denver international airport project management case study

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Lessons Learned from Project Failure at Denver International Airport: Why Checking Bags is Still a Pain

October 30, 2021 - 7 min read

We regularly review major projects to  extract valuable lessons and pass on the knowledge so that everyone can benefit. One failed project we recently took an interest in is Denver International Airport's luggage handling system.

I was compelled to study this project because checking bags at the airport is still one of my biggest fears. My eye twitches just thinking about it. You can never predict how long check-in lines will be, suitcases are lost daily, and human baggage handlers have a tendency to manhandle their wards. We have probably all wondered why airports haven't come up with a better system by now.

The Failed Project of Denver International Airport

It's not that airports haven't tried to fix the baggage system. When construction started on the new Denver International Airport, it was supposed to come with a brand-new automated system for handling luggage travel and transfers. The goal was to replace the standard reliance on manual labor with a fully-automated baggage system that would also integrate all three terminals. It would reduce aircraft turn-around time for faster service to travelers.

But the project went 16 months past its hard deadline, cost the city $560 million over budget, and performed just a fraction of its original automation goals. Instead of integrating the three concourses and all airlines, it was only used at one concourse, for one airline, for outbound flights only. The project team had to resort to building a second, manual labor system for all other baggage operations. And after valiantly attempting to use the system for 10 years, the only airline that actually adopted the system finally bowed out due to high maintenance costs.

The project ended in spectacular failure — and from their mistakes,  we stand to learn a lot about project communication, scope creep , and poor project definition .

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3 Lessons We Should Learn from Denver

1. Listen when people say, "This isn't going to work."

Warning #1: After airport construction started, the City of Denver hired Breier Neidle Patrone Associates to evaluate if the proposed baggage system project was feasible. The company flat-out stated that  the plan was too complex . The city decided to pursue the possibility anyway.

Warning #2: A similar, simpler project in Munich took a full two years to be completed, followed by six months of 24/7 testing prior to the actual launch. The larger, much more complex Denver International Airport system was due to open in a little over two years. Which means that Denver International Airport was trying to  cram a very complicated project into a very short timeline . The Munich airport advised that it was a project set up to fail. Despite the worrying outlook, the City of Denver decided to proceed without altering their schedule.

Warning #3: When the airport began accepting bids on the new luggage system project, only three companies submitted proposals. Of those proposals, none of them predicted they'd be able to finish the project within the allotted timeframe. The city rejected all three bids, and instead approached a fourth company, BAE Systems, to convince them to take on the superhuman project; again,  without changing the proposed timeline .

Warning #4: Senior managers at BAE Systems expressed initial misgivings about the project's complexity. They estimated a 4-year timeline instead of 2 years, but the  concern was ignored and the project went on with its 2-year deadline still in place.

Four ignored warnings later, nothing had changed. If the City of Denver or the project team had heeded any of these caution flares regarding project complexity and tight deadlines, they would have changed their timeline or scaled back their goals. Instead they barreled ahead, and as a result their project went far past deadline, cost millions of extra dollars, with the final product a disappointing shadow of its original design.

 If the project failure of Denver International Airport teaches you only one thing, it's this:  pay attention to the flashing red lights . Listening to project advice keeps us from dedicating ourselves to impossible projects.

2. Don't wait to involve all parties affected by the project

While BAE Systems and the airport's larger project management team were the steamrollers on the project, they were ultimately not the parties affected by the outcome. Airlines renting space in the airport would be most impacted by the outcome of the automated baggage system. Yet they were not brought into the planning discussions. These  key stakeholders were excluded from the initial decision-making — an open invitation for failure.

Once the airlines were finally asked for their opinions,  they required major changes from the project team: adding ski equipment racks, different handling for oversized luggage, and separate maintenance tracks for broken carts. The requests required major redesign on portions of the project — some of which had already been "completed." But these requests were not optional features for the airlines, and the project team was forced to redo their work.

By waiting to approach stakeholders, the project team  wasted time and money . Had they approached the airlines right away, they would have been able to incorporate these requests into early project plans. They would have shaved off months of extra labor if they didn't have to redo completed work; not overshooting their deadline by 16 months would have saved them a good chunk of the extra $560 million spent. 

It is essential that we include stakeholders from Day 1 to avoid wasting time and money. Don't make the same mistake of waiting until halfway through a project to collect vital requirements.

3. Beware of "Big Bang" projects meant to change the world

Another project complication was the decision to go with an  all-at-once "Big Bang" rollout to all three concourses, as opposed to slower, incremental rollout. In an  article dissecting the problems with Denver International Airport's baggage system project plan , Webster & Associates LLC, an IT consulting company, said that this was one of the biggest project flaws. BAE Systems  should have tested the new automated system in sections to make sure it would work before implementing it throughout the rest of the airport.

This project was the first attempt at an automated system of this size and complexity, and was meant to change the way that airports handled baggage. They wanted instant, large-scale success. Instead, the final product fell short of everyone's expectations.

The best way to get big results is to first ensure you can  create a successful minimal viable product . Once your MVP works well, repeat the process on a larger playing ground, slowly scaling efforts until you reach the end goal.

Project Failure is Not Fatal

Although the automated baggage system failed, today the Denver International Airport is fully functional. I've even taken my skis through their airport without issue. And as long as we learn valuable lessons from their mistakes, we shouldn't consider this project a complete failure — just a painful boo-boo.

Next time you're working on a project, remember these three lessons and avoid facing the same fate as Denver International Airport:

1. Watch for red flags, and heed the warnings of experts. 2. Involve all project stakeholders from Day 1. 3. Take small steps to successfully reach the end goal.

 Good luck on your next projects and next flights!

Related Articles:

•  10 Reasons Projects Fail: Lessons from the Death Star •  3 Kinds of Data to Help Avoid Project Management Failure

Sources: http://calleam.com/WTPF/?page_id=2086 , http://calleam.com/WTPF/content/uploads/articles/DIABaggage.pdf,  http://www.computerworld.com/article/2556725/it-project-management/united-axes-troubled-baggage-system-at-denver-airport.html ,  http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/154219.pdf ,  http://www.eis.mdx.ac.uk/research/SFC/Reports/TR2002-01.pdf

Ashley Coolman

Ashley is a former Content Marketing Manager of Wrike. She specializes in social media, dry humor, and Oxford commas.

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RACI Improved: Structuring Responsibilities with the Help of Project Management 2.0 Software

In one of my recent posts I wrote that using project management 2.0 software helps project manager guide his team’s work, delegate some of his initial duties and allocate roles and responsibilities so that they are clear to everybody on the team. Project management 2.0 tools also let one apply some traditional methodologies of structuring responsibilities more effectively. Let’s take RACI as an example. Originally a RACI diagram, or RACI matrix, is used to describe the roles and accountabilities of various teams or people in project delivery and operations. It is especially useful in clarifying responsibilities in cross-functional/departmental projects and processes. The RACI diagram splits tasks into four participatory responsibility types, which are then assigned to different roles in the project. These responsibilities’ types make up the acronym RACI. Responsible (R) - offer commitment, skills, and contributions that shape a project’s final outcome. In short, this is the “doer”, who actually completes the task. This person is responsible for action/implementation. There can be several people responsible for one task. Accountable/Approver (A) - a person ultimately answerable for the correct and thorough completion of the task. There must be only one Accountable specified for each task. Consulted (C) – those who are consulted before the final decision or action is made. Informed (I) - those who are kept up-to-date on progress. Your clients, for example. Applying the RACI method provides maximum benefit when responsibilities are not clear, for example, when a project team is formed by members from several organizations, who report to different managers, have no imposed governance model and have a hard time achieving objectives on time. I agree with Michael L Smith and James Erwin who say that trying to complete a big project in bureaucratic environment without clearly establishing roles and responsibilities, is like trying to parallel park with one eye closed. RACI’s core advantage is that it helps to avoid potential responsibility uncertainty. However, despite all the benefits, the RACI model does have some disadvantages. Data collection cycle and information exchange flows may be too slow. Project management 2.0 software can help eliminate these drawbacks and speed up the communications. With project management 2.0 software, everybody can clearly see who is accountable for each task.  Visibility brought by emergent structures makes it possible to keep all the responsibilities clear for everybody on the team. Emergent structures brought by the second-generation tools let have the full insight into what each RACI team member is working on. For example, A can easily follow the work of Rs. At the same time, project work can be easily adjusted to changes in the environment, by reassigning roles, changing work-breakdown structures and task flow in seconds. This flexibility helps to bring iterative and incremental practices into project management without giving away the control. Second, it is very easy to plug in responsible, consulted and informed people. Project management 2.0 software lets all the members of the RACI team work in one flexible Web-based collaborative environment. Teams can collect all the relevant information in one place, thus minimizing the time of information exchange. Everyone on the team will be able to access the data anytime he needs it without pulling information out of his colleagues. This means that team members can collaborate seamlessly, building work structures with less central control, assigning tasks and defining roles. For example, if there are several Rs assigned to one task they can work together, keeping all the relevant discussions, files, notes, links in one place that can also be accessed by A, C and I. Last, but not least, thanks to many-to-many structures, each member of the team his own perspective of a project. Each team member becomes more productive because they can follow their own portion of the work and see its relationship to the project as a whole. The RACI method, when combined with project management 2.0 technologies, allows teams to become more agile and react to changes going on inside and outside the organization at a faster pace. RACI is not the only methodology that can be made more efficient by the second-generation tools. You are very welcome to provide your examples in the comments.

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Why Do Projects Fail?

Denver airport baggage system case study.

Read the full case study – Denver International Airport Baggage Handling System case study – or read the abstract below.

Denver International

Originally billed as the most advanced system in the world, the baggage handling system at the new Denver International Airport was to become one of the most notorious examples of project failure.  Originally planned to automate the handling of baggage through the entire airport, the system proved to be far more complex than some had original believed.  The problems building the system resulted in the newly complete airport sitting idle for 16 months while engineers worked on getting the baggage system to work.

Denver Baggage Handling System

The delay added approximately $560M USD to the cost of the airport and became a feature article in Scientific American titled the Software’s Chronic Crisis.  At the end of the day, the system that was finally implemented was a shadow of what was originally planned.  Rather than integrating all three concourses into a single system, the system supported outbound flights on a single concourse only.  All other baggage was handled by a manual tug and trolley system that was hurriedly built when it became clear the automated system would never meet its goals.

Conveyor Belts

Even the portion of the system that was implemented never functioned properly and in Aug 2005 the system was scrapped altogether.  The $1M monthly cost to maintain the system was outweighing the value the remaining parts of the system offered and using a manual system actually cut costs.

Contributing factors as reported in the press : Underestimation of complexity.  Complex architecture.  Changes in requirements.  Underestimation of schedule and budget.  Dismissal of advice from experts.  Failure to build in backup or recovery process to handle situations in which part of the system failed.  The tendency of the system to enjoy eating people’s baggage.

Full case study : For more information read the following in-depth analysis – Denver International Airport Baggage Handling System case study

Related story : In Apr 2008 British Airways & British Airports Authority encountered serious problems when Heathrow’s Terminal 5 opened.  Again Baggage system glitches were a major contributor to the problem.

Reference links :

• MSNBC on Denver’s Automated Baggage System

Other case studies :

• US Census Bureau – Field Data Collection Automation project

• Harvard Business School →
• Faculty & Research →
• April 1996 (Revised November 1996)
• HBS Case Collection

BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System

• Format: Print
• | Language: English
• | Pages: 15

About The Author

Lynda M. Applegate

Related work.

• May 1996 (Revised October 2001)
• Faculty Research

BAE Automated Systems (B): Implementing the Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System

• BAE Automated Systems (B): Implementing the Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System  By: Lynda M. Applegate, H. James Nelson, Ramiro Montealegre and Carin-Isabel Knoop

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Lessons Learned: The Denver International Airport Automated Baggage-Handling System

The Denver International Airport (DIA) is renowned for its iconic tent-like structure, but it is also infamous in engineering and project management circles for its ambitious yet flawed automated baggage-handling system. This system, which was intended to revolutionize the airport industry, instead became a case study in the pitfalls of over-ambitious engineering and poor project management.

The automated baggage-handling system was designed in the early 1990s to be the jewel in DIA’s crown. It promised to use cutting-edge technology to transport luggage from check-in to aircraft with minimal human intervention, thereby increasing efficiency, reducing mishandled luggage, and improving passenger experience. However, the system never fully functioned as intended, leading to significant delays in the airport’s opening and substantial financial losses. There were many factors that led to the failure of the system.

Causal Factors

• Unproven Technology: The system was based on unproven technology that had never been used on such a large scale. The use of automated carts to transport luggage was a novel idea, but the technology was not mature enough to handle the complexity and volume of luggage at DIA. The carts often malfunctioned, leading to delays and lost luggage.
• Complexity: The system’s complexity was a major technical challenge. It was designed to handle 60,000 bags per day, with a network of 21 miles of conveyor belts and track, and hundreds of autonomous carts. The system was intended to use barcodes and radio frequency identification (RFID) tags to track and sort bags. However, the system often misread or failed to read the barcodes, leading to misrouted bags.
• System Integration: The system was designed to integrate with the airport’s other systems, such as check-in and flight scheduling. However, this integration was poorly executed, leading to further technical issues. For example, if a flight was delayed or rescheduled, the system often failed to update the baggage routing information, leading to bags being sent to the wrong planes.
• Capacity: The system was not designed to handle peak volumes of luggage. During peak times, the system was overwhelmed, leading to jams and delays. This was a fundamental design flaw that could not be easily fixed.
• Reliability: The system was plagued by reliability issues. The autonomous carts often collided or derailed, and the conveyor belts frequently jammed. These reliability issues led to frequent system shutdowns and contributed to the airport’s inability to open on schedule.
• Software Issues: The software controlling the system was also problematic. It was supposed to coordinate the movements of hundreds of carts and thousands of bags, but it often failed, leading to system-wide shutdowns. The software was also unable to effectively manage the system’s complexity and volume, leading to further technical issues.

The City of Denver had warning signs early on that were not heeded.

• Upon commencing airport construction, the city enlisted Breier Neidle Patrone Associates to assess the feasibility of the proposed baggage system project. The firm outright stated that the plan was overly complex. Nevertheless, the city chose to pursue the project despite the cautionary advice.
• Drawing from the experience of a similar, but simpler project in Munich, which took a full two years for completion and six months of rigorous 24/7 testing before launch, it became evident that the much larger and more intricate Denver International Airport system was being squeezed into an extremely tight two-year timeline. The Munich airport authorities warned that this approach was destined to fail. Despite these concerns, the City of Denver decided to press ahead without adjusting their schedule.
• When the airport invited bids for the new luggage system project, only three companies submitted proposals. None of these proposals projected completion within the given timeframe. Undeterred, the city rejected all three bids and approached a fourth company, BAE Systems, urging them to take on this nearly impossible project without extending the proposed timeline.

From a project management perspective, the baggage-handling system was a textbook example of scope creep and poor risk management. The project’s scope was expanded mid-way through construction to include all airlines, not just United, which dramatically increased its complexity. This decision was made without a thorough risk assessment or consideration of the additional resources and time required.

The failure led to significant financial losses. The airport opened in February, 1995, 16 months behind schedule with cost overruns estimated at $560 million, much of which was attributed to the baggage system. The system was eventually decommissioned in 2005, and a traditional manual system was installed in its place.

However, the failure also led to some positive changes in the industry—it highlighted the importance of thorough testing and risk management in large-scale projects, and spurred innovation in baggage handling technology, with a greater focus on reliability and scalability.

In conclusion, the failure of DIA’s automated baggage-handling system was a significant event in the history of airport engineering and project management. It serves as a stark reminder of the risks of over-ambitious engineering and poor project management. However, it also provides valuable lessons that can help prevent similar failures in the future. The key takeaways are the importance of thorough risk assessment, realistic project scope, adequate testing, and the careful implementation of new technology.

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The one thing you missed is that the Scope Creep was likely do to upper-level people who were only looking for the praise that would come with as system that could do it all. Missing who the stockholders are is the fastest way to have a project fail. Often those who are told to make it happen, are not listened to. Failures of this type happen because those making the decisions are lacking the technical experience to make those decisions. This leads to Scope Creep and eventual project failure.

It was a political/politics/politicians failure.

It is not the first and will not be the last engineering failure event

Very interesting case. A system like this should have been installed in a smaller airport first. I think that governments should always spend capital money based on high level of assurances and not ambitions.

Reading the article I see that there were overruns in the area of $560 million dollars, however I wonder what were the direct costs attributed to the baggage handling system itself. As noted by Kamal above it sounds like the system should have been installed at a smaller airport first. Another option would have been going with known technology & having provisions for a cutting edge system to be installed / incorporated at a future date.

Yet Amazon probably does this on a larger scale on a daily basis in its distribution centers. Better design & planning? Using a system integrator who knows what they’re doing?

Unfortunately, politics and engineering make poor bedfellows…..

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Case Study - Denver International Airport Baggage Handling System - An illustration of ineffectual decision making

• Calleam Consulting Ltd
• Published 2008
• Engineering, Business

9 Citations

A risk assessment framework for airport development projects, planning, tracking, and reducing a complex project’s value at risk, application of predictive analytics in telecommunications project management, empirical study of root cause analysis of software failure, the impact of situational factors on information system (is) managerial leader behaviors: what information systems employees want, stakeholder engagement: achieving sustainability in the construction sector, diagnosing wicked problems, international journal of advanced research in computer science and software engineering, high profile systems illustrating contradistinctive aspects of systems engineering, 9 references, the baggage system at denver: prospects and lessons, the denver international airport baggage handling system, related papers.

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• Prof. Olivier de Weck
• Dr. James Lyneis
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• Engineering Systems Division

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System project management, case studies.

HBS Case: 9–396–311, BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System describes the events surrounding the construction of the BAE baggage-handling system at the Denver International Airport. It looks specifically at project management, including decisions regarding budget, scheduling, and the overall management structure. Also examines the airport’s attempt to work with a great number of outside contractors, including BAE, and coordinate them into a productive whole, while under considerable political pressures. Approaches the project from the point of view of BAE’s management, which struggles to fulfill its contract, work well with project management and other contractors, and deal with supply, scheduling, and engineering difficulties. Setting: Denver, CO; Construction industry; Engineering; 365 employees; 1989–1994.

Alternatively, we will discuss a “live” case based on BP’s emerging wind energy portfolio in North America.

HBS Case: 9–601–040, The Rise and Fall of Iridium Examines the history of Iridium Communications, a provider of mobile satellite services. Discusses the genesis of Iridium’s technical design, and then follows the venture through various stages of development. Describes Iridium’s attempts to build a subscriber base after the launch of commercial service, ending with the company’s filing for Chapter 11 in 1999.

HBS Case: 9–602–086, Microsoft.NET Set in the summer of 2000, following the unveiling of Microsoft’s .NET initiative to the public. Three of the key figures in .NET’s development are considering the next steps they would have to take to keep the initiative moving forward. Specifically, the challenges they face include the retirement of a key executive sponsor and the need to make major changes across many of Microsoft’s core products. The protagonists must come up with a process and an organizational structure to keep the initiative moving forward. Setting: Global; Software industry; $22.9 billion revenues; 14,000 employees; 2000. (Alternatively: Microsoft Office 2000 case)

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The Denver International Airport Story or Everything You Ever Wanted To Know About How Not To Run A Project (Pt. 1)

In the annals of project management literature, there are few stories as compelling as that of the Denver International Airport (DIA).  DIA – which was to replace Stapleton International Airport – was scheduled to open in October of 1994 with the construction budget being set at $2B. It eventually opened 16 months late, ultimately costing $4.8B, an almost 250% increase. Maintaining the empty airport and interest charges on construction loans cost the city of Denver $1.1M per day throughout the delay. The main reason pointed to for the delay was scope changes requested by United Airlines. ( Italics and boldface are mine.)

If you want to read the full story, there are many case studies on the Internet. I’ve quoted from a few below. (Tellingly, one of them is subtitled “An illustration of ineffectual decision making.” 1 ) If you’re pressed for time, consider this an executive summary. For the record, DIA is, of course, open. I’ve flown into it a number of times in the past few years and it’s quite nice. So this is not the story of a project that was abandoned. It is the story of a technology project run amok, which became much harder and much more expensive than it ever had to. There are far too many reasons underlying this fiasco to fit in this post. I will focus here on three, summarizing some others below:

Design complexity/Scope changes

The baggage handling capabilities of the system – or lack thereof – are fundamental to understanding the initial massive failure. They represent the vast majority of the scope changes requested by the airlines. In short, everyone involved underestimated the complexity of the system.  But even when it was pointed out that A) the system was too complex and B) no bidder could build it on time, the decision was made to go ahead anyway. (See below, Project Management Expertise.) And even if the complexity issue had been factored in – and solved- it never occurred to anyone to update the original schedule, much less budget. ( Scope Creep ).

I will now here quote project management guru Harold Kerzner on the complexity of this proposed “never-been-done-before” baggage handling system: “The system would contain 100 computers, 56 laser scanners, conveyor belts, and thousands of motors. … It would contain 400 fiberglass carts, each carrying a single suitcase through 22 miles (!) of steel tracks. Operating at 20 MPH, it could deliver 60,000 bags per hour from dozens of gates. ..To illustrate the complexity of the situation, consider 4000 taxicabs in a major city, all without drivers, being controlled by a computer through the streets of a city.” 2 ( Google working on something like this?) For the record, there were some 2100 design changes.

In April 1994, the airport arranged for a demonstration of what is likely the most complex – luggage handling system ever built. (Alas, without informing BAE Systems, who designed it). Result? In a nutshell, bags were crushed, clothes disgorged, and public humiliation was had. Jay Leno, then of the Tonight Show, had a field day with it. (To be continued).

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Denver International Airport Harvard Case Solution & Analysis

Home >> Harvard Case Study Analysis Solutions >> Denver International Airport

Denver International Airport Case Study Solution

Problem statement & justification of the problem statement.

The first stage of the project management is setting the objective of the project as in the case of the Denver International Airport, the objective was the replacement of Denver’s Stapleton project, to improve the baggage delivery cycle time and ground efficiency, reduce the close out time for hub operations and decrease the manual handling. It could be seen that the objective was clearly stated otherwise if the wrong objective was set, then the project would be on the wrong track.

The problem arose in the second stage of the project management, where the officials announced the budget of the project, which was $1.2 billion, however Denver’s voters passed a referendum at the estimated cost of $1.7 billion. The problem was that the cost should be analyzed before the starting of the project, as it would help the company in investing in the right project because if the project cost is more than its benefits, then the project would not be feasible to go start off with. On the other hand, the first selected company increased the cost by $48 million therefore, another company was selected to analyze the cost of the project, which resulted in unnecessary time and cost.

Another important issue was that the timing of the project should be set before the starting of the project because unnecessary delay will increase the cost of the company. As in the case of the Denver International airport, the project was delayed four times, sometimes due to handling of the system and sometimes due to security issues. This would also result in negatively affecting the company’s reputation.

Another issue in the airport project was that no one was responsible for the success of the project, as in the project management, a project sponsor should be assigned who would be responsible for the project. Moreover, the project manager and project team should also be assigned for the project. In Denver International Airport project, two companies were selected to assist the project, however due to unusual split of responsibilities, it was decided that who would finally be responsible of the failure of the project.

Another issue in the failure of the project was that the series of changes in the original plan. The important principle of the project management was that proper business case should be made at the start of the project, which should be approved by the senior management of the company and proper plan should be made i.e. how to handle the project however, in Denver International Airport, all the decisions are to made in reaction to the maintenance. This created a problem for the design team because the project requirement was not specified at the start of the project.

Another important issue in project management was the poor communication among the staff, lack of compliance with present conditions, failure to objectively assess the situation and escalating the situation and poor planning at the early stage of the project.

Another problem in the project management was that the benefits were not identified in the business as to what the benefits will be if the project will be successful, as this would help the company to assess whether the project would be successful or not, and lastly, the performance of the sponsor should be assessed and he should be made responsible for it.

Leadership is an important principle of the project management. In this case, the sponsor died in October 1992 without any succession planning, after which replacement manager retained prior responsibilities and therefore, was extended to the maximum value.

Possible alternatives & Evaluation of the alternatives;-

First of all, proper business case should be made in which project objectives, cost benefit analysis, timelines, project stakeholders i.e. project sponsor, project manager and team, any constraints and their solution/recommendation, risk management should be included in the business case and should be approved by the senior management of the company.

Project objectives:-

Objective is an important principle of the project management because without proper establishment of the objective, the project will be on the wrong track and will not benefit the company. A proper objective will help the company to gain competitive advantage and remain profitable and increase the shareholders’ wealth.

Denver International Airport Harvard Case Solution & Analysis

Cost benefit analysis:-

For making the project successful, cost benefit analysis is important as it would help the company identify if the project is feasible or not. If the benefits exceed the cost, then the project would be feasible and that the company should go ahead whereas, if the cost increases the benefit, then the project is not feasible due to which the company should not go ahead. This step should be implemented before the starting of the project. However, the detailed cost benefit analysis will require a lot of time at the start of the project, but it should be acceptable by the company rather than investing in the wrong project...................

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Denver Airport Baggage Handling System Case Study – Calleam Consulting Case Study – Denver International Airport Baggage Handling System – An illustration of ineffectual decision making

Synopsis Dysfunctional decision making is the poison that kills technology projects and the Denver Airport Baggage System project in the 1990's is a classic example. Although several case studies have been written about the Denver project, the following paper reexamines the case by looking at the key decisions that set the project on the path to disaster and the forces behind those decisions.

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Megaprojects continue to play a prominent role in promoting economic development, and have proliferated rapidly worldwide. But, as they have grown larger in number, size, and complexity, their planning, implementation and ultimate success become increasingly problematic. Most encounter unexpected difficulties and seldom achieve their original objectives. This article addresses the reasons for this state of affairs by focusing upon the relevance of the Rational model of decision making to the case of the new Denver International Airport. It traces its evolution and considers the extent to which the Rational model explains the major events. It concludes that this model has only limited explanatory power because it does not incorporate political elements which play a major role in megaprojects. The Rational model can be successfully applied to an entire project only where the political system permits a powerful agency to design and implement the project. This condition is rarely met in democratic societies, especially in the U.S. Furthermore, its applicability is limited by the new environment in which planning takes place, an environment that is marked by the emergence of new actors and increasing turbulence and uncertainty. Accordingly, recognition of the role of power suggests that the utility of the Rational model is limited and that alternative planning approaches that emphasize consensus building and flexibility need to be developed for megaproject planning.

César Martínez

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DEN Receives Award for Excellence in Transportation Demand Management for Peña Mobility Study

Denver International Airport (DEN) was recently awarded the 2024 Association for Commuter Transportation (ACT) Excellence in Planning Award for DEN’s Transportation Demand Management (TDM) Plan. DEN’s TDM Plan aims to improve airport access for passengers and employees while promoting sustainable transportation options.

“DEN’s passengers and employees depend on a well-developed, multi-modal transportation system to access the airport. Our Transportation Demand Management Plan aims to improve ground transportation to and from DEN as we prepare to serve 100 million passengers annually while promoting sustainable transportation,” DEN CEO Phil Washington said. “As our plan moves to the next phases and as alternatives to drive alone trips are refined, we will remain committed to improving commuter and community mobility to create a better journey for passengers, employees and other Peña Boulevard users.”

DEN’s Mobility Study was conducted to identify strategies to reduce demand on Peña Boulevard and other roadways, reduce the environmental impacts associated with vehicle trips and improve access to the airport for employees and passengers. The award DEN received specifically recognizes that the TDM program will reduce employee drive-alone trips by ten percent and increase passenger use of transit by ten percent, all before 2035, by implementing strategies to incentivize employees to take alternative modes of transportation. Examples of these strategies include the option to purchase a transit ticket when airline tickets are purchased, as well as vanpool and carpool programs for employees, among others. Additionally, DEN secured a $1.2 million grant in 2023 to begin implementing the TDM program.

The next step in this process is for DEN to begin implementing its TDM plan, which includes 20 different strategies that encourage passengers and employees alike to consider sustainable transportation to the airport.

DEN’s TDM plan is available on flydenver.com .

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Case Study – Denver International Airport Baggage Handling System –... illustration of ineffectual decision making

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