81% of Hindus – say they believe in the purifying power of the Ganges River, a central belief in Hinduism. In Northern India, 12% of Hindus and 10% of Sikhs, along with 37% of Muslims, identity with Sufism, a mystical tradition most closely associated with Islam. And the vast majority of Indians of all major religious backgrounds say that respecting elders is very important to their faith.

Yet, despite sharing certain values and religious beliefs – as well as living in the same country, under the same constitution – members of India’s major religious communities often don’t feel they have much in common with one another. The majority of Hindus see themselves as very different from Muslims (66%), and most Muslims return the sentiment, saying they are very different from Hindus (64%). There are a few exceptions: Two-thirds of Jains and about half of Sikhs say they have a lot in common with Hindus. But generally, people in India’s major religious communities tend to see themselves as very different from others.

This perception of difference is reflected in traditions and habits that maintain the separation of India’s religious groups. For example, marriages across religious lines – and, relatedly, religious conversions – are exceedingly rare (see Chapter 3 ). Many Indians, across a range of religious groups, say it is very important to stop people in their community from marrying into other religious groups. Roughly two-thirds of Hindus in India want to prevent interreligious marriages of Hindu women (67%) or Hindu men (65%). Even larger shares of Muslims feel similarly: 80% say it is very important to stop Muslim women from marrying outside their religion, and 76% say it is very important to stop Muslim men from doing so.

Moreover, Indians generally stick to their own religious group when it comes to their friends. Hindus overwhelmingly say that most or all of their close friends are also Hindu. Of course, Hindus make up the majority of the population, and as a result of sheer numbers, may be more likely to interact with fellow Hindus than with people of other religions. But even among Sikhs and Jains, who each form a sliver of the national population, a large majority say their friends come mainly or entirely from their small religious community.

Fewer Indians go so far as to say that their neighborhoods should consist only of people from their own religious group. Still, many would prefer to keep people of certain religions out of their residential areas or villages. For example, many Hindus (45%) say they are fine with having neighbors of all other religions – be they Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist or Jain – but an identical share (45%) say they would not be willing to accept followers of at least one of these groups, including more than one-in-three Hindus (36%) who do not want a Muslim as a neighbor. Among Jains, a majority (61%) say they are unwilling to have neighbors from at least one of these groups, including 54% who would not accept a Muslim neighbor, although nearly all Jains (92%) say they would be willing to accept a Hindu neighbor.

Indians, then, simultaneously express enthusiasm for religious tolerance and a consistent preference for keeping their religious communities in segregated spheres – they live together separately . These two sentiments may seem paradoxical, but for many Indians they are not.

Indeed, many take both positions, saying it is important to be tolerant of others and expressing a desire to limit personal connections across religious lines. Indians who favor a religiously segregated society also overwhelmingly emphasize religious tolerance as a core value. For example, among Hindus who say it is very important to stop the interreligious marriage of Hindu women, 82% also say that respecting other religions is very important to what it means to be Hindu. This figure is nearly identical to the 85% who strongly value religious tolerance among those who are not at all concerned with stopping interreligious marriage.

In other words, Indians’ concept of religious tolerance does not necessarily involve the mixing of religious communities. While people in some countries may aspire to create a “melting pot” of different religious identities, many Indians seem to prefer a country more like a patchwork fabric, with clear lines between groups.

One of these religious fault lines – the relationship between India’s Hindu majority and the country’s smaller religious communities – has particular relevance in public life, especially in recent years under the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the BJP is often described as promoting a Hindu nationalist ideology .

The survey finds that Hindus tend to see their religious identity and Indian national identity as closely intertwined: Nearly two-thirds of Hindus (64%) say it is very important to be Hindu to be “truly” Indian.

Most Hindus (59%) also link Indian identity with being able to speak Hindi – one of dozens of languages that are widely spoken in India. And these two dimensions of national identity – being able to speak Hindi and being a Hindu – are closely connected. Among Hindus who say it is very important to be Hindu to be truly Indian, fully 80% also say it is very important to speak Hindi to be truly Indian.

The BJP’s appeal is greater among Hindus who closely associate their religious identity and the Hindi language with being “truly Indian.” In the 2019 national elections, 60% of Hindu voters who think it is very important to be Hindu and to speak Hindi to be truly Indian cast their vote for the BJP, compared with only a third among Hindu voters who feel less strongly about both these aspects of national identity.

Overall, among those who voted in the 2019 elections, three-in-ten Hindus take all three positions: saying it is very important to be Hindu to be truly Indian; saying the same about speaking Hindi; and casting their ballot for the BJP.

These views are considerably more common among Hindus in the largely Hindi-speaking Northern and Central regions of the country, where roughly half of all Hindu voters fall into this category, compared with just 5% in the South.

Whether Hindus who meet all three of these criteria qualify as “Hindu nationalists” may be debated, but they do express a heightened desire for maintaining clear lines between Hindus and other religious groups when it comes to whom they marry, who their friends are and whom they live among. For example, among Hindu BJP voters who link national identity with both religion and language, 83% say it is very important to stop Hindu women from marrying into another religion, compared with 61% among other Hindu voters.

This group also tends to be more religiously observant: 95% say religion is very important in their lives, and roughly three-quarters say they pray daily (73%). By comparison, among other Hindu voters, a smaller majority (80%) say religion is very important in their lives, and about half (53%) pray daily.

Even though Hindu BJP voters who link national identity with religion and language are more inclined to support a religiously segregated India, they also are  more  likely than other Hindu voters to express positive opinions about India’s religious diversity. Nearly two-thirds (65%) of this group – Hindus who say that being a Hindu and being able to speak Hindi are very important to be truly Indian  and  who voted for the BJP in 2019 – say religious diversity benefits India, compared with about half (47%) of other Hindu voters.

This finding suggests that for many Hindus, there is no contradiction between valuing religious diversity (at least in principle) and feeling that Hindus are somehow more authentically Indian than fellow citizens who follow other religions.

Among Indians overall, there is no overwhelming consensus on the benefits of religious diversity. On balance, more Indians see diversity as a benefit than view it as a liability for their country: Roughly half (53%) of Indian adults say India’s religious diversity benefits the country, while about a quarter (24%) see diversity as harmful, with similar figures among both Hindus and Muslims. But 24% of Indians do not take a clear position either way – they say diversity neither benefits nor harms the country, or they decline to answer the question. (See Chapter 2 for a discussion of attitudes toward diversity.)

India’s Muslim community, the second-largest religious group in the country, historically has had a complicated relationship with the Hindu majority. The two communities generally have lived peacefully side by side for centuries, but their shared history also is checkered by civil unrest and violence. Most recently, while the survey was being conducted, demonstrations broke out in parts of New Delhi and elsewhere over the government’s new citizenship law , which creates an expedited path to citizenship for immigrants from some neighboring countries – but not Muslims.

Today, India’s Muslims almost unanimously say they are very proud to be Indian (95%), and they express great enthusiasm for Indian culture: 85% agree with the statement that “Indian people are not perfect, but Indian culture is superior to others.”

Relatively few Muslims say their community faces “a lot” of discrimination in India (24%). In fact, the share of Muslims who see widespread discrimination against their community is similar to the share of Hindus who say Hindus face widespread religious discrimination in India (21%). (See Chapter 1 for a discussion of attitudes on religious discrimination.)

But personal experiences with discrimination among Muslims vary quite a bit regionally. Among Muslims in the North, 40% say they personally have faced religious discrimination in the last 12 months – much higher levels than reported in most other regions.

In addition, most Muslims across the country (65%), along with an identical share of Hindus (65%), see communal violence as a very big national problem. (See Chapter 1 for a discussion of Indians’ attitudes toward national problems.)

Like Hindus, Muslims prefer to live religiously segregated lives – not just when it comes to marriage and friendships, but also in some elements of public life. In particular, three-quarters of Muslims in India (74%) support having access to the existing system of Islamic courts, which handle family disputes (such as inheritance or divorce cases), in addition to the secular court system.

Muslims’ desire for religious segregation does not preclude tolerance of other groups – again similar to the pattern seen among Hindus. Indeed, a majority of Muslims who favor separate religious courts for their community say religious diversity benefits India (59%), compared with somewhat fewer of those who oppose religious courts for Muslims (50%).

Sidebar: Islamic courts in India

Since 1937, India’s Muslims have had the option of resolving family and inheritance-related cases in officially recognized Islamic courts, known as dar-ul-qaza. These courts are overseen by religious magistrates known as qazi and operate under Shariah principles . For example, while the rules of inheritance for most Indians are governed by the Indian Succession Act of 1925 and the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 (amended in 2005), Islamic inheritance practices differ in some ways, including who can be considered an heir and how much of the deceased person’s property they can inherit. India’s inheritance laws also take into account the differing traditions of other religious communities, such as Hindus and Christians, but their cases are handled in secular courts. Only the Muslim community has the option of having cases tried by a separate system of family courts. The decisions of the religious courts, however, are not legally binding , and the parties involved have the option of taking their case to secular courts if they are not satisfied with the decision of the religious court.

As of 2021, there are roughly 70 dar-ul-qaza in India. Most are in the states of Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh. Goa is the only state that does not recognize rulings by these courts, enforcing its own uniform civil code instead. Dar-ul-qaza are overseen by the All India Muslim Personal Law Board .

While these courts can grant divorces among Muslims, they are prohibited from approving divorces initiated through the practice known as triple talaq, in which a Muslim man instantly divorces his wife by saying the Arabic/Urdu word “talaq” (meaning “divorce”) three times. This practice was deemed unconstitutional by the Indian Supreme Court in 2017 and formally outlawed by the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India’s Parliament, in 2019. 1

Recent debates have emerged around Islamic courts. Some Indians have expressed concern that the rise of dar-ul-qaza could undermine the Indian judiciary, because a subset of the population is not bound to the same laws as everyone else. Others have argued that the rulings of Islamic courts are particularly unfair to women, although the prohibition of triple talaq may temper some of these criticisms. In its 2019 political manifesto , the BJP proclaimed a desire to create a national Uniform Civil Code, saying it would increase gender equality.

Some Indian commentators have voiced opposition to Islamic courts along with more broadly negative sentiments against Muslims, describing the rising numbers of dar-ul-qaza as the “Talibanization” of India , for example.

On the other hand, Muslim scholars have defended the dar-ul-qaza, saying they expedite justice because family disputes that would otherwise clog India’s courts can be handled separately, allowing the secular courts to focus their attention on other concerns.

Since 2018, the Hindu nationalist party Hindu Mahasabha (which does not hold any seats in Parliament) has tried to set up Hindu religious courts , known as Hindutva courts, aiming to play a role similar to dar-ul-qaza, only for the majority Hindu community. None of these courts have been recognized by the Indian government, and their rulings are not considered legally binding.

The seminal event in the modern history of Hindu-Muslim relations in the region was the partition of the subcontinent into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan at the end of the British colonial period in 1947. Partition remains one of the largest movements of people across borders in recorded history, and in both countries the carving of new borders was accompanied by violence, rioting and looting .

More than seven decades later, the predominant view among Indian Muslims is that the partition of the subcontinent was “a bad thing” for Hindu-Muslim relations. Nearly half of Muslims say Partition hurt communal relations with Hindus (48%), while fewer say it was a good thing for Hindu-Muslim relations (30%). Among Muslims who prefer more religious segregation – that is, who say they would not accept a person of a different faith as a neighbor – an even higher share (60%) say Partition was a bad thing for Hindu-Muslim relations.

Sikhs, whose homeland of Punjab was split by Partition, are even more likely than Muslims to say Partition was a bad thing for Hindu-Muslim relations: Two-thirds of Sikhs (66%) take this position. And Sikhs ages 60 and older, whose parents most likely lived through Partition, are more inclined than younger Sikhs to say the partition of the country was bad for communal relations (74% vs. 64%).

While Sikhs and Muslims are more likely to say Partition was a bad thing than a good thing, Hindus lean in the opposite direction: 43% of Hindus say Partition was beneficial for Hindu-Muslim relations, while 37% see it as a bad thing.

Context for the survey

Interviews were conducted after the conclusion of the 2019 national parliamentary elections and after the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status under the Indian Constitution. In December 2019, protests against the country’s new citizenship law broke out in several regions.

Fieldwork could not be conducted in the Kashmir Valley and a few districts elsewhere due to security concerns. These locations include some heavily Muslim areas, which is part of the reason why Muslims make up 11% of the survey’s total sample, while India’s adult population is roughly 13% Muslim, according to the most recent census data that is publicly available, from 2011. In addition, it is possible that in some other parts of the country, interreligious tensions over the new citizenship law may have slightly depressed participation in the survey by potential Muslim respondents.

Nevertheless, the survey’s estimates of religious beliefs, behaviors and attitudes can be reported with a high degree of confidence for India’s total population, because the number of people living in the excluded areas (Manipur, Sikkim, the Kashmir Valley and a few other districts) is not large enough to affect the overall results at the national level. About 98% of India’s total population had a chance of being selected for this survey.

Greater caution is warranted when looking at India’s Muslims separately, as a distinct population. The survey cannot speak to the experiences and views of Kashmiri Muslims. Still, the survey does represent the beliefs, behaviors and attitudes of around 95% of India’s overall Muslim population.

These are among the key findings of a Pew Research Center survey conducted face-to-face nationally among 29,999 Indian adults. Local interviewers administered the survey between Nov. 17, 2019, and March 23, 2020, in 17 languages. The survey covered all states and union territories of India, with the exceptions of Manipur and Sikkim, where the rapidly developing COVID-19 situation prevented fieldwork from starting in the spring of 2020, and the remote territories of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep; these areas are home to about a quarter of 1% of the Indian population. The union territory of Jammu and Kashmir was covered by the survey, though no fieldwork was conducted in the Kashmir region itself due to security concerns.

This study, funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts and the John Templeton Foundation, is part of a larger effort by Pew Research Center to understand religious change and its impact on societies around the world. The Center previously has conducted religion-focused surveys across sub-Saharan Africa ; the Middle East-North Africa region and many other countries with large Muslim populations ; Latin America ; Israel ; Central and Eastern Europe ; Western Europe ; and the United States .

The rest of this Overview covers attitudes on five broad topics: caste and discrimination; religious conversion; religious observances and beliefs; how people define their religious identity, including what kind of behavior is considered acceptable to be a Hindu or a Muslim; and the connection between economic development and religious observance.

Caste is another dividing line in Indian society, and not just among Hindus

Religion is not the only fault line in Indian society. In some regions of the country, significant shares of people perceive widespread, caste-based discrimination.

The caste system is an ancient social hierarchy based on occupation and economic status. People are born into a particular caste and tend to keep many aspects of their social life within its boundaries, including whom they marry. Even though the system’s origins are in historical Hindu writings , today Indians nearly universally identify with a caste, regardless of whether they are Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist or Jain.

Overall, the majority of Indian adults say they are a member of a Scheduled Caste (SC) – often referred to as Dalits (25%) – Scheduled Tribe (ST) (9%) or Other Backward Class (OBC) (35%). 2

Buddhists in India nearly universally identify themselves in these categories, including 89% who are Dalits (sometimes referred to by the pejorative term “untouchables”).

Members of SC/ST/OBC groups traditionally formed the lower social and economic rungs of Indian society, and historically they have faced discrimination and unequal economic opportunities . The practice of untouchability in India ostracizes members of many of these communities, especially Dalits, although the Indian Constitution prohibits caste-based discrimination, including untouchability, and in recent decades the government has enacted economic advancement policies like reserved seats in universities and government jobs for Dalits, Scheduled Tribes and OBC communities.

Roughly 30% of Indians do not belong to these protected groups and are classified as “General Category.” This includes higher castes such as Brahmins (4%), traditionally the priestly caste. Indeed, each broad category includes several sub-castes – sometimes hundreds – with their own social and economic hierarchies.

Three-quarters of Jains (76%) identify with General Category castes, as do 46% of both Muslims and Sikhs.

Caste-based discrimination, as well as the government’s efforts to compensate for past discrimination, are politically charged topics in India . But the survey finds that most Indians do not perceive widespread caste-based discrimination. Just one-in-five Indians say there is a lot of discrimination against members of SCs, while 19% say there is a lot of discrimination against STs and somewhat fewer (16%) see high levels of discrimination against OBCs. Members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are slightly more likely than others to perceive widespread discrimination against their two groups. Still, large majorities of people in these categories do not think they face a lot of discrimination.

These attitudes vary by region, however. Among Southern Indians, for example, 30% see widespread discrimination against Dalits, compared with 13% in the Central part of the country. And among the Dalit community in the South, even more (43%) say their community faces a lot of discrimination, compared with 27% among Southern Indians in the General Category who say the Dalit community faces widespread discrimination in India.

A higher share of Dalits in the South and Northeast than elsewhere in the country say they, personally, have faced discrimination in the last 12 months because of their caste: 30% of Dalits in the South say this, as do 38% in the Northeast.

Although caste discrimination may not be perceived as widespread nationally, caste remains a potent factor in Indian society. Most Indians from other castes say they would be willing to have someone belonging to a Scheduled Caste as a neighbor (72%). But a similarly large majority of Indians overall (70%) say that most or all of their close friends share their caste. And Indians tend to object to marriages across caste lines, much as they object to interreligious marriages. 3

Overall, 64% of Indians say it is very important to stop women in their community from marrying into other castes, and about the same share (62%) say it is very important to stop men in their community from marrying into other castes. These figures vary only modestly across members of different castes. For example, nearly identical shares of Dalits and members of General Category castes say stopping inter-caste marriages is very important.

Majorities of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Jains consider stopping inter-caste marriage of both men and women a high priority. By comparison, fewer Buddhists and Christians say it is very important to stop such marriages – although for majorities of both groups, stopping people from marrying outside their caste is at least “somewhat” important.

People surveyed in India’s South and Northeast see greater caste discrimination in their communities, and they also raise fewer objections to inter-caste marriages than do Indians overall. Meanwhile, college-educated Indians are less likely than those with less education to say stopping inter-caste marriages is a high priority. But, even within the most highly educated group, roughly half say preventing such marriages is very important. (See Chapter 4 for more analysis of Indians’ views on caste.)

In recent years, conversion of people belonging to lower castes (including Dalits) away from Hinduism – a traditionally non-proselytizing religion – to proselytizing religions, especially Christianity, has been a contentious political issue in India. As of early 2021, nine states have enacted laws against proselytism , and some previous surveys have shown that half of Indians support legal bans on religious conversions. 4

This survey, though, finds that religious switching, or conversion, has a minimal impact on the overall size of India’s religious groups. For example, according to the survey, 82% of Indians say they were raised Hindu, and a nearly identical share say they are currently Hindu, showing no net losses for the group through conversion to other religions. Other groups display similar levels of stability.

Changes in India’s religious landscape over time are largely a result of differences in fertility rates among religious groups, not conversion.

Respondents were asked two separate questions to measure religious switching: “What is your present religion, if any?” and, later in the survey, “In what religion were you raised, if any?” Overall, 98% of respondents give the same answer to both these questions.

An overall pattern of stability in the share of religious groups is accompanied by little net gain from movement into, or out of, most religious groups. Among Hindus, for instance, any conversion out of the group is matched by conversion into the group: 0.7% of respondents say they were raised Hindu but now identify as something else, and although Hindu texts and traditions do not agree on any formal process for conversion into the religion, roughly the same share (0.8%) say they were  not raised Hindu but now identify as Hindu. 5  Most of these new followers of Hinduism are married to Hindus.

Similarly, 0.3% of respondents have left Islam since childhood, matched by an identical share who say they were raised in other religions (or had no childhood religion) and have since become Muslim.

For Christians, however, there are some net gains from conversion: 0.4% of survey respondents are former Hindus who now identify as Christian, while 0.1% are former Christians.

Three-quarters of India’s Hindu converts to Christianity (74%) are concentrated in the Southern part of the country – the region with the largest Christian population. As a result, the Christian population of the South shows a slight increase within the lifetime of survey respondents: 6% of Southern Indians say they were raised Christian, while 7% say they are currently Christian.

Some Christian converts (16%) reside in the East as well (the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha and West Bengal); about two-thirds of all Christians in the East (64%) belong to Scheduled Tribes.

Nationally, the vast majority of former Hindus who are now Christian belong to Scheduled Castes (48%), Scheduled Tribes (14%) or Other Backward Classes (26%). And former Hindus are much more likely than the Indian population overall to say there is a lot of discrimination against lower castes in India. For example, nearly half of converts to Christianity (47%) say there is a lot of discrimination against Scheduled Castes in India, compared with 20% of the overall population who perceive this level of discrimination against Scheduled Castes. Still, relatively few converts say they, personally, have faced discrimination due to their caste in the last 12 months (12%).

Though their specific practices and beliefs may vary, all of India’s major religious communities are highly observant by standard measures. For instance, the vast majority of Indians, across all major faiths, say that religion is very important in their lives. And at least three-quarters of each major religion’s followers say they know a great deal about their own religion and its practices. For example, 81% of Indian Buddhists claim a great deal of knowledge about the Buddhist religion and its practices.

Indian Muslims are slightly more likely than Hindus to consider religion very important in their lives (91% vs. 84%). Muslims also are modestly more likely than Hindus to say they know a great deal about their own religion (84% vs. 75%).

Significant portions of each religious group also pray daily, with Christians among the most likely to do so (77%) – even though Christians are the least likely of the six groups to say religion is very important in their lives (76%). Most Hindus and Jains also pray daily (59% and 73%, respectively) and say they perform puja daily (57% and 81%), either at home or at a temple. 6

Generally, younger and older Indians, those with different educational backgrounds, and men and women are similar in their levels of religious observance. South Indians are the least likely to say religion is very important in their lives (69%), and the South is the only region where fewer than half of people report praying daily (37%). While Hindus, Muslims and Christians in the South are all less likely than their counterparts elsewhere in India to say religion is very important to them, the lower rate of prayer in the South is driven mainly by Hindus: Three-in-ten Southern Hindus report that they pray daily (30%), compared with roughly two-thirds (68%) of Hindus in the rest of the country (see “ People in the South differ from rest of the country in their views of religion, national identity ” below for further discussion of religious differences in Southern India).

The survey also asked about three rites of passage: religious ceremonies for birth (or infancy), marriage and death. Members of all of India’s major religious communities tend to see these rites as highly important. For example, the vast majority of Muslims (92%), Christians (86%) and Hindus (85%) say it is very important to have a religious burial or cremation for their loved ones.

The survey also asked about practices specific to particular religions, such as whether people have received purification by bathing in holy bodies of water, like the Ganges River, a rite closely associated with Hinduism. About two-thirds of Hindus have done this (65%). Most Hindus also have holy basil (the tulsi plant) in their homes, as do most Jains (72% and 62%, respectively). And about three-quarters of Sikhs follow the Sikh practice of keeping their hair long (76%).

For more on religious practices across India’s religious groups, see Chapter 7 .

Nearly all Indians say they believe in God (97%), and roughly 80% of people in most religious groups say they are absolutely certain that God exists. The main exception is Buddhists, one-third of whom say they do not believe in God. Still, among Buddhists who do think there is a God, most say they are absolutely certain in this belief.

While belief in God is close to universal in India, the survey finds a wide range of views about the type of deity or deities that Indians believe in. The prevailing view is that there is one God “with many manifestations” (54%). But about one-third of the public says simply: “There is only one God” (35%). Far fewer say there are many gods (6%).

Even though Hinduism is sometimes referred to as a polytheistic religion , very few Hindus (7%) take the position that there are multiple gods. Instead, the most common position among Hindus (as well as among Jains) is that there is “only one God with many manifestations” (61% among Hindus and 54% among Jains).

Among Hindus, those who say religion is very important in their lives are more likely than other Hindus to believe in one God with many manifestations (63% vs. 50%) and less likely to say there are many gods (6% vs. 12%).

By contrast, majorities of Muslims, Christians and Sikhs say there is only one God. And among Buddhists, the most common response is also a belief in one God. Among all these groups, however, about one-in-five or more say God has many manifestations, a position closer to their Hindu compatriots’ concept of God.

Most Hindus feel close to multiple gods, but Shiva, Hanuman and Ganesha are most popular

Traditionally, many Hindus have a “personal god,” or  ishta devata:  A particular god or goddess with whom they feel a personal connection. The survey asked all Indian Hindus who say they believe in God which god they feel closest to – showing them 15 images of gods on a card as possible options – and the vast majority of Hindus selected more than one god or indicated that they have many personal gods (84%). 7  This is true not only among Hindus who say they believe in many gods (90%) or in one God with many manifestations (87%), but also among those who say there is only one God (82%).

The god that Hindus most commonly feel close to is Shiva (44%). In addition, about one-third of Hindus feel close to Hanuman or Ganesha (35% and 32%, respectively).

There is great regional variation in how close India’s Hindus feel to some gods. For example, 46% of Hindus in India’s West feel close to Ganesha, but only 15% feel this way in the Northeast. And 46% of Hindus in the Northeast feel close to Krishna, while just 14% in the South say the same.

Feelings of closeness for Lord Ram are especially strong in the Central region (27%), which includes what Hindus claim is his ancient birthplace , Ayodhya. The location in Ayodhya where many Hindus believe Ram was born has been a source of controversy: Hindu mobs demolished a mosque on the site in 1992, claiming that a Hindu temple originally existed there. In 2019, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the demolished mosque had been built on top of a preexisting non-Islamic structure and that the land should be given to Hindus to build a temple, with another location in the area given to the Muslim community to build a new mosque. (For additional findings on belief in God, see Chapter 12 .)

Sidebar: Despite economic advancement, few signs that importance of religion is declining

A prominent theory in the social sciences hypothesizes that as countries advance economically, their populations tend to become less religious, often leading to wider social change. Known as “secularization theory,” it particularly reflects the experience of Western European countries from the end of World War II to the present.

Despite rapid economic growth, India’s population so far shows few, if any, signs of losing its religion. For instance, both the Indian census and the new survey find virtually no growth in the minuscule share of people who claim no religious identity. And religion is prominent in the lives of Indians regardless of their socioeconomic status. Generally, across the country, there is little difference in personal religious observance between urban and rural residents or between those who are college educated versus those who are not. Overwhelming shares among all these groups say that religion is very important in their lives, that they pray regularly and that they believe in God.

Nearly all religious groups show the same patterns. The biggest exception is Christians, among whom those with higher education and those who reside in urban areas show somewhat lower levels of observance. For example, among Christians who have a college degree, 59% say religion is very important in their life, compared with 78% among those who have less education.

The survey does show a slight decline in the perceived importance of religion during the lifetime of respondents, though the vast majority of Indians indicate that religion remains central to their lives, and this is true among both younger and older adults.

Nearly nine-in-ten Indian adults say religion was very important to their family when they were growing up (88%), while a slightly lower share say religion is very important to them now (84%). The pattern is identical when looking only at India’s majority Hindu population. Among Muslims in India, the same shares say religion was very important to their family growing up and is very important to them now (91% each).

The states of Southern India (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Puducherry, Tamil Nadu and Telangana) show the biggest downward trend in the perceived importance of religion over respondents’ lifetimes: 76% of Indians who live in the South say religion was very important to their family growing up, compared with 69% who say religion is personally very important to them now. Slight declines in the importance of religion, by this measure, also are seen in the Western part of the country (Goa, Gujarat and Maharashtra) and in the North, although large majorities in all regions of the country say religion is very important in their lives today.

Despite a strong desire for religious segregation, India’s religious groups share patriotic feelings, cultural values and some religious beliefs. For instance, overwhelming shares across India’s religious communities say they are very proud to be Indian, and most agree that Indian culture is superior to others.

Similarly, Indians of different religious backgrounds hold elders in high respect. For instance, nine-in-ten or more Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists and Jains say that respecting elders is very important to what being a member of their religious group means to them (e.g., for Hindus, it’s a very important part of their Hindu identity). Christians and Sikhs also overwhelmingly share this sentiment. And among all people surveyed in all six groups, three-quarters or more say that respecting elders is very important to being truly Indian.

Within all six religious groups, eight-in-ten or more also say that helping the poor and needy is a crucial part of their religious identity.

Beyond cultural parallels, many people mix traditions from multiple religions into their practices: As a result of living side by side for generations, India’s minority groups often engage in practices that are more closely associated with Hindu traditions than their own. For instance, many Muslim, Sikh and Christian women in India say they wear a bindi (a forehead marking, often worn by married women), even though putting on a bindi has Hindu origins.

Similarly, many people embrace beliefs not traditionally associated with their faith: Muslims in India are just as likely as Hindus to say they believe in karma (77% each), and 54% of Indian Christians share this view. 8  Nearly three-in-ten Muslims and Christians say they believe in reincarnation (27% and 29%, respectively). While these may seem like theological contradictions, for many Indians, calling oneself a Muslim or a Christian does not preclude believing in karma or reincarnation – beliefs that do not have a traditional, doctrinal basis in Islam or Christianity.

Most Muslims and Christians say they don’t participate in celebrations of Diwali, the Indian festival of lights that is traditionally celebrated by Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists. But substantial minorities of Christians (31%) and Muslims (20%) report that they do celebrate Diwali. Celebrating Diwali is especially common among Muslims in the West, where 39% say they participate in the festival, and in the South (33%).

Not only do some followers of all these religions participate in a celebration (Diwali) that consumes most of the country once a year, but some members of the majority Hindu community celebrate Muslim and Christian festivals, too: 7% of Indian Hindus say they celebrate the Muslim festival of Eid, and 17% celebrate Christmas.

While there is some mixing of religious celebrations and traditions within India’s diverse population, many Hindus do not approve of this. In fact, while 17% of the nation’s Hindus say they participate in Christmas celebrations, about half of Hindus (52%) say that doing so disqualifies a person from being Hindu (compared with 35% who say a person can be Hindu if they celebrate Christmas). An even greater share of Hindus (63%) say a person cannot be Hindu if they celebrate the Islamic festival of Eid – a view that is more widely held in Northern, Central, Eastern and Northeastern India than the South or West.

Hindus are divided on whether beliefs and practices such as believing in God, praying and going to the temple are necessary to be a Hindu. But one behavior that a clear majority of Indian Hindus feel is incompatible with Hinduism is eating beef: 72% of Hindus in India say a person who eats beef cannot be a Hindu. That is even higher than the percentages of Hindus who say a person cannot be Hindu if they reject belief in God (49%), never go to a temple (48%) or never perform prayers (48%).

Attitudes toward beef appear to be part of a regional and cultural divide among Hindus: Southern Indian Hindus are considerably less likely than others to disqualify beef eaters from being Hindu (50% vs. 83% in the Northern and Central parts of the country). And, at least in part, Hindus’ views on beef and Hindu identity are linked with a preference for religious segregation and elements of Hindu nationalism. For example, Hindus who take a strong position against eating beef are more likely than others to say they would not accept followers of other religions as their neighbors (49% vs. 30%) and to say it is very important to be Hindu to be truly Indian (68% vs. 51%).

Relatedly, 44% of Hindus say they are vegetarians, and an additional 33% say they abstain from eating certain meats. Hindus traditionally view cows as sacred, and laws pertaining to cow slaughter have been a recent flashpoint in India . At the same time, Hindus are not alone in linking beef consumption with religious identity: 82% of Sikhs and 85% of Jains surveyed say that a person who eats beef cannot be a member of their religious groups, either. A majority of Sikhs (59%) and fully 92% of Jains say they are vegetarians, including 67% of Jains who do not eat root vegetables . 9  (For more data on religion and dietary habits, see Chapter 10 .)

Sidebar: People in the South differ from rest of the country in their views of religion, national identity

The survey consistently finds that people in the South (the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Telangana, and the union territory of Puducherry) differ from Indians elsewhere in the country in their views on religion, politics and identity.

For example, by a variety of measures, people in the South are somewhat less religious than those in other regions – 69% say religion is very important in their lives, versus 92% in the Central part of the country. And 37% say they pray every day, compared with more than half of Indians in other regions. People in the South also are less segregated by religion or caste – whether that involves their friendship circles, the kind of neighbors they prefer or how they feel about intermarriage. (See Chapter 3 .)

Hindu nationalist sentiments also appear to have less of a foothold in the South. Among Hindus, those in the South (42%) are far less likely than those in Central states (83%) or the North (69%) to say being Hindu is very important to be truly Indian. And in the 2019 parliamentary elections, the BJP’s lowest vote share came in the South. In the survey, just 19% of Hindus in the region say they voted for the BJP, compared with roughly two-thirds in the Northern (68%) and Central (65%) parts of the country who say they voted for the ruling party.

Culturally and politically, people in the South have pushed back against the BJP’s restrictions on cow slaughter and efforts to nationalize the Hindi language . These factors may contribute to the BJP’s lower popularity in the South, where more people prefer regional parties or the Indian National Congress party.

These differences in attitudes and practices exist in a wider context of economic disparities between the South and other regions of the country. Over time, Southern states have seen stronger economic growth than the Northern and Central parts of the country. And women and people belonging to lower castes in the South have fared better economically than their counterparts elsewhere in the country. Even though three-in-ten people in the South say there is widespread caste discrimination in India, the region also has a history of anti-caste movements . Indeed, one author has attributed the economic growth of the South largely to the flattening of caste hierarchies.

Muslim identity in India

Most Muslims in India say a person cannot be Muslim if they never pray or attend a mosque. Similarly, about six-in-ten say that celebrating Diwali or Christmas is incompatible with being a member of the Muslim community. At the same time, a substantial minority express a degree of open-mindedness on who can be a Muslim, with fully one-third (34%) saying a person can be Muslim even if they don’t believe in God. (The survey finds that 6% of self-described Muslims in India say they do not believe in God; see “ Near-universal belief in God, but wide variation in how God is perceived ” above.)

Like Hindus, Muslims have dietary restrictions that resonate as powerful markers of identity. Three-quarters of Indian Muslims (77%) say that a person cannot be Muslim if they eat pork, which is even higher than the share who say a person cannot be Muslim if they do not believe in God (60%) or never attend mosque (61%).

Indian Muslims also report high levels of religious commitment by a host of conventional measures: 91% say religion is very important in their lives, two-thirds (66%) say they pray at least once a day, and seven-in-ten say they attend mosque at least once a week – with even higher attendance among Muslim men (93%).

By all these measures, Indian Muslims are broadly comparable to Muslims in the neighboring Muslim-majority countries of Pakistan and Bangladesh, according to a Pew Research Center survey conducted in those countries in late 2011 and early 2012. In Pakistan, for example, 94% of Muslims said religion is very important in their lives , while 81% of Bangladeshi Muslims said the same. Muslims in India are somewhat more likely than those elsewhere in South Asia to say they regularly worship at a mosque (70% in India vs. 59% in Pakistan and 53% in Bangladesh), with the difference mainly driven by the share of women who attend.

At the same time, Muslims in India are slightly less likely to say there is “only one true” interpretation of Islam (72% in Pakistan, 69% in Bangladesh, 63% in India), as opposed to multiple interpretations.

When it comes to their religious beliefs, Indian Muslims in some ways resemble Indian Hindus more than they resemble Muslims in neighboring countries. For example, Muslims in Pakistan and Bangladesh almost universally say they believe in heaven and angels, but Indian Muslims seem more skeptical: 58% say they believe in heaven and 53% express belief in angels. Among Indian Hindus, similarly, 56% believe in heaven and 49% believe in angels.

Majority of Muslim women in India oppose ‘triple talaq’ (Islamic divorce)

Many Indian Muslims historically have followed the Hanafi school of thought, which for centuries allowed men to divorce their wives by saying “talaq” (which translates as “divorce” in Arabic and Urdu) three times. Traditionally, there was supposed to be a waiting period and attempts at reconciliation in between each use of the word, and it was deeply frowned upon (though technically permissible) for a man to pronounce “talaq” three times quickly in a row. India’s Supreme Court ruled triple talaq unconstitutional in 2017, and it was banned by legislation in 2019 .

Most Indian Muslims (56%) say Muslim men should not be allowed to divorce this way. Still, 37% of Indian Muslims say they support triple talaq, with Muslim men (42%) more likely than Muslim women (32%) to take this position. A majority of Muslim women (61%) oppose triple talaq.

Highly religious Muslims – i.e., those who say religion is very important in their lives – also are more likely than other Muslims to say Muslim men should be able to divorce their wives simply by saying “talaq” three times (39% vs. 26%).

Triple talaq seems to have the most support among Muslims in the Southern and Northeastern regions of India, where half or more of Muslims say it should be legal (58% and 50%, respectively), although 12% of Muslims in the South and 16% in the Northeast do not take a position on the issue either way.

Sikhism is one of four major religions – along with Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism – that originated on the Indian subcontinent. The Sikh religion emerged in Punjab in the 15th century, when Guru Nanak, who is revered as the founder of Sikhism, became the first in a succession of 10 gurus (teachers) in the religion.

Today, India’s Sikhs remain concentrated in the state of Punjab. One feature of the Sikh religion is a distinctive sense of community, also known as “Khalsa” (which translates as “ones who are pure”). Observant Sikhs differentiate themselves from others in several ways, including keeping their hair uncut. Today, about three-quarters of Sikh men and women in India say they keep their hair long (76%), and two-thirds say it is very important to them that children in their families also keep their hair long (67%). (For more analysis of Sikhs’ views on passing religious traditions on to their children, see Chapter 8 .)

Sikhs are more likely than Indian adults overall to say they attend religious services every day – 40% of Sikhs say they go to the gurdwara (Sikh house of worship) daily. By comparison, 14% of Hindus say they go to a Hindu temple every day. Moreover, the vast majority of Sikhs (94%) regard their holy book, the Guru Granth Sahib, as the word of God, and many (37%) say they read it, or listen to recitations of it, every day.

Sikhs in India also incorporate other religious traditions into their practice. Some Sikhs (9%) say they follow Sufi orders, which are linked with Islam, and about half (52%) say they have a lot in common with Hindus. Roughly one-in-five Indian Sikhs say they have prayed, meditated or performed a ritual at a Hindu temple.

Sikh-Hindu relations were marked by violence in the 1970s and 1980s, when demands for a separate Sikh state covering the Punjab regions in both India and Pakistan (also known as the Khalistan movement) reached their apex. In 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards as revenge for Indian paramilitary forces storming the Sikh Golden Temple in pursuit of Sikh militants. Anti-Sikh riots ensued in Northern India, especially in the state of Punjab.

According to the Indian census, the vast majority of Sikhs in India (77%) still live in Punjab, where Sikhs make up 58% of the adult population. And 93% of Punjabi Sikhs say they are very proud to live in the state.

Sikhs also are overwhelmingly proud of their Indian identity. A near-universal share of Sikhs say they are very proud to be Indian (95%), and the vast majority (70%) say a person who disrespects India cannot be a Sikh. And like India’s other religious groups, most Sikhs do not see evidence of widespread discrimination against their community – just 14% say Sikhs face a lot of discrimination in India, and 18% say they personally have faced religious discrimination in the last year.

At the same time, Sikhs are more likely than other religious communities to see communal violence as a very big problem in the country. Nearly eight-in-ten Sikhs (78%) rate communal violence as a major issue, compared with 65% of Hindus and Muslims.

The BJP has attempted to financially compensate Sikhs for some of the violence that occurred in 1984 after Indira Gandhi’s assassination, but relatively few Sikh voters (19%) report having voted for the BJP in the 2019 parliamentary elections. The survey finds that 33% of Sikhs preferred the Indian National Congress Party – Gandhi’s party.

• Ahmed, Hilal. 2019. “ Siyasi Muslims: A story of political Islams in India .” ↩
• All survey respondents, regardless of religion, were asked, “Are you from a General Category, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or Other Backward Class?” By contrast, in the 2011 census of India, only Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists could be enumerated as members of Scheduled Castes, while Scheduled Tribes could include followers of all religions. General Category and Other Backward Classes were not measured in the census. A detailed analysis of differences between 2011 census data on caste and survey data can be found here . ↩
• According to the 2004 and 2009 National Election Studies by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), roughly half of Indians or more said that marriages of boys and girls from different castes should be  banned . In 2004, a majority also said this about people from different religions. ↩
• In both the 2004 and 2009 National Election Studies (organized by CSDS), roughly half of Indians said that “There should be a legal ban on religious conversions.” ↩
• This includes 0.2% of all Indian adults who now identify as Hindu but give an ambiguous response on how they were raised – either saying “some other religion” or saying they don’t know their childhood religion. ↩
• Puja is a specific worship ritual that involves prayer along with rites like offering flowers and food, using vermillion, singing and chanting. ↩
• Fifteen named deities were available for selection, though no answer options were read aloud. Respondents could select up to three of those 15 deities by naming them or selecting the corresponding image shown on a card. The answer option “another god” was available on the card or if any other deity name was volunteered by the respondent. Other possible answer options included “I do not have a god I feel closest to” and “I have many personal gods,” though neither was on the card. See the questionnaire or topline for the full list of gods offered. ↩
• The religious origins of karma are debated by scholars, but the concept has deep roots in Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism and Jainism. ↩
• For an analysis of Jain theology on the concept of  jiva  (soul) see Chapple, Christopher K. 2014. “Life All Around: Soul in Jainism.” In Biernacki, Loriliai and Philip Clayton, eds. “ Panentheism Across the World’s Traditions .” ↩

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Diversity and Change in Modern India: Economic, Social and Political Approaches

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India's society, economy, and polity have been transformed at a gathering pace since the early 1990s, and India's growing role on the world stage makes it imperative to understand the roots and consequences of these changes. The eleven chapters in this interdisciplinary volume review the growing body of data that help to make sense of these changes and to understand their likely significance. The volume provides systematic, macro-level studies of economic, demographic, social, and political change in India but also micro-level analyses of the detailed mechanisms ‘on the ground’ of how Indian society is being re-shaped. This combination of micro- and macro-level analyses thus gives a picture not only of national trends but also of the underlying processes of change. Each of the chapters showcases the fruits of previously unpublished scholarship across the social sciences.

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Inspiring Indians Using Social Media to Drive Positive Change.

Technology in general, and social media in particular, have recently received a lot of flack. Many complain, even in a digital India, that they are a waste of time, paint unrealistic expectations of travel (and life) and make us anti-social.

In the past year though, I’ve discovered some surprising ways in which the internet is being used to drive positive change. During my year-long collaboration with Airtel , documenting stories of digital empowerment in India , I’ve come across inspiring individuals and organisations leveraging technology to fight gender stereotypes among tribal women in Madhya Pradesh, help farmers in Haryana make climate resilient agricultural decisions, document traditional medicine in a remote mountain desert, and rescue bruised and battered horses in Karnataka.

Behold, a small selection of inspiring stories from across the country, that prove that there are two sides to every coin, including social media:

Digital India: An app that enables teachers to teach kids about sustainability

When my friend Helene, who runs the beautiful Secret Garden in Goa , introduced me to Simran Mulchandani, I had no idea how a single mobile app could have the potential to revolutionise formal schooling. As you might be aware, schools in South Asia are very different from our western counterparts. The emphasis on academic grades trumps personal growth and out-of-the-box thinking. That’s exactly what Simran’s (and his colleagues Priyanka Seth Pandit and Karishma Menon) brainchild “ Project Rangeet ” aims to address – and after rolling out across 3,000 schools in Bangladesh, they are dreaming of a digital India and setting up pilots across Delhi, Andhra Pradesh and Pune.

Project Rangeet’s app is designed to empower teachers to deliver lessons on sustainability and other important issues like gender inequality – through music, art and storytelling. The app can track the quality of lessons on a micro level, and incentives are designed to reward hard-working teachers. While beta testing the Indian version of the app, I wistfully wished it had rolled out when I was in school!

If you have access to an educational institution and care about sustainability reaching Indian classrooms, reach out to Project Rangeet to explore a collaboration.

Also read: 15 Sustainable Travel Tips for Authentic, Meaningful Experiences on the Road

Digital India: A sanctuary that relies on Instagram to rescue and rehabilitate horses and donkeys

View this post on Instagram A post shared by The Backwater Sanctuary (@thebackwatersanctuary) on Jun 14, 2019 at 8:50pm PDT

On the idyllic Karnataka countryside, Zoha Jung, the founder of The Backwater Sanctuary , has dedicated her life to rescuing and rehabilitating horses, ponies, donkeys and mules who have suffered immensely at the hands of humans. These animals often have broken spirits and limbs after being worked to the ground for riding, pulling carts and carrying loads.

What does digital India have to do with this? Much to my surprise, Zoha told me that she can’t imagine her sanctuary functioning like it does without Instagram! She painstakingly documents the often disturbing rescues and their inspiring recoveries on her Instagram posts and stories. And her niche community responds by helping identify and plan new rescues, as well as sponsoring the existing ones.

We can support The Backwater Sanctuary’s incredible work by sponsoring one of their rescues or donating whatever possible; DM them on Instagram if you’d like to contribute. Also, please say a firm no to riding these animals, using them in weddings or making them carry loads on a trek.

Also read: How to Travel as a Vegan and Find Delicious Food Anywhere in the World

Digital India: Using technology to connect tribal women with urban female mentors

It’s a shame that even in 2020, many women in rural (and urban) India are only expected to fulfill the duties of a wife, mother, cook and cleaner. Project GOAL by the Digital Empowerment Foundation (DEF) strives to challenge such conventions. In their pilot project, DEF selected a handful of women from a tribal village in Madhya Pradesh, introduced them to the internet and social media, and connected each with an urban female entrepreneur.

The weekly mentorship calls aimed to help build connections that broadened the perspectives of both rural and urban women, by learning about the challenges and aspirations of their counterparts. This year, Facebook has partnered with DEF to roll out this unique mentorship project on a larger scale – and I hope to join it as a mentor someday!

Connect with DEF to follow their unique and inspiring work in digital India .

Also read: How Responsible Tourism Can Challenge Patriarchy in India

India’s first Instagram channel run entirely by rural Himalayan storytellers!

View this post on Instagram A post shared by The People of Munsiari (@voicesofmunsiari) on Nov 2, 2019 at 7:48am PDT

Back in 2017, in the remote reaches of Uttarakhand’s Munsiyari district, began India’s first (and only) Instagram channel to be run entirely by a rural village community . We began with just a few smartphones, a handful of young adults and a basic Instagram tutorial. In 2018, we crowdsourced 10 smartphones (big thank you again to those of you who contributed), held a photography and Instagram workshop in the village (supported by professional photographer Jayashree) and garnered interest from many women in the village to join the community-run channel.

In 2019, Alka Rautela, a university student and one of the youngest storytellers on the channel, saved up her money to buy a DSLR camera and further her interest in photography (follow her dreamy work on Instagram @alka_rautela ). Soon, her sister Pallawi, even younger than Alka, took on the role of the official photographer for the annual village mela and produced some amazing work (follow her on Instagram @pallawi_rautela ).

Follow @voicesofmunsiari on Instagram, or better still, stay in Sarmoli’s community-run homestays to learn about their mountain world and their connection with digital India.

Also read: Awe-Inspiring Homestays in the Uttarakhand Himalayas to Tune Out of Life and Tune into the Mountains

How has technology or social media changed your world in a positive way?

Cover photo: Darshan Gajara  on  Unsplash

Join my adventures around the world on  Instagram ,  Facebook  and  Twitter .

Order a copy of my bestselling book,  The Shooting Star .

Welcome to my blog, The Shooting Star. I’ve been called a storyteller, writer, photographer, digital nomad, “sustainability influencer,” social entrepreneur, solo traveller, vegan, sustainable tourism consultant and environmentalist. But in my heart, I’m just a girl who believes that travel – if done right – has the power to change us and the world we live in.

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19 comments.

Shivya – Thank you for this post. You are right that we can complain tons but only when we do something positive is when we can make a difference. I have shared my details at GOAL and though I filled it quickly, I hope to get a call back. 🙂 BIG THANK YOU!

I hope you do Parul! And yes, I guess this post is a reminder for me too that every once in a while, we need to take a step back and see how we’re using (or not using) social media. It’s only a tool, we need to set the intention.

Shivya, you are just amazing, what you discover, share and take actions on. It is such a blessing to follow your work and to be part of your amazing growth. Have a productive week. As always “Minds together” from Cornelia

So grateful for all the opportunities that come my way, Cornelia!

Wonderful, Shivya.

Social media is definitely driving changes, however, time will tell whether these changes are positives or negative.

True, again it depends on how we use it. It’s just a tool at the end of the day!

Absolutely amazing post. Thanks for bringing attention to and elevating these awesome causes.

Thanks for reading Chloe; a reminder of how social media can be a powerful tool for positive change!

Social media is not bad afterall, if you know how to use it right instead of using to pull others down and draw some inspiration. Thanks for sharing this post.

Totally agree Bhavya. If nothing else, it’s a great way to raise awareness and change perceptions.

It depends on us that how we use social media.

I think social media is not a bad thing. It helps in our daily life to do work or to get useful information and to connect with family and friends. It depends upon the people that how they use social media.

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This is such an inspiring post. Could you share the names of some more people who are using technology to drive change?

We all love traveling and gathering experiences but honestly most of the times the purpose of doing it is totally selfish and personal. But the way you travel, responsibly and being a vegan is totally commendable and adorable. I really appreciate your thought process and mindset. Keep the good work 🙂

This is such an amazing post!

As a parent I’m always conflicted between reducing screen time vs the benefits of it. There’s so much to see and learn if used properly

Essay on The Past, Present, and Future of India

Students are often asked to write an essay on The Past, Present, and Future of India in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on The Past, Present, and Future of India

The past of india.

India, known as Bharat in the past, has a rich history. It was home to the Indus Valley Civilization, one of the world’s oldest. Over centuries, it saw the rise and fall of many empires like Maurya, Gupta, and Mughal.

The Present of India

Today, India is the world’s largest democracy. It’s known for its cultural diversity, technological advancements, and economic growth. However, it also faces challenges like poverty, corruption, and pollution.

The Future of India

The future of India looks promising. With a growing economy and advancements in technology, it aims to become a global leader. However, to achieve this, it needs to overcome its challenges.

250 Words Essay on The Past, Present, and Future of India

India’s past is a tapestry of rich cultural heritage and complex historical events. Home to one of the world’s oldest civilizations, the Indus Valley, India has been the cradle of significant philosophical, scientific, and artistic contributions. Its history is marked by the rise and fall of empires, from the Maurya and Gupta dynasties to the Mughal Empire and British Raj, each leaving indelible imprints on the country’s socio-cultural fabric.

Looking ahead, India’s future appears promising yet fraught with challenges. The country is poised to become a global economic powerhouse, driven by its youthful population and digital revolution. However, it must address pressing issues such as climate change, population explosion, and gender inequality. The future of India hinges on its ability to leverage its strengths, such as its human capital and cultural diversity, while effectively addressing its weaknesses. In essence, India’s journey from the past, through the present, and into the future, is a fascinating study of resilience, transformation, and potential.

500 Words Essay on The Past, Present, and Future of India

India, a land of diverse cultures and rich heritage, has a history that spans thousands of years. The Indus Valley Civilization, one of the world’s oldest, laid the foundation for the region’s socio-economic and political structure. The subsequent rule of the Maurya and Gupta Empires saw the development of advanced political systems, arts, sciences, and literature.

The medieval era was marked by the establishment of Sultanates and the Mughal Empire, which contributed significantly to India’s architectural and cultural wealth. The British colonial period, however, was a time of significant upheaval. It brought about far-reaching changes in India’s social, political, and economic structures, with the introduction of modern education, railways, and the press, but also led to economic exploitation and socio-cultural disruptions.

Post-independence, India has made significant strides in various fields. It has established itself as a democratic republic, with a constitution that guarantees fundamental rights to all its citizens. Despite the challenges of diversity, India has managed to maintain unity and democratic values.

Economically, India has become one of the fastest-growing major economies in the world. India’s IT and software services sector has gained global recognition, contributing significantly to its economic growth. However, the country still grapples with issues like poverty, corruption, and inadequate public healthcare.

Looking ahead, India faces both challenges and opportunities. The country’s burgeoning youth population can be a demographic dividend if harnessed properly. However, it can also pose a challenge if not provided with adequate education and employment opportunities.

In terms of technology, India has the potential to be a global leader. The success of the Mars Orbiter Mission and the growth of tech startups indicate a promising future. However, the digital divide and issues of data privacy and cybersecurity need to be addressed.

In the socio-political realm, India needs to work on issues like gender inequality, caste discrimination, and religious intolerance. Strengthening democratic institutions and ensuring social justice will be key to India’s progress.

In conclusion, the past, present, and future of India present a fascinating journey of a civilization that has withstood the test of time and continues to evolve. The challenges are many, but the potential for growth and progress is immense. The future of India depends on how effectively it can address its challenges and leverage its opportunities.

Apart from these, you can look at all the essays by clicking here .

Happy studying!

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What are the positive and negative impacts of rapid development in India?

Positive impacts of rapid development in India

Social 

• More people have access to clean water and medical care.
• In some areas, TNCs provide support to local communities by encouraging entrepreneurial opportunities providing goods for people to sell.

Economic 

• More money is available to improve people’s quality of life through greater tax income from the growth in economic activities.
• Wages have increased.
• Some TNCs employ tens of thousands of people.

Environmental 

• Income from increased economic activity is now spent on protecting the environment. For example, India’s forest cover has increased since 1990. India recorded a one per cent jump (8,021 square km) in overall forest and tree cover between 2015 and 2017 despite population and livestock pressures.

Negative impacts of rapid development in India

• India’s growing demand for housing and infrastructure cannot be met. Almost a quarter of people in urban areas live in slums.
• Claims of exploitation have been made against some TNCs.
• Poor working conditions can reduce a worker’s quality of life.
• As educated people move from rural to urban areas there is a brain drain.
• Profits from some TNCs leave the country.
• Some TNCs chase financial incentives to move to different areas. Some companies have relocated when tax breaks have ended.
• There has been a significant increase in demand for energy in India. Air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions have increased as industry and transport have developed. Ten of the most polluted cities in the world are located in India.
• Land and water pollution has increased as a result of rapid urban growth. Around 70% of India’s raw sewage flows untreated into rivers and streams.
• Some TNCs have caused considerable environmental damage.

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More From Forbes

10 ways india has changed over the last decade.

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The Presidential Palace buildings are illuminated in Delhi. (MONEY SHARMA/AFP/Getty Images)

By James Owen

What a difference a decade makes in India.

When Control Risks set up its office in Delhi 10 years ago, India was a different country. It had just started to shake off the inertia of slow growth that had hobbled it for decades. In 2007 it was the 12th largest economy in the world in nominal terms. Today it’s the seventh largest; third, if you count by purchasing power parity. In 2013 India joined a handful of nations that have mounted successful missions to Mars. By one count, the number of multinational companies in India quadrupled in just over a decade to 2012.

The changes of the decade are not only reflected in numbers. There have been profound shifts in politics and policy, in diplomacy and digitization, in arts and sports. Well, perhaps not so much in sports – except that India won two more cricket world cups in this time.

What is certain is that India has changed remarkably in a number of ways in these 10 years. Some of these changes affect not just the country’s 1.3 billion people – but the rest of the world too. On the occasion of 10 years of Control Risks in India, we have selected what we consider to be the 10 most significant changes of the decade.

1) Emerging as one of the largest economies

India’s recent economic expansion has brought a record number of people out of poverty. A growing middle class has fueled impressive consumer growth. It is today the world’s third largest market for smart phones and the sixth largest for cars. India’s software industry employs more than 4 million people directly and more than 10 million indirectly. The breadth and depth of this growth is reflected in the extraordinary range of projects Control Risks has engaged in during this period.

But India is not just one of the world’s largest economies; it is one of the youngest too. Almost half of India’s population today is under the age of 26. While this unique demographic holds the promise of making India a thrumming engine of the world economy, it also poses the staggering challenge of finding jobs for the million-odd Indians who enter the employment market every month , not to mention providing for the health and education of such a large nation.

2) Gaining diplomatic clout

Economic heft has brought with it a greater strategic sway. Gone are the Nehruvian years of the Cold War era, when India led the global Non-Aligned Movement. In 2008, the then government staked its parliamentary majority to ratify the US-India Civil Nuclear Treaty. It heralded India into the global nuclear elite. For the last three years, India has given more aid than it has received, with neighbors Bhutan, Afghanistan and Nepal topping the list of recipients. All of this has added up to give India much more power in diplomatic negotiations. Ministers from the largest economies can be routinely seen making a beeline for Raisina Hill, the seat of power in the nation’s capital – including those from the UK keen on agreeing a post-Brexit trade deal.

India has reached out, too. This Indian government is the first one to consistently conduct diplomacy in the language of international business. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has undertaken more than 70 foreign trips since taking office in May 2014. He has been as at home on the campuses of Facebook and Google as at packed diaspora events at Madison Square Garden in New York and Wembley Stadium in London. Given his focus on trade and investment, Modi is widely promoting the fact that India jumped 30 places on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business list for 2018 to the 100th place.

3) Evolving federalism

Ten years ago many of our multinational clients viewed India as a single, homogenous market, not the agglomeration of 29 states that it really is. Over this past decade, the federal structure has come into a sharper focus, with more policy-making powers and funds devolving to the states and village panchayats (local governments). The mantra of cooperative federalism has morphed into a competitive federalism in which states – many with the populations of large countries – vie with each other for investment. Our clients now need to assess the political and regulatory scenarios at both the federal and state levels and pay attention to the state-wise ease of doing business rankings that are published every year.

In the middle of 2017, India implemented perhaps the boldest tax reform in history. It replaced dozens of state and federal taxes with a national one, called the Goods and Services Tax or GST. The idea is to create a more unified national market and, despite its early teething troubles, we expect the new tax to lead to greater efficiencies and a more attractive business environment.

4) Fighting corruption and black money

Another unprecedented policy move was announced on 8 November 2016. As the world woke up to hear the news of Donald Trump’s election victory, Prime Minister Modi announced the immediate withdrawal of two high-value currency notes. In one stunning move, 86% of the currency was sucked out of circulation, to be gradually replaced by new bills. The declared aim of the move was to fight black money and counterfeiting. While its success is still being debated, it made one thing clear: this government – elected on an anti-corruption manifesto – was willing to rip up the rulebook in order to drive home its agenda.

That resolve has been shown in other ways too. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, which was implemented in 2005, has been given more teeth in recent years with an expanded Enforcement Directorate, the federal agency tasked with fighting money laundering. Between April and August of 2017, the Enforcement Directorate and the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the stock market regulator, acted against at least 331 shell companies and 100 brokerages charged with facilitating money laundering. This government has implemented Aadhaar, the world’s largest biometric identification system, which was initiated by the previous government to root out duplication of identities and safeguard welfare schemes from corruption-related leakages.

5) Forging a stricter compliance regime

Control Risks has always worked with foreign and domestic Indian companies concerned about their exposure to extra-territorial anti-corruption legislation such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the UK Bribery Act. However, today we are also seeing nervousness around the application of a more rigorous domestic compliance regime. The Companies Act of 2013 has brought clearer accountability to corporate anti-corruption and anti-fraud measures. The Reserve Bank of India, the country’s central bank, has been given more power in 2017 to act against loan defaulters. Our clients today do not just want to fix a problem; they are seeking to instill a preventive compliance culture right across their businesses.

The challenge here is to be able to disrupt previously entrenched relationships – such as those along the supply chain or with public officials – which might require companies to trade a short-term financial hit for long-term resilience. The good news is that this kind of approach, while always hard, is being increasingly adopted by Indian and multinational companies.

6) Emergence of the modern Indian multinational

Those Indian groups that have extended their international footprint during the decade have changed in more significant ways. In January 2007, the salt-to-software conglomerate Tata Group bought Britain’s Corus Steel for $13 billion. The next month, Hindalco, the aluminium company of the Aditya Birla Group, announced the acquisition of Canada’s Novelis for $6 billion. The next year Tata Motors bought the Jaguar Land Rover car businesses from Ford Motor for $2.3 billion. Some of the global growth has been organic too: Tata Consultancy Services, a $17 billion software company that employs more than 370,000 people, operates in 46 countries now.

These acquisitions have helped change the culture of corporate India, embedding international best practices in some of India’s top companies. During the same period, Indians have been appointed to the top jobs in some of the world’s leading companies, particularly in Silicon Valley. However, family-run conglomerates still represent the largest part of the business environment in the country and acrimonious disputes that pit promoters against professional management still dominate the headlines – a trend that is likely to continue for some time.

7) Tilting to the political right

Another dark shadow lengthened on India this September. Gauri Lankesh, an award-winning journalist whose work was critical of the ruling right-wing BJP, was shot and killed at point blank range in front of her Bengaluru home. It was a horrific reflection of a murder that in 2006 had rocked Russia, where I had worked for six years before coming to India. Like Gauri, Anna Politkovskaya, an award-winning journalist who often criticised the ruling regime, was shot and killed at point blank in her block of flats in Moscow. It’s an extreme example of the shift to the hard right and the intolerance that is becoming more visible in India.

Business leaders are certainly not immune from this growing right-wing nationalism. A few months ago, I had the opportunity to discuss the changing business climate with the heads of some of the largest multinational companies in India. If there was something in common that the leaders of these various industries faced, it was a sense of nationalism coming in the way of business decisions and policies. As the most populous democracy in the world heads towards another national election in the first half of 2019, this position is unlikely to soften anytime soon.

8) Growing wealth of "godmen"

In an atmosphere filled with right-wing rhetoric, religion mixes better than ever with politics and business. And this can bestow superhuman powers to godmen of all hues.

Consider this: the fastest growing FMCG company in the country today is Patanjali, which was founded just a decade ago by Baba Ramdev, a yoga evangelist whose religious sermons on his own television channel are watched by tens of millions every day. His diet-biscuit-to-dish-washer company is now a $1.6 billion behemoth whose success has forced several multinational giants to rethink their market strategies.

In August 2017, the police arrested a guitar-wielding ‘rockstar’ godman, Gurmeet Ram Rahim, in his sprawling compound 260 km outside Delhi. While the police scrambled to contain the tens of thousands of his followers running amuck after his arrest, our clients in the area found it impossible to ship their products, an operational challenge that befuddled and frustrated them in equal measure. 

9) Changing security challenges

Operational challenges have evolved over the decade. In November 2008, ten members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, an Islamic terrorist organisation based in Pakistan, launched coordinated attacks at various locations across India’s financial capital, Mumbai. The event, which lasted four days and cost 164 human lives, changed India’s approach to terrorism, instilling a resolve to fight terrorism in a more coordinated way. The other internal security threat at the time – extreme leftist Maoist insurgents – has subsided over the years, though bandhs (or shutdown strikes) do still occur frequently.

Clients today are looking at a broader range of security risks, such as those related to labor activism, restructuring and cyber extortion. Putting in place mitigation steps tailored to these scenarios is essential, not to mention the business continuity measures to navigate natural disasters such as the Chennai floods of 2015 or communal protests, such as when the ethnic Jat community paralyzed the state of Haryana for more than a week in 2016 and cut off the main water supply to Delhi for days.

The terrible state of Delhi’s air is an existential challenge that – in contrast to other polluted cities like Beijing – has elicited little meaningful government action. The worsening pollution is setting off loud ‘duty of care’ alarm bells in embassies, multinationals and Indian companies across one of the world’s largest capital cities by population.

10) Leaping into a digital future : One of the dividends of India’s young demographic is that a large number of Indians are quick adopters of new technologies. The country is supposed to have 62 internet connections per 100 people, though there is a sharp divide in the levels of access between urban and rural areas, and between men and women. The Modi government has launched Digital India, a campaign to improve the country’s digital infrastructure and offer more government services online.

This breakneck growth has come at a cost. Indian citizens are increasingly concerned about data privacy and censorship, and perhaps with good reason given the intention to link Aadhaar ID biometric details to transactions, such as opening bank accounts, obtaining a new phone and filing tax returns. The Supreme Court’s decision to affirm the inalienable right to privacy – or the right to be left alone – in September 2017 does not sit easily with the government’s digital mission, but the agenda is here to stay and many Indian companies are leveraging artificial intelligence, data analytics and machine learning to disrupt their markets and deliver competitive edge.

These 10 extraordinary changes remind us that, as Control Risks steps into its second decade in India, the challenges and opportunities in front of us are quite different from those that faced us and our clients a decade ago. We have a fantastic team to take on those challenges. What we can assure you is that we will keep a keen eye on the shape of things to come.

James Owen is a Senior Partner at Control Risks, the specialist global risk consultancy. He heads the South Asia business and is based in Delhi.

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Demographic transition in india: insights into population growth, composition, and its major drivers.

• Usha Ram Usha Ram International Institute for Population Sciences, Department of Public Health and Mortality Studies
•  and  Faujdar Ram Faujdar Ram Population Council of India and International Institute for Population Sciences
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190632366.013.223
• Published online: 26 April 2021

Globally, countries have followed demographic transition theory and transitioned from high levels of fertility and mortality to lower levels. These changes have resulted in the improved health and well-being of people in the form of extended longevity and considerable improvements in survival at all ages, specifically among children and through lower fertility, which empowers women. India, the second most populous country after China, covers 2.4% of the global surface area and holds 18% of the world’s population. The United Nations 2019 medium variant population estimates revealed that India would surpass China in the year 2030 and would maintain the first rank after 2030. The population of India would peak at 1.65 billion in 2061 and would begin to decline thereafter and reach 1.44 billion in the year 2100. Thus, India’s experience will pose significant challenges for the global community, which has expressed its concern about India’s rising population size and persistent higher fertility and mortality levels. India is a country of wide socioeconomic and demographic diversity across its states. The four large states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan accounted for 37% of the country’s total population in 2011 and continue to exhibit above replacement fertility (that is, the total fertility rate, TFR, of greater than 2.1 children per woman) and higher mortality levels and thus have great potential for future population growth. For example, nationally, the life expectancy at birth in India is below 70 years (lagging by more than 3 years when compared to the world average), but the states of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan have an average life expectancy of around 65–66 years.

The spatial distribution of India’s population would have a more significant influence on its future political and economic scenario. The population growth rate in Kerala may turn negative around 2036, in Andhra Pradesh (including the newly created state of Telangana) around 2041, and in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu around 2046. Conversely, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan would have 764 million people in 2061 (45% of the national total) by the time India’s population reaches around 1.65 billion. Nationally, the total fertility rate declined from about 6.5 in early 1960 to 2.3 children per woman in 2016, a result of the massive efforts to improve comprehensive maternal and child health programs and nationwide implementation of the national health mission with a greater focus on social determinants of health. However, childhood mortality rates continue to be unacceptably high in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh (for every 1,000 live births, 43 to 55 children die in these states before celebrating their 5th birthday). Intertwined programmatic interventions that focus on female education and child survival are essential to yield desired fertility and mortality in several states that have experienced higher levels. These changes would be crucial for India to stabilize its population before reaching 1.65 billion. India’s demographic journey through the path of the classical demographic transition suggests that India is very close to achieving replacement fertility.

• demographic transition
• contraception
• family planning
• life expectancy
• child mortality

India is one of the oldest civilizations and has a vibrant cultural heritage coupled with remarkable diversity. The Mughals ruled the country from 1526 to 1761 , and were mainly located north of Vindhyanchal. India was a British colony from 1612 until 1947 , when the country attained its independence and became a sovereign nation. The British occupied all of present-day India after defeating Tipu Sultan in Mysuru and Marathas in Maharashtra. The British East India Company governed India and controlled trade throughout the region, except for Goa, which the Portuguese controlled in 1510–1961 , and Pondicherry, which the French controlled in 1673–1693 and again in 1699–1962 .

India has conducted a regular decadal census since 1881 that measures population size and composition as well as decadal growth at the national and subnational levels (including states, districts, and tehsils). At the dawn of Indian independence, there were about 345 million Indians. The year 1951 witnessed the first census of an independent India, recording a total population of 361 million and a moderate annual exponential growth rate of 1.25% during 1941–1951 . From a population growth perspective, the year 1951 became a turning point because it indicated a population explosion since it multiplied threefold by 2001 .

According to a United Nations (UN, 2019 ) report, India constituted 17.7% of the total world population, and was second only to China, whose share was 18.5%. The same estimates revealed that India would not only surpass China in the year 2030 with its share of 17.6% (and China’s would decrease to 17.1%) but it would also maintain the first rank after 2030 . The report further indicated that Africa’s share would rise to 25.6% in 2050 and 39.4% in 2100 . In contrast, the percentage share of Asia would decline from 59.5% in 2020 to 43.4% in 2100 . By 2100 , India would attain the first rank as far as the share of a single country is concerned. Nonetheless, its relative share would decline to 16.8% in 2050 and 13.3% in 2100 . It is thus essential to examine the dynamics of population growth, its potential, and future drivers of population growth of India.

The rapid population growth caused by a comparatively quick decline in mortality and persisting higher fertility levels has been the cause of concern in most developing counties, including India. The 1961 census of India revealed an annual exponential national growth rate close to 2% during 1951–1961 . The concerns were raised about the population growth and its rising size, both nationally and globally. The demographics of India—population size, growth rate, fertility, mortality, and so on—continue to occupy significant space discussions concerning its impact on various global health and developmental indicators. Alarmed at burgeoning numbers, and a view to accelerating a rapid decline in fertility levels, many developing countries, especially in Southeast Asia, launched official family planning programs in the mid-1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s, most witnessed a strong commitment by leaders to reduce fertility levels. As a result, they experienced one of the fastest transitions in levels of fertility (Pathak & Ram, 1981 ; Srinivasan & Pathak, 1981 ). Although India launched an official family planning program in the early 1950s, the real inputs for the program were recorded from the 1960s, when the program became method-mixed and target oriented. Post-independence, upon the advice of several researchers (Chitre, 1964 ; Gopalaswamy, 1962 ; Laxmi, 1964 ), the Indian government implemented its official family planning program in 1952 that promoted sterilization on a large scale. This was considered as the most cost-effective and impactful approach by the government given resource constraints. However, Agarwala ( 1964 ) disagreed with this and criticized the program. Recently, Srinivasan ( 2006 ) also opined that the continuous focus on sterilization (female) has dominated the Indian national family planning program. In the mid-1960s, government expanded the basket of methods for the clients and included IUD into the program. This, nonetheless failed due to several side effects on the users (Pujari et al., 1967 ).

The well-known linguistic, economic, and social-cultural diversity of India and its century-old demographic diversity across geographies have expanded, especially since independence. Several states in India, including Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu in the southern region, have moved much faster in achieving the national goal of the replacement fertility. The onset of fertility transition in these southern states occurred when the social and development indicators such as female literacy rates, per capita income, mortality and so on were rather poorer. At the same time, Hindi-speaking states in the northern region, including Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, continue to experience high levels of fertility as well as mortality. Nationally, fertility levels in India have fallen, and by 2000 Indian women were having an average of about 3.3 children. A significant portion of this decline came from the states in the southern region, where female literacy rates were higher, and women enjoyed greater autonomy than the women in the rest of India. While the southern states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu attained replacement-level fertility long ago, the giant northern states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan continue to reproduce at a prodigious rate (Krishnamoorthy, 1997 ; Rajan, 1994 ; Seal & Talwar, 1994 ). It is important to note that the prevailing social and economic conditions in the southern states at the time of onset of fertility transitions varied considerably. The doctrine of demographic-transition theory advocates indicates that a rise in per capita income, industrialization, and urbanization subsequently leads to reduced levels of fertility and mortality in populations. However, this did not happen in Kerala. Fertility and mortality levels in Kerala were not accompanied by the concurrent improvements in the levels of per capita income, industrialization, and urbanization (Zachariah, 1983 ).

Until the end of the 20th century , family welfare programs and policies in India focused on lowering fertility rates because the authorities visualized that the persisting higher fertility rates would further add to the built-in growth momentum of its population age composition. The UN’s ( 1987 ) population projections revealed that the population momentum alone would add substantially to growing numbers in India. Visaria and Visaria ( 1994 ) warned that the ultimate population size of India would be enormous if the country failed to put a brake on the fertility rate and achieved the replacement levels before 2016 . It would thus be useful to elaborate on the demographic transition in India and identify gaps to provide future directions for the program to enable positive changes in matters of population growth, thereby improving the lives and well-being of its people. The national scenario masks the diversity across states. Thus, achieving the goals may be less feasible without any understanding of the issues at the subnational level. This article documents the demographic transition of India at the national and subnational levels and examines various drivers of the transition.

The data for the present research come from several sources. The world population for the past and future years comes from the UN’s ( 2019 ) World Population Prospects . The time-series data for India on population size, growth rates, and age distribution at the national and state levels come from Indian government censuses conducted between 1881 and 2011 . The Government of India’s National Commission on Population (NCP, 2019 ) projections provides the numbers for the period 2021–2036 . The indicators of fertility (total fertility rates) and mortality (infant mortality rate, under-5 mortality rate, and life expectancy at birth come) are from various rounds of the Indian government’s Sample Registration System (SRS). The data for multiple years is available in the annual statistical reports published by the Registrar General of India ( 2020 ). The information on contraceptive use and marriage comes from the National Family Health Surveys (International Institute for Population Sciences [IIPS], 1993 ; IIPS & ICF, 2017 ; IIPS & ORC-Macro, 2000 , 2007 ). Figures and tables presented throughout the article give detailed data from these sources.

Demographic Transition Theory: A Brief Description

The demographers Warren Thompson ( 1929 ) and Adolphe Landry circa 1934 (Landry, 1987 ), described the classical demography/population transition. However, Frank W. Notestein ( 1945 ), an American demographer proposed a precise framework and presented a systematic formulation of the theory in its real sense According to the demographic transition theory, most countries will go through a process of population change from the stage of high birth and death rates (pretransition stage 1) to the last stage of lowest birth and death rates (stage 4). In other words, countries move from the lowest pretransition stage 1 (sometimes negative growth rate) to the highest growth rate (stages 2 and 3) before reaching stage 4, when the growth rate is extremely low (occasionally negative) and the country has attained below-replacement fertility. According to the theory, the demographic transition of a nation can be described with the help of the growth rates if the country has regular censuses over a reasonably long period. In his critical exploration of the demographic transition, Kirk ( 1996 ) stated that

the timing of the decline in countries with Non-European tradition conformed to the forecast by the original authors of the theory, without exception, fall in mortality preceded the decline in the levels of fertility . . . In general, the transition period was shorter in Non-European countries than the countries inhabited by Europeans. (p. 383)

Further, the non-European countries are transitioning with a lower level of socioeconomic development (Cleland & Wilson, 1987 ).

Several researchers (Kaa, 1987 , 2002 ; Lesthaeghe, 2011 , 2014 ; Lesthaeghe & Surkyn, 2004 ) have referred to a second demographic transition (SDT). The SDT is a period of continued fertility decline much below-replacement fertility. The most critical factors related to this continued decline are increase in nonmarriage, individual autonomy, self-actualization, rising symmetry in sex roles, advancing female education, and economic independence of women (for details, see Lesthaeghe, 2014 ). Nevertheless, the postulate of SDT based on the experiences of European countries may not hold in developing countries (Cleland, 2001 ; Dyson, 2010 ). The SDT, nevertheless, is much more challenging than the original demographic transition because the countries face declining population sizes, shrinking working population, and graying population. To an extent, replacement migration could help these nations overcome these emerging challenges. Coleman ( 2006 ), using the emergence of migrants as the dominant community in some geographies compared to the natives, advocated the concept of the third demographic transition (TDT), which emphasizes the drastic change in population composition. However, the idea of TDT could be a reflection of the adjustment for the shrinking labor force that arises out of SDT, and it does not fit into the purview of demographic transition theory per se.

This section discusses changes in population size, growth and its age-sex composition over time to understand India’s population transition. This is followed by a detailed exploration of the crucial factors that led to population transition. For this, we have considered four major drivers of population change that include fertility, mortality, family planning and changes in marriage pattern. Changes in fertility levels have been studied using total fertility rate. The changes in mortality have been studied using three indicators of infant mortality, under-5 mortality and expectation of life at birth. The changes in contraceptive use is examined with the help of contraceptive prevalence rate. Finally, changes in marriage pattern is examined with the help of percentage of women aged 20–24 years who were married before reaching age 18 years and women aged 30–34 years who remained single.

Population Size, Growth, and Age Structure

The UN ( 2019 ) estimated a total of 7,795 million people globally in 2020 . They suggested that this number would surpass 10 billion by the turn of the 21st century (Table 1 ). In 2020 , about 60% of the people live in Asia and a little over 17% live in Africa. By 2100 , Asia would be home to 43% of the global people and Africa to 39%. The share of European countries is estimated to reduce from 9.6% in 2020 to less than 6% in 2100 . While a similar pattern is predicted for the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and the North American regions, the share of Oceania remains unchanged. China’s population, was about 19% of the global population in 2020 , would reduce to less than 10% by 2100 . In India the share would decrease from less than 18% in 2020 to slightly over 13% in 2100 .

Table 1. Population Size and Share of the Population of World Regions, China, and India, 2020–2100

Source: UN ( 2019 ).

The indirect estimates of crude birth and death rates for India are for the period 1901–1961 . After 1971 , the SRS, which was established in the late 1960s, started to provide the crude birth rate (CBR) and crude death rate (CDR) for India and bigger states annually. The most recent SRS estimates are available for the year 2017 . At the beginning of the 20th century , India had very high levels of crude birth and death rates (48 births/deaths per 1,000 persons; Figure 1 ), which persisted until 2021 . The death rates started to decline around 1930 and reached 16 deaths per 1,000 persons in 1971 . The CBR, too, began to fall at a much slower pace. While the CBR was 36 births per 1,000 persons in the early 1970s, the CDR was 16 deaths per 1,000 persons. This declining trend continues, and the gap between the two rates is narrowing over time. The CBR was 20 per 1,000 persons in 2017 as compared to the CDR of 6 per 1,000 persons.

Figure 1. Crude birth rate (CBR) and crude death rate (CDR) for India, 1901–2017.

At the beginning of the 20th century , India had 238 million people. The results of the first census of the new millennium revealed that India had crossed the one billion mark by the end of the 20th century as the 2001 census enumerated a total of 1,029 million Indians (Table 2 ). The country annually added 16.1 million people in the 1980s and 18.2 million in the 1990s. While the world population increased threefold (from 2 to 6 billion) during the last century, it grew five times in India. The 15th census of India conducted in 2011 enumerated a total of 1,210 million Indians. The population of India grew with a decadal growth rate of about 17.5% during 2001–2011 , resulting in an annual exponential growth rate of 1.62% (a decline from 1.96% observed during 1991–2001 ). Despite a substantial reduction in the growth rate during 2001–2011 , India added nearly 181 million people. The UN’s 2019 projections indicated a similar addition during 2011–2021 , before the country experienced a drastic decline in the subsequent decades.

Figure 2. Estimated and observed exponential annual population growth rate (%) during 1901–2011 and 2021–2101, respectively, for India.

Indian annual population growth peaked at 2.22% during 1961–1971 (Table 1 and Figure 2 ) and stayed around 2% for the next four decades until 2001 . This period may be referred to as the second stage (population explosion stage) of demographic transition for India, during which the country added approximately 590 million people. Between 2001 and 2011 India experienced a substantial decline in its population growth rate (from 1.95% in 1991–2001 to 1.62% in 2001–2011 ). The UN’s 2019 assessment suggested that as far as the population size as concerned, India would surpass China in the next 7–8 years and would continue to increase until the year 2061 when its population size would reach 1,650 million. India may experience a decline in its total population after 2061 and count 1,444 million people in the year 2101 . Thus, India would add another 440 million people to its 2011 population size before achieving stabilization. In other words, India is likely to enter the fourth stage (near-zero growth rate) in the next 50 years or so. For India, the third stage of the demographic transition may fall between 2011 and 2051 . The momentum inbuilt in the age structure of the population would mostly lead to its growth.

Table 2. Population Size, Intercensal Change (Absolute and Percentage), and Exponential Annual Growth Rate, India, 1901–2001

Source : Registrar General of India ( n.d.-a ); Population estimated from UN ( 2019 ).

Examination of the current growth rate in specific states of India, especially for the larger Indian states (in terms of population size), helps to locate growth potentials. Table 3 gives population size for 2001 and 2011 , the two recent censuses of India, absolute change and state share in the total national change during 2001–2011 , and the exponential population growth rate observed during 2001–2011 for 20 large states of India. The four states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan deserve particular attention. With a population increase of 33.6 million, Uttar Pradesh contributed the most significant growth to the total national change of 182.2 million during 2001–2011 , followed by Bihar at 21.1 million and Maharashtra at 15.5 million. Kerala recorded the lowest annual exponential growth rate of 0.48%, followed by Andhra Pradesh (1.04%), Punjab (1.30%), and Odisha (1.31%). Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh together added 446 million (43%) of the total national addition and each state had an annual growth rate of 2% or more. These states are likely to make significant contributions to Indian population growth in the future because the fertility and mortality rates in these states are comparatively high and the decline in these rates has been much slower than that of other states. The most recent projections of the Government of India (NCP, 2019 ) indicated that by the year 2036 there would be a total of 596 million Indians, and half of them would come from these four states.

Table 3. Population Size, Intercensal Change (Absolute and Percentage), and Exponential Annual Growth Rate for Selected States of India, 2001–2011

a Sum of states may not match to India due to rounding of the numbers.

b Undivided including Telangana.

Table 4 gives a future population scenario in the 13 large states of India subdivided into three groups based on the attainment of the replacement level of fertility. These 13 states together cover nearly 80% of the national total. Group 1 consists of four states—Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh—that have yet to attain replacement fertility. Group 2 and Group 3 consist of the states that have recently reached replacement fertility and a long time ago, respectively. The four large states in Group 1 have enormous potential for growth, and during 2026–2036 their combined growth rate is projected to be close to 1% (0.83%). Bihar is an outlier even within this group, with a growth rate of 1.16% annually. Group 2 states would have a growth rate of around 0.37% and Group 3 of about 0.20%. These findings indicate that a major part of India’s population growth potential lies in the four states of Group 1.

Table 4. Population Size and Year of the Attainment of Replacement Fertility in 13 Large States of India Stratified by Level of Total Fertility Rate, 2011–2036

a 2011 population data from the census of India.

b Projected population for the period 2016–2036 is from NCP ( 2019 ).

c Undivided including Uttarakhand.

d Undivided including Jharkhand.

e Undivided including Chattisgarh.

Source : NCP ( 2019 ).

Population Age-Sex Composition

The population age-sex composition of a country narrates historical experiences, including wars, epidemics, famines, and so on. Population age distribution and the female to male ratio are indicative of fertility and mortality levels and the social status of the women in the populations. Along with the demographic transition in India described earlier, there has been an inevitable change in the age-sex structure—that is, the decline in mortality followed by fertility has resulted in changes to the population’s age structure. Several studies have debated and discussed the role of these changes in economic growth. Sex composition (population sex ratio overall and, more important, at birth) reflects the status of women in the society. Globally, the population sex ratio (males per 1,000 females) is favorable to the female gender. An overall sex ratio of 1,030–1,050 females per 1,000 males is standard under the natural conditions. The situation is slightly different in India.

Table 5 gives the sex ratio overall and for children younger than 5 years of age for India for a period of 120 years ( 1881–2011 ) along with the absolute change in them. For India, the overall sex ratio was close to normal until around 1931 . It started to rise gradually in favor of males after that. The 1991 census of India revealed a higher overall sex ratio nationally: 1,078 males per 1,000 females. However, the scenario is different for the child sex ratio. Female children marginally outnumbered male children until 1941 as the sex ratio was in favor of the female children (960–995 male children per 1,000 female children below age 5). However, the scenario reversed when the 1951 census results were declared as the child sex ratio turned in favor of male children (1,008 male children per 1,000 female children) and has deepened over the years with the widening female-male children gap. The child sex ratio in India increased from 1,022 in 1981 to 1,047 in 1991 and further to 1,071 in 2001 and 1,082 in 2011 male children per 1,000 female children. Nationally, during the periods 1981–1991 and 1991–2001 , the child sex ratio increased astonishingly by 25 and 24 units, respectively. The distorted child sex ratio in India as well as in neighboring countries in the region has been a matter of concern and point of debate and investigations among policy makers and researchers. Many have cited widespread gender-based discrimination (neglect) in the form of son preference, lower autonomy to the women, and so on as the leading cause of this distortion. These practices result in sex-selective abortions and gender-specific mortality differentials (Bongaarts, 2013 ; Bongaarts & Guilmoto, 2015 ; Guilmoto et al., 2018 ; Jha et al., 2011 ; Kashyap, 2019 ; Ram & Ram, 2018 ).

Table 5. Sex Ratio (Males per 1,000 Females) of the Total Population and Children Younger Than 5 Years of Age, India, 1881–2011

Notes: The sex ratio for the years 1881 and 1891 was calculated using data from Mukherji ( 1976 ). The sex ratio for children younger than 5 years of age was calculated using data from a C-series in the respective census of India.

Source : Registrar General of India ( n.d.-b ).

A few studies have estimated a decrease in girls due to the practice of sex-selective abortions in India and found that these practices are not universal across geographies. Instead, they vary considerably in subregions of India (Jha et al., 2011 ; Ram & Ram, 2018 ). Table 6 presents the sex ratio for selected states in India for the period 1991–2011 and the change in it. Regardless of the year, Kerala is the only state that has an overall sex ratio lower than 1,000 (i.e., females exceeding the male population). In addition, the male-female gap has widened over the past two decades by almost 43 units. Punjab and Haryana have the most skewed overall sex ratio, varying between 1,117 and 1,162 males per 1,000 females. The overall sex ratio has been in favor of males in the remaining states. However, the gaps in sex ratio seemingly have bridged over time. While the decline was sharp in the states of Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Assam, it has remained mostly similar in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Similar to the overall sex ratio, Haryana and Punjab had a highly skewed child sex ratio, varying between 1,128 and 1,144, respectively, in 1991 and 1,190 and 1,169 in 2011 . In 2011 , Gujarat (1,110), Rajasthan (1,120), and Maharashtra (1,117) also showed a child sex ratio skewed in favor of male children. Other states also showed a considerable deficit of female children. Haryana topped the list as the child sex ratio increased by 62 units in favor of males during 1991–2011 . The corresponding increase was by 59 units in Maharashtra, 50 units in Rajasthan, 44 units in Gujarat, 42 units in Madhya Pradesh, and 30–39 units in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Odisha, and Uttar Pradesh. Kerala was the only state where the child sex ratio improved in favor of female children by 16 units between the 1991 and 2011 censuses.

Table 6. Sex Ratio (Males per 1,000 Females) of the Total Population and Children Younger Than 5 Years of Age for India and Selected States, 1991–2011

Note: Sex ratio from respective censuses of India (Table C-6 of 1991 and C-14 of 2001 and 2011).

a Undivided including Telangana.

Almost half of the districts in the country in 2011 had a deficit of girl children. The practice of neglect of the female child resulting in sex-selective abortion and excess female mortality is universal (Guilmoto et al., 2018 ; Ram & Ram, 2018 ). A more recent analysis for India by Kashyap ( 2019 ) indicated the dominance of prenatal factors (sex-selective abortion) compared to excess female mortality (postnatal factor). Table 7 presents the sex ratio at birth (SRB) for India and selected states. The data suggest that the SRB is favorable to male children for India nationally and subnationally. Punjab and Haryana, followed by Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, and Bihar, had a highly disturbing SRB in 1999 . For every 100 female births, Punjab and Haryana recorded 125 to 126 male births each, the other states recorded 112 to 118 male births. The male-female imbalance at birth has continued over time, although with a sign toward bridging the gaps. At the national level, the SRB has mostly remained unchanged at 112 male children for every 100 female children. Nonetheless, the imbalance has widened in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, and Haryana, suggesting that the efforts to address this have failed to yield desirable results. The study by Jha et al. ( 2011 ) demonstrated that the practices are more prevalent among affluent and educated people.

Table 7. Sex Ratio at Birth (Male Births Per 1,000 Female Births) and Absolute Change in Sex Ratio at Birth in India and Selected States, 1999–2016

a Undivided including Telangana for the years 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2013.

b Undivided including Jharkhand for the year 1999.

c Undivided including Chhattisgarh for the year 1999.

d Undivided including Uttarakhand for the years 1999, 2004, and 2009.

Source: Sex ratio from the annual statistical report of the Sample Registration System of India.

Table 8 presents age distribution by sex and dependency ratios (child, old age, and overall) for the period 1981–2011 (census of India) and 2036 for India (NCP, 2019 ). Figures 3A and 3B present age-sex population pyramids. The results in Table 8 suggest a visible change in the age structure over the decades. Nationally, the share of children below age 15 in the total population declined to from about 40% in 1981 to 31% in 2011 . The NCP ( 2019 ) projections indicated that the share would decrease to 20% by 2036 . The percentage of people aged 60 years and older increased to 9% in 2011 and is estimated to reach 15% in 2036 (over 227 million). The changes in the dependency ratios for children and older people also confirm a transition in the age structure. While the child dependency ratio in India declined from 73% in 1981 and to 51% in 2011 , the dependency ratio for older people increased marginally from 12% to 14%. The official population projections suggest that in 2036 the child dependency ratio would further decline to 30% and the dependency ratio for older people would increase to 23% nationally. In 2001 , India had about 587 million people in the working ages, between 15 and 59 years. Those aged 15–34 years accounted for nearly 60% (349 million). The number of people in the working ages of 15–59 years and 15–34 years increased to 733 million and 425 million, respectively, in the year 2011 . Population projections suggest that in 2036 , while the number of people of working age would increase to almost 989 million, young labor would reach 464 million. Such changes would impact future economic development and would call on the government to initiate innovative strategies to take care of the older population. Besides, a sharp rise in the labor force demands generation of more employment.

Table 8. Share of the Male and Female Population Out of the Total Population by Age Groups and Dependency Ratios (for Children, Older People, and Overall), India, 1981–2011 and 2036

a Population is taken from the censuses of India 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011.

b Projected population for 2036 is from NCP ( 2019 ).

c Dependency ratio from author calculations. The child dependency ratio is defined as the number of children below 15 years of age per 100 persons in the working ages of 15–59 years. The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the number of persons aged 60 years or older per 100 persons in the working ages of 15–59 years. The overall dependency ratio is defined as the number of children below 15 years of age and persons aged 60 years or older per 100 persons in the working ages of 15–59 years.

Figure 3A. Age-sex population pyramids of India, 1991.

Figure 3B. Age-sex population pyramids of India, 2036.

Major Drivers of Population Growth

Three drivers impact the population growth rate and are responsible for demographic transition: fertility, mortality, and international migration. Generally speaking, international migration has a limited role, as its volume is small. Thus, it is mainly the changes in fertility and mortality levels in a population that lead to demographic transition. This section discusses fertility and mortality transition in India and specific programmatic interventions responsible for the change in the fertility and mortality levels. India lacks good quality civil registration data on births and deaths (Ram et al., 2020 ; Yadav & Ram, 2019 ). Until the early 1970s, the estimated fertility and mortality for India and its states came from indirect methods that used census data stratified by age and sex. In the early 1970s, the Registrar General of India launched an annual nationwide system of collecting data on fertility and mortality (known as the sample registration system; SRS), which provides invaluable data for India and its states, especially for the bigger states. For the most part, the present research used fertility and mortality data from the SRS.

Figure 4 presents the total fertility rate (TFR) for India spanning over nearly 150 years (Ram et al., 1995 ). The TFR gives the number of children a woman would have at the end of the reproductive period, assuming that she experiences the prevailing age patterns of fertility. The data suggests that the TFR in India virtually remained unchanged at around 6.3 children per woman from 1871–1881 until 1951–1961 (standard deviation = 0.27). There has been little fluctuation in the TFR, which is mainly attributed to the variations in the quality of age-sex data in different censuses (Mukherji, 1976 ). Coale’s ( 1986 ) proposition of survival strategy postulates that a TFR of less than six for the expectation of life at birth (e o o ) of 20–25 years could lead to a zero or negative population growth. Thus, under a high mortality regime, maintaining a TFR of 6 and above was an excellent strategy to ensure moderate positive population growth. The decline in the TFR during the period 1896–1901 might have been the result of the famines of 1896–1997 and 1899–1901 , which were among the worst ever experienced in history and affected substantial sections of the population (Dyson, 1991 ).

The fertility transition in India most likely began during the late 1960s. Since the inception of fertility transition, the TFR in India declined by 19% to about 1.1 fewer children per woman during the first decade ( 1966–1971 to 1976–1981 ). The 1960s witnessed a substantial change in the family planning program in India, which became target-oriented and included the introduction of intrauterine devices to the official program in 1965 . The initial inherent demand for family planning and a persistently higher level of fertility may have been the reason for a relatively faster fertility decline during the first decade following the onset of the demographic transition. In the next decade ( 1976–1981 to 1986–1991 ), although the decrease in fertility continued, its pace slowed down. The decline in TFR slowed down notably in the subsequent decade of 1976–1981 to 1986–1991 when the reduction was only about 15%. The coercive approach adopted during the emergency period ( 1975–1977 ) was mainly responsible for this reduction in several states, more specifically in the larger Hindi-speaking states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. This in turn accelerated the decline in TFR. Between 1986–1991 and 1996–2001 , the TFR declined by 19% (from about 4 children to 3.2 children per woman). During 1996–2001 , the TFR in India declined by about 14%. The mid-1990s saw a paradigm shift in the national family planning program as the country revamped the program from a target-oriented to target-free regime. This paradigm shift resulted in an initial decline/stagnation in the family planning performance in the country.

Figure 4. Total fertility rate, India, 1871–2018.

Nationally, the TFR almost halved in the 30 years between 1986 and 2016 from 4.2 to 2.3 children per woman (Table 9 ). Many states in India showed a similar trend. Rural India also experienced a decline in the TFR from 4.5 in 1986 to 2.5 in 2016 . However, urban India had already achieved replacement fertility in 2006 . Of the states included in this analysis, eight states have already attained replacement or below-replacement fertility. The lagging states are Bihar Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, where TFR continues to be close to 3 children per woman. As noted, these are the states that are or could be center for India population growth in the coming years. The urban areas in several states attained replacement or below-replacement fertility in 2016 : the urban areas had a TFR of as low as 1.3 children per woman in West Bengal, 1.4 in Odisha, 1.5 in Andhra Pradesh, and 1.6 in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. Further, the rural areas of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal had a TFR that varied between 1.7 and 1.9 children per woman in 2016 .

Table 9. Total Fertility Rate for Combined, Rural, and Urban Areas and the Ratio of Rural to Urban Rate for India and Selected States, 1986–2016

a Undivided including Telangana for the years 1986, 1996, and 2006.

b Undivided including Jharkhand for the years 1986 and 1996.

c Undivided including Chhattisgarh for the years 1986 and 1996.

d Undivided including Uttarakhand for the years 1986, 1996, and 2006.

Source: Total fertility rate from the annual statistical report of the Sample Registration System of India.

Improved child survival and concurrent expansion of female education have led to fertility decline in developing countries like India (Davis, 1963 ; Dyson, 2010 ). We have already discussed geographic diversity in the TFR and transition. In Table 10 , we present the levels of TFR by education for India and selected states. In 1992–1993 , the TFR for India was 4.3 per woman for women who had completed fewer than 5 years of schooling (including nonliterate) compared to 3.3 for those who had 10 or more years of schooling; a difference of one child. By 2015–2016 , the TFR declined to 2.9 per woman and 1.8 for the respective groups. Over time there is no convergence in the level of fertility in lower and higher education groups as TFR declined by 45.5% among those who had 10 or more years of schooling compared to 32.6% among those who had fewer than 5 years of schooling. Nationally, around 22% of women aged 15–49 had completed 10 or more years of schooling in 1992–1993 . The share of these women increased to about 60% in 2015–2016 . Although TFR is higher for less educated people in India, their share in total women aged 15–49 has been reducing rapidly due to the expansion of education. The rise in education has a significant impact on delay in age at marriage.

A similar trend is observed at the state level as well. In 2015–2016 , with the exception of Bihar (TFR = 2.3), women who had 10 or more years of schooling had reached the replacement level of fertility. The lowest being in Punjab (TFR = 1.4) and the highest in Uttar Pradesh (TFR = 2.0). Women with 5–9 years of schooling in many states except Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh either reached replacement or below-replacement level fertility or are very close to achieving it. The four larger states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh) have lower child survival and limited outreach of female education. In 2015–2016 , Kerala had 95% of women aged 15–49 with 10 or more years of schooling, which was 44% in Bihar (including Jharkhand), 46% in Rajasthan, 52% in Madhya Pradesh (including Chhattisgarh), and 53% in Uttar Pradesh (including Uttarakhand).

Table 10. Total Fertility Rate by the Educational Status of the Women, India and Selected States, 1992–2016

a Undivided including Telangana (1992–1993, 1998–1999, and 2005–2006).

b Undivided including Jharkhand (1992–1993 and 1998–1999).

c Undivided including Chhattisgarh (1992–1993 and 1998–1999).

d Undivided including Uttarakhand (1992–1003 and 1998–1999).

Source : International Institute for Population Sciences ( 1993 ); International Institute for Population Sciences & ICF ( 2017 ); International Institute for Population Sciences & ORC-Macro ( 2000 ); International Institute for Population Sciences & ORC-Macro ( 2007 ).

The mortality data has information on three key indicators: infant mortality rate (IMR), under-5 mortality rate (U5MR), and expectation of life at birth (LEB; e o o ). The data comes from the SRS for India and covers about 25 years ( 1990–2016 ). The year 1990 is chosen as a base since it benchmarks the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) base year, and the year 2016 benchmarks the base year of the recently declared Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The MDG goal for U5MR for India was to attain a U5MR of 42 deaths of children aged below 5 years per 1,000 live births by the year 2015 . The corresponding goal for the IMR was 37 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. Under the SDG, the goals are 21 and 15, respectively, for the year 2030 .

At the beginning of the 20th century , in India, a newborn baby had an average life expectancy of 21–23 years (Davis, 1951 ; Mukherji, 1976 ). The SRS life table available for the period 2013–2017 revealed that a newborn baby in India would live an average of more than 69 years, which is considerably lower than in other countries globally and in the South Asian region. Nonetheless, this is a significant improvement from just about 20 years to close to 70 years, and an essential aspect of this improvement relates to IMR. At the national level, the IMR was 80 infant deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 , which declined to 68 in 2000 (12 points in 10 years; see Table 11 ). The first decade of the 21st century unfolded a significant decline in the IMR for India— 47 infant deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010 and 34 per 1,000 in 2016 . Mortality decline in India and its states may have been due to improvements in access to health services and also an incremental increase in access to improved drinking water and sanitation. Similar to the global evidence (Fink et al., 2011 ), the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) data for 1992–1993 and 2015–2016 revealed a quantum jump in access to sanitation facilities (IIPS, 1993 ; IIPS & ICF, 2017 ).

The acceleration, especially after 2005 , may be due to the Janani Suraksha Yojana program implemented under the National Health Mission (erstwhile known as the National Rural Health Mission). The program provided a cash incentive of Rs. 1400 to women who delivered their babies in a health facility (Stephen et al., 2010 ). However, compliance varies considerably across India’s states. In the year 1990 , Kerala had the lowest IMR (17 infant deaths per 1,000 live births), whereas it was higher in Odisha (122), followed by Madhya Pradesh (111) and Uttar Pradesh (99). By 2016 , IMR declined significantly in all states. While Kerala continued to occupy the first place with the lowest IMR, Madhya Pradesh replaced Odisha with an IMR of 47 deaths per 1,000 live births. The states, on the whole, have succeeded in reducing the IMR; however, the usual lagging states of Assam, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Odisha continue to have higher IMRs.

Table 11. Infant Mortality Rate and Percentage Change in the Rate in India and Selected States, 1990–2016

a Undivided including Telangana for the years 1990, 1995, 2005, and 2010

b Undivided including Jharkhand for the years 1990 and 1995.

c Undivided including Chhattisgarh for the years 1990 and 1995.

d Undivided including Uttarakhand for the years 1990 and 1995.

Source: Infant mortality rates from the annual statistical report of the Sample Registration System of India.

Table 12 presents the gender-specific U5MRs for India and states for 1990–2016 . An average of 114 children per 1,000 live births died in India in 1990 before celebrating their 5th birthday, which declined to 39 in 2016 ; a two-thirds decline in 26 years. During the same period, the U5MR declined from 119 to 37 for male children and from 132 to 41 for female children. Similar to IMR, the U5MR fell relatively faster in the last 16 years in India ( 2000–2016 ) when compared with the corresponding change during 1990–2000 . Once again, there are vast differences across states of India in U5MR as well; the lagging states continue to have significantly higher levels of childhood mortality. In 2016 Kerala had the lowest U5MR (11), and the Madhya Pradesh had the highest (55), followed by Assam (52) and Odisha (50). The improvement in child survival in India brought a sense of security for the families to go for smaller families and contributed to the lowering of the TFR. An important point to note here is that regardless of the period studied, the U5MR in India has exceeded for female children compared to the male children. Surprisingly, most states have revealed a gender gap in childhood mortality. A study by Ram et al. ( 2013 , 2014 ) documented wide disparities in the levels of under-5 mortalities in districts of India.

Table 12. Gender-Specific Under-5 Mortality Rate and Percentage Change, India and Selected States, 1990–2016

a Undivided including Telangana for the years 1990, 1995, 2005, and 2010.

b Undivided including Jharkhand for the years 1990, 1995, 2005, and 2010.

c Undivided including Chhattisgarh for the years 1990, 1995, 2005, and 2010.

d Undivided including Uttarakhand for the years 1990, 1995, 2005, and 2010.

Source: Author calculations based on data from SRS Based Life Tables for 1988–1992, 1993–1997, 1998–2002, and 2003–2007. Data for 2015 and 2016 from the annual statistical report of the Sample Registration System of India for the respective years.

We now examine levels of life expectancy at birth (LEB). Table 13 presents the relevant data for India and its states for both sexes combined as well as separately. The LEB for India was nearly 49 years during 1970–1975 , which increased to about 58 years in 1986–1990 , an increase of 9 years in 16 years resulting in an annual improvement of approximately 0.6 years. By 1996–2000 , the LEB in India increased to 62 years and further to 69 years in 2013–2017 . Up until the 1980s, nationally, Indian males lived longer than the Indian females (Ram & Ram, 1997 ). Data on gender-specific LEB since 1993 indicates that in India, females now live longer than males, and the gap was by 2 years in 2013–2017 . The gender gap indeed widened in the mid-1990s when male LEB was at 60.4 years and females at 61.8 years. But at the same time, gender gaps in mortality have also widened for adolescents (to the female disadvantage), an anomaly indicating the downside of using only LEB for exploring gender disparity.

Table 13. Gender-Specific Life Expectancy at Birth and Changes in the Life Expectancy, India and Selected States, 1986–2017

$$ authors calculation using SRS gender-specific life tables.

b Undivided including Jharkhand for 1986–1990 and 1996–2000.

c Undivided including Chhattisgarh for 1986–1990 and 1996–2000.

d Undivided including Uttarakhand for 1986–1990, 1996–2000, and 2006–2010

Source: From Life tables of the Sample Registration System (SRS) of India.

Family Planning and Unmet Need

India acquired the status of being the first nation globally to launch an official family planning program in 1952 . However, the real push to the program came through in the 1960s when the program adopted a target-specific approach. The federal authorities in India assigned targets to the states, which were allocated to districts and further to the individual health workers at the lowest level of service provision. These targets became extremely volatile over the years, and the authorities announced disincentives and incentives to the users and the service providers based on performance (Pachauri, 2014 ). This period was accompanied by the emergency period ( 1975–1977 ) in India, when the program became extremely coercive. This act of the government damaged the program to a great extent and impacted the northern Hindi-speaking belt where fertility levels were higher. Although the success in fertility reduction in India is not comparable to that of other Asian countries, its achievements are by no means modest. In the initial phase, the program success was mostly monitored and evaluated using service statistics with the help of the number of acceptors and births averted as a result of family planning acceptance. Family planning surveys conducted in the 1970s and 1980s (ORG, 1972 , 1982 , 1990 ) complemented monitoring and evaluating efforts. After 1990 , India launched nationwide surveys (see IIPS, 1993 ; IIPS & ICF, 2017 ; IIPS & ORC-Macro 2000 , 2007 ). Tables 14 , 15 , and 16 give selected family planning indicators for India.

There has been a continuous rise in the percentage of married women using modern contraception in India. For example, just over 10% of married Indian women in 1970 used modern contraception (ORG, 1972 ). This percentage increased to 42.8% in 1998–1999 and to 48.5% in 2005–2006 (Table 14 ). India’s contraceptive prevalence rates (CPRs) are presented for the period between 1992–1993 to 2015–2016 in Table 13 . At the national level, overall CPR has increased from a little over 36% in the early 1990s to close to 48% in 2015–2016 , which translates to an increase of 12 units over the 23 years (an annual increase of 1.4%). The 2017 NFHS indicated that modern method CPR had marginally decreased from 48.5% in 2005–2006 to 47.8% in 2015–2016 (IIPS & ICF, 2017 ; IIPS & ORC-Macro, 2007 ). The decline in CPR of the modern method is substantial in many states, including Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu. This has raised debates among policy makers and researchers because these states have concurrently exhibited a significant decline in TFR levels. There is some research evidence that has indicated doubt about the estimated CPR for the period 2015–2016 . A study by Jayachandran and Stover ( 2018 ) expressed concern over the quality of contraceptive data collected in the 2017 NFHS. The modern limiting method CPR showed an increase of five units (from 31% to a little over 36%) and there was a twofold rise in the modern spacing method CPR (from about 6% to over 11%) during the same period. Interestingly, CPR for traditional methods also increased, from 4% to almost 6% (IIPS & ICF, 2017 ).

The levels of CPR, as well as the pace of change in it, varied considerably across Indian states included in the analysis. Generally, the states in the southern and western regions revealed higher levels of CPR compared to those in the northern and eastern regions of India. While the CPR rose over time, Gujarat and Kerala had a marginal decline in the overall CPR. Assam, Odisha, and West Bengal (all three in the eastern region) and Uttar Pradesh in the northern part had higher CPR of the traditional method (abstinence and withdrawal/rhythm) compared to the remaining states. While the CPR for traditional methods declined in Assam and West Bengal, it increased from 1%–2% in 1992–1993 to over 12%–14% in 2015–2016 in Odisha and Uttar Pradesh. The use of traditional methods is higher among women who live in urban areas, who were more educated and resided in economically better-off households. The patterns of CPR are somewhat similar for the modern limiting and spacing methods across states, as seen for all methods combined. Nonetheless, a few states, such as Assam, Haryana, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal, have shown a tremendous rise in the CPR for modern spacing methods.

Table 14. Contraceptive Prevalence Rate for Modem Limiting, Modern Spacing Methods and Traditional Methods of Family Planning and Percentage Change in Them, India and Selected States, 1992–2016