human empathy essay

Understanding others’ feelings: what is empathy and why do we need it?

Senior Lecturer in Social Neuroscience, Monash University

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Pascal Molenberghs receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC Discovery Early Career Research Award: DE130100120) and Heart Foundation (Heart Foundation Future Leader Fellowship: 1000458).

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This is the introductory essay in our series on understanding others’ feelings. In it we will examine empathy, including what it is, whether our doctors need more of it, and when too much may not be a good thing.

Empathy is the ability to share and understand the emotions of others. It is a construct of multiple components, each of which is associated with its own brain network . There are three ways of looking at empathy.

First there is affective empathy. This is the ability to share the emotions of others. People who score high on affective empathy are those who, for example, show a strong visceral reaction when watching a scary movie.

They feel scared or feel others’ pain strongly within themselves when seeing others scared or in pain.

Cognitive empathy, on the other hand, is the ability to understand the emotions of others. A good example is the psychologist who understands the emotions of the client in a rational way, but does not necessarily share the emotions of the client in a visceral sense.

Finally, there’s emotional regulation. This refers to the ability to regulate one’s emotions. For example, surgeons need to control their emotions when operating on a patient.

Another way to understand empathy is to distinguish it from other related constructs. For example, empathy involves self-awareness , as well as distinction between the self and the other. In that sense it is different from mimicry, or imitation.

Many animals might show signs of mimicry or emotional contagion to another animal in pain. But without some level of self-awareness, and distinction between the self and the other, it is not empathy in a strict sense. Empathy is also different from sympathy, which involves feeling concern for the suffering of another person and a desire to help.

That said, empathy is not a unique human experience. It has been observed in many non-human primates and even rats .

People often say psychopaths lack empathy but this is not always the case. In fact, psychopathy is enabled by good cognitive empathic abilities - you need to understand what your victim is feeling when you are torturing them. What psychopaths typically lack is sympathy. They know the other person is suffering but they just don’t care.

Research has also shown those with psychopathic traits are often very good at regulating their emotions .

Why do we need it?

Empathy is important because it helps us understand how others are feeling so we can respond appropriately to the situation. It is typically associated with social behaviour and there is lots of research showing that greater empathy leads to more helping behaviour.

However, this is not always the case. Empathy can also inhibit social actions, or even lead to amoral behaviour . For example, someone who sees a car accident and is overwhelmed by emotions witnessing the victim in severe pain might be less likely to help that person.

Similarly, strong empathetic feelings for members of our own family or our own social or racial group might lead to hate or aggression towards those we perceive as a threat. Think about a mother or father protecting their baby or a nationalist protecting their country.

People who are good at reading others’ emotions, such as manipulators, fortune-tellers or psychics, might also use their excellent empathetic skills for their own benefit by deceiving others.

Interestingly, people with higher psychopathic traits typically show more utilitarian responses in moral dilemmas such as the footbridge problem. In this thought experiment, people have to decide whether to push a person off a bridge to stop a train about to kill five others laying on the track.

The psychopath would more often than not choose to push the person off the bridge. This is following the utilitarian philosophy that holds saving the life of five people by killing one person is a good thing. So one could argue those with psychopathic tendencies are more moral than normal people – who probably wouldn’t push the person off the bridge – as they are less influenced by emotions when making moral decisions.

How is empathy measured?

Empathy is often measured with self-report questionnaires such as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) or Questionnaire for Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE).

These typically ask people to indicate how much they agree with statements that measure different types of empathy.

The QCAE, for instance, has statements such as, “It affects me very much when one of my friends is upset”, which is a measure of affective empathy.

Cognitive empathy is determined by the QCAE by putting value on a statement such as, “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.”

Using the QCAE, we recently found people who score higher on affective empathy have more grey matter, which is a collection of different types of nerve cells, in an area of the brain called the anterior insula.

This area is often involved in regulating positive and negative emotions by integrating environmental stimulants – such as seeing a car accident - with visceral and automatic bodily sensations.

We also found people who score higher on cognitive empathy had more grey matter in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.

This area is typically activated during more cognitive processes, such as Theory of Mind, which is the ability to attribute mental beliefs to yourself and another person. It also involves understanding that others have beliefs, desires, intentions, and perspectives different from one’s own.

Can empathy be selective?

Research shows we typically feel more empathy for members of our own group , such as those from our ethnic group. For example, one study scanned the brains of Chinese and Caucasian participants while they watched videos of members of their own ethnic group in pain. They also observed people from a different ethnic group in pain.

The researchers found that a brain area called the anterior cingulate cortex, which is often active when we see others in pain, was less active when participants saw members of ethnic groups different from their own in pain.

Other studies have found brain areas involved in empathy are less active when watching people in pain who act unfairly . We even see activation in brain areas involved in subjective pleasure , such as the ventral striatum, when watching a rival sport team fail.

Yet, we do not always feel less empathy for those who aren’t members of our own group. In our recent study , students had to give monetary rewards or painful electrical shocks to students from the same or a different university. We scanned their brain responses when this happened.

Brain areas involved in rewarding others were more active when people rewarded members of their own group, but areas involved in harming others were equally active for both groups.

These results correspond to observations in daily life. We generally feel happier if our own group members win something, but we’re unlikely to harm others just because they belong to a different group, culture or race. In general, ingroup bias is more about ingroup love rather than outgroup hate.

Yet in some situations, it could be helpful to feel less empathy for a particular group of people. For example, in war it might be beneficial to feel less empathy for people you are trying to kill, especially if they are also trying to harm you.

To investigate, we conducted another brain imaging study . We asked people to watch videos from a violent video game in which a person was shooting innocent civilians (unjustified violence) or enemy soldiers (justified violence).

While watching the videos, people had to pretend they were killing real people. We found the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, typically active when people harm others, was active when people shot innocent civilians. The more guilt participants felt about shooting civilians, the greater the response in this region.

However, the same area was not activated when people shot the soldier that was trying to kill them.

The results provide insight into how people regulate their emotions. They also show the brain mechanisms typically implicated when harming others become less active when the violence against a particular group is seen as justified.

This might provide future insights into how people become desensitised to violence or why some people feel more or less guilty about harming others.

Our empathetic brain has evolved to be highly adaptive to different types of situations. Having empathy is very useful as it often helps to understand others so we can help or deceive them, but sometimes we need to be able to switch off our empathetic feelings to protect our own lives, and those of others.

Tomorrow’s article will look at whether art can cultivate empathy.

Theory of mind
Emotional contagion
Understanding others' feelings

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Cultivating empathy

Psychologists’ research offers insight into why it’s so important to practice the “right” kind of empathy, and how to grow these skills

Vol. 52 No. 8 Print version: page 44

Personality

In a society marked by increasing division, we could all be a bit more kind, cooperative, and tolerant toward others. Beneficial as those traits are, psychological research suggests empathy may be the umbrella trait required to develop all these virtues. As empathy researcher and Stanford University psychologist Jamil Zaki, PhD, describes it, empathy is the “psychological ‘superglue’ that connects people and undergirds co-operation and kindness” ( The Economist , June 7, 2019). And even if empathy doesn’t come naturally, research suggests people can cultivate it—and hopefully improve society as a result.

“In general, empathy is a powerful predictor of things we consider to be positive behaviors that benefit society, individuals, and relationships,” said Karina Schumann , PhD, a professor of social psychology at the University of Pittsburgh. “Scholars have shown across domains that empathy motivates many types of prosocial behaviors, such as forgiveness, volunteering, and helping, and that it’s negatively associated with things like aggression and bullying.”

For example, research by C. Daniel Batson , PhD, a professor emeritus of social psychology at the University of Kansas, suggests empathy can motivate people to help someone else in need ( Altruism in Humans , Oxford University Press, 2011), and a 2019 study suggests empathy levels predict charitable donation behavior (Smith, K. E., et al., The Journal of Positive Psychology , Vol. 15, No. 6, 2020).

Ann Rumble , PhD, a psychology lecturer at Northern Arizona University, found empathy can override noncooperation, causing people to be more generous and forgiving and less retaliative ( European Journal of Social Psychology , Vol. 40, No. 5, 2010). “Empathic people ask themselves, ‘Maybe I need to find out more before I jump to a harsh judgment,’” she said.

Empathy can also promote better relationships with strangers. For example, Batson’s past research highlights that empathy can help people adopt more positive attitudes and helping behavior toward stigmatized groups, particularly disabled and homeless individuals and those with AIDS ( Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , Vol. 72, No. 1, 1997).

Empathy may also be a crucial ingredient in mitigating bias and systemic racism. Jason Okonofua , PhD, an assistant professor of psychology at the University of California, Berkeley, has found that teachers are more likely to employ severe discipline with Black students—and that they’re more likely to label Black students as “troublemakers” ( Psychological Science , Vol. 26, No. 5, 2015).

These labels, Okonofua said, can shape how teachers interpret behavior, forging a path toward students’ school failure and incarceration. When Okonofua and his colleagues created an intervention to help teachers build positive relationships with students and value their perspectives, their increased empathy reduced punitive discipline ( PNAS , Vol. 113, No. 19, 2016).

Similarly, Okonofua and colleagues found empathy from parole officers can prevent adults on probation from reoffending ( PNAS , Vol. 118, No. 14, 2021).

In spite of its potential benefits, empathy itself isn’t an automatic path toward social good. To develop empathy that actually helps people requires strategy. “If you’re trying to develop empathy in yourself or in others, you have to make sure you’re developing the right kind,” said Sara Konrath , PhD, an associate professor of social psychology at Indiana University who studies empathy and altruism.

The right kind of empathy

Empathy is often crucial for psychologists working with patients in practice, especially when patients are seeking validation of their feelings. However, empathy can be a draining skill if not practiced correctly. Overidentifying with someone else’s emotions can be stressful, leading to a cardiovascular stress response similar to what you’d experience in the same painful or threatening situation, said Michael J. Poulin , PhD, an associate professor of psychology at the University at Buffalo who studies how people respond to others’ adversity.

Outside of clinical practice, some scholars argue empathy is unhelpful and even damaging. For example, Paul Bloom, PhD , a professor of psychology at Yale University, argues that because empathy directs helping behavior toward specific individuals—most often, those in one’s own group—it may prevent more beneficial help to others ( Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion , Ecco , 2016).

In some cases, empathy may also promote antagonism and aggression (Buffone, A. E. K., & Poulin, M. J., Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , Vol. 40, No. 11, 2014). For example, Daryl Cameron , PhD, an associate professor of psychology and senior research associate in the Rock Ethics Institute and director of the Empathy and Moral Psychology Lab at Penn State University, has found that apparent biases in empathy like parochialism and the numbness to mass suffering may sometimes be due to motivated choices. He also notes that empathy can still have risks in some cases. “There are times when what looks like empathy promotes favoritism at the expense of the outgroup,” said Cameron.

Many of these negative outcomes are associated with a type of empathy called self-oriented perspective taking—imagining yourself in someone else’s shoes. “How you take the perspective can make a difference,” said John Dovidio , PhD, the Carl I. Hovland Professor Emeritus of Psychology and a professor emeritus in the Institute for Social and Policy Studies and of Epidemiology at Yale University. “When you ask me to imagine myself in another person’s position,” Dovidio said, “I may experience a lot of personal distress, which can interfere with prosocial behaviors.” Taking on that emotional burden, Schumann added, could also increase your own risk for distressing emotions, such as anxiety.

According to Konrath, the form of empathy shown most beneficial for both the giver and the receiver is an other-oriented response. “It’s a cognitive style of perspective taking where someone imagines another person’s perspective, reads their emotions, and can understand them in general,” she said.

Other-oriented perspective taking may result in empathic concern, also known as compassion, which could be seen as an emotional response to a cognitive process. It’s that emotion that may trigger helping behavior. “If I simply understand you’re in trouble, I may not act, but emotion energizes me,” said Dovidio.

While many practitioners may find empathy to come naturally, psychologists’ research can help clinicians guide patients toward other-oriented empathy and can also help practitioners struggling with compassion fatigue to re-up their empathy. According to Poulin, people are more likely to opt out of empathy if it feels cognitively or emotionally taxing, which could impact psychologists’ ability to effectively support their patients.

To avoid compassion fatigue with patients—and maintain the empathy required for helping them—Poulin said it’s important to reflect on the patient’s feeling or experience without necessarily trying to feel it yourself. “It’s about putting yourself in the right role,” he said. “Your goal isn’t to be the sufferer, but to be the caregiver.”

Be willing to grow

Cameron’s research found that the cognitive costs of empathy could cause people to avoid it but that it may be possible to increase empathy by teaching people to do it effectively ( Journal of Experimental Psychology: General , Vol. 148, No. 6, 2019).

Further, research by Schumann and Zaki shows that the desire to grow in empathy can be a driver in cultivating it. They found people can extend empathic effort—asking questions and listening longer to responses—in situations where they feel different than someone, primarily if they believe empathy could be developed with effort ( Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , Vol. 107, No. 3, 2014).

Similarly, Erika Weisz , PhD, a postdoctoral fellow in psychology at Harvard University, said that the first step to increasing your empathy is to adopt a growth mindset—to believe you’re capable of growing in empathy.

“People who believe that empathy can grow try harder to empathize when it doesn’t come naturally to them, for instance, by empathizing with people who are unfamiliar to them or different than they are, compared to people who believe empathy is a stable trait,” she said.

For example, Weisz found addressing college students’ empathy mindsets increases the accuracy with which they perceive others’ emotions; it also tracks with the number of friends college freshmen make during their first year on campus ( Emotion , online first publication, 2020).

Expose yourself to differences

To imagine another’s perspective, the more context, the better. Shereen Naser , PhD, a professor of psychology at Cleveland State University, said consuming diverse media—for example, a White person reading books or watching movies with a non-White protagonist—and even directly participating in someone else’s culture can provide a backdrop against which to adopt someone else’s perspective.

When you’re in these situations, be fully present. “Paying attention to other people allows you to be moved by their experiences,” said Sara Hodges , PhD, a professor of psychology at the University of Oregon. “Whether you are actively perspective-taking or not, if you just pay more attention to other people, you’re likely to feel more concerned for them and become more involved in their experiences.”

For example, in a course focused on diversity, Naser encourages her graduate students to visit a community they’ve never spent time in. “One student came back saying they felt like an outsider when they attended a Hindu celebration and that they realized that’s what marginalized people feel like every day,” she said. Along with decreasing your bias, such realizations could also spark a deeper understanding of another’s culture—and why they might think or feel the way they do.

Read fiction

Raymond Mar , PhD, a professor of psychology at York University in Toronto, studies how reading fiction and other kinds of character-driven stories can help people better understand others and the world. “To understand stories, we have to understand characters, their motivations, interactions, reactions, and goals,” he said. “It’s possible that while understanding stories, we can improve our ability to understand real people in the real world at the same time.”

When you engage with a story, you’re also engaging the same cognitive abilities you’d use during social cognition ( Current Directions in Psychological Science , Vol. 27, No. 4, 2018). You can get the same effect with any medium—live theater, a show on Netflix, or a novel—as long as it has core elements of a narrative, story, and characters.

The more one practices empathy (e.g., by relating to fictional characters), the more perspectives one can absorb while not feeling that one’s own is threatened. “The foundation of empathy has to be a willingness to listen to other peoples’ experiences and to believe they’re valid,” Mar said. “You don’t have to deny your own experience to accept someone else’s.”

Harness the power of oxytocin

The social hormone oxytocin also plays a role in facilitating empathy. Bianca Jones Marlin , PhD, a neuroscientist and assistant professor of psychology at Columbia University, found that mice that had given birth are more likely to pick up crying pups than virgin animals and that the oxytocin released during the birth and parenting process actually changes the hearing centers of the brain to motivate prosocial and survival behaviors ( Nature , Vol. 520, No. 7548, 2015).

Oxytocin can also breed helping responses in those who don’t have a blood relationship; when Marlin added oxytocin to virgin mice’s hearing centers, they took care of pups that weren’t theirs. “It’s as if biology has prepared us to take care of those who can’t take care of themselves,” she said. “But that’s just a baseline; it’s up to us as a society to build this in our relationships.”

Through oxytocin-releasing behaviors like eye contact and soft physical touch, Marlin said humans can harness the power of oxytocin to promote empathy and helping behaviors in certain contexts. Oxytocin is also known to mediate ingroup and outgroup feelings.

The key, Marlin said, is for both parties to feel connected and unthreatened. To overcome that hurdle, she suggests a calm but direct approach: Try saying, “I don’t agree with your views, but I want to learn more about what led you to that perspective.”

Identify common ground

Feeling a sense of social connection is an important part of triggering prosocial behaviors. “You perceive the person as a member of your own group, or because the situation is so compelling that your common humanity is aroused,” Dovidio said. “When you experience this empathy, it motivates you to help the other person, even at a personal cost to you.”

One way to boost this motivation is to manipulate who you see as your ingroup. Jay Van Bavel , PhD, an associate professor of psychology and neural science at New York University, found that in the absence of an existing social connection, finding a shared identity can promote empathy ( Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , Vol. 55, 2014). “We find over and over again when people have a common identity, even if it’s created in the moment, they are more motivated to get inside the mind of another person,” Van Bavel said.

For example, Van Bavel has conducted fMRI research that suggests being placed on the same team for a work activity can increase cooperation and trigger positive feelings for individuals once perceived as outgroup, even among different races ( Psychological Science , Vol. 19, No. 11, 2008).

To motivate empathy in your own interactions, find similarities instead of focusing on differences. For instance, maybe you and a neighbor have polar opposite political ideologies, but your kids are the same age and go to the same school. Build on that similarity to create more empathy. “We contain multiple identities, and part of being socially intelligent is finding the identity you share,” Van Bavel said.

Ask questions

Existing research often measures a person’s empathy by accuracy—how well people can label someone’s face as angry, sad, or happy, for example. Alexandra Main , PhD, an assistant professor of psychology at the University of California, Merced, said curiosity and interest can also be an important component of empathy. “Mind reading isn’t always the way empathy works in everyday life. It’s more about actively trying to appreciate someone’s point of view,” she said. If you’re in a situation and struggling with empathy, it’s not necessarily that you don’t care—your difficulty may be because you don’t understand that person’s perspective. Asking questions and engaging in curiosity is one way to change that.

While Main’s research focuses on parent-child relationships, she says the approach also applies to other relationship dynamics; for example, curiosity about why your spouse doesn’t do the dishes might help you understand influencing factors and, as a result, prevent conflict and promote empathy.

Main suggests asking open-ended questions to the person you want to show empathy to, and providing nonverbal cues like nodding when someone’s talking can encourage that person to share more. Certain questions, like ones you should already know the answer to, can have the opposite effect, as can asking personal questions when your social partner doesn’t wish to share.

The important thing is to express interest. “These kinds of behaviors are really facilitative of disclosure and open discussion,” Main said. “And in the long term, expressing interest in another person can facilitate empathy in the relationship” ( Social Development , Vol. 28, No. 3, 2019).

Understand your blocks

Research suggests everyone has empathy blocks, or areas where it is difficult to exhibit empathy. To combat these barriers to prosocial behavior, Schumann suggests noticing your patterns and focusing on areas where you feel it’s hard to connect to people and relate to their experiences.

If you find it hard to be around negative people, for example, confront this difficulty and spend time with them. Try to reflect on a time when you had a negative outlook on something and observe how they relate. And as you listen, don’t interrupt or formulate rebuttals or responses.

“The person will feel so much more validated and heard when they’ve really had an opportunity to voice their opinion, and most of the time people will reciprocate,” Schumann said. “You might still disagree strongly, but you will have a stronger sense of why they have the perspective they do.”

Second-guess yourself

Much of empathy boils down to willingness to learn—and all learning involves questioning your assumptions and automatic reactions in both big-picture issues, such as racism, and everyday interactions. According to Rumble, it’s important to be mindful of “what-ifs” in frustrating situations before jumping to snap judgments. For example, if a patient is continually late to appointments, don’t assume they don’t take therapy seriously––something else, like stress or unreliable transportation, might be getting in the way of their timeliness.

And if you do find yourself making a negative assumption, slow down and admit you could be wrong. “As scientists, we second-guess our assumptions all the time, looking for alternative explanations,” said Hodges. “We need to do that as people, too.”

What Is Empathy?

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Amy Morin, LCSW, is a psychotherapist and international bestselling author. Her books, including "13 Things Mentally Strong People Don't Do," have been translated into more than 40 languages. Her TEDx talk, "The Secret of Becoming Mentally Strong," is one of the most viewed talks of all time.

Verywell / Bailey Mariner

Empathy is the ability to emotionally understand what other people feel, see things from their point of view, and imagine yourself in their place. Essentially, it is putting yourself in someone else's position and feeling what they are feeling.

Empathy means that when you see another person suffering, such as after they've lost a loved one , you are able to instantly envision yourself going through that same experience and feel what they are going through.

While people can be well-attuned to their own feelings and emotions, getting into someone else's head can be a bit more difficult. The ability to feel empathy allows people to "walk a mile in another's shoes," so to speak. It permits people to understand the emotions that others are feeling.

Press Play for Advice on Empathy

Hosted by therapist Amy Morin, LCSW, this episode of The Verywell Mind Podcast , featuring empathy expert Dr. Kelsey Crowe, shares how you can show empathy to someone who is going through a hard time. Click below to listen now.

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Signs of Empathy

For many, seeing another person in pain and responding with indifference or even outright hostility seems utterly incomprehensible. But the fact that some people do respond in such a way clearly demonstrates that empathy is not necessarily a universal response to the suffering of others.

If you are wondering whether you are an empathetic person, here are some signs that show that you have this tendency:

You are good at really listening to what others have to say.
People often tell you about their problems.
You are good at picking up on how other people are feeling.
You often think about how other people feel.
Other people come to you for advice.
You often feel overwhelmed by tragic events.
You try to help others who are suffering.
You are good at telling when people aren't being honest .
You sometimes feel drained or overwhelmed in social situations.
You care deeply about other people.
You find it difficult to set boundaries in your relationships.

Are You an Empath? Take the Quiz!

Our fast and free empath quiz will let you know if your feelings and behaviors indicate high levels of traits commonly associated with empaths.

Types of Empathy

There are several types of empathy that a person may experience. The three types of empathy are:

Affective empathy involves the ability to understand another person's emotions and respond appropriately. Such emotional understanding may lead to someone feeling concerned for another person's well-being, or it may lead to feelings of personal distress.
Somatic empathy involves having a physical reaction in response to what someone else is experiencing. People sometimes physically experience what another person is feeling. When you see someone else feeling embarrassed, for example, you might start to blush or have an upset stomach.
Cognitive empathy involves being able to understand another person's mental state and what they might be thinking in response to the situation. This is related to what psychologists refer to as the theory of mind or thinking about what other people are thinking.

Empathy vs. Sympathy vs. Compassion

While sympathy and compassion are related to empathy, there are important differences. Compassion and sympathy are often thought to be more of a passive connection, while empathy generally involves a much more active attempt to understand another person.

Uses for Empathy

Being able to experience empathy has many beneficial uses.

Empathy allows you to build social connections with others . By understanding what people are thinking and feeling, you are able to respond appropriately in social situations. Research has shown that having social connections is important for both physical and psychological well-being.
Empathizing with others helps you learn to regulate your own emotions . Emotional regulation is important in that it allows you to manage what you are feeling, even in times of great stress, without becoming overwhelmed.
Empathy promotes helping behaviors . Not only are you more likely to engage in helpful behaviors when you feel empathy for other people, but other people are also more likely to help you when they experience empathy.

Potential Pitfalls of Empathy

Having a great deal of empathy makes you concerned for the well-being and happiness of others. It also means, however, that you can sometimes get overwhelmed, burned out , or even overstimulated from always thinking about other people's emotions. This can lead to empathy fatigue.

Empathy fatigue refers to the exhaustion you might feel both emotionally and physically after repeatedly being exposed to stressful or traumatic events . You might also feel numb or powerless, isolate yourself, and have a lack of energy.

Empathy fatigue is a concern in certain situations, such as when acting as a caregiver . Studies also show that if healthcare workers can't balance their feelings of empathy (affective empathy, in particular), it can result in compassion fatigue as well.

Other research has linked higher levels of empathy with a tendency toward emotional negativity , potentially increasing your risk of empathic distress. It can even affect your judgment, causing you to go against your morals based on the empathy you feel for someone else.

Impact of Empathy

Your ability to experience empathy can impact your relationships. Studies involving siblings have found that when empathy is high, siblings have less conflict and more warmth toward each other. In romantic relationships, having empathy increases your ability to extend forgiveness .

Not everyone experiences empathy in every situation. Some people may be more naturally empathetic in general, but people also tend to feel more empathetic toward some people and less so toward others. Some of the factors that play a role in this tendency include:

How you perceive the other person
How you attribute the other individual's behaviors
What you blame for the other person's predicament
Your past experiences and expectations

Research has found that there are gender differences in the experience and expression of empathy, although these findings are somewhat mixed. Women score higher on empathy tests, and studies suggest that women tend to feel more cognitive empathy than men.

At the most basic level, there appear to be two main factors that contribute to the ability to experience empathy: genetics and socialization. Essentially, it boils down to the age-old relative contributions of nature and nurture .

Parents pass down genes that contribute to overall personality, including the propensity toward sympathy, empathy, and compassion. On the other hand, people are also socialized by their parents, peers, communities, and society. How people treat others, as well as how they feel about others, is often a reflection of the beliefs and values that were instilled at a very young age.

Barriers to Empathy

Some people lack empathy and, therefore, aren't able to understand what another person may be experiencing or feeling. This can result in behaviors that seem uncaring or sometimes even hurtful. For instance, people with low affective empathy have higher rates of cyberbullying .

A lack of empathy is also one of the defining characteristics of narcissistic personality disorder . Though, it is unclear whether this is due to a person with this disorder having no empathy at all or having more of a dysfunctional response to others.

A few reasons why people sometimes lack empathy include cognitive biases, dehumanization, and victim-blaming.

Cognitive Biases

Sometimes the way people perceive the world around them is influenced by cognitive biases . For example, people often attribute other people's failures to internal characteristics, while blaming their own shortcomings on external factors.

These biases can make it difficult to see all the factors that contribute to a situation. They also make it less likely that people will be able to see a situation from the perspective of another.

Dehumanization

Many also fall victim to the trap of thinking that people who are different from them don't feel and behave the same as they do. This is particularly common in cases when other people are physically distant.

For example, when they watch reports of a disaster or conflict in a foreign land, people might be less likely to feel empathy if they think that those who are suffering are fundamentally different from themselves.

Victim Blaming

Sometimes, when another person has suffered a terrible experience, people make the mistake of blaming the victim for their circumstances. This is the reason that victims of crimes are often asked what they might have done differently to prevent the crime.

This tendency stems from the need to believe that the world is a fair and just place. It is the desire to believe that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get—and it can fool you into thinking that such terrible things could never happen to you.

Causes of Empathy

Human beings are certainly capable of selfish, even cruel, behavior. A quick scan of the news quickly reveals numerous unkind, selfish, and heinous actions. The question, then, is why don't we all engage in such self-serving behavior all the time? What is it that causes us to feel another's pain and respond with kindness ?

The term empathy was first introduced in 1909 by psychologist Edward B. Titchener as a translation of the German term einfühlung (meaning "feeling into"). Several different theories have been proposed to explain empathy.

Neuroscientific Explanations

Studies have shown that specific areas of the brain play a role in how empathy is experienced. More recent approaches focus on the cognitive and neurological processes that lie behind empathy. Researchers have found that different regions of the brain play an important role in empathy, including the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula.

Research suggests that there are important neurobiological components to the experience of empathy. The activation of mirror neurons in the brain plays a part in the ability to mirror and mimic the emotional responses that people would feel if they were in similar situations.

Functional MRI research also indicates that an area of the brain known as the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) plays a critical role in the experience of empathy. Studies have found that people who have damage to this area of the brain often have difficulty recognizing emotions conveyed through facial expressions .

Emotional Explanations

Some of the earliest explorations into the topic of empathy centered on how feeling what others feel allows people to have a variety of emotional experiences. The philosopher Adam Smith suggested that it allows us to experience things that we might never otherwise be able to fully feel.

This can involve feeling empathy for both real people and imaginary characters. Experiencing empathy for fictional characters, for example, allows people to have a range of emotional experiences that might otherwise be impossible.

Prosocial Explanations

Sociologist Herbert Spencer proposed that empathy served an adaptive function and aided in the survival of the species. Empathy leads to helping behavior, which benefits social relationships. Humans are naturally social creatures. Things that aid in our relationships with other people benefit us as well.

When people experience empathy, they are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors that benefit other people. Things such as altruism and heroism are also connected to feeling empathy for others.

Tips for Practicing Empathy

Fortunately, empathy is a skill that you can learn and strengthen. If you would like to build your empathy skills, there are a few things that you can do:

Work on listening to people without interrupting
Pay attention to body language and other types of nonverbal communication
Try to understand people, even when you don't agree with them
Ask people questions to learn more about them and their lives
Imagine yourself in another person's shoes
Strengthen your connection with others to learn more about how they feel
Seek to identify biases you may have and how they affect your empathy for others
Look for ways in which you are similar to others versus focusing on differences
Be willing to be vulnerable, opening up about how you feel
Engage in new experiences, giving you better insight into how others in that situation may feel
Get involved in organizations that push for social change

A Word From Verywell

While empathy might be lacking in some, most people are able to empathize with others in a variety of situations. This ability to see things from another person's perspective and empathize with another's emotions plays an important role in our social lives. Empathy allows us to understand others and, quite often, compels us to take action to relieve another person's suffering.

Reblin M, Uchino BN. Social and emotional support and its implication for health . Curr Opin Psychiatry . 2008;21(2):201‐205. doi:10.1097/YCO.0b013e3282f3ad89

Cleveland Clinic. Empathy fatigue: How stress and trauma can take a toll on you .

Duarte J, Pinto-Bouveia J, Cruz B. Relationships between nurses' empathy, self-compassion and dimensions of professional quality of life: A cross-sectional study . Int J Nursing Stud . 2016;60:1-11. doi:10.1016/j.ijnurstu.2016.02.015

Chikovani G, Babuadze L, Iashvili N, Gvalia T, Surguladze S. Empathy costs: Negative emotional bias in high empathisers . Psychiatry Res . 2015;229(1-2):340-346. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2015.07.001

Lam CB, Solmeyer AR, McHale SM. Sibling relationships and empathy across the transition to adolescence . J Youth Adolescen . 2012;41:1657-1670. doi:10.1007/s10964-012-9781-8

Kimmes JG, Durtschi JA. Forgiveness in romantic relationships: The roles of attachment, empathy, and attributions . J Marital Family Ther . 2016;42(4):645-658. doi:10.1111/jmft.12171

Kret ME, De Gelder B. A review on sex difference in processing emotional signals . Neuropsychologia . 2012; 50(7):1211-1221. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.12.022

Schultze-Krumbholz A, Scheithauer H. Is cyberbullying related to lack of empathy and social-emotional problems? Int J Develop Sci . 2013;7(3-4):161-166. doi:10.3233/DEV-130124

Baskin-Sommers A, Krusemark E, Ronningstam E. Empathy in narcissistic personality disorder: From clinical and empirical perspectives . Personal Dis Theory Res Treat . 2014;5(3):323-333. doi:10.1037/per0000061

Decety, J. Dissecting the neural mechanisms mediating empathy . Emotion Review . 2011; 3(1): 92-108. doi:10.1177/1754073910374662

Shamay-Tsoory SG, Aharon-Peretz J, Perry D. Two systems for empathy: A double dissociation between emotional and cognitive empathy in inferior frontal gyrus versus ventromedial prefrontal lesions . Brain . 2009;132(PT3): 617-627. doi:10.1093/brain/awn279

Hillis AE. Inability to empathize: Brain lesions that disrupt sharing and understanding another's emotions . Brain . 2014;137(4):981-997. doi:10.1093/brain/awt317

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

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The concept of empathy is used to refer to a wide range of psychological capacities that are thought of as being central for constituting humans as social creatures allowing us to know what other people are thinking and feeling, to emotionally engage with them, to share their thoughts and feelings, and to care for their well–being. Ever since the eighteenth century, due particularly to the influence of the writings of David Hume and Adam Smith, those capacities have been at the center of scholarly investigations into the underlying psychological basis of our social and moral nature. Yet, the concept of empathy is of relatively recent intellectual heritage. Moreover, since researchers in different disciplines have focused their investigations on very specific aspects of the broad range of empathy-related phenomena, one should probably not be surprised by a certain amount of conceptual confusion and a multiplicity of definitions associated with the empathy concept in a number of different scientific and non-scientific discourses. The purpose of this entry is to clarify the empathy concept by surveying its history in various philosophical and psychological discussions and by indicating why empathy was and should be regarded to be of such central importance in understanding human agency in ordinary contexts, in the human sciences, and for the constitution of ourselves as social and moral agents. More specifically, after a short historical introduction articulating the philosophical context within which the empathy concept was coined, the second and third sections will discuss the epistemic dimensions associated with our empathic capacities. They will address the contention that empathy is the primary epistemic means for knowing other minds and that it should be viewed as the unique method distinguishing the human from the natural sciences. Sections 4 and 5 will then focus on claims that view empathy as the fundamental social glue and that understand empathy as the main psychological mechanism enabling us to establish and maintain social relations and taking an evaluative stance towards each other.

1. Historical Introduction

2.1 mirror neurons, simulation, and the discussion of empathy in the contemporary theory of mind debate, 3.1 the critique of empathy in the context of a hermeneutic conception of the human sciences, 3.2 the critique of empathy within the context of a naturalist conception of the human sciences, 4. empathy as a topic of scientific exploration in psychology, 5.1 empathy and altruistic motivation, 5.2 empathy, its partiality, susceptibility to bias, and moral agency, 5.3 empathy, moral judgment, and the authority of moral norms, other internet resources, related entries.

Before the psychologist Edward Titchener (1867–1927) introduced the term “empathy” in 1909 into the English language as the translation of the German term “Einfühlung” (or “feeling into”), “sympathy”was the term commonly used to refer to empathy-related phenomena. If one were to point to a conceptual core for understanding these phenomena, it is probably best to point to David Hume’s dictum that “the minds of men are mirrors to one another,”(Hume 1739–40 [1978], 365) since in encountering other persons, humans can resonate with and recreate that person’s thoughts and emotions on different dimensions of cognitive complexity. While, as we will see, not everybody shares such resonance conception of empathy(some philosophers in the phenomenological tradition emphatically reject it), it certainly constitutes the center of Theodor Lipps’s understanding, who Titchener had in mind in his translation of “Einfühlung” as “empathy.”

Theodor Lipps (1851–1914)was also very familiar with the work of David Hume (see the introduction to Coplan and Goldie 2011 in this respect). More importantly, it was Theodor Lipps, whose work transformed empathy/Einfühlung from a concept of nineteenth century German aesthetics into a central category of the philosophy of the social and human sciences. To understand this transformation we first need to appreciate the reasons why philosophers of the nineteenth century thought it necessary to appeal to empathy in order to account for our ability to appreciate natural objects and artefacts in an aesthetic manner. According to the dominant (even though not universally accepted) positivistic and empiricist conception, sense data constitute the fundamental basis for our investigation of the world. Yet from a phenomenological perspective, our perceptual encounter with aesthetic objects and our appreciation of them as being beautiful—our admiration of a beautiful sunset, for example—seems to be as direct as our perception of an object as being red or square. By appealing to the psychological mechanisms of empathy, philosophers intended to provide an explanatory account of the phenomenological immediacy of our aesthetic appreciation of objects. More specifically, for Lipps, our empathic encounter with external objects trigger inner “processes” that give rise to experiences similar to ones that I have when I engage in various activities involving the movement of my body. Since my attention is perceptually focused on the external object, I experience them—or I automatically project my experiences—as being in the object. If those experiences are in some way apprehended in a positive manner and as being in some sense life-affirming, I perceive the object as beautiful, otherwise as ugly. In the first case, Lipps speaks of positive; in the later of negative empathy. Lipps also characterizes our experience of beauty as “objectified self-enjoyment,” since we are impressed by the “vitality” and “life potentiality” that lies in the perceived object (Lipps 1906, 1903 a,b. For the contemporary discussion of empathy’s role in aesthetics see particularly Breithaupt 2009; Coplan and Goldie 2011 (Part II); Curtis & Koch 2009; and Keen 2007. For a recent history of the empathy concept see also Lanzoni 2018).

In his Aesthetik, Lipps closely links our aesthetic perception and our perception of another embodied person as a minded creature. The nature of aesthetic empathy is always the “experience of another human” (1905, 49) . We appreciate another object as beautiful because empathy allows us to see it in analogy to another human body. Similarly, we recognize another organism as a minded creature because of empathy. Empathy in this context is more specifically understood as a phenomenon of “inner imitation,” where my mind mirrors the mental activities or experiences of another person based on the observation of his bodily activities or facial expressions. Empathy is ultimately based on an innate disposition for motor mimicry, a fact that is well established in the psychological literature and was already noticed by Adam Smith (1853). Even though such a disposition is not always externally manifested, Lipps suggests that it is always present as an inner tendency giving rise to similar kinaesthetic sensations in the observer as felt by the observed target. In seeing the angry face of another person we instinctually have a tendency of imitating it and of “imitating” her anger in this manner. Since we are not aware of such tendencies, we see the anger in her face (Lipps 1907). Despite the fact that Lipps’s primary examples of empathy focus on the recognition of emotions expressed in bodily gestures or facial expressions, his conception of empathy should not be understood as being limited to such cases. As his remarks about intellectual empathy suggest (1903b/05), he regards our recognition of all mental activities—insofar as they are activities requiring human effort—as being based on empathy or on inner imitation (See also the introductory chapter in Stueber 2006).

2. Empathy and the Philosophical Problem of Other Minds

It was indeed Lipps’s claim that empathy should be understood as the primary epistemic means for gaining knowledge of other minds that was the focus of a lively debate among philosophers at the beginning of the 20 th century (Prandtl 1910, Stein 1917, Scheler 1973). Even philosophers, who did not agree with Lipps’s specific explication, found the concept of empathy appealing because his argument for his position was closely tied to a thorough critique of what was widely seen at that time as the only alternative for conceiving of knowledge of other minds, that is, Mill’s inference from analogy. Traditionally, the inference from analogy presupposes a Cartesian conception of the mind according to which access to our own mind is direct and infallible, whereas knowledge of other minds is inferential, fallible, and based on evidence about other persons’ observed physical behavior. More formally one can characterize the inference from analogy as consisting of the following premises or steps.

i.) Another person X manifests behavior of type B . ii.) In my own case behavior of type B is caused by mental state of type M . iii.) Since my and X ’s outward behavior of type B is similar, it has to have similar inner mental causes. (It is thus assumed that I and the other persons are psychologically similar in the relevant sense.) Therefore: The other person’s behavior ( X ’s behavior) is caused by a mental state of type M .

Like Wittgenstein, but predating him considerably, Lipps argues in his 1907 article “Das Wissen von fremden Ichen” that the inference from analogy falls fundamentally short of solving the philosophical problem of other minds. Lipps does not argue against the inference from analogy because of its evidentially slim basis, but because it does not allow us to understand its basic presupposition that another person has a mind that is psychologically similar to our own mind. The inference from analogy thus cannot be understood as providing us with evidence for the claim that the other person has mental states like we do because, within its Cartesian framework, we are unable to conceive of other minds in the first place. For Lipps, analogical reasoning requires the contradictory undertaking of inferring another person’s anger and sadness on the basis of my sadness and anger, yet to think of that sadness and anger simultaneously as something “absolutely different” from my anger and sadness. More generally, analogical inference is a contradictory undertaking because it entails “entertaining a completely new thought about an I, that however is not me, but something absolutely different” (Lipps 1907, 708, my translation).

Yet while Lipps diagnoses the problem of the inference of analogy within the context of a Cartesian conception of the mind quite succinctly, he fails to explain how empathy is able to provide us with an epistemically sanctioned understanding of other minds or why our “feeling into” the other person’s mind is more than a mere projection. More importantly, Lipps does not sufficiently explain why empathy does not encounter similar problems to the ones diagnosed for the inference from analogy and how empathy allows us to conceive of other persons as having a mind similar to our own if we are directly acquainted only with our own mental states(See Stueber 2006). Wittgenstein’s critique of the inference from analogy is in the end more penetrating because he recognizes that its problem depends on a Cartesian account of mental concepts. If my grasp of a mental concept is exclusively constituted by me experiencing something in a certain way, then it is impossible for me to conceive of how that very same concept can be applied to somebody else, given that I cannot experience somebody else’s mental states. I therefore cannot conceive of how another person can be in the same mental state as I am because that would require that I can conceive of my mental state as something, which I do not experience. But according to the Cartesian conception this seems to be a conceptually impossible task. Moreover, if one holds on to a Cartesian conception of the mind, it is not clear how appealing to empathy, as conceived of by Lipps, should help us in conceiving of mental states as belonging to another mind.

Within the phenomenological tradition, the above shortcomings of Lipps’s position of empathy were quite apparent (see for example Stein 1917, 24 and Scheler 1973, 236). Yet despite the fact that they did not accept Lipps’s explication of empathy as being based on mechanisms of inner resonance and projection, authors within the phenomenological tradition of philosophy were persuaded by Lipps’s critique of the inference from analogy. For that very reason, Husserl and Stein, for example, continued using the concept of empathy and regarded empathy as an irreducible “type of experiential act sui generis” (Stein 1917, 10), which allows us to view another person as being analogous to ourselves without this “analogizing apprehension” constituting an inference of analogy (Husserl 1931 [1963], 141). Scheler went probably the furthest in rejecting the Cartesian framework in thinking about the apprehension of other minds, while keeping committed to something like the concept of empathy. [ 1 ] (In order to contrast his position from Lipps, Scheler however preferred to use the term “nachfühlen” rather than “einfühlen.”) For Scheler, the fundamental mistake of the debate about the apprehension of other minds consists in the fact that it does not take seriously certain phenomenological facts. Prima facie, we do not encounter merely the bodily movements of another person. Rather, we are directly recognizing specific mental states because they are characteristically expressed in states of the human body; in facial expressions, in gestures, in the tone of voice, and so on. Empathy within the phenomenological tradition then is not conceived of as a resonance phenomenon requiring the observer to recreate the mental states of the other person in his or her own mind but as a special perceptual act (See Scheler 1973, particularly 232–258; For a succinct explication of the debate about empathy in the phenomenological tradition consult Zahavi 2010)

The idea that empathy understood as inner imitation is the primary epistemic means for understanding other minds has however been revived in the 1980’s by simulation theorists in the context of the interdisciplinary debate about folk psychology; an empirically informed debate about how best to describe the underlying causal mechanisms of our folk psychological abilities to interpret, explain, and predict other agents. (See Davies and Stone 1995). In contrast to theory theory, simulation theorists conceive of our ordinary mindreading abilities as an ego-centric method and as a “knowledge–poor” strategy, where I do not utilize a folk psychological theory but use myself as a model for the other person’s mental life. It is not the place here to discuss the contemporary debate extensively, but it has to be emphasized that contemporary simulation theorists vigorously discuss how to account for our grasp of mental concepts and whether simulation theory is committed to Cartesianism. Whereas Goldman (2002, 2006) links his version of simulation theory to a neo-Cartesian account of mental concepts, other simulation theorists develop versions of simulation theory that are not committed to a Cartesian conception of the mind. (Gordon 1995a, b, and 2000; Heal 2003; and Stueber 2006, 2012).

Moreover, neuroscientific findings according to which so called mirror neurons play an important role in recognizing another person’s emotional states and in understanding the goal-directedness of his behavior have been understood as providing empirical evidence for Lipps’ idea of empathy as inner imitation. With the help of the term “mirror neuron,” scientists refer to the fact that there is significant overlap between neural areas of excitation that underlie our observation of another person’s action and areas that are stimulated when we execute the very same action. A similar overlap between neural areas of excitation has also been established for our recognition of another person’s emotion based on his facial expression and our experiencing the emotion. (For a survey on mirror neurons see Gallese 2003a and b, Goldman 2006, chap. 6; Keysers 2011; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004; and particularly Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008). Since the face to face encounter between persons is the primary situation within which human beings recognize themselves as minded creatures and attribute mental states to others, the system of mirror neurons has been interpreted as playing a causally central role in establishing intersubjective relations between minded creatures. For that very reason, the neuroscientist Gallese thinks of mirror neurons as constituting what he calls the “shared manifold of intersubjectivity” (Gallese 2001, 44). Stueber (2006, chap. 4)—inspired by Lipps’s conception of empathy as inner imitation—refers to mirror neurons as mechanisms of basic empathy; [ 2 ] as mechanisms that allow us to apprehend directly another person’s emotions in light of his facial expressions and that enable us to understand his bodily movements as goal-directed actions, that is, as being directed towards an external object like a person reaching for the cup. The evidence from mirror neurons—and the fact that in perceiving other people we use very different neurobiological mechanisms than in the perception of physical objects—does suggest that in our primary perceptual encounter with the world we do not merely encounter physical objects. Rather, even on this basic level, we distinguish already between mere physical objects and objects that are more like us (See also Meltzoff and Brooks 2001). The mechanisms of basic empathy have to be seen as Nature’s way of dissolving one of the principal assumptions of the traditional philosophical discussion about other minds shared by opposing positions such as Cartesianism and Behaviorism; that is, that we perceive other people primarily as physical objects and do not distinguish already on the perceptual level between physical objects like trees and minded creatures like ourselves. Mechanisms of basic empathy might therefore be interpreted as providing us with a perceptual and non-conceptual basis for developing an intersubjectively accessible folk psychological framework that is applicable to the subject and observed other (Stueber 2006, 142–45).

It needs to be acknowledged however that this interpretation of mirror neurons crucially depends on the assumption that the primary function of mirror neurons consists in providing us with a cognitive grasp of another person’s actions and emotions. This interpretation has however been criticized by researchers and philosophers who think that neural resonance presupposes rather than provides us with an understanding of what is going on in the minds of others (Csibra 2007, Hickok 2008 and 2014). They have also pointed out that in observing another person’s emotion or behavior, we never fully “mirror” another person’s neural stimulation. The neuroscientist Jean Decety has argued that in observing another person’s pain our vicariously stimulated pain matrix is not sensitive to the phenomenal quality of pain. Rather it is sensitive to pain as an indicator of “aversion and withdrawal when exposed to danger and threats”(Decety and Cowell 2015, 6 and Decety 2010). At least as far as empathy for pain is concerned, our neural resonance is also modulated by a variety of contextual factors, such as how close we feel to the observed subject, whether we regard the pain to be morally justified (as in the case of punishment, for example) or whether we regard it as unavoidable and necessary, such as in a medical procedure (Singer and Lamm 2009; but see also Allen 2010, Borg 2007, Debes 2010, Gallese 2016, Goldman 2009, Iacoboni 2011, Jacob 2008, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2016, and Stueber 2012a).

Yet it should be noted that everyday mindreading is not restricted to the realm of basic empathy. Ordinarily we not only recognize that other persons are afraid or that they are reaching for a particular object. We understand their behavior in more complex social contexts in terms of their reasons for acting using the full range of psychological concepts including the concepts of belief and desire. Evidence from neuroscience shows that these mentalizing tasks involve very different neuronal areas such as the medial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal cortex, and the cingulate cortex. (For a survey see Kain and Perner 2003; Frith and Frith 2003; Zaki and Ochsner 2012). Low level mindreading in the realm of basic empathy has therefore to be distinguished from higher levels of mindreading (Goldman 2006). It is clear that low level forms of understanding other persons have to be conceived of as being relatively knowledge– poor as they do not involve a psychological theory or complex psychological concepts. How exactly one should conceive of high level mindreading abilities, whether they involve primarily knowledge–poor simulation strategies or knowledge–rich inferences is controversially debated within the contemporary debate about our folk psychological mindreading abilities(See Davies and Stone 1995, Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997, Gordon 1995, Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, Heal 2003, Nichols and Stich 2003, Goldman 2006, and Stueber 2006). Simulation theorists, however, insist that even more complex forms of understanding other agents involve resonance phenomena that engage our cognitively intricate capacities of imaginatively adopting the perspective of another person and reenacting or recreating their thought processes (For various forms of perspective-taking see Coplan 2011 and Goldie 2000). Accordingly, simulation theorists distinguish between different types of empathy such as between basic and reenactive empathy (Stueber 2006) or between mirroring and reconstructive empathy (Goldman 2011). Interestingly, the debate about how to conceive of these more complex forms of mindreading resonates with the traditional debate about whether empathy is the unique method of the human sciences and whether or not one has to strictly distinguish between the methods of the human and the natural sciences. Equally noteworthy is the fact that in the contemporary theory of mind debate voices have grown louder that assert that the contemporary theory of mind debate fundamentally misconceives of the nature of social cognition. In light of insights from the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions in philosophy, they claim that on the most basic level empathy should not be conceived of as a resonance phenomenon but as a type of direct perception. (See particularly Zahavi 2010; Zahavi and Overgaard 2012, but Jacob 2011 for a response). More complex forms of social cognition are also not to be understood as being based on either theory or empathy/simulation, rather they are better best conceived of as the ability to directly fit observed units of actions into larger narrative or cultural frameworks (For this debate see Gallagher 2012, Gallagher and Hutto 2008, Hutto 2008, and Seemann 2011, Stueber 2011 and 2012a, and various articles in Matravers and Waldow 2018). For skepticism about empathic perspective-taking understood as a complete identification with the perspective of the other person see also Goldie 2011). Regardless of how one views this specific debate it should be clear that ideas about mindreading developed originally by proponents of empathy at the beginning of the 20 th century can no longer be easily dismissed and have to be taken seriously.

3. Empathy as the Unique Method of the Human Sciences

At the beginning of the 20 th century, empathy understood as a non-inferential and non-theoretical method of grasping the content of other minds became closely associated with the concept of understanding (Verstehen); a concept that was championed by the hermeneutic tradition of philosophy concerned with explicating the methods used in grasping the meaning and significance of texts, works of arts, and actions. (For a survey of this tradition see Grondin 1994). Hermeneutic thinkers insisted that the method used in understanding the significance of a text or a historical event has to be fundamentally distinguished from the method used in explaining an event within the context of the natural sciences. This methodological dualism is famously expressed by Droysen in saying that “historical research does not want to explain; that is, derive in a form of an inferential argument, rather it wants to understand” (Droysen 1977, 403), and similarly in Dilthey’s dictum that “we explain nature, but understand the life of the soul” (Dilthey 1961, vol. 5, 144). Yet Droysen and authors before him never conceived of understanding solely as an act of mental imitation or solely as an act of imaginatively “transporting” oneself into the point of view of another person. Such “psychological interpretation” as Schleiermacher (1998) used to call it, was conceived of as constituting only one aspect of the interpretive method used by historians. Other tasks mentioned in this context involved critically evaluating the reliability of historical sources, getting to know the linguistic conventions of a language, and integrating the various elements derived from historical sources into a consistent narrative of a particular epoch. The differences between these various aspects of the interpretive procedure were however downplayed in the early Dilthey. For him, grasping the significance of any cultural fact had to be understood as a mental act of “transposition.” (See for example Dilthey 1961, vol. 5, 263–265). .

Ironically, the close association of the concepts of empathy and understanding and the associated claim that empathy is the sole and unique method of the human sciences also facilitated the decline of the empathy concept and its almost utter disregard by philosophers of the human and social sciences later on, in both the analytic and continental/hermeneutic traditions of philosophy. Within both traditions, proponents of empathy were—for very different reasons—generally seen as advocating an epistemically naïve and insufficiently broad conception of the methodological proceedings in the human sciences. As a result, most philosophers of the human and social sciences maintained their distance from the idea that empathy is central for our understanding of other minds and mental phenomena. Notable exceptions in this respect are R.G. Collingwood and his followers, who suggested that reenacting another person’s thoughts is necessary for understanding them as rational agents (Collingwood 1946, Dray 1957 and 1995). Notice however that in contrast to the contemporary debate about folk psychology, the debate about empathy in the philosophy of social science is not concerned with investigating underlying causal mechanisms. Rather, it addresses normative questions of how to justify a particular explanation or interpretation.

Philosophers arguing for a hermeneutic conception of the human and social sciences insist on a strict methodological division between the human and the natural sciences. [ 3 ] Yet they nowadays favor the concept of understanding (Verstehen) and reject the earlier identification of understanding and empathy for two specific reasons. First, empathy is no longer seen as the unique method of the human sciences because facts of significance, which a historian or an interpreter of literary and non-literary texts are interested in, do not solely depend on facts within the individual mind. A historian, for example, is not bound by the agent’s perspective in telling the story of a particular historical time period(Danto 1965). Similarly, philosophers such as Hans Georg Gadamer, have argued that the significance of a text is not tied to the author’s intentions in writing the text. In reading a text by Shakespeare or Plato we are not primarily interested in finding out what Plato or Shakespeare said but what these texts themselves say.(Gadamer 1989; for a critical discussion see Skinner (in Tully 1988); “Introduction” in Kögler and Stueber 2000; and Stueber 2002).

The above considerations, however, do not justify the claim that empathy has no role to play within the context of the human sciences. It justifies merely the claim that empathy cannot be their only method, at least as long as one admits that recognizing the thoughts of individual agents has to play some role in the interpretive project of the human sciences. Accordingly, a second reason against empathy is also emphasized. Conceiving of understanding other agents as being based on empathy is seen as an epistemically extremely naïve conception of the interpretation of individual agents, since it seems to conceive of understanding as a mysterious meeting of two individual minds outside of any cultural context. Individual agents are always socially and culturally embedded creatures. Understanding other agents thus presupposes an understanding of the cultural context within which an agent functions. Moreover, in the interpretive situation of the human sciences, the cultural background of the interpreter and the person, who has to be interpreted, can be very different. In that case, I can not very easily put myself in the shoes of the other person and imitate his thoughts in my mind. If understanding medieval knights, to use an example of Winch (1958), requires me to think exactly as the medieval knight did, then it is not clear how such a task can be accomplished from an interpretive perspective constituted by very different cultural presuppositions. Making sense of other minds has, therefore, to be seen as an activity that is a culturally mediated one; a fact that empathy theorists according to this line of critique do not sufficiently take into account when they conceive of understanding other agents as a direct meeting of minds that is independent of and unaided by information about how these agents are embedded in a broader social environment. (See Stueber 2006, chap.6, Zahavi 2001, 2005; for the later Dilthey see Makreel 2000. For a critical discussion of whether the concept of understanding without recourse to empathy is useful for marking an epistemic distinction between the human and natural sciences consult also Stueber 2012b. Within the context of anthropology, Hollan and Throop argue that empathy is best understood as a dynamic, culturally situated, temporally extended, and dialogical process actively involving not only the interpreter but also his or her interpretee. See Hollan 20012; Hollan and Throop 2008, 2001; Throop 2010).).

Philosophers, who reject the methodological dualism between the human and the natural sciences as argued for in the hermeneutic context, are commonly referred to as naturalists in the philosophy of social science. They deny that the distinction between understanding and explanation points to an important methodological difference. Even in the human or social sciences, the main point of the scientific endeavor is to provide epistemically justified explanations (and predictions) of observed or recorded events (see also Henderson 1993). At most, empathy is granted a heuristic role in the context of discovery. It however can not play any role within the context of justification. As particularly Hempel (1965) has argued, to explain an event involves—at least implicitly—an appeal to law-like regularities providing us with reasons for expecting that an event of a certain kind will occur under specific circumstances. Empathy might allow me to recognize that I would have acted in the same manner as somebody else. Yet it does not epistemically sanction the claim that anybody of a particular type or anybody who is in that type of situation will act in this manner.

Hempel’s argument against empathy has certainly not gone unchallenged. Within the philosophy of history, Dray (1957), following Collingwood, has argued that empathy plays an epistemically irreducible role, since we explain actions in terms of an agent’s reasons. For him, such reason explanations do not appeal to empirical generalizations but to normative principles of actions outlining how a person should act in a particular situation. Similar arguments have been articulated by Jaegwon Kim (1984, 1998). Yet as Stueber (2006, chap. 5) argues such a response to Hempel would require us to implausibly conceive of reason explanations as being very different from ordinary causal explanations. It would imply that our notions of explanation and causation are ambiguous concepts. Reasons that cause agents to act in the physical world would be conceived of as causes in a very different sense than ordinary physical causes. Moreover, as Hempel himself suggests, appealing to normative principles explains at most why a person should have acted in a certain manner. It does not explain why he ultimately acted in that way. Consequently, Hempel’s objection against empathy retain their force as long as one maintains that reason explanations are a form of ordinary causal explanations and as long as one conceives of the epistemic justification of such explanations as implicitly appealing to some empirical generalizations (For Kim’s recent attempt to account for the explanatory character of action explanations by acknowledging the centrality of the first person perspective see also Kim 2010).

Despite these concessions to Hempel, Stueber suggests that empathy (specifically reenactive empathy) has to be acknowledged as playing a central role even in the context of justification. For him, folk psychological explanations have to be understood as being tied to the domain of rational agency. In contrast to explanations in terms of mere inner causes, folk psychological explanations retain their explanatory force only as long as agents’ beliefs and desires can also be understood as reasons for their actions. The epistemic justification of such folk psychological explanations implicitly relies on generalizations involving folk psychological notions such as belief and desire. Yet the existence of such generalizations alone does not establish specific beliefs and desires as reasons for a person’s actions. Elaborating on considerations by Heal (2003) and Collingwood (1946), Stueber suggests that recognizing beliefs and desires as reasons requires the interpreter to be sensitive to an agent’s other relevant beliefs and desires. Individual thoughts function as reasons for rational agency only relative to a specific framework of an agent’s thoughts that are relevant for consideration in a specific situation. Most plausibly—given our persistent inability to solve the frame problem—recognizing which of another agent’s thoughts are relevant in specific contexts requires the practical ability of reenacting another person’s thoughts in one’s own mind. Empathy’s central epistemic role has to be admitted, since beliefs and desires can be understood only in this manner as an agent’s reasons (See Stueber 2006, 2008, 2013. For a related discussion about the role of understanding in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science see Grimm 2016 and Grimm, Baumberger, and Ammon 2017).

The discussion of empathy within psychology has been largely unaffected by the critical philosophical discussion of empathy as an epistemic means to know other minds or as the unique method of the human sciences. Rather, psychologists’ interest in empathy–related phenomena harks back to eighteenth century moral philosophy, particularly David Hume and Adam Smith (See also Wispe 1991). Here empathy, or what was then called sympathy, was regarded to play a central role in constituting human beings as social and moral creatures allowing us to emotionally connect to our human companions and care for their well-being. Throughout the early 20 th century, but particularly since the late 1940’s, empathy has, therefore, been an intensively studied topic of psychological research.

More broadly one can distinguish two psychological research traditions studying empathy–related phenomena; that is, the study of what is currently called empathic accuracy and the study of empathy as an emotional phenomenon in the encounter of others. The first area of study defines empathy primarily as a cognitive phenomenon and conceives of empathy in general terms as “the intellectual or imaginative apprehension of another’s condition or state of mind,” to use Hogan’s (1969) terminology. Within this area of research, one is primarily interested in determining the reliability and accuracy of our ability to perceive and recognize other persons’ enduring personality traits, attitudes and values, and occurrent mental states. One also investigates the various factors that influence empathic accuracy. One has, for example, been interested in determining whether empathic ability depends on gender, age, family background, intelligence, emotional stability, the nature of interpersonal relations, or whether it depends on specific motivations of the observer. (For a survey see Ickes 1993 and 2003; and Taft 1955). A more detailed account of the research on empathic accuracy and some of its earlier methodological difficulties can be found in the

Supplementary document on the Study of Cognitive Empathy and Empathic Accuracy .

Philosophically more influential has been the study of empathy defined primarily as an emotional or affective phenomenon, which psychologists in the middle of the 1950’s started to focus on. In this context, psychologists have also addressed issues of moral motivation that have been traditionally topics of intense discussions among moral philosophers. They were particularly interested in investigating (i) the development of various means for measuring empathy as a dispositional trait of adults and of children and as a situational response in specific situations, (ii) the factors on which empathic responses and dispositions depend, and (iii) the relation between empathy and pro-social behavior and moral development. Before discussing the psychological research on emotional empathy and its relevance for moral philosophy and moral psychology in the next section, it is vital to introduce important conceptual distinctions that one should keep in mind in evaluating the various empirical studies.

Anyone reading the emotional empathy literature has to be struck by the fact that empathy tended to be incredibly broadly defined in the beginning of this specific research tradition. Stotland, one of the earliest researcher who understood empathy exclusively as an emotional phenomenon, defined it as “an observer’s reacting emotionally because he perceives that another is experiencing or is about to experience an emotion” (1969, 272). According to Stotland’s definition very diverse emotional responses such as feeling envy, feeling annoyed, feeling distressed, being relieved about, feeling pity, or feeling what Germans call Schadenfreude (feeling joyful about the misfortune of another) have all to be counted as empathic reactions. Since the 1980’s however, psychologists have fine tuned their understanding of empathy conceptually and distinguished between different aspects of the emotional reaction to another person; thereby implicitly acknowledging the conceptual distinctions articulated by Max Scheler (1973) almost a century earlier. In this context, it is particularly useful to distinguish between the following reactive emotions that are differentiated in respect to whether or not such reactions are self or other oriented and whether they presuppose awareness of the distinction between self and others. (See also the survey in the Introduction to Eisenberg/Strayer 1987 and Batson 2009)

Emotional contagion: Emotional contagion occurs when people start feeling similar emotions caused merely by the association with other people. You start feeling joyful, because other people around you are joyful or you start feeling panicky because you are in a crowd of people feeling panic. Emotional contagion however does not require that one is aware of the fact that one experiences the emotions because other people experience them, rather one experiences them primarily as one’s own emotion (Scheler 1973, 22). A newborn infant’s reactive cry to the distress cry of another, which Hoffman takes as a “rudimentary precursor of empathic distress” (Hoffman 2000, 65), can probably be understood as a phenomenon of emotional contagion, since the infant is not able to properly distinguish between self and other.

Affective and proper Empathy: More narrowly and properly understood, empathy in the affective sense is the vicarious sharing of an affect. Authors however differ in how strictly they interpret the phrase of vicariously sharing an affect. For some, it requires that the empathizers and the persons they empathize with need to be in very similar affective states (Coplan 2011; de Vignemont and Singer 2006; Jacob 2011). For Hoffman, on the other hand, it is an emotional response requiring only “the involvement of psychological processes that make a person have feelings that are more congruent with another’s situation than with his own situation” (Hoffman 2000, 30). According to this definition, empathy does not necessarily require that the subject and target feel similar emotions (even though this is most often the case). Rather the definition also includes cases of feeling sad when seeing a child who plays joyfully but who does not know that it has been diagnosed with a serious illness (assuming that this is how the other person himself or herself would feel if he or she would fully understand his or her situation). In contrast to mere emotional contagion, genuine empathy presupposes the ability to differentiate between oneself and the other. It requires that one is minimally aware of the fact that one is having an emotional experience due to the perception of the other’s emotion, or more generally due to attending to his situation. In seeing a sad face of another and feeling sad oneself, such feeling of sadness should count as genuinely empathic only if one recognizes that in feeling sad one’s attention is still focused on the other and that it is not an appropriate reaction to aspects of one’s own life. Moreover, empathy outside the realm of a direct perceptual encounter involves some appreciation of the other person’s emotion as an appropriate response to his or her situation. To be happy or unhappy because one’s child is happy or sad should not count necessarily as an empathic emotion. It cannot count as a vicarious emotional response if it is due to the perception of the outside world from the perspective of the observer and her desire that her children should be happy. My happiness about my child being happy would therefore not be an emotional state that is more congruent to his situation. Rather, it is an emotional response appropriate to my own perspective on the world. In order for my happiness or unhappiness to be genuinely empathic it has to be happiness or unhappiness about what makes the other person happy. Accordingly, if I share another person’s emotion vicariously I do not merely have to be in an affective state with a similar phenomenal quality. Rather my affective state has to be directed toward the same intentional object. (See Sober and Wilson 1998, 231–237 and Maibom 2007. For a critical discussion of how and whether such vicarious sharing is possible see also Deonna 2007 and Matravers 2018). It should be noted, however, that some authors conceive of proper empathy more broadly as not merely being concerned with the vicarious reenactment of affective states but more comprehensively as including non-affective states such as beliefs and desires. This is especially true if they are influenced by the discussion of of empathy as an epistemic means such as Goldman (2011) and Stueber (2006). However, already Adam Smith (1853) constitutes a good example for such broad understanding of proper empathy. Finally, others suggest that it is best to distinguish between affective sharing and perspective taking (Decety and Cowell 2015).

Sympathy: In contrast to affective empathy, sympathy—or what some authors also refer to as empathic concern—is not an emotion that is congruent with the other’s emotion or situation such as feeling the sadness of the other person’s grieving for the death of his father. Rather, sympathy is seen as an emotion sui generis that has the other’s negative emotion or situation as its object from the perspective of somebody who cares for the other person’s well being (Darwall 1998). In this sense, sympathy consists of “feeling sorrow or concern for the distressed or needy other,” a feeling for the other out of a “heightened awareness of the suffering of another person as something that needs to be alleviated.” (Eisenberg 2000a, 678; Wispe 1986, 318; and Wispe 1991).

Whereas it is quite plausible to assume that empathy—that is, empathy with negative emotions of another or what Hoffman (2000) calls “veridical empathic distress”—under certain conditions (and when certain developmental markers are achieved) can give rise to sympathy, it should be stressed that the relation between affective empathy and sympathy is a contingent one; the understanding of which requires further empirical research. First, sympathy does not necessarily require feeling any kind of congruent emotions on part of the observer, a detached recognition or representation that the other is in need or suffers might be sufficient. (See Scheler 1973 and Nichols 2004). Second, empathy or empathic distress might not at all lead to sympathy. People in the helping professions, who are so accustomed to the misery of others, suffer at times from compassion fatigue. It is also possible to experience empathic overarousal because one is emotionally so overwhelmed by one’s empathic feelings that one is unable to be concerned with the suffering of the other (Hoffman 2000, chap. 8). In the later case, one’s empathic feeling are transformed or give rise to mere personal distress, a reactive emotional phenomenon that needs to be distinguished from emotional contagion, empathy, and sympathy.

Personal Distress: Personal distress in the context of empathy research is understood as a reactive emotion in response to the perception/recognition of another’s negative emotion or situation. Yet, while personal distress is other-caused like sympathy, it is, in contrast to sympathy, primarily self-oriented . In this case, another person’s distress does not make me feel bad for him or her, it just makes me feel bad, or “alarmed, grieved, upset, worried, disturbed, perturbed, distressed,and troubled;” to use the list of adjectives that according to Batson’s research indicates personal distress (Batson et al. 1987 and Batson 1991). And, in contrast to empathic emotions as defined above, my personal distress is not any more congruent with the emotion or situation of another. Rather it wholly defines my own outlook onto the world.

While it is conceptually necessary to differentiate between these various emotional responses, it has to be admitted that it is empirically not very easy to discriminate between them, since they tend to occur together. Think or imagine yourself attending the funeral of the child of a friend or good acquaintance. This is probably one reason why early researchers tended not to distinguish between the above aspects in their study of empathy related phenomena. Yet since the above distinctions refer to very different psychological mechanisms, it is absolutely central to distinguish between them when empirically assessing the impact and contribution of empathy to an agent’s pro-social motivation and behavior. Given the ambiguity of the empathy concept within psychology—particularly in the earlier literature—in evaluating and comparing different empirical empathy studies, it is always crucial to keep in mind how empathy has been defined and measured within the context of these studies. For a more extensive discussion of the methods used by psychologists to measure empathy see the

Supplementary document on Measuring Empathy .

5. Empathy, Moral Philosophy, and Moral Psychology

Moral philosophers have always been concerned with moral psychology and with articulating an agent’s motivational structure in order to explicate the importance of morality for a human life. After all, moral judgments supposedly make demands on an agent’s will and are supposed to provide us with reasons and motivations for acting in a certain manner. Yet moral judgments, at least in the manner in which we conceive of them in modern times, are also regarded to be based on normative standards that, in contrast to mere conventional norms, have universal scope and are valid independent of the features of specific social practices that agents are embedded in. One only needs to think of statements such as “cruelty to innocent children or slavery is morally wrong,” which we view as applying also to social practices where the attitude of its population seem to condone such actions. Moral judgements thus seem to address us from the perspective of the moral stance where we leave behind the perspective of self-love and do not conceive of each other either as friends or foes (see Hume 1987, 75) or as belonging to the in–group or out–group, but where we view each other all to be equal part of a moral community. Finally, and relatedly, in order to view morality as something that is possible for human beings we also seem to require that our motivations based on or associated with moral reasons have a self-less character. Given to charity for merely selfish reasons, for example, seems to clearly diminish its moral worth and implicitly deny the universal character of a moral demand. Philosophically explicating the importance of morality for human life then has to do the following: It has to explain how it is that we humans as a matter of fact do care about morality thusly conceived, it has to address the philosophically even more pertinent question of why it is that we should care about morality or why it is that we should regard judgments issued from the perspective of the moral stance to have normative authority over us; and it has to allow us to understand how it is that we can act self-lessly in a manner that correspond to the demands made on us from the moral stance. Answering all of these questions however necessitates at one point to explain how our moral interests are related to our psychological constitution as human beings and how moral demands can be understood as being appropriately addressed to agents who are psychologically structured in that manner.

Prima facie, the difficulty of this enterprise consists in squaring a realistic account of human psychology with the universal scope and intersubjective validity of moral judgments, since human motivation and psychological mechanisms seem to be always situational, local, and of rather limited scope. Moreover, as evolutionary psychologists tell us in–group bias seems to be a universal trait of human psychology. One of the most promising attempts to solve this problem is certainly due to the tradition of eighteenth century moral philosophy associated with the names of David Hume and Adam Smith who tried to address all of the above philosophical desiderata by pointing to the central role that our empathic and sympathetic capacities have for constituting us as social and moral agents and for providing us with the psychological capacities to make and to respond to moral judgments. While philosophers in the Kantian tradition, who favor reason over sentiments, have generally been skeptical about this proposal, more recently the claim that empathy is central for morality and a flourishing human life has again been the topic of an intense and controversial debate. On the one hand, empathy has been hailed by researchers from a wide range of disciplines and also by some public figures, President Obama most prominently among them. Slote (2010) champions empathy as the sole foundation of moral judgment, de Waal (2006) conceives of it as the unique evolutionary building block of morality, Rifkin (2009) regards it even as a force whose cultivation has unique revolutionary powers to transform a world in crisis, and Baron-Cohen (2011, 194) views it as a “universal solvent” in that “any problem immersed in empathy becomes soluble.” On the other hand, such empathy enthusiasm has encountered penetrating criticism by Prinz (2011 a,b) and Bloom (2016), who emphasize its dark side, that is, its tendency to fall prey to so–called “here and now” biases. The following subsections will address these issues by surveying the relevant empirical research on the question whether empathy motivates us in a self-less manner, the question of whether empathy is inherently biased and partial to the in-group, and it will discuss how we might think of the normative character of moral judgments in light of our empathic capacities.(For a survey of other relevant issues from social psychology, specifically social neuroscience, consult also Decety and Lamm 2006; Decety and Ickes 2009, and Decety 20012. For a discussion of the importance empathy for medical practice see Halpern 2001)

In a series of ingeniously designed experiments, Batson has accumulated evidence for what he calls the empathy-altruism thesis. In arguing for this thesis, Batson conceives of empathy as empathic concern or what others would call sympathy. More specifically, he characterized it in terms of feelings of being sympathetic, moved by, being compassionate, tender, warm and soft-hearted towards the other’s plight (Batson et al. 1987, 26) The task of his experiments consists in showing that empathy/sympathy does indeed lead to genuinely altruistic motivation, where the welfare of the other is the ultimate goal of my helping behavior, rather than to helping behavior because of predominantly egoistic motivations. According to the egoistic interpretation of empathy–related phenomena, empathizing with another person in need is associated with a negative feeling or can lead to a heightened awareness of the negative consequences of not helping; such as feelings of guilt, shame, or social sanctions. Alternatively, it can lead to an enhanced recognition of the positive consequences of helping behavior such as social rewards or good feelings. Empathy according to this interpretation induces us to help through mediation of purely egoistic motivations. We help others only because we recognize helping behavior as a means to egoistic ends. It allows us to reduce our negative feelings (aversive arousal reduction hypothesis), to avoid “punishment,” or to gain specific internal or external “rewards” (empathy-specific punishment and empathy-specific reward hypotheses).

Notice however that in arguing for the empathy-altruism thesis, Batson is not claiming that empathy always induces helping behavior. Rather, he argues against the predominance of an egoistic interpretation of an agent’s motivational structure. He argues for the existence of genuinely altruistic motivations and more specifically for the claim that empathy causes such genuinely altruistic motivation. These genuinely altruistic motives (together with other egoistic motives) are taken into account by the individual agent in deliberating about whether or not to help. Even for Batson, the question of whether the agent will act on his or her altruistic motivations depends ultimately on how strong they are and what costs the agent would incur in helping another person.

The basic set up of Batson’s experiments consists in the manipulation of the situation of the experimental subjects (dependent on the egoistic alternative to be argued against) and the manipulation of empathy/sympathy felt for an observed target in need. The decisive evidence for the empathy/sympathy-altruism thesis is always the recorded behavior of the subject, who is in a high empathy condition and in a situation where his helping behavior can not plausibly be seen as a means for the satisfaction of a personal goal. Since here is not the place to extensively describe the details of Batson’s experiments, a brief description of the experimental set up—focusing on Batson’s argument against the aversive arousal interpretation of empathy—and a brief evaluation of the success of his general argumentative strategy has to suffice (for more details see Batson 1991 and 2011). In all of his experiments, Batson assumes—based on Stotland (1969) and others—that empathy/sympathy can be manipulated either by manipulating the perceived similarity between subjects and targets or by manipulating the perspective taking attitude of the subjects. Empathy according to these assumptions can be increased by enhancing the perceived similarity between subject and target or by asking the subject to imagine how the observed person would feel in his or her situation rather than asking the subject to attend carefully to the information provided. [Note also that instructing the subject to imagine how they themselves would feel in the other’s situation, rather than instructing them to imagine how the other feels, is associated with an increase in personal distress and not only sympathetic feelings. (Batson et al. 1997b and Lamm, Batson, and Decety 2007).]

In trying to argue against the aversive arousal reduction interpretation, Batson also manipulates the ease with which a subject can avoid helping another person (in this case taking his place when they see him getting electric shocks). He reasons that if empathy leads to genuinely altruistic motivations, subjects in the high empathy/easy escape condition should still be willing to help. If they were only helping in order to reduce their own negative feelings, they would be expected to leave in this situation, since leaving is the less costly means for reaching an egoistic goal. As Batson was happy to report, the results confirmed his empathy/sympathy-altruism hypothesis, not only in the above experiments but also in experiments testing other alternative interpretations of empathy such as the empathy- specific punishment and the empathy-specific award hypotheses.

Researchers generally agree in finding Batson’s experimental research program and the accumulated evidence for the empathy-altruism thesis to be impressive. Yet they disagree about how persuasive one should ultimately regard his position. In particular it has been pointed out that his experiments have limited value, since they target only very specific egoistic accounts of why empathy might lead to helping behavior. Batson is not able to dismiss conclusively every alternative egoistic interpretation. In addition, it has been claimed that egoism has the resources to account for the result of his experiments. For example, one might challenge the validity of Batson’s interpretation by speculating whether empathy/sympathy leads to a heightened awareness of the fact that one will be troubled by bad memories of seeing another person in need, if one does nothing to help him or her. In this case even an egoistically motivated person would help in the high empathy/easy escape condition. (For this reply and various other egoistic interpretations of Batson’s experiments see Sober and Wilson 1998, 264–271).

Cialdini and his collaborators have suggested an even more elaborate non-altruistic interpretation of helping behavior in high empathy/easy escape conditions. According to their suggestions, conditions of high empathy are also conditions of increased “interpersonal unity, wherein the conception of self and other are not distinct but are merged to some degree” (Cialdini et al. 1997, 490). It is this increased feeling of oneness rather than empathy that is causally responsible for motivating helping behavior (See however Batson et al. 1997a, Neuberg et al. 1997, and Batson 1997 and 2011 for a plausible reply and May 2018, 144–153 for a probing discussion of the relation between empathic concern and oneness). One therefore has to be cautious in claiming that Batson has conclusively proven that the empathy/sympathy-altruism hypothesis is true, if that means one has logically excluded every egoistic alternative in accounting for helping behavior. But it has to be acknowledged that Batson has radically changed the argumentative dialectic of the egoism-altruism debate by forcing the egoistic account of human agency to come up with ever more elaborate alternative interpretations in order to account for helping behavior within its framework. Egoism was supposed to provide a rather unified and relatively simple account of the motivational structure of human agency. In challenging the predominance and simplicity of this framework in an empirically acute fashion, Batson has at least established altruism—claiming that besides egoistic motivations we are also motivated by genuinely altruistic reasons—as an empirically plausible hypothesis. He has shown it to be a hypothesis one is almost persuaded to believe that it is true, as he himself recently has characterized his own epistemic attitude (Batson 1997, 522.) More positively expressed, Batson’s research has at least demonstrated that empathy/sympathy is a causal factor in bringing about helping behavior. Regardless of the question of the exact nature of the underlying motivation for helping or prosocial behavior, psychologists generally assume that in adults and children a positive, even if weak, correlation between empathy—measured in a variety of ways—and prosocial behavior has been established; and this despite the fact that the above aspects of emotional responding to another person have not always been sufficiently distinguished.(For a survey see Eisenberg and Miller 1987; Eisenberg/Fabes 1998, Spinrad and Eisenberg 2014. For a general survey of the various factors contributing to prosocial behavior see Bierhoff 2002).

Regardless of how exactly one views the strength of Batson’s position, his research alone does not validate the thesis, articulated by various traditional moral philosophers, that sympathy or empathy is the basis of morality or that it constitutes the only source for moral motivation. First, nothing in his research has shown that empathy/sympathy is empirically necessary for moral agency. Second, some of Batson’s own research casts doubt on the claim that sympathy/empathy is the foundation of morality as empathy induced altruism can lead to behavior that conflicts with our principles of justice and fairness. One, for example, tends to assign a better job or a higher priority for receiving medical treatment to persons with whom one has actually sympathized, in violation of the above moral principles (See Batson et al. 1995). For that very reason, Batson himself distinguishes between altruistic motivation concerned with the well-being of another person and moral motivation guided by principles of justice and fairness (Batson 2011). Unfortunately we do not always realize this fact when we abstractly contrast moral motivation broadly with egoistic motivation. For that very reason, we also do not realize that we need to be more conscious in “orchestrating” the relationship between altruistic and moral motivations in order to fully utilize the motivational power of altruism for moral purposes (Batson 2014). Finally, the research discussed so far is not relevant for deciding the question of whether sophisticated mindreading abilities are required for full blown moral agency, since Batson understands empathy primarily as an emotional phenomenon. (See Nichols 2001 and Batson et al. 2003 in this respect.)

Within the psychological literature, one of the most comprehensive accounts of empathy and its relation to the moral development of a person is provided by the work of Martin Hoffman (for a summary see his 2000). Hoffman views empathy as a biologically based disposition for altruistic behavior (Hoffman 1981). He conceives of empathy as being due to various modes of arousal allowing us to respond empathically in light of a variety of distress cues from another person. Hoffman mentions mimicry, classical conditioning, and direct association—where one empathizes because the other’s situation reminds one of one’s own painful experience—as “fast acting and automatic” mechanisms producing an empathic response. As more cognitively demanding modes, Hoffman lists mediated association—where the cues for an empathic response are provided in a linguistic medium—and role taking.

Hoffman distinguishes between six (or more) developmental stages of empathic responses ranging from the reactive newborn cry, egocentric empathic distress, quasi-ego-centric empathic distress, to veridical empathy, empathy for another beyond the immediate situation, and empathy for whole groups of people. Accordingly, empathic responses constitute a developmental continuum that ranges from emotional contagion (as in the case of a reactive newborn cry) to various forms of proper empathy reached at the fourth stage. At the developmentally later stages, the child is able to emotionally respond to the distress of another in a more sophisticated manner due to an increase of cognitive capacities, particularly due to the increased cognitive ability to distinguish between self and other and by becoming aware of the fact that others have mental states that are independent from its own. Only at the fourth stage of empathic development (after the middle of the second year) do children acquire such abilities. They do no longer try to comfort themselves, when emotionally responding to another child’s distress—like seeking comfort from their own mother—, or use helping strategies that are more appropriate to comfort themselves than the other person—like using their own teddy-bear in trying to comfort the other child. Only at the fourth stage does empathy become also transformed or associated with sympathy leading to appropriate prosocial behavior. Hoffman’s developmental view is further supported by Preston and DeWaal’s account of empathy as a phenomenon to be observed across species at various levels of complexities related to different degrees of cognitive development. (Preston and DeWaal 2002a,b. For a discussion of the philosophical relevance of DeWaal’s view see also DeWaal 2006).

Significantly, Hoffman combines his developmental explication of empathy with a sophisticated analysis of its importance for moral agency. He is thereby acutely aware of the limitations in our natural capacity to empathize or sympathize with others, particularly what he refers to as “here and now” biases, that is, the fact that we tend to empathize more with persons that are in some sense perceived to be closer to us. (For a neuro-scientific investigation of how racial bias modulates empathic responses see Xuo, Zuo, Wang and Han 2009). Like Batson, Hoffman does not regard the moral realm as being exclusively circumscribed by our ability to empathize with other people. Besides empathic abilities, moral agency requires also knowledge of abstract moral principles, such as the principles of caring and justice. Hoffman seems to conceive of those principles as being derived from cognitive sources that are independent from our empathic abilities. Yet Hoffmann is rather optimistic about the natural compatibility of empathic motivation and our commitment to moral principles. He regards stable and effective moral agency as requiring empathy so that moral principles can have a motivational basis in an agent’s psychology. Within this context, he has lately emphasized a final stage of empathy development or what he calls “witnessing”, an empathic response to the suffering of others that is so intense that we “become fully committed to help”(Hoffman 2014, 82). As he explains—in light of examples from the history of abolitionism, the civil rights movement, serfdom reform in Russia, and various cases before the Supreme Court— it is particularly such witnessing that has contributed towards bending the arc of the moral universe towards justice. Accordingly, and despite our natural limitations in empathizing with others, Hoffman still regards empathy as the “bedrock of morality” and “the glue of society”(Hoffman 2014, 96. Besides Hoffman 2011 and 2014, see also Deigh 2011 for a measured evaluation of empathy in the legal context ).

More recently, such ultimately positive evaluation of empathy’s contributing role in constituting us as moral agents, as agents who address each other from the moral stance, has encountered penetrating criticism, particularly by Prinz (2011a,b) and Bloom (2016). Both emphasize the dark side of empathy, that is, the aforementioned “here and now” biases. More specifically Prinz mentions explicitly the cuteness, salience, and proximity effects—the fact that we tend to empathize more easily with attractive persons, with persons that are in close proximity and only if their suffering is particularly noteworthy— similarity biases and the fact that we tend to be rather selective in choosing whom to empathize with. Empathy is also very easily modulated by a variety of top-down factors that influence our perception of the social world and that let us register social divisions that seem to be prima facie incompatible with the more impartial stance demanded by the moral perspective. Research has documented these biases in a more fine-grained manner and shown that subjects generally “reported experiencing more empathy for the in–group then the out–group targets and more counter–empathy for the out–group than in–group targets”(Cikara et. al. 2014, 120), counter–empathy here being understood as the feeling of pleasure at the misfortune of another (Schadenfreude) or the feeling displeasure at something fortunate happening to another (Glückschmerz). This is particularly true if the other group is viewed to be in competition with one’s own group. Empathy can also be further reduced through various dehumanizing and objectifying strategies, strategies that have certainly employed in the context of the genocides of the twentieth century and the system of racial slavery in the United States (See Fuchs 2019, Kteily and Bruneau 2017). Heightened empathy for perceived wrongs done to members of the in–group can also lead to violent and immoral behavior (Bloom 2016, chap. 5). In addition, empathy tends to focus on the one (particularly if he or she is identifiable) rather than the many, what Bloom refers to as its spotlight feature. Empathy can mislead us particularly in contexts where we need to take into account statistically relevant information when addressing a moral or social problem, such as when thinking about the benefits of vaccination where it is more appropriate to think about the large numbers of children saved rather than empathizing with the bad effects such vaccination might have on one specific child. For all of these reasons, Prinz favors the moral emotions such as anger, guilt and shame as the foundation for morality, while Bloom prefers sympathy guided by reason as a more viable means than empathy to steer us in moral matters.

Here is not the place for a final evaluation of empathy’s contribution in regard to pro-social and moral motivation or moral and pro-social behavior, since this question is still very much the topic of an ongoing empirical investigation. Yet the following observations are certainly justified in light of the empirical evidence so far and might help to further clarify the debate. First, it seems to be pretty well established that however one defines our natural capacity for empathy, it is on its own not sufficient to keep us reliably on the path of morality (See also Decety and Cowell 2015). Whether that ultimately means that we should think of our capacity for empathy as a limited resource or whether it would be better to think of empathy as a motivated phenomenon and its limitations as being due to our reluctance to activate that capacity (Zaki 2014), is certainly another intriguing question for further empirical inquiry. One might also wonder why we should expect that the emotions such as sympathy and anger, which Bloom and Prinz point to, are less prone to bias and less affected by a universal human tendency to favor the in–group. Certainly sympathy within the context of Buddhism, to which Bloom appeals to is a highly regulated emotion, controlled through mindfulness practices or meditation and guided by an intellectual grasp about the detriments of various forms of attachment to this world. Persson and Savulescu (2018) therefore suggest that rather than giving up on empathy completely one should reform empathy by regulating it through one’s reflective capacities in light of our knowledge of its natural shortcomings or focus one’s empathy (cognitive and affective) particularly on another person’s concerns for his or her well-being as such empathy includes sympathy for the other (Simmons 2014). Such suggestions are also very much in line with proposals by David Hume and Adam Smith, who suggested already in the eighteenth century that we need to regulate empathy with the help of certain corrective mechanisms such as “some steady and general points of view” or the perspective of the“impartial spectator” in order to compensate for empathy’s limited scope. (For a good analysis of the philosophical discussion about empathy/sympathy in the eighteenth century see Frazer 2010).

Most importantly, in order to evaluate the empirical discussion about empathy’s role for morality, one needs to be very sensitive to how researchers define and measure empathy in arguing for and against empathy’s relation to moral motivation or moral judgment. Prinz and Bloom are quite explicit in defining empathy merely as an affective phenomenon, as our ability to feel what the other person feels. Evidence suggests indeed that merely sharing another person’s emotion empathically does not increase our concern or motivation for moral or pro-social action. Interestingly, however, perspective–taking and empathic concern/sympathy, which have always been seen as an integral part of empathy-related phenomena, are a slightly different matter. They do seem to be positively related to cooperation and charitable giving (Jordon et. al. 2016), to reducing prejudices against particular groups (Galinski and Morowitz 2011), and to an increase in one’s sensitivity to injustices done to others (Decety and Yoder 2015). Yet even here further research is needed as the effects of such perspective–taking could be modulated by the power differential between groups. It has, for example, been shown that in active intergroup conflicts, positive intergroup interaction can increase empathy for the other group. Yet within such contexts, taking the perspective of a person from the other group while interacting with them might also hinder the development of intergroup empathy if the dominant group is reminded through such perspective–taking of how they might be viewed by the non-dominant group. Even perspective taking by the non–dominant group might increase rather than decrease established negative stereotypes in thinking about the other group (Cikara et. al. 2014). It seems more effective if the non–dominant group is asked to articulate the difficulties of their lives (perspective–giving) and the dominant group is asked to translate that description into their own words (perspective–taking), even if the positive effects of such interaction is relatively short-lived (Bruneau and Saxe 2012).

So far, this entry has discussed mainly research exploring the relation between empathy and prosocial/moral behavior or motivation. Other important areas for considering empathy’s role in moral matters have to do with addressing the questions of how and whether empathy contributes to our ability to distinguish between moral and conventional norms, to the making of moral judgments, and how empathy can be appealed to in explicating the normative authority of such judgments. In considering the first question, psychologists and philosophers have generally followed Turiel in understanding moral norms as expressing concerns for “rights, justice, and the welfare of other people” (Turiel 1983, 3) and as having a very specific “signature response patterns” (Kelly et. al. 2007) associated with it. Moral norms are generally regarded to be more important than conventional norms in that their normative validity is conceived as being independent of social authority or specific social practices and agreements. Their scope is also judged to be much broader—they are thought of to be valid in other countries, for example—, and violation of moral norms is generally understood to be a more serious offense than the violation of other norms. Notice however that in distinguishing between moral and conventional norms subjects do not necessarily associate a strict universality in the Kantian sense with moral norms and view them as applicable to all rational beings. Indeed there is some evidence that 6–9 year old children, for example, view the moral/conventional distinction as being fully applicable only to behavior of individuals in the in-group and view prescription against harming members of the out-group to be more like conventional norms (Rhodes and Chalik 2013). Accordingly, the fact that empathy shows considerable in-group bias, as discussed above, does not automatically count as evidence against it playing a role in allowing humans to distinguish between moral and conventional norms within a social context.

Of central importance for assessing the role of empathy for grasping the moral/conventional distinction has been the research on the nature of psychopathy and autism. Both pathologies are seen as involving deficits in different dimensions of empathy but only psychopaths have great difficulties in living up to moral standards of their societies and only they were originally thought of as having difficulties in appropriately distinguishing between moral and conventional norms (Blair 1995 and 1996). More specifically, psychopaths show a selective deficit in affective or emotional empathy particularly in “processing fearful, sad, and possibly disgusted facial expressions”(Blair 2010, 710). In contrast to persons with autism they however do not show similar deficits in perspective taking or theory of mind capacities. In his 1995 article, Blair therefore blames the absence of what he calls the Violence Inhibition Mechanism(VIM) that allows us to respond appropriately to the observed distress cues in others for the psychopaths’ moral deficits and their inability to draw the moral/conventional distinction. In his later work, he speaks more broadly of a dysfunction of our Integrated Emotion System (IES), caused by a deficit in the amygdala to properly represent negative emotions. (Blair, Mitchel, and Blair 2005, for a recent survey regarding the very specific deficit of psychopaths in feeling and recognizing fear see also Marsh 2014). Yet one has to tread very carefully in drawing definite conclusions about the role of empathy for morality from the empirical research about psychopathy. The results of the empirical investigations are far from unified and do not point in the same direction (For a concise survey see Maibom 2017). Newer studies, for example, seem to suggest that psychopaths, as measured by the overall score of the revised psychopathy checklist (PCL–R), are able to understand the distinction between moral and conventional norms if tested under a forced choice paradigm (Aharoni et. al 2012.)Nevertheless even that study seems to allow for the possibility that emotional deficits are responsible for the psychopath’s shortcomings in accurately drawing the distinction since they are somewhat linked to the affective and antisocial facets of the PCL–R. Given the inconsistent results of the various studies, other researchers prefer to view a psychopath’s immorality not as a specific deficit in empathy, but understand it to be caused by their general inability to feel strong emotions, by their general coldheartedness, or even by shortcomings in their rational and prudential capacities. From that perspective, a psychopath might understand in an abstract manner that certain things are morally wrong to do, but he just does not care for morality, the welfare of another person, or even for himself. (For further discussion see Maibom 2005 and 2009, Nichols 2004, and Prinz 2011a,b). Similar considerations apply also to research regarding subjects with autism. Kennett (2002)has argued that evidence from autistic individuals, whose imaginative role-play and thus empathic capacities are diminished, does not support the claim that empathy is necessary for moral agency. Yet in her arguments she only considers the fact that persons with autism have difficulties with putting themselves in another person’s shoes but does not consider that they seem to have some ability to pick up on the emotional states of other people as revealed by their facial expressions. Moreover, while autistic subjects in general can distinguish between moral and conventional norms they do seem to lack a certain flexibility in evaluating the seriousness of the violation of a moral norm when they reflect on moral dilemmas or when they encounter an accidental or unintentional violation of such norms. (See McGeer 2008, Zalla et. al 2011, but see also Kennett 2011 and Leslie et. al. 2006 in response).

Philosophers have however not been merely be interested in appealing to empathy for explicating the psychological basis for our thinking that certain norms have moral status. Within the general framework of moral sentimentalism, which sees morality generally linked to our emotional responsiveness to the actions of others and ourselves, they have also appealed to empathy in explicating more generally the nature of moral judgments (see also Kauppinen 2014 and 2017a). David Hume, for example, has suggested that moral judgments are based on peculiar sentiments of moral approbations and disapprobation, which are causally mediated by our ability to empathize— or what he called sympathy— with the pain and pleasures of others (See also Sayre-Mcord 1994 and 2014). More specifically, sentiments of moral approbations arise in response to our ability to think about and enliven the pleasure and pain that others feel with the help of our empathic/sympathetic capacities when we consider the benefits (the pleasure and pain) which a person’s character traits and actions provide to himself and others. Yet Hume was already quite aware of some of the above mentioned limitations and biases of our natural willingness and capacity to empathize with others. Accordingly, he insisted that sentiments of approbations can only be conceived of as moral approbation if empathy/sympathy is regulated or corrected by what he refers to as “steady and general points of view” (Hume 1739–40 [1978], 581/2) so that our capacity for sympathy enables us to “touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and symphony” (Hume 1748 [1983], 75). There are certainly a number of issues that can be raised in response to Hume’s proposal. Suffice it here to point out that it is difficult to fully understand how Hume is ultimately able distinguish between judgments about something being bad and something being morally wrong. Certainly natural disasters also cause us to sympathize/empathize with the pain it causes others, yet such sympathy is not mediating any judgments about the moral impermissibility of natural disasters. Hume himself might have thought to have solved this problem by thinking that sentiments of moral approbation have a peculiar or distinct character (see in this respect particularly Debes 2012). Yet pointing to the peculiarity of such sentiments seems to be rather unsatisfying for answering this challenge.

Michael Slote, one of the main contemporary proponents of the claim that empathy plays a constitutive role for moral judgments, does not follow Hume in thinking that empathy plays a moral role in allowing us to pick up on a subject’s pleasure and pain. Rather Slote, who also has been influenced by a feminist ethics of care (Slote 2007, 2010), suggests that empathy is central for moral approval in that we as spectators empathically pick up on whether or not an agent acted out of empathic concern for another subject. Moral approval of an action consists then in the subsequent reflective feeling of warmth when empathizing with an agent’s empathic concern, while moral disapproval is equivalent with a reflective feeling of chill due to our recognition that the agent acted without any empathic concern. Actions are then judged to be morally right or wrong in terms of whether they can be conceived of the actions of an agent we would morally approve of in that they are actions done out of empathic concern. Notice also that while Slote does regard empathy in the above sense to be constitutive of moral approval only if it is fully or well–developed, he does not follow Hume in thinking that empathy needs to be regulated in order to correct for some of its natural partiality. Indeed Slote thinks that this is a virtue of his account since he regards such partiality reflected in our moral intuitions. For example, he thinks that we have a greater moral obligation to help the child in front of us or members of our family rather than people who are more removed from us. Slote certainly deserves credit for reviving the debate about the role of empathy for morality in contemporary metaethics. Yet his conception of the relation between empathy and morality has also encountered some skepticism. First of all, it is questionable that only motivations of empathic concern, rather than the thought that one is doing the right thing, constitute proper moral motivations. Second, in light of the above research on empathy’s bias and natural shortcomings, it is rather questionable to maintain that all aspects of empathy’s partiality are sanctioned by our our moral intuitions. It is therefore hard to see how empathy’s moral role can be justified without appeal to some form of corrective mechanism. Third, phenomenologically speaking, moral disapproval is not necessarily based on a “chilly” feeling. At times we are rather upset and angry in encountering violations of moral norms. Finally, Slote’s proposed empathic mechanism underlying moral approval seems to lack a certain psychological plausibility. For Slote, we approve of an action because we recreate the empathic concern that the agent feels towards his or her subjects and that causes us to feel warmly towards the agent. Yet if a positive moral judgment of an actions is tied to providing us with the motivation or with a reason for doing a specific action, it is hard to see how moral approval, consisting in us feeling warmly towards the agent, should help us accomplish this. If Slote is right, it would rather provide us with a reason for merely praising or being nice towards the agent (See D’Arms 2011, Kauppinen 2014 and 2017a, Prinz 2001a,b, and Stueber 2011c).

There is one additional element to consider when debating empathy’s contribution to morality. Philosophers are not merely interested in answering factual and causal questions of why we care about morality, what causal role empathy plays in this respect, or how empathy causally contributes in allowing us to distinguish between moral and conventional norms and judging what is morally right or wrong. Rather they are also interested in genuinely normative questions in attempting to answer the question of why we should care about morality and why we should regard moral judgments as making normative demands on us. In morally blaming other persons we do assume that we evaluate their behavior according to standards that they as persons are in some sense already committed to. We assume that these standards are their own standards rather than standards that we impose from an external perspective on them. Unfortunately, even if one would agree with either David Hume or Michael’s Slote’s account of the causal role of empathy outlined above, it is doubtful that their account would help us to answer the genuinely normative question appropriately. Why exactly should I take a particular emotional reaction of another person towards me and my action, even if it is a feeling of warmth caused by empathy, as something that is normatively relevant for me. Certainly we all like to be liked and try to fit in with our peer group, but then moral judgments would be nothing more than a glorified form of peer pressure. Hume might respond that we should take them seriously because they are responses from the general point of view, but that in itself seems to be begging the question of why such perspective is articulating the appropriate normative standard for judging our behavior and character. This is also exactly the reason, why philosophers with Kantian inclinations have been in general skeptical about moral sentimentalism and positions that think of empathy as a foundation of morality (for a nice explication of Kant’s critical view of sympathy see Deimling 2017). Contemporary “Kantians” do at times, however, admit that empathy and perspective taking is epistemically relevant for moral deliberations, even if it is not solely constitutive for moral agency (Deigh 1996 and 2018; Darwall 2006, Shermann 1998, For a review see also Oxley 2011). Interestingly, philosophers sympathetic to moral sentimentalism have particularly turned to Adam Smith for inspiration in developing empathy based accounts of morality and in responding to the above normativity problem. In contrast to Hume, Smith conceives of empathy/sympathy not merely as the enlivening of a perceived emotion or feeeling but as imaginative perspective–taking. In taking up another person’s perspective we put ourselves in his situation and imagine how he would respond to the situation, how he would think and feel about it. If in bringing another person’s point of view “home to ourselves” in this manner, we recognize that we ourselves might have felt or acted like the other person, then we approve of the other person’s sentiment or action, otherwise we disapprove. Moreover, such approval constitutes moral approval if we have empathized with the other from the perspective of the impartial spectator, a perspective that Smith, like Hume, appeals to in order to correct for empathy’s natural shortcomings. More importantly, some authors think that within the Smithian framework we also find some answers to the normativity problem. They think that the impartial spectator perspective can be recast as an implicit commitment of our ordinary practice of making sense of each other as rational and emotional creatures with the help of empathic perspective taking (Stueber 2017) or argue that Smithian perspective–taking involves quasi-Kantian commitments to the dignity of a person, including his or her affective dimension. (Debes 2017, but see also Fricke 2005, Kauppinen 2017b, and Roughley 2018).

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Further Important Surveys of Empathy

Maibom, H. (ed.), 2017. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Empathy , New York: Routledge.
Matraver, D., 2017. Empathy , Cambridge: Polity Press.

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Greater Good Science Center • Magazine • In Action • In Education

Empathy Defined

What is empathy.

The term “empathy” is used to describe a wide range of experiences. Emotion researchers generally define empathy as the ability to sense other people’s emotions, coupled with the ability to imagine what someone else might be thinking or feeling.

Contemporary researchers often differentiate between two types of empathy : “Affective empathy” refers to the sensations and feelings we get in response to others’ emotions; this can include mirroring what that person is feeling, or just feeling stressed when we detect another’s fear or anxiety. “Cognitive empathy,” sometimes called “perspective taking,” refers to our ability to identify and understand other people’s emotions. Studies suggest that people with autism spectrum disorders have a hard time empathizing .

Empathy seems to have deep roots in our brains and bodies, and in our evolutionary history . Elementary forms of empathy have been observed in our primate relatives , in dogs , and even in rats . Empathy has been associated with two different pathways in the brain, and scientists have speculated that some aspects of empathy can be traced to mirror neurons , cells in the brain that fire when we observe someone else perform an action in much the same way that they would fire if we performed that action ourselves. Research has also uncovered evidence of a genetic basis to empathy , though studies suggest that people can enhance (or restrict) their natural empathic abilities.

Having empathy doesn’t necessarily mean we’ll want to help someone in need, though it’s often a vital first step toward compassionate action.

For more: Read Frans de Waal’s essay on “ The Evolution of Empathy ” and Daniel Goleman’s overview of different forms of empathy , drawing on the work of Paul Ekman.

What are the Limitations?

When Empathy Hurts, Compassion Can Heal

A new neuroscientific study shows that compassion training can help us cope with other…

Does Empathy Reduce Prejudice—or Promote It?

Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton explains how to make sense of conflicting scientific evidence.

How to Avoid the Empathy Trap

Do you prioritize other people's feelings over your own? You might be falling into the…

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Why Practice It?

Empathy is a building block of morality—for people to follow the Golden Rule, it helps if they can put themselves in someone else’s shoes. It is also a key ingredient of successful relationships because it helps us understand the perspectives, needs, and intentions of others. Here are some of the ways that research has testified to the far-reaching importance of empathy.

Seminal studies by Daniel Batson and Nancy Eisenberg have shown that people higher in empathy are more likely to help others in need, even when doing so cuts against their self-interest .
Empathy is contagious : When group norms encourage empathy, people are more likely to be empathic—and more altruistic.
Empathy reduces prejudice and racism : In one study, white participants made to empathize with an African American man demonstrated less racial bias afterward.
Empathy is good for your marriage : Research suggests being able to understand your partner’s emotions deepens intimacy and boosts relationship satisfaction ; it’s also fundamental to resolving conflicts. (The GGSC’s Christine Carter has written about effective strategies for developing and expressing empathy in relationships .)
Empathy reduces bullying: Studies of Mary Gordon’s innovative Roots of Empathy program have found that it decreases bullying and aggression among kids, and makes them kinder and more inclusive toward their peers. An unrelated study found that bullies lack “affective empathy” but not cognitive empathy, suggesting that they know how their victims feel but lack the kind of empathy that would deter them from hurting others.
Empathy reduces suspensions : In one study, students of teachers who participated in an empathy training program were half as likely to be suspended, compared to students of teachers who didn’t participate.
Empathy promotes heroic acts: A seminal study by Samuel and Pearl Oliner found that people who rescued Jews during the Holocaust had been encouraged at a young age to take the perspectives of others.
Empathy fights inequality. As Robert Reich and Arlie Hochschild have argued, empathy encourages us to reach out and want to help people who are not in our social group, even those who belong to stigmatized groups , like the poor. Conversely, research suggests that inequality can reduce empathy : People show less empathy when they attain higher socioeconomic status.
Empathy is good for the office: Managers who demonstrate empathy have employees who are sick less often and report greater happiness.
Empathy is good for health care: A large-scale study found that doctors high in empathy have patients who enjoy better health ; other research suggests training doctors to be more empathic improves patient satisfaction and the doctors’ own emotional well-being .
Empathy is good for police: Research suggests that empathy can help police officers increase their confidence in handling crises, diffuse crises with less physical force, and feel less distant from the people they’re dealing with.

For more: Learn about why we should teach empathy to preschoolers .

How Do I Cultivate It?

Humans experience affective empathy from infancy, physically sensing their caregivers’ emotions and often mirroring those emotions. Cognitive empathy emerges later in development, around three to four years of age , roughly when children start to develop an elementary “ theory of mind ”—that is, the understanding that other people experience the world differently than they do.

From these early forms of empathy, research suggests we can develop more complex forms that go a long way toward improving our relationships and the world around us. Here are some specific, science-based activities for cultivating empathy from our site Greater Good in Action :

Active listening: Express active interest in what the other person has to say and make him or her feel heard.
Shared identity: Think of a person who seems to be very different from you, and then list what you have in common.
Put a human face on suffering: When reading the news, look for profiles of specific individuals and try to imagine what their lives have been like.
Eliciting altruism: Create reminders of connectedness.

And here are some of the keys that researchers have identified for nurturing empathy in ourselves and others:

Focus your attention outwards: Being mindfully aware of your surroundings, especially the behaviors and expressions of other people , is crucial for empathy. Indeed, research suggests practicing mindfulness helps us take the perspectives of other people yet not feel overwhelmed when we encounter their negative emotions.
Get out of your own head: Research shows we can increase our own level of empathy by actively imagining what someone else might be experiencing.
Don’t jump to conclusions about others: We feel less empathy when we assume that people suffering are somehow getting what they deserve .
Show empathic body language : Empathy is expressed not just by what we say, but by our facial expressions, posture, tone of voice, and eye contact (or lack thereof).
Meditate: Neuroscience research by Richard Davidson and his colleagues suggests that meditation—specifically loving-kindness meditation, which focuses attention on concern for others—might increase the capacity for empathy among short-term and long-term meditators alike (though especially among long-time meditators).
Explore imaginary worlds: Research by Keith Oatley and colleagues has found that people who read fiction are more attuned to others’ emotions and intentions.
Join the band: Recent studies have shown that playing music together boosts empathy in kids.
Play games : Neuroscience research suggests that when we compete against others, our brains are making a “ mental model ” of the other person’s thoughts and intentions.
Take lessons from babies: Mary Gordon’s Roots of Empathy program is designed to boost empathy by bringing babies into classrooms, stimulating children’s basic instincts to resonate with others’ emotions.
Combat inequality: Research has shown that attaining higher socioeconomic status diminishes empathy , perhaps because people of high SES have less of a need to connect with, rely on, or cooperate with others. As the gap widens between the haves and have-nots, we risk facing an empathy gap as well. This doesn’t mean money is evil, but if you have a lot of it, you might need to be more intentional about maintaining your own empathy toward others.
Pay attention to faces: Pioneering research by Paul Ekman has found we can improve our ability to identify other people’s emotions by systematically studying facial expressions. Take our Emotional Intelligence Quiz for a primer, or check out Ekman’s F.A.C.E. program for more rigorous training.
Believe that empathy can be learned : People who think their empathy levels are changeable put more effort into being empathic, listening to others, and helping, even when it’s challenging.

For more : The Ashoka Foundation’s Start Empathy initiative tracks educators’ best practices for teaching empathy . The initiative gave awards to 14 programs judged to do the best job at educating for empathy . The nonprofit Playworks also offers eight strategies for developing empathy in children .

What Are the Pitfalls and Limitations of Empathy?

According to research , we’re more likely to help a single sufferer than a large group of faceless victims, and we empathize more with in-group members than out-group members . Does this reflect a defect in empathy itself? Some critics believe so , while others argue that the real problem is how we suppress our own empathy .

Empathy, after all, can be painful. An “ empathy trap ” occurs when we’re so focused on feeling what others are feeling that we neglect our own emotions and needs—and other people can take advantage of this. Doctors and caregivers are at particular risk of feeling emotionally overwhelmed by empathy.

In other cases, empathy seems to be detrimental. Empathizing with out-groups can make us more reluctant to engage with them, if we imagine that they’ll be critical of us. Sociopaths could use cognitive empathy to help them exploit or even torture people.

Even if we are well-intentioned, we tend to overestimate our empathic skills. We may think we know the whole story about other people when we’re actually making biased judgments—which can lead to misunderstandings and exacerbate prejudice.

‘I Feel Your Pain’: The Neuroscience of Empathy

Developmental Psychology
Forecasting
Neuroscience
Sensory Systems

Whether it’s watching a friend get a paper cut or staring at a photo of a child refugee, observing someone else’s suffering can evoke a deep sense of distress and sadness — almost as if it’s happening to us. In the past, this might have been explained simply as empathy, the ability to experience the feelings of others, but over the last 20 years, neuroscientists have been able to pinpoint some of the specific regions of the brain responsible for this sense of interconnectedness. Five scientists discussed the neuroscience behind how we process the feelings of others during an Integrative Science Symposium chaired by APS Fellow Piotr Winkielman (University of California, San Diego) at the 2017 International Convention of Psychological Science in Vienna.

Mirroring the Mind

Cultural emphasis on ingroups and outgroups may create an “empathy gap” between people of different races and nationalities, says Ying-yi Hong .

“When we witness what happens to others, we don’t just activate the visual cortex like we thought some decades ago,” said Christian Keysers of the Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience in Amsterdam. “We also activate our own actions as if we’d be acting in similar ways. We activate our own emotions and sensations as if we felt the same.”

Through his work at the Social Brain Lab, Keysers, together with Valeria Gazzola, has found that observing another person’s action, pain, or affect can trigger parts of the same neural networks responsible for executing those actions and experiencing those feelings firsthand. Keysers’ presentation, however, focused on exploring how this system contributes to our psychology. Does this mirror system help us understand what goes on in others? Does it help us read their minds? Can we “catch” the emotions of others?

To explore whether the motor mirror system helps us understand the inner states behind the actions of others, Keysers in one study asked participants to watch a video of a person grasping toy balls hidden within a large bin. In one condition, participants determined whether or not the person in the video hesitated before selecting a ball (a theory-of-mind task). Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in combination with fMRI, Keysers showed that interfering with the mirror system impaired people’s ability to detect the level of confidence of others, providing evidence that this system indeed contributes to perceiving the inner states of others. Performing fMRI and TMS on other brain regions such as the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) further suggests that this motor simulation in the mirror system is then sent onward to more cognitive regions in the TPJ.

“Very rapidly, we got this unifying notion that when you witness the states of others you replicate these states in yourself as if you were in their shoes, which is why we call these activities ‘vicarious states,’” Keysers said.

Studies have suggested that this ability to mentalize the experiences of others so vividly can lead us to take prosocial steps to reduce their pain, but Keysers also wanted to investigate the depth of this emotional contagion — how and to what extent we experience other people’s suffering. To do this, Keysers’ lab studied two very different populations: human psychopaths and rats.

While witnessing the pain of others is correlated with activity in the insula, which is thought to contribute to self-awareness by integrating sensory information, and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is associated with decision making and impulse control, the researchers found that psychopaths who passively observed an aggressor twisting someone’s hand exhibited significantly less brain activity than their neurotypical peers. When the psychopathic individuals were asked to attempt to empathize with the person in the video, however, their brain activity increased to baseline levels.

This suggests that the current model of empathy as a one-dimensional scale with empathic individuals at one end and psychopaths at the other may be overly simplistic, Keysers said.

“Psychopaths are probably equally high on ability, it’s just that they don’t recruit this spontaneously, so their propensity is modified,” he explained.

These findings could lead to more effective interventions for psychopathic individuals, as well as to future research into where people with autism spectrum disorders may fall on these axes.

Shared Pain

Studies of emotional contagion in animal models have allowed researchers to further examine the role of deep brain activity, which can be difficult to neurostimulate in humans. Keysers’ work with rats has found that these animals are more likely to freeze after watching another rat receive an electric shock if they themselves had been shocked in the past.

Inhibiting a region analogous to the ACC in the rats’ brains reduced their response to another rat’s distress, but not their fear of being shocked themselves, suggesting that the area deals specifically with socially triggered fear, Keysers said.

Claus Lamm, University of Vienna, investigates the processes that regulate firsthand pain and those that cause empathy for pain through numerous studies on the influence of painkillers.

In these experiments, participants who took a placebo “painkiller” reported lower pain ratings after receiving a shock than did those in the control group. When those same participants watched a confederate get shocked, they reported a similar drop in their perception of the actor’s pain.

“If you reduce people’s self-experienced pain, if you induce analgesia, that not only helps people to deal with their own pain, but it also reduces empathy for the pain of another person,” Lamm said.

On the neural level, Lamm said, fMRI scans showed that people in the placebo group displayed lower levels of brain activity in the anterior insula and mid cingulate cortex in both cases. These results were further confirmed in another study that compared participants who received only the painkiller placebo with those who received both the placebo and naltrexone, an opioid antagonist that prevents the brain from regulating pain.

This resulted in a “complete reversal” of the placebo effect, causing participants to report both their own pain and the pain of others at near baseline rates, supporting Lamm’s previous claims about the pain system’s role in empathy.

“This suggests that empathy for pain is grounded in representing others’ pain within one’s own pain systems,” Lamm said.

The Self/Other Divide

Empathy may not give us a full sense of someone else’s experiences, however. When observers in one of Keysers’ studies were given the opportunity to pay to reduce the severity of the electric shocks a confederate was about to receive, on average participants paid only enough to reduce her pain by 50%.

Lamm studied this self/other distinction through a series of experiments that measured people’s emotional egocentricity bias. To do so, participants were presented with visuo-tactile stimulation that was either congruent or incongruent with that of a partner under fMRI. In an incongruent pair, for example, one participant might be presented with an image of a rose and be touched with something that felt like a rose, while the other was shown a slug and touched with a slimy substance.

Participants’ own emotions were found to color their perception of other people’s affect at a relatively low rate — however, when researchers inhibited the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG), a region of the brain previous associated mainly with language processing, this egocentricity bias increased, suggesting that the rSMG may be responsible for maintaining a self/other divide, Lamm said.

“Empathy not only requires a mechanism for sharing emotions, but also for keeping them separate. Otherwise we are getting ‘contaged,’ emotionally distressed and so on,” he said.

The rate of rSMG activation also changes significantly across a lifetime, Lamm added, with the area’s developmental trajectory causing emotional egocentricity to be more common in adolescents and the elderly.

Developing Division

Researchers are working to unite neuroscientific and psychological perspectives on feelings, empathy, and identity, says Piotr Winkielman .

Rebecca Saxe (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) said her work with developmental psychology confirms this trend. In one series of experiments, Saxe monitored the brain networks that 3- to 5-year-old children used to consider a character’s mind (the temporoparietal junction, posterior cingulate, and prefrontal cortex) and body (the secondary somatosensory cortex, insula, middle frontal gyrus, and ACC) throughout a short film.

Saxe found that while these brain regions may interact with each other, there were no points of overlap between the mind and body networks’ activities.

“When we’re getting information from the same source and about the same people, we still nevertheless impose a kind of dualism where we alternate between considering what their bodies feel like and the causes of their minds,” Saxe said.

Furthermore, Saxe and her colleagues found that while these networks were more distinct in children who were able to pass an explicit-false-belief task (e.g., if Sally puts her sandwich on a shelf and her friend moves it to the desk, where will she look for it?), the division was present in participants of all ages.

“Most people have treated explicit false belief as if it were the milestone,” Saxe said. “Actually, the false-belief task is just one measure of a much more continuous developmental change as children become increasingly sophisticated in their thinking about other people’s minds.”

Next, Saxe scaled this experiment down to test the theory of mind of infants as young as 6 months, this time measuring their response to children’s facial expressions, outdoor scenes, and visual static. This time period may be key to understanding the neuropsychology of empathy because most of the brain’s cognitive development happens within the first year of life, she explained.

“A baby’s brain is more different from a 3-year-old’s brain than a 3-year-old’s brain is from a 33-year-old’s brain,” Saxe said.

Under fMRI, the infants’ brains were found to have many of the same regional responses that allow adults to distinguish between faces and scenes. Their brains didn’t show any regional preferences for objects and bodies, however.

This level of regional specificity suggests that the Kennard Principle, the theory that infants’ brains possess such resilience and plasticity because the cortex hasn’t specialized yet, may be only partially true. There does appear to be some functional organization of social process, Saxe said, with gradually increasing specialization as the child ages.

Empathy in Action

Brian D. Knutson says analysis of individuals’ brain activity when considering a purchase may be predictive of aggregate market choices.

On the surface, neuroforecasting sounds like a concept that would be right at home in the world of Philip K. Dick’s Minority Report — a science fiction thriller about a society that stops crime before it happens based on the brainwaves of three mutant “precogs” — said APS Fellow Brian D. Knutson (Stanford University), but someday it could play a very real role in the future of economics.

Knutson’s research on the brain mechanisms that influence choice homes in on three functional targets: the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) for gain anticipation, the anterior insula for loss anticipation, and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) for value integration.

Using fMRI, Knutson was able to predict participants’ purchases in a simulated online shopping environment on the basis of brain activations in these areas. Before participants chose to buy a product, increased activity in the NAcc and mPFC was paired with a decrease in the insula, while the reverse was true of trials in which participants chose not to make a purchase.

“This was very exciting to me as a psychologist to be able to say, ‘Wow, we can take activity out of the brain and, not knowing anything else about who it is and what product they’re seeing, we can predict choice,’” Knutson said.

His economist colleagues weren’t as impressed: They were interested in market activity, not individual choice. Knutson said he accepted this challenge by applying his neuroanaylsis to large-scale online markets such as Kiva and Kickstarter.

Knutson asked 30 participants to rate the appeal and neediness of loan requests on Kiva and found that posts with photos of people displaying a positive affect were most likely to trigger the increased NAcc activity that caused them to make a purchase — or in this case, a loan. More importantly, the averaged choices of those participants forecasted the loan appeal’s success on the internet. Two similar studies involving Kickstarter campaigns also suggested a link between NAcc activity and aggregate market activity.

While brain activity doesn’t scale perfectly to aggregate choice, Knutson said, some components of decision making, such as affective responses, may be more generalizable than others.

“The paradox may be that the things that make you most consistent as an individual, that best predict your choices, may not be the things that make your choices conform to those of others. We may be able to deconstruct and decouple those components in the brain,” Knutson said.

Global Empathy

The neuroanatomy of our brains may allow us to feel empathy for another’s experiences, but it can also stop us from making cross-cultural connections, said APS Fellow Ying-yi Hong (Chinese University of Hong Kong).

“Despite all these neurobiological capabilities enabling us to empathize with others, we still see cases in which individuals chose to harm others, for example during intergroup conflicts or wars,” Hong said.

This may be due in part to the brain’s distinction between in-group and out-group members, she explained. People have been found to show greater activation in the amygdala when viewing fearful faces of their own race, for example, and less activation in the ACC when watching a needle prick the face of someone of a different race.

The cultural mixing that accompanies globalization can heighten these responses, Hong added. In one study, she and her colleagues found that melding cultural symbols (e.g., combining the American and Chinese flags, putting Chairman Mao’s head on the Lincoln Memorial, or even presenting images of “fusion” foods) can elicit a pattern of disgust in the anterior insula of White Americans similar to that elicited by physical contaminant objects such as insects.

These responses can also be modulated by cultural practices, Hong said. One study comparing the in-group/out-group bias in Korea, a more collectivist society, and the United States, a more individualistic society, found that more interdependent societies may foster a greater sense of in-group favoritism in the brain.

Further research into this empathy gap should consider not just the causal relationship between neural activation and behavior, she said, but the societal context in which they take place.

“What I want to propose,” Hong said, “is that maybe there is another area that we can also think about, which is the culture, the shared lay theories, values, and norms.”

There is some fantastic research going on in empathy. From an evolutionary point of view however it’s important to distinguish an evolved motivation system from a competency. Empathy is a competency not a motivation. Empathy can be used for both benevolent but also malevolent motives. And psychopaths have a competency for empathy but what they lack is mammalian caring motivation. Insofar as part of the reproductive strategy of the psychopath is to exploit others and even threaten them then having a brain that turns off distress to the suffering they cause would be an advantage to them. Psychopaths are much more likely to be prepared to harm others to get what they want. Mammalian caring motivation, when guided by higher cognitive processes and human empathy gives rise to compassion. Without empathy compassion would be tricky but without compassion you can still have empathic competencies

Gilbert, P. (2017). Compassion as a social mentality: An evolutionary approach. In: P. Gilbert (ed). Compassion: Concepts, Research and Applications. (p. 31-68). London: Routledge

Gilbert. P. (2015). The evolution and social dynamics of compassion Journal of Social & Personality Psychology Compass, 9, 239–254. DOI: 10.1111/spc3.12176

Catarino, F., Gilbert, P., McEwan., K & Baião, R. (2014). Compassion motivations: Distinguishing submissive compassion from genuine compassion and its association with shame, submissive behaviour, depression, anxiety and stress Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 33, 399-412.

Gilbert, P., Catarino, F., Sousa, J., Ceresatto, L., Moore, R., & Basran, J. (2017). Measuring competitive self-focus perspective taking, submissive compassion and compassion goals. Journal of Compassionate Health Care, 4(1), 5

Very interesting article. The research behind what links our empathy to our actions determining the agenda is fascinating. As social creatures, we seem to inhibit empathetic tendencies naturally in our genetic makeup when studied. Since we have the highest empathetic behavior compared to other animals, who also show empathetic behavior, I wonder if it falls more on our social norms. What we consider relatable is worthy of our empathy. If we don’t relate, we may be less inclined to put ourselves in the other position.

I have what I call empathy pain. It radiates an aching pain in my legs and I can barely stand it. I’ve googled it in attempts to validate it is real. It seems people either do not believe me or can’t understand stand when I tell them it makes my legs ache. Seeing someone’s cuts, surgical incisions, bloody wounds. I can’t describe all the triggers, but I can 100% say the pain I feel in response is intense, even when they say “oh, it didn’t hurt” or “it’s not hurting”. Well, it hurt ME seeing it.

I am currently writing a literature review for my psychology course in University, based on what I am writing about I believe you may have Mirror Touch Synesthesia. This condition is characterized by viewing others being touched and feeling tactile sensations, and this seems quite similar to what you shared. I would recommend doing a bit of research on MTS, and see if it relates to you.

Since I was 7 years old I felt others pain Then I thought everyone could . I came to realize I feel so much more than most . I feel what I see, I feel what I hear. My sensitive to touch is more like pain but my pain level is very high, I can take a lot of pain.

What about feeling pain or illness without observing it or even having knowledge of someone else’s pain? Such as the phenomenon of twins. I’m looking for research of this outside of the twin sibling relationship.

When carrying out functional mapping of the amygdala cortex by means of electrical stimulation in one of my patients with focal epileptic seizures who was being evaluated for resective epilepsy surgery of the orbitofrontal, opercular, and anterior insular cortex the stimulation caused the patient to reminisce over video films he had seen of cartoons (animaniacs) as a child, at the same time empathizing with the suffering of those characters. I had probably activated a limbic pathway connected to the limen insulae where I was administering electrical stimulation at that time. The visual imagery stopped as soon as the stimulus train was over but the patient still empathized with the cartoon characters for about 20 seconds after the stimulation was over and reported his feelings to me.

Wow… I thought I was alone in the way I feel everyone’s pain and joy. I find that I can not watch scenes of torture or violence on tv, thus I hate most movies, unless it’s a children flick. I get pulled into every story I read. On 911 I thought my heart really was breaking, it consumed my entire body. I can’t watch history shows of Pearl Harbor, or nazis. If I do, sometimes those images stay with me for years and come back as nightmares. It’s not easy living with this in today’s world.

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Scientists Discuss How to Study the Psychology of Collectives, Not Just Individuals

In a set of articles appearing in Perspectives on Psychological Science, an international array of scientists discusses how the study of neighborhoods, work units, activist groups, and other collectives can help us better understand and respond to societal changes.

Artificial Intelligence: Your Thoughts and Concerns

APS members weigh in on the biggest opportunities and/or ethical challenges involving AI within the field of psychological science. Will we witness vast and constructive cross-fertilization—or “a dystopian cyberpunk corporation-led hellscape”?

Hearing is Believing: Sounds Can Alter Our Visual Perception

Audio cues can not only help us to recognize objects more quickly but can even alter our visual perception. That is, pair birdsong with a bird and we see a bird—but replace that birdsong with a squirrel’s chatter, and we’re not quite so sure what we’re looking at.

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Practice Empathy

Admit You’re Biased
Stand Up for Others
Raise Empathetic Kids
Hard Conversations
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Originally published on Dec. 1, 2018

How to Be More Empathetic

By Claire Cain Miller

Illustrations by Jaime Jacob

More and more, we live in bubbles. Most of us are surrounded by people who look like us, vote like us, earn like us, spend money like us, have educations like us and worship like us. The result is an empathy deficit, and it’s at the root of many of our biggest problems. It’s because of how homogeneous people’s social circles have become, and also because humans naturally hold biases. But researchers have discovered that far from being an immutable trait, empathy can be developed. There are steps people can take to acknowledge their biases and to move beyond their own worldviews to try to understand those held by other people. Bonus: You’ll make new friends along the way.

While some people are naturally more empathetic, there are exercises that anyone can do to improve.

An illustration of several people working on home repairs. Two carry a wooden log, one holds a window to be installed and one is carrying cans of paint.

So what is empathy? It’s understanding how others feel and being compassionate toward them. It happens when two parts of the brain work together, neuroscientists say — the emotional center perceives the feelings of others and the cognitive center tries to understand why they feel that way and how we can be helpful to them.

Research has shown that empathy makes people better managers and workers , and better family members and friends . But it’s bigger than just its personal effect. We’re all in this together, and researchers say that connection and compassion are crucial to a sustainable and humane future.

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Empathy 101: 3+ Examples and Psychology Definitions

Has a book, film, or photograph ever driven you to tears?

Or have you ever felt driven to ease someone else’s emotions?

If you have answered yes to at least one of these, then you have experienced empathy.

Empathy is a complex psychological process that allows us to form bonds with other people. Through empathy, we cry when our friends go through hard times, celebrate their successes, and rage during their times of hardship. Empathy also allows us to feel guilt, shame, and embarrassment, as well as understand jokes and sarcasm.

In this article, we explore empathy, its benefits, and useful ways to measure it. We also look at empathy fatigue – a common experience among clinicians and people in the caring professions – and provide beneficial resources.

Before you continue, we thought you might like to download our three Emotional Intelligence Exercises for free . These science-based exercises will not only enhance your ability to understand and work with your emotions but will also give you the tools to foster the emotional intelligence of your clients, students, or employees.

This Article Contains

What is empathy in psychology, the empathy quotient, 7 real-life examples, is it important 3+ benefits of empathy, empathy vs sympathy and compassion, assessing empathy: 4 helpful questionnaires, a note on empathy fatigue, positivepsychology.com resources, a take-home message.

In psychology, empathy is loosely defined as an ability to understand and experience someone else’s feelings and to adopt someone else’s viewpoint (Colman, 2015). The term ‘empathy’ comes from the German word Einfuhlung, which means “projecting into” (Ganczarek, Hünefeldt, & Belardinelli, 2018) and may explain why empathy is considered the ability to place yourself in someone else’s shoes.

Difficulties with defining empathy

Defining empathy clearly and exhaustively enough to be studied in psychology is difficult. For example, is empathy the ability to understand or feel or share or interpret someone else’s feelings?

Each of these verbs differs slightly, providing a different meaning to empathy. As a result, the underlying psychological mechanism and part of the brain responsible for empathy also differ.

Part of the difficulty defining empathy is that it comprises multiple components. For example, Hoffman (1987) argued that empathy in children develops across four different stages and that each stage lays down the foundation for the next.

These four stages are:

Global empathy or ‘emotion contagion,’ where one person’s emotion evokes the same emotional reaction in another person (or the observer).
Attention to others’ feelings, where the observer is aware of another person’s feelings but doesn’t mirror them.
Prosocial actions, where the observer is aware of another person’s feelings and behaves in a way to comfort the other person.
Empathy for another’s life condition, where the observer feels empathy toward someone else’s broader life situation, rather than their immediate situation right at this instance.

Fletcher-Watson and Bird (2020) provide an excellent overview of the challenges associated with defining and studying empathy. They argue that empathy results from a four-step process:

Step 1: Noticing/observing someone’s emotional state
Step 2: Correctly interpreting that emotional state
Step 3: ‘Feeling’ the same emotion
Step 4: Responding to the emotion

Empathy is not achieved if any of these four steps fail.

This multi-component conception of empathy is echoed across other research. For example, Decety and Cowell (2014) also posit that empathy arises from multiple processes interacting with each other.

These processes are:

Emotional: The ability to share someone else’s feelings
Motivational: The need to respond to someone else’s feelings
Cognitive: The ability to take someone else’s viewpoint

Part of this confusion stems from their corresponding definitions.

Empathy is the ability to share someone else’s emotions and perspectives. Emotional intelligence is the ability to understand, interpret, and manage other people’s emotions, as well as your own. This last inclusion – your own emotions – is what distinguishes emotional intelligence from empathy.

The Empathy Quotient is a measurement of empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). It is akin to the Intelligence Quotient (IQ) but is a measure of empathy rather than intelligence. Like IQ, higher scores of the Empathy Quotient are meant to represent higher abilities of empathy.

Importantly, the Empathy Quotient differs from the Emotional Quotient. Emotional Quotient is measured using the BarOn Emotional Quotient-Inventory (Bar-On, 2004) and aims to measure emotional intelligence rather than empathy. It’s easy to confuse them because “EQ” is used to refer to both.

To determine whether the Empathy Quotient is a suitable test of empathy, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) administered the measurement to a group of neurotypical people and a group of people diagnosed with Asperger syndrome and compared their scores.

On average, individuals with Asperger syndrome scored significantly lower than neurotypical people. From this study, a score of 30 was determined to be a critical cut-off mark. Scores less than 30 were typically found among the participants with Asperger syndrome. Furthermore, the test-retest reliability of the Empathy Quotient was high, suggesting that the test reliably measures empathy.

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Since empathy is so complex and involved in so many social interactions, there are many examples of empathy in the real world.

In a discussion with a friend, have you ever felt so moved that you experienced the same emotion that they did? Or maybe a friend shared a cringe-worthy story of sheer humiliation, and that feeling was mirrored in you.

These situations when you experienced the same emotions as your friends are examples of empathy. Other examples of empathy include understanding someone else’s point of view during an argument, feeling guilty when you realize why someone might have misunderstood what you said, or realizing something you said was a faux pas . These scenarios require you to take someone else’s viewpoint.

Some of the best examples of empathy can be found in the work by Oliver Sacks and Atul Gawande. Sacks was a neurologist who had a profound impact through his thoughtful, patient-driven books on the field of psychiatry and neuropsychology.

Atul Gawande is a surgeon who worked with the World Health Organization and has published several books on improving healthcare and healthcare systems. Both authors address their patients in a sensitive, thoughtful manner that evokes a lot of empathy in the reader.

The following books are highly recommended:

Awakenings by Oliver Sacks
The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat by Oliver Sacks
Being Mortal by Atul Gawande

We participate in many scenarios in which we convey and receive information with other people, verbally and nonverbally.

Regardless of whether or not these interactions are important, we have to perceive, interpret, and respond to numerous cues.

Empathy is more than ‘just’ the ability to feel what someone else is feeling. Empathy is an essential skill that allows us to effectively engage with other people in social contexts (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).

Without empathy, we would struggle to:

understand other people’s feelings, motivations, and behaviors;
respond appropriately to someone else’s feelings; and
understand social interactions that rely on subtle behaviors, cues, and social norms, such as jokes, faux pas, and sarcasm.

The ability to respond appropriately to someone else’s emotions is extremely important for forming bonds. Empathy underlines the bond that forms between parent and child (Decety & Cowell, 2014).

Some researchers even consider some aspects of empathy to be a defining feature of humans. Our ability to consider another person’s viewpoint is considered uniquely human (Decety & Cowell, 2014).

Jean Decety and Jason Cowell (2014) argue that empathy is one process that contributes to understanding and engaging in complex social behavior, such as prosocial behavior, which includes volunteering as well as providing care for people who are terminally ill.

Earlier in this article, we mentioned the studies by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) in which they compared Empathy Quotient scores between people with Asperger syndrome and neurotypical people.

People on the autism–Asperger spectrum are believed to have a diminished capacity for empathy and, as a result, struggle with social contexts. However, their lower empathy scores do not mean that they are without feeling or should be considered psychopaths (who also have lower scores of empathy).

People on the autism spectrum often report that their intention is not to hurt other people’s feelings, and they feel guilty if they caused someone else’s hurt feelings (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).

Furthermore, people on the autism spectrum often report that they want human connections; however, they struggle to make them because they are not aware of how their behavior affects how other people perceive them (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). This shows how important empathy is in developing relationships and interpreting subtle social cues.

The three terms – empathy, sympathy, and compassion – are often confused with each other, because they are often used when referring to someone else’s feelings. For example, in response to a friend’s bad news, do you feel empathy, sympathy, or compassion? The terms are used in similar contexts, but they refer to different behaviors.

From the definitions provided above, empathy involves interpreting, understanding, feeling, and acting on other people’s feelings. Empathy is a multidimensional process and relies on affective, cognitive, behavioral, and moral components (Jeffrey, 2016). Remember, empathy is the ability to adopt someone else’s viewpoint or to put yourself into someone else’s shoes.
Sympathy is the feeling of pity for someone else’s misfortune or circumstances.
Compassion is the desire and act of wanting to alleviate someone else’s suffering. Compassion includes the affective components of empathy and sympathy, but it is accompanied by an action to change the circumstances of the person who is suffering (Sinclair et al., 2017). A compassionate act can also result in our suffering alongside the other person; this is referred to as co-suffering. Compassion is also linked to altruistic behavior (Jeffrey, 2016).

Examples of Empathy vs Sympathy vs Compassion

To further cement the difference between these three terms, consider the following examples:

Emma relays a recent event where she was extremely embarrassed. As she retells the story, her friend, Tamika, groans and mutters “Oh my word, I would feel so embarrassed. I would want the world to swallow me whole!”

In this example, Tamika doesn’t actually want to disappear into a hole. Instead, she’s correctly understanding and interpreting the situation that Emma found herself in. She is most likely experiencing empathy for Emma’s situation. She is not feeling pity, nor is she acting compassionately.

Jerome’s mother recently suffered a near-fatal heart attack. He listens to his mother retell her sisters about her experience. As she recounts her experience, she starts crying, because she was so afraid, and she realized that she might never see her loved ones again. Jerome starts crying as he listens to his mother.

In this example, Jerome is feeling sympathy (pity) for his mother and what she went through.

On his route to university, Jamal sees the same homeless man every day. The homeless man sits in the same place, regardless of the weather, with a sign next to him that asks for assistance. Jamal decides to donate some of his clothing to the homeless man.

Jamal’s behavior is an act of compassion . By donating his clothing, he is trying to alleviate the homeless man’s suffering. He may also be experiencing sympathy towards the man, but the act of trying to change the man’s situation is an act of compassion.

Use these questionnaires to determine what your current level of empathy is.

Empathy Quotient

The Empathy Quotient, including the entire questionnaire, its psychometric properties, and the scoring, is described in the original paper by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004). Professor Simon Baron-Cohen works with the Autism Research Centre (ARC), and the 60-item Empathy Quotient, as well as the scoring matrix, is available from the ARC website .

The Empathy Questionnaire (EmQue)

The Empathy Questionnaire (EmQue), designed by Rieffe, Ketelaar, and Wiefferink (2010), measures empathy in young children (average age of around 30 months) and reflects Hoffman’s (1987) theory of how empathy developed in children.

The questionnaire comprises three subscales, which map onto the first three stages of empathy development posited by Hoffman (1987). The questionnaire correlates well with other measures that aim to capture similar constructs. You can access this questionnaire on the Academia website .

The Empathy Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (EmQue-CA)

A similar version of the EmQue also exists for older children. This version is known as the Empathy Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (EmQue-CA; Overgaauw, Rieffe, Broekhof, Crone, & Güroğlu, 2017).

Unlike the EmQue, the EmQue-CA is a self-report measure. In other words, the adolescents and children must answer how much they agree with each statement, rather than their parents observing their behaviors.

The final version of the EmQue-CA measures the following three subscales: affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and intention to comfort. The 14 questions and the psychometric properties of the questionnaire are reported in the original paper, which can be accessed on the Frontiers in Psychology website as a free downloadable PDF .

The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ)

The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ) was developed by refining a collection of questionnaires that measure empathy into a core set of questions (Spreng, McKinnon, Mar, & Levine, 2009).

Researchers collected questions from multiple empathy questionnaires, administered these questions to a large sample of students, and then using exploratory factor analysis, refined the questions to a core set of 16.

The questionnaire and scoring rules are described in the appendix of the original paper (Spreng et al., 2009), which can be accessed on the Measurement Instrument Database for the Social Sciences .

Finally, the TEQ and the Empathy Quotient have a strong, positive correlation, confirming that the questions in both measure the same psychological construct.

Empathy is often confused with sympathy, which involves a lack of truly understanding another person’s experience.

For instance, if your friend recently lost their job, expressing sympathy would include feeling sorry for them and wishing them luck finding another job.

In contrast, empathy entails relating to your friend’s frustrations and fears about unemployment and actively experiencing those negative emotions by putting yourself in their shoes.

An example of compassion would be assisting your friend in applying for other jobs and updating their resume.

While empathy and sympathy drive acts of compassion, compassion stands out due to its proactive nature of motivating individuals to alleviate suffering.

Recognizing the distinctions between sympathy, empathy, and compassion can help you adjust your emotional responses when someone is going through hardship, enabling you to provide better support.

Feeling empathy is a very useful skill, especially for health professionals such as clinicians, therapists, and psychologists. But the ability to feel empathy for other people comes at the cost of empathy fatigue.

Empathy fatigue refers to the feeling of exhaustion that health professionals experience in response to constantly revisiting their emotional wounds through their clients’ experience (Stebnicki, 2000). For example, a therapist whose client is going through bereavement may be reminded of their own grief and trauma.

By being emotionally available for their client through emotional and stressful periods, the therapist experiences fatigue at a psychological, emotional, and physiological level (Stebnicki, 2000).

Besides manifesting as a sense of fatigue, we can consider empathy fatigue as a form of re-trauma, and as a result, the symptoms resemble that of secondary traumatic stress disorder.

Empathy fatigue in the clinical domain is also referred to as ‘counselor impairment’ because the clinician’s ability to perform their job is impaired (Stebnicki, 2007). An outcome of empathy fatigue is burnout, with a particularly sudden onset (Stebnicki, 2000).

Stebnicki (2007) provides a comprehensive list of strategies that clinicians can use to prevent empathy fatigue:

Self-awareness of the symptoms of empathy fatigue
Self-care strategies and lifestyle behaviors that protect the clinician from empathy fatigue
Using a support group and supervisor during periods of empathy fatigue

Finally, PositivePsychology.com’s post detailing self-care for therapists can be easily adapted to other industries. For example, these tips could be incorporated into a wellness session in the workplace to help prevent empathy fatigue.

17 Exercises To Develop Emotional Intelligence

These 17 Emotional Intelligence Exercises [PDF] will help others strengthen their relationships, lower stress, and enhance their wellbeing through improved EQ.

Created by Experts. 100% Science-based.

Below is a list of four items, each targeting a different aspect of empathy.

To help children better understand what is meant by empathy, we recommend the What is Empathy? worksheet. In this worksheet, children are asked to recall scenarios when they experienced a similar emotion as someone else. Children are also asked to think of reasons why empathy is a good thing and how they can improve their sense of empathy.

To practice looking at things from a fresh perspective, we recommend the 500 Years Ago Worksheet and the Trading Places Worksheet. Both worksheets can be used in group exercises, but only the second one is also appropriate for individual clients.

In five steps, the Listening Accurately Worksheet lays out an easy-to-follow guide to better develop empathy through active listening .

This worksheet is especially useful for clinicians and health professionals but is also very appropriate for anyone working in a profession where they need to communicate with other people constantly.

If you’re looking for more science-based ways to help others develop emotional intelligence, this collection contains 17 validated EI tools for practitioners. Use them to help others understand and use their emotions to their advantage.

If we show a little tolerance and humility, and if we are willing to stand in the other person’s shoes — as my mom would say — just for a moment, stand in their shoes. Because here’s the thing about life: there’s no accounting for what fate will deal you. Some days, when you need a hand. There are other days when we’re called to lend a hand.

U.S. President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Inauguration speech

And that is what empathy is: being able to put yourself in someone else’s shoes. Humans are social creatures, and empathy is an important skill. Without empathy, we will struggle to connect and form bonds. Underdeveloped empathy results in awkward social interactions, which can also weaken social bonds.

No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.

By connecting, by understanding, by having empathy, we can all stand together, lend a hand when needed, and be given a hand when we, in turn, may need it.

We hope you enjoyed reading this article. Don’t forget to download our three Emotional Intelligence Exercises for free .

Bar-On, R. (2004). The Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i): Rationale, description and summary of psychometric properties. In G. Geher (Ed.), Measuring emotional intelligence: Common ground and controversy (pp. 115–145). Nova Science Publishers.
Baron-Cohen, S., & Wheelwright, S. (2004). The Empathy Quotient: An investigation of adults with Asperger syndrome or high functioning autism, and normal sex differences. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders , 34 (2), 163–175.
Colman, A. M. (2015). A dictionary of psychology . Oxford University Press.
Decety, J., & Cowell, J. M. (2014). The complex relation between morality and empathy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 18 , 337–339.
Fletcher-Watson, S., & Bird, G. (2020). Autism and empathy: What are the real links? Autism , 24 (1), 3–6.
Ganczarek, J., Hünefeldt, T., & Belardinelli, M. O. (2018). From “Einfühlung” to empathy: Exploring the relationship between aesthetic and interpersonal experience. Cognitive Processing , 19 (4), 141–145.
Gawande, A. (2017). Being mortal: Medicine and what matters in the end. Picador.
Hoffman, M. L. (1987). The contribution of empathy to justice and moral judgment. In N. Eisenberg & J. Strayer (Eds.), Cambridge studies in social and emotional development. Empathy and its development (pp. 47–80). Cambridge University Press.
Jeffrey, D. (2016). Empathy, sympathy and compassion in healthcare: Is there a problem? Is there a difference? Does it matter? Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine , 109 (12), 446–452.
John Donne. (2020, October 17). Wikiquote . Retrieved January 20, 2021, from https://en.wikiquote.org/w/index.php?title=John_Donne&oldid=2878168
Overgaauw, S., Rieffe, C., Broekhof, E., Crone, E. A., & Güroğlu, B. (2017). Assessing empathy across childhood and adolescence: Validation of the Empathy Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (EmQue-CA). Frontiers in Psychology , 8 , Article 870.
Rieffe, C., Ketelaar, L., & Wiefferink, C. H. (2010). Assessing empathy in young children: Construction and validation of an Empathy Questionnaire (EmQue). Personality and Individual Differences , 49 (5), 362–367.
Sacks, O. (1998). The man who mistook his wife for a hat: And other clinical tales. Touchstone.
Sacks, O. W. (2011). Awakenings (New ed.). Picador.
Sinclair, S., Beamer, K., Hack, T. F., McClement, S., Raffin Bouchal, S., Chochinov, H. M., & Hagen, N. A. (2017). Sympathy, empathy, and compassion: A grounded theory study of palliative care patients’ understandings, experiences, and preferences. Palliative Medicine , 31 (5), 437–447.
Spreng, R. N., McKinnon, M. C., Mar, R. A., & Levine, B. (2009). The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire: Scale development and initial validation of a factor-analytic solution to multiple empathy measures. Journal of Personality Assessment , 91 (1), 62–71.
Stebnicki, M. A. (2000). Stress and grief reactions among rehabilitation professionals: Dealing effectively with empathy fatigue. Journal of Rehabilitation , 66 (1).
Stebnicki, M. A. (2007). Empathy fatigue: Healing the mind, body, and spirit of professional counselors. American Journal of Psychiatric Rehabilitation , 10 (4), 317–338.

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Im positive that the origin of the word ’empathy’ comes from Greek, with ‘pathos’ being an umbrella word for emotions (sympathy, apathy, antipathy, and from there passion, compassion etc).

It’s important to mention that empathy is not a sign of a weak personality. I did a huge work before I could finally cry when touched by my friend’s story. Because “men shouldn’t show their tears in public.” But don’t you dare tell me how I should react! 😀

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Empathy: What Is It and How Does It Work Essay

To find inspiration for your paper and overcome writer’s block
As a source of information (ensure proper referencing)
As a template for you assignment

Introduction

The meaning of empathy, what it takes for one to express empathy, empathy in the society, empathy in the study book, how important is empathy, works cited.

Empathy is a virtue that is associated with human beings. It can be said to be one of the virtues that separate caring and uncaring people. This article examines the meaning of empathy in general. It shows what it means to have empathy as a human being. Empathy is also examined from the context of the book Do androids dream of electric sheep. The context of the story in this book reveals, in a special way, how empathy can be and cannot be expressed. The effects of expressing and not expressing empathy are also looked at. Over expression is specifically pointed out as being unhealthy.

Empathy has been defined as the ability to identify with a situation that another person is going through. It has also been defined as the ability to experience another person’s feelings (Empathy 1). When a person identifies with another person’s situation and tries to alleviate or mitigate the stressing factor in the situation, then one can say that he or she is expressing empathy. Acts of empathy may therefore include such actions as giving food to the needy in the society or providing shelter to those who are homeless. Generally, empathy has much to do with acts of kindness directed to people faced with situations which are hostile. It is kindness directed to people who need it based on how the donor or the person giving has perceived the situation at hand (Vincent 10).

The feeling of empathy comes up when there is a clear difference between the person being empathetic and the one who is the subject of empathy. Generally, two persons in the same unfortunate situation may not manifest empathy feelings towards each other. This is because of undergoing the same situation and neither of them may be in a position to help the other. But if two people are experiencing different unfortunate circumstances at the same time, they may be able console each other thus they may show empathy to each other. For instance, a bereaved person may show empathy to another person who has lost his or her house to fire.

Empathy can be examined as a feeling that pushes a person to do something good for another person particularly when the other person is in a bad situation. Basically, for one to express empathy therefore one needs to have feelings. One has to feel and be touched by what others are going through. Because empathy is just but a feeling, it does not really cost much, at least financially, to feel empathetic. However, acts of empathy may cost some resources depending on individual acts in question (Thagard 15).

What it takes to express empathy is therefore the ability to have the feeling first such that there is identification with the situation at hand and then being in a position to offer the help required in whole or in part. Empathy has to do with feelings and in cases where a person’s feelings have been hardened; empathy may not be manifested easily. A good illustration is those that propagate violence especially the leaders (Thagard 15).

Empathy can only be expressed between two person or more. For empathy to be expressed, one party (one person or persons) has to be in a disadvantaged or hostile position in order for the other to offer some assistance. It is worth noting that acts of empathy or helping others who are a hostile situation or in a position that need assistance should be on a voluntary basis. If one is coerced to help another person then such an action may not pass as an act of empathy. Empathy therefore has significantly to do with the willingness to help out of one’s own volition or free will.

There are many ways in which empathy can be expressed in the society. More often than not, people in the society are not endowed equally and therefore there are some who are less privileged. One way on expressing empathy therefore is by lending a hand to those who are less privileged. One way in which this can be done perfectly is through visiting children homes. Most of the children in these homes are orphans. By spending time with them, playing and talking with them, they get the feeling of being cared for. This is important as it enables them to develop self confidence. Apart from spending time with them one can gift them with items such as clothes.

One may also express empathy to the sick especially those admitted in hospitals. Patients admitted in hospital are more likely to undergo psychological distress especially because of being away from family members. Expressing empathy in this case can be done through a word of encouragement. Words of encouragement as gestures of empathy will also work well in a family setting especially when one of the members has been faced with an unfortunate situation, for instance, falling sick.

The study book Do androids dream of electric sheep depicts in a clear manner the meaning of empathy and how it is applied. The book starts by setting the conditions right for the empathy to be exercised. The whole world is destroyed and only a handful of living things survive. Human beings as well as animals are left vulnerable and in a state where they need each other. Empathy in this book is shown as a biological trait which no android, even the most intelligent, can imitate. This is because emotions cannot be programmed into a computer (Dick 1).

I am of the view that it is the human beings who are the subject of empathy in this book. This may sound reversal but taking into consideration the joy and satisfaction that humans get from keeping animals, it turns out to be true. To keep an animal is prestigious and those who cannot afford animals are forced to find pleasure in keeping electric animals. This act of keeping electric animals as seen in the book can only point out to the fact that humans have some desire within themselves to offer care that if not satisfied disturbs them. Animals come in to satisfy that need by accepting to be cared for by the humans.

Technically, as the animals are being shown empathy by being cared for they are also playing a major role of showing empathy to humans by allowing themselves to be cared for. Indeed in the book, empathy is viewed as a two way traffic action whereby one party is willing to show empathy to another party and the other party is willing to accept the actions of empathy advanced by the first party.

Empathy is a vital virtue to human beings. It can be said to be among the virtues that help to make the society better. As was noted in the book, empathy differentiates us from machines. It gives us the kindness that makes human beings different from animals. Empathy also helps to unite people as they identify with one another in various struggles that they undergo (Waal 1).

Although it has been generally agreed that empathy is important, there is a caution that it should be expressed carefully in some cases. Caregivers need to express empathy when attending to patients. However, it has been noted that expression of empathy too much may make the patients vulnerable to be hurt (Hojat 12). Too much expression of empathy in such a scenario may also make the patients feel that their situations are dire. Such a feeling will obviously do more harm than any good (Eisenberg 1).

Empathy has been viewed as the ability to identify with a situation that another person is undergoing. Empathy significantly has to do with feelings. Empathy is shown when a person is in an unfortunate situation that may need consoling. In most cases, empathy propels a person to do something about the situation in question. The feeling of empathy will therefore push one into action, however in some cases there are no actions which might be done. Therefore, empathy does not change because one has not responded to the prompt to act.

It has also been discussed that it only takes feeling to have empathy. Since one does not need to act in order to show empathy, it can be argued that almost every person can express empathy. Those who may not display empathy are those who have hardened their emotions. Showing empathy has a positive effect on those who receive it.

Empathy consoles them and psychologically strengthens them to keep on fighting. This is especially the case for patients. However, it has also been cautioned against too much expression of empathy as it may create the impression that a person is in such a desperate situation that he or she might not recover. This will psychologically affect the person in a very negative manner.

Dick, Philip. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep . New York: Orion, 2010. Print.

Eisenberg, Nancy. Empathy and Its Development . New York: CUP Archive, 1990. Print.

Empathy. Empathy vs. Sympathy . DIFFEN, 2013.

Hojat, Mohammad. Empathy in Patient Care: Antecedents, Development, Measurement, and Outcomes . New York: Springer, 2007. Print.

Thagard, Paul. The Brain and the Meaning of Life . New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print.

Vincent, Steve. Being Empathic: A Companion for Counselors and Therapists . New York: Radcliffe Publishing, 2005. Print.

Waal, Franz. The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society . New Jersey: Crown Publishing Group, 2010. Print.

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Essays About Empathy: Top 5 Examples Plus Prompts

If you’re writing essays about empathy , check out our essay examples and prompts to get started.

Empathy is the ability to understand and share other people’s emotions. It is the very notion which To Kill a Mockingbird character Atticus Finch was driving at when he advised his daughter Scout to “climb inside [other people’s] skin and walk around in it.”

Being able to feel the joy and sorrow of others and see the world from their perspective are extraordinary human capabilities that shape our social landscape. But beyond its effect on personal and professional relationships, empathy motivates kind actions that can trickle positive change across society .

If you are writing an article about empathy, here are five insightful essay examples to inspire you:

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1. Do Art and Literature Cultivate Empathy? by Nick Haslam

2. empathy: overrated by spencer kornhaber, 3. in our pandemic era, why we must teach our children compassion by rebecca roland, 4. why empathy is a must-have business strategy by belinda parmar, 5. the evolution of empathy by frans de waal, 1. teaching empathy in the classroom., 2. how can companies nurture empathy in the workplace, 3. how can we develop empathy, 4. how do you know if someone is empathetic, 5. does empathy spark helpful behavior , 6. empathy vs. sympathy., 7. empathy as a winning strategy in sports. , 8. is there a decline in human empathy, 9. is digital media affecting human empathy, 10. your personal story of empathy..

“Exposure to literature and the sorts of movies that do not involve car chases might nurture our capacity to get inside the skins of other people. Alternatively, people who already have well-developed empathic abilities might simply find the arts more engaging…”

Haslam, a psychology professor, laid down several studies to present his thoughts and analysis on the connection between empathy and art. While one study has shown that literary fiction can help develop empathy, there’s still lacking evidence to show that more exposure to art and literature can help one be more empathetic. You can also check out these essays about character .

“Empathy doesn’t even necessarily make day-to-day life more pleasant, they contend, citing research that shows a person’s empathy level has little or no correlation with kindness or giving to charity.”

This article takes off from a talk of psychology experts on a crusade against empathy. The experts argue that empathy could be “innumerate, parochial, bigoted” as it zooms one to focus on an individual’s emotions and fail to see the larger picture. This problem with empathy can motivate aggression and wars and, as such, must be replaced with a much more innate trait among humans: compassion.

“Showing empathy can be especially hard for kids… Especially in times of stress and upset, they may retreat to focusing more on themselves — as do we adults.”

Roland encourages fellow parents to teach their kids empathy, especially amid the pandemic, where kindness is needed the most. She advises parents to seize everyday opportunities by ensuring “quality conversations” and reinforcing their kids to view situations through other people’s lenses.

“Mental health, stress and burnout are now perceived as responsibilities of the organization. The failure to deploy empathy means less innovation, lower engagement and reduced loyalty, as well as diluting your diversity agenda.”

The spike in anxiety disorders and mental health illnesses brought by the COVID-19 pandemic has given organizations a more considerable responsibility: to listen to employees’ needs sincerely. Parmar underscores how crucial it is for a leader to take empathy as a fundamental business strategy and provides tips on how businesses can adjust to the new norm.

“The evolution of empathy runs from shared emotions and intentions between individuals to a greater self/other distinction—that is, an “unblurring” of the lines between individuals.”

The author traces the evolutionary roots of empathy back to our primate heritage — ultimately stemming from the parental instinct common to mammals. Ultimately, the author encourages readers to conquer “tribal differences” and continue turning to their emotions and empathy when making moral decisions.

10 Interesting Writing prompts on Essays About Empathy

Check out below our list of exciting prompts to help you buckle down to your writing:

This essay discuss teaching empathy in the classroom. Is this an essential skill that we should learn in school? Research how schools cultivate children’s innate empathy and compassion. Then, based on these schools’ experiences, provide tips on how other schools can follow suit.

An empathetic leader is said to help boost positive communication with employees, retain indispensable talent and create positive long-term outcomes. This is an interesting topic to research, and there are plenty of studies on this topic online with data that you can use in your essay. So, pick these best practices to promote workplace empathy and discuss their effectiveness.

Essays About Empathy: How can we develop empathy?

Write down a list of deeds and activities people can take as their first steps to developing empathy. These activities can range from volunteering in their communities to reaching out to a friend in need simply. Then, explain how each of these acts can foster empathy and kindness.

Based on studies, list the most common traits, preferences, and behaviour of an empathetic person. For example, one study has shown that empathetic people prefer non-violent movies. Expound on this list with the support of existing studies. You can support or challenge these findings in this essay for a compelling argumentative essay. Make sure to conduct your research and cite all the sources used.

Empathy is a buzzword closely associated with being kind and helpful. However, many experts in recent years have been opining that it takes more than empathy to propel an act of kindness and that misplaced empathy can even lead to apathy. Gather what psychologists and emotional experts have been saying on this debate and input your analysis.

Empathy and sympathy have been used synonymously, even as these words differ in meaning. Enlighten your readers on the differences and provide situations that clearly show the contrast between empathy and sympathy. You may also add your take on which trait is better to cultivate.

Empathy has been deemed vital in building cooperation. A member who empathizes with the team can be better in tune with the team’s goals, cooperate effectively and help drive success. You may research how athletic teams foster a culture of empathy beyond the sports fields. Write about how coaches are integrating empathy into their coaching strategy.

Several studies have warned that empathy has been on a downward trend over the years. Dive deep into studies that investigate this decline. Summarize each and find common points. Then, cite the significant causes and recommendations in this study. You can also provide insights on whether this should cause alarm and how societies should address the problem.

There is a broad sentiment that social media has been driving people to live in a bubble and be less empathetic — more narcissistic. However, some point out that intensifying competition and increasing economic pressures are more to blame for reducing our empathetic feelings. Research and write about what experts have to say and provide a personal touch by adding your experience.

Acts of kindness abound every day. But sometimes, we fail to capture or take them for granted. Write about your unforgettable encounters with empathetic people. Then, create a storytelling essay to convey your personal view on empathy. This activity can help you appreciate better the little good things in life.

Check out our general resource of essay writing topics and stimulate your creative mind!

See our round-up of the best essay checkers to ensure your writing is error-free.

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The Role of Empathy in Health and Social Care Professionals

Maria moudatsou.

1 Department of Social Work, Hellenic Mediterranean University, 71410 Heraklion, Greece; rg.oohay@muostaduom

2 Laboratory of Interdisciplinary Approaches for the Enhancement of Quality of Life (Quality of Life Lab), Hellenic Mediterranean University, 71410 Heraklion, Greece; moc.liamg@uoluoporvatsitera

3 Centre of Mental Health, 71201 Heraklion, Greece

Areti Stavropoulou

4 Nursing Department, University of West Attica, 12243 Athens, Greece

Anastas Philalithis

5 Department of Social Medicine, Medical School, University of Crete, 70013 Heraklion, Greece; rg.cou@lalihp

Sofia Koukouli

The current article is an integrative and analytical literature review on the concept and meaning of empathy in health and social care professionals. Empathy, i.e., the ability to understand the personal experience of the patient without bonding with them, constitutes an important communication skill for a health professional, one that includes three dimensions: the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral. It has been proven that health professionals with high levels of empathy operate more efficiently as to the fulfillment of their role in eliciting therapeutic change. The empathetic professional comprehends the needs of the health care users, as the latter feel safe to express the thoughts and problems that concern them. Although the importance of empathy is undeniable, a significantly high percentage of health professionals seem to find it difficult to adopt a model of empathetic communication in their everyday practice. Some of the factors that negatively influence the development of empathy are the high number of patients that professionals have to manage, the lack of adequate time, the focus on therapy within the existing academic culture, but also the lack of education in empathy. Developing empathetic skills should not only be the underlying objective in the teaching process of health and social care undergraduate students, but also the subject of the lifelong and continuous education of professionals.

1. Introduction

Communication skills have been described as the most important ability for a health professional. Efficient communication depends upon the therapist feeling certain that they have really heard and recorded the health care user’s needs so as to provide personalized care [ 1 ]. It is important for health professionals to understand people’s feelings, opinions and experiences in order to assess their real needs and act accordingly, offering tailor-made services. Reaching that goal makes the development of empathetic skills necessary [ 2 ].

The concept of empathy is a common denominator for many health professionals such as nurses, doctors, psychologists, and social workers [ 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ]. The person-centered approach for the unconditional acceptance of the health care user and empathy have for years been the fundamental values in the education and implementation of clinical social practice [ 3 , 7 , 8 , 9 ].

2. Material and Methods

The aim of the present paper was to analyze the concept of empathy and emphasize its importance to the health professions. The research questions under consideration have been the following: 1. What does empathy mean and which are its dimensions; 2. What are the role and meaning of empathy in health and social care professions for the therapeutic journey of the health care user; 3. How can we assess the levels of empathy in professionals (assessment tools); 4. Which factors influence empathy?

A literature search was conducted by searching PubMed and Scopus databases, to identify studies of the last fifteen years published in English and Greek language. The key-words used were ‘empathy’ and ‘health professionals’. Out of the search, 78 studies were identified that better answer the aim and purposes of the present paper. These studies were discussed and evaluated by the authoring team in order to reach consensus on the eligibility of each one with the proposed research questions. After agreement was reached, re-examination and analysis of the studies’ findings lead to the formulation of four thematic categories, namely, a) Concept definition and dimensions, b) The role of empathy in health and social care professionals, c) Assessing empathy, and d) Factors that influence empathy.

3.1. Concept Definition and Dimensions

Empathy is the ability to understand and share other people’s feelings [ 10 ]. It is a core concept as, according to the psychodynamic, behavioral and person-centered approaches, it facilitates the development of a therapeutic relationship with the health care user, providing the basis for therapeutic change [ 11 ].

Empathy was first mentioned in a psychotherapeutic context in the 1950s [ 7 ]. The person-centered approach defined it as the temporary condition that a health professional experiences in his/her effort to understand a health care user’s life without bonding with them [ 3 , 12 ].

The contemporary concept of empathy is multidimensional and consists of affective, cognitive, and behavioral aspects [ 6 , 11 , 13 ]. Throughout history, the development and integration of this concept evolved along three different time periods. Until the end of the 1950s, the cognitive dimension was mostly prevalent. From 1960 onwards, emphasis was given to the affective dimension, whereas since 1970, empathy has been defined in all its multi-dimensionality; that is, the behavioral aspect has been added to the everyday practice of the health care professionals [ 14 ].

The affective dimension consists of the concepts of caring and that of the sincere, unconditional acceptance of the health care user (congruence) [ 8 , 15 , 16 ]. Caring refers to the assistance and support as byproducts of an emotional interaction. The concept of the full and sincere unconditional acceptance refers to the approval of the ‘other’ and a consensus between people, without preconceptions or stereotypes.

The cognitive dimension pertains to the interpersonal sensitivity and the ability to understand the position the other person is in (perspective taking) [ 17 , 18 ]. Interpersonal sensitivity means objectively understanding the other person’s situation. It is a deep process of getting to know someone, based in both verbal and non-verbal cues. The ability to understand the other person’s situation refers to the flexibility and the objective understanding of the point of view of the other person (walk in their shoes, comprehending the way they perform cognitively, emotionally, and mentally) [ 17 , 18 ].

Altruism and the therapeutic relationship both belong to the behavioral dimension which develops empathy into practice [ 19 , 20 ]. Altruism is a socially directed behavior aimed at relieving difficulties, problems, and the pain associated with them [ 11 ].

Sympathy, empathy, and compassion are closely related terms that are often used interchangeably. Sympathy has been defined as an emotional reaction of pity toward the misfortune of another, especially those who are perceived as suffering unfairly [ 21 ]. Empathy is understood as a more complex interpersonal construct that involves awareness and intuition, while compassion is a ‘complementary social emotion, elicited by witnessing the suffering of others’ and is related with the feelings of concern, warmth associated to motivating of support [ 22 ]. Empathetic listening might result in compassion fatigue because of prolonged exposure to stress and all it evokes [ 23 ]. Self-care practice, well-being, and self-awareness are fundamental in enhancing empathy and reducing compassion fatigue [ 23 , 24 ].

3.2. The Role of Empathy in Health and Social Care Professionals

In a qualitative research study, nurse students, who were asked their opinion on empathy, emphasized the three dimensions of the concept [ 3 ]. Participants described it as the nurse’s ability to understand and experience other people’s feelings, thoughts, and wishes, as well as the nurse’s capacity to comprehend the emotional and cognitive state of the person they work with. To sum up, empathy is perceived as a combination of the emotional, cognitive and practical skills involved when caring for a patient [ 3 ].

Empathy is one of the fundamental tools of the therapeutic relationship between the carers and their patients and it has been proven that its contribution is vital to better health outcomes [ 8 , 25 , 26 ]. As it allows the health care providers to detect and recognize the users’ experiences, worries, and perspectives [ 27 ], it strengthens the development and improvement of the therapeutic relationship between the two parts [ 28 ]. It is widely acknowledged that the health professional’s empathetic ability leads to better therapeutic results [ 29 ].

The empathetic relationship of the health professionals with their health care users reinforces their cooperation towards designing a therapeutic plan and a tailor-made intervention, increasing thus the patient’s satisfaction from the therapeutic process. This way, quality of care is enhanced, errors are eliminated, and an increased percentage of health care recipients positively experience therapy [ 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 ]. Furthermore, it has been noted that the empathetic relationship developed during the process of care reinforces the therapeutic results, as the users better comply with the therapeutic course of action [ 34 ].

Studies performed in various groups of patients with different health problems generated positive results regarding the progress of their health. Specifically, studies of patients with diabetes showed that there is an association between empathy and the positive therapeutic course of disease [ 31 , 35 ]. Moreover, patients with cancer demonstrate less stress, depression, and aggressiveness when receiving empathetic nursing care [ 36 ]. The empathetic relationship between a midwife and a future mother increases the latter’s satisfaction and lessens the stress, the agony, and the pain of the forthcoming labor as the mother feels security, trust, and encouragement [ 37 ].

Understanding based on empathy is critical to the relationship between the health professional and the recipient of care. When that happens, health care users feel secure and trust the professional’s abilities. Therefore, the distance between the expert and the patient shortens and both of them come closer, enjoying mutual benefits [ 12 ]. Moreover, a relationship based on empathy helps the therapists lessen their stress and burnout in the workplace and adds to their quality of life [ 37 , 38 ]. It has been shown that physicians who have higher levels of empathy experience less burnout or depression [ 39 , 40 ].

Empathy is especially important to the social care professions. It has been noted that the ability of the social worker for empathy and understanding of the users’ experiences and feelings plays a crucial role in social care as empathy is one of the most important skills that these professionals may employ to develop a therapeutic relationship [ 5 , 41 ].

Health care users who experience empathy during their treatment exhibit better results and a higher possibility for a potential improvement [ 42 ]. Moreover, social workers with higher levels of empathy work more efficiently and productively as to the fulfillment of their role in creating social change [ 13 ]. This happens because empathy helps the social worker understand and feel compassion towards their health care users so as the latter can feel secure to express their thoughts and problems. This way, a basis for trust is created, one that leads to therapeutic change and the improvement of the care recipient’s overall social functionality [ 13 ]. Social functionality levels are assessed by the social worker and refer to the ability of a person to accomplish their everyday activities (preparing and keeping meals, seeking accommodation, taking care of their selves, commuting) as well as their ability to fulfill social roles (parent, employee, member of a community) according to the requirements of their cultural environment [ 43 ].

Empathy contributes to the precise assessment of the situation the health care user is in. It offers the therapists the chance to make good use of non-verbal cues (behavior modeling, body movements, tone of voice, etc.) and helps them manage the user’s emotions. What is more, empathy enhances the user’s ability to comprehend reality and improve the quality of their life [ 13 ].

3.3. Assessing Empathy

Although both health care users and health professionals consider empathy as very important for the development of the therapeutic relationship and a necessary skill for a therapist, studies show a reduction of empathy in professional relationships. Often, health care users believe that health professionals do not understand the situation that health care users are in, whereas research findings showed that health professionals and health care users have different views on the communication abilities of the former, as if they come from different worlds [ 44 , 45 ]. It is especially important that—according to research findings deriving from medical student samples—empathy seems to increase in the first year of studies, but starts decreasing around the third year and remains low up to graduation [ 46 , 47 ].

As mentioned before, there are different dimensions, but also levels of empathy. Accordingly, there are different assessment scales for professionals and patient-users [ 48 ].

One of the most important tools for the quantitative assessment of empathy is the Jefferson Scale of Empathy (JSE) which was originally used to evaluate empathy in medical students [ 27 , 49 ]. Subsequently, its use was extended to other professional groups also, for example physicians, health professionals in general and students of other health professions [ 27 , 49 , 50 , 51 ]. The Jefferson scale has been used in many countries, such as the USA, Poland, Korea, Italy, Japan and has been standardized for its validity and reliability [ 12 , 49 , 50 , 52 , 53 ]. It is self-administered and completed by physicians and other health professionals who provide care to patients in clinical settings. Moreover, students of medical, nursing, and other health care sciences may also complete it. The scale includes 20 questions and the overall score ranges from twenty to one hundred and forty; higher scores indicate a better empathic relationship in the medical and therapeutic care [ 26 , 49 , 53 , 54 ].

More specifically, for social work, the Empathy Scale for Social Workers (ESSW) is a questionnaire designed for the quantitative assessment of empathy in social care professionals and students. It can be very useful in practice settings to support decision making processes, assist career choice decisions, continuing education, and supervision needs in the field of social care. Its usefulness is also underscored for potential social work supervisors, as it helps identifying the types of empathy needed while supervising clinicians and staff. The scale is a screening and self-evaluation tool completed by social work students and practitioners [ 13 ]. It consists of 41 questions and every question is marked on a five point scale and higher scores indicate higher levels of empathy [ 13 ].

3.4. Factors that Influence Empathy

As mentioned before, although research has showed the value of empathy, there are still many difficulties in regards to its implementation in the clinical practice [ 32 ]. A relatively high percentage of health professionals, about 70%, find it difficult to develop empathy with their health care users [ 32 ].

Age, self-reflection, appraisal, and emotions’ expressions were associated with women’s social workers empathy. Social workers had a higher score of empathy whenever they had previous work experience [ 55 ]. Additionally, there are studies that support that being female is associated with higher levels of empathy [ 56 , 57 ].

Research outcomes suggest that protective factors of social workers’ empathy are prosocial behavior toward work and positive personal and environmental resources [ 58 ]. Self-esteem, work engagement, and emotional regulation are also positively associated with empathy [ 58 , 59 ]. On the other hand, empathy is limited due to daily stress, that is a risk factor for burnout and compassion fatigue [ 59 , 60 ].

Empathy is positively correlated with reflective ability and emotional intelligence both in professional social workers and social work students [ 55 , 61 ]. According to a study in social work students in India, empathy and emotional intelligence were extracted as predictors of resilience through regression analysis. The authors underlined the need to enhance these attributes in social work students through the provision of appropriate curricular experiences [ 62 ].

The lack of empathy—or the low empathy levels—depends on several reasons. The most important are the large number of health care users that professionals have to deal with, the lack of adequate time, the focus on therapy, the predominant culture in medical schools, and the lack of training in empathy [ 30 ].

Further reasons include presumptions, a sense of superiority from the health professionals, and a fear of boundary violation. Time pressure, anxiety, a lack of self-awareness, and a lack of appropriate training, as well as the different socio-economic status, all the above do not favor empathy either [ 13 ].

According to scientific views from the Medicine field, empathy can be learned and Medical schools should educate their students in this respect [ 63 , 64 ]. Many studies have pointed out the necessity for future professionals to receive training in order to enhance their empathetic skills [ 64 , 65 ].

Although empathy is a core, quality principle for the health care professions, there are studies that show that health professionals cannot adequately express it and implement it [ 66 , 67 ]. According to studies in undergraduate nursing students, empirical education through learning processes can positively influence empathy [ 4 , 68 ]. Education is considered, both by students and professionals, as especially important for the reinforcement of empathetic skills [ 4 , 69 , 70 ].

Nevertheless, research data on the effectiveness of education in empathy are limited [ 71 , 72 , 73 ]. In a research study, conducted in the USA regarding the effect that empathy education has on health professionals, it was found that education contributes a great deal to the improvement of the therapeutic relationship [ 32 ]. In the same study, trained professionals are more likely to detect the emotion and progress of their health care users and therefore further explore and meet their needs. Education can be offered through hands-on work, multimedia use, role play, and experiential learning [ 32 ].

In a qualitative study, health professionals made suggestions regarding the enhancement of empathy. These suggestions included more holistic, educational interventions in behaviors that are central to the patient’s needs, with an emphasis on personal development, professional training, and supervision programs, rather than education in behavioral and communication skills [ 74 ].

‘Diversity Dolls’ is a hands-on educational method for the reinforcement of empathy that is used among social care students in a Greek university, so that students can instill empathetic skills in socially vulnerable populations [ 75 ]. It is believed that the use of such based-on-art methods helps social care students to feel safe, to explore, and give meaning to the real circumstances people live in, through pleasant, participatory, interactive activities [ 76 ].

Globally, creative educational methods such as journaling, art, role-play, and simulation games globally are becoming more popular in the health and social care fields helping students to increase their knowledge and skills in relation to empathy [ 75 , 76 ].

Teaching techniques and classroom methodologies familiarize social workers to empathetic skills [ 55 ]. In a study, among social work students, the results suggest that empathetic modeling from professors and field supervisors enhance social work students’ empathy. Social work educators should not focus on traditional teaching but they ought to concentrate on interactive and creative education that enhances the empathetic modeling and relationship between educators and students [ 77 ]. Apart from teaching social work students with mental flexibility, regulation of emotional and perspective taking, social workers should be taught empathy throughout the phenomenological psychological approach (seminars that utilize transcribed audio recordings of interactions) [ 78 , 79 ]. Additionally, regular supervision has a key role in enabling social workers to process their own feelings and to deal with empathy [ 80 ].

4. Conclusions

Empathy among health care users and professionals significantly contributes to how both groups behave as well as to their therapy and overall well-being. The development of empathetic skills constitutes an important priority in the education of health and social care students and should be encouraged. Educational programs should primarily be performed in a hands-on way that will strengthen the students’ personal and social skills and allow them to effectively communicate with their patients.

Moreover, health care professionals should be supported through continuous and personal development education programs as well as through supervision sessions that will allow them to develop empathetic skills. Political will is a prerequisite for the financing and encouragement of further actions.

Author Contributions

All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

This research received no external funding.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Empathy Essay Examples

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About Empathy

Empathy is the action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another of either the past or present without having the feelings, thoughts, and experience fully communicated in an objectively explicit manner

Renowned psychologists Daniel Goleman and Paul Ekman have identified three components of empathy: Cognitive, Emotional and Compassionate.

Affective and cognitive empathy influence, and are influenced by, biological systems and processes that contribute to everyday feelings, thoughts, beliefs, decisions, and behavior. Empathetic feelings might enable individuals to develop more satisfactory interpersonal relations, especially in the long-term. Empathy-induced altruism can improve attitudes toward stigmatized groups, and to improve racial attitudes, and actions toward people with AIDS, the homeless, and convicts.

Painkillers reduce one’s capacity for empathy. Observation of another human being experiencing emotions lights up the same neurons in our brain as if we're experiencing the same feeling. Empathy exists because we know we’ve got only one life to live. Painkillers Reduce Your Capacity For Empathy Meditation May Heighten Empathy.

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