essay about dr abdul qadeer khan

National Museum of Nuclear Science & History

Physicist Pakistan

Government official scientist spy.

Abdul Qadeer Khan, more commonly known as A. Q. Khan, is a Pakistani physicist.

Khan was born in 1935 or 1936 to a Muslim family in Bhopal, India. In 1952, the Khan family moved to Pakistan. As a young man, Khan went to Europe to study at the Technical University of Berlin. He later earned a master’s degree from Delft University of Technology and a Ph.D. in metallurgical engineering from the Catholic University of Leuven.

In 1972, Khan went to work at URENCO, a nuclear fuel company, on uranium enrichment plants in the Netherlands. After India tested its first atomic bomb in 1974, Khan contacted Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to offer his services for the Pakistani nuclear program . Khan stayed in the Netherlands for another year to gather information before returning to Pakistan in December 1975 along with stolen gas centrifuge blueprints. The Dutch government opened an investigation into Khan and sentenced him in absentia to four years in prison, although it was later overturned on appeal.

Project-706

Upon his return to Pakistan, Khan established a new laboratory in Kahuta—later renamed the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL)—to develop highly enriched uranium (HEU). Khan’s nuclear rival was Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan , who at the time led efforts for a plutonium bomb. “Munir Ahmad Khan and his people are liars and cheats,” Khan wrote to Prime Minister Bhutto . “No work is being carried out, and Munir Ahmad Khan is cheating you.” Although Munir Ahmad Khan maintained his role with PAEC, Bhutto soon granted A. Q. Khan virtual autonomy over his uranium production program, codenamed “Project-706.” The Kahuta gas centrifuge plant produced its first HEU in 1982.

During this period, Khan was highly critical of Western attempts to disrupt Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development. “I want to question the bloody holier-than-thou attitudes of the Americans and the British,” he wrote in the German magazine Der Spiegel . “Are these bastards God-appointed guardians of the world to stockpile hundreds of thousands of nuclear warheads and have they God-given authority to carry out explosions every month?” With the assistance of China’s implosion bomb design , a Pakistani atomic bomb was soon a reality. On May 28, 1998, Pakistan detonated its first nuclear devices using bomb cores built by Khan. As he declared after the successful tests , “I never had any doubts I was building a bomb. We had to do it.”

Nuclear Proliferation Network

During the 1970s and 1980s, Khan purchased centrifuge parts and equipment from Europe, including his many contacts in the Netherlands, Germany, and France. Khan, however, purchased twice as many centrifuge parts as he needed. Over the next several decades, he sold this equipment on the nuclear black market to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Blueprints for the Chinese uranium implosion bomb later turned up in Libya in a dry cleaning bag from Islamabad. There is also evidence that Khan offered to sell nuclear technology to Iraq before the First Gulf War, but was rebuffed by Saddam Hussein.

The United States had long suspected Khan of proliferating nuclear materials but did not learn the full extent of his network until 2003, when U.S. agents intercepted the BBC China , a German cargo ship, en route to Libya. The ship contained parts for 1,000 gas centrifuges, allegedly at a $100 million price. In December, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi agreed to dismantle Libya’s nuclear program and named Khan as its supplier.

In February 2004, Khan publicly admitted to selling nuclear materials on the black market and offered his “deepest regrets and unqualified apologies.” Under pressure from the United States, Pakistani officials placed Khan under house arrest. He was released in 2009.

Despite his controversial career, the majority of Pakistanis view Khan as a national hero who advanced science, technology, and security in Pakistan. Khan has also received an extraordinary number of awards, including forty-five gold medals, three gold crowns, and twice the Nishan-i-Imtiaz, Pakistan’s highest civilian honor.

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A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network

This article was reported and written by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger

• Feb. 12, 2004

The break for American intelligence operatives tracking Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear network came in the wet August heat in Malaysia, as five giant cargo containers full of specialized centrifuge parts were loaded into one of the nondescript vessels that ply the Straits of Malacca.

The C.I.A. had penetrated the factory of Scomi Precision Engineering, where one of the nuclear network's operatives -- known to the workers only as Tinner -- watched over the production of the delicate machinery needed to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs.

Spy satellites tracked the shipment as it wended its way to Dubai, where it was relabeled ''used machinery'' and transferred to a German-owned ship, the BBC China. When it headed through the Suez Canal, bound for Libya, the order went out from Washington to have it seized, according to accounts from American officials.

That seizure led to the unraveling of a trading network that sent bomb-making designs and equipment to at least three countries -- Iran, North Korea and Libya -- and has laid bare the limits of international controls on nuclear proliferation.

Yesterday, President Bush proposed to enhance that system by restricting the production of nuclear fuel to a few nations. [Page A18.]

The scope and audacity of the illicit network are still not fully known. Nor is it known whether the Pakistani military or government, which had supported Dr. Khan's research, were complicit in his activities.

But what has become clear in recent days is that Dr. Khan, a Pakistani national hero who began his rise 30 years ago by importing nuclear equipment to secretly build his country's atom bomb, gradually transformed himself into the largest and most sophisticated exporter in the nuclear black market.

''It was an astounding transformation when you think about it, something we've never seen before,'' said a senior American official who has reviewed the intelligence. ''First, he exploits a fragmented market and develops a quite advanced nuclear arsenal. Then he throws the switch, reverses the flow and figures out how to sell the whole kit, right down to the bomb designs, to some of the world's worst governments.''

The story of that transformation emerges from recent interviews on three continents -- from Islamabad, Pakistan's capital, to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; from the streets of Dubai, where many of the deals were cut, to Washington and Vienna, where intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency struggled to understand and defuse the threat.

Taken together, they show how Dr. Khan assembled a far-reaching organization of scientists, engineers and business executives who operated on murky boundaries between the legal and the illegal, sometimes underground but often in plain view, unencumbered by international agreements that prohibit trafficking in nuclear technology.

Dr. Khan started in the mid-1980's, according to nuclear proliferation experts, by ordering twice the number of parts the Pakistani nuclear program needed, and then selling the excess to other countries, notably Iran.

Later, his network acquired another customer: North Korea, which was desperate for a more surreptitious way to build nuclear weapons after the United States had frozen the North's huge plutonium-production facilities in Yongbyon.

And in the end he moved on to Libya, his ultimate undoing, selling entire kits, from centrifuges to enrich uranium, to crude weapons designs. Investigators found the weapons blueprints wrapped in bags from an Islamabad dry cleaner.

In his speech yesterday, Mr. Bush said the network even sold raw uranium to be processed into bomb fuel. He also identified Dr. Khan's deputy -- ''the network's chief financial officer and money-launderer,'' he called him -- as Bukhari Sayed Abu Tahir, a businessman in Dubai, who, investigators say, placed the order for the Libyan equipment.

One longtime trading partner of Dr. Khan's was Peter Griffin, a British engineer who said in an interview that he had been a supplier to Pakistan for two decades, in the period when Dr. Khan was building nuclear weapons.

''Anything that could be sent to Pakistan, I sent to Pakistan,'' he said. But he said that all his sales had been approved by British trade authorities.

Mr. Griffin is also the partner in a Dubai company that investigators said placed the order for materials that wound up on the ship headed for Libya, although he denies knowing anything about that shipment.

For years hints of Dr. Khan's operation circulated widely among intelligence officers and officials in Pakistan, the United States and elsewhere. But Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, confronted Dr. Khan only after the BBC China was seized on its way to Libya and evidence of the network tumbled out. Last week Dr. Khan issued a public confession and then was pardoned by General Musharraf.

The deference shown Dr. Khan at the end began decades before, when he was working secretly and successfully to make his country a nuclear power.

''Khan had a complete blank check,'' said one aide close to General Musharraf. ''He could do anything. He could go anywhere. He could buy anything at any price.''

Research Roots in Holland

Dr. Khan's start came with India's first atomic test in 1974, an event that so traumatized Pakistan that developing its own weapon became the country's most pressing goal. ''We will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own,'' said Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then the prime minister.

Dr. Khan, a bright young Pakistani metallurgist working in the Netherlands, lent his aid. From his perch at Urenco, a European consortium, he possessed blueprints of the world's best centrifuges -- the hollow metal tubes that spin very fast to enrich natural uranium into bomb fuel.

A set of thousands of centrifuges, called a cascade, concentrates the rare U-235 isotope to make a potent fuel.

''I saw top-secret technical drawings in his house,'' recalled Frits Veerman, a Dutch colleague who shared an office with Dr. Khan.

Dr. Khan stole the designs, Dutch investigators found, and he fled back to Pakistan in 1976. He used the blueprints and his knowledge to set up an enrichment project in Kahuta, near Islamabad, that reported directly to the prime minister. He drew heavily on Dutch lists of nearly 100 companies that supplied centrifuge parts and materials.

''They literally begged us to buy their equipment,'' Dr. Khan boasted in 2001 in a publication celebrating the 25th anniversary of his Pakistani laboratory. ''My long stay in Europe and intimate knowledge of various countries and their manufacturing firms was an asset.''

Business executives and merchants, including German, Dutch and French middlemen, flocked to Pakistan to offer price lists for high-technology goods and learn what Pakistan needed. The multilingual Dr. Khan led the acquisition effort. His shopping spree spanned the world.

''Africa was important because of the materials needed,'' said a senior Pakistani official involved in the investigation of Dr. Khan. ''Europe was crucial for bringing in high-tech machines and components. Dubai was the place for shipments and for payments.

''We were not the first beneficiaries of this network. But the intensity of Pakistan's nuclear acquisition effort did enlarge the market. Everybody knew that there is a buyer out there, loaded with money and hellbent on getting this ultimate weapon.''

Even in the early days, the trade was no secret. Washington sent Germany dozens of complaints about their leaky export-control system that let ''dual use'' technology leave even though some was clearly intended for Pakistan's nuclear program, said Mark Hibbs, a Germany-based editor of a technical journal, Nucleonics Week. But many of those warnings were ignored, he said.

Mr. Veerman said Dutch companies continued to work with Dr. Khan after it was clear he was developing centrifuges for a weapon. Dr. Khan even sent scientists to the Netherlands in the late 1970's for centrifuge-related training.

Eventually the flow of technology reversed, two senior Pakistani military officials involved in the probe of Dr. Khan said. ''These contacts and channels were later used for sending technology out of Pakistan by certain individuals,'' a military official said, ''including Dr. A. Q. Khan.''

From Buyer to Seller

Dr. Khan had three motives, investigators say. He was eager to defy the West and pierce ''clouds of the so-called secrecy,'' as he once put it. He was equally eager to transfer technology to other Muslim nations, according to a senior Pakistani politician. ''He also said that giving technology to a Muslim country was not a crime,'' the politician said.

But another motive appears to have been money. As Dr. Khan's nuclear successes grew, so did his wealth. He acquired homes and properties, including a tourist hotel in Africa.

A family friend said Dr. Khan spoke of the centrifuge designs he perfected as if the technology belonged to him personally, not to Pakistan. A senior politician said that in meetings with Chaudry Shujat Hussain, leader of a pro-Musharraf political party, Dr. Khan never spoke of selling the technology, only of ''sharing'' it.

He started slowly. He simply ordered more parts in the black market than he needed for Pakistan.

At first, Western intelligence agencies tracking Dr. Khan were perplexed.

''In the 1980's, I remember being told by officials that Khan was over-ordering centrifuge parts and they couldn't understand why,'' recalled Simon Henderson, a London-based author who has written extensively about Dr. Khan. It eventually became clear that the extras went to clients outside Pakistan.

Around 1987, Dr. Khan struck a deal with Iran, which wanted to build 50,000 centrifuges of a type known as P-1, for Pakistan-1, an entry-level model, Western investigators found. If ever completed, a plant that size would let Tehran make fuel for about 30 atom bombs each year.

As Pakistan's own technology became more sophisticated, Dr. Khan sold old Pakistani centrifuges and parts, Western investigators found, some contaminated with highly enriched uranium.

Iran appears to have acquired such second-hand gear. ''They were not happy to discover they overpaid for old wares,'' said one American intelligence official. But for Iran, it was a start.

A Pakistani military official involved in the investigation of Dr. Khan said foreign requests for technology ''came on paper, in person, through third parties, in meetings with Khan himself.''

The scientist then used the vast logistic system available to him, which included government cargo planes, to ship the components to middlemen, who cloaked the source.

''The same network, the same routes, the same people who brought the technology in were also sending it out,'' said the military official.

In the final stages of his export career, Dr. Khan simply used his middlemen to order large shipments of parts for foreigners, even if Pakistan had no apparent role in the transaction and appeared to receive no direct benefits, American investigators said.

A Made-to-Order Customer

When Libya embarked on a two-step effort to become a nuclear-weapons nation, Dr. Khan's network was presented with an opportunity to sell a particularly sophisticated system. The network was moving to a new level of ambition.

Libya's initial focus was the aging P-1 design, American and European investigators said. But eventually the Libyans sought a more efficient technology, the P-2, made of maraging steel, a superhard alloy. That design has steel rotors that could spin nearly twice as fast as earlier aluminum ones, doubling the rate of enrichment.

The central figure in the Libyan P-2 effort, American officials said, was Mr. Tahir, a Sri Lankan native who had moved to Dubai as a child. Dr. Khan had attended Mr. Tahir's wedding in 1998, Malaysian officials said.

In his speech yesterday, Mr. Bush said Mr. Tahir used a company in Dubai, SMB Computers, ''as a front for the proliferation activities of the A. Q. Khan network.'' Corporate records list him as an owner.

Another associate whose name surfaced in the Libyan deal was Mr. Griffin, the British engineer who long procured gear for Dr. Khan, according to investigators in several countries, corporate records and company officials.

Interviewed by telephone from France, Mr. Griffin, 68, declined to discuss details of his early relationship with Dr. Khan but said he had known him for decades. ''We met ages ago,'' he said.

Mr. Griffin said that all the items he sent to Pakistan were approved by the British Department of Trade and Industry and that he had done nothing illegal. He said the British authorities had seized his computer in June from his home in France. That had given rise to false ''suspicions that Gulf Technical Industries and myself were doing things for Libya,'' Mr. Griffin said. ''There's no such truth in it.''

In June 2000, according to investigators and public records, Mr. Griffin set up a trading company in Dubai, Gulf Technical Industries. The following year, it contracted with a Malaysian manufacturing conglomerate to make sophisticated parts.

The manufacturer, Scomi Group Berhad, said it signed a contract with Gulf Technical in December 2001 to supply the components. Mr. Griffin and Mr. Tahir had met with company officials months earlier, in February 2001, to discuss the possible deal, said Rohaida Ali Badaruddin, a Scomi spokeswoman. After the contract was signed, Scomi set up Scomi Precision Engineering, hired some 40 workers, bought costly machine tools and began work, she said.

Dr. Khan provided the blueprints for the machines and parts, said a close aide to General Musharraf who is familiar with the Pakistani investigation. ''He had given most of the designs,'' the aide said. At one point Dr. Khan suggested that two of his senior aides join the Malaysian enterprise, the aide said.

Scomi Precision made its first shipment to Gulf Technical in December 2002 and the last in August 2003. Investigators said the shipments were largely P-2 centrifuge parts.

Throughout the work at Scomi Precision, the man known as Tinner, an engineer sent from Dubai by Mr. Tahir, was on site overseeing the work, a Scomi official said.

In a statement, Scomi said the shipments had consisted only of ''14 semifinished components.'' Company officials said they never knew of the intended use of the parts.

A senior Bush administration official disputed the company's account, saying it would be highly unlikely that someone there did not know what they were producing. American and European weapons experts also said that the shipment headed for Libya contained thousands of centrifuge parts.

''Their goal was far reaching,'' a top European nuclear expert said of the Libyans. ''They had ordered this very large amount.''

Mr. Griffin acknowledged that he had been to Malaysia and that he and Mr. Tahir had met with Scomi officials. But he said the discussion had to do with exports of tank trucks, a deal he said never materialized. Mr. Griffin said that if Mr. Tahir had continued to meet with Scomi officials, or struck any deals, he had not authorized it.

But a Scomi official insisted the meeting was to discuss Scomi's contract for finely tooled parts.

Malaysian officials said Mr. Tahir was under investigation in Malaysia, but was not under arrest. His younger brother, Sayed Ibrahim Bukhari, said in a telephone interview this week that Mr. Tahir does not hold any ownership position in SMB Computers.

Mr. Bush said the Malaysian authorities had assured Washington that the Scomi factory was no longer producing centrifuge parts.

An American expert said the Libyans planned on making at least 10,000 of the machines. Such a complex would make enough highly enriched uranium each year for about 10 nuclear weapons.

But the advanced centrifuges never reached Libya. They were seized on the BBC China.

When investigators went to Libya, they found that Dr. Khan's network had also provided blueprints for a nuclear weapon. For investigators, it was a startling revelation of how audacious and dangerous the black market had become. And it made them recognize that they did not know who else out there was buying and selling.

Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said, ''We haven't really seen the full picture.''

Reporting for this article was contributed by David Rohde and Talat Hussain from Pakistan, Craig S. Smith from the Netherlands and Tim Golden from New York.

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Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan Photo Credit: Waiza Rafique, Wikipedia Commons

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan: The Opennheimer Of Pakistan – OpEd

By Isha Noor

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a brilliant scientist whose exceptional work prompted Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, appears as an enigmatic figure in the historical events where the strands of science and destiny interwine.

The “Opennheimer of Pakistan,” Abdul Qadeer Khan, was a visionary scientist whose contributions to nuclear technology changed the course of Pakistan. Dr. Khan’s journey was one of brilliance and controversy, leading to his position as a key player in Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Although appreciated in Pakistan for his part in building the nation’s nuclear deterrent, his efforts towards nuclear proliferation sparked concerns around the entire globe. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s tale is still fascinating and t serves as a reminder of how much influence scientific knowledge has on determination of the future of nations. In the end, it is important to recognise both the achievements and the concerns around Dr. Khan to understand the complex interplay between science and politics in the context of nuclear proliferation.

Dr. Khan was born in Bhopal, India, on April 27, 1936, migrated to Pakistan in 1952 and began a remarkable journey that would completely changed the direction of his country’s history permanently. He became a symbol of scientific brilliance and national pride thanks to his groundbreaking contribution in the creation of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. This article examines Dr. Abdul Qadeer’s significant contribution to Pakistan’s nuclear programme and the circumstances that led to his perception as a danger to the West.

In the 1960s, Dr. Khan began his career as a scientist by studying metallurgical engineering in Germany. The foundation for his future contributions to Pakistan’s technological breakthroughs was created by this academic endeavour. As he ventured into the field of nuclear research, Dr. Khan’s experience in metallurgical engineering proved to be a valuable advantage. His early experiences in Western research labs broadened his knowledge. 

The acquirement to uranium centrifuge blueprints, which turn uranium into weapons-grade fuel for nuclear fissile material, was a key contribution to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. While employed by the Anglo-Dutch-German nuclear engineering partnership Urenco, he was accused of stealing it from the Netherlands and transporting it to Pakistan in 1976. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the country’s former prime minister, assigned Khan control over the initiating uranium enrichment programme shortly after he returned to Pakistan. Khan later revealed in a newspaper interview that by 1978 his team had enriched uranium and that by 1984 they were all set to explode a nuclear bomb. Pakistan’s economy fell into a severe decline after the 1998 nuclear test because of the international sanctions.

The Nishan-e-Imtiaz was given to him by the government in recognition of his remarkable contributions in 1996 and again in 1998. . Although Dr. Khan is considered as a national hero in Pakistan, his work and Pakistan’s nuclear programme threatened Western countries, especially the United States. The West saw Pakistan’s groundbreaking achievement of nuclear weapons as a threat because it was concerned about the conflicts that could come with the proliferation of nuclear technology. The potential of nuclear technology slipping into the wrong hands was one of the most important issues that the West emphasised, particularly in the view of the unstable regional security climate. Calls for greater regulation of the transfer of nuclear technology and initiatives to stop proliferation were stimulated by this concern. 

Pakistan’s relations with the West were crucial in the early 2000s by the disclosure of the Khan network.  The network, an illegal proliferation network controlled by Dr. Khan, facilitated the sharing of nuclear technology with other countries, including Iran, Libya and North Korea. Geopolitical dynamics were complicated as a result of the Western response to Pakistan’s nuclear programme and Dr. Khan’s participation in proliferation activities. Pakistan was under pressure from the United States and other Western nations to stop developing nuclear weapons and abide by international non-proliferation standards. Pakistan was in a difficult situation as it tried to establish its right for national security while dealing with the foreign pressure.

It is crucial to comprehend the intricate context in which Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s acts took place. Pakistan believes in nuclear deterrence as the only way to maintain national security and safeguard the country’s sovereignty. In the beginning, Dr. Khan denied any kind of involvement in the nuclear proliferation but he confessed on national television in Pakistan in 2004 that he had given nuclear technology and centrifuge parts to other nations. He asserted that he did not have the Pakistani government’s consent and took full responsibility for his actions. After this confession, Khan was pardoned by Musharraf, although he later walked back his statements. 

“I saved the country for the first time when I made Pakistan a nuclear nation and saved it again when I confessed and took the whole blame on myself,” Khan said in an interview while under effective house arrest.

Pakistan is the first and only Muslim country to have developed and tested nuclear weapons till the date. It was crucial for Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons because of the geostrategic threats including establishing deterrence to deter aggression, ensuring security against India’s nuclear threat, improving national prestige, achieving regional power balance and obtaining diplomatic leverage in peace negotiations. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s work played a major role in the establishment of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. 

In conclusion, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan has been the only driving force behind Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons. His outstanding achievements in the field of nuclear science significantly advanced the nation’s nuclear programme. Dr. Khan’s knowledge of uranium enrichment accelerated Pakistan’s progress towards nuclear capability. Dr. Khan played a crucial part in the creation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, despite the controversies and international concerns. His contributions changed South Asia’s geostrategic environment, changing the security dynamics  and strengthening Pakistan’s position on national security. As the curtains fall on the remarkable contributions of Dr. Khan, it is clear that his unwavering commitment, dedication, and groundbreaking accomplishmentsb have forever cemented his legacy as the Oppennheimer of Pakistan, a visionary scientist whose exceptional work will continue to inspire generations to come. 

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Isha Noor is a student of BS Peace and Conflict studies at National Defence University, Islamabad.

One thought on “ Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan: The Opennheimer Of Pakistan – OpEd ”

Maryam Nawaz when she gives credit to Nawaz Sharif for Pakistan nuclear capability she never mentions the name of Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan. It’s a shame.

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Abdul Qadeer Khan: Nuclear hero in Pakistan, villain to the West

Revered in Pakistan, Khan was seen by West as dangerous renegade for smuggling nuclear technology to other countries.

Abdul Qadeer Khan, revered as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, died on Sunday .

He was lauded in Pakistan for transforming it into the world’s first Islamic nuclear weapons power. But he was seen by the West as a dangerous renegade responsible for smuggling technology to rogue states.

The nuclear scientist died at 85 in the capital, Islamabad, after recently being hospitalised with COVID-19.

He was seen as a national hero for bringing the country up to par with neighbours India in the atomic field and making its defences “impregnable”.

But he found himself in the crosshairs of controversy when he was accused of illegally proliferating nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Khan was placed under effective house arrest in Islamabad in 2004 after he admitted running a proliferation network to the three countries.

In 2006 he was diagnosed with prostate cancer, but recovered after surgery.

A court ended his house arrest in February 2009, but his movements were strictly guarded, and he was accompanied by authorities every time he left his home in an upmarket sector of leafy Islamabad.

Crucial contribution

Born in Bhopal, India, on April 1, 1936, Khan was just a young boy when his family migrated to Pakistan during the bloody 1947 partition of the sub-continent at the end of British colonial rule.

He completed a science degree at Karachi University in 1960, then went on to study metallurgical engineering in Berlin before completing advanced studies in the Netherlands and Belgium.

The crucial contribution to Pakistan’s nuclear programme was the procurement of a blueprint for uranium centrifuges, which transform uranium into weapons-grade fuel for nuclear fissile material.

He was charged with stealing it from the Netherlands while working for Anglo-Dutch-German nuclear engineering consortium Urenco, and bringing it back to Pakistan in 1976.

On his return to Pakistan, then-PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto put Khan in charge of the government’s nascent uranium enrichment project.

By 1978, his team had enriched uranium and by 1984 they were ready to detonate a nuclear device, Khan later said in a newspaper interview.

The 1998 nuclear test saw Pakistan slapped with international sanctions and sent its economy into freefall.

Khan’s aura began to dim in March 2001 when then-President Pervez Musharraf, reportedly under United States pressure, removed him from the chairmanship of Kahuta Research Laboratories and made him a special adviser.

But Pakistan’s nuclear establishment never expected to see its most revered hero subjected to questioning.

The move came after Islamabad received a letter from the International Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations watchdog, containing allegations that Pakistani scientists were the source of sold-off nuclear knowledge.

Khan said in a speech to the Pakistan Institute of National Affairs in 1990 that he had dealings on world markets while developing Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

“It was not possible for us to make each and every piece of equipment within the country,” he said.

‘I saved the country’

Khan was pardoned by Musharraf after his confession but later retracted his remarks.

“I saved the country for the first time when I made Pakistan a nuclear nation and saved it again when I confessed and took the whole blame on myself,” Khan told AFP news agency in an interview in 2008 while under effective house arrest.

The scientist believed in nuclear defence as the best deterrent.

After Pakistan carried out atomic tests in 1998 in response to tests by India, Khan said Pakistan “never wanted to make nuclear weapons, it was forced to do so”.

Nearly a decade ago, Khan tried his luck in the political arena, forming a party – the Tehreek-e-Tahafuz Pakistan (Save Pakistan Movement) – in July 2012 in hopes of winning votes on the basis of the respect he still commands in Pakistan.

But he dissolved it a year later after none of its 111 candidates won a seat in national elections.

Khan also stirred a new controversy that same year when, in an interview with Urdu newspaper Daily Jang, he said he transferred nuclear technology to two countries on the direction of slain prime minister Benazir Bhutto.

He did not name the countries, nor did he say when Bhutto, the twice-elected PM who was assassinated in 2007, had supposedly issued the orders.

“I was not independent but was bound to abide by the orders of the prime minister,” he was quoted as saying.

Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party denied the claim as “baseless and unfounded”.

None of the controversies appear to have dented Khan’s popularity, even years on.

He regularly wrote op-ed pieces, often preaching the value of a scientific education, for the popular Jang group of newspapers.

Many schools, universities, institutes and charity hospitals across Pakistan are named after him, his portrait decorating their signs, stationery and websites.