expressive speech act meaning

What Is The Speech Act Theory: Definition and Examples

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• An Introduction to Punctuation
• Ph.D., Rhetoric and English, University of Georgia
• M.A., Modern English and American Literature, University of Leicester
• B.A., English, State University of New York

Speech act theory is a subfield of pragmatics that studies how words are used not only to present information but also to carry out actions.

The speech act theory was introduced by Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin in "How to Do Things With Words" and further developed by American philosopher John Searle. It considers the degree to which utterances are said to perform locutionary acts , illocutionary acts , and/or perlocutionary acts .

Many philosophers and linguists, such as Andreas Kemmerling , study speech act theory as a way to better understand human communication. "Part of the joy of doing speech act theory, from my strictly first-person point of view," Kemmerling wrote, "is becoming more and more remindful of how many surprisingly different things we do when we talk to each other".

Searle's Five Illocutionary Points

Philosopher John Searle is responsible for devising a system of speech act categorization.

"In the past three decades, speech act theory has become an important branch of the contemporary theory of language thanks mainly to the influence of [J.R.] Searle (1969, 1979) and [H.P.] Grice (1975) whose ideas on meaning and communication have stimulated research in philosophy and in human and cognitive sciences..."

From Searle's view, there are only five illocutionary points that speakers can achieve on propositions in an utterance, namely:

• The assertive
• The commissive
• The directive
• The declaratory
• The expressive

Speakers achieve:

• The assertive point when they represent how things are in the world;
• The commissive point when they commit themselves to doing something;
• The directive point when they make an attempt to get hearers to do something;
• The declaratory point when they do things in the world at the moment of the utterance solely by virtue of saying that they do;
• The expressive point when they express their attitudes about objects and facts of the world (Vanderkeven and Kubo 2002)

Speech Act Theory and Literary Criticism

"Since 1970 speech act theory has influenced...the practice of literary criticism. When applied to the analysis of direct discourse by a character within a literary work, it provides a systematic...framework for identifying the unspoken presuppositions, implications, and effects of speech acts [that] competent readers and critics have always taken into account, subtly though unsystematically.

Speech act theory has also been used in a more radical way, however, as a model on which to recast the theory of literature...and especially...prose narratives. What the author of a fictional work—or else what the author's invented narrator—narrates is held to constitute a 'pretended' set of assertions, which are intended by the author, and understood by the competent reader, to be free from a speaker's ordinary commitment to the truth of what he or she asserts.

Within the frame of the fictional world that the narrative thus sets up, however, the utterances of the fictional characters—whether these are assertions or promises or marital vows—are held to be responsible to ordinary illocutionary commitments," (Abrams and Galt Harpham 2005).

Criticisms of Speech Act Theory

Although Searle's theory of speech acts has had a tremendous influence on functional aspects of pragmatics, it has also received very strong criticism.

The Function of Sentences

Some argue that Austin and Searle based their work principally on their intuitions, focusing exclusively on sentences isolated from the context where they might be used. In this sense, one of the main contradictions to Searle's suggested typology is the fact that the illocutionary force of a concrete speech act cannot take the form of a sentence as Searle considered it.

"Rather, researchers suggest that a sentence is a grammatical unit within the formal system of language, whereas the speech act involves a communicative function separate from this."

Interactional Aspects of Conversation

"In speech act theory, the hearer is seen as playing a passive role. The illocutionary force of a particular utterance is determined with regard to the linguistic form of the utterance and also introspection as to whether the necessary felicity conditions —not least in relation to the speaker's beliefs and feelings—are fulfilled. Interactional aspects are, thus, neglected.

However, [a] conversation is not just a mere chain of independent illocutionary forces—rather, speech acts are related to other speech acts with a wider discourse context. Speech act theory, in that it does not consider the function played by utterances in driving conversation is, therefore, insufficient in accounting for what actually happens in conversation," (Barron 2003).

• Abrams, Meyer Howard, and Geoffrey Galt Harpham.  A Glossary of Literary Terms . 8th ed., Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2005.
• Austin, J.l. “How To Do Things With Words.” 1975.
• Barron, Anne.  Acquisition in Interlanguage Pragmatics Learning How to Do Things with Words in a Study Abroad Context . J. Benjamins Pub. Co., 2003..
• Kemmerling, Andreas. “Speech Acts, Minds, and Social Reality: Discussions with John r. Searle. Expressing an Intentional State.”  Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy , vol. 79, 2002, pp. 83.  Kluwer Academic Publishers .
• Vanderveken, Daniel, and Susumu Kubo. “Introduction.”  Essays in Speech Act Theory , John Benjamins, 2001, pp. 1–21.
• Locutionary Act Definition in Speech-Act Theory
• Speech Acts in Linguistics
• Illocutionary Force in Speech Theory
• Question Mark Definition and Examples
• Illocutionary Act
• Perlocutionary Act Speech
• Felicity Conditions: Definition and Examples
• Performative Verbs
• Explicature (Speech Acts)
• The Power of Indirectness in Speaking and Writing
• What Is Relevance Theory in Terms of Communication?
• Meaning Semantics
• Reported Speech
• Mental-State Verbs
• Verbal Hedge: Definition and Examples
• Information Content (Language)

• Media Studies
• Communication
• Linguistics

Speech Act Theory | How Words Shape Meaning & Interactions

• June 27, 2023 March 31, 2024

In the captivating world of media and communications, one theory that holds immense importance is the Speech Act Theory. Developed by philosophers J.L. Austin and John Searle, this theory helps us comprehend how our words possess the power to shape meaning. Also, how it influences our interactions with others. Let’s delve into this theory and explore its key concepts to unlock the secrets of effective communication.

The Power of Words

Words are not merely sounds or symbols; they carry profound power. Thus, they possess the ability to convey thoughts, express emotions, and influence others. Speech Act Theory enables us to comprehend that when we speak, we are not solely stating facts, but also performing actions through our words.

Understanding the power of words allows us to recognise the impact our speech has on others. It helps us become conscious of the choices we make in our language use. Thus, making us aware of the potential consequences they may have. By harnessing the power of words, we can express ourselves effectively and create meaningful connections with those around us.

Locution, Illocution & Perlocution

Speech acts can be understood through three levels: locution, illocution, and perlocution. Locution refers to the actual words and phrases we use. Illocution focuses on the intentions behind our words, such as making a request or giving an order. Perlocution refers to the impact our words have on others, like persuading or motivating them to take action.

By recognising these levels of speech acts, we gain a deeper understanding of the complexities of communication. We become aware that our words carry not only literal meanings but also implied intentions. We then need to consider the potential effects on the receiver. This awareness enables us to be more mindful of our speech and adapt it according to our communicative goals.

Types of Speech Acts

Speech Act Theory categorises speech acts into three main types: assertive, directive, and expressive. Assertive speech acts aim to convey information, such as stating facts or making claims. Directive speech acts involve issuing commands or requests. Expressive speech acts express emotions, attitudes, or feelings.

Understanding the different types of speech acts helps us navigate various communicative situations effectively. We learn to recognise when we need to provide information, give instructions, or express ourselves emotionally. This knowledge allows us to choose the appropriate speech acts to achieve our communication goals. Therefore, allowing us to convey our intended meanings accurately.

Felicity Conditions

For a speech act to be successful, certain conditions known as felicity conditions must be met. These conditions ensure that the act is performed appropriately and is understood by the intended audience. Felicity conditions may include factors such as sincerity, relevance, and the social context in which the speech act takes place. Understanding and adhering to these conditions contribute to effective communication.

Recognising felicity conditions helps us gauge the appropriateness and effectiveness of our speech acts. Therefore, we become more conscious of the importance of sincerity in our words. Furthermore, the relevance of our statements to the context, and finally the impact of social norms on communication. By considering these conditions, we enhance our ability to convey our messages successfully and build stronger connections with others.

Speech Act Theory & Performativity

Speech Act Theory emphasises the concept of performativity. This suggests that by uttering specific words, we bring about a change in the world. For example, saying “I now pronounce you husband and wife” during a wedding ceremony establishes a new marital status for the couple. Our words have the power to create realities and shape social structures. This aspect of speech acts highlights their transformative nature.

Understanding performativity allows us to appreciate the significant influence of our words on social and cultural contexts. As a result, we become aware of the role our speech plays in shaping perceptions, reinforcing norms, and constructing shared meanings. Also, by harnessing the power of performativity, we can contribute to positive social change and inspire others through our words.

Contextual Factors of Speech Act Theory

Context plays a vital role in comprehending speech acts. The same words can have different meanings depending on the context in which they are used. For instance, cultural norms, social relationships, and shared knowledge influence the interpretation of speech acts. Being aware of these contextual factors is essential for effective communication. Therefore, understanding the situational context helps to avoid miscommunication and ensures that the intended meaning is conveyed.

Considering contextual factors enhances our ability to adapt our communication to specific situations. We become sensitive to cultural nuances and adapt our language to different social relationships. Also, it allows us to utilise shared knowledge to convey our ideas effectively. By understanding context, we navigate diverse communication settings with ease and promote mutual understanding.

Pragmatics & Politeness

Speech Act Theory is closely intertwined with Pragmatics , the study of how language is used in real-life situations. Politeness is a significant aspect of pragmatics. Sociolinguists Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson argue that Politeness Strategies , such as using indirect language or employing polite expressions, help maintain social harmony and prevent potential conflicts. Being aware of cultural and social norms of politeness aids in building positive interpersonal relationships.

Understanding pragmatics and politeness allows us to engage in effective and harmonious communication. Thus, we learn to adapt our speech to different social contexts, respect cultural norms, and demonstrate consideration for others. Therefore, by employing politeness strategies, we cultivate empathy, show respect, and foster healthy relationships with those around us.

Criticisms of Speech Act Theory

Despite its significant contributions to understanding communication, Speech Act Theory is not without its criticisms. Some scholars argue that the theory places excessive focus on the speaker’s intentions. Therefore, it neglects the role of the listener in interpreting speech acts. They suggest that meaning is a collaborative effort between the speaker and the listener. This is influenced by shared knowledge and social context.

Others criticise Speech Act Theory for its limited scope in accounting for non-verbal communication. Also, the impact of non-linguistic elements such as body language and facial expressions. They argue that meaning is not solely derived from words but also from non-verbal cues that accompany speech acts.

Additionally, critics point out that Speech Act Theory tends to overlook the role of power dynamics and social inequalities in communication. They argue that the ability to perform certain speech acts may be constrained by societal structures. Thus, not all individuals have equal opportunities to exercise their speech acts freely.

Speech Act Theory offers us a valuable framework for comprehending the power of words and the intricacies of human communication. By recognising the various levels of speech acts, the significance of felicity conditions, the transformative nature of performativity, the impact of context, and the importance of pragmatics and politeness, we can become more effective communicators. However, it is important to acknowledge the criticisms of the theory and consider alternative perspectives. This helps us to then develop a more comprehensive understanding of communication.

Austin, J.L. (1962). How to Do Things with Words . Oxford University Press.

Searle, J.R. (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language . Cambridge University Press.

Brown, P., & Levinson, S. C. (1987). Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage . Cambridge University Press.

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Speech Acts

We are attuned in everyday conversation not primarily to the sentences we utter to one another, but to the speech acts that those utterances are used to perform: requests, warnings, invitations, promises, apologies, predictions, and the like. Such acts are staples of communicative life, but only became a topic of sustained investigation, at least in the English-speaking world, in the middle of the twentieth century. [ 1 ] Since that time “speech act theory” has become influential not only within philosophy, but also in linguistics, psychology, legal theory, artificial intelligence, literary theory, and feminist thought among other scholarly disciplines. [ 2 ] Recognition of the significance of speech acts has illuminated the ability of language to do other things than describe reality. In the process the boundaries among the philosophy of language, the philosophy of action, aesthetics, the philosophy of mind, political philosophy, and ethics have become less sharp. In addition, an appreciation of speech acts has helped lay bare a normative structure implicit in linguistic practice, including even that part of this practice concerned with describing reality. Much recent research aims at an accurate characterization of this normative structure underlying linguistic practice.

1. Introduction

2.1 the independence of force and content, 2.2 can saying make it so, 2.3 theories of performativity, 3.1 direction of fit, 3.2 conditions of satisfaction, 3.3 seven components of illocutionary force, 3.4 direct and indirect force, 4.1 force conventionalism, 4.2 a biosemantic species of force conventionalism.

• 4.3 An Intentionalist Alternative to Force Conventionalism

5.1 Grice’s Account of Speaker Meaning

5.2 objections to grice’s account, 5.3 force as an aspect of speaker meaning, 6.1 speech acts and conversations, 6.2 speech acts and scorekeeping, 7. force-indicators and the logically perfect language, 8. do speech acts have a logic, 9. speech acts and social issues, further reading, other internet resources, related entries.

Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Descriptions was a paradigm for many philosophers in the twentieth century. One reason for this is that it suggested a way to respond to longstanding philosophical problems by showing them to be specious. Russell argued that such sentences as ‘The present King of Singapore is bald,’ and, ‘The round square is impossible,’ possess superficial grammatical forms that are misleading as to their underlying logical structure. In so doing he showed how such sentences can be meaningful without this fact obliging us to posit current Singaporean monarchs or round squares. Many philosophers in what came to be known as the Ordinary Language movement were inspired by this achievement to argue that classic philosophical problems (e.g., of free will, the relation of mind to body, truth, the nature of knowledge, and of right and wrong) likewise rested on a misunderstanding of the language in which these problem are couched. In How to Do Things with Words , J.L. Austin for instance writes,

…in recent years, many things which would once have been accepted without question as ‘statements’ by both philosophers and grammarians have been scrutinized with new care… It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts…Along these lines it has by now been shown piecemeal, or at least made to look likely, that many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. Whatever we may think of any particular one of these views and suggestions…it cannot be doubted that they are producing a revolution in philosophy. (Austin 1962, pp. 1–2)

The Ordinary Language movement, with its broad claim that the meaning of an expression should be equated with its use, and its desire to transcend traditional philosophical perplexities, did not achieve the revolution of which Austin speaks. Nonetheless one of its enduring legacies is the notion of a speech act.

One way of appreciating the distinctive features of speech acts is in contrast with other well-established phenomena within the philosophy of language and linguistics. Accordingly in this entry we will consider the relations among speech acts and: semantic content, grammatical mood, speaker-meaning, logically perfect languages, perlocutions, performatives, presuppositions , and implicature . This will enable us to situate speech acts within their ecological niche.

2. Content, Force, and How Saying Can Make It So

Whereas an act of speech is any act of uttering [ 3 ] meaningful words, ‘speech act’ is a term of art. As a first approximation, speech acts are those acts that can (though need not) be performed by saying that one is doing so. On this conception, resigning, promising, asserting and asking are all speech acts, while convincing, insulting and growing six inches are not. One can, for instance, resign by saying, “I resign…”, although one can also resign from a position without describing oneself as doing so. However, this conception is too inclusive, since it also counts whispering as a speech act even though one can whisper a string of nonsense words without meaning anything. Instead a more accurate characterization of speech acts builds on Grice’s notion of speaker meaning. This notion is discussed further in Section 5 below, but for now it is enough to note that in looking at my watch, I might be trying to tell the time; or I might be trying to indicate to you that it’s time for us to leave. The latter (but not the former) is a case of speaker meaning.

Accordingly, a speech act is a type of act that can be performed by speaker meaning that one is doing so. This conception still counts resigning, promising, asserting and asking as speech acts, while ruling out convincing, insulting and whispering. This definition leaves open the possibility of speech acts being performed wordlessly, as well as speech acts being performed without saying that you are doing so. Our characterization of speech acts captures this fact in emphasizing speaker meaning rather than the uttering of any words.

Speech acts are thus also to be distinguished from performatives. ‘Performative’ is another technical term, and as used here it refers in the first instance to a kind of sentence. A performative sentence is in the first person, present tense, indicative mood, active voice, that describes its speaker as performing a speech act. ‘I assert that George is the culprit,’ is a performative sentence by this test. As we have seen, one can perform a speech act without uttering a performative. Further, since it is merely a type of sentence, one can utter a performative without performing a speech act. For instance, while talking in my sleep I might say, “I hereby promise to climb the Eiffel Tower,” without thereby making any promise. We may also define a performative utterance as an utterance of a performative sentence that is also a speech act. [ 4 ]

More nomenclature: ‘Speech act’ and ‘illocution’ will here be used synonymously. The latter term is due to Austin, who used ‘illocutionary force’ to refer to a dimension of communicative acts. (It is nowadays common also to use ‘illocute’ as a verb meaning ‘to perform a speech act.’) Austin’s reason for using ‘force’ begins with the observation that, construed as a bit of observable behavior, the communicative significance of an act may be underdetermined by what has been said or observably done. I bow deeply before you. So far you may not know whether I am paying obeisance, responding to indigestion, or looking for a wayward contact lens. So too, an utterance of a meaningful sentence (which Austin calls a locutionary act ) such as ‘You’ll be more punctual in the future,’ may leave you wondering whether I am making a prediction or issuing a command or even a threat. The colloquial question, “What is the force of those words?” is often used to elicit an answer. In asking such a question we acknowledge a grasp of those words’ meaning but seek to know how that meaning is to be taken–as a threat, as a prediction, or as a command.

Or so it seems. In an early challenge to Austin, Cohen (1964) argues that the notion of illocutionary force is otiose provided we already have in place the notion of a sentence’s meaning (Austin’s locutionary meaning). Cohen contends that for a performative sentence such as ‘I promise to read that novel,’ its meaning already guarantees that it is a promise. On the other hand, for a sentence that is not a performative, such as ‘I will read that novel,’ if it is understood as being used to make a promise, the promise is still implicit in the sentence’s meaning. In either case, Cohen concludes, meaning already guarantees force and so we do not require an extra-semantic notion to do so.

Cohen’s reasoning assumes that any utterance of ‘I promise to read that novel’ is a promise. But as we have seen with the case of the somniloquist, neither a sentence, nor even the utterance of a sentence, is sufficient on its own for the performance of a speech act, be it a promise or some other. In a similar spirit to that of Cohen, Searle (1968, p. 407) observes that a serious and literal utterance of ‘I promise to read that novel,’ made under what he terms “conditions of successful utterance”, also counts as a promise. Searle concludes from this that some locutionary acts are also illocutionary acts, and infers from this in turn that for some sentences, their locutionary meaning determines their illocutionary force. This last inference is, however, a non sequitur . As we have seen, the aforementioned sentence’s meaning does not determine the illocutionary force with which it is uttered. Rather, when that sentence is uttered in such a way as to constitute a promise, what determines that force is the meaning of the sentence together with such factors as the speaker’s being serious and other contextual conditions being met.

We may thus agree with Searle that some locutionary acts are also illocutionary acts, without losing sight of our earlier observation that locutionary meaning underdetermines illocutionary force. This fact about underdetermination is implied by Davidson’s Thesis of the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning, according to which once a bit of language has acquired a conventional meaning, it can be used for any of a variety of extra-linguistic purposes (Davidson, 1979). Green 1997 argues for a qualification of Davidson’s Autonomy Thesis to recognize sentences having the feature that if they are used in a speech act all, then there is at least one other illocutionary force that their utterance must have. Even in light of this qualified version of the Autonomy Thesis, the most that can be said of, ‘I promise to climb the Eiffel Tower,’ is that it is designed to be used to make promises, just as common nouns are designed to be used to refer to things and predicates are designed to characterize things referred to. Below (Section 6.3) we shall consider the view that force is a component of meaning, albeit not of a sentence’s meaning. [ 5 ]

Let us return, then, to an elucidation of our distinction between what a speaker says and the force of her utterance. A grammatical sentence composed of meaningful words is commonly thought to express a “content,” which is determined by what that sentence literally means together with features of the context of utterance. Suppose I say to someone in a crowded subway, “You’re standing on my foot.” I am most likely trying to convey the message that he should move. However, what I literally say is only that the addressee in question is standing on my foot. This is the content of my utterance. Many if not most utterances of grammatical sentences composed of meaningful words express more than those sentences’ contents. Pragmaticians, however, commonly distinguish content from other aspects of meaning conveyed by an utterance. On this way of thinking, two intertranslatable sentences of different languages will express the same content, and certain transformations of a sentence within a language are commonly thought to express the same content. Thus, ‘Mary saw John,’ and ‘John was seen by Mary,’ will express the same content even if a speaker’s use of one rather than another of these will carry a distinctive suggestion. For indicative sentences, such contents are typically called Propositions . (In what follows I will capitalize this term to signify that it is in part technical.) Propositions, then, are the contents of indicative sentences, are what such sentences express, and, further, are often thought to be the primary bearers of truth value.

Illocutionary force and semantic content are often taken to be distinct from one another, not just in the way that your left and right hand are distinct, but rather by virtue of falling into different categories. Stenius 1967 elucidates this distinction, noting that in chemical parlance a radical is a group of atoms normally incapable of independent existence, whereas a functional group is the grouping of those atoms in a compound that is responsible for certain of that compound’s properties. Analogously, a Proposition is itself communicatively inert. For instance, merely expressing the Proposition that it is snowing is not to make a move in a “language game”. Rather, such a move is only made by putting forth a Proposition with an illocutionary force such as assertion, conjecture, command, etc. The chemical analogy gains further support from the fact that just as a chemist might isolate radicals held in common among various compounds, the student of language may isolate a common element held among ‘Is the door shut?’, ‘Shut the door!’, and ‘The door is shut’. This common element is the Proposition that the door is shut, queried in the first sentence, commanded to be made true in the second, and asserted in the third. According to the chemical analogy, then:

Illocutionary force : Propositional content :: functional group : radical

In light of this analogy we may see, following Stenius, that just as the grouping of a set of atoms is not itself another atom or set of atoms, so too the forwarding of a Proposition with a particular illocutionary force is not itself a further component of Propositional content.

Encouraged by the chemical analogy, a central tenet in the study of speech acts is that content may remain fixed while force varies. The force of an utterance also underdetermines its content: Just from the fact that a speaker has made a promise, we cannot deduce what she has promised to do. For these reasons, students of speech acts contend that a given communicative act may be analyzed into two components: force and content. While semantics studies the contents of communicative acts, pragmatics studies their force.

The force/content distinction also finds parallels in our understanding of mentality. Speech acts are not only moves in a “language game.” They also often purport to express of states of mind with analogous structural properties. An assertion that it is snowing purports to express the speaker’s belief that it is snowing. A promise to read Middlemarch purports to express the speaker’s intention to read Middlemarch . We find evidence for these relationships in the fact that it is in some sense absurd to say, ‘It’s snowing, but I don’t believe that it is,’ and ‘I promise to read Middlemarch , but I have no intention of doing so.’ [ 6 ] Further, just as we may distinguish between an assert ing and what is assert ed (the so-called “ing/ed ambiguity” for verbs such as ‘assert’), and a promis ing from what is promis ed , we may also distinguish between a state of believing and what is believed, and a state or act of intending and what is intended. Searle 1983 delineates structural analogies between speech acts and the mental states they express. Pendlebury 1986 succinctly explains the merits of this approach.

In spite of these structural analogies, we may still wonder why an elucidation of the notion of force is important for a theory of communication. That A is an important component of communication, and that A underdetermines B , do not justify the conclusion that B is an important component of communication. Content also underdetermines the decibel level at which we speak but this fact does not justify adding decibel level to our repertoire of core concepts for pragmatics or the philosophy of language. Why should force be thought any more worthy of admission to this set of core concepts than decibel level? One reason for an asymmetry in our treatment of force and decibel level is that the former, but not the latter, seems to be a component of speaker meaning: Force is a feature not of what is said but of how what is said is meant; decibel level, by contrast, is a feature at most of the way in which something is said. This point is developed in Section 5 below.

We have spoken thus far as if the contents of speech acts must be Propositions, and indeed Searle routinely analyzes speech acts as having the form F ( p ) (e.g., 1975, p. 344), where ‘ F ’ is the force component and ‘ p ’ the Propositional content component. However, in the last two decades linguistic semantics has developed formal representations of contents for the two other major grammatical moods besides the indicative, namely the interrogative and the imperative. On the strength of the analyses of Hamblin (1958), Bell (1975), Pendlebury (1986) and others, one strategy for the semantics of interrogatives is to construe them as expressing sets of propositions rather than a single proposition, where each element of the putative set is a complete answer to the question at issue. Thus the content expressed by ‘How many doors are shut?’ will be {<No doors are shut>, <One door is shut>, …} where the ellipsis will be filled by as many other Propositions as it is reasonable to interpret the questioner as asking after. Call such a set an Interrogative . A complete answer to an Interrogative is an element of the set by which it is defined; a partial answer is a subset of that set containing two or more members, as would naturally be expressed by the sentence ‘Between two and four doors are shut.’ On the present conceptualization, just as we may distinguish between expressing and asserting a Propositional content, we may also distinguish between expressing an Interrogative and asking a question. One merely expresses an Interrogative in such an utterance as, ‘John wonders how many doors are shut.’ In fact, a single utterance may express two Interrogatives while asking neither, as in ‘How many doors are shut will depend on how many customers are trying on clothes.’ Asking a question is no less substantial a conversational move than is making an assertion.

Similarly, work by Hamblin (1987), Belnap (1990), Portner (2004) and others suggests semantic analyses for sentences in the imperative mood: on one approach an imperative expresses a property, and when one speaker issues an imperative that her addressee accepts, that property is added to her “to do list”, itself a parameter of what we will later describe as conversational score (Section 7).

In light of the above liberalization of the notion of sentential content to accommodate the contents of non-indicative sentences, we may rephrase Stenius’s chemical analogy as follows:

Illocutionary force : sentential content :: functional group : radical

with the understanding that different types of sentential content will correspond to the different grammatical moods. This refined analogy would in turn require there to be different types of radical. [ 7 ]

In some cases we can make something the case by saying that it is. Alas, I cannot lose ten pounds by saying that I am doing so, nor can I persuade you of a claim by saying that I am doing so. On the other hand I can promise to meet you tomorrow by uttering the words, “I promise to meet you tomorrow,” and if I have the authority to do so, I can even appoint you to an office by saying, “I hereby appoint you.” (I can also appoint you without making the force of my act explicit: I might just say, “You are now Treasurer of the Corporation.”) Only an appropriate authority, speaking at the appropriate time and place, can: christen a ship, pronounce a couple married, appoint someone to an administrative post, declare the proceedings open, or rescind an offer. Austin, in How To Do Things With Words, details the conditions that must be met for a given speech act to be performed felicitously .

Failures of felicity fall into two classes: misfires and abuses . The former are cases in which the putative speech act fails to be performed at all. If I utter, before the QEII, “I declare this ship the Noam Chomsky,” I have not succeeded in naming anything because I lack the authority to do so. My act thus misfires in that I’ve performed an act of speech but no speech act. Other attempts at speech acts might misfire because their addressee fails to respond with an appropriate uptake : I cannot bet you $100 on who will win the election unless you accept that bet. If you do not accept that bet, then I have tried to bet but have not succeeded in betting. As we will see in Section 9, a systematic unwillingness on the part of a speaker’s interlocutors to respond with the requisite uptake may compromise that speaker’s freedom of speech.

Some speech acts can be performed–that is, not misfire—while still being less than felicitous. I promise to meet you for lunch tomorrow, but haven’t the least intention of making good. Here I have promised all right, but the act is not felicitous because it is not sincere. My act is, more precisely, an abuse because although it is a speech act, it fails to live up to a standard appropriate for speech acts of its kind. Sincerity is a paradigm condition for the felicity of speech acts. Austin foresaw a program of research in which thousands of types of speech act would be studied in detail, with felicity conditions elucidated for each. [ 8 ]

As observed by Sbisà 2007, not only can I perform a speech act by speaker meaning that I am doing so, I can also subsequently rescind that act. I cannot, it would seem, change the past, and so nothing I can do on Wednesday can change the fact that I made a promise or assertion on Monday. However, on Wednesday I may be able to retract a claim I made on Monday. I can’t take back a punch or a burp; the most I can do is apologize for one of these infractions, and perhaps make amends. By contrast, not only can I apologize or make amends for a claim I now regret; I can also withdraw it. Likewise, you may allow me on Wednesday to retract the promise I made to you on Monday. In both these cases of assertion and promise, I am now no longer beholden to the commitments that the speech acts engender in spite of the fact that the past is fixed. Just as one can, under appropriate conditions, perform a speech act by speaker meaning that one is doing so, so too one can, under the right conditions, retract that very speech act.

Austin famously denied that performatives are statements (1962, p. 6). This may be taken either as the denial that performative sentences, even those in the indicative grammatical mood, have truth value; or instead as the denial that utterances of performative sentences, even when such sentences have truth value, are assertions. One can consistently hold that an indicative sentence has truth value, and even that it may be uttered in such a way as to say something true, while denying that its utterance is an assertion. (Testing a microphone in a windowless room, I utter, “It’s raining,” and it happens to be raining outside. Here I have said something true but have made no assertion.)

Lemmon 1962 argues that performative utterances are true on the ground that they are instances of a wider class of sentences whose utterance guarantees their truth. If sound, this argument would show that performatives have truth value, but not that they are assertions. It also leaves unanswered the question why some verb phrases such as ‘I promise’ may be used performatively while others cannot be so used. Sinnott-Armstrong 1994 also argues that performatives can have truth value without addressing the question whether they are also used to make assertions. Reimer 1995 argues that while performatives have truth values, they are not also assertions. Adopting a similar strategy, Jary 2007 aims to explain how utterances of such sentences as “I order you to clean the kitchen,” can succeed in being orders. In so doing he draws on Green’s 2007 analysis of showing to argue that such utterances show (rather than merely describe) the force of the speaker’s utterance. Because ‘show’ is factive, if such an utterance shows its force, then it must have that force.

Most challenges to Austin, however, construe performatives as assertions and attempt to explain their properties in that light. Ginet 1979 argues that performative verbs (‘promise,’ ‘appoint’, etc.) name the kinds of acts that one can perform by asserting that one is doing so, and elaborates on why this is so. In this way he offers an account of how performatives work that depends on the assumption that performative utterances are assertions. Starting from that same assumption, Bach 1975 contends that ‘I order you to clean the kitchen’ is an assertion, and proceeds to explain on this basis how the speaker is indirectly also issuing an order. This explanation depends on the speaker’s being able to count on the addressee’s ability to discern the speaker’s communicative intention. In later work, such as Bach and Harnish 1978, and 1992, this view is refined with a notion of standardization, so that a sufficiently common practice of issuing assertions with performative effect enables speakers and hearers to bypass complex inferential reasoning and jump by default to a conclusion about the illocution being performed. Reimer 1995 challenges Bach and Harnish on the ground that hearers do not seem to impute assertoric force to the indicative sentences speakers utter with performative effect; her criticism would evidently carry over to Ginet’s proposal. Instead Reimer contends that performative utterances rest on systems of what she terms illocutionary conventions to achieve their performative effects.

Searle 1969, p. 62–4, had argued that a performative formula such as “I promise to…” is an “illocutionary force indicator” in the sense that it is a device whose role is to make explicit the force of the speaker’s utterance. Making something explicit, however, would seem to involve characterizing an independent event or state of affairs, and as a result Searle’s account presupposes that speakers can imbue their utterances with the force of demotions and excommunications; yet this is what was to be explained. Realizing this, Searle and Vanderveken (1985) characterize performatives as speech acts having the force of declarations. Uncontroversial examples of this speech act are declaring war or adjourning a meeting. Searle 1989 then acknowledges that this account pushes us back to the question how certain expressions come to have the power to make declarations. In that same work he offers an answer that depends on the view that in uttering a sentence with a performative prefix, a speaker manifests an intention to perform an act of a certain kind: in uttering the words, ‘I order you to close the door’, I manifest an intention to order you to close the door, etc. Searle also takes it that manifesting an intention to perform a speech act is sufficient for the performance of that act. On this basis, Searle goes on to attempt to derive the assertoric nature of performatives, holding that when uttered in such a way as to say something true, they are also assertions.

3. Aspects of Illocutionary Force

Austin distinguishes illocutionary acts into five categories: verdictives (in which a speaker gives a verdict, e.g. acquitting and diagnosing), exercitives (in which speakers exercise powers, rights or influence, e.g. excommunicating and resigning), commissives (in which speakers commit themselves to causes or courses of action, e.g. promising and betting), behabitives (concerning attitudes and social behavior, e.g. apologizing and toasting), and expositives (in which speakers clarify how their utterances fit into lines of reasoning, e.g., postulating and defining).

Searle (1975) criticizes Austin’s taxonomy on two central grounds. First, Austin’s methodology is unduly lexicographic, assuming that we can learn about the range and limits of illocutionary acts by studying illocutionary verbs in English or other natural languages. However, Searle observes, nothing rules out the possibility of there being illocutionary acts that are not named by a verb either in a particular language such as Swahili or Bengali, or indeed in any language at all; similarly, two non-synonymous illocutionary verbs may yet name one and the same illocutionary act.

Second, Searle argues that the principles of distinction among Austin’s categories are unclear. For instance, behavitives seem to be a heterogeneous group with little unifying principle. Similarly, ‘describe’ appears both as a verdictive and as an expositive whereas one would expect taxonomic categories to be mutually exclusive. More generally, Austin’s brief account of each category gives no direction as to why this way of delineating them does so along their most fundamental features. Searle offers a new categorization of speech acts based on relatively clear principles of distinction. To appreciate this it will help to explain some of the basic concepts he uses for this purpose.

Consider an example derived from Anscombe (1963): a woman sends her husband to the grocery store with a list of things to procure; unbeknownst to him he is also being trailed by a detective concerned to make a list of what the man buys. By the time the husband and detective are in the checkout line, their two lists contain exactly the same items. The contents of the two lists differ, however, along another dimension. For the contents of the husband’s list guide what he puts in his shopping cart. Insofar, his list exhibits world-to-word direction of fit : It is, so to speak, the job of the items in his cart to conform to what is on his list. By contrast, it is the job of the detective’s list to conform with the world, in particular to what is in the husband’s cart. As such, the detective’s list has word-to-world direction of fit : The onus is on those words to conform to how things are. Speech acts such as assertions and predictions have word-to-world direction of fit, while speech acts such as commands have world-to-word direction of fit.

Not all speech acts appear to have direction of fit. I can thank you by saying “Thank you,” and it is widely agreed that thanking is a speech act. However, thanking seems to have neither of the directions of fit we have discussed thus far. Similarly, asking who is at the door is a speech act, but it does not seem to have either of the directions of fit we have thus far mentioned. Some would respond by construing questions as a form of imperative (e.g., “Tell me who is at the door!”), and then ascribing the direction of fit characteristic of imperatives to questions. This leaves untouched, however, banal cases such as thanking or even, “Hooray for Arsenal!” Some authors, such as Searle and Vanderveken 1985, describe such cases as having “null” direction of fit. That characterization is evidently distinct from saying such speech acts have no direction of fit at all. [ 9 ]

Direction of fit is also not so fine-grained as to enable us to distinguish speech acts meriting different treatment. Consider asserting that the center of the Milky Way is inhabited by a black hole, as opposed to conjecturing that the center of the Milky Way is so inhabited. These two acts are subject to different norms: The former purports to be a manifestation of knowledge, while the latter does not. This is suggested by the fact that it is appropriate to reply to the assertion with, “How do you know?” (Williamson 1996), while that is not an appropriate response to the conjecture (Green 2017). Nevertheless, both the assertion and conjecture have word-to-world direction of fit. Might there be other notions enabling us to mark differences between speech acts with the same direction of fit?

One suggestion might come from the related notion of conditions of satisfaction . This notion generalizes that of truth. As we saw in 2.3, it is internal to the activity of assertion that it aims to capture how things are. When an assertion does so, not only is it true, it has hit its target; the aim of the assertion has been met. A similar point may be made of imperatives: it is internal to the activity of issuing an imperative that the world is enjoined to conform to it. The imperative is satisfied just in case it is fulfilled. Assertions and imperatives both have conditions of satisfaction—truth in the first place, and conformity in the second. In addition, it might be held that questions have answerhood as their conditions of satisfaction: A question hits its target just in case it finds an answer, often in a speech act, such as an assertion, that answers the question posed. Like the notion of direction of fit, however, the notion of conditions of satisfaction is too coarse-grained to enable us to make some valuable distinctions among speech acts. Just to use our earlier case again: an assertion and a conjecture that P have identical conditions of satisfaction, namely that P be the case. May we discern features distinguishing these two speech acts, in a way enabling us to make finer-grained distinctions among other speech acts as well? I shall return to this question in Sections 6–7.

In an attempt to systematize and deepen Austin’s approach, Searle and Vanderveken 1985 distinguish between those illocutionary forces employed by speakers within a given linguistic community, and the set of all possible illocutionary forces. While a certain linguistic community may make no use of forces such as conjecturing or appointing, these two are among the set of all possible forces. (These authors appear to assume that while the set of possible forces may be infinite, it has a definite cardinality.) Searle and Vanderveken go on to define illocutionary force in terms of seven features, namely:

• Illocutionary point : This is the characteristic aim of each type of speech act. For instance, the characteristic aim of an assertion is to describe how things are, and perhaps also to bring about belief in an addressee; the characteristic aim of a promise is to commit oneself to a future course of action.
• Degree of strength of the illocutionary point : Two illocutions can have the same point but differ along the dimension of strength. For instance, requesting and insisting that the addressee do something both have the point of attempting to get the addressee to do that thing; however, the latter is stronger than the former.
• Mode of achievement : This is the special way, if any, in which the illocutionary point of a speech act must be achieved. Testifying and asserting both have the point of describing how things are; however, the former also involves invoking one’s authority as a witness while the latter does not. To testify is to assert in one’s capacity as a witness. Commanding and requesting both aim to get the addressee to do something; yet only someone issuing a command does so in her capacity as a person in a position of authority.
• Content conditions : Some illocutions can only be achieved with an appropriate propositional content. For instance, I can only promise what is in the future and under my control; or, at least, I cannot promise to do anything that it is obvious to myself and my promissee that I cannot do. So too, I can only apologize for what is in some sense under my control and already the case. (In light of our discussion above of semantics for non-indicative contents, this condition could be recast in terms of imperatival, interrogative, and propositional content conditions.)
• Preparatory conditions : These are all other conditions that must be met for the speech act not to misfire. Such conditions often concern the social status of interlocutors. For instance, a person cannot bequeath an object unless she already owns it or has power of attorney; a person cannot marry a couple unless she is legally invested with the authority to do so.
• Sincerity conditions : Many speech acts involve the expression of a psychological state. Assertion expresses belief; apology expresses regret, a promise expresses an intention, and so on. A speech act is sincere only if the speaker is in the psychological state that her speech act expresses.
• Degree of strength of the sincerity conditions : Two speech acts might be the same along other dimensions, but express psychological states that differ from one another in the dimension of strength. Requesting and imploring both express desires, and are identical along the other six dimensions above; however, the latter expresses a stronger desire than the former.

Searle and Vanderveken (1985) suggest, in light of these seven characteristics, that each illocutionary force may be defined as a septuple of values, each of which is a “setting” of a value within one of the seven characteristics. It follows, according to this suggestion, that two illocutionary forces F 1 and F 2 are identical just in case they correspond to the same septuple.

I cannot slow the expansion of the universe or convince you of the truth of a claim by saying that I am doing so. However, these two cases differ in that the latter, but not the former, is a characteristic aim of a speech act. One characteristic aim of assertion is the production of belief in an addressee, whereas there is no speech act one of whose characteristic aims is the slowing of the universe’s expansion. A type of speech act can have a characteristic aim without each speech act of that type being issued with that aim: Speakers sometimes make assertions without aiming to produce belief in anyone, even themselves. Instead, the view that a speech act-type has a characteristic aim is akin to the view that a biological trait has a function. The characteristic role of wings is to aid in flight even though some flightless creatures are winged.

Austin called these characteristic aims of speech acts perlocutions (1962, p. 101). I can both urge and persuade you to shut the door, yet the former is an illocution while the latter is a perlocution. How can we tell the difference? We can do so by noting that under the right conditions, one can urge just by saying and speaker meaning, “I hereby urge you to shut the door,” while there are no circumstances in which I can persuade you just by saying, “I hereby persuade you to shut the door.” A characteristic aim of urging is, nevertheless, the production of a resolution to act (1962, p. 107). Cohen (1973) develops the idea of perlocutions as characteristic aims of speech acts.

Perlocutions are characteristic aims of one or more illocution, but are not themselves illocutions. Nevertheless, one speech act can be performed by means of the performance of another. For instance, my remark that you are standing on my foot is normally taken as, in addition, a demand that you move; my question whether you can pass the salt is normally taken as a request that you do so. These are examples of so-called indirect speech acts (Searle 1979). Phrases that are commonly used in service of indirect speech acts are, ‘Would you mind terribly if I…,’ ‘Might I suggest…,’ and ‘It seems to me that…’, or simply ‘please’, as in ‘Can you pass the salt, please?’ Observe that this last sentence, with its appended tag-question, cannot be interpreted as a request for information (about the addressee’s salt-passing abilities), but can only be understood as a request. Asher and Lascarides (2001) provide a formal model of indirect speech acts on which some are conventionalized while others require Gricean reasoning for their interpretation.

While indirect communication is ubiquitous, indirect speech acts are less common than might first appear. In asking whether you intend to quit smoking, I might be taken as well to be suggesting that you quit. However, while the embattled smoker might jump to this interpretation, we do well to consider what evidence would mandate it. After all, while I probably would not have asked whether you intended to quit smoking unless I hoped you would quit, I can evince such a hope without performing the speech act of suggesting. Evincing a psychological state, even if done intentionally, arguably does not constitute a speech act. Instead, intentionally evincing a psychological state may be understood as simply expressing that state (See Green 2020, ch. 2).

Whether, in addition to a given speech act, I am also performing an indirect speech act would seem to depend on my intentions. My question whether you can pass the salt is also a request that you do so only if I intend to be so understood. What is more, this intention must be feasibly discernible on the part of one’s audience. Even if, in remarking on the fine weather, I intend as well to request that you pass the salt, I will not have issued a request unless I have made that intention manifest in some way.

How might I do this? One way is by making an inference to the best explanation. Perhaps the best explanation of my asking whether you can pass the salt is that I mean to be requesting that you do so, and perhaps the best explanation of my remarking that you are standing on my foot, particularly if I use a stentorian tone of voice, is that I mean to be demanding that you desist. By contrast, it is doubtful that the best explanation of my asking whether you intend to quit smoking is that I intend to suggest that you do so. Another explanation at least as plausible is my hope, or expression of hope, that you do so. Bertolet 1994 develops a more skeptical position than that suggested here, arguing that any alleged case of an indirect speech act can be construed just as an indication, by means of contextual clues, of the speaker’s intentional state—hope, desire, etc., as the case may be. Postulation of a further speech act beyond what has been (relatively) explicitly performed is, he contends, explanatorily unmotivated. McGowan et al . (2009) reply by offering three conditions they take to be sufficient for a case of what they term linguistic communication. They would also argue that in, for instance, the smoking case, the speaker meets those three conditions, and thus counts as suggesting that the addressee quit smoking. Bertolet (2017) replies that these three conditions are not sufficient for an instance of speaker meaning, and given that (as we have seen) speaker meaning is a necessary condition for (non-conventional) speech acts, concludes that McGowan et al . have not established that the cases that concern them are indirect speech acts.

These considerations suggest that indirect speech acts, if they do occur at all, can be explained within the framework of conversational implicature–that process by which we mean more (and on some occasions less) than we say, but in a way not due exclusively to the conventional meanings of our words. Conversational implicature, too, depends both upon communicative intentions and the availability of inference to the best explanation (Grice, 1989). In fact, Searle’s 1979 influential account of indirect speech acts is couched in terms of conversational implicature (although he does not use this phrase). The study of speech acts is in this respect intertwined with the study of conversations; we return to this theme in Section 6. [ 10 ]

4. Mood, Force and Convention

Not only does content underdetermine force; content together with grammatical mood does so as well. ‘You’ll be more punctual in the future’ is in the indicative grammatical mood, but as we have seen, that fact does not determine its force. The same may be said of other grammatical moods. Although I overhear you utter the words, ‘shut the door’, I cannot infer yet that you are issuing a command. Perhaps instead you are simply describing your own intention, in the course of saying, “I intend to shut the door.” If so, you’ve used the imperative mood without issuing a command. So too with the interrogative mood: I overhear your words, ‘who is on the phone.’ Thus far I don’t know whether you’ve asked a question, since you may have so spoken in the course of stating, “John wonders who is on the phone.” Might either or both of initial capitalization or final punctuation settle the issue? Apparently not: What puzzles Meredith is the following question: Who is on the phone?

Mood together with content underdetermine force. On the other hand it is a plausible hypothesis that grammatical mood is one of the devices we use (together with contextual clues, intonation, and the like) to indicate the force with which we are expressing a content. Understood in this weak way, it is unexceptionable to construe the interrogative mood as used for asking questions, the imperatival mood as used for issuing commands, and so on. So understood, we might go on to ask how speakers indicate the force of their speech acts given that grammatical mood and content cannot be relied on alone to do so.

One well known answer we may term force conventionalism . According to a strong version of this view, for every speech act that is performed, there is some convention that will have been invoked in order to make that speech act occur. This convention transcends those imbuing words with their literal meaning. Thus, force conventionalism implies that in order for use of ‘I promise to meet you tomorrow at noon,’ to constitute a promise, not only must the words used possess their standard conventional meanings, there must also exist a convention to the effect that the use, under the right conditions, of some such words as these constitutes a promise. Austin seems to have held this view. For instance in his characterization of “felicity conditions” for speech acts, Austin holds that for each speech act

There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances… (1962, p. 14).

Austin’s student Searle follows him in this, writing

…utterance acts stand to propositional and illocutionary acts in the way in which, e.g., making an X on a ballot paper stands to voting. (1969, p. 24)

Searle goes on to clarify this commitment in averring,

…the semantic structure of a language may be regarded as a conventional realization of a series of sets of underlying constitutive rules, and …speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering sentences in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules. (1969, p. 37)

Searle espouses a weaker form of force conventionalism than does Austin in leaving open the possibility that some speech acts can be performed without constitutive rules; Searle considers the case of a dog requesting to be let outside (1969, p. 39). Nevertheless Searle does contend that speech acts are characteristically performed by invoking constitutive rules.

Millikan (1998) espouses a parsimonious conception of conventions that she terms ‘natural conventions,’ and on the assumption that natural conventions are a type of convention, one would expect this strategy to make it easier to defend the view that speech acts are inherently conventional. For Millikan, a natural convention is constituted by patterns that are reproduced by virtue of the weight of precedent. [ 11 ] A pattern is reproduced just in case it has a form that derives from a previous entity having, in certain respects, the same form, and in such a way that had the previous form been different in those respects, the current form would be different in those respects as well (1998, p. 163). Photocopying is one form of reproduction meeting these criteria; the retinotopic mapping from patterns of stimulation on the retina to patterns of stimulation in the visual cortex is evidently another. Millikan would not treat retinotopic mapping as a type of convention, however, since it would not seem to be perpetuated by virtue of the weight of precedent. The point is difficult to discern, however, since in her discussion of the matter Millikan discusses the conditions under which a pattern is taken to be conventional, rather than for it to be conventional, writing

To be thought of as conventional, a reproduced pattern must be perceived as proliferated due, in important part, to weight of precedent, not to its intrinsically superior capacity to produce a desired result, or due, say, to ignorance of alternatives (ibid, p. 166).

Millikan thus seems to characterize what it is for a pattern to have weight of precedent in terms of that pattern’s being perceived to have such weight. This notion is not itself elucidated, and as a result the notion of weight of precedent is left obscure in her account. Nonetheless, she tells us that just as the conventions of chess dictate that when one’s king is in check, one does what one can to get him out of check; so too the conventions of language dictate that when A tells B that p , B responds by believing that p . Millikan describes the hearer’s response as a hidden, inner act that is not under B ’s voluntary control. Millikan also describes this response as being learned in the way that we learn what she calls “natural sign patterns,” such as our learning that the sound of crashing waves is an indication of a nearby coastline.

On Millikan’s view, then, A ’s assertion of p being followed by B ’s belief that p is a process that is not intrinsically superior to others that might have been followed. This may be doubted, however. What, after, all would be viable alternative responses? Dis believing p ? Remaining neutral on the question of p ? Scratching one’s left earlobe? Any of these responses would tend to undermine the use of language as a means for transmission of information. What is more, if belief formation is not under the voluntary control of addressees, it is obscure how this aspect of communication could be conventional, any more than the pattern of stimulation of our visual cortex is conventional when that pattern results from an isomorphic pattern on the retina.

4.3. An Intentionalist Alternative to Force Conventionalism

Force-conventionalism as espoused by Austin and later Searle has been challenged by Strawson , who writes,

I do not want to deny that there may be conventional postures or procedures for entreating: one can, for example, kneel down, raise one’s arms, and say, “I entreat you.” But I do want to deny that an act of entreaty can be performed only as conforming to such conventions….[T]o suppose that there is always and necessarily a convention conformed to would be like supposing that there could be no love affairs which did not proceed on lines laid down in the Roman de la Rose or that every dispute between men must follow the pattern specified in Touchstone’s speech about the countercheck quarrelsome and the lie direct. (1964, p. 444)

Strawson contends that rather than appealing to a series of extra-semantic conventions to account for the possibility of speech acts, we explain that possibility in terms of our ability to discern one another’s communicative intentions. What makes an utterance of a sentence in the indicative mood a prediction rather than a command, for instance, is that it manifests an intention to be so taken; likewise for promises rather than predictions. This position is compatible with holding that in special cases linguistic communities have instituted conventions for particular speech acts such as appointing and excommunicating. So too, as Skinner (1970) observes, understanding the utterances of an historical figure crucially depends on sensitivity to conventions of the society in which they are made.

Intending to make an assertion, promise, or request, however, is not enough to perform one of these acts. Those intentions must be efficacious. The same point applies to cases of trying to perform a speech act, even when what one is trying to do is clear to others. This fact emerges from reflecting on an oft-quoted passage from Searle:

Human communication has some extraordinary properties, not shared by most other kinds of human behavior. One of the most extraordinary is this: If I am trying to tell someone something, then (assuming certain conditions are satisfied) as soon as he recognizes that I am trying to tell him something and exactly what it is I am trying to tell him, I have succeeded in telling it to him. (1969, p. 47.)

As Green 2013 observes, the point may be doubted. Suppose I am trying to work up the courage to ask Sidney’s hand in marriage. Sidney recognizes this fact on the basis of background knowledge, my visible embarrassment, and my fumbling in my pocket for an engagement ring. Here we cannot infer that I have succeeded in asking Sidney anything. Nothing short of coming out and saying it will do. Similarly, it might be common knowledge that my moribund uncle is trying, as he breathes his last, to bequeath me his fortune; still, I won’t inherit a penny if he expires before saying what he was trying to. [ 12 ] Closer to Searle’s example, even if you were to find, on the basis of fMRI analysis of my neural activity, that I was trying to tell you that it’s going to rain tomorrow, I still have not asserted anything about tomorrow’s weather. (If I were completely paralyzed as a result of Locked-In Syndrome, then making such a neural effort might be the most I can hope to do; in that case, your fMRI information might be enough to justify you in taking me to have performed a speech act.)

The gist of these examples is not the requirement that words be uttered in every speech act—we have already observed that speech acts can be performed silently. Rather, their gist is that speech acts involve intentional undertaking of a publicly accessible commitment; further, that commitment is not undertaken simply by virtue of my intending to undertake it, even when it is common knowledge that this is what I am trying to do. Can we, however, give a more illuminating characterization of the relevant intentions than merely saying that, for instance, to assert P one must intentionally put forth P as an assertion? Strawson (1964) proposes that we can do so with aid of the notion of speaker meaning—to which we now turn.

5. Speaker-Meaning and Force

As we have seen, that A is an important component of communication, and that A underdetermines B , do not justify the conclusion that B is an important component of communication. One reason for an asymmetry in our treatment of force and decibel level is that the former, but not the latter, seems crucial to how I mean what I say. I intend to speak at a certain volume, and sometimes succeed, but in most cases it is no part of how I mean what I say that I happen to be speaking at that volume. On the other hand, the force of my utterance is an aspect of what I mean. It is not, as we have seen, any aspect of what I say—that notion being closely associated with content. However, whether I mean what I say as an assertion, a conjecture, a promise or something else will be crucial to how I mean what I do.

In his influential 1957 article, Grice distinguished between two uses of ‘mean’. One use is exemplified by remarks such as ‘Those clouds mean rain,’ and ‘Those spots mean measles.’ The notion of meaning in play in such cases Grice dubs ‘natural meaning’. Grice suggests that we may distinguish this use of ‘mean’ from another use of the word more relevant to communication, exemplified in such utterances as

In saying “You make a better door than a window”, George meant that you should move,

In gesticulating that way, Salvatore means that there’s quicksand over there,

Grice used the term ‘non-natural meaning’ for this use of ‘mean’, and in more recent literature this jargon has been replaced with the term ‘speaker meaning’. [ 13 ] After distinguishing between natural and (what we shall hereafter call) speaker meaning, Grice attempts to characterize the latter. It is not enough that I do something that influences the beliefs of an observer: In putting on a coat I might lead an observer to conclude that I am going for a walk. Yet in such a case it is not plausible that I mean that I am going for a walk in the sense germane to speaker meaning. Might performing an action with an intention of influencing someone’s beliefs be sufficient for speaker meaning? No: I might secretly leave Smith’s handkerchief at the crime scene to make the police think that Smith is the culprit. However, whether or not I am successful in getting the authorities to think that Smith is the culprit, in this case it is not plausible that I mean that Smith is the culprit.

What is missing in the handkerchief example is the element of overtness. This suggests another criterion: Performing an action with the, or an, intention of influencing someone’s beliefs, while intending that this very intention be recognized. Grice contends that even here we do not have enough for speaker meaning. Herod presents Salome with St. John’s severed head on a charger, intending that she discern that St. John is dead and intending that this very intention of his be recognized. Grice observes that in so doing Herod is not telling Salome anything, but is instead deliberately and openly letting her know something. Grice concludes that Herod’s action is not a case of speaker meaning either. The problem is not that Herod is not using words; we have already considered communicators who mean things wordlessly. The problem seems to be that to infer what Herod intends her to, Salome does not have to take his word for anything. She can see the severed head for herself if she can bring herself to look. By contrast, in its central uses, telling requires a speaker to intend to convey information (or alleged information) in a way that relies crucially upon taking her at her word. Grice appears to assume that at least for the case in which what is meant is a proposition (rather than a question or an imperative), speaker meaning requires a telling in this central sense. What is more, this last example is a case of performing an action with an intention of influencing someone’s beliefs, even while intending that this very intention be recognized; yet it is not a case of telling. Grice infers that it is not a case of speaker meaning either.

Grice holds that for speaker meaning to occur, not only must one (a) intend to produce an effect on an audience, and (b) intend that this very intention be recognized by that audience, but also (c) intend this effect on the audience to be produced at least in part by their recognition of the speaker’s intention. The intention to produce a belief or other attitude by means (at least in part) of recognition of this very intention, has come to be called a reflexive communicative intention .

It may be doubted that speaker meaning requires reflexive communicative intentions. After all, a mathematics teacher who proves a theorem T for her class likely wants her pupils to believe T on the strength of her proof rather than their recognition of her intention that they come to believe T. (Vlach 1981) It may even be doubted that speaker meaning requires intentions to produce cognitive effects on addressees at all: Davis (1992) provides a range of cases such as speaking to pre-linguistic infants, uncooperative photocopy machines, and photos of deceased loved ones. [ 14 ] , [ 15 ] Instead of intentions to produce psychological effects in an addressee, some authors have advocated a construal of speaker meaning as overtly manifesting an aspect of one’s commitments or state of mind (Green 2019). Compare my going to the closet to take out my overcoat (not a case of speaker meaning), with the following case: After heatedly arguing about the weather, I march to the closet while beadily meeting your stare, then storm out the front door while ostentatiously donning the coat. Here it is more plausible that I mean that it is raining outside, and the reason seems to be that I am making some attitude of mine overt: I am not only showing it, I am making clear my intention to do just that.

How does this detour through speaker meaning help to elucidate the notion of force? One way of asserting that P , it seems, is overtly to manifest my commitment to P , and indeed commitment of a particular kind: commitment to defend P in response to challenges of the form, “How do you know that?” I must also overtly manifest my liability to be either right or wrong on the issue of P depending on whether P is the case. By contrast, I conjecture P by overtly manifesting my commitment to P in this same “liability to error” way, but I am not committed to responding to challenges demanding full justification. I must, however, give some reason for believing P ; this much cannot, however, be said of a guess.

We perform a speech act, then, when we overtly commit ourselves in a certain way to a content—where that way is an aspect of how we speaker-mean that content. One way to do that is to invoke a convention for undertaking commitment; another way is overtly to manifest one’s intention to be so committed. We may elucidate the relevant forms of commitment by spelling out the norms underlying them. We have already adumbrated such an approach in our discussion of the differences among asserting and conjecturing. Developing that discussion a bit further, compare

• conjecturing

All three of these acts have word-to-world direction of fit, and all three have conditions of satisfaction mandating that they are satisfied just in case the world is as their content says it is. Further, one who asserts, conjectures, or guesses that P is right or wrong on the issue of P depending on whether P is in fact so. However, as we move down the list we find a decreasing order of stringency in commitment. One who asserts P lays herself open to the challenge, “How do you know that?”, and she is obliged to retract P if she is unable to respond to that challenge adequately. By contrast, this challenge is inappropriate for either a conjecture or a guess. On the other hand, we may justifiably demand of the conjecturer that she give some reason for her conjecture; yet not even this much may be said of one who makes a guess. (The “educated guess” is intermediate between these two cases.)

This illocutionary dimension of speaker meaning characterizes not what is meant, but rather how it is meant. Just as we may consider your remark, directed toward me, “You’re tired,” and my remark, “I’m tired,” as having said the same thing but in different ways; so too we may consider my assertion of P , followed by a retraction and then followed by a conjecture of P , as two consecutive cases in which I speaker-mean that P but do so in different ways. This idea will be developed further in Section 8 under the rubric of “mode” of illocutionary commitment. [ 16 ]

Speaker meaning, then, encompasses not just content but also force, and we may elucidate this in light of the normative structure characteristic of each speech act: When you overtly display a commitment characteristic of that speech act, you have performed that speech act. Is this a necessary condition as well? That depends on whether I can perform a speech act without intending to do so—a topic for Section 9 below. For now, however, compare the view at which we have arrived with Searle’s view that one performs a speech act when others become aware of one’s intention to perform that act. What is missing from Searle’s characterization is the notion of overtness: The agent in question must not only make her intention to undertake a certain commitment manifest; she must also intend that that very intention be manifest. There is more to overtness than wearing one’s heart (or mind) on one’s sleeve.

6. Force, Norms, and Conversation

In elucidating this normative dimension of force, we have sought to characterize speech acts in terms of their conversational roles. That is not to say that speech acts can only be performed in the setting of a conversation: I can approach you, point out that your vehicle is blocking mine, and storm off. Here I have made an assertion but have not engaged in a conversation. Perhaps I can ask myself a question in the privacy of my study and leave it at that–not continuing into a conversation with myself. However, a speech act’s “ecological niche” may nevertheless be the conversation. In that spirit, while we may be able to remove a speech act type from its environment and scrutinize it in isolated captivity, doing so may blind us to some of its distinctive features.

This ecological analogy sheds light on a dispute over the question whether speech acts can profitably be studied in isolation from the conversations in which they occur. An empiricist framework, exemplified in John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic , suggests attempting to discern the meaning of a word, for instance a proper name, in isolation. By contrast, Gottlob Frege (1884) enjoins us to understand a word’s meaning in terms of the contribution it makes to an entire sentence. Such a method is indispensable for a proper treatment of such expressions as quantifiers, and represents a major advance over empiricist approaches. Yet students of speech acts have espoused going even further, insisting that the unit of significance is not the proposition but the speech act. Vanderveken writes,

Illocutionary acts are important for the purpose of philosophical semantics because they are the primary units of meaning in the use and comprehension of natural language. (Vanderveken, 1990, p. 1.)

Why not go even further, since speech acts characteristically occur in conversations? Is the unit of significance really the debate, the colloquy, the interrogation?

Students of conversation analysis have contended precisely this, remarking that many speech acts fall naturally into pairs. [ 17 ] For instance, questions pair naturally with assertions when the latter purport to be answers to those questions. Likewise, offers pair naturally with acceptances or rejections, and it is easy to multiply examples. Searle, who favors studying speech acts in isolation, has replied to these considerations (Searle 1992). There he issues a challenge to students of conversation to provide an account of conversations parallel to that of speech acts, arguing as well that the prospects for such an account are dim. One of his reasons is that unlike speech acts conversations do not as such have a point or purpose. Green 1999 rejoins that many conversations may indeed be construed in teleological terms. For instance, many conversations may be construed as aimed at answering a question, even when that question concerns something as banal as the afternoon’s weather or the location of the nearest subway station. Asher and Lascardes (2003) develop a systematic treatment of speech acts in their conversational setting that also responds to Searle’s challenge. Additionally, Roberts (2004, 2012) develops a model of conversational kinematics according to which conversations are invariably aimed at answering what she terms a question under discussion (QUD). This view is best appreciated within the framework of the “scorekeeping model” of conversation, to which we now turn.

Much literature concerned with speech acts is curiously disconnected from research in the semantics of natural language emphasizing pragmatic factors. For instance, Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974), Lewis (1979, 1980), Thomason (1990) and others have developed models of the kinematics of conversations aimed at understanding the role of quantification, presupposition (both semantic and pragmatic), anaphora, deixis, and vagueness in discourse. Such models typically construe conversations as involving an ever-developing set of Propositions that can be presupposed by interlocutors. This set of Propositions is the conversational common ground , defined as that set of Propositions that all interlocutors take to be true, while also taking it that all other interlocutors take them to be true. If a Proposition p is in a conversation’s common ground, then a speaker may felicitously presuppose p’s truth. Suppose then that the Proposition that Singapore has a unique King is in a conversation’s common ground at given point; then a speaker may felicitously utter a sentence such as ‘The present King of Singapore is wise,’ or ‘Singapore’s king is sleeping’. Other parameters characterizing a conversation at a given point include the domain of discourse, a set of salient perceptible objects, standards of precision, time, world or situation, speaker, and addressee. The set of all values for these items at a given conversational moment is often referred to as “conversational score”.

“Scorekeeping” approaches to language use typically construe a contribution to a conversation as a Proposition: If that “assertion” is accepted, then the score is updated by having the Proposition entered into common ground. In this spirit, MacFarlane (2011) considers an account of the speech act of assertion in terms an utterance’s capacity to update conversational score. Such an approach will, however, face a difficulty in explaining how two speech acts with the same content, such as an assertion that the Milky Way contains a black hole, and a conjecture that it does, will make different conversational contributions. An enrichment of the scorekeeping model would include sensitivity to differences such as these.

Another development in the scorekeeping model refines the teleological picture adumbrated above to incorporate Questions, construed (along the lines of Section 2.1) as sets of Propositions. When an interlocutor proffers an assertion that is not met with objections by others in the conversation, the Propositional content of that illocution will enter into common ground. When an interlocutor poses a question that is accepted by others, we may represent the change as an addition to Common Ground of the set of propositions that is the Interrogative content of that illocution. The presence of that Interrogative obliges interlocutors to work to rule all but one Proposition that is a complete answer to the Interrogative. Because Interrogatives stand in inferential relations to one another (Q1 entails Q2 just in case any answer to Q1 is an answer to Q2), one strategy for answering a question is to divide it into tractable questions that it entails: ‘How many covered bridges are there in Japan?’ can be answered by answering that question for each of that country’s 47 prefectures. Roberts (2004, 2012) develops the Question Under Discussion model of conversational dynamics according to which common ground contains a partially ordered set of Interrogatives in addition to a set of Propositions. This teleological approach to conversation bids fair to enrich our understanding of the relations of speech acts to other central topics within pragmatics such as presupposition and implicature. [ 18 ]

Frege’s Begriffsschrift (1879) constitutes history’s first thoroughgoing attempt to formulate a rigorous formal system in which to carry out deductive reasoning. However, Frege did not see his Begriffsschrift as merely a tool for assessing the validity of arguments. Rather, he appears to have seen it as an organon for the acquisition of knowledge from unquestionable first principles; in addition he wanted to use it in order to help make clear the epistemic foundations on which our knowledge rests. To this end his formal system contains not only symbols indicating the content of propositions (including logical constants), but also symbols indicating the force with which they are put forth. In particular, Frege insists that when using his formal system to acquire new knowledge from propositions already known, we use an assertion sign to indicate our acknowledgment of the truth of the proposition used as axioms or inferred therefrom. Frege thus employs what would now be called a force indicator : an expression whose use indicates the force with which an associated proposition is being put forth (Green 2002).

Reichenbach expands upon Frege’s idea in his 1947. In addition to using an assertion sign, Reichenbach also uses indicators of interrogative and imperatival force. Hare similarly introduces force indicators to lay bare the way in which ethical and cognate utterances are made (Hare 1970). Davidson (1979), however, challenges the value of this entire enterprise of introducing force-indicating devices into languages, formal or otherwise. Davidson’s reason is that since natural language already contains many devices for indicating the force of one’s speech act, the only interest a force indicator could have would be if it could guarantee the force of one’s speech act. But nothing could do this: Any device purporting to be, say, an infallible indicator of assertoric force is liable to being used by a joker or actor to heighten the realism of their performance. Referring to the putative force-indicating device as a ‘strengthened mood,’ he writes,

It is apparent that merely speaking the sentence in the strengthened mood cannot be counted on to result in an assertion: every joker, storyteller, and actor will immediately take advantage of the strengthened mood to simulate assertion. There is no point, then, in the strengthened mood; the available indicative does as well as language can do in the service of assertion (Davidson 1979, p. 311).

Hare 1989 replies that there could be a society with a convention that utterance of a certain expression constituted performance of a certain illocutionary act, even those utterances that occur on stage or as used by jokers or storytellers. Green 1997 questions the relevance of this observation to asserting, which as we have seen, which as we have seen, seem to require intentions for their performance. Just as no convention could make it the case that I believe that P , so too no convention could make it the case that I intend to put forth a certain sentence as an assertion.

On the other hand, Green 1997 and Green 2000 also observe that even if there can be no force indicator in the sense Davidson criticizes, nothing prevents natural language from containing devices that indicate force conditional upon one’s performing a speech act: such a force indicator would not show whether one is performing a speech act, but, given that one is doing so, it would show which speech act one is performing. For instance, parenthetical expressions such as, ‘as is the case’ can occur in the antecedent of conditionals, as in: ‘If, as is the case, the globe is warming, then Antarctica will melt.’ Use of the parenthetical cannot guarantee that the sentence or any part of it is being asserted, but if the entire sentence is being asserted, then, Green claims, use of the parenthetical guarantees that the speaker is also committed to the content of the antecedent. If this claim is correct, natural language already contains force indicators in this qualified sense. Whether it is worth introducing such force indicators into a logical notation remains an open question.

Subsequent to Austin’s introduction of the notion of a performative, it has also been suggested that what we might call performative sentential frames behave like force indicators: ‘I claim that it is sunny,’ seems to be a prolix way of saying that it is sunny, where the ‘I claim’ seems only to indicate how what follows is to be taken. On the approach of Urmson (1952), for instance, such a sentence should be understood on the model of ‘It is sunny, I claim.’ Support for such an analysis may be found in the fact that a potential reply to that utterance is ‘No it isn’t; it’s pouring outside!’, while ‘No you don’t’ is not. Again, if the speaker does not believe it is sunny outside, she cannot dodge, she cannot dodge the accusation of lying by remarking that what she had asserted was that she claimed that it is sunny, and not anything about the weather.

Nonetheless, drawing on Cohen 1964, Lycan 2018 objects to the view that such performative frames make no contribution to sentence or utterance meaning. If Marissa felicitously utters, ‘I claim that it is sunny,’ while Abdul felicitously utters, ‘I conjecture that it is sunny,’ the view implies that their utterances mean the same. The two speakers have clearly said different things, however. On the other hand, if we hold that the performative frame does contribute to the content of what Marissa and Abdul said, then, Lycan points out, it will be difficult to explain how their utterances commit either of them to any position about the weather. It evidently won’t do to posit inference rules such as ‘I state that p ,‘ ergo , ‘ p ’. We will consider a solution to what Lycan terms “Cohen’s Problem” after developing a notion of illocutionary inference in the next section.

Students of speech acts contend, as we have seen, that the unit of communicative significance is the Illocution rather than the Proposition. This attitude prompts the question whether logic itself might be enriched by incorporating inferential relations among speech acts rather than just inferential relations among Propositions. Just as two event-types E 1 and E 2 (such as running quickly and running) could be logically related to one another in that it is not possible for one to occur without the other; so too speech act types S 1 and S 2 could be inferentially related to one another if it is not possible to perform one without performing the other. A warning that the bull is about to charge is also an assertion that the bull is about to charge but the converse is not true. This is in spite of the fact that these two speech acts have the same propositional content: That the bull is about to charge. If, therefore, warning implies asserting but not vice versa, then that inferential relation is not to be caught within the net of inferential relations among propositions.

In their Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (1985), Searle and Vanderveken attempt a general treatment of logical relations among speech acts. They describe their central question in terms of commitment:

A theory of illocutionary logic of the sort we are describing is essentially a theory of illocutionary commitment as determined by illocutionary force. The single most important question it must answer is this: Given that a speaker in a certain context of utterance performs a successful illocutionary act of a certain form, what other illocutions does the performance of that act commit him to? (1985, p. 6)

To explicate their notion of illocutionary commitment, these authors invoke their definition of illocutionary force in terms of the seven values mentioned in Section 2.3 above. On the basis of this definition, they define two notions pertinent to entailment relations among speech acts, namely strong illocutionary commitment and weak illocutionary commitment . According to the former definition, an illocutionary act S 1 commits a speaker to another illocutionary act S 2 iff it is not possible to perform S 1 without performing S 2 . Whether that relation holds between a pair of illocutionary acts depends on the particular septuples with which they are identified. Thus suppose that S 1 is identical with <IP 1 , Str 1 , Mode 1 , Cont 1 , Prep 1 , Sinc 1 , Stresinc 1 > (corresponding to illocutionary point, strength, mode of achievement, propositional content, preparatory condition, sincerity condition, and strength of sincerity condition, respectively); and suppose that S 2 is identical with <IP 1 , Str 2 , Mode 1 , Cont 1 , Prep 1 , Sinc 1 , Stresinc 1 >. Suppose further that Str 1 and Str 2 differ only in that 1 is stronger than 2. Then it will not be possible to perform S 1 without performing S 2 ; whence the former strongly illocutionarily implies the latter. (This definition of strong illocutionary commitment generalizes in a straightforward way to the case in which a set of speech acts S 1 , …, S n −1 implies a speech act S n .)

Searle and Vanderveken also define a notion of weak illocutionary commitment such that S 1 weakly illocutionarily implies S 2 iff every performance of S 1 commits an agent to meeting the conditions laid down in the septuple identical to S 2 (1985, p. 24). Searle and Vanderveken infer that this implies that if P logically entails Q , and an agent asserts P , then she is committed to believing that Q . These authors stress, however, that this does not mean that the agent who asserts P is committed to cultivating the belief Q when P implies Q . In lieu of that explication, however, it is unclear just what notion of commitment is at issue. It is unclear, for instance, what it could mean to be committed to believing Q (rather than just being committed to Q ) if this is not to be explicated as being committed to cultivating the belief that Q .

Other approaches attempt to circumvent such problems by reductively defining the notion of commitment in terms of obligations to action and liability to error and/or vindication. Performance of a speech act or set of speech acts can commit an agent to a distinct content, and do so relative to some force. If P and Q jointly imply R , then my asserting both P and Q commits me to R . That is not to say that I have also asserted R : if assertion were closed under deductive consequence I would assert infinitely many things just by virtue of asserting one. By contrast, if I conjecture P and Q , then I am once again committed to R but not in the way that I would have been had I asserted P and Q . For instance, in the assertion case, once my further commitment to R is made clear, it is within the rights of my addressee to ask how I know that R holds; this would not have been an acceptable reply to my merely conjecturing P and Q . Developing this theme, let S be an arbitrary speaker, <Δ l A l , …, Δ n A n , Δ B > a sequence of force/content pairs; then:

<Δ l A l , …, Δ n A n , Δ B > is illocutionarily valid iff if speaker S is committed to each A i under mode Δ i , then S is committed to B under mode Δ. [ 19 ]

Because it concerns what force/content pairs commit an agent to what others, illocutionary validity is an essentially deontic notion: It will be cashed out in terms either of obligation to use a content in a certain way conversationally, or liability to error or vindication depending upon how the world is.

Our discussion of the possibility of an illocutionary logic answers one question posed at the end of Section 6.3, namely whether it is possible to perform a speech act without intending to do so. This seems likely given Searle and Vanderveken’s definition of strong illocutionary commitment: We need only imagine an agent performing some large number of speech acts, S 1 , …, S n −1 , which, unbeknownst to her, jointly guarantee that she fulfills the seven conditions defining another speech act S n . Even in such a case she performs S n only by virtue of intentionally performing some other set of speech acts S 1 , …, S n −1 ; it is difficult to see how one can perform S n while having no intention of performing a speech act at all.

We are also in a position to make headway on Cohen’s Problem as formulated by Lycan. As argued in Green 2000, in an assertion of ‘I (hereby) assert that p ’, a speaker commits herself to p even though her words do not logically entail that Proposition; nor do they presuppose, or either conversationally or conventionally imply it. They do, however, illocutionarily entail it: anyone committed to ‘I assert that p ’ assertorically is thereby committed to p assertorically. By contrast, one committed to ‘I assert that p ’ as a supposition for the sake of argument is not thereby committed to p . Accordingly, such a phrase as ‘I assert that’ is semantically opaque (making a non-trivial contribution to the truth conditions of the sentences in which it occurs) but pragmatically transparent in the sense that a speaker who undertakes assertoric commitment to a sentence in which it has widest scope is also assertorically committed to its complement. Analogous remarks apply to ‘I conjecture that’ and the like.

In a paradigmatic illocutionary event, a speaker has a choice of which if any speech act to perform and her addressee will do her charitable best to discern that speaker’s intentions and, where necessary, which conventions she may be invoking. Pratt (1986) observes that this paradigm is not true to the facts of many areas of communicative life, writing

An account of linguistic interaction based on the idea of exchange glosses over the very basic facts that, to put it crudely, some people get to do more talking than others, some are supposed to do more listening, and not everybody’s words are worth the same. (1986, p. 68)

Although Pratt intends this remark as a critique of speech act theory, it also suggests a way in which this theory might shed light on subtle forms of oppression. We saw in Section 2.2 that a putative bet can misfire if it is not accepted. In such a case the speaker attempts to bet but fails in that effort due to a lack of audience uptake. So too, a person may not be in the correct social position to, say, excommunicate or appoint, and her attempts to perform such illocutions will misfire. More momentously, a pattern of abuses of speech act institutions might deprive a person of an ability to perform speech acts: the inveterate promise-breaker will, in time, lead others in his community to be unwilling to accept any promises he tries to make. He can perform countless locutionary acts but will be unable to perform the illocutionary act of promising, at least in this community.

A pattern of culpable behavior could make a speaker unable to perform one speech act type. Could a pattern of culpable behavior–intentional or inadvertent—on the part of others in a speaker’s community achieve the same effect? This could happen if enough such speakers decide never to accept one person’s bets, warnings, or promises. Beyond such hypothetical cases, it has been argued that patterns of social inequality can prevent members of certain groups from performing the speech acts they would choose to. Building on and refining McKinnon’s (1993) claim that pornography silences women, Langton (1993), and Hornsby and Langton (1998) argue that the industry and consumption of pornography deprive women of the ability to perform the speech act of refusing sexual advances. Refusing is a speech act, but if large enough numbers of men deny uptake (with such thoughts as, “By ‘no’ she really means ‘yes’,” etc.) then, these authors argue, women’s attempts to refuse sexual advances will be characteristically inert with respect to the speech act of refusal. Women will still be able to attempt to refuse sexual advances, and can still try to prevent them by physical means, but a crucial illocutionary form of protection will be closed to them. So too, apartheid, Jim Crow, and even patterns of discrimination of which the perpetrators are not consciously aware, can deprive racial, religious, and ethnic minority groups of the ability to perform speech-act types requiring uptake. These phenomena are generally referred to as illocutionary silencing .

Bird (2002) denies that the speech act of refusal requires uptake. Such an illocution is, he contends, like inviting and surrendering, which can occur whether or not their intended audiences grasp or accept the proffered illocutions. Similarly denying that the “silencing” argument should be cast in terms of speech acts, Maitra 2009 argues that the institution of pornography prevents speaker-meant instances of refusal from being understood. One can speaker-mean that she refuses, for instance, but patterns of cognitive and affective response will systematically prevent that refusal from being grasped. Broadening the scope of investigations of the interaction of injustice and illocutionary phenomena, McGowan 2009 argues that some speech acts can not only cause but also constitute instances of oppression. Anderson, Haslanger and Langton (2012) provide overviews of research on racial, gender and related forms of oppression as they relate to speech acts.

Although not inherently culpable, the practice of dogwhistling has also recently gained the interest of theorists of speech acts. As suggested by the metaphor, an agent dogwhistles just in case one or more dimensions of a speech act she performs is readily intelligible only to a proper subset of her addressees. Saul 2018 notes that in contemporary American politics, stating one’s opposition to the Supreme Court case of Dred Scott seems to be a way of signaling one’s anti-abortion sympathies. For those not in the know, however, a speaker’s opposition to the Dred Scott appears to be an uncontroversial act of rejecting racism. The phenomenon of dogwhistling provides an apparent challenge to conceptions of speaker meaning in terms of overtness, since the dogwhistler would seem to speaker mean a content that is cryptic to all but her insider audience: is her utterance both overt and covert? Instead of adopting such a view, one who construes speech acts in terms of overtness could refine the notion of manifestness occuring in her account. What is manifest to one addressee may not be manifest to another, and a speaker may exploit this fact. Accordingly, someone who avows, “I’m against Dred Scott,” may speaker-mean that she is both against Dred Scott and pro-life to one part of her audience, but only that she is against Dred Scott to another part.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Research project in the philosophy of language , maintained at the University of Berne, Switzerland. This site is devoted to some main themes of research stemming from Grices’ work on speaker meaning and implicature.
• Working Papers in Linguistics , University College London.
• Question Under Discussion , collecting research germane to this approach to conversational kinematics. .
• ‘ Toward a history of speech act theory ,’ a paper by Barry Smith (SUNY/Buffalo).
• ‘ J.L. Austin ,’ an annotated bibliography by Guy Longworth, Oxford Bibliographies Online .
• ‘ Pragmatics ,’ an annotated bibliography by Mitchell S. Green, Oxford Bibliographies Online .

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Basic Tools: Elements of a Theory of Speech Acts

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• Marco Ruffino 10  

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 443))

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In this chapter, I explain the basics of speech act theory in the version that best suits our purpose, i.e., in Searle and Vanderveken ( Foundations of illocutionary logic . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985) formulation. I also explain with illustrations the notion of declarative illocutionary acts, by means of which we can generate institutional facts by means of illocutions. I also discuss the notion of illocutionary commitment and illocutionary consistency and argue that they provide a promising tool to deal with Kripke’s cases of contingent a priori truths. This chapter is meant as a theoretical tool that will be applied in Chap. 10 .

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This is not to deny that there are other approaches with alternative taxonomies, e.g., the one more recently presented in Roberts ( 2018 ). For a survey of alternative approaches and taxonomies to the one here favored, see Green ( 2017 ).

Talking about a “composition” here does not mean that these two acts are produced separately and then combined; on the contrary, Austin conceives locutionary and illocutionary as occurring originally combined in an illocutionary act, and the locutionary act is conceivable only as an abstraction from the latter.

“There are not, as Wittgenstein (on one possible interpretation) and many others have claimed, an infinite or indefinite number of language games or uses of language. Rather, the illusion of limitless uses of language is engendered by an enormous unclarity about what constitutes the criteria for delimiting one language game or use of language from another. If we adopt illocutionary point as the basic notion on which to classify uses of language, then there are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language: we tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to doing things, we express our feelings and attitudes, and we bring about changes through our utterances.” ( 1979a , p. 29)

Actually, Searle’s view on the basic elements changes over time. There are four elements in Searle ( 1969 ), twelve in Searle ( 1979a ) (though many of them do not have a clear relevance in the determination of different forces), and seven in Searle and Vanderveken ( 1985 ). The latter work has a fuller formal development.

As Searle and Vanderveken remark ( 1985 , p. 16), sometimes the mode of achievement and the strength of the illocutionary point are interdependent, e.g., an order (issued by invoking the speaker’s authority) has a stronger degree of strength of the illocutionary point (getting the interlocutor to do something) than requesting.

Searle ( 1979a ) notices that it would be desirable to build a taxonomy solely in terms of the direction of fit, but sees no way of doing this. That is to say, his taxonomy needs to use the other dimensions in order to do justice to the variety of illocutionary acts. For an attempt to build an alternative taxonomy based only on the direction of fit, see Roberts ( 2018 ).

For the peculiarities of assertions within mathematics, see Ruffino et al. ( 2020 ).

We characterize the illocutionary point as taking responsibility for a future action instead of performing a future action because there might be unfulfilled promises that are, nevertheless, promises.

Many such acts correspond to what Austin called “behabitive”, i.e., they express an appreciation in view of other people’s (or the speaker’s own) actions.

In Searle’s original formulation ( 1979a ) there is no sincerity conditions, but in ( 1985 ) Searle and Vanderveken recognize that some declarative acts might require a psychological state such as, e.g., belief.

Vanderveken ( 1990a , p. 140).

“In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it. None of the utterances cited is either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it. It needs argument no more than that ‘damn’ is not true or false: it may be that the utterance ‘serves to inform you’—but that is quite different. To name the ship is to say (in the appropriate circumstances) ‘I name, etc.’. When I say, before the registrar or altar, etc., ‘I do’, I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging on it.[…]I propose to call it performative sentence or a performative utterance, or, for short, ‘a performative’.[…] The name is derived, of course, from ‘perform’, the usual verb with the noun ‘action’: it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action—it is not normally thought of as just saying something.”( 1962 , pp. 6–7) Though many people agree with Austin that performative utterances are actions denoted by the corresponding verbs, fewer agree that such utterances are neither true nor false.

E.g., in most (but not all) cases, the verb is in the first person, present tense and indicative mood. E.g., ‘I promise…’ is performative, but ‘He promises…’ is not; ‘I promised…’ is a report, but not a performative; similarly with ‘Do I promise…?’. Most performative utterances admit the accretion of ‘hereby’ without changing their intuitive meaning. E.g.,

remains unchanged in meaning in

The same does not happen with

The former might be true, while the latter is plainly false.

As said before, the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary act is, for Austin, also artificial and made only for theoretical purposes since, in a speech situation, a locutionary act only occurs as part or aspect of an illocutionary act.

This claim inspired what would be later called the Performative Hypothesis (or Performative Deletion Analysis ), i.e., the hypothesis that any utterance of a sentence in ordinary communication has a performative verb in its deep structure that is not necessarily evident in the surface structure (e.g., Ross, 1970 , and Sadock, 1974 ). The Hypothesis was severely criticized both by philosophers (e.g., Searle, 1979b ) and linguists (e.g., Levinson, 1983 ) based on overwhelming empirical counterevidence.

For a critical view of the latter taxonomy, and a study of its roots in Austin’s, see Sadock ( 2002 ).

This binomial here is not to be confounded with the descriptivist/anti-descriptivist theories of reference of singular terms, which label something quite different.

Austin includes yet another category of “infelicities” which he calls abuses , i.e., those cases in which some appropriate psychological state is missing like, e.g., a promise without the intention of fulfilling it (p. 18).

E.g., Hartnack ( 1963 ), Black ( 1963 ), Harris ( 1978 ), Taylor and Wolf ( 1981 ), Recanati ( 1987 ), Jary ( 2007 ).

The list of defenders of the descriptivist interpretation also include Kempson ( 1975 ), Edmondson ( 1979 , 1983 ), Leech ( 1976 ), Spielmann ( 1980 ) and Wiggins ( 1971 ).

In the first situation, it is defective because S could only apologize to another person, but not to an object. In the second situation, it is presumably defective because, strictly speaking, S ’s apology only makes sense regarding S ’s own actions, but not someone else’s actions.

Harris describes the situation in the following way:

There is no way out of this dilemma for the descriptivist: his interpretation automatically commits him to one or other of two self-defeating explanations of how to assign a truth value to what S says. No parallel problem in such cases emerges for the non-descriptivist, for the simple reason that for him the question of whether a performative utterance is true or false does not arise. ( 1978 , p. 310)

Harris’ dilemma gave rise to an interesting discussion (mainly among linguists) concerning the prospects of the descriptivist interpretation. Edmondson ( 1979 , 1983 ) seeks to escape the dilemma (and, hence, to save descriptivism) by introducing a distinction between the semantics and the pragmatics of performatives, i.e., on some occasions (like those illustrating Harris’ dilemma) a statement like ‘I apologize’ might be true, although pragmatically the act of apologizing was not successful. So, meaning and truth of performative utterances are, in his view, independent from success in achieving the illocutionary point. Wachtel ( 1980 ) goes in the same direction by distinguishing the “going through the motions of performing a speech act” (which gives the semantic content of a performative utterance and its truth-conditions) from the satisfaction of its felicity conditions (which is neither contained nor implied by “going through the motions of performing a speech act”). Taylor and Wolf ( 1981 ) complained that Edmondson’s (and, by extension, also Wachtel’s) attempt to escape the dilemma makes the descriptivist’s position even worse because it relies on the assumption that one might correctly describe an illocutionary act as ‘he ϕ ed’ even though the felicity conditions of ϕ ing are not fulfilled (and, hence, the act was not carried on). Finally, Rajagopalan ( 1984 ) sees both positions as compatible insofar as they talk about distinct aspects of an illocutionary act: the semantic aspect (descriptive interpretation) and the act itself (anti-descriptive interpretation).

Declarative acts are such that

We thus achieve the world-to-word direction of fit, but we achieve that direction of fit by way of representing the world as having been changed, that is, by way of word-to-world direction of fit. (Searle, 2008 , p. 451)

Recanati ( 1987 ) has a similar account, but with some differences. He divides performatives into three big classes: directives, commissives and declarations. The main feature of directives and commissives is that bringing about the state of affairs represented in the propositional content is intended to be the responsibility of the speaker and hearer, respectively, while in the case of a declaration, bringing about this state of affairs is meant to be nobody’s responsibility, but simply an immediate consequence of the declaration itself.

E.g., Hedenius ( 1963 ), Lewis ( 1970 ), Bach and Harnish ( 1979 ), Ginet ( 1979 ) and García-Carpintero ( 2013 ).

Pagin ( 2004 ) and Jary ( 2007 ) follow Searle in this criticism.

Of course my declaration will be unsuccessful (despite the flat-earthers’ unshakable faith), but the fact is that a declaration comes into existence by the use of a performative.

Although many people see the latter fact as extraordinary because it involves abstract entities (numbers and operations). I mean here by ‘ordinary’ facts that exist independently of a linguistic act.

In Searle ( 2009 ) he presses the point and formulates what he describes as a “very strong theoretical claim”:

The claim that I will be expounding and defending in this book is that all of human institutional reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that have the same form as) S[tatus] F[unction] Declarations, including the cases that are not speech acts in the explicit form of Declarations. (p. 13)

Sometimes Searle talks of institutions instead of institutional facts as a “system of constitutive rules, and such a system automatically creates the possibility of institutional facts” ( 2009 , p. 10). But the difference between institutions (such as universities) and institutional facts (such as academic degrees) seems to be just a matter of complexity: institutions are complex institutional facts that can be explored to generate, in a systematic way, new institutional facts. As I interpret him, they are, at the bottom, the same kind of entity.

See Vanderveken (1990, p. 29, 152).

In the less known work of Adolf Reinach ( 1913 ), from the beginning of the twentieth century on the foundations of the civil law, we find passages like the following that seem to anticipate, in some ways, the idea that the performance of one illocutionary act may, as a matter of necessity, give rise to the existence (actual or just potential) of other illocutionary acts:

There is no doubt that the causal relation is no necessary “relation of ideas.” But it would be a mistake to extend this principle to every relationship obtaining between temporally existing things. The case which is now before us is the best proof of this. A “cause” which can generate claim and obligation is the act of promising. From this act, as we shall show more exactly, proceed claim and obligation; we can bring this to evidence when we consider clearly what a promise is, and achieve the intuition ( erschauen ) that it lies in the essence of such an act to generate claim and obligation under certain conditions. And so it is by no means experience in the sense of observation ( Erfahrung ) which instructs us, not even indirectly, about the existential connection of these legal entities; we have rather to do here with a self-evident and necessary relation of essence. ( 1913 , p. 15)

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Ruffino, M. (2022). Basic Tools: Elements of a Theory of Speech Acts. In: Contingent A Priori Truths. Synthese Library, vol 443. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86622-8_9

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Speech Acts and Conversation

Language use: functional approaches to syntax, language in use, sentence structure and the function of utterances, speech acts, the cooperative principle, violations of the cooperative principles, politeness conventions, speech events, the organization of conversation, cross-cultural communication.

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• Expressives

Would you consider yourself to be an expressive person? If so, how do you like to express yourself? Some people may express themselves through the clothes they wear. Others may like to paint, play music, dance, etc. But one of the main ways we can express ourselves is through the language that we use! Through what linguists call a 'speech act'. 

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So what is a speech act?

A speech act is an utterance that has a purpose . Whenever we speak, we are also carrying out a kind of action. These 'actions' can be referred to as illocutionary acts, which are broken down into five categories: a ssertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarative.

What are expressive words in English?

Expressive verbs are words used for the purpose of performing a certain speech act. They can be used to express either positive or negative situations, and are usually centred on the listener. Expressive verbs are more specific than basic verbs, as they are used to express particular actions.

According to Searle and Vanderveken (1985)¹, some examples of expressive verbs include:

- apologising, consoling, congratulating, lamenting, praising, greeting, and welcoming.

These words are used to perform various speech acts ; 'Oops, sorry, I didn't see you there', is an apology.

Synonyms for 'expressive'

The adjective 'expressive' has a very similar meaning to 'expressive speech acts.' We can better understand this type of speech act if we look at some synonyms for 'expressive.' Some of these are:

• Demonstrative

What is an expressive person?

An expressive person is someone who uses expressive language. This is done by often using expressive speech acts. We'll have a look at what these are next.

Can we define 'expressive speech acts'?

Expressive speech acts are utterances that are spoken to convey the speaker’s emotions and feelings about themselves and the world around them. Depending on the situation, different expressives can be used to communicate different feelings.

What are the different types of expressive speech acts?

According to psycholinguist Herbert Clark (1996)², there are four main types of expressive. These are as follows:

Apologising

Congratulating

Let’s take a look at each of these in more detail.

Expressive speech acts examples

The act of thanking refers to an expression of gratitude. It is also a way of showing respect and kindness to the listener, letting them know that the speaker appreciates what they have done.

“Thank you for helping me out with my work”

“Thank you very much for my birthday present!”

“Thank you for thinking of me, I really appreciate it”

The act of apologising refers to an expression or admission of wrongdoing, showing that they regret something they have done or realise they may have caused offence or upset.

“I’m sorry for shouting at you.”

“I’m sorry for hurting your feelings, I didn’t mean to upset you.”

“I apologise for getting angry, it will not happen again.”

But, there are also other ways an apology can be used, not just to take responsibility for something wrong you have done, but also...

...to express sympathy. For example, if someone passes away, it is not uncommon for people to say “I’m sorry for your loss” to the people who are grieving. It is a way of showing that you acknowledger their pain.

The act of congratulating refers to the act of praising someone or joining in with their success. It is a positive way to wish someone happiness and/or celebrate their success.

“Congratulations on your engagement!”

“Congratulations on passing your exams!”

“Congratulations on your new job!”

The act of greeting refers to an expression of welcome or acknowledgment.

“Hey, it’s lovely to see you”

“Welcome! Please come in”

“Morning, how’s it going?”

But wait, that’s not all!

There has been lots of research into the different types of expressive speech acts. Neal Norrick, an American linguist, researched further possible groups of expressive acts in his article Expressive Illocutionary Acts (1978). Norrick explored the idea that expressives can be either positive or negative and came up with nine different types of expressive acts.

We’ve already explored thanking, apologising, congratulating and greeting … So what else did Norrick come up with?

Deploring/censoring

Let’s go through these in more detail!

Think of the opposite of congratulating. This refers to when the speaker sympathises with the listener and expresses sadness about a negative event.

People often send their condolences at funerals.

This refers to when the speaker tells the listener off for doing/saying something that upsets or angers them. It is a way for the speaker to make the listener aware that their behaviour needs to change and usually results in an apology from the listener.

“You need to be quiet, you’re disrupting me.”

“I find what you said offensive.”

“I’m really upset that you did that.”

This refers to when the speaker complains to the listener about negative things happening in their life. This may be because of something the speaker has done themselves, or because of something that someone else has done. It could be something mildly upsetting, such as having a bad day . Or, it could be something more extreme , such as losing a loved one .

"I fell over at work today."

"I broke my arm."

"My cat passed away."

This refers to when the speaker is able to stop feeling resentful towards something the listener may have said or done. It is a way for the speaker to put the past behind them and bring themselves peace, instead of holding onto grudges.

“I forgive you for hurting me.”

“Don’t worry, it’s okay. I know you didn’t mean it like that.”

“Thank you for apologising, I forgive you.”

This refers to when the speaker shows off to the listener about something they have done. It is a way of showing that they are proud or satisfied with themselves.

“I won a competition, I’m so happy!”

“I passed my exam, I’m so proud of myself!”

“I just finished writing my dissertation!”

Expressives - Key takeaways

• Expressive verbs are words that express a particular action/feeling.
• Expressive speech acts are utterances that convey the speaker’s emotions about themselves/the world.
• There are four main types of expressives according to Clark: thanking, apologising, congratulating, greeting.
• Norrick recognised those four types but also included these others: condoling, deploring, lamenting, forgiving and boasting.

¹ D. Vanderveken & J. Searle. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic . 1985.

² H. Clark. Using language . 1996.

Flashcards in Expressives 25

Which of the following is an example of an expressive verb?

B. Congratulating

An expressive speech act conveys a speaker's emotions about themselves and the world.

True or false?

Which of the following is NOT an example of an expressive speech act?

A. Thanking

B. Laughing

C. Apologising

"I'm sorry I broke your lamp"  is an example of which type of expressive?

"Nice to finally meet you!" is an example of which type of expressive?

Which of the following is an example of boasting?

A. I've won so many writing contests.

B. I have three pet rats.

C. I had an awful day today.

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Frequently Asked Questions about Expressives

What are Expressives in linguistics?

Expressives are utterances used to convey someone's emotions about themselves and the world around them.

What is an example of an expressive?

An example of an expressive is, "I'm sorry I lost your pen" (apology).

Why are expressives used in English language?

Expressives are used as a way for a speaker to communicate their emotions and feelings about themselves and/or others to a listener.

What is an expressive personality?

Someone with an expressive personality will want to express aspects of themselves such as creativity or class through their actions and language. Linguistically, expressive people will often use expressive speech acts to represent their expressive nature.

How do you use expressive in a sentence?

The term 'expressive' is an adjective used to describe a person or action. Expressive speech acts can be used in sentences wherever you are carrying out the following actions: thanking, apologising, congratulating, or greeting.

Test your knowledge with multiple choice flashcards

Which expressive speech act is a way of expressing gratitude?

Which expressive speech act is a welcoming or acknowledgement?

Who came up with the expressive speech acts: condoling, lamenting, forgiving and boasting?

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Categorizing expressive speech acts in the pragmatically annotated SPICE Ireland corpus

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Published Online : Apr 01, 2015

Page range: 25 - 45, doi: https://doi.org/10.1515/icame-2015-0002, this work is licensed under the creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 3.0 license..

Expressive speech acts are one of the five basic categories of speech acts identified by Searle (1976). Expressives remain underresearched, though select categories of expressive speech acts, especially offering thanks and compliments, have received more extensive attention. An overall classification of expressive speech acts on the basis of corpus data has not yet been carried out. The current study provides a first survey of different types of expressive speech acts on the basis of three categories of spoken Irish English of different levels of formality: broadcast discussion, classroom discussion and face-to-face interaction. The data are extracted from the pragmatically tagged SPICE-Ireland corpus, a member of the International Corpus of English-family of corpora. The aim of the current study is to offer an overview and classification of expressives in the corpus material. Eight distinct subcategories of expressive speech acts are identified in this study. These categories are agreement, disagreement, volition, offering thanks, apologies, exclamations, expressions of sorrow and greetings.

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Expressive Speech Acts in Educational e-chats

The category of expressive speech acts has traditionally proven elusive of definition in contrast to other types of speech acts. This might explain why this group of speech acts has been less researched. The present paper aims to redress this imbalance by analysing the expressive speech acts performed by two groups of university students in two educational chats, carried out in English or in Spanish, respectively. The main purpose of the study is to find out if students express their emotions (and which emotions) when interacting online and, if the use of their mother tongue or not affects their performance of expressive speech acts in terms of frequency and type. To this purpose, Weigand’s (2010) taxonomy of speech acts was followed, since it provides a more systematic delimitation of the traditional category of “expressive acts”. Her distinction between emotives and declaratives was thus applied to the dataset under scrutiny. Results show that students opt for performing declarative acts but refrain from expressing their own emotions in an educational setting. As for the use of English or Spanish, no significant differences were observed, which reveals that the use of their mother tongue does not seem to affect the kind of acts performed.

Tradicionalmente, la definición de los actos expresivos ha sido menos concreta que la de otros actos de habla. Esto podría explicar por qué este grupo de actos de habla ha recibido menos atención. Este estudio tiene como objetivo equilibrar, al menos en parte, este desequilibrio mediante el análisis de los actos expresivos producidos por dos grupos de estudiantes universitarios en dos chats educativos, en inglés y español, con el fin de descubrir si los estudiantes expresan sus emociones (y cuáles) cuando interactúan online y si el uso de su lengua materna afecta su producción de actos de habla expresivos. Para ello, se ha utilizado la taxonomía de actos de habla propuesta por Weigand (2010) pues ofrece una delimitación más sistemática de los tradicionalmente conocidos como “actos expresivos”. Su distinción entre actos “emotivos” y “declarativos” se ha aplicado a los datos a analizar y los resultados muestran que los estudiantes optan por producir actos declarativos pero limitan la expresión de sus emociones en un contexto educativo. En cuanto al uso del español o el inglés, no se observan diferencias significativas, lo que demuestra que el uso de la lengua materna en este contexto parece no afectar el tipo de actos de habla producidos.

1 Introduction

In contrast to other categories of speech acts like directives, expressives still remain under researched (despite exceptions like apologies or compliments, which have received a great deal of scholarly attention [1] ). In the last years, however, there seems to be a growing interest in expressive acts ( Ronan, 2015 ) and the expressive function of language in general ( Potts, 2007 ; Bednarek, 2008 ; Thompson, 2008 ; Riemer, 2013 ; Foolen, 2016 , among many others). This paper is intended to contribute to this growing body of research on the expressive function of language by means of a data-driven approach to a corpus of naturally occurring computer-mediated communication (CMC henceforth) at a Spanish University with two groups of students: in group 1, the students’ mother tongue (i.e. Spanish) is used as the language of instruction whilst in group 2, the language used for instruction is English (a foreign language for all the students, even if they are highly proficient). More specifically, I aim to answer the following research questions:

Do students express their emotions when interacting online with their teacher? If so, what expressive speech acts are more frequently used?

Does the use of their mother tongue (Spanish) or not (English) affect their performance of expressive speech acts in terms of frequency and type?

It is hypothesized that, given the educational nature of the chat, expressives will be very low-profiled if not practically non-existent; especially so when there is a conspicuous presence of the teacher, which adds to the institutional (and relatively formal) nature of the interaction. As for the second question, the language used (mother tongue versus a foreign language) is expected to affect the frequency and type of expressive acts performed, given that bilingual speakers are expected to vary their emotions depending on the language they are using ( Ervin-Tripp, 1973 ; Wierzbicka, 1997 , 1999 ; Pavlenko, 2008 , 2014 ; Pérez-Luzardo Díaz and Schmidt, 2016).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on defining expressive speech acts so as to delimit the scope of the present analysis. It also provides a taxonomy of the different types of expressive acts by previous scholars as well as trying to establish a more clear relationship between the types of expressives and the realm of emotions, introducing the distinction between “emotive speech acts” and “declaratives” established by Weigand (2010) in her dialogue games. Section 3 presents the methodology, paying attention to the participants involved in the study, the data-gathering procedure and the description of the corpus. Section 4 focuses on the data analysis. For the sake of clarity, this section has been subdivided into two. Section 4.1 . deals with emotives and Section 4.2 . focuses on declaratives. The paper closes with Section 5 , where some conclusions and pointers to future research are offered.

2 Defining expressive speech acts

As opposed to other speech acts like directives, expressives seem to be more problematic when attempting to define them. Austin (1975) named “behavitives” all these acts having to do with social behaviour and attitudes (e.g. apologies). However, he also admitted they were a “miscellaneous” and “troublesome” group ( Austin, 1975 , p. 152). In his seminal taxonomy of speech acts, Searle (1976) renamed this category as “expressives”, describing them as those speech acts whose illocutionary point is “to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content” ( Searle, 1976 , p. 12). In contrast with the other speech acts in Searle’s taxonomy, expressives are characterised for their lack of direction of fit ––i.e. there is no match between the words and the world since the speaker is referring to her “inner” world rather than the “external” one. Despite their troublesome nature, there seems to be agreement on the fact that expressives deal with the speaker’s “inner” world, as reflected by other definitions which have also focused on the speaker’s “underlying emotions” ( Norrick, 1978 ), “state of mind, attitudes and feelings” ( Taavitsainen and Jucker, 2010 ) or their “psychological attitudes” ( Guiraud et al., 2011 ).

It could be argued that some expressive acts are, however, demanded by certain socio-cultural norms and may be expected by the interactants (e.g. greeting or thanking). Thus, the absence of these expected expressives can be perceived as marked and eventually lead to social disruptiveness, since they play a crucial role in facework –i.e. or social rituals in Goffman’s terms ( 1967 , p. 13). These socially expected acts also tend towards a higher degree of formulaicity (e.g. “I’m sorry for your loss” when expressing our condolences). In more recent years, however, this approach to socially expected speech acts has been heavily criticised by analysts who argue in favour of more fluctuant facework, created anew in each human interaction (e.g. Locher, 2004 ; Locher y Watts, 2005 ). Even if there is consensus about this, I also agree with Hernández Flores (2013 , p. 181) that the undeniable fluid nature of facework does not impede the existence of certain patterns that interactants can identify and (partially) follow. In her own words:

Sin embargo, en mi opinión, que el intercambio comunicativo se cree en cada ocasión no es óbice para que en él se adopten esquemas y modelos preexistentes. De hecho, el aspecto ritual no se puede obviar en estudios de cortesía diacrónica (Kádár, 2011, pp. 255–256), ni tampoco se puede dejar de reconocer en situaciones comunicativas que, por su carácter institucionalizado (juicios, programas de televisión, entrevistas), o por su frecuencia de aparición (encuentros sociales de visita entre amigos, por ejemplo), presentan un modelo de comportamiento definido y delimitado bien conocido (y repetido) por los miembros de la comunidad en sus interacciones (cf. Bernal, 2009; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, 2010 ; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, Lorenzo-Dus y Bou-Franch, 2010). [2]

The distinction between ‘socially-expected’ and more self-centred expressives is also partially reported by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk and Wilson (2014 , p. 125), who differentiate between social emotions and basic emotions. In their own words,

Social emotions [are those] whose origin is connected with the situational or contextual factors involving an interactant, some of which will constitute a stimulus for or a cause of an emotion event. Basic emotions, such as fear, surprise or disgust, irrespective of the fact as to whether they are verbally and/or paralinguistically expressed or not, do not necessarily assume the presence of an interlocutor, although the degree of their socialization function does not need to be identical. (Their emphasis)

For Haverkate (1993) , this distinction would correspond to the distinction between expressive acts centred on the speaker and those centred on the hearer, which tend to perform polite functions. According to Haverkate (1993 , pp. 149–150), expressives centred on the hearer (e.g. expressing condolences, thanking, complimenting) outnumber expressives centred on the speaker precisely because of the polite functions they perform, even if the original ‘emotional content’ is still partially present. In his own words:

Cuantitativamente, esta categoría [los actos expresivos centrados en el oyente] predomina con mucho a aquélla [los actos expresivos centrados en el hablante], que cuenta con relativamente muy pocos miembros. Algunos ejemplos son: lamentarse, avergonzarse y arrepentirse. Y aun, estos verbos se emplean frecuentemente para denotar un estado sicológico del hablante acarreado directamente por su relación con el oyente. [3]

Similarly, in her contrastive study of Spanish and German speech acts, Siebold (2008) exclusively focuses on expressives centred on the hearer (i.e. compliments, responses to compliments and apologies) whilst those focused on the speaker are not even mentioned. Barros García (2010) also focuses exclusively on expressives centred on the hearer, as prototypically polite acts (e.g. thanking, congratulating, apologizing, expressing condolences or compliments), mostly aimed at boosting the hearer’s positive face ( Brown and Levinson, 1987 ). Following also Bravo’s ( 2002 , 2005 , 2008 ) concept of social effect –i.e. the effects of a communicative activity on the socio-emotional climate of interactions –in combination with the direction of facework; Hernández Flores (2013 , p. 182) distinguishes between a positive, negative or neutral social effect. In this case, hence, it would be considered a polite act since the speaker is directing positive facework towards the addressee. Such positive facework does, however, also affect the speaker’s own (positive) face, in a bidirectional way (ibid.).

Interestingly enough, Weigand also considers these socially-expected expressive acts as a different type of speech act altogether; thus, she defines them as declaratives , since their main purpose is the creation of social rapport by means of politeness conventions and “mainly refer to routines of behaviour such as expressing congratulations, condolences, thanks or excuses […] which do not express sincere feelings” ( 2010 , p. 179).

Therefore, and given the problematic nature of Searle’s category of “expressives”, which could be inclusive of a myriad of unconnected acts ( Verschueren, 1999 ; Carretero, Maíz-Arévalo & Martínez, 2014 , p. 265), this paper will opt for Weigand’s (2010) more specific definition of “emotives”. In her dialogue games, Weigand (2010 , p. 166) identifies a category of speech acts described as “emotive”, since they “focus on the speaker’s emotional involvement ” (her italics). Emotives focus on the speaker’s emotions; on his/her emotional involvement with the utterance itself and their function is to announce and/or express emotions. Therefore, this subcategory implies not just simple statements, but “emotional affect or being overwhelmed by emotions” ( Weigand 2010 , p. 166).

The distinction between emotives and declaratives has its expression in the linguistic realization of both categories. Thus, declaratives (like thanking, expressing condolences and so on) tend to be formulaic. In fact, Weigand (2010 , p. 179) argues that, “due to their frequent use in everyday talk, shortened forms have been developed which confirm that they are mostly empty routines and have nothing to do with sincerity conditions” (my emphasis). Thus, she compares between apologies such as “sorry”, where just the syntactic attribute is used and a real emotive like “I feel really sad” where the full copulative sentence is linguistically expressed. In the latter case, the reactive act would most probably be one of empathy or compassion (e.g. “I know how you feel” or “poor thing”, respectively).

Another advantage to Weigand’s classification is that she considers speech acts as parts of what she defines as “dialogue games”. In other words, speech acts do not happen “in isolation” as Searle’s (1969) taxonomy seems to suggest but as parts of discourse where both interlocutors initiate and react to what is respectively uttered. Hence, the reaction to emotives is expected to be empathy and compassion by the interlocutor ( Weigand, 2010 ). Emotives, in contrast to other speech acts like declaratives, are not only truth-conditioned, but link that truth to the interlocutors’ emotional side, to their feelings and opinions, expecting back empathy and/or compassion. Thus, emotives may not be specifically demanded by the social situation per se but, when/if they happen, they can lead to social rapport among the interactants. In other words, when the speaker ‘opens up’ to the hearer, she might also be implicitly acknowledging that their degree of closeness has become suitable enough to do so and hence invite reciprocity on the hearer’s part so as to increase their rapport by entering each other’s private sphere. It must be acknowledged, however, that a miscalculated use of emotives might also be highly face-threatening for the hearer, who may perceive such openness on the speaker’s part as an intrusion to share their own privacy, which they still might be unwilling to do ( Weisbuch et al., 2009 , p. 574).

However, it must be admitted that the distinction between emotives and declaratives is not as clear-cut as the above discussion might suggest. Thus, and even though it seems to ring true that declaratives are more context-bound than others (e.g. expressing condolences), each particular instance should be considered in its individual context. For instance, the expression of condolences is usually context-bound but not necessarily devoid of genuine feeling. Likewise, social norms –or just good manners –might dictate the speaker’s explicit expression of liking a particular dish if invited to have a homely lunch even if they genuinely might not like it at all and produce a polite compliment. For example, in Spanish, the formulaic perdona (‘excuse me’) that precedes a request, as in perdona, ¿tienes fuego? (‘excuse me, do you have a light?’) and the contrite perdóname, de verdad que no quería hacerte daño (‘please forgive me, I did not want to hurt you’) are both triggered by the same verb ( perdonar ). However, whilst the first has become formulaic and lexically bleached as a polite mitigator of the request to avoid face-threatening the interlocutor, the latter retains its original ‘emotional’ meaning. In fact, they even translate differently in English, where the polite mitigator translates as ‘excuse me’ while the second one would correspond to ‘forgive me’. Another example is the Spanish formulaic expression Me alegro de verte (‘I’m glad to see you’) which often accompanies either a greeting or a farewell to someone the speaker has not seen for a while. As in the previous case, this declarative also derives from the initial positive emotion alegría (‘joy’) to encounter an old acquaintance. It was its repeated use in similar contexts that eventually led to its formulization and “bleaching” of initial meaning. Hence, it could be argued that emotives and declaratives, rather than different categories, derive from the same etymological meaning, albeit specializing in different functions but still sharing their core semantic load, as illustrated by Figure 1 below.

Common etymology of emotives and declaratives.

Finally, it is also important to mention that, in the case of face-to-face communication, the expression of emotions can easily be supported by supralinguistic and non-verbal elements such as intonation, facial gestures or bodily posture, among others. Weigand (2010 , pp. 166–167) points out the use of the exclamatory sentence type, intonation, interjections –e.g. ‘oh’, ‘wow’ –particles and routine phrases as typical devices in the performance of emotives. For example, the expression “I am sorry” can be stressed as “I am sorry” to express emotion in contrast to “I’m sorry ” or simply “sorry”, which would act as an apology with a declarative function.

Likewise, Kallen and Kirk (2012) mention prosody as a crucial element to identify a speech act as emotive. However, these supralinguistic elements are mostly absent in CMC given its disembodied nature (cf. Maíz-Arévalo, 2013 ). In this case, typographical elements such as emoticons, capitalization, typographical repetition of letters, etc. might serve to underline the expression of emotions ( Yus, 2011 ).

3 Methodology

The methodology adopted in the present paper combines a quantitative with a qualitative approach. The need to quantify also explains why the chosen unit of analysis is primarily the sentence rather than the discursive paragraph, more open to a qualitative analysis. However, “working at sentence level does not rule out the fact that speech acts are derived from the meaning of sentences as utterances in specific contexts of situation” ( Carretero et al., 2014 , pp. 271–272). As a participant, the context is well known to the researcher, which poses a clear advantage when analysing the data at hand.

3.1 Participants

The corpus on which this study is based consists in the online written interaction of two groups of undergraduate and postgraduate students enrolled in two different courses at the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain. The first group consisted of last-year undergraduate students following an obligatory course on Pragmatics as part of their Degree in English studies. The second group involves a group of post-graduate students doing a Master’s on literary translation. Although the groups might seem heterogeneous at first sight, they share more similarities than differences. Thus, the students of Pragmatics are in the final year of their degree and most of the master students were graduate students just the year before, being their ages practically the same (between 22 and 25). Secondly, all of them share a close relationship in their group and with their lecturer (also the author of the present paper). Finally, even if the Pragmatics group was initially larger in number than the master’s one (with 50 students enrolled versus 25), the number of students who actually took part in the chat was 14, practically the same number as the master students, where 10 of them joined the online discussion. From the perspective of sociopragmatics, these interactions are especially interesting since they are multidirectional. In other words, the issue of directionality and social effect become even more complex given the “polilogic” nature of the interaction rather than “dialogic” (i.e. speaker/addressee) ( Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, 2010 ). In this case, and even though the teacher may address only one of the students, the image of all the interactants is also affected, producing a multidirectional effect ( Hérnandez Flores, 2013 , p. 186).

As for gender, both datasets include mostly female students –i.e. 11 females versus 3 males in the pragmatics group and 7 females versus 3 males in the Master group, which renders the gender variable out. The most important difference, which also raises one of the research questions, is that the group studying Pragmatics uses English as the language of instruction whereas the Master students employ Spanish (their mother tongue) as the instructing language.

Finally, it is also important to point out that, in order to avoid unnaturally biased exchanges, the participants were not informed a priori of their participation in this research project; once the experiment was over, they were dutifully informed and asked for their consent, which they all provided. Likewise, and also to avoid any bias, all the interventions by the teacher/researcher have been excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, given the limited size of the corpus, it is also necessary to admit that the results cannot be taken as generalisations but rather as mere tendencies which the analysis of a much larger corpus might help to confirm.

3.2 Procedure

The data used in the present paper consists of two educational chats. Both chats were intended to revise previous theoretical concepts and do further practice, the only difference being that the chat in English took place because of a student strike which kept the faculty locked and the Spanish one was due to the teacher’s illness which deprived her of her voice. Students were told when the chat would take place and voluntarily chose whether to join it or not. The participation in the chat was not assessed as part of the final mark, so as to ensure it was really entered just by volunteering students. In both cases, it lasted for a couple of hours and I was in charge of monitoring it so as to follow a certain order. The teacher’s presence, hence, was pervasive and domineered the conversational floor, with the highest percentage of conversational turns, as seen in Table 1 :

Chats’ description.

Since the main interest of the paper lies in the speech acts produced by the students, only their interventions have been analysed. With regard to the number of words, the Spanish chat is slightly larger, which could be due to the more synthetic nature of English as a language. Besides, the students using English might feel less prone to participate as they are using a language which is not their mother tongue and in which they might feel less confident. In any case, the percentage of participation and the length of both chats were exactly the same.

3.3 Corpus description

As already mentioned, the corpus used in this paper comprises two synchronous chats, which render a total of 12,152 words. More specifically, chat 1 (Pragmatics class) consists in 5,387 words and Chat 2 (Master class) encompasses 6,309 words. The spontaneous nature of the sets has rendered naturally-occurring data on similar conditions. However, an important limitation is the fact that, precisely because of their being naturally occurring, the number of words in each set is slightly different. This might be explained by the lower level of lexical density in the case of English in contexts such as the one at hand. In Halliday’s words ( 1994 , pp. 57–58):

the nearer to the ‘language-in-action’ end of the scale, the lower the lexical density. Since written language is characteristically reflective rather than active, in a written text the lexical density tends to be higher; and it increases as the text becomes further away from spontaneous speech.

It can be argued that, even if apparently written in form, a chat is closer to the spontaneous and oral extreme of the written-oral continuum. This is also shown by the very use of the term “chat”, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary [4] as “an informal conversation” in its primary sense.

Finally, it is important to repeat that the approach adopted has combined a quantitative and qualitative analysis, even if the quantitative side is reduced to tendencies given the limited size of the dataset. The identification of the examples has been manually carried out, following a detailed and fine-grained search for the different emotive acts. A manual search was favoured over an automatic once given that, even though specific search strings may be employed to search for patterns ( Jucker et al., 2008 ; Jucker, 2009 , p. 1622), a purely automatic search is likely to lead to overgeneralization and skipping of relevant examples, especially those examples which “which do not conform to the searched-for pattern” (ibid.). Furthermore, given the researcher’s advantaged access to the context of situation, the analysis is negligibly limited by the deficiencies often signalled in the literature ( Rühlemann, 2010 , pp. 288–291; Weigand, 2010 , pp. 27–28).

4 Data analysis

4.1 emotives.

As already mentioned, I shall consider emotives as those speech acts that communicate the speaker’s emotions (and emotional involvement) as the initiative act, expecting the interlocutor’s empathy or compassion as its reaction in the dialogue game. To this purpose, I will take Norrick (1978) and Guiraud et al.’s ( 2011 ) classification of positive and negative emotions –both basic and complex– as triggers of emotives. For example, according to Guiraud et al. (2011) , negative emotions include basic emotions like sadness and disapproval and complex ones like guilt, regret, disappointment or reproach. Apologies, for instance, can be originated because of guilt and regret, but may also cause sadness on the speaker and disapproval of her own actions ( Goffman, 1971 ; Fraser, 1980 ). Considering the interaction between social effect and directionality (cf. Bravo, 2005 ; Bernal, 2007 ; Hernández Flores, 2005 , 2013 ), apologies are also an attempt to restore the ritual equilibrium when this has been ‘broken’ by a previous action of the speaker’s in detriment of the addressee. Thus, apologies appear as complex acts where both the speaker’s and addressee’s face(s) are at stake.

Guiraud et al.’s ( 2011 ) taxonomies of basic and complex emotions is illustrated by Figure 2 :

Classification of emotions (based on Guiraud et al., 2011 ).

As for their linguistic realization, emotives in the corpus tend to be linguistically performed by the following linguistic features, expecting to trigger in the interlocutor the reactive act of empathy or compassion:

Use of the exclamatory sentence (e.g. “how interesting!”)

Use of the copulative sentence to express the speaker’s feelings and emotions (e.g. “I feel+adjective” / “I am+adjective”)

Use of interjections (e.g. “oh”, “damn”)

Use of emoticons to express emotions (e.g. I’m lost L)

For example, one of the students expresses a negative complex emotion (disappointment) with her understanding of the exercise by employing the following copulative sentence: “I’m awful with this”, which is met by the expression of empathy and compassion “Don’t worry, tomorrow we will see exactly what you are asking” to ease her. This would be considered a prototypical case of emotive speech act in Weigand’s terms. These acts where the speakers negatively focus upon their own face may, however, lead to a positive self-facework, since it allows the speaker to show a degree of modesty as well as allowing the other interactants to show empathy, hence reinforcing their own affiliative face as a considerate interlocutor, who takes into account the addressee’s needs (cf. Kaul De Marlangeon, 2008 ; Hernández Flores, 2013 , p. 189). In fact, if the speaker manages to get the understanding and empathy of their interlocutors, group rapport is also usually built up (cf. Alcaide Lara, 2008 ; Brenes Peña, 2009 ).

4.1.1 Emotive acts triggered by positive emotions

Liking, rejoicing, wishing the speaker’s own welfare and expressing moral satisfaction (even ‘boasting’) might be considered as triggers of emotives, since they pertain to the expression of the speaker/writer’s feelings. According to Merriam Webster Dictionary , [5] “to like” is:

to enjoy (something),

to get pleasure from (something),

to regard (something) in a favourable way,

to feel affection for (someone) and

to enjoy being with (someone).

In other words, ‘liking’ is clearly connected to positive emotions and to the category of ‘affect’ in appraisal theory ( Martin and White, 2005 ) and to the basic emotion of “joy” or “happiness”, as in examples (1) and (2), where the participant expresses her joy to finally understand something she could not before:

me gusta mucho su traducción

‘I really like her translation’

entiendo, vale! ahhh genial

‘I understand, ok! Ahhh, great’

Occasionally, Spanish participants resort to laughter to express their joy that their answer is correct, as in (3) below, where the student initially thought she had made a mistake but then realizes that her answer to the exercise is fine:

que susto! Jajaj

‘What a fright! Hahah’

As for other kind of emotives such as wishing their own personal welfare or expressing satisfaction for their own work, users refrain from performing these emotives. This may be mainly motivated by the maxim of modesty ( Leech, 1983 ), since the expression of these emotives might be misinterpreted by the others as boasting and eventually lead to social disruption. In this case, the participants might also have been biased by the semi-public nature of the channel, where the teacher is conspicuously present and in control of the conversational floor. This is also in line with Ronan’s results ( 2015 ), who did not come across any examples of expressing moral satisfaction either. On the whole, however, the number of emotives triggered by positive emotions is very low, with only 2 occurrences in the Spanish dataset and none in the English one. The transactional nature of the corpus under analysis might have also had a say in this scarcity, since the participants may not only refrain from opening up in front of a relatively unknown audience but also be more focused upon building up group rapport by other means –i.e. declarative acts.

4.1.2 Emotives triggered by negative emotions: expressing sadness/concern

According to Ronan (2015 , p. 40), “a category that is less-frequently found in the corpus data is the expression of sorrow or feeling sad. […] Norrick (1978 , pp. 288–289) posits the expression of sorrow not on somebody else’s behalf, but on one’s own behalf, which he calls lamenting”. In her study, Ronan only finds two examples of expressing sorrow or sadness on account of oneself. This replicates the English chat, where only one example has been found of a participant expressing concern about her lack of ability to do the exercise right:

I’m awful with this

It is worth mentioning that similar emotives are relatively more frequent in the Spanish chat, where we find six occurrences in which students publicly vent their concern about not understanding or finding contents difficult, as illustrated by examples (5) and (6):

Esto para mi [sic] es un misterio

‘This is a mystery to me’

no la tengo muy clara :/

‘I’m not very sure about it :/’

In (6), the participant even accompanies his concern with an emoticon emphasizing the previous message (:/). The same reasons may be underlying this scarcity; namely, the transactional nature of the corpus, the relatively unknown nature of the participants (especially in the chats), the teacher’s presence (also in the chats) and, in the case of negative emotions, what Boucher and Osgood (1969) and Jing-Schmidt (2007) call the Pollyanna hypothesis, according to which: “Humans tend to ‘look on (and talk about) the bright side of life […] in the hope that we can verbally construct a safer world for ourselves” ( Jing-Schmidt, 2007 , pp. 422–423).

4.2 Declaratives

In this section, I will focus on Haverkate’s expressive acts centred on the hearer and declaratives according to Weigand. The different subsections will thus be devoted to the declaratives triggered by positive emotions (i.e. thanking, complimenting, greeting, agreeing and wishing other’s welfare) and negative emotions (i.e. apologies).

4.2.1 Thanking

Thanking is probably one of the declaratives more clearly formulaic and closely related to what is ordinarily understood as ‘being polite’. Norrick (1978 , p. 285) defines it as a speech act “where the speaker expresses positive feelings to the addressee, who has done a service to the speaker”. For Guiraud et al. (2011) , thanking involves the basic emotion of “joy” but also the complex emotion of “gratitude”. Thanking is therefore socially expected on those occasions where the speaker has been done a service by the addressee and its absence may be perceived as markedly rude and socially disruptive, as thanking is a reactive act par excellence ( Coulmas 1981 in Milà García, 2011 , p. 16). This also explains why parents insist on teaching their offspring to say ‘thanks’ ( Norrick, 1978 ; Greif and Gleason, 1980 ).

Expectedly enough, thanking appears in both chats in practically the same frequency. There are 19 tokens in the Spanish chat and 14 tokens in the English one which correspond to a ratio per word of 0.29% and 0.25%, respectively. This might be explained by the teacher’s presence. Students feel grateful for her time and help and markedly express their gratitude at the end of each chat, as illustrated by the examples below:

thank you dor [sic] your time!

Thank you Carmen

Vale, pues muuuchas gracias por tu esfuerzo! :D

‘ok, then thaaaaanks a lot for your effort! :D’

As can be observed, the linguistic realization of “thanking” tends to be rather formulaic and simple (as in examples (8) and (10)), which might also explain why it is favoured by a fast pacing like the one imposed by the synchronous chat. However, students may also express their gratitude in an intensified way (as in example (9)), complementing it with the explicit expression of the thanked for token (i.e. the teacher’s time or effort, as in the case of (7) and (9)). These results are in line with Milà García’s study on the speech act of gratitude ( 2011 , p. 30), where she points out that in an asymmetric situation between students and a teacher, where the teacher has done a favour to the student(s), the students opt for thanking in an intensified way.

Finally, it is also important to point out that the computer-mediated nature of the interaction seems to have a consequence (together with the asymmetric relationship between teacher and students, where the latter perceive the former as their superior in power). In fact, the ‘disembodied’ character of the interaction seems to make unavailable non-verbal means to express gratitude (e.g. a smile, a friendly touch on the arm, etc.), even if emoji may also be employed for these means. In fact, in Spanish face-to-face interactions the word ‘thanks’ may not necessarily be uttered in some contexts ( Hickey, 2005 , p. 327) and is often substituted for non-verbal expressions of gratitude.

4.2.2 Complimenting

Despite their apparent innocence, compliments have been extensively proved to be rather complex speech acts ( Maíz-Arévalo, 2010 ), which can be genuinely expressing the speaker’s approval of the hearer but also acting as satellites of face-threatening speech acts such as directives or disagreements.

In contrast to a previous study of expressives in educational forums ( Carretero et al., 2014 ), where compliments among peers –i.e. students to students- were pervasive; in the chats under analysis it is the teacher who compliments the students (in a positive evaluation of their answers, interventions, etc.). This is due to the different kind of activity; thus, in the forum the focus is on the students’ collaborative work with an inconspicuous presence of the teacher as opposed to the chat, where the floor is teacher-controlled and the conversational turns follow the typical three-turn classroom schema: I(nitiation)+R(esponse)+Follow up (cf. Sacks et al., 1974 ; Tsui, 1994 ). Table 2 shows the distribution of compliments in both chats, and how they are clearly employed as a feedback mechanism by the teacher, which is why they have been excluded from the analysis proper, where only interventions by students have been taken into account.

Frequency of compliments.

With regard to the compliments produced by students themselves, the only token produced in the Spanish chat is an implicit compliment which can be also considered an emotive (see Figure 1 ), where the student expresses her liking of a translation by one of her classmates but without addressing her directly:

Me gusta mucho su traducción

As for the English chat, the compliments produced among peers (only 3 tokens) consist of very formulaic, often employing a single adjective (“good”, “interesting”). This may be due to the fast rhythm of the chat, as commented on by one of the students in the only compliment from a student to the instructor. Interestingly enough, the compliment here is rather more elaborated, maybe because it is addressed to the teacher and because there is a face-threatening part to it (“a bit hazy”), ending it with a thanking:

Hahahaha—it was great, a bit hazy, but great. Thank you very much for this session, Carmen.

4.2.3 Greetings

As thanking, greetings are also socially expected acts whose absence may be marked and lead to social disruption. Interestingly enough, greetings are politeness routines which seem to be a universal phenomenon in human languages ( Ferguson, 1976 ). Linguistically rather formulaic and simple, greetings may be argued to be pragmatically very convenient since they are “an easy and effective way to build rapport and keep communication fluent” ( Carretero et al., 2014 , p. 278; cf. also Goffman, 1971 ; Pinto, 2008 ).

As conversational openers, greetings are expected at the beginning of a gathering such as the chats. In fact, both chats invariably start with greetings, as illustrated by the following beginnings from the Spanish and the English chat, respectively, initiated by the teacher, as the one in control of the “conversational floor”. Although the teacher’s interventions have not been included in the analysis, they have been included in these examples so as to contextualise the students’ own interventions:

Carmen (Teacher): Hola chicas, buenas tardes y gracias por conectaros. Esperamos un par de minutos más hasta que vayan conectándose el resto, vale? […]

‘Hello girls, good afternoon and thanks for connecting. Let’s wait a couple of minutes until more people have connected, ok?’

Student: Hola

Carmen (Teacher): si os parece bien, comenzamos

‘It is okay for you, we can start’

Student: Hola Carmen!

‘Hello Carmen!’

(14) Carmen (Teacher): Morning everyone!

Student: Morning!

Student: Morning!!

Student: morning!

Student: Hello

Interestingly enough, the synchronicity of the channel makes communication faster, and greetings are performed just by the very first participants to join the chat. This could explain why they are so scarce (2 in the Spanish chat and 4 in the English one) despite the relatively high number of participants. Thus, in both chats, greetings follow the same structure, the teacher greets first, opening up the “class”. The rest of the participants, who join slightly later, refrain from performing any greeting at all maybe because the conversation proper has already started and they do not want to disrupt it by, in addition, arriving “late” and threatening their own positive face in front of the group.

The presence of the teacher in the chats also seems to play an important role to determine the formality of the greetings, especially in the case of the English chat, where more colloquial formulas like “hi!” are non-existent in contrast to more formal formulas like “good morning”. This tendency, however, is not observed in the Spanish chat, maybe because “hola” is not considered as an informal but as a neutral greeting in contrast to “hi”.

Farewells (or closing greetings) can also be considered extremely formulaic ways to close a conversation and their absence is likewise noticeable and likely to provoke social disruption. In the dataset under study, they follow a similar pattern to that of their opening counterparts mostly probably due to the same reasons (the teacher’s control of the conversational floor and the fast pace of the conversation). Hence, both groups of students in the chats employ just one formula (“see you” or “hasta el miércoles”) as their farewell on nine occasions in the English chat and just three in the Spanish one.

4.2.4 Agreeing

As pointed out by Ronan (2015 , p. 33), agreement can be considered to correspond to Guiraud et al.’s category of “approval”. The distinction between ‘liking’ and ‘agreement’ is that liking expresses a positive attitude “towards a person or thing” whilst agreement expresses approval of a proposition. In certain contexts, such as the ones at hand, where there is discussion, agreement can be socially expected. From the linguistic point of view, it is also highly formulaic. As for its number of tokens, agreement is one of the most frequent acts produced in both chats (45 tokens in the Spanish chat and 44 in the English one). As in previous cases, the synchronicity and fast pacing of the chats explains why agreement is expressed in formulaic and rather brief ways, such as by means of the performative (“I agree”) or “me too”, whilst longer formulas such as “I think so”) are rarely used. This is illustrated by (15), where several practically successive answers (as indicated by the time) have been included:

11:30 Student: Me too

11:30 Student: i agree

11:31 Student: I think so

11:31 Student: i also agree

11:31 Student: me too

In the case of Spanish, the variety of formulas used to express agreement is more reduced, with only three ways to express agreement: “vale”, “ok” and “de acuerdo”. There is a clear preference for “vale” as a way to express agreement (29 tokens) as opposed to more formal and longer formulas like “de acuerdo” (with only 1 token). Interestingly enough, “ok” is also employed on 15 occasions. This could be due to the fact that these students are also proficient in English and, in fact, the subject they are studying is English-Spanish translation. As in the example above, (16) illustrates both uses in a synchronous sequence by four different students:

15:54 Student: ok

15:54 Student: vale

15:54 Student: Vale

Although “vale” outnumbers “ok”, this is still relatively frequent, also maybe because it is faster to type two letters as opposed to four. Curiously enough, there also seem to be personal preferences, since one of the students employs “ok” (occasionally with emoticons) on 6 out of the 15 occasions where it is used. Finally, Table 3 sums up the different ways to express agreement found in both chats:

The expression of agreement in the English and Spanish chats: frequency.

4.2.5 Wishing others’ welfare

There are not many examples of this speech act. The only five occurrences take place in the Spanish chat, right at the end. Occasionally, they may act in combination with farewell formulas, as illustrated by (17):

Gracias! Nos vemos el miércoles, mejórate J

‘Thanks! See you on Wednesday, get better J’

It is rather obvious that the teacher’s illness and her teaching (albeit online) triggers these good wishes on the students’ part, who appreciate her effort as shown by the fact that their good wishes are accompanied by thanking her. In the case of the other chat, there is apparently no reason why students should wish anybody’s welfare.

4.2.6 Apologies

According to Guiraud et al. (2011) , negative emotions can include basic emotions like sadness or disapproval and complex ones like guilt, regret, disappointment and reproach. When these negative emotions are related to the addressee, they can lead to the performance of speech acts like apologizing, condoling, disagreeing or reproaching. In the case of the first two, the speaker’s aim is to either restore or boost the addressee’s face by sympathising with them. Disagreement and reproach, on the other hand, pose a direct attack to the addressee’s (positive) face, who is either opposed in their views or accused of a negative behaviour. In the dataset at hand, the only declarative of this type is apologies, with a few occurrences in both chats (3 in the English chat and 5 in the Spanish one).

In apologies, the speaker expresses negative feelings towards a patient-addressee to appease them (Norrick, 1978, p. 284). Apologies may also involve the speaker’s guilt and regret for having committed a socially sanctioned fault. Linguistically, apologies may be realised by an illocutionary force indicating device (IFID henceforth) such as “I am sorry”. According to Olshtain and Cohen (1983) and Olshtain (1989) , this IFID can appear in isolation or accompanied by different strategies (which may also be used on their own) such as:

An offer of repair, i.e. “I’ll pay for your damage”

an acknowledgement of responsibility, i.e. “It was my fault”

an expression of lack of intent, i.e. “It wasn’t my intention”

an expression of self-deficiency, i.e. “I didn’t notice you”

a statement of remorse, i.e. “I feel bad for that”

an expression of self-dispraise, i.e. “How clumsy (of me)”

a justification of the addressee, i.e. “I understand why you’re upset”

In general terms, however, apologies are far from common in the data under scrutiny, with only two tokens in the case of the English chat, where students opt for the formulaic expression “sorry”, as illustrated by (18) and (19), where students apologise for a previous mistake in their correction of the exercise (as in (18)) or a misspelling, as in (19):

the students, I mean. Sorry

11:12 Student: Be orderly, brief, avoy ambiguity and one more I don’t remember

11:13 Student: *avoid sorry

As for the Spanish chat, the number of tokens is slightly higher (with 5 occurrences). Curiously enough, students in the Spanish chat seem to opt for more implicit apologies, which they may occasionally combine with humour (as in 20). This might be explained as an attempt to preserve their own positive face, either by presenting their blunder in a positive light or by avoiding the performative (“lo siento”), which might sound too formal and too much of an apology, hence admitting a larger mistake. A similar explanation might account for their use of English as part of their apology, as illustrated by example (20):

Student: ups

Unfortunately, however, the number of apologies in the data is too scarce to offer a more quantitative approach, which limits this subsection to a more qualitative perspective.

5 Conclusions

The present paper has aimed to answer the following research questions, repeated here for the sake of clarity:

To answer these questions, a delimitation of the scope of expressives was carried out, taking Weigand’s mixed game theory as a departing point of view. Hence, a distinction between emotives (i.e. where speakers express their emotions) and declaratives (i.e. polite acts expected in the particular interactional context) was established. It was hypothesized that, given the educational nature of the chats, emotives would be very low-profiled if not practically non-existent; especially so when there is a conspicuous presence of the teacher, which adds to the institutional (and relatively formal) nature of the interaction. As for the second question, the language used (mother tongue versus a foreign language) was expected to affect the frequency and type of expressive acts performed (especially in the case of emotives).

To that purpose, a corpus consisting in two chats by university students was gathered, one in Spanish and the other one in English. Both chats took place for 120 minutes and in both of them, the teacher/researcher’s presence was conspicuous, with the control of the “conversational floor”. This corpus allowed for a comparison between two different settings: students using their mother tongue (Spanish) to interact and students using a language different from their mother tongue (English) with educative purposes. From a sociopragmatic perspective, the interaction is asymmetric and polilogic (cf. Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, 2010 ), which may play a crucial role both in the social effect and directionality of facework (cf. Bravo, 2002 ; Bernal, 2007 ; Hernández Flores, 2013 ; among others).

As initially expected, analysis of the data reveals that the transactional nature of the tasks also plays a crucial role in the kind of speech acts participants produce. Hence, emotives are extremely low-profiled as opposed to declarative acts. This is due not only to the transactional nature of the task and the fact that participants feel they are in a relatively formal context but also to the teacher’s presence, which adds to the institutional nature of the interaction. On the whole, participants are more focused on ensuring a good rapport in the group and their relational facework. As a social activity among relative strangers, opening up and expressing their own emotions is hence avoided and only occurs occasionally, making these deviant cases especially interesting for the analyst. In fact, even these cases serve to boost rapport among the participants since they are immediately followed by similar “emotional outbursts” from their partners. This might be regarded as an interpersonal positive effect since it leads to a higher degree of affiliation in the group (cf. Bravo, 2005 ). With regard to declarative acts (e.g. thanking, complimenting, greeting, etc.), they are clearly more frequent as expected from the situational context the participants are engaging in.

As for the second question, the different language employed (Spanish versus English), the hypothesis is refuted since there are only two differences when the chat is carried out in English or in Spanish. On the one hand, the students of the Spanish chat perform a slightly higher number of emotives triggered by negative emotions such as concern (6 versus 1 in English). These students are few in number in their everyday classes and might feel more at ease than the students of the English chat to vent away their concerns in public. On the other hand, the students in the Spanish chat are the only ones to wish the welfare of the interlocutor (in this case, the teacher). This, however, is not due to the language they are employing to communicate but to the situational context, since they know their teacher is ill and still has carried out the chat so that they did not miss the lesson. This lack of differences might also be due to the fact that the group of students using English might be applying other sociopragmatic uses related to their own L1 rather than to those of the L2.

Finally, I must acknowledge some serious limitations faced by the present study. First, the collected corpus might certainly benefit from being enlarged in the future since its limited size does hinder generalising results and only tendencies can be reported. Secondly, the contrast with more CMC channels in pedagogic contexts –e.g. email, blogs, etc. –might offer more data regarding the use and frequency of expressive acts in this particular institutional field (e.g. tertiary education). Third, this paper has offered a general overview of expressive acts but further research is needed on each individual expressive act in larger corpora. Indeed, understanding the complexity of emotions and their linguistic realisation is bound to open up further avenues for future research.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the students who took part in these chats and who let me use their contributions for my research. Without them, this would not have been possible. Secondly, my gratitude goes to the Emo-Fundett project and team for their suggestions and thought-provoking meetings, which inspired this paper. Last but not least, I would also like to thank my husband for his encouragement, never-ending support and our discussions on sociology and social psychology, which have been highly illuminating during this research. Finally, it goes without saying that any mistakes remain exclusively mine.

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Categorizing expressive speech acts in the pragmatically annotated SPICE Ireland corpus

2015, ICAME Journal

Expressive speech acts are one of the five basic categories of speech acts identified by Searle (1976). Expressives remain underresearched, though select categories of expressive speech acts, especially offering thanks and compliments, have received more extensive attention. An overall classification of expressive speech acts on the basis of corpus data has not yet been carried out. The current study provides a first survey of different types of expressive speech acts on the basis of three categories of spoken Irish English of different levels of formality: broadcast discussion, classroom discussion and face-to-face interaction. The data are extracted from the pragmatically tagged SPICE-Ireland corpus, a member of the International Corpus of English-family of corpora. The aim of the current study is to offer an overview and classification of expressives in the corpus material. Eight distinct subcategories of expressive speech acts are identified in this study. These categories are a...

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Dialogue and Universalism, 1, 2013, 129-142.

Maciej Witek

The paper reconstructs and discusses three different approaches to the study of speech acts: (i) the intentionalist approach, according to which most illocutionary acts are to be analysed as utterances made with the Gricean communicative intentions, (ii) the institutionalist approach, which is based on the idea of illocutions as institutional acts constituted by systems of collectively accepted rules, and (iii) the interactionalist approach, the main tenet of which is that performing illocutionary acts consists in making conventional moves in accordance with patterns of social interaction. It is claimed that, first, each of the discussed approaches presupposes a different account of the nature and structure of illocutionary acts, and, second, all those approaches result from one-sided interpretations of Austin’s conception of verbal action. The first part of the paper reconstructs Austin's views on the functions and effects of felicitous illocutionary acts. The second part reconstructs and considers three different research developments in the post-Austinian speech act theory—the intentionalist approach, the institutionalist approach, and the interactionalist approach.

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Article contents

Speech acts.

• Mitchell Green Mitchell Green Philosophy, University of Connecticut
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199384655.013.200
• Published online: 29 March 2017

Speech acts are acts that can, but need not, be carried out by saying and meaning that one is doing so. Many view speech acts as the central units of communication, with phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic properties of an utterance serving as ways of identifying whether the speaker is making a promise, a prediction, a statement, or a threat. Some speech acts are momentous, since an appropriate authority can, for instance, declare war or sentence a defendant to prison, by saying that he or she is doing so. Speech acts are typically analyzed into two distinct components: a content dimension (corresponding to what is being said), and a force dimension (corresponding to how what is being said is being expressed). The grammatical mood of the sentence used in a speech act signals, but does not uniquely determine, the force of the speech act being performed. A special type of speech act is the performative, which makes explicit the force of the utterance. Although it has been famously claimed that performatives such as “I promise to be there on time” are neither true nor false, current scholarly consensus rejects this view. The study of so-called infelicities concerns the ways in which speech acts might either be defective (say by being insincere) or fail completely.

Recent theorizing about speech acts tends to fall either into conventionalist or intentionalist traditions: the former sees speech acts as analogous to moves in a game, with such acts being governed by rules of the form “doing A counts as doing B”; the latter eschews game-like rules and instead sees speech acts as governed by communicative intentions only. Debate also arises over the extent to which speakers can perform one speech act indirectly by performing another. Skeptics about the frequency of such events contend that many alleged indirect speech acts should be seen instead as expressions of attitudes. New developments in speech act theory also situate them in larger conversational frameworks, such as inquiries, debates, or deliberations made in the course of planning. In addition, recent scholarship has identified a type of oppression against under-represented groups as occurring through “silencing”: a speaker attempts to use a speech act to protect her autonomy, but the putative act fails due to her unjust milieu.

• performative
• illocutionary force
• communicative intentions
• perlocution
• felicity condition
• speaker meaning
• presupposition
• indirect speech act
• illocutionary silencing

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Article Contents

Introduction, acknowledgments, about the authors.

• < Previous

The Construction of Away Messages: a Speech Act Analysis

• Article contents
• Figures & tables
• Supplementary Data

Jacqueline Nastri, Jorge Peña, Jeffrey T. Hancock, The Construction of Away Messages: a Speech Act Analysis, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication , Volume 11, Issue 4, 1 July 2006, Pages 1025–1045, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2006.00306.x

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Previous research suggests that “away messages” in instant messaging express informational and entertainment communicative goals while displaying a users’ identity. This study investigated the extent to which these communicative goals are reflected in the language structure of away messages, by examining the speech acts performed through the production of 483 away messages crafted by 44 participants. The messages were also analyzed for the use of non-standard orthography and humor. The results show that the messages were constructed primarily with assertives, followed by expressives and commissives, but rarely with directives, confirming that away messages tend to reflect both informational and entertainment goals. Non-standard orthography and humor were also common, although experienced participants used fewer non-standard forms than less experienced participants. These findings are discussed in terms of computer-mediated discourse and online self-presentation.

Perhaps the most important function of communication technologies is to enable people to maintain connections with those from whom they are distanced physically. This function is most obviously achieved through the interpersonal messaging capabilities that these technologies support. On a daily basis individuals may use the phone to talk to friends and family, email colleagues about work and social activities, and use instant messaging to message people on their buddy lists. While these technologies are used to achieve specific objectives, like arranging a meeting or coordinating a project, they are also used more generally to stay informed about friends and family—to be in the know about what they are doing, what they are thinking, and how they are feeling. Indeed, the social uses of technology play an explicit role in maintaining relationships and presenting oneself to others ( Baym, 1995; Lea & Spears, 1995; McKenna, Green, & Gleason, 2002; Walther, 1992 ).

Communication technologies can also provide more implicit ways of maintaining social contact ( Erickson & Kellogg, 2003 ). Instant messaging (IM), for example, allows users to create and display away messages , or customized text messages signifying users’ presence or absence in front of a computer ( Baron, Squires, Tench, & Thompson, 2005 ). While the ability to leave messages for people trying to contact someone via communication technologies is not new (e.g., answering machines for the telephone, auto-responders for email), IM users appear to employ away messages in a different way from forms of messaging such as answering machines. For example, while people use answering machines in order to leave messages much as one would send a letter ( Dingwall, 1992 ), IM users frequently check the away messages of people on their buddy list without leaving a message ( Baron, et al., 2005 ; Grinter & Palen, 2002 ). Moreover, while some research suggests that people can feel frustrated or disoriented when using answering machines ( Ehrlich, 1987 ), people frequently check away messages to amuse themselves ( Baron, et al., 2005; Grinter & Palen, 2002 ).

The present study investigates the social uses of IM by examining how participants use language to construct their away messages. In particular, we examine what specific types of utterances, or speech acts, used by participants to create their away messages can tell us about the structural and functional properties of away messages. We are also interested in how people use non-standard orthography (e.g., LOL) and humor in their away messages. The objectives of this article are thus (1) to provide an empirical analysis of an important new type of communication (Pew Internet & American Life Report, 2005), (2) to assess the usefulness of speech acts as a framework for analyzing computer-mediated communication (CMC) ( Twitchell & Nunamaker, 2004 ), and (3) to examine how away messages can achieve social functions that were not necessarily intended in the design of the away message ( Dourish, 2001 ).

Communication features of instant messaging and away messages

Instant messaging is currently one of the most popular CMC technologies. For instance, IM appears to be the communication technology of choice for teenagers in the U.S., who employ instant messaging (IM) to make plans with friends, talk about homework, share jokes, check in with parents, and post away messages or notices about what they are doing when they are away from their computers (Pew Internet & American Life Report, 2005). Instant messaging is also an important resource for adults, who use it for both social and task-related interactions ( Isaacs, Walendowski, & Ranganathan, 2001 ; Ljungstrand & Hard af Segerstad, 2000 ; Nardi, Whittaker, & Brander, 2000; Quan-Haase, Cothrel, & Wellman, 2005 ). For example, IM is used in the workplace for scheduling and coordinating meetings ( Isaacs, Walendowski, Whittaker, Schiano, & Kamm, 2002 ), as well as for more personal, informal online conversations in the workplace ( Grinter & Palen, 2002 ).

Online text-based conversations require users to master a number of coordination strategies in order to achieve understanding, such as managing turn-taking (e.g., Hancock & Dunham, 2001 ). Instant messaging introduces another factor into the coordination process, namely that there is no guarantee that one’s partner is actively attending to the conversation, because IM users tend to take on multiple tasks at the same time ( Grinter & Palen, 2002 ; Nardi, et al., 2000 ; Pew Internet & American Life, 2003, 2005). As such, it is difficult for a sender to know whether a non-response reflects some message effect (e.g., his or her last message insulted the addressee) or whether the addressee is otherwise engaged (e.g., multi-tasking) or is no longer at the computer. Away messages were developed to deal with this threat to the coordination of online conversations. Away messages indicate whether communicators are in front of their computer and available for conversation or not ( Baron, et al., 2005; Grinter & Palen, 2002 ). When these messages are activated by the user or automatically (e.g., after 10 minutes of idle time), they become visible to anyone looking at the user’s IM profile.

How can we conceptualize away messages as a form of communication? In her discussion of computer-mediated discourse analysis (CMDA), Herring (2001 , 2004) describes several dimensions that can frame an analysis of mediated language use. In the CMDA framework, discourse is first classified according to medium and situational variables that may shape language use. According to this framework, away messages can be classified as an asynchronous and single-channel (text) medium, with a relatively small granularity (i.e., messages are typically short) and controlled persistence (users control how long their away message remains accessible to others). Because of their small granularity, the linguistic structure of away messages might be expected, for example, to involve non-standard orthographic forms that minimize typing effort and space ( Clark & Brennan, 1991; Herring, 2001 ).

The CMDA framework also describes different domains or levels of analysis of online discourse, including (1) structure, (2) meaning , (3) interaction management , and (4) social practices ( Herring, 2004 ). The level of interaction management analysis refers to how users coordinate their ongoing interaction (e.g., turn-taking and threading; see Cherny, 1999 ; Hancock & Dunham, 2001 ). With respect to this level, away messages are a unique form of CMD because, as noted above, they were designed explicitly to manage interactions by providing evidence about a user’s availability for communication. According to a Pew Internet and American Life Report (2005), away messages can also be used to regulate interaction coordination by allowing users to dodge conversational partners, for example by putting up an away message that remains even after the person has returned to his or her computer.

With respect to the social practices domain of CMDA, which refers to the analysis of social or contextual factors that may shape discourse, recent research suggests that away message use has evolved to include a number of important social functions, such as self-expression. For example, Grinter and Palen (2002) note that IM users dislike employing default away messages and report feeling compelled to personalize their messages in order to avoid being seen as impersonal or rude. In fact, almost eight million away message users in the United States reported that they do not use the default away message included in the popular AOL instant messenger program (i.e., “I’m away from my computer right now”), and instead post their own ( Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2005 ).

The personalization of away messages does not appear to go unnoticed. In perhaps the first systematic analysis of away messages, Baron, et al. (2005) observed that teenagers reported signing on to IM not necessarily to talk, but rather to look at the away messages of their online buddies. Based on interviews with college-age IM users and a qualitative analysis of their away messages, Baron and colleagues argued that users tend to post away messages with two communicative goals in mind: to entertain and to inform. Messages used for entertainment were often examples of self-expression and included the use of humor, quotations, and links to different websites. Messages used for informational purposes conveyed, for instance, personal information about the sender’s location or activity (e.g., “at the library”), or simply that the person was away from the computer (e.g., “out”). More broadly, away messages seemed to serve an overt self-presentation purpose, as away messages were interpreted by participants as capable of providing a glimpse of the sender’s identity ( Baron, et al., 2005 ).

These observations suggest that users construct personalized away messages with informational and expressive purposes in mind in order to regulate conversations, maintain social connections, and express their identity. If this is the case, then the linguistic composition of away messages should reflect these purposes. In the present study, we examine whether the speech acts in away messages support the informational and expressive goals that away messages are believed to accomplish. Consistent with Herring’s CMDA framework, speech act analysis is considered a type of analysis at the level of meaning (i.e., semantics, pragmatics). 1 At the same time, we are also interested in the non-standard orthography used in away messages (e.g., LOL), which involves a structural level of analysis. These analytic approaches are described below.

Speech acts and away messages

In conversation, most types of utterances do not involve simply communicating a meaning; rather, they are designed to accomplish something, such as convince someone of a belief, get someone to do something, etc. ( Austin, 1962 ). The different types of actions that we try to accomplish with our utterances are referred to as speech acts (Bach, 1994), and a long tradition of research has attempted to develop categories and classifications of different types of speech acts. Although many different taxonomies of speech acts have been presented (e.g., Austin, 1962 ; Bach & Harnish, 1979 ), one well-known taxonomy that has been used in natural language processing and other CMC research (e.g., Twitchell & Nunamaker, 2004 ) is described by Searle (1969, 1979) . In his taxonomy, Searle categorizes speech acts according to their illocutionary purpose (i.e., what the speaker is doing with the utterance), their fit to the world, their expressed psychological state, and their propositional content.

According to Searle’s basic taxonomy, there are five main categories of speech acts. (1) Assertive acts are phrases employed to form in the addressee a specific idea, proposition, or belief (e.g., “Out for a while,”“We won the game!”). With assertives speakers commit themselves to something being true. (2) Directive speech acts focus on calling the addressee to action, yet do not require the sender to reciprocate any action of his own (e.g., “call the cell”). (3) Commissive speech acts relate to committing oneself to a future action. Note that in contrast to assertive speech acts, commissives are not based in current facts (e.g., “Going to the gym then class”). (4) Expressive speech acts are based on psychological states and relate to the expression of feelings or emotions to the receiver (e.g., “It’s been a sad day”). Expressive speech acts reflect affective reactions to a situation, and therefore are not necessarily based on assertions of fact.

The fifth category of speech acts is declaratives ; according to Clark (1996) , this category can be broken down into two subsets, the (5) effective speech acts and (6) verdictive speech acts. Clark maintains that although effective and verdictive speech acts are related, they are also subtly unique. Both the effective and verdictive speech acts require the sender to be in power within an institution. The effective speech act refers to those utterances that are able to change an institutional state of affairs, such as a minister baptizing a baby. Verdictive acts also refer to changing a state of affairs, but unlike effectives they refer to judgments made by persons vested with certain institutional power, such as an umpire calling a pitch a strike even if it was outside the strike zone. Although in reality the pitch might have been a ball, with the utterance “Strike!” the umpire creates a different truth that must be upheld. These speech acts are illustrated in Table 1 .

Coding scheme for analyzing speech acts and quotations in away messages

Note. The examples were selected from the current away message corpus.

Searle’s scheme has a number of important problems (Bach, 1994; Bach & Harnish, 1979 ; Burkhardt, 1990 ). For example, the scheme does not provide any principles for how new illocutionary acts should be classified, and its assumption that each speech act belongs only to one category fails to account for the multi-functionality of language use ( Clark, 1996 ). Nonetheless, Searle’s basic classification scheme’s widely accepted nomenclature and structuralist approach provides a useful framework for the present attempt to analyze the basic linguistic construction of away messages.

If, as previous research suggests, away messages are used to inform and entertain ( Baron, et al., 2005 ), then away messages should reflect a specific pattern of speech acts. For instance, if away messages provide information about a user’s current situation or state, then the most common speech act should be the assertive. Since assertives encompass the category of notifications, they can be used to inform others about activities or current events (e.g., “not here”) as well as to entertain (e.g., “My tissues and I are staying in tonight”).

Similarly, commissive speech acts, in which the speaker pledges a future action, may also be used to provide information, since many users post away messages pertaining to tasks they plan on completing throughout the day (e.g., “Going to the gym then class”). Finally, expressive speech acts, typically based on emotional reactions to situations, may also provide information about a person (e.g., “I’m not happy now”) and entertain (e.g., “Feeling hot today”).

To the extent that away messages have as their primary purpose to provide informational and entertainment content, it seems unlikely that directive speech acts would be common, since they do not increase awareness regarding the speaker’s current state, but instead focus on the receiver. Finally, effective and verdictive speech acts are not expected to be observed frequently, as there appears to be no institutional component to away messages, at least in the context of informal IM usage.

Since assertive, commissive, and expressive speech acts may all serve to provide information and entertainment, we expected the construction of speech acts within away messages to be comprised mostly of these three speech act types. The least observed speech acts should be directives, verdictives, and effectives.

Non-standard orthography in away messages

A second objective of the present study was to examine how different types of non-standard orthographic forms are used in away messages. The first type of non-standard orthography of interest was CMC-based orthography . Online communication is rife with non-standard orthographic forms, such as abbreviations (e.g., “LOL”), emoticons (i.e., “smiley faces”), intentional misspellings (e.g., “looooong day”), and non-standard uses of punctuation (e.g., ∼*sleeping*∼) ( Baron, 2004; Hancock, 2004a; Herring, 2001; Walther & D’Addario, 2001; Yates & Orlikowski, 1992 ). Consistent with Grice’s (1989) maxims of quantity (i.e., contributions to the conversation should be informative, but no more than necessary) and relevance (i.e., contributions should be relevant to the topic of conversation), such non-standard forms have been assumed to minimize the cost of producing long textual utterances ( Clark & Brennan, 1991 ; Herring, 2001 ). For instance, substituting “BRB” for “Be Right Back” saves the communicator ten keystrokes.

The use of non-standard orthography has been observed frequently in text-based messaging in which the cost of producing characters is particularly high ( Grinter & Eldridge, 2001 ; Peña & Hancock, 2006 ; Utz, 2000 ). These types of non-standard orthographic forms have been studied in various modes of text-based interactions, including instant messaging (e.g., Baron, 2004 ; Grinter & Eldridge, 2001 ; Hancock, 2004b ), Internet Relay Chat ( Werry, 1996 ), and SMS ( Thurlow, 2003 ). The present study examines the use of non-standard CMC-based orthography in away messages in an effort to determine how frequently they are used in this message type.

The second type of orthography of interest was non-standard forms of language use that rely on knowledge that is common ground only to members within a specific community ( Clark, 1996 ). For example, the non-standard spelling of library as “libe” may be understandable only to the group of people for whom the term “libe” has been previously established as referring to the library. We refer to orthographic forms that are understood primarily within small groups or communities as group-based orthography . Given that group-based orthography relies on specific shared knowledge within a group, IM users who are members of groups should be more likely to rely on this type of orthography to reach understanding with less effort. If this is the case, then a student who is a member of multiple groups (e.g., a fraternity, a sports team, a club) should use more group-based orthography in her away messages than a student who is a member of only one group.

Theories concerned with social identity online also suggest that people involved in computerized group activities may have distinct uses and perceptions of group-based orthography (e.g., Lea & Spears, 1992 ). A number of studies have shown that members of in-groups interacting in online environments are more likely to express the social norms of the in-group in order to identify with the in-group and distance themselves from out-groups ( Douglas & McGarty, 2001 , 2002 ). For example, some group-based orthographic forms identify the user with specific clubs (e.g., “453 review session at GS”). Note that in this view group-based orthography relies not only on the shared knowledge of the specific community, but its use also highlights the speaker’s identification with that group or community. Thus, we expected that the more active a user is with groups, the more group-based orthography should be observed in away messages.

Another research question is how experience with instant messaging affects the use of these types of non-standard orthography. On the one hand, given that more experience with a channel tends to lead to enhanced perceptions and proficiency when using that channel ( Carlson & Zmud, 1999 ), we might expect that more experienced instant messagers would use more non-standard orthographic forms in their away messages ( Peña & Hancock, 2006 ; Utz, 2000 ). On the other hand, a “newbie effect” in CMC has often been observed (e.g., Kraut, et al., 2002 ), according to which new users tend to go through an initial phase of maximizing their use of novel communication forms and practices, such as the CMC orthographic forms described above, only to reduce their use over time and with experience ( Bergs & Kesseler, 2003; Thurlow, 2003 ). If this is the case, and users tend to move from a high use of non-standard orthography over time to more standard forms of English, then we should see an inverse relationship between IM experience and CMC orthography in away messages.

Finally, we are also interested in the role of humor in away messages. Research suggests that humor is often observed in text-based online communication (e.g., Baym, 1995; Danet, Ruedenberg-Wright, & Rosenbaum-Tamari, 1997; Hancock, 2004a; Holcomb, 1997; Hubler & Bell, 2003; Morkes, Kernal, & Nass, 1999 ). Hancock (2004a) has argued, consistent with the assumption of Social Information Processing theory that communicators verbalize socioemotional content ( Walther, 1992 ), that participants in text-based environments may use humor in an attempt to achieve relational goals. That is, humor may be a verbal adaptation for expressing relational intentions in a medium in which nonverbal communication is not possible. Given that away messages appear to accomplish social functions such as self-expression, humor may be an important strategy in away messages. Indeed, Baron, et al. (2005) report that away messages often incorporate humor in an attempt to showcase personality, and that the participants in their study appeared to value the use of humor in away messages. In the present study, we extend Baron, et al.’s work by providing an empirical analysis of the frequency of humor production in away messages.

Participants

This study used a sample population consisting of 49 undergraduate students who were recruited in Spring 2004 from a communication class at a large northeastern university in the United States. The sample consisted of 29 females (59.1%) and 20 males (40.9%), who ranged in age from 18 to 22 years old. Students in the study were given course credit for their participation. Five participants did not produce any away messages; thus the final sample size was reduced to 44 participants.

Participants completed a questionnaire pertaining to their computer and Instant Messenger use. 2 Participants were asked about their online activity, including how many minutes they spend online daily, the number of minutes they spend on IM, the number of months that they have been using IM, and the number of people on their buddy list. The questionnaire also included questions relating to their involvement in campus group activities, including the number of hours devoted to group activity each week. Participants also completed three other scales (i.e., a personality measure, a sarcasm scale, and a conversation indirectness scale) that are not reported in the present study.

Participants were first informed that the study required collecting their Instant Messenger screen name in order to record their away messages, and were asked for their written consent. Participants completed the measures described above after consenting to partake in the study. Participants were told that their away messages would be observed for either a one or a two-week period, although they were not told how often they would be looked at daily. Due to university scheduling conflicts (i.e., Spring break), not all the participants could be observed for two consecutive weeks, which led to two groups of participants, with 28 (57.1%) participants being observed for one week, and 21 (42.9%) participants observed for two weeks. However, statistical analyses revealed no overall differences between the two groups, and the data were collapsed. Away messages were gathered three times daily, with recording periods set at 10 a.m., 5 p.m., and 10 p.m.

Content analysis

Recorded messages were coded according to their speech acts as described in Table 1 . The unit of analysis was the speech act, defined as punctuation or propositional units. Away messages were parsed into their constitutive speech acts, as a single message could contain more than one speech act. For example, in the message “class now, then the gym” there are two speech acts, one referring to “class now” and the other referring to “then the gym.” Speech act categories, however, were mutually exclusive.

Away messages were first analyzed for the number of speech acts they contained. Next, using the speech act taxonomy described in Table 1 , the speech acts were coded as assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, effective, or verdictive. Quotations within away messages were coded in a separate category, and were not categorized into speech acts.

Messages were also coded for non-standard orthography, which was categorized into two types: that requiring group-based knowledge and that regularly found in CMC ( Hancock, 2004b; Herring, 2001; Peña & Hancock, 2006; Thurlow, 2003; Utz, 2000 ). Abbreviations and phrases requiring localized, group-related knowledge (e.g., “at the libe,” where libe refers to the library) were coded as group-based orthography . Any time a message included non-standard orthography such as emoticons, repeated punctuation (e.g., “Woo hoo Friday!!!!!,” or “Is it really raining again?!?!?!”), ellipses, intentional misspellings (e.g., “sleeeeeping”, or “riiiight”), or abbreviations (e.g., “lol” for laughing out loud, or “brb” for be right back), the element was coded as CMC-based orthography .

The speech acts were also evaluated for humor, and were coded as either containing humor or not containing humor. Humor was defined broadly to include any form of jocularity that appeared to be an attempt to signal or evoke amusement ( Norrick, 1993 ). This could include jokes (e.g., “I’ve decided to go to class…. not falling asleep and paying attention are NOT guaranteed :-O”), verbal wit (e.g., “You are the apex of sexy danger”), sarcasm or irony (e.g., “Just call me sniffles”), and teasing or facetious remarks (e.g., “Sleep… Kicking some Dartmouth a** tomorrow night on the turf… be there or you smell A LOT”).

Two raters individually coded all the messages. Inter-coder reliability at the most detailed level of the coding scheme (i.e., parsing away messages into thought-units, see Hirokawa, 1988 ), and coding these into the six types of speech acts was high ( kappa =.90). The inter-coder reliability for the humor was also satisfactory ( kappa =.83).

A total of 483 unique away messages were recorded, with a mean of .93 ( SD =.63) messages produced per day during the observation period. Five participants produced no away messages during the recording period, and they were excluded from the analysis. Females and males produced approximately the same number of away messages per day and similar frequencies of speech acts and orthography types; for this reason, gender differences are not discussed further.

A total of 80 quotations were observed. Quotations included song lyrics, famous quotes, and links to webpages. On average, there were .17 ( SD =.22) quotes per message, suggesting that about one-fifth of away messages contained a quote.

Speech act analysis

Messages were analyzed according to their speech act composition (see Table 1 ). Only messages produced by the user were included. For example, message content that consisted of quoted material (e.g., a song lyric, a hyperlink, etc.) was excluded from the speech act analysis. This yielded a total of 574 speech acts, with an average of 1.14 ( SD =.44) acts per away message.

Recall that speech acts were coded into one of six mutually exclusive speech act categories (i.e., assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, effectives, and verdictives). The proportion of each speech act category produced per participant was calculated by dividing the number of speech acts in a given category by the total number of speech acts produced by the participant. Only one effective and no verdictive speech acts were produced by the participants. As such, effectives and verdictives were not included in the analysis.

Means and standard deviations for all speech act categories are presented in Figure 1 . Non-parametric statistics were employed for the speech act analysis because of the categorical nature of the data ( Siegel, 1956 ). Pairwise comparisons among the four remaining speech acts categories (i.e., assertives, directives, commissives, and expressives) using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests revealed that participants constructed away messages with assertives (e.g., “At the library”) more than with any other speech act. Expressives (e.g., “What a lousy day”) and commissives (e.g., “…studio, kickboxing, chapter…”) were both produced more frequently than directives (e.g., “call my cellphone”), but expressives and commissives were not significantly different from one another. These analyses are described in Table 2 . Taken together, the data suggest that away messages are constructed primarily with assertive, expressive, and commissive speech acts.

Means and (standard errors) of speech act types in away messages. Note . Proportions are based on the number of speech acts divided by the total number of unique messages in that category. Because proportions represent averages across participants, the total does not necessarily sum to 1.

Pairwise Wilcoxon test comparisons among proportions of speech act types

Note. Pairwise comparisons were based on the proportion of each speech act category, calculated by dividing the total of speech acts in a given category by the total number of speech acts produced by the participant.

p <.05, two tailed.

**p<.01.

Analyses of non-standard orthographic forms and humor

A second analysis was conducted to examine the use of non-standard orthography and humor in away messages. Recall that non-standard orthography was coded into two types: group-based and CMC-based forms. The proportion of orthographic forms per message was calculated by dividing the total number of orthographic forms by the total number of messages produced per person. The two orthography types were not significantly related ( r =.21, ns ); hence independent analyses were done for each type.

On average, 9% ( SD =14%) of away messages included group-based orthographic forms. We expected that involvement in local group activities should be associated with higher production of group-based orthography in away messages. Involvement in student groups was measured in two ways: (1) as the total number of groups with which a participant was involved, and (2) as the total number of hours participants reported working in group-based activity per week. The correlation between total number of groups and group-based orthography usage was not significant ( r =−.10, ns ). Similarly, the correlation between hours involved in group activity and group-based orthography was not reliable ( r =−.05, ns ).

On average, 39% ( SD = 50%) of away messages included CMC-based orthography. Our primary question was how IM experience related to the use of orthographic forms. Experience with IM was measured in three ways: (1) the number of months that a participant had used IM, (2) the number of minutes that a participant reported using IM on a daily basis, and (3) the number of people on a participant’s buddy list. CMC orthography did not correlate with either the number of minutes a participant used IM on a daily basis ( r =−.03, ns ), or the number of people on a participant’s buddy list ( r =.03, ns ). While these measures of experience were not related to CMC orthography usage, the number of months that a participant had been using IM was negatively correlated with CMC orthography production ( r =−.33, p <.01), indicating that the longer participants had used IM, the fewer CMC orthographic forms they used per away message. These data suggest that increased experience with IM may result in a reduced rate of CMC orthography in away messages.

Finally, the proportion of humor per message was calculated in the same manner described above for non-standard orthography. Specifically, the total number of messages that involved humor was divided by the total number of messages produced per person. On average, 16% ( SD =21%) of away messages contained some element of humor, suggesting that approximately one-fifth of messages were humorous.

Speech acts, orthography, and humor

To what degree are different speech acts associated with different types of orthography and humor? In order to examine this question, the frequencies of group-based and CMC-based orthographic forms, as well as humor, were examined across the four types of speech acts observed in the sample of messages (i.e., assertives, directives, commissives, and expressives) (see Table 3 ). A Chi square analysis revealed significant differences in the pattern of group-based orthography use across speech acts, χ 2 (3) = 35.09, p< .001. As can be seen in Table 3 , group-based orthography was used in the assertive category more than would be expected by chance and less than expected in the directive and expressive categories. The pattern of CMC-based orthography across speech act categories was also significant, χ 2 (3) = 129.84, p< .001. As described in Table 3 , CMC orthography was produced more frequently than expected in assertive speech acts and less than expected in expressive, commissive, and directive categories. Finally, humor was also observed more often than expected in the assertive category and less than expected in the directive and commissive categories, with the expected amount of humor being displayed in the expressive category, χ 2 (3) = 108.58, p< .001. When comparing across the orthography types, assertives appeared to be most frequently associated with group-based and CMC-based orthographic forms, as well as with humor.

Observed and (expected) values across speech acts, orthography, and humor

The present study investigated the construction of away messages by examining how IM users produced speech acts, group-based and CMC orthography, and humor in their messages. While previous studies have taken a qualitative approach to why people use away messages (e.g., Baron, et al., 2005 ; Grinter & Palen, 2002 ), the present study complemented this research by empirically analyzing the linguistic structure of away messages in relation to the communication goals identified in the previous studies. First, it is worth noting that participants appear to use away messages far more frequently than the message features of other communication technologies (e.g., answering machines for telephones). Participants in this study posted an average of .93 unique messages on a daily basis. This observation suggests that away messages are changed approximately once per day, which is much more frequent than other asynchronous messaging services, such as answering machine messages or voicemail ( Ehrlich, 1987 ).

Recent studies have argued that away messages provide either informational or entertainment value when explaining one’s absence ( Baron, et al., 2005 ). Consistent with these functions, the speech act structure of observed away messages was also found to be primarily informational and expressive in nature. Assertive speech acts or statements of facts accounted for 68% of all speech acts produced, with expressive speech acts or affective reactions accounting for 14%, and commissive speech acts accounting for 12%. The proportion of assertive speech acts within away messages was significantly higher than all other speech act categories. The rates at which commissive and expressive speech acts were produced did not differ from one another, but both were produced more frequently than directives, verdictives, and effectives.

The very low production rate of directive speech acts is consistent with the assumption that away messages are used primarily for informational and expressive purposes. Directive speech acts focus on getting the receiver to do something ( Searle, 1979 ). Effective and verdictive speech acts are statements made in conjunction with institutional settings ( Clark, 1996 ). Because instant messaging lacks this institutional framework, at least in the context of student away messaging, the absence of effective and verdictive speech acts was expected.

One of the main functions of informational away messages is to convey that one is not in front of the computer or to otherwise signal unavailability for instant messaging at that time ( Baron, et al., 2005 ). It appears that this function is mostly accomplished by using assertives stating where one is (e.g., “at the gym”), or assertives simply stating that one is unavailable (e.g., “out and around…”). Baron, et al. observed that whether away messages signaled unavailability or one’s whereabouts and activities, the messages still fulfilled the function of informing buddies of a person’s online conversational status (i.e., available/unavailable). In particular, the assertive speech acts observed in this study often conveyed unavailablility (e.g., “very busy, off doing stuff”) rather than offering explicit information about one’s whereabouts and activities (e.g., “classes, gym, girlfriend”). Finally, compared to the other speech acts, assertives were also the most frequently associated with non-standard orthographic forms and humor (see Table 3 ), providing additional evidence that assertives are the most important speech act in the construction of away messages.

Commissive speech acts, which usually list the activities one will become involved in, such as “then class” in the away message “at the gym til 2, then class,” also seem to support the provision of information about one’s activities. By posting commissive-based away messages detailing personal schedules or future plans (e.g., “Class and then testing fume hoods in Duffield!! Def want to get out of work early-back around 4 ?!?!”), participants are fulfilling the informational function ascribed to away messages ( Baron, et al., 2005 ). Commissives were not significantly associated with humor, indicating that this particular speech act may not fulfill entertainment purposes when posting away messages.

Expressive speech acts were also relatively frequent in the construction of away messages, comprising 14% of the speech act sample. In contrast to assertive and commissive speech acts, expressive acts are typically emotion based ( Clark, 1996 ). Instead of providing factual or scheduling information, expressive speech acts reflect sentiments about specific events or people. Expressive speech acts also appear to be uniquely suited to achieving both the informational and entertainment functions of away messages described by Baron, et al. (2005) . Through the display of emotions and feelings (e.g., “Yaay for Friday!,”“Damm the political theories of hobbes, locke, rousseau…damn them!”), participants not only inform buddies of their personal opinions (e.g., their favorite classes, people, and activities), but they also give a glimpse of their emotional state (e.g., aroused, happy, sad, angry, stressed).

While Baron, et al. (2005) found that away messages were sometimes used to initiate discussions or social encounters, this purpose was not reflected in the speech act structure of the away messages observed in the present study. As stated above, directive speech acts (e.g., “call the cell”), which ask the receiver to take some action ( Searle, 1979 ), comprised only 6% of the total speech acts in the sample. Instead, based on the most prevalent speech act categories in away messages (i.e., assertives, commissives, and expressives), it appears that the main goal of the away message is not to coordinate joint activities, but rather to provide a forum for posting personal information and self-expression. Future studies might focus on possible behavioral responses elicited by away messages beyond their speech act structure. For instance, an assertive-based away message (e.g., “at Mann library”) may prompt closer buddies actually to go to the library to interact with the sender of the informative message.

Although the use of Searle’s taxonomy in the present study offers important insight into how away messages are built linguistically, some assumptions underlying Searle’s notion of speech acts have been criticized over the years (e.g., Bach & Harnish, 1979 ; Burkhardt, 1990 ). For example, the mutually exclusive nature of the speech act categories glosses over the multiple levels and goals of communication (see Hirokawa, 1988 ). While Searle’s speech acts may represent a narrow view on language use (see Clark, 1996 ), the taxonomy provides a well-known nomenclature for this initial analysis of speech acts in away messaging. Indeed, the speech act perspective has been recently reinvigorated as a valuable approach to understanding CMC conversations in other contexts ( Twitchell, Adkins, Nunamaker, & Burgoon, 2004 ; Twitchell & Nunamaker, 2004 ).

We also investigated the use of non-standard orthography within away messages. We considered both group-based (e.g., students saying “at the libe” to refer to the library), and CMC-based orthographic forms (e.g., “lol” to refer to laughing out loud). Drawing on theories of common ground (e.g., Clark, 1996 ) and research on social identity (e.g., Douglas & McGarty, 2001 , 2002 ; Lea & Spears, 1992 ), we predicted that the greater one’s group involvement, the more group-based orthography a person would post. This prediction, however, was not supported; the correlations between group involvement and group-based orthography were not significant. This lack of support could be due in part to the university setting from which the participants were selected. A university is in itself a large group, and university students tend to share a large number of experiences. As a consequence, they may also have substantial amounts of common ground and non-standard orthography signaling shared group identification (e.g., naming conventions for places on campus, knowledge of specific classes, and university sporting events). While some group-based orthography observed was related to specific campus groups such as fraternities and sororities, the majority of group-based orthography was grounded in the localized language of the university (e.g., “at club uris,” referring to the campus library, and “on the hill,” referring to campus). Additional research is required to examine differences in group-based orthography in away messages comparing more heterogeneous communities (e.g., a student community and a professional community).

CMC-based orthography was more frequently produced in the away messages than was group-based orthography, with 39% of away messages containing some type of CMC orthography, including common abbreviations (e.g., “BRB” for Be Right Back), emoticons, intentional misspellings (e.g., “loooooong day”), and non-standard uses of punctuation (e.g., ∼*sleeping*∼). These findings support views of language use that argue that users adapt their language to the constraints of the communication medium and to their social objectives (e.g., Clark & Brennan, 1991 ; Herring, 2001 ). The present data suggest that users view these orthographic forms as an effective language strategy for accomplishing the informational and entertainment objectives discussed above, through shortening phrases (e.g., BRB) or lengthening expressions (e.g., “loooooong day”).

The participants’ experience with instant messaging played an important role in how frequently they used non-standard orthography. In particular, a negative correlation was observed between the number of months a participant had used instant messaging and their production of CMC orthography, suggesting that more experienced players used fewer non-standard forms. This observation is consistent with recent research suggesting that people tend to overuse these distinctive forms of non-standard orthography initially, returning to more standard forms of English as they gain experience with the medium ( Bergs & Kesseler, 2003 ; Thurlow, 2003 ). This negative trend, from overuse to more normalized use, however, has not been observed in all forms of CMC. In fact, research in synchronous forms of CMC such as online multiplayer videogames suggests that more experienced participants rely more heavily on CMC-based orthography ( Peña & Hancock, 2006; Utz, 2000 ). Additional research is needed to investigate the factors that identify the factors that moderate the relationship between experience and non-standard language use.

Finally, the humor analysis suggested that away messages often have a jocular or witty component. Almost one-fifth of all away messages in our sample included some attempt to evoke amusement. The frequency with which humor was observed in the present study is consistent with a growing literature suggesting that CMC is rife with humor ( Baym, 1995; Danet, et al., 1997; Hancock, 2004a, 2004b; Holcomb, 1997; Hubler & Bell, 2003; Morkes, Kernal, & Nass, 1999 ). The fact that humor was so frequently observed in away messages also suggests that, as noted above, while a primary function of away messages may be to provide information about one’s activities or status, self-expression is also important. At the level of speech acts, humor was associated with assertive and expressive speech acts rather than with commissive or directive speech acts.

Quotations coming from books, movies, and song lyrics were also often used in away messages. In our data, 17% of away messages contained a quotation of some kind. This finding is consistent with Baron, et al. (2005) , who also found that quotations were a common component of away messages. Baron, et al. (2005) argue that quotations fulfill the same functions as self-produced language in away messages, namely to entertain and provide personal information.

At a broader level, our findings suggest that participants made active use of away messages for self-presentation purposes ( Goffman, 1956 ), a social function that was not necessarily a part of their original design (i.e., indicating absence from computer) (see Dourish, 2001 , for a discussion of emergent technology use). Much as we do with clothes, the IM users in this study tended to change their away messages on a daily basis. The quantitatively defined speech act structure (i.e., assertives, commissives, and expressives) reported in the present study, which is assumed to reveal the intentions of the speakers ( Searle, 1979 ), complements the qualitative approach of Baron, et al. (2005) , supporting the view that informational and entertainment motivations underlie the construction of away messages. Participants also displayed their personal tastes by using humor and various forms of quotation in many of their away messages. These results paint an overall picture of active and purposeful impression management by means of away messages. This is congruent with Baron, et al.’s (2005) proposition that away messaging is “onstage” or overt impression management behavior. It appears that away messages are part of the modern expressive equipment students at U.S. universities use to perform social roles ( Goffman, 1956 ), at least in front of online buddies.

Taken together, these results improve our understanding about how away messages are constructed in relation to identified messaging goals. While some messages provide information about one’s activities and others focus more on personal beliefs and mottos, what these messages all have in common is that they provide information regarding a user’s current communication status (e.g., online/offline), activity, schedule, emotional state, etc., potentially offering cues for impression formation and the maintenance of social links. Through posting away messages, users can express their identity and maintain their sense of connection to their friends and family by providing them with a window into their lives.

This manuscript is based in part on an honor’s thesis by the first author in the Department of Communication at Cornell University. The authors would like to thank Joseph Walther for his comments on an earlier draft. This research was supported by a Federal Hatch Grant to Jeffrey Hancock.

Speech acts accomplish different functions simultaneously; they “do things with words” on the illocutionary level and may also participate in interaction (i.e., count as interactional moves). As such, speech act analysis can be classified at multiple levels of analysis in the CMDA framework. In the present study, we consider speech act analysis at the meaning level of CMDA, in that we do not analyze the exchange of messages but rather the qualities of individual messages.

AOL was the primary instant messaging system used by all the recruited participants.

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Jacquelyn Nastri, B.S. Cornell University, has completed her first year in the Teach for America program. Her interests focus on how people use language to express themselves in computer-mediated discourse.

Address : 240 Heartland Terrace; Orange, CT 06477 USA

Jorge Peña is a doctoral student in the Department of Communication at Cornell University. His research focuses on how interaction takes place and impressions develop during online work and play. His previous publications focus on communication processes during online computer game playing.

Address: Department of Communication, 320 Kennedy Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14853 USA

Jeffrey T. Hancock is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication and in the Faculty of Computing and Information Science at Cornell University. His research focuses on social interactions mediated by information and communication technology, with an emphasis on how people produce and understand language.

Address : Department of Communication, 320 Kennedy Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14853 USA

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Book contents

• Frontmatter
• List of contributors
• Series editors' preface
• Acknowledgements
• Part I LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY
• Part II LANGUAGE AND VARIATION
• Part III LANGUAGE AND INTERACTION
• Part IV LANGUAGE AND CULTURE
• 11 The ethnography of communication
• 12 Speech acts
• 13 Literacy and literacies

12 - Speech acts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2009

“Sorry about that!” may serve as an adequate apology in some situations. In others it may be perceived as a rude, even arrogant, nonapology. In yet other situations, it may not even be intended as an apology in the first place. Hence, it has become increasingly clear that the teaching of second language words and phrases isolated from their sociocultural context may lead to the production of linguistic curiosities which do not achieve their communicative purposes. Given this reality, second language teachers may well find that an understanding of speech act theory and practice will improve their ability to prepare their learners to meet the challenge of producing more contextually appropriate speech in the target language.

Speech act behavior constitutes an area of continual concern for language learners since they are repeatedly faced with the need to utilize speech acts such as complaints, apologies, requests, and refusals, each of which can be realized by means of a host of potential strategies. Although no course of instruction could possibly furnish all the insights that a foreign language learner would need in order to successfully finetune each and every speech act utterance, there is some evidence that furnishing learners with selected insights regarding the comprehension and production of speech acts may provide them with valuable information that they would probably not acquire on their own.

This chapter will first define speech acts and provide a brief overview of how this field of discourse has been applied to second language acquisition (SLA).

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• Speech acts
• By Andrew D. Cohen
• Edited by Sandra Lee McKay , San Francisco State University , Nancy H. Hornberger , University of Pennsylvania
• Book: Sociolinguistics and Language Teaching
• Online publication: 22 July 2009
• Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511551185.018

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