problem solving for neighbourhood policing

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Community-Oriented Policing and Problem-Oriented Policing

In 1979, Hermon Goldstein observed from several studies conducted at the time on standard policing practices that law enforcement agencies seemed to be more concerned about the means rather than the goals of policing. He argued that law enforcement agencies should shift away from the traditional, standard model of policing and that police become more proactive, rather than reactive, in their approaches to crime and disorder (Hinkle et al., 2020; Weisburd et al., 2010). Goldstein’s work set the stage for the development of two new models of policing: community-oriented policing (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP).

COP is a broad policing strategy that relies heavily on community involvement and partnerships, and on police presence in the community, to address local crime and disorder. POP provides law enforcement agencies with an analytic method to develop strategies to prevent and reduce crime and disorder, which involves problem identification, analysis, response, and assessment (National Research Council, 2018).

Although COP and POP differ in many ways, including the intensity of focus and diversity of approaches (National Research Council, 2004), there are several important similarities between them. For example, COP and POP both represent forms of proactive policing, meaning they focus on preventing crime before it happens rather than just reacting to it after it happens. Further, both COP and POP require cooperation among multiple agencies and partners, including community members (National Research Council, 2018). In addition, POP and COP overlap in that each involves the community in defining the problems and identifying interventions (Greene, 2000).

Although few studies focus on youth involvement in COP and POP, youths can play an important role in both strategies. In COP, youths often are part of the community with whom police work to identify and address problems. Youths can be formally involved in the process (i.e., engaging in local community meetings) or informally involved in efforts to strengthen the relationship between the police and members of the community. For example, a police officer on foot patrol may decide to engage with youths in the community through casual conversation, as part of a COP approach (Cowell and Kringen, 2016). Or police might encourage youth to participate in activities, such as police athletic leagues, which were designed to prevent and reduce the occurrence of juvenile crime and delinquency, while also seeking to improve police and youth attitudes toward each other (Rabois and Haaga, 2002). Using POP, law enforcement agencies may specifically focus on juvenile-related problems of crime and disorder. For example, the Operation Ceasefire intervention, implemented in Boston, MA, is a POP strategy that concentrated on reducing homicide victimization among young people in the city (Braga and Pierce, 2005).

This literature review discusses COP and POP in two separate sections. In each section, definitions of the approaches are provided, along with discussions on theory, examples of specific types of programs, overlaps with other policing strategies, and outcome evidence.

Specific research on how police and youth interact with each other in the community will not be discussed in this review but can be found in the Interactions Between Youth and Law Enforcement literature review on the Model Programs Guide.  

Community-Oriented Policing Definition

Community-oriented policing (COP), also called community policing, is defined by the federal Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services as “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systemic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime” (Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, 2012:3). This policing strategy focuses on developing relationships with members of the community to address community problems, by building social resilience and collective efficacy, and by strengthening infrastructure for crime prevention. COP also emphasizes preventive, proactive policing; the approach calls for police to concentrate on solving the problems of crime and disorder in neighborhoods rather than simply responding to calls for service. This model considerably expands the scope of policing activities, because the targets of interest are not only crimes but also sources of physical and social disorder (Weisburd et al., 2008).

After gaining acceptance as an alternative to traditional policing models in the 1980s, COP has received greater attention and been used more frequently throughout the 21st century (Greene, 2000; National Research Council, 2018; Paez and Dierenfeldt, 2020). The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 articulated the goal of putting 100,000 additional community police officers on the streets and established the federal Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services. Research from 2013 suggests that 9 out of 10 law enforcement agencies in the United States that serve a population of 25,000 or more had adopted some type of community policing strategy (Reaves, 2015).

COP comprises three key components (Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, 2012):

• Community Partnerships. COP encourages partnerships with stakeholders in the community, including other government agencies (prosecutors, health and human services, child support services and schools); community members/groups (volunteers, activists, residents, and other individuals who have an interest in the community); nonprofits/service providers (advocacy groups, victim groups, and community development corporations); and private businesses. The media also are an important mechanism that police use to communicate with the community.
• Organizational Transformation. COP emphasizes the alignment of management, structure, personnel, and information systems within police departments to support the philosophy. These changes may include increased transparency, leadership that reinforces COP values, strategic geographic deployment, training, and access to data.
• Problem-Solving. Proactive, systematic, routine problem-solving is the final key component of COP. COP encourages police to develop solutions to underlying conditions that contribute to public safety problems, rather than responding to crime only after it occurs. The SARA model (which stands for Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment) is one major conceptual model of problem-solving that can be used by officers (for a full description of the SARA model, see Problem-Oriented Policing below).

At the heart of COP is a redefinition of the relationship between the police and the community, so that the two collaborate to identify and solve community problems. Through this relationship, the community becomes a “co-producer” of public safety in that the problem-solving process draws on citizen expertise in identifying and understanding social issues that create crime, disorder, and fear in the community (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Gill et al., 2014; National Research Council, 2018).

COP is not a single coherent program; rather, it encompasses a variety of programs or strategies that rest on the assumption that policing must involve the community. Elements typically associated with COP programs include the empowerment of the community; a belief in a broad police function; the reliance of police on citizens for authority, information, and collaboration; specific tactics (or tactics that are targeted at particular problems, such as focused deterrence strategies) rather than general tactics (or tactics that are targeted at the general population, such as preventive patrol); and decentralized authority to respond to local needs (Zhao, He, and Lovrich, 2003). One Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) survey of MCCA members found that some of the most common COP activities were officer representation at community meetings, bicycle patrols, citizen volunteers, foot patrols, police “mini-stations” (see description below), and neighborhood storefront offices (Scrivner and Stephens, 2015; National Research Council, 2018).

Community members who engage in COP programs generally report positive experiences. For example, residents who received home visits by police officers as part of a COP intervention reported high confidence in police and warmth toward officers, compared with residents who did not receive visits (Peyton et al., 2019). Notably, however, those who participate in COP–related activities, such as community meetings, may not be representative of the whole community (Somerville, 2008). Many individuals in communities remain unaware of COP activities, and those who are aware may choose not to participate (Adams, Rohe, and Arcury, 2005; Eve et al., 2003). Additionally, it can be difficult to sustain community participation. While police officers are paid for their participation, community members are not, and involvement could take time away from family and work (Coquilhat, 2008).

Specific Types of COP Programs

Because COP is such a broad approach, programs that involve the community may take on many different forms. For example, some COP programs may take place in a single setting such as a community center, a school, or a police mini-station. Other COP–based programs, such as police foot patrol programs, can encompass the entire neighborhood. The following are different examples of specific types of COP programs and how they can affect youth in a community.

School Resource Officers (SROs) are an example of a commonly implemented COP program in schools. SROs are trained police officers who are uniformed, carry firearms and a police department badge, and have arrest powers. They are tasked with maintaining a presence at schools to promote safety and security (Stern and Petrosino, 2018). The use of SROs is not new; SRO programs first appeared in the 1950s but increased significantly in the 1990s as a response to high-profile incidents of extreme school violence and the subsequent policy reforms (Broll and Howells, 2019; Lindberg, 2015). SROs can fulfill a variety of roles. They are intended to prevent and respond to school-based crime; promote positive relationships among law enforcement, educators, and youth; and foster a positive school climate (Thomas et al., 2013).

The National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO), the largest professional organization of SROs, formally defines the SRO roles using a “triad model,” which aligns with community policing models (May et al., 2004), and includes the three primary functions of SROs: 1) enforcing the law; 2) educating students, school staff, and the community; and 3) acting as an informal counselor or mentor (Broll and Howells, 2019; Fisher and Hennessy, 2016; Javdani, 2019; Thomas et al., 2013). There may be significant variability in how these roles and responsibilities are balanced, as they are usually defined through a memorandum of understanding between the local law enforcement agency and the school district (Fisher and Hennessy, 2016). Even with the SRO responsibilities formally spelled out, there may still be tensions and ambiguities inherent to the SRO position based on their positioning at the intersection of the education system and the juvenile justice system, which often have competing cultures and authority structures (Fisher and Hennessy, 2016). As members of the police force, the SROs may view problematic behaviors as crimes, whereas educators view them as obstacles to learning. Another ambiguity is that as an informal counselor/mentor, the SRO is expected to assist students with behavioral and legal issues, which may result in a conflict of interest if the adolescent shares information about engaging in illegal activities (Fisher and Hennessy, 2016).

Evaluation findings with regard to the effectiveness of the presence of SROs in schools have been inconsistent. In terms of school-related violence and other behaviors, some studies have found that SROs in schools are related to decreases in serious violence (Sorensen, Shen, and Bushway, 2021; Zhang, 2019), and decreases in incidents of disorder (Zhang, 2019). Others have found increases in drug-related crimes (Gottfredson et al., 2020; Zhang, 2019) associated with the presence of SROs in schools, and other studies have shown no effects on bullying (Broll and Lafferty, 2018; Devlin, Santos, and Gottfredson, 2018). In terms of school discipline, one meta-analysis (Fisher and Hennessy, 2016) examined the relationship between the presence of SROs and exclusionary discipline in U.S. high schools. Analysis of the seven eligible pretest–posttest design studies showed that the presence of SROs was associated with rates of school-based disciplinary incidents that were 21 percent higher than incident rates before implementing an SRO program. However, in another study, of elementary schools, there was no association found between SRO presence and school-related disciplinary outcomes, which ranged from minor consequences, such as a warning or timeout, to more serious consequences such as suspension from school (Curran et al., 2021).

Further, several studies have been conducted on the effects of SROs on students’ attitudes and feelings. One example is a survey of middle and high school students (Theriot and Orme, 2016), which found that experiencing more SRO interactions increased students’ positive attitudes about SROs but decreased school connectedness and was unrelated to feelings of safety. Conversely, findings from a student survey, on the relationship between awareness and perceptions of SROs on school safety and disciplinary experiences, indicated that students’ awareness of the presence of SROs and their perceptions of SROs were associated with increased feelings of safety and a small decrease in disciplinary actions. However, students belonging to racial and ethnic minority groups reported smaller benefits related to SROs, compared with white students (Pentek and Eisenberg, 2018).

Foot Patrol is another example of a program that uses COP elements. Foot patrol involves police officers making neighborhood rounds on foot. It is a policing tactic that involves movement in a set area for the purpose of observation and security (Ratcliffe et al., 2011). The primary goals of foot patrol are to increase the visibility of police officers in a community and to make greater contact and increase rapport with residents. Officers sometimes visit businesses on their beat, respond to calls for service within their assigned areas, and develop an intimate knowledge of the neighborhood. Additionally, police officers on foot patrols may offer a level of “citizen reassurance” to community members and may decrease a resident’s fear of crime by bringing a feeling of safety to the neighborhood (Wakefield, 2006; Ratcliffe et al., 2011; Walker and Katz, 2017). Another duty of foot patrol officers is to engage youth in the community, and some are instructed to go out of their way to engage vulnerable youth. For example, if an officer sees a group of youths hanging out on a street corner, the officer may stop and initiate casual conversation in an effort to build a relationship (Cowell and Kringen, 2016).

Though foot patrols limit the speed at which an officer can respond to a call (compared with patrol in a vehicle), research has found that community members are more comfortable with police being in the neighborhood on foot. Residents are more likely to consider an officer as “being there for the neighborhood” if they are seen on foot (Cordner, 2010; Piza and O’Hara, 2012).

While there are mixed findings regarding the effectiveness of foot patrols on crime (Piza and O’Hara, 2012), improved community relationships are one of the strongest benefits. Research has shown that foot patrol improves the relationships between community members and police officers through increasing approachability, familiarity, and trust Ratcliffe et al. 2011; Kringen, Sedelmaier, and Dlugolenski, 2018). Foot patrols can also have a positive effect on officers. Research demonstrates that officers who participate in foot patrol strategies have higher job satisfaction and a higher sense of achievement (Wakefield, 2006; Walker and Katz, 2017).

Mini-Stations are community-forward stations that allow police to be more accessible to members of a community. Mini-stations (also known as substations, community storefronts, and other names) can be based in many places—such as local businesses, restaurants, or community centers—and can be staffed by police officers, civilian employees, volunteers, or a combination of these groups, and have fewer officers stationed in them (Maguire et al., 2003). These stations allow officers to build on existing relationships with businesses in the area and give citizens easier access to file reports and share community concerns. Additionally, they are a means to achieving greater spatial differentiation, or a way for a police agency to cover a wider area, without the cost of adding a new district station (Maguire et al., 2003). Residents can also go to mini-stations to receive information and handouts about new policing initiatives and programs in the community. Police mini-stations also increase the overall amount of time officers spend in their assigned patrol areas. The concept of mini-stations stems from Japanese kobans , which gained prominence in the late 1980s. Officers who worked in kobans became intimately familiar with the neighborhood they served and were highly accessible to citizens (usually within a 10-minute walk of residential homes) [Young, 2022].

Mini-stations can also be helpful to youth in the community. For example, Youth Safe Haven mini-stations are mini-stations that are deployed in 10 cities by the Eisenhower Foundation. These mini-stations were first developed in the 1980s and are located in numerous youth-related areas, including community centers and schools (Eisenhower Foundation, 2011). In addition to crime outcomes (such as reduced crime and fear of crime), goals of youth-oriented mini-stations include homework help, recreational activities, and providing snacks and social skills training. Older youths can be trained to be volunteers to assist younger youths with mentoring and advocacy. There are mixed findings regarding mini-stations and their effect on crime rates, but research has shown that adults and older youths who participate in mini-station community programs (or have children who participate) are more likely to report crime, and younger youths are more comfortable speaking with police (Eisenhower Foundation, 1999; Eisenhower Foundation, 2011).

Theoretical Foundation

COP approaches are usually rooted in two different theories of crime: broken windows theory and social disorganization theory (Reisig, 2010; National Research Council, 2018). Both focus on community conditions to explain the occurrence of crime and disorder.

Broken Windows Theory asserts that minor forms of physical and social disorder, if left unattended, may lead to more serious crime and urban decay (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Visual signs of disorder (such as broken windows in abandoned buildings, graffiti, and garbage on the street) may cause fear and withdrawal among community members. This in turn communicates the lack of or substantial decrease in social control in the community, and thus can invite increased levels of disorder and crime (Hinkle and Weisburd, 2008). In response, to protect the community and establish control, the police engage in order maintenance (managing minor offenses and disorders). Four elements of the broken windows strategy explain how interventions based on this approach may lead to crime reduction (Kelling and Coles, 1996). First, dealing with disorder puts police in contact with those who commit more serious crimes. Second, the high visibility of police causes a deterrent effect for potential perpetrators of crime. Third, citizens assert control over neighborhoods, thereby preventing crime. And finally, as problems of disorder and crime become the responsibility of both the community and the police, crime is addressed in an integrated fashion. COP programs rooted in broken windows theory often use residents and local business owners to help identify disorder problems and engage in the development and implementation of a response (Braga, Welsh, and Schnell, 2015).

Social Disorganization Theory focuses on the relationship between crime and neighborhood structure; that is, how places can create conditions that are favorable or unfavorable to crime and delinquency (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003). Social disorganization refers to the inability of a community to realize common goals and solve chronic problems. According to the social disorganization theory, community factors such as poverty, residential mobility, lack of shared values, and weak social networks decrease a neighborhood’s capacity to control people’s behavior in public, which increases the likelihood of crime (Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw and McKay, 1969 [1942]). Researchers have used various forms of the social disorganization theory to conceptualize community policing, including the systemic model and collective efficacy (Reisig, 2010). The systemic model focuses on how relational and social networks can exert social controls to mediate the adverse effects of structural constraints, such as concentrated poverty and residential instability. The model identifies three social order controls with decreasing levels of influence: 1) private, which includes close friends and family; 2) parochial , which includes neighbors and civic organizations; and 3) public, which includes police (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Hunter, 1985). Community policing efforts based on the systemic model can increase informal social controls by working with residents to develop stronger regulatory mechanisms at the parochial and public levels (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003; Resig, 2010). Collective efficacy, which refers to social cohesion and informal social controls, can mitigate social disorganization. Community policing can promote collective efficacy by employing strategies that enhance police legitimacy in the community and promote procedurally just partnerships, to encourage residents to take responsibility for public spaces and activate local social controls (Resig, 2010).

Outcome Evidence

Although there are numerous programs that incorporate COP, there are limited examples of COP programs that directly target youth, and fewer that have been rigorously evaluated (Forman, 2004; Paez and Dierenfeldt, 2020). The following programs, which are featured on CrimeSolutions , are examples of how COP has been implemented and evaluated in different cities.

The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS , developed in 1993, incorporates aspects of both community and problem-oriented policing (see Problem-Oriented Policing, below). The CAPS approach has been implemented by dividing patrol officers into beat teams and rapid response teams in each of the districts. Beat teams spend most of their time working their beats with community organizations, while rapid response teams concentrate their efforts on excess or low-priority 911 calls. Meetings occur monthly for both teams, and they receive extensive training. This structure enables officers to respond quickly and effectively to problems that they have not been traditionally trained to handle but have learned how to do by receiving training, along with residents, in problem-solving techniques. Civic education, media ads, billboards, brochures, and rallies have been used to promote awareness of the program in the community (Skogan, 1996; Kim and Skogan, 2003).

To evaluate the effects of the CAPS program, one study (Kim and Skogan, 2003) examined the impact on crime rates and 911 calls. Data were collected from January 1996 to June 2002, using a time-series analysis. The study authors found statistically significant reductions in crime rates and 911 calls in police beats that implemented the CAPS program, compared with police beats that did not implement the program.

Some studies have found that foot-patrol interventions make varying impacts on different types of street violence. Operation Impact , a saturation foot-patrol initiative in the Fourth Precinct of Newark, NJ, was selected as the target area based on an in-depth analysis of the spatial distribution of street violence. The initiative primarily involved a nightly patrol of 12 officers in a square-quarter-mile area of the city, which represented an increase in police presence in the target area. Officers also engaged in proactive enforcement actions that were expected to disrupt street-level disorder and narcotics activity in violence-prone areas. One study (Piza and O’Hara, 2012) found that the target area that implemented Operation Impact experienced statistically significant reductions in overall violence, aggravated assaults, and shootings, compared with the control area that implemented standard policing responses. However, there were no statistically significant differences between the target and control areas in incidents of murder or robbery.

With regard to community-based outcomes, other studies have shown that COP programs have demonstrated positive results. A COP intervention implemented in New Haven, CT , consisted of a single unannounced community home visit conducted by uniformed patrol officers from the New Haven Police Department. During the visits, the patrol officers articulated their commitment to building a cooperative relationship with residents and the importance of police and residents working together to keep the community safe. One evaluation found that residents in intervention households who received the COP intervention reported more positive overall attitudes toward police, a greater willingness to cooperate with police, had more positive perceptions of police performance and legitimacy, had higher confidence in police, reported higher scores on perceived warmth toward police, and reported fewer negative beliefs about police, compared with residents who did not receive home visits. These were all statistically significant findings. However, there was no statistically significant difference in willingness to comply with the police between residents in households that received home visits, compared with those who did not (Peyton et al., 2019).

Problem-Oriented Policing Definition

Problem-oriented policing (POP) is a framework that provides law enforcement agencies with an iterative approach to identify, analyze, and respond to the underlying circumstances that lead to crime and disorder in the community and then evaluate and adjust the response as needed (Braga et al., 2001; Hinkle et al., 2020; National Research Council, 2004). The POP approach requires police to focus their attention on problems rather than incidents (Cordner and Biebel, 2005). Problems, in this model, are defined “as chronic conditions or clusters of events that have become the responsibility of the police, either because they have been reported to them, or they have been discovered by proactive police investigation, or because the problems have been found in an investigation of police records” (National Research Council, 2004:92).

The POP strategy contrasts with incident-driven crime prevention approaches, in which police focus on individual occurrences of crime. Instead, POP provides police with an adaptable method to examine the complicated factors that contribute and lead to crime and disorder, and develop customized interventions to address those factors (National Research Council, 2018).

As noted previously, the idea behind the POP approach emanated several decades ago (Goldstein, 1979) from observations that law enforcement agencies seemed to be more concerned about the means rather than the goals of policing, or “means-over-ends syndrome” (Goldstein, 1979; Eck, 2006; MacDonald, 2002). In 1990, this work was expanded to systematically define and describe what it meant to use POP approaches in policing. During the 1990s, law enforcement agencies in the United States and other countries (such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom) began to implement POP strategies (Scott, 2000).

The traditional conceptual model of problem-solving in POP, known as the SARA model, consists of the following four steps (Weisburd et al., 2010; Hinkle et al., 2020; National Research Council, 2004):

• Scanning. Police identify problems that may be leading to incidents of crime and disorder. They may prioritize these problems based on various factors, such as the size of the problem or input from the community.
• Analysis. Police study information about the identified problem or problems, using a variety of data sources, such as crime databases or surveys of community members. They examine information on who is committing crimes, victims, and crime locations, among other factors. Police then use the information on responses to incidents — together with information obtained from other sources — to get a clearer picture of the problem (or problems).
• Response. Police develop and implement tailored strategies to address the identified problems by thinking “outside the box” of traditional police enforcement tactics and creating partnerships with other agencies, community organizations, or members of the community, depending on the problem. Examples of responses in POP interventions include target hardening, area cleanup, increased patrol, crime prevention through environmental design measures, multiagency cooperation, and nuisance abatement.
• Assessment. Police evaluate the impact of the response through self-assessments and other methods (such as process or outcome evaluations) to determine how well the response has been carried out and what has been accomplished (or not accomplished). This step may also involve adjustment of the response, depending on the results of the assessment.

The SARA model was first defined by a POP project conducted in Newport News, VA, during the 1980s. The Newport News Task Force designed a four-stage problem-solving process . A case study of the project revealed that officers and their supervisors identified problems, analyzed, and responded to these problems through this process, thus leading to the SARA model (Eck and Spelman, 1987).

Since the creation and development of SARA, other models have been established, in part to overcome some noted weaknesses of the original model, such as an oversimplification of complex processes or a process in which problem-solving is nonlinear. These other models include the following 1) PROCTOR (which stands for PROblem, Cause, Tactic or Treatment, Output, and Result); 2) the 5I’s (Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, Involvement, and Impact); and 3) the ID PARTNERS (which stands for I dentify the demand; D rivers; P roblem; A im, R esearch and analysis; T hink creatively; N egotiate and initiate responses; E valuate; R eview; and S uccess) [Sidebottom and Tilley, 2010]. However, compared with these models, the SARA model appears to be used more often by agencies that apply a POP approach to law enforcement (Sidebottom and Tilley, 2010; Borrion et al., 2020).

A POP approach can be used by law enforcement agencies to address youth-related issues, including offenses committed by youths (such as gun violence, vandalism, graffiti, and other youth-specific behaviors such as running away from home or underage drinking.

For example, in the 2019–20 school year, about one third of public schools experienced vandalism (Wang et al., 2022). If a police agency wanted to tackle the problem of school vandalism , often committed by youth, they could apply the SARA model to determine the scope of the problem, develop an appropriate response, and conduct an overall assessment of efforts. A problem-oriented guide, put together by the Problem-Oriented Policing Center at Arizona State University, outlines the steps that law enforcement agencies can take to use the SARA model and address the issues of vandalism committed specifically at schools (Johnson, 2005).

Thus, during the scanning step of the SARA model, to identify the problem police would focus on the specific problem of school vandalism by examining multiple sources of data, including information gathered from both police departments and school districts. During the analysis step, police would ask about the specific school vandalism problems they are targeting, such as 1) how many and which schools reported vandalism to the police, 2) which schools were vandalized, 3) what are the characteristics (such as the age, gender, school attendance rate) of any youth identified as committing the vandalism, and 4) on what days and times the vandalism occurred. The analysis step also should include information from various data sources, including official reports to the police of school vandalism incidents, interviews with SROs, and information from students at the school (Johnson, 2005).

Once police have analyzed the school vandalism problem and have a clear picture of the issue, they would then move on to the response step. The response depends on what police learn about the vandalism problem at schools. For example, if police find that vandalism occurs because youths have easy access to school grounds, especially after school hours, they might suggest a response that improves building security. Finally, during the assessment stage, police would determine the degree of effectiveness of their response to school vandalism through various measures of success, such as the reduction in the number of incidents of vandalism, the decrease in the costs for repair of damaged property, and the increase of incidents (when they do occur) in which the person or persons who engaged in vandalism are identified and apprehended (Johnson, 2005).

Overlap of POP With Other Policing Strategies

POP shares several similarities and overlapping features with other policing models, such as focused deterrence strategies and hot-spots policing. Hot-spots policing involves focusing police resources on crime “hot spots,” which are specific areas in the community where crime tends to cluster. Hot-spots policing interventions tend to rely mostly on traditional law enforcement approaches (National Research Council, 2004; Braga et al., 2019). Focused deterrence strategies (also referred to as “pulling levers” policing) follow the core principles of deterrence theory. These strategies target specific criminal behavior committed by a small number of individuals who repeatedly offend and who are vulnerable to sanctions and punishment (Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan, 2018).

While POP, focused deterrence, and hot spots policing are three distinct policing strategies, there can be an overlap in techniques. For example, a POP approach can involve the identification and targeting of crime hot spots, if the scanning and analysis of the crime problems in a community reveal that crime is clustering in specific areas. Further, a hot-spots policing intervention may use a problem-oriented approach to determine appropriate responses to address the crime in identified hot spots. However, POP can go beyond examination of place-based crime problems, and hot-spots policing does not require the detailed analytic approach used in POP to discern which strategy is appropriate to prevent or reduce crime (Hinkle et al., 2020; National Research Council, 2018; Gill et al., 2018). Similarly, POP involves targeting resources to specific, identified problems, in a similar way that focused deterrence strategies target specific crimes committed by known high-risk offenders. However, focused deterrence strategies tend to rely primarily on police officers to implement programs, whereas POP may involve a variety of agencies and community members (National Research Council, 2004).

Although POP, focused deterrence, and hot-spots policing differ in some distinct ways (such as intensity of focus and involvement of other agencies), these strategies may often overlap (National Research Council, 2004).

POP draws on theories of criminal opportunity to explain why crime occurs and to identify ways of addressing crime, often by altering environmental conditions (Reisig, 2010). While much criminological research and theory are concerned with why some individuals offend in general, POP strategies often concentrate on why individuals commit crimes at particular places, at particular times, and against certain targets (Braga, 2008; Goldstein, 1979; Eck and Spelman, 1987; Eck and Madensen, 2012). Thus, POP draws on several theoretical perspectives that focus on how likely individuals (including those who may commit a crime and those who may be victimized) make decisions based on perceived opportunities. These include rational choice theory, routine activities theory , and situational crime prevention (Braga, 2008; Braga et al., 1999; Eck and Madensen, 2012; Hinkle et al., 2020; McGarrell, Freilich, and Chermak, 2007). These three theories are considered complements to one another (Tillyer and Eck, 2011).

Rational Choice Theory focuses on how incentives and constraints affect behavior (Cornish and Clark 1986; Gull, 2009). In criminology, rational choice theory draws on the concepts of free will and rational thinking to examine an individual’s specific decision-making processes and choices of crime settings by emphasizing their motives in different situations. The starting point for rational choice theory is that crime is chosen for its benefits. Thus, rational choice theory informs POP by helping to examine and eliminate opportunities for crime within certain settings. Eliminating these opportunities should help to intervene with a potential offender’s motives to commit a crime (Karğın, 2010).

Routine Activity Theory , formulated by Cohen and Felson (1979), is the study of crime as an event, highlighting its relation to space and time and emphasizing its ecological nature (Mir ó–Llinares , 2014). It was originally developed to explain macro-level crime trends through the interaction of targets, offenders, and guardians (Eck, 2003). The theory explains that problems are created when offenders and targets repeatedly come together, and guardians fail to act. Since its formulation, routine activity theory has expanded. In terms of POP, routine activity theory implies that crime can be prevented if the chances of the three elements of crime (suitable target, motivated offender, and accessible place) intersecting at the same place and at the same time are minimized (Karğın, 2010). The SARA problem-solving methodology allows law enforcement agencies to examine and identify the features of places and potential targets that might generate crime opportunities for a motivated offender and develop solutions to eliminate these opportunities, thereby preventing future crime (Hinkle et al., 2020).

Situational Crime Prevention was designed to address specific forms of crime by systematically manipulating or managing the immediate environment with the purpose of reducing opportunities for crime. The goal is to change an individual’s decisionmaking processes by altering the perceived costs and benefits of crime by identifying specific settings (Clarke, 1995; Tillyer and Eck, 2011). Situational crime prevention has identified a number of ways to reduce opportunity to commit crime, such as: 1) increase the effort required to carry out the crime, 2) increase the risks faced in completing the crime, 3) reduce the rewards or benefits expected from the crime, 4) remove excuses to rationalize or justify engaging in criminal action, and 5) avoid provocations that may tempt or incite individuals into criminal acts (Clarke 2009). Certain POP strategies make use of situation crime prevention tactics during the response phase, such as physical improvements to identified problem locations. These may include fixing or installing street lighting, securing vacant lots, and getting rid of trash from the streets (Braga et al., 1999).

Although the POP approach is a well-known and popular approach in law enforcement, there have been a limited number of rigorous program evaluations, such as randomized controlled trials (National Research Council 2018; Gill et al. 2018), and even fewer evaluations specifically centered on youth. 

One meta-analysis (Weisburd et al., 2008) reviewed 10 studies, which examined the effects of problem-oriented policing on crime and disorder. These included various POP interventions and took place in eight cities across the United States (Atlanta, GA; Jersey City, NJ; Knoxville, TN; Oakland, CA; Minneapolis, MN; Philadelphia, PA; San Diego, CA; and one suburban Pennsylvania area.) and six wards in the United Kingdom. The studies evaluated interventions focused on reducing recidivism for individuals on probation or parole; interventions on specific place-based problems (such as drug markets, vandalism and drinking in a park, and crime in hot spots of violence); and interventions that targeted specific problems such as school victimization. Findings across these studies indicated that, on average, the POP strategies led to a statistically significant decline in measures of crime and disorder.

The following programs, which are featured on CrimeSolutions, provide a brief overview of how POP has been implemented and evaluated in the United States. Programs with examined youth-related outcomes or a specific focus on youth are noted; however, most of the research on POP interventions does not focus on youth.

Operation Ceasefire in Boston (first implemented in 1995) is a problem-oriented policing strategy that was developed to reduce gang violence, illegal gun possession, and gun violence in communities. Specifically, the program focused on reducing homicide victimization among young people in Boston (Braga and Pierce, 2005). The program involved carrying out a comprehensive strategy to apprehend and prosecute individuals who carry firearms, to put others on notice that carrying illegal firearms faces certain and serious punishment, and to prevent youth from following in the same criminal path. The program followed the steps of the SARA model, which included bringing together an interagency working group of criminal justice and other practitioners to identify the problem (scanning); using different research techniques (both qualitative and quantitative) to assess the nature of youth violence in Boston ( analysis ); designing and developing an intervention to reduce youth violence and homicide in the city, implementing the intervention, and adapting it as needed ( response ); and evaluating the intervention’s impact ( assessment ). An evaluation of the program found a statistically significant reduction (63 percent) in the average number of youth homicide victims in the city following the implementation of the program. There were also statistically significant decreases in citywide gun assaults and calls for service (Braga et al., 2001). Similarly, another study found a statistically significant reduction (24.3 percent) in new handguns recovered from youth (Braga and Pierce, 2005).

Another program implemented in the same city, the Boston Police Department’s Safe Street Teams (SSTs) , is an example of a place-based, problem-oriented policing strategy to reduce violent crime and includes some components targeting youth. Using mapping technology and violent index crime data, the Boston Police Department identified 13 violent crime hot spots in the city where SST officers could employ community- and problem-oriented policing techniques such as the SARA model. SST officers implemented almost 400 distinct POP strategies in the crime hot spots, which fell into three broad categories: 1) situational/environment interventions, such as removing graffiti and trash or adding or fixing lighting, designed to change the underlying characteristics and dynamics of the places that are linked to violence; 2 ) enforcement interventions, including focused enforcement efforts on drug-selling crews and street gangs, designed to arrest and deter individuals committing violent crimes or contributing to the disorder of the targeted areas; and 3) community outreach/social service interventions, designed to involve the community in crime prevention efforts. Examples of these activities included providing new recreational opportunities for youth (i.e., basketball leagues), partnering with local agencies to provide needed social services to youth, and planning community events. One evaluation (Braga, Hureau, and Papachristos, 2011) found that over a 10-year observation period areas that implemented the SSTs interventions experienced statistically significant reductions in the number of total violent index crime incidents (17.3 percent), in the number of robbery incidents (19.2 percent), and in the number of aggravated assault incidents (15.4 percent), compared with the comparison areas that did not implement the interventions. However, there were no statistically significant effects on the number of homicides or rape/sexual assault incidents. The study also did not examine the impact on youth-specific outcomes.

The Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places (Jersey City, N.J.) intervention used techniques from hot spots policing and POP to reduce violent crime in the city. The program and evaluation design followed the steps of the SARA model. During the scanning phase, the Jersey City Police Department and university researchers used computerized mapping technologies to identify violent crime hot spots. During the analysis phase, officers selected 12 pairs of places for random assignment to the treatment group, which received the POP strategies, or to the control group. During the response phase, the 11 officers in the department’s Violent Crime Unit were responsible for developing appropriate POP strategies at the hot spots. For example, to reduce social disorder, aggressive order maintenance techniques were applied, including the use of foot and radio patrols and the dispersing of groups of loiterers. During the assessment phase, the police department evaluated the officers’ responses to the problems, and either adjusted the strategies or closed down the program to indicate that the problem was alleviated. An evaluation found statistically significant reductions in social and physical incivilities (i.e., disorder), the total numbers of calls for service, and criminal incidents at the treatment locations that implemented POP techniques, compared with the control locations (Braga et al., 1999).

COP and POP are two broad policing approaches that, while sharing many characteristics, are still distinct—owing to the focus of their respective approaches. COP’s focus is on community outreach and engagement and does not necessarily rely on analysis methods such as the SARA model. For POP, the primary goal is to find effective solutions to problems that may or may not involve the participation of the community (Gill et al., 2014).

Though COP and POP may differ in their approaches, the end goal is the same in both models. Both are types of proactive policing that seek to prevent crime before it happens. COP and POP also both rely on cooperation from numerous different parties and agencies, including community members (National Research Council, 2018). The two models are similar enough that they often overlap in implementation. For example, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) incorporates elements from both models. Using aspects of COP, police officers divide into beat teams and spend most of their time working with community organizations. With regard to POP, CAPS trains officers and residents to use problem-solving techniques that stem from its theoretical basis (Skogan, 1996; Kim and Skogan, 2003).

There are, however, limitations in the research examining the effectiveness of these models. For example, evaluation studies on COP and POP tend to focus on results related to crime and disorder; other outcomes, such as collective efficacy, police legitimacy, fear of crime, and other community-related outcomes are often overlooked or not properly defined (Hinkle et al., 2020; Gill et al., 2014). Exploring other community-related outcomes would be useful, as community involvement is an important component to both models. Further, some researchers have noted specific limitations to the implementation of COP and POP interventions. With regard to COP programs, for example, the definition of “community” is sometimes lacking. This can be an important factor to define, as community may mean something different across law enforcement agencies (Gill et al., 2014). Regarding POP programs, it has been noted that the rigor of the SARA process is limited and that law enforcement agencies may take a “shallow” approach to problem-solving (National Research Council, 2018:193; Borrion et al., 2020). To date, the research on both models has lacked focus on youth; only a few evaluations have focused on youth in either in the implementation process or in examined outcomes (Braga et al., 2001; Gill et al., 2018). Despite these limitations, however, the outcome evidence supports the effectiveness of COP and POP interventions to reduce crime and disorder outcomes.

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About this Literature Review

Suggested Reference: Development Services Group, Inc. January  2023. “Community-Oriented Policing and Problem-Oriented Policing.” Literature review. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.  https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/model-programs-guide/literature-reviews/community-oriented-problem-oriented-policing

Prepared by Development Services Group, Inc., under Contract Number: 47QRAA20D002V.

Last Update: January 2023

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Autonomy and Connection: How Ward Panels Support Neighbourhood Policing

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Carina O’Reilly, Autonomy and Connection: How Ward Panels Support Neighbourhood Policing, Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice , Volume 18, 2024, paae010, https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paae010

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Neighbourhood or community policing is receiving renewed attention internationally as a means of responding to a perceived legitimacy crisis in police forces globally. However, with budgets still tight in the post-Covid environment, understanding which activities are most effective and efficient in supporting confidence and legitimacy is vital. This article looks at the workings of London’s community-driven ward panel system, chaired by volunteers but administered by the Metropolitan Police. It reports on a study that asked how ward panels contributed to neighbourhood policing; one of very few to explore ward panels as a community policing structure. A series of observations and interviews were carried out as part of a case study of a single London borough. The study found that ward panels contributed in a number of ways, facilitating partnership working, building connections with hard-to-reach communities, and enhancing police accessibility. Significantly, several panels had begun to develop autonomy in identifying and resolving local problems. This article discusses the potential for semi-autonomous community bodies such as ward panels to contribute to the work of community or neighbourhood policing, thereby relieving demand on forces, and weighs up the risks entailed.

Community policing has had an enduring attraction to police forces and governments globally. However, changes to demand and funding, and the cyclical nature of political support, mean that such approaches have come under pressure in recent years. This study explores how volunteer-led panels of local residents can support community policing, and argues they can relieve community policing teams of demand in unexpected ways, fostering public confidence and enhancing police legitimacy.

Neighbourhood policing is a particular version of community policing that was introduced in the UK as the Neighbourhood Policing Programme (NPP) that ran from 2005 to 2008. Neighbourhood policing has been largely institutionalized as the ‘cornerstone’ of British policing ( HMIC, 2017 ), despite budget pressures since 2010, and the fragmentation of the model in practice ( Higgins, 2018a ). However, this fragmentation has made it harder for forces to identify best practice, and for learning to be shared internationally.

With new concerns over public confidence, and indications that a future Labour government will revitalize neighbourhood policing ( Thomas-Symonds, 2021 ), understanding how best to deliver good community policing on the ground has taken on greater urgency. This exigency is mirrored by pressures around police legitimacy internationally, crystallised in the Black Lives Matter movement, which demonstrated the increasing ‘context collapse’ ( Goldsmith and McLaughlin, 2022 ) facilitated by social media, leaving police legitimacy globally more volatile.

Comprehensive evaluation work was undertaken in the early years of the NPP, which suggested that neighbourhood policing could boost public confidence, and reduce perceptions of and fear of crime and disorder ( Quinton and Morris, 2008 ; Tuffin et al ., 2006 ). These effects were facilitated through three core mechanisms: visibility, community engagement, and problem-solving. One final possibility was that neighbourhood policing could help build collective efficacy. 1

Much of the community engagement and problem-solving work of the NPP took place through police–public meetings. These were standardized in British policing after the Scarman report ( Scarman, 1982 ). Problems with these post-Scarman Police Community Consultation Groups (PCCGs), and their capacity to support the aims of police–public consultation, became quickly apparent; and further problems with police–public meetings as a vehicle for engagement are well-documented. The police are therefore regularly exhorted to move beyond public meetings in their community engagement efforts. Yet few effective alternatives exist for setting local priorities with public participation, and those often suffer from similar issues.

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has a framework for public engagement which has appeared increasingly unusual nationally, as forces withdraw from formal community engagement structures ( Higgins, 2018b ). Each neighbourhood policing team (NPT) in London has Dedicated Ward Officers, including at least one Police Community Support Officer 2 (PCSO); and each ward also has a ‘ward panel’. These involve a largely stable group of local residents holding regular meetings, usually chaired by a volunteer, to determine local police promises and priorities. Many, though not all, incorporate a public meeting element as well.

This study’s overarching aim was to find out how ward panels contributed to neighbourhood policing, as part of a larger project which looked at how neighbourhood policing, seen through ward panels, contributed to public confidence and police legitimacy. This article focuses on one key element of this: it explores how volunteer-led ward panels were able to support NPTs in sometimes unexpected ways, thus contributing to confidence and legitimacy. The findings suggest that supporting stable, long-term volunteer-led groups along the lines of ward panels has the potential to offer significant benefits for forces in terms of engaging with local communities and delivering effective and trusted neighbourhood policing.

Neighbourhood policing

The UK’s version of community policing, the NPP, emerged from an earlier project, the National Reassurance Policing Project (NRPP); a pilot project intended as a programme of local policing that would target residents’ fear of crime, and raise confidence in policing ( Quinton and Tuffin, 2007 ). It rested on insights from the signal crimes perspective, developed by University of Surrey academics alongside Surrey Police. This perspective suggested that some crimes matter more to some people than others; that this varies by locality; and that local engagement can identify these ‘signal crimes’, and allow the police to tailor their responses in ways that make the greatest difference to people’s sense of safety and confidence in the police ( Innes and Fielding, 2002 ). This local engagement is in practice often facilitated by public meetings, which this study explores.

Three key mechanisms were identified through which public confidence in policing could be supported. The first was police visibility. Ring-fenced funding for PCSOs enhanced visibility and the accessibility of police in communities. The second mechanism was community engagement, measured as improved perceptions of police effort in finding out what the public thinks ( Quinton and Morris, 2008 ). The final element was problem-solving: treating problems rather than crimes as the basic unit of policing ( Goldstein, 1990 ). Forces were expected to ensure community involvement at every stage of the problem-solving process ( Bullock, 2010 ).

These activities support confidence and legitimacy in a range of ways. Firstly, they serve to ‘reassure’ the public, in part by sending ‘control signals’ that show that the police are focusing on the crime and disorder that matters most to local residents ( Innes, 2007 ). Secondly, these activities support central elements of procedural justice, which in turn support police legitimacy ( Tyler, 2006 ). The elements of procedural justice are voice, neutrality, respect, and trust ( Lind and Tyler, 1988 ). Procedural justice suggests that if officers treat residents in ways that are seen to be fair, those residents are more likely to see them as legitimate. By focusing on engaging with and listening to residents, solving the problems that they raise, and reporting back, neighbourhood policing can be seen to act in procedurally just ways.

Finally, neighbourhood policing supports confidence through the demonstration of guardianship and the symbolism of local order ( Barker, 2014 ; Loader, 2006 ). While there is evidence that community policing does not work in every place in the same way, particularly in the Global South ( Blair et al., 2021 ), in the UK, with its relatively high levels of social trust ( Beilmann and Lilleoja, 2015 ), levels of effectiveness in lowering crime appear less important to public confidence in policing than these affective factors ( Jackson and Bradford, 2009 ).

The Coalition government that took office in 2010 instituted a programme of budget cuts across the public sector, known as ‘austerity’. This has affected all three main mechanisms of neighbourhood policing. Visibility has been damaged as resources for neighbourhood policing have been spread more thinly, and PCSO numbers have plummeted ( O’Neill, 2014 ). While some community engagement has been protected, in practice, budget constraints have meant a retreat from resource-intensive activities such as school visits and local meetings. Problem-solving has been particularly vulnerable as it relies heavily on effective partnership work—often with partners who have suffered even deeper cuts to funding in the last ten years ( Gray and Barford, 2018 ). Perhaps most troublingly for the model has been the pressure to reassess police priorities at a strategic level, and the subsequent shift towards the prioritization of vulnerability, risk, and harm. ( HMIC, 2017 ) This has come at the expense of confidence as a motive force in policing, and has seen it slip down the list of priorities ( O’Reilly, 2023 ).

The public meeting

Despite austerity, many elements of neighbourhood policing have persisted, demonstrating the institutionalization of the model. One of the most resilient has been the public meeting, in which police officers dedicated to the local area consult with residents on issues of concern in the neighbourhood and what their local priorities should be.

Meetings can achieve a great deal. Deliberative fora can enhance the development of trust and can facilitate co-production ( Palmer et al. , 2020 ). Evidence suggests that co-production can contribute to reducing crime, fear of crime, and increasing police legitimacy and confidence ( Loeffler, 2020 ). Meetings can facilitate a release of community tensions and the holding of officers to account. They allow community involvement in the setting of police priorities, and provide a forum in which police can report back to residents and respond to their concerns ( Myhill et al. , 2003 ). Engagement between police and residents at meetings may allow more authentic conversations and connections, and the sharing of sensitive concerns that may not be similarly facilitated through other methods, particularly for those not comfortable with social media ( Ralph et al. , 2022 ).

However, there are a number of well-evidenced problems with public meetings and with police-community engagement more broadly. Police-Community Consultation Groups (PCCGs), set up following the 1981 Brixton Riots, were widely regarded as failures ( Elliott and Nicholls, 1996 ; Morgan and Maggs, 1985 ). Rather than allowing the police to engage with community concerns, they were seen as legitimating the status quo ( Reiner, 1992 ). This may have been exacerbated by the police-dominated structure of the meetings ( Bull and Stratta, 1994 ).

More contemporary studies evidence similar issues. Police can dominate meetings, set the agenda, and lead participants towards ‘rubber-stamping’ decisions that have already been made ( Bullock, 2018 ; Forrest et al ., 2005 ; Myhill et al. , 2003 ). Attendance can be low and unrepresentative of the communities in which the meetings take place ( Harkin, 2014 ; Higgins, 2018a ; Jones and Newburn, 2001 ; Mistry, 2007 ; Myhill et al ., 2003 ). In general, participation in community groups is often associated with being older, wealthier, and better educated ( Herbert, 2006 ), though there is also evidence that participation in police–public meetings can be higher in areas with poorer housing and higher crime ( Bullock and Sindall, 2014 ; Skogan and Steiner, 2004 ). Police officers can regard a lack of representation as undermining the legitimacy of such forums ( O’Reilly, 2023 ). Overall, the public meeting has a poor reputation, despite remaining the dominant way in which forces reach out to residents. This means that limited attention has been paid to how to improve these meetings and how they are constituted and run.

Elsewhere in UK policing, the use of volunteers is considered one way of addressing broader issues of legitimacy, representation, and community engagement. Austerity has reduced the capacity of forces to undertake tasks that might be described as marginal to the police mission; and has begun to erode their capacity to fulfil some roles that would once have been considered central, such as staffing the front desks of police stations, for which volunteers are increasingly recruited ( Millie, 2012 ). The last Labour government championed volunteering as a means of generating ‘active citizens’ ( Hope, 2005 ).

Citizens who take part in or help facilitate community engagement could be considered ‘volunteers from a distance’ ( Millie, 2019 ), as opposed to direct volunteering such as serving as a Special Constable. There have been a number of studies that discuss such meetings from the perspectives of the citizens who take part ( Gasper and Davies, 2018 ) and some that specifically examine legitimacy and representation ( Harkin, 2015 ). However, there has been little attention paid to how the structure of these meetings and the role of volunteers in them can support or hinder the capacity of neighbourhood policing to support confidence and legitimacy.

There have also been few localized case studies of the effects of austerity on neighbourhood policing in practice. This study therefore addresses two under-studied areas, in examining the post-austerity state of neighbourhood policing on the ground, seen through the prism of these volunteer-led panels.

This study looked at neighbourhood policing primarily through a focus on the ward panel system in London. The fieldwork took place from 2016 to 2017; at a time when the full effects of austerity-led budget cuts were being felt; but before the ‘uplift’ in police numbers that saw significant new recruitment. This section briefly outlines the background and structure of neighbourhood policing in London, and the operation of the ward panels, before outlining the methods used in the study.

London was chosen as a site for research for several reasons. Unlike other parts of the country, London retained a universal approach to neighbourhood policing ( Higgins, 2018a ) despite reorganizing this provision in response to post-2010 budget cuts. The Local Policing Model (LPM), developed in 2013, cut the number of neighbourhood police officers dedicated to each ward, in favour of a more flexible model that could allow neighbourhood officers within a Basic Command Unit (BCU), then largely coterminous with the London boroughs, to be deployed to meet demand. However, the LPM retained at least one Dedicated Ward Officer for each ward, and one PCSO. 3

London also has a well-established ward panel system. Instituted by the MPS, this involves local residents and other stakeholders recruited to sit on panels specific to that local authority ward. The panels are chaired and run by residents, and set local promises and priorities. Elsewhere, such meetings tend to be chaired by the police; and cover much larger areas ( Casey, 2008 ).

An embedded case study approach ( Yin, 2014 ) was chosen that allowed a focus on a single borough (Borough One) within which individual panels could be studied. In five of the 18 wards in Borough One, I observed panel meetings, interviewed the panel Chair, and interviewed at least two of the DWOs. This was supplemented by interviews with officers and panel participants in other wards. These wards were selected to reflect the demographic range of Borough One, and the complexity of the social environment; but this approach was limited by practical considerations, such as the availability and in some cases the inexperience of potential participants. My ward selection was therefore a limited number of wards which I could study in depth, plus partial case studies that enhanced the demographic range I was aiming for.

I also interviewed senior police officers overseeing neighbourhood work across the Borough and the force, as well as councillors, council officers and others engaged with the panels. In total, I undertook 7 hours of observations, and 33 interviews with 43 participants. Ethical clearance was secured from Anglia Ruskin University, and the study was approved by the MPS. All interview participants were fully informed of the nature of the research, and signed consent forms.

However, as is common with ethnographic research ( Bryman, 2016 , p. 129) it was impossible in the case of my observations of public meetings (and sometimes large ward panels) to gain full consent from all participants. I did not therefore record these observations. Instead, I took longhand, contemporaneous notes. Due to the absence of informed consent, I do not incorporate direct quotes taken from any of my observations within this article, though I use information from these observations to contextualize my findings.

The data from the interviews and observations was transcribed and coded using NVivo, before being analysed using thematic analysis ( Table 1 ) ( Braun and Clarke, 2006 ). Thematic analysis is a way of analysing and understanding qualitative data that involves identifying patterns within the data through an iterative process of coding and identifying themes. A number of themes were identified in the interview data in terms of how the ward panels worked to support neighbourhood policing, and a typology of the panels developed.

: Interviews and observations

a A police officer with responsibility for more than one ward.

b Discussed by participants but no observations/interviews undertaken.

As with all case studies, there is a limit to how much one can generalize from the findings presented here. However, analytic generalizations are possible ( Yin, 2013 ): that is, one can suggest lessons that can be drawn from this example of how ward panels contribute to neighbourhood policing in one London borough which might be applicable to other volunteer-led panels set up to support a community policing model.

Many of the panels operated with a great deal of autonomy. Since their original establishment in 2004, panels have been given considerable latitude to run themselves, and their structure and operation have diverged. Panels which were very open and which represented wider networks were also those which demonstrated the most autonomy in the way that they operated. These in turn appeared able to offer the most support to NPTs.

The MPS now encourages all panels to hold meetings open to the public, and also to hold virtual ward panels (which, pre-pandemic, consisted of online surveys sent out every 2 or 3 months). In Borough One, some panels held supplementary public events, while some made all their meetings fully open to the public. However, a handful of panels functioned as closed meetings. Some panels in Borough One had connections to institutional networks, with regular attendees who were local councillors and officers, and representatives of community groups, such as tenants and traders’ associations. At the other end of the scale were panels described to me with only a handful of panel members, who were not attending as representatives of anyone but themselves (though no panels I observed were as extremely ‘atomized’ as this).

Almost all the panels in this study had developed some capacity to operate without the guidance of the police; but the extent of this was variable. Participants recounted stories of panels so limited in capacity that the police were forced to chair them as nobody else was prepared to do so; though these were described as outliers. At the other end of the scale, some panels had developed a significant amount of autonomy. One of the more obvious ways this was expressed was in their processes: the organization and publicizing of meetings, and the recruitment of new attendees. In Priory ward, the Chair delivered leaflets to every household concerned with a particular issue. With some 6,000 households in the ward, this far outstripped local officers’ capacity. Another chair ran a local Facebook page, with a reach of some 2–3,000 followers.

In almost all panels, the running of meetings was entirely devolved to community members. Despite this, police officers felt strongly that meeting procedures reflected on the police. Officers valued the quality of the meetings and the effective running of them sometimes more highly than residents interviewed for the study—perhaps reflecting some gratitude that they were not left with the job themselves, but also a sense that effective processes enhanced police legitimacy. Chairing in particular was highly valued by the police, as were the Chairs themselves:

If they have a positive attitude about the police and policing, the way we do the policing, they portray that positive attitude to the community and you get much better feedback than if somebody who’s always negative, then the community will be negative because they’re the link between us and them. (Officer Five)

The recruiting of panel members was another area that was often devolved to panels. Official MPS guidance ( 2014 ) allocates responsibility for recruitment to the police, and suggests a formal process. However, in practice, for most panels, recruitment was more informal. In Chapel Hill, for example, the process was described by the chair as, ‘basically, we badger people really and get them to come along’.

Resident ‘ownership’ of recruitment was particularly common where panels were already highly connected to the wider community through their own members’ networks.

This suggests that volunteer-led panels which are set up to be open and transparent, and are recruited from those with strong networks in the wider community, can more rapidly become autonomous and self-sustaining. However, this also meant that officers had much less control over elements such as recruitment, representation, and appointment of Chairs, which they might regard as central to the legitimacy of the meetings themselves. Nevertheless, the ceding of control had important benefits: these more autonomous panels appeared able to offer significant support to neighbourhood policing across two main areas: with community engagement and police accessibility, and secondly with problem-solving.

Community engagement and accessibility

Community engagement was a central purpose of the meetings, but participants also felt the meetings helped render the police more accessible. This was of particular importance given the closure of many police stations ( Pratt, 2019 ). Panel meetings often became the only venue in walking distance where residents could be sure of finding a police officer to speak to face-to-face. Given the high-profile problems that the MPS has faced with regard to confidence and legitimacy, it was also important to officers to have a venue in which they could talk to members of the public in a non-confrontational way:

I try and get to as many new people who’s there, because it makes you seem like … because it is a uniform at the end of the day, isn’t it, and some people might be scared of uniforms from past experiences … the ward panel meeting breaks that down in the sense of, ‘Hello, I’m actually quite nice. I’m just a human being like you.’ You know, sort of like, opens that door a little bit, and once you’ve got your foot in it, I think a lot of the time it’s a lot easier to get in. (Officer Seven, Chapel Hill)

Panels helped residents to recognize and trust their local officers. Neighbourhood work was understood by many participants as being about relationships, which could only be built up through consistent contact. However, Borough One, as elsewhere, experienced considerable turnover in officers. This rapid turnover was seen as regrettable, but part of the unavoidable character of life in a major metropolitan force:

The thing about neighbourhood policing is it’s about knowing your neighbourhood and if you’ve got that constant change then it’s difficult for them officers to get that continuity, as well as the members of the public knowing who their local bobbies are … But that is the beast of the Met; people move around all the time. (Officer Five)

Ward panels by contrast did not appear to suffer the same issues of continuity. Chairs often remained in place for many years, and many attendees were also long-standing. The more autonomous the panel, the more resilient they appeared to be, and capable of retaining links to wider community networks even when there was turnover in membership. The panels acted as a site for the development of these links. Local knowledge of community safety issues such as disorder was not confined to residents or to police officers, but was held across a network of actors, each of whom could act as a repository of local knowledge to support the work of the police. Panel members and chairs saw their task as facilitating this engagement between police and residents, acting as conduits across the gulf of different levels of status and authority. Meetings were seen as one element in a wider and complex community network that explicitly aimed to connect people with the police in areas where demographics and the diversity of the population could otherwise make this difficult:

It’s very easy to meet a few isolated people in the community, but to connect those dots in the community is not easy, because this area is so diverse. (Resident Five, Priory)

In Chapel Hill, other networks that were connected to the ward panel included the local market’s community association, residents’ and tenants’ associations. The ward panel was viewed as playing a central role in tying the police into these networks. Officers working with these highly connected wards were keenly aware of the value of their autonomy and the strength of their community networks, and the role of the volunteer chairs in this:

I’d say he’s the glue that keeps it all together, to be honest … if someone feels like they can’t go to the police for whatever reason … which a lot of people do, they might go to [Chair Four], which they do, and then [Chair Four] comes and tells us. (Officer Seven, Chapel Hill)

Thus the most autonomous panels were able to facilitate the accessibility of the police, and enhance and even undertake some of the community engagement work between police and hard-to-reach communities themselves, thereby directly supporting the confidence-building mechanisms of neighbourhood policing:

I didn’t realise how much it actually involves and how much science is involved in keeping a community together, or keeping a troubled community good. I’m not saying [Chapel Hill] is a troubled community, because I’m sure there’s far worse, but in terms of keeping it good, you’ve got [Chair Four] and [Council Officer One] just sort of cementing it all together, and that’s what’s kept it at a sustained plateau level. (Officer Seven, Chapel Hill)

The existence of the panels thus facilitated community engagement and visibility, while providing a reliable space for local officers to find out about and respond to local problems.

Problem-solving

Research suggests that problem-solving, the third strand of neighbourhood policing, can present particular difficulties under austerity, as it is resource intensive and easily crowded out when neighbourhood officers are required to pick up expanded responsibilities ( CoP, 2015 ).

In Borough One, there were a number of evident strengths in the way ward panels supported problem-solving. These included strong public involvement, especially in bringing issues to police attention; well-embedded partnership work, particularly between the police and local council; and the management of public expectations around what NPTs could do.

The existence of regular ward panel meetings made it easier for the public to bring problems to police attention. Meetings were respected as a means of identifying low-level problems that officers might not have otherwise flagged. In this way, they gave value and status to community knowledge. The discursive nature of the meetings and the requirement to set priorities also contributed to the development of a collective sense of security and a local identity. The panels thus allowed concerns that posed minimal ‘objective’ risk to be reconstituted as collective security issues to which the police could legitimately dedicate resources.

In Mandeville, Officer Four spoke warmly of panel members’ willingness to negotiate over the relative importance of particular problems, and to come to the table with suggested strategies to solve problems, regardless of whether they had originally been brought to the panel’s attention by residents or the police: ‘We can come to them with things that we believe or they might not have known before, and try and get … to work out a plan between us’.

Most meetings included members of other agencies. This allowed some problems to be taken on by agencies better suited to deal with them, and some problems could be directly handed to the relevant agencies at the meeting. When a meeting had specialist council attendees, much of the work that might otherwise have had to be led by the police could be resolved then and there:

Most of it could be cancelled, because they’ll come to us about noise or they’ll come to us about littering. And we’ll say, ‘Right, well,’ and then we’ll have somebody from the council in and then they speak up. And then they’ll say, ‘Oh I’ll address that one, I’ll address that one, I’ll address that one’. So they could come with 20 problems and 19 could be cancelled. (Officer Nineteen, Priory)

Thus the panel meetings themselves became a form of partnership working in which responsibility was allocated, and the processes for accountability made clear. This removed certain low-level problems from police responsibility entirely; while still allowing residents to raise their concerns and feel heard by the agencies with the capacity to help them.

At times, panels were able to bypass the police entirely, speaking directly to relevant councillors and council officers outside the meetings. Volunteer Chairs acted as a direct conduit not just between police and residents, but from residents to councillors and council officers, effectively bypassing the police and sometimes the meetings themselves:

The chair is important because the chair is available all the time, never stops talking, is able to phone up, you know, on first name terms … you know, at least 20 really key council officers. Not to badger them, but just to sort of, if I’ve got a problem, put it before them and ask for help, if they’ve got any ideas of how to solve it. (Chair Four, Chapel Hill)

In this way, the more autonomous panels could liberate NPTs from a significant volume of problems that were not directly policing issues, while officers could still reap potential benefits in confidence and legitimacy gained from those problems being dealt with through an MPS-sponsored ward panel. At the same time, the autonomy of the panels facilitated the visibility of the police, and provided a reliable and broadly trusted forum for community engagement.

Ward panels had many similarities with standard public meetings held elsewhere, but they differed from them in key ways. They were almost always chaired by volunteers drawn from the local community, rather than by police officers or local councillors. The panels also had a core of members who were expected to attend regularly, even if they also held public meetings open to everyone. This smaller group was able to offer continuity, and take responsibility for the decisions that the panel made. The long-term relationships that this structure engendered facilitated the development of wider networks and greater autonomy than possible with traditional public meetings.

This structure resonates with particular aspects of the signal crimes perspective, which suggests that, to properly understand community concerns about crime and disorder, forces need to engage deeply at a local level ( Innes, 2005 ). Interestingly, this perspective means that it is not always necessary to consult with the wider community, so long as ‘key individuals’ can be identified who had an in-depth knowledge of the relevant issues ( Bullock, 2010 ; Innes, 2005 ): some residents, who are highly engaged in their local area, might have a much better insight into the local problems and potential solutions than those less engaged ( Innes, 2005 ). The ward panel system, which by its structure relies on highly engaged local residents (supplemented by engagement with a broader demographic) echoes this insight.

The ward panels were able, through the development of wider networks and greater autonomy, to support neighbourhood policing in all through three key mechanisms: visibility, community engagement, and problem-solving. The regularity of ward panel meetings, and their local nature, enhanced visibility and accessibility, and helped facilitate community engagement. Panel meetings were regular and predictable, and the wider networks of the panels meant that residents had conduits to access the police that did not require formal engagement.

Panel members facilitated this by building long-term relationships with those in authority, and the wider community, and acting as a conduit between them. Individuals in participatory fora are often seen to move between their roles as individuals and as representatives of wider groups—what Becher (2010) describes as a dynamic process of ‘intermediation’. Panel members clearly ‘intermediated’ between the police and the wider community, including groups who were less comfortable about talking to officers. By doing this, they began to build social capital, and particularly ‘linking’ capital across power and authority gradients ( Szreter and Woolcock 2004 ). Ward panels had begun at the behest of the MPS, and were at the beginning very much ‘invited spaces’ ( Cornwall, 2004 ), in which residents were encouraged to take part in an exercise designed by and for the police. However, over time, and particularly in wards with continuity in panel membership, the panels had begun to look more like ‘popular spaces’ that belonged to residents rather than the police, and at which officers acknowledged they were now guests.

However, the development of this autonomy, and the concomitant loss of police control over the panels, could bring its own problems. There was a notable difference between the extent to which neighbourhood police officers and panel members valued representativeness ( O’Reilly, 2023 ). While panel members often acknowledged the value of diversity, its absence did not undermine their perception of the panels’ legitimacy, which was not the case for officers. Where panels lacked demographic representativeness, some officers felt that they were not bound to respond to community direction of priorities in the same way, and even that it could be dangerous to police legitimacy for them to do so.

There is a risk that, in building close and cohesive community networks, some residents are excluded. This is one of the reasons that Tilley (2008) argues for a form of ‘weak’ community policing, in which the police avoid developing ‘strong’ ties with communities, but instead foster numerous weak ties within and between communities and the police. While panels in this study were more aligned with a ‘weak ties’ model, the structure and autonomy of the panels clearly contained the potential for the development of ‘strong’ and exclusive networks.

The pressure for consensus within the panels also entailed a risk that a dominant chair could align the agenda and decisions of the panel towards the interests of the police rather than the community. Barnes et al. (2004 , p. 276) describe this as a process of ‘incorporation’, whereby citizens heavily engaged in participatory forums are drawn into the organization’s discourses and practices. On the other hand, it may be that this is part of the process of negotiating a common understanding of what the community values: not everyone can have their concerns made a priority.

As Barnes and Eagle (2007 , p. 170) write, perhaps ‘it is not the role of the police to create social capital but to allow the space for it to flourish by providing a sense of security where connections can be made’. From this perspective, support for autonomous ward panels or something similar could legitimise a space where communities develop their own, specific local constellation of connections that facilitate the development of social capital and collective efficacy in unexpected ways. This could have particular relevance internationally in areas of low police legitimacy or high levels of deprivation.

The panels also supported procedural justice. They allowed residents to have their voices heard. The status of the police as guests at the panels facilitated the demonstration of neutrality and respect; as did the status of the volunteer chairs; while trust—which rests on relationships ( Higgins and Hales, 2017 )—was supported by the continuity of the panel members, even when the NPTs themselves were affected by high turnover of personnel.

Finally, the panels were an active and very local demonstration of guardianship and the importance of local order. In the absence of police stations, the panel meetings showed the police proactively concerned for local order in the area, and permitted the demonstration of local knowledge and commitment. This demonstration of guardianship, and facilitation of relationships with named police officers, offered communities reassurance, reflecting the expressive nature of public confidence, and the affective nature of citizens’ relationship to the police. This could again have relevance globally, particularly in areas with fewer or less accessible police bases.

The goal of this study was to identify the way that ward panels contributed to neighbourhood policing. The experience of Borough One suggests that volunteer-led panels can support NPTs in several important ways, that facilitate the development of social capital in communities, and which support confidence and legitimacy in policing. Ward panels, unlike wider public meetings, were able to develop their own autonomous identity, establish and reach out into wider networks, and to undertake low-level problem-solving in their own right, while facilitating the demonstration of procedural justice and local guardianship: precursors of legitimacy and public confidence respectively.

This article does not argue that such panels were without problems, some of which could impinge on police legitimacy. Moreover, it is important to underline the extent to which the panels relied upon the sponsorship of MPS, especially in the years following their establishment; and the extent to which autonomy was easier to develop in stable communities with pre-existing community groups and networks. This is resource-intensive work for the police, which should not be underestimated. Further research could explore the challenges in establishing such panels in areas with poorer existing networks and a higher proportion of ‘hard-to-reach’ communities; or in the Global South.

Nevertheless, this article concludes that volunteer-led groups dedicated to policing issues, sponsored by forces, and run along the lines of ward panels, have enormous potential to support and entrench public confidence in policing—and show promise around boosting collective efficacy for neighbourhoods themselves. Given the resurgence of concern for confidence and legitimacy, the renaissance of neighbourhood policing as a model, and the commitment of the current Labour opposition to reinforcing the model with new officers, ward panels or their equivalents should be seriously considered as part of the armoury for delivering effective and trusted local policing.

Ethical approval was received from Anglia Ruskin University Ethics Committee in September 2015.

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The evaluation of the NRPP concluded that changes in social capacity might require a longer timescale and different activity with partners—but did not rule out such an outcome in the longer term ( Tuffin et al. , 2006 ).

Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) were established in 2002 by the then Labour government. They do not have police powers and their primary purpose was community engagement. Funding was initially ring-fenced, but this was withdrawn from April 2013.

An announcement that the number of DWOs for each ward would double was made during the course of the study but was not implemented until after fieldwork was completed.

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• Corpus ID: 107733994

Problem Solving for Neighbourhood Policing

• M. Ashby , S. Chainey
• Published 12 November 2012
• Sociology, Law

3 Citations

Community policing and young people: a critical insight into young people's perceptions in leicester, crime and the nte: multi-classification crime (mcc) hot spots in time and space, communication skills, problem solving and managing conflict, related papers.

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PROBLEM SOLVING for NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING How to Solve Local Crime and Disorder Problems for Neighbourhood Police Officers Matthew Ashby and Spencer Chainey Contents

UCL JILL DANDO INSTITUTE OF SECURITY AND CRIME SCIENCE

PROBLEM SOLVING FOR NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING How to solve local crime and disorder problems for neighbourhood police officers Matthew Ashby and Spencer Chainey Contents

Welcome 1 Why solve problems? 3 What’s the problem? 5 Understanding the problem 8 Responding to the problem 14 Working with others 18 Problem solved? 20 Contents

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non- commercial-Share Alike Licence. That means you can copy it as long as you comply with the terms of the licence. For more details, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/ ii Published November 2012. Welcome

This guide will help you solve local crime and disorder problems.

We hope this guide will be useful to police officers and others who work on neighbourhood policing teams, as well as other people responsible for dealing with crime and disorder in local communities. The UCL Jill Dando Institute provides short training courses that complement this guide. Visit our website for more details: www.ucl.ac.uk/jdi

Solving local crime problems is important because if they aren’t solved they will continue to damage the lives of the people who live in your community. Residents and others are likely to feel unsafe and to have a negative opinion of their local police.

If a crime problem is not solved, you and your colleagues are likely to be called repeatedly to deal with the consequences of the problem. For example, if there Welcome is a problem in your neighbourhood with street drinkers abusing passers-by, local people are likely to repeatedly call the police to deal with them. If the problem is not solved, you and your colleagues could still be answering the same calls in ten years’ time. 1 Sometimes problem solving is misunderstood as something that always takes a long time to implement or to have an impact on crime. This is not true. Once you understand a problem well, you can usually start implementing short-term responses very quickly. This gives you time and space to work on longer-term solutions that will help keep crime down.

This guide will take you through a process for identifying, understanding and solving local crime and disorder problems. These techniques have been developed by teams of researchers and police officers in different countries to deal with many different local problems.

This guide has been written by researchers at the UCL Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science, a university department that develops better ways to cut crime and increase security. The Institute was set up using funds given in memory of the broadcaster Jill Dando, who was murdered in 1999. We now have more than fifty researchers working on ways to reduce all types of crime, from terrorism to bike theft.

As well as research and short training courses, we run MSc degrees in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism, Crime Science, and Crime and Forensic Science .

This guide is an introduction to solving local crime and disorder problems. If you would like to learn more, there are links to further information throughout the guide. You might also like to visit our departmental website at www.ucl.ac.uk/scs

2 Why solve problems?

Solving problems means fewer incidents and fewer crimes .

The police are very busy: they deal with everything from speeding motorists to murder scenes, as well as many issues not related to crime. Add the time taken to investigate crimes and locate offenders, and many officers have little time left to work on preventing crimes.

Problem solving is a term used to describe legal and ethical action that prevents a specific type of crime or disorder in a specific place. Problem solving aims to ensure that fewer crimes occur, and that the problem does not reappear.

Solving problems is important because many years of Why solve problems? academic research and practical experience have shown that it helps reduce crime more than traditional police activities can do alone.

For example, while concentrated patrols in crime hotspots can help reduce crime (until the patrols stop), general ‘random’ patrolling has little impact on crime because there are simply too many streets to patrol. Investigating crimes after they have happened is 3 important and valuable, but most crimes are not reported to the police so many offenders remain free.

Problem solving focuses on preventing crime, so that there are fewer incidents to respond to and fewer crimes to investigate. Problem-solving techniques deal with incidents that the police are repeatedly called to deal with, whether they are serious or minor. Problem solving gives police officers a chance to do something about crime.

Investigating crimes often won’t help to reduce crime, because most crimes are not reported to police and most offenders are not identified.

100 burglaries, robberies, thefts and assaults …

59 crimes not reported to police

offender identified offender not identified

12 crimes reported to police but not recorded as a crime

21 crimes recorded by police but offender not identified

6 crimes offender identified but not convicted 2 crimes Source: Ratcliffe, J H. Intelligence-Led offender convicted 4 Policing. Cullompton: Willan. What’s the problem?

A problem is a set of recurring similar events that harm the community.

Problem-solving techniques deal with repeating events and they work best when the problem has been correctly identified and well defined. The first stage of problem solving is to identify if there is actually a problem to be solved. Before going further, ask some basic questions.

Do the events repeat? If the event is unlikely to happen again, there is no problem to solve.

Are the events similar? If the events have little in common, they are unlikely to have a common solution.

Are the events harmful? Sometimes problems will What’s the problem? involve harmful events that are not themselves illegal (law enforcement is only one part of police work). To justify a police response, events must be harmful to at least some people.

Do the events affect the community? Not everyone in the community has to be harmed before police take action, but if no one in the community is affected by an issue, it probably shouldn’t be a priority. 5 Sometimes police are asked to tackle ‘problem’ places such as shopping centres or groups such as homeless people. In these circumstances, ask what events are causing concern. For example, if you are told ‘we have a problem with youths outside the local shops’, ask what events are causing the issue – what are the youths doing at the shops that you want to stop happening?

Once you have decided that the issue you are dealing with is a problem that can be solved, there is a four-step process that can help you solve it. This process has been used for many years to solve many different crime and disorder problems in different countries.

The process is known as SARA:

Scanning. In this stage, you define the problem clearly and specifically, so that it can be solved.

Analysis. Next, you understand the problem in detail so that you can choose solutions that are most likely to solve it.

Response. Once you understand the problem, you take action to solve it and identify what others can do as well.

Assessment. After responding, you check to make sure the response solved the problem. If it didn’t, you work out why not before trying more responses.

Researchers have studied why problem-solving techniques sometimes don’t work; it is often because people miss out stages in the SARA process.

Sometimes people do not define a problem specifically, 6 so the problem becomes too big to solve. In general, descriptions of crime types that are used to monitor performance are not specific enough to be used to define a problem. For example, it would be very difficult to solve the problem of ‘anti-social behaviour’ (ASB), even in one neighbourhood, because there are likely to be several different types of ASB occurring, each with a different cause. It would be much easier to solve the problem of ‘verbal abuse and littering by street drinkers outside the supermarket on Long Street during the daytime’, because that problem is more specific.

Similarly, it would be very difficult for a police neighbourhood team to solve the problem of ‘burglary’. The term ‘burglary’ might mean residential or commercial burglary, or distraction burglary, each of which can be done in many different ways. The problem of ‘burglary of ground-floor flats on New Town Road through windows and back doors in the daytime’ is very different from ‘burglaries of pharmacies in the town centre at night through skylights’. The more specific a problem is, the more likely it is that you will be able to solve it.

Find out more J E Eck and W Spelman. 1987. Problem Solving: problem-oriented policing in Newport News. Washington, DC: Department of Justice. J E Eck. 2010. A Guide to Problem-Solving Success: recognizing the 15 sources of problem-solving failure. http://bit.ly/ Rlgqii D Weisburd, J E Eck, J C Hinkle and C Telep. 2008. The effects of problem-oriented policing on crime and disorder. http://bit.ly/Q95c36

7 Understanding the problem

If you don’t understand a problem, you can only guess at the solutions.

There are lots of reasons not to spend time studying a problem before taking action to solve it. You might feel it is important to act immediately, or that you are too busy to spend time analysing a problem. These feelings are understandable, but if you do not understand a problem then you can only guess at what the solution might be.

Sometimes it will appear obvious what the problem is. However, problem solvers have found that these appearances are often deceiving. For example, if you are asked to deal with ‘burglaries of ground-floor flats through rear windows’, you might decide to run a publicity campaign to encourage people not to leave windows open. However, if the problem is actually caused by burglars using tools to force windows open, or by faulty window locks, then this response will not work.

Some crimes might happen while you are studying the problem, but if your responses to the problem don’t work then the crimes will continue indefinitely. It is often better to spend a little time understanding a problem properly, 8 then taking action that is much more likely to work. Specialist crime analysts can often work with you to analyse crime and disorder problems, combining their skills with your local knowledge. However, if an analyst is not available then it is still important to understand the problem before taking action.

To start understanding a problem, you should gather enough information so that you can answer six questions about it.

What events happen? Work out exactly what events contribute to the problem.

Where do they happen? Everything happens somewhere, and often lots of crimes happen in a small number of ‘hot spots’.

When do they happen? Lots of events happen at a Understanding the problem few ‘hot times’, and responses must happen at the right time if they are going to solve the problem.

Who is involved? Every problem will involve at least one offender and at least one victim. Also think about other people who can help solve a problem, or make it worse.

Why do the events happen? Think about the motives of the people involved in the problem. What do they stand to gain? 9 How do the events happen? Break the event down into steps – each step is an opportunity to solve the problem. Breaking the event into steps means you can identify the steps that provide the best opportunities to solve the problem.

There are many sources of information that might help you answer these questions. As well as police crime records, intelligence reports and incident logs, you might want to use information from other organisations such as the local government or a community group. It may be helpful to ask people in the community to gather information for you, for example by keeping a diary of anti-social behaviour.

Once you know what, where, when, who, why and how, you can bring that information together to work out how to solve the problem. One way to do this is to use the problem-analysis triangle. This is based on the idea that a crime can only happen if a motivated offender and a suitable target are in the same place at the same time. If you take away the offender or the target, or the place where they come together, the crime cannot happen.

For most crimes, changing some elements of the triangle will have more impact than changing others would do. In general, you should focus on the part of the triangle that you and your partners can have the most impact on. This will vary depending on exactly what the problem is.

Some problems will have a few offenders committing 10 offences against lots of targets in lots of places, for Use the problem-analysis triangle to make sense of the information you have gathered about a problem.

motivated offender Crime

suitable target

example a gang robbing lots of banks in different neighbourhoods. This sort of problem can usually be solved most easily by dealing with the offender.

For some problems, a few targets will be repeatedly attacked by different offenders, for example robberies of cash-in-transit vans on different streets. In these cases, the most effective approach will usually be to make the target less vulnerable.

Other problems might be focused on events repeatedly happening at the same place, involving different offenders and different targets. For example, there might be many street robberies of different people by different offenders, all in the same alleyway. In these cases, the most effective approach is to focus on the place. 11 In these examples, one of the three elements – offender, target, place – stands out as being the one that you can successfully focus on to reduce crime. For many problems, the three elements will be more balanced and action might be needed on two or even all three.

When you use the problem-analysis triangle, you are more likely to solve the problem if you are specific about the three elements. Often you will not know everything about the offenders, targets and places. You should try to find out as much as you can, because the more you know the more likely you are to solve the problem.

The diagram on the right shows that it becomes easier to solve a problem if you are more specific about each element. For example, you might not know the names of the offenders, but if you have intelligence that suggests they are members of a particular gang, you might be able to deal with that gang’s activities even without knowing who the individual offenders are. As you make each element more specific, you may find that potential responses to the problem become obvious.

Find out more R V Clarke and J Eck. 2003. Become a Problem Solving Crime Analyst in 55 Small Steps. http://www.popcenter.org/ library/ M Felson and R L Boba. 2010. Crime and Everyday Life. 4th edition. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. S L Gwinn, C Bruce, J P Cooper and S Hick (eds.). 2008. Exploring Crime Analysis: readings on essential skills. 2nd edition. Overland Park, Kansas: International Association of Crime Analysts.

12 When using the problem-analysis triangle, be as specific as possible: the more specific the problem, the easier the solution is likely to be.

The offender, target and place in this triangle Theare offender, not specific unnamed targetenough and placeto help place in thissolve triangle the offenders shops areproblem. not specific enough to help offender shop solve the problem. robberies target valuable items

MORE SPECIFIC

These elements are more late-night specific, but the teenage food Theproblem elements might here white and wine arestill more be specific,difficult place but tothe solve. problem males shops might still be difficult to solve. offender shop robberies

target cash

The elements in sales this triangle are counters specific enough young white at late-night Theto elements point to in males from food and thisresponses triangle are that the ‘Star’ place wine specificcan solve enough the to gang shops pointproblem. to responses that can solve the offender shop problem. robberies target cash from the shop tills 13 Responding to the problem

In general, the harder a crime is, the fewer people will do it.

Once you understand a problem then you can take action to solve it. Many crime-prevention techniques work by making crimes harder because, in general, the harder a crime is to commit, the fewer people will do it. For example, there have been far fewer thefts of cars since engine immobilisers became common.

There are lots of ways to make crimes harder. For example, there are many legal tools (such as anti-social behaviour orders) to help control persistent offenders. The table on pages 16 and 17 gives examples of many different ways to prevent crime by focusing on the target and the place as well as the offender.

Some techniques are known not to help reduce crime. For example, setting up police-run pawn shops to attract burglars sometimes actually encourages burglary, and mass arrests of prostitutes during ‘sweeps’ of areas seldom stop prostitution for more than a few hours.

Some traditional policing methods can be effective, but 14 only if they are closely targeted at a specific problem. General foot or vehicle patrol, or reporting offenders for summons, usually does not reduce crime in the long term, but hotspot patrols can be effective as a short- term response while you prepare long-term responses. If community members or partners suggest that patrols and arrests should be the only responses, ask them what will happen when officers have to go elsewhere to deal with another problem. If patrol is the only response, the problem is likely to come back when the patrols stop.

When choosing a response to a problem, make sure there is a reason to think the response will work. Ask yourself: how will this action solve this problem? Often effective responses are imaginative, and may not have been tried before. However, potential solutions to many common problems have been tried and tested already. The website of the US Center for Problem-Oriented Policing at www.popcenter.org has free guides to Responding to the problem many problems such as house burglary, robbery of delivery drivers, domestic abuse and bike theft.

Find out more R Brown and M S Scott. 2007. Implementing Responses to Problems. http://bit.ly/XbBoEI R V Clarke. 1997. Situational Crime Prevention: successful case studies. 2nd edition. Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press. Home Office. 2008. A Guide to Anti-Social Behaviour Tools and Powers. http://bit.ly/ScqaMr M S Scott. 2004. The Benefits and Consequences of Police Crackdowns. http://bit.ly/T5M1S9 15 25 techniques for solving crime and disorder problems.

Increase the Harden targets Control access effort offenders to facilities must make Make it more e.g. install alley difficult for gates so only offenders to get to residents have or remove targets, access to rear e.g. anti-robbery gardens. screens in shops.

Increase the Extend Assist natural risks of being guardianship surveillance caught Encourage Make it easy to community to see offenders, e.g. protect each other, trim hedges so e.g. ‘cocoon’ attackers cannot watch to prevent wait without being repeat burglaries. seen.

Reduce the Conceal targets Remove targets rewards that offenders expect Make targets Ensure vulnerable harder to find, targets are not e.g. encourage available, e.g. drivers not to ensure power leave valuables on tools are not left display in cars. on building sites.

Reduce Reduce frustration Avoid disputes provocations and stress for offending Reduce the anger Make sure groups that can lead to don’t conflict, assaults or abuse, e.g. arrange for e.g. arrange pubs to close at customer-service different times. training.

Remove Set rules Post instructions excuses for offending Make sure rules Make sure people are clear, e.g. know the rules, set up a no- e.g. put up signs drinking zone to clearly explaining prevent drunken what behaviour is behaviour. unacceptable. 16 Adapted from D B Cornish and R V Clarke. 2003. “Opportunities, precipitators and crimi- nal decisions”. In Theory for Practice in Situational Crime Prevention, edited by M J Smith and D B Cornish. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. http://bit.ly/Q1JSXc 25 techniques for solving crime and disorder problems.

Screen exits Deflect offenders Control tools and weapons e.g. electronic Move offenders e.g. ask shops alarms at shop away from not to sell flour or exits and pre-bail vulnerable targets eggs to teenagers warrant checks. and places, e.g. during Halloween. benches designed against sleeping.

Reduce anonymity Utilize place Strengthen formal managers surveillance Make it easy to Find out what the Monitor offenders identify offenders, community knows, or places, e.g. e.g. make e.g. start a Shop arrange probation school uniforms Watch scheme to visits more often compulsory. identify potential or install CCTV on shoplifters. a street.

Identify property Disrupt markets Deny benefits

Make stolen Make it difficult e.g. always have goods easy to to benefit from graffiti cleaned identify, e.g. bright crime, e.g. ask immediately so orange school pawn shops to offenders know it projectors can’t give transaction will not be seen by easily be sold on. records to police. others.

Reduce emotional Neutralise peer Discourage arousal pressure imitation Prevent emotional Promote positive Prevent offenders provocations for influences, e.g. imitating others, offending, e.g. ‘friends don’t let e.g. encourage limit activities of friends drink and newspapers not to convicted sex drive’. publish details of offenders. offence methods.

Alert conscience Assist compliance Control drugs and alcohol Explain Make legal e.g. by setting consequences, behaviour easy, licence conditions e.g. ask children e.g. provide or enforcing no- to speak to drivers ticket machines drinking zones. caught speeding to prevent fare near schools. evasion. 17 Working with others

Many problems can only be solved with help from partner organisations.

The police are responsible for reducing crime, but in many cases other organisations will be more able to solve a particular problem. For example, a response to street prostitution is to block off one end of each affected street, turning through streets into dead ends. The police cannot do this, but local government organisations can. The better you understand a problem, the easier it will be to identify what partners and the public can do.

Working with others is key to problem solving: most responses will be more effective if they involve partner organisations, and many problems can only be solved by others. In these cases, the role of the police is to co- ordinate the SARA process.

Sometimes, organisations may be unable to help solve a problem. Occasionally, they may be unwilling to solve a problem because they profit from it. Convincing an organisation to help should start with an educational programme or a straightforward request. If this does not work, confrontational requests may be necessary. 18 In rare cases, you may want to consider charging for local people

transport operators

residents’ police associations

teams alcohol and religious groups event licensing

fire service r to p c u charities e b s l i e c health services t

v problem i

solvers o r

businesses o local

r government

and business g a

n probation service building owners and managers prosecutors social services schools and

youth offending colleges teams

street wardens

or withdrawing some police services, publicising the Working with others organisation’s lack of help or taking legal action.

Find out more S Chainey. 2012. Information Sharing for Community Safety. http://bit.ly/VrQO8d H Goldstein. 1997. The Pattern of Emerging Tactics for Shifting the Ownership of Prevention Strategies. http://bit.ly/TBlJaQ M S Scott and H Goldstein. 2005. Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems. http://bit.ly/VLMgnF 19 Problem solved?

A problem is solved when crime goes down.

The police service measures success in many different ways, but problem solving can only be called successful when the events that make up the problem happen less often, or become less harmful. Measures of police activity, such as the number of arrests made, are no substitute for reducing the level of harm that the community is suffering.

The number of crimes that happen, for example, each month, varies naturally in several ways. There might be more of some types of crime in the winter, or in months with five weekends, or when a particular event is happening. This makes it difficult to know if a reduction in the number of crimes after you respond to a problem is due to the response or would have happened anyway.

These issues can often be dealt with by specialist crime analysts, whom you should ask for help if you are unsure about the results of your responses. If crime goes down after you act, it can be tempting to assume that the change is due to your actions. However, if 20 something else caused the reduction in crime, it is likely the problem will come back and you will have to take further action.

Whether the response worked or not, you should try to work out why. This will either help you to solve similar problems in the future, or work out what more you can do to solve the current problem. Look back at your analysis and your plans for responding to the problem. Ask whether each component of the response worked as expected, and if it did not work then ask yourself why.

Finally, keep monitoring the problem even if your response appears to have worked. If the problem is solved it should not return, even after the response finishes. If the problem comes back, go through the SARA process again until the problem is solved permanently.

Find out more J E Eck. 2002. Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers. http://bit.ly/VLOBPe Problem solved?

What next? If you want to understand the SARA problem- solving process in more detail, you might like to read Become A Problem Solving Crime Analyst in 55 small steps by Ronald Clarke and John Eck, available online in several languages at http://www.popcenter.org/library/ 21 This project was funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council

The UCL Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science is the first institute in the world devoted to studying crime science. Our research concentrates on new ways to cut crime and increase security, drawing upon UCL’s vast experience in related disciplines, including architecture, economics , engineering, geography, medicine, psychology, statistics and town planning. The JDI brings together 30 top departments and research groups from across UCL that are interested in the field of security and crime. The JDI promotes multidisciplinary research in crime and security and also runs conferences, 35 Tavistock Square events, training and short courses in these fields. We London WC1H 9EZ work with partners and clients in academia, industry, www.ucl.ac.uk/jdi22 commerce and government.

Published daily by the Lowy Institute

Why neighbourhood policing is critical to preventing terrorism

The value of neighbourhood policing in countering violent extremism goes beyond the collection of intelligence.

Relationships built over time between police officers and the communities they serve are essential for countering the so-called homegrown terrorism many nations now face.

Neighbourhood residents who believe local police officers have their best interests at heart are more likely to share information that may prevent violence. In this way, law enforcement ideally becomes a collective problem solving activity, whereby consistent community engagement leads to reciprocal trust and enhanced public safety.

Since the 2005 London transit bombings, the UK has invested heavily in internal security, heightening operational capabilities and introducing terrorism prevention officers. Funding for counter-terrorism has been ' ringfenced ' in recent years, yet cuts to regular law enforcement budgets have eroded the time police can spend interacting with locals, removing the crucial safeguarding benefits of strong police-community relations.

Last year saw five domestically planned terrorist attacks in British cities; senior police officers are increasingly concerned about the demise of neighbourhood policing.

Britain's experience has international relevance as Australia and other nations across the world struggle to address the radicalisation of disengaged community members. Open lines of communication between governments and residents can both identify imminent threats and diagnose any local factors contributing to potential violence. Police officers are best placed to provide the necessary link.

Disrupting and Engaging

The UK's counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST , dates back to 2003 but has since seen updated iterations to keep step with evolving threats. The four branches include Pursue (to thwart attacks), Protect (to harden targets), Prepare (to mitigate impact), and Prevent, which focuses on pre-crime interventions. A number of government agencies are involved, but police maintain a hand in each directive.

Prevent has become controversial for the statutory duty placed on teachers and healthcare providers to recognise 'at risk' individuals who may benefit from targeted social services that attempt to 'de-radicalise' their views.

Less visible are specialised Prevent police who operate in communities to identify concerning behaviour and avert violence. Today the strategy has developed to one of disruption , where officers aim to interfere with people suspected of involvement in terrorism – not necessarily in pursuit of prosecution, but as an efficient use of resources to prevent violence amid a multitude of possible threats.

Initially Prevent officers sought to withhold their counter-terrorism mandate, but in an atmosphere of suspicion decided to be open about their intentions when talking to the public. Such transparency may not be sufficient, however, as many British Muslims view the government's prevention strategy as unfairly targeting their communities and creating divisions .

In a report published in December last year, the Home Affairs select committee acknowledged the issue . 'Rather than being seen as the community-led approach Prevent was supposed to be, it is perceived as a top-down “Big Brother” security operation'.

An evident solution to this problem is the assistance of everyday police who have gained trust gradually by addressing routine community concerns. Unfortunately, such officers are increasingly absent from the scene.

Losing Eyes and Ears

Following austerity measures enacted in 2010, police numbers in the UK have dropped from a shade over 171,000 officers at the beginning of the decade to roughly 150,000 today, representing a 12% fall and a return to 1985 levels of personnel. London's Metropolitan Police is now so stretched that it may have to stop investigating 'lower level crimes' such as shoplifting.

Hardest hit has been the nation's uniformed civilian support staff known as Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), which were introduced with the 2002 Police Reform Act to provide a non-threatening bridge between police and public. Since 2010, numbers have fallen by 40% , while ethnic minority representation has also declined.

Remaining PCSOs have had to pick up the slack of under-pressure warranted colleagues. Speaking in 2016, one officer said :

I am no longer the link between the community and the Police. I am simply another resource utilised in menial tasks. There is no relationship between myself and our community any longer.

The loss of police presence in neighbourhoods may have a number of detrimental effects, but there is particular concern given what the government is calling a 'shift rather than a short-term spike in the terrorist threat'.

Recently retired Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe warned against the demise of neighbourhood officers in 2015, explaining that leads on counter-terrorism that used to come through intelligence agencies were increasingly reported by members of the public. 'The main reason people tell police officers or PCSOs is because they know them', he said. 'They have got a trusting relationship and they trust them to do something about it. So it is a vital component'.

In November 2017, senior national counter-terrorism coordinator Neil Basu expressed frustrations that police were becoming 'divorced from the frontline' and missing out on vital intelligence. 'All the work we've done over the last 20 years to put neighbourhood policing back on the map…is in danger of disappearing', he said. 'For me, that is a national security issue.'

Cooperative Prevention

It is clear that active and dependable communication with local residents can yield crucial information that may thwart attacks, but the value of neighbourhood policing in countering violent extremism goes beyond the collection of intelligence.

Counter-terrorism measures such as deploying undercover informants, police raids, securitised scrutiny from teachers, and pervasive CCTV surveillance have created a sense that certain communities are under constant suspicion. This feeds into the 'us-vs-them' narrative that extremist groups can so readily draw upon to lure embittered young people down destructive pathways.

Frequent casual conversations between local police officers and residents on street corners have the potential to bridge this divide and address local grievances, allowing beleaguered communities to feel they are part of the solution, rather than vilified as a source of the problem.

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The UK population has lost trust in its police forces – Labour’s plan to improve crime investigation is critical

Senior Lecturer in Police Studies, University of Portsmouth

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Police in England and Wales are facing a crisis of confidence. In the wake of cases including the Charing Cross scandal , the murder of Sarah Everard at the hands of off-duty Metropolitan Police constable Wayne Couzens and former police officer and serial rapist David Carrick , public trust in police has completely broken down .

Another is the failure of police to solve crimes. Between 2015 and 2023 in England and Wales the percentage of crime resulting in the offender being caught by the police and taken to court fell from 16% to 5.7%. For rape, it is around 2% of reported rapes cases that result in the Crown Prosecution Service charging a suspect and taking them to court.

The question then is whether either of the main parties is up to the immense challenge of rebuilding trust. The Conservatives have promised to recruit 8,000 more police officers “to patrol communities and catch criminals in every ward in the country”. Labour is similarly focused on recruitment, and, critically, aims to improve police crime investigation.

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The Conservatives’ plan to boost recruitment

Under austerity, police forces in England and Wales were forced to reduce their workforce numbers. From 2010 to 2019 this caused a reduction of 21,363.

Recent Conservative governments since 2019 have increased the basic number of officers, bringing them back to 2010 pre-austerity levels. But the problem now is that police are experiencing the highest-ever rate of voluntary resignations.

Research published in May 2023 shows that many recruits didn’t really know enough about how being a police officer would affect them emotionally, their social and home life. This meant they became disillusioned quite quickly and left.

As a result, over a third of officers in 2023 now have below five years of service, up from 31% in 2022. There are simply not enough officers trained and experienced in solving crimes.

Forcing through rapid recruitment without adequate vetting and checks, just to satisfy political targets, does not help retain good officers who are likely to make a career out of policing and become experienced crime fighters.

Read more: Police officer resignations have risen by 72% in the last year – we asked former officers why

The Tories promise another 8,000 police, and that isn’t to be sniffed at. Stipulating that there will be a “neighbourhood” officer in every ward, though, shows a lack of understanding of how police forces function.

Police forces do not necessarily use electoral wards for operational policing deployment. Depending on need, a neighbourhood team may be assigned to a much smaller area (a single housing estate or a few streets) or a larger one, covering three or four electoral wards. Chief constables decide where officers are best placed. The idea that central government could or should dictate this is not feasible.

The nostalgic concept of “bobbies on the beat” may appeal to older voters, but it has no measurable effect on actual crime-fighting policing. Neighbourhood or response police officers are not dealing with the low-level crime which they would have done 20 years ago. The police fail to even attend, let alone investigate, many of the most common crimes. Shortages of officers means they have become deskilled and are rushing from job to job.

There is some evidence that neighbourhood police can help improve public confidence in the police and reduce public perception of disorder. But this is different from actually reducing it. The police themselves do not claim that neighbourhood police officers are there to solve crimes.

The Conservatives also aim to strengthen police powers for protests, which will require more officers. But the officers holding riot shields at marches are not dedicated riot police. They are just regular patrol and neighbourhood officers who could otherwise be doing neighbourhood policing. The more laws created that require the police to arrest people who are protesting, the fewer officers are available for other types of police work. It’s all about priorities.

The most helpful thing proposed is the Conservatives’ plan to address misconduct by improving vetting processes. I have written before about how these need reform. But this doesn’t need to be legislated.

If a chief constable needs to be forced by law to vet their staff, they are probably not suitable for that role anyway. Rather, the Home Office, chief inspectorate and the National Police Chiefs’ Council should work together on an intrusive vetting regime to be adopted by all forces, and this seems to be Labour’s proposal.

Labour’s plan to improve crime investigation

Labour also wants to recruit thousands of new police officers and support neighbourhood policing, but unlike the Conservatives, they are not promising to stipulate where these officers are placed.

Labour’s focus will instead be on tackling anti-social behaviour, which is more in line with their intended problem-solving role.

Labour’s rhetoric on solving crime looks promising. At the moment, if you have a bike stolen or your fence is kicked down, you are unlikely to see a police officer. If you even bother to report it the police will just give you a crime number for your insurance company and tell you they do not investigate such crimes.

It is not a serious proposition for Labour to imply the police should attend every call and thoroughly investigate every crime: that hasn’t been the case for decades and can safely be ignored.

However, Labour does seem serious about improving the investigation and detection of more serious crimes, including burglary, rape and domestic abuse.

Rape investigation is one of the disasters in the current criminal justice system. The Labour manifesto has the interesting observation: “Rather than working together, police and prosecutors often engage in a blame game, which lets down victims.”

One big reason why so many rapists get away with their crime is the breakdown in communication between police and the Crown Prosecution Service.

Frustratingly, however, much of Labour’s talk so far on rape has been about specialist courts. Indeed, it is a manifesto pledge to “fast-track rape cases, with specialist courts at every Crown Court location in England and Wales”.

It is important for victims to see their case in court quickly, but we currently have a situation in England and Wales whereby hardly any rape cases are reaching court at all. Most of the attrition in rape cases occurs while the police are investigating. Only about 5% of cases are even sent to the Crown Prosecution Services asking for a charging decision.

Labour have also announced they will create a direct entry detective scheme. Such a scheme has been in existence for several years in some police forces, including the Met . But, as there is little doubt that the police need to dramatically improve their ability to investigate and detect crime, Labour seems to be pushing the right buttons.

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What do people want from Austin's next police chief? Here's what they said in survey

A majority of respondents to the city's survey said austin has gotten less safe in the past five years. most people said they want a chief who will prioritize crime prevention..

Nearly 1,230 people took an anonymous survey to tell the city what they want to see from the next person chosen to be the Austin Police Department's chief.

The survey, which closed on June 10, included three questions:

• How would you rank the safety in Austin today compared to five years ago?
• What do you believe are the most important characteristics to have in the next Chief of Police?
• What do you believe should be the most important priorities for the next Chief of Police?

For the final two questions, each respondent selected their top three choices from a variety of answers.

City officials said they hope to have a candidate selected by the end of July. Austin has been without a permanent police chief since last September. Interim Chief Robin Henderson said she would not apply for the position.

The city partnered with recruiting firm Mosaic Public Partners to search for the next candidate. Applications opened May 15, with 32 people applying for the position. Although the city originally said it would take applications through June 10, officials said the application would remain open until the job is filled, which is typical for executive leadership positions.

The American-Statesman obtained the survey results through a public information request. Here's what we found:

Is Austin safer than 5 years ago?

Almost three-quarters of respondents said safety in Austin is worse now than it was five years ago.

About 16% of people said the city is as safe now as it was five years ago. Nearly 8% of respondents said they weren't sure if the city was safer now. Only 51 people — or about 4% of survey takers — said the city felt safer.

What characteristics do people want in the next police chief?

The three most selected answers to this question were having a police chief who would support officers while also holding them accountable when necessary, someone who would work to build credibility within the department and community, and a chief who would be transparent.

Nearly 10% of people wrote their own answer to this question by selecting "other." The responses ranged from people saying they want someone who will be tough on crime to someone who will prioritize police accountability.

When answering this question, respondents were asked to select their top three answers from 11 choices.

Here's the percentage breakdown of which answers were selected in order of the most selected to the least:

• Courage to defend officers and staff when they are right and hold them accountable when they are not: 19.5%
• A strong leader with the ability to build credibility with both the staff and members of the community: 17%
• An honest, effective, engaging, and transparent communication style: 12.5%
• Other: 9.9%
• A commitment to modern policing methods that are in keeping with community expectations: 8%
• Experience working successfully with police oversight: 7.8%
• A commitment to the professional development of the members of the Austin Police Department: 7.3%
• A visionary who will help the department advance through problem solving and innovation: 5.5%
• A progressive leader who can harness ideas and contributions from a diverse workforce: 4.6%
• A track record of being a collaborative leader and partnership builder: 4.5%
• The ability to create and lead a values-driven organization: 3.4%

What should be the chief's top priorities?

The top priority for the next chief should be crime prevention and making the city safer, according to the survey results.

The next two priorities should be to focus on recruiting and retaining more officers and then on better training those officers in deescalation, use of force, racial profiling and mental health responses, according to the survey.

The Police Department has been struggling with ongoing vacancies for the past few years and is currently down by about 330 sworn officers.

Similar to the previous question, respondents were asked to select their top three answers out of 11. Here's the percentage breakdown of those choices:

• Crime prevention and reduction, neighborhood safety, and providing a safer community for both residents and visitors: 21.1%
• Improve the recruitment and retention of officers and staff: 16%
• Focus on officer training in key areas such as deescalation and use of force, racial profiling, and mental health policing: 13.4%
• Focus on creatively addressing issues surrounding homelessness and mental health response: 8.6%
• Commitment to transparency: 8.2%
• Invest in training, equipment, technology, and facilities: 8%
• Develop proactive partnerships with the community while building public trust and relationships: 7.8%
• Increase community engagement and community policing: 6.4%
• Other: 6.3%
• Increase the focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion in the Austin Police Department to represent the communities it serves: 4.2%