recognition in international law essay

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In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Recognition in International Law

Introduction, bibliographies.

General Studies
Studies of Historical Interest
Judicial Decisions
Recognition of State
Specific Studies on the Former Yugoslavia
Specific Studies on Kosovo
Specific Studies on Palestine
Specific Studies on Northern Cyprus
Specific Studies on South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Specific Studies on Somaliland
Specific Studies on Crimea
Specific Studies on Catalonia
Specific Studies on Côte d’Ivoire
Abandonment of Recognition of Governments
Specific Studies on the USSR and China
Particular Situations of Governments in Exile
National Liberation Organizations
Other Objects of Recognition
De Facto and De Jure Recognition
Implied Recognition
Collective Recognition
Conditional Recognition
Effects in the International Legal Order
Effects in the Domestic Legal Order
Obligation of Nonrecognition
Withdrawal of Recognition

Other Subject Areas

Forthcoming articles expand or collapse the "forthcoming articles" section.

China and the Law on Use of Force
China and World Trade Organization Law
Legitimacy in International Law
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Recognition of States under International Law

International law Subject-wise Law Notes
June 8, 2021

Introduction

A new state is born out from an existing State or an old State which disappeared and comes with a new name or by splitting an existing State into two States. If a new state enjoys certain rights, privileges and obligations then it must get recognition as a state, which is very essential. However, there are some minimum criteria required before a State is considered to be a State. A State must get the De Jure (when a state is legally recognized) recognition for considering a State as a sovereign State. Political thought plays an important role in this decision whether to grant recognition or not. For recognition as a State, it must enter into relations with the other existing States. The elements, theories, and processes are reflected in this article.

Meaning of State Recognition in Public International Law

The term “Recognition” means ratification, confirmation, acknowledgment that something done by any other person in one name had one’s authority.

Recognition of State

“In recognizing a state as a member of international community, the existing states declare that in their opinion the new state fulfills the conditions off statehood as required by International law” (Oppenheim)

According to Kelsen

The country to be recognized as an international person must be:-

Politically organized
Have control over a definite territory.
Which tends towards permanence.
And must be independent.

Essentials for recognition as a state under Public International Law

Under the International Law, Article 1 of the Montevideo Conference, 1933 defines the state as a person and lays down following essentials that an entity should possess in order to acquire recognition as a state:

Population;
Government;
Sovereignty;
Control should tend towards permanency.

If these conditions are fulfilled, then the State can be recognized.

Legal effects of state recognition in Public International Law

When a state acquires recognition, it gains certain rights, obligations and immunities such as.

It acquires the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations with other states.
It acquires the capacity to enter into treaties with other states.
The state is able to enjoy the rights and privileges of international statehood.
The state can undergo state succession.
With the recognition of state comes the right to sue and to be sued.
The state can become a member of the United Nations organisation.

Theories of recognition in international law

The recognition of a new entity as a sovereign state is based on two main theories:

Consecutive Theory
Declaratory Theory

1. Consecutive theory of state recognition in International Law

The main exponents related to this theory are Oppenheim, Hegal and Anziloti .

According to the consecutive theory of state recognition in International Law, for a State to be considered an international person, its recognition by the existing states as a sovereign required. Consecutive theory of state recognition in International Law is of the view that only after recognition a State gets the status of an International Person and becomes a subject to International Law. So, even if an entity possesses all the characteristics of a state, it does not get the status of an international person unless recognised by the existing States.

Consecutive theory of state recognition in International Law does not mean that a State does not exist unless recognised, but according to this theory, a state only gets the exclusive rights and obligations and becomes a subject to International Law after its recognition by other existing States.

Criticism of the consecutive theory of state recognition in International Law

This theory has been criticised by several jurists. Few of the criticisms of this theory are:

This theory is criticised because unless a state is recognised by other existing states, rights, duties and obligations of statehood community under International Law is not applicable to it.
This theory also leads to confusion when a new state is acknowledged and recognised by some of the existing states and not recognised by other states.

2. Declaratory theory of state recognition in International Law

The main exponents of the Declaratory Theory of Statehood are Wigner, Hall, Fisher and Brierly. According to this theory, any new state is independent of the consent by existing states. This theory has been laid down under Article 3 of the Montevideo Conference of 1933. This theory states that the existence of a new state does not depend on being recognised by the existing state. Even before recognition by other states, the new state has the right to defend its integrity and independence under International law.

The followers of theory consider the process of recognition as merely a formal acknowledgement of statehood by other states.

Criticism of the declaratory theory of state recognition in International Law

The declaratory theory of statehood has also been criticised. This declaratory theory of state recognition in International Law has been criticised on the ground that this theory alone cannot be applicable for recognition of a state. When a state having essential characteristics comes into existence as a state, it can exercise international rights and obligations and here comes the application of declaratory theory, but when other states acknowledge its existence and the state gets the legal rights of recognition, the consecutive theory comes into play.

Modes of Recognition of State in International Law

De facto Recognition.
De jure Recognition.

These are the two modes of recognition of State in International Law.

De facto Recognition of States under International Law

It is the process of acknowledging a new state by a non-committal act.

De facto recognition is a provisionally grant.
It is the first step to the next mode of recognition.
It is a temporary and factual recognition as a state
It can either be conditional or without any condition.
A test of control for newly formed states.

When the other existing countries have an opinion that the new state does not have enough capacity but the new state holds a sufficient territory and control over a particular territory.

Example: The Soviet Union was de facto recognized by the government of the UK in 1921.

De jure recognition of States under International Law

When the other existing countries have an opinion that the new state has all the eligible capacity then such state will be recognized by the de jure recognition. To grant recognition under the de jure method there is no need for the fulfillment of the first mode.

It is granted when the newly formed state acquires permanent stability and statehood.
It grants the permanent status of a newborn state as a sovereign state.

Example: The Soviet Union was given de jure recognition Soviet Union was in 1924.

In conclusion, there is no distinction between de facto and de jure as it is for the states to give effect to the internal acts of the recognized authority. This was held in the case Luther v. Sagar [3]. [(1921)3 KB 532]

The distinction between De Facto and De Jure Recognition of State in International Law

As soon as the de facto recognition under International Law is given, the Government acquires sovereign immunity from being sued in the courts of a foreign State which so recognizes it. It does not matter in such cases, whether de facto or de jure recognition is given, because a de facto recognition dates back in the same manner as a de jure recognition.

This rule has been applied in a number of cases viz. Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt & Ligouri (1937) 3 All ER 8. The Arantzanu Mendi (1939) 1 All ER 719. So far as conflict of authority takes place between a displaced de jure government and a newly recognized de facto government, concerning matters in the territory ruled by the de facto government, the rights and status of de facto government will prevail.

Forms of Recognition of State in International Law

When a newly formed state is recognised, its declaration can be made in two forms:

Expressed Recognition
Implied Recognition

1. Expressed Recognition of State

When an existing state recognises a new state expressly through official declaration or notification, it is considered to be the expressed form of recognition. Express recognition can be made through any express or formal means such as sending or publishing declaration or statement to the opposite party. When a state is recognised by expressed ways, it is a de jure recognition unless provided otherwise by the recognising state in the declaration.

2. Implied Recognition of State

When the existing state recognises a newly formed state through any implied act, then it is considered as an implied recognition. Implied recognition can be granted through any implied means by which a current state treats the newly formed state as an international person. The implied credit not granted through any official notification or declaration. The recognition through implied means varies from case to case.

Conditional recognition of State in International Law

The recognition of state with which certain conditions are attached in order to obtain its status as a sovereign state is conditional recognition in International Law. The conditions attached varies from state to state such as religious freedom, the rule of law, democracy, human rights etc. The recognition of any state is already associated with the essential conditions to be fulfilled for the status of a sovereign state but when an addition condition is attached it is conditional recognition in International Law.

Many jurists criticise conditional recognition. The conditional recognition is criticised on the ground that recognition is a legal procedure, and no additional conditions should be attached with it other than the conditions recognised by law. Another reason for criticism is that the recognised state if it does not fulfil the condition attached for its recognition, recognition is not extinguished and it should still be valid.

An example is Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.), recognized by many States including India. In contrast to de facto government, governments-in-exile lack effective control over the territory of a State and have been accorded de jure recognition.

Withdrawal of Recognition of State in International Law

1. withdrawal of de facto recognition in international law.

Under international law when a state having de facto recognition fails to fulfil the essential conditions of statehood, its recognition can be withdrawn. The recognition can be withdrawn in International Law by the recognizing state through declaration or through communicating with the authorities of the recognized states. The withdrawal can also be done by issuing a public statement.

2. Withdrawal of De Jure recognition in International Law

Withdrawal of de jure recognition is a very debatable issue under the International Law. Withdrawal of a de jure recognition in International Law is a very exceptional event. If strictly interpreted, the de jure recognition can be withdrawn.

Even though the process of recognition is a political act, de jure recognition is of legal nature. Jurists who consider de jure recognition as a political act considers it revocable. Such revocation of de jure recognised states can be withdrawn only when a state loses the essential characteristics of statehood or any other exceptional circumstances. This type of revocation can be done expressly by the recognising state by issuing a public statement.

Recognition of government

For any statehood, the government is an important element. When a state is formed, its government changes from time to time. When the government changes as an ordinary course of political action, the recognition of government by the existing state is not required but when the government changes due to any revolution, then its recognition by the existing state is required.

For recognising the new government established out of revolution, the existing states need to consider that:

The new government have sufficient control over the territory and its people or not.
The new government is willing to fulfil the international duties and obligations or not.

When the existing states are satisfied that the new government resulting out of the revolution is capable of fulfilling the conditions as mentioned above, then the new government can be recognised by the existing states.

The recognition of the state is an essential procedure so that it can enjoy all the privileges of statehood community under international law. There is a controversy between Consecutive Theory and Declaratory theory of Recognition by different jurists, but we can conclude that the theory followed for recognition is in between the consecutive and declaratory theory.

The recognition being either de facto or de jure, it provides rights, privileges and obligations. When a state gets its de facto recognition, the rights, privileges and obligations are less but when it is recognised de jure, it gets absolute rights, liabilities and privileges. The recognition of the state is too much politically influences on the International platform.

There have been many instances where the powerful states create obstructions in recognition of a newly formed state. It can even be withdrawal when the recognising state feels that the new state is not fulfilling the prerequisites for being a sovereign state. The recognition can be done either by express form or implied form and its mode, i.e., de facto and de jure recognition varies from case to case basis.

United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/international-law-and-justice/index.html.
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, https://www.ilsa.org/Jessup/Jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf.
Luther v. Sagar, (1921)3 KB 532.
Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt & Ligouri (1937) 3 All ER 8
Verma S.K, Introduction to Public International Law, 2nd Edition,2014.
Recognition of a State under International Law, https://blog.ipleaders.in/recognition-state-international-law/
Recognition of State – its implication, modes, and necessity, Legal Bites, https://www.legalbites.in/recognition-state-implication-modes-necessity/
Dr. Walid Abdulrahim Professor of Law, Recognition, https://sites.google.com/site/walidabdulrahim/home/my-studies-in-english/8-recognition.

Author Details: Ayushi Chaudhary (Amity Law School)

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Recognition Of A State Under International Law

Introduction.

International Law is also known as public international law and the law of nations is the set of rules, norms and standards generally accepted in relations between nations. [1] Usually, every country is termed as ‘State’ under international law. Under international law, the agreements and treaties are binding between the states. For a state to enjoy its rights, duties and obligations of the international law, it must be recognized on an international platform or in an international community. An entity to be recognized as a state should possess all the attributes of statehood that are population, sovereignty, government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. It is only after the recognition of the states that the other states of the international community will acknowledge it.

Requirements of Statehood

As such there are no fixed rules or criterions for an entity to be a state. It is from the point of view of others that the essentials are drafted to some extent.

Montevideo Convention

According to Montevideo Conference, 1993 under international law, the essential for an entity to become a state are as follows:-

Permanent population
Definite / fixed territory
Well organized government
Capacity to enter into an agreement or relationship with other states

Kelsen’s Theory

According to Kelsen, a community to be recognized as an international person it must fulfill the following four conditions:

The community must be politically organized.
It should have control over the definite territory.
This control tends towards permanence.
The community thus constituted must be independent.

Definition of Recognition

“In recognizing state as a member of the international community, the existing state declares that in their opinion the new state fulfills the condition of statehood as required by the International law.” – Prof. Oppenheim. “It is a political community acquiring or satisfying the requirements of statehood, qualifying itself to be the members of the international community.” – J. Jessup.

Thus the recognition of a state can be defined as the acknowledgment or acceptance of a state as an international entity by the existing state of the international community. [2]

The requirements laid down by the Montevideo Convention are fourfold requirements to a political community. One cannot say whether the nature of these requirements is legal or political. Sometimes it is theoretically legal and sometimes it is practically political. Hence the nature of the requirement is legal or political affairs. The recognition of the state is sometimes a free act and sometimes a political act. Through the political act, recognition is used to support or to reject a state or a government which is new in an international community.

The legal importance of recognition is the interrelation between the states that are governed by the process of recognition. Various rights and duties are conferred on recognized states. For example – the recognized states have diplomatic immunity and the ability to file a suit in the International Court of Justice whereas the unrecognized states do not have such diplomatic immunity.

Expressed or Implied Recognition

Recognition usually depends upon the matter of will and intention of the state. It may be either expressed or implied. The new entity must however give a clear indication as to enter into relations with other states or to accept the new government.

Express recognition means the acknowledgment of the recognized state by a formal declaration. This formal declaration can be made via the formal announcement of recognition, a personal message from the head of a State or the minister of foreign affairs, a diplomatic note, or a treaty of recognition. [3]

Implied recognition means the recognition of a state or government where in there is no need to make an official declaration or actions is intended to grant recognition.

Theories of recognition

There are mainly two traditional theories of recognition:-

Constitutive Theory
Declaratory Theory

The constitutive theory was the standard nineteenth-century model of statehood, and the declaratory theory was developed in the twentieth century to address shortcomings of the constitutive theory. [4]

1. Constitutive Theory

The constitutive view is largely expounded by legal positivists. This theory is supported and propounded by Hegel, Anzilloti, Holland and Oppenheim.

According to Holland, a State cannot be said to have attained maturity unless it is stamped with the seal of recognition, which is indispensable to the full enjoyment of rights which it connotes. According to Oppenheim, a State is and becomes an international person through recognition only and exclusively.

According to this theory, recognition gives the rights and duties to recognized states under international law. Thus a new state can acquire rights and duties only when the former old states have recognized it. Thus even though an entity may possess the criteria of statehood but a new community cannot claim to participate in international law unless and until there has been formal act of recognition.

The first and foremost drawback of this theory is that for an entity to be recognized there should be recognized from the pre–existing states. Secondly, the pre–existing states have got no rights, duties and obligations to recognize any entity which in fact has acquired the attributes of statehood. Thirdly, the government of the new state cannot be recognized on the same footing as the state is recognized. The government clearly cannot be “constituted” by the recognizing state, although they can be admitted to the rights which the pre-existing state possessed. Fourthly, non-recognition of the state means it is not protected under international law, war and peaces as well as they also do not possess any rights and duties which cannot be accepted.

2. Declaratory Theory

This theory was supported and propounded by Brierly, Moore, Verdross, Chen, Kunz, and Briggs. This theory is exactly the opposite of the constitutive theory i.e. in this theory it is first statehood and then recognition. It is a formal acknowledgment of an already existing state. According to this theory statehood or authority of new government existed even prior to and independently of recognition. When the entity acquires the attributes of statehood than it automatically turns into a state and becomes subject to the rights and duties of the international law without any formal action on the part of the other members of the international system.

As Moore says, “The rights and attributes of sovereignty belong to it independently of all recognition, but it is only after it has been recognized that it is assured of exercising them.” Like an infant who obtains majority without expressed recognition similarly a community which has satisfied the objective conditions of international law, obtains statehood. This thus results in setting up of standard objectives like population, territory, independence and the existence of government. This theory has made it possible to overcome the problems of accommodating government. The government of the state cannot be constituted directly through recognition but their existence can be made by declaratory actions of the recognizing states.

As compared to the constitutive theory, this theory also has some drawbacks to it. The sates do not acquire international rights unless and until they are recognized on the international platform. The major difficulties of this theory would be the eligibility criteria to apply, instability and unpredictable natures of the competing versions of the criteria, the hypocrisy in applying different criteria to different states and the legitimacy of some proposed criteria. [5]

Analysis of the theories

Both the theories of recognition are appropriate within their own limited spheres and that the term ‘recognition’ contains too many concepts which can be usefully distinguished. Many activists have tried to merge the two theories but it was not possible as the theories are not entirely convincing. Lauterpacht’s attempted to create a synthesis—that the constitutive theory should be applied for the notion that the new state begins its existence upon recognition and the declaratory theory for the notion that states’ discretion in recognizing the new state was constrained.

Thomas Grant stated that there is more than one institution of recognition. Michael Schoiswohl has proposed a “dissolving succession” theory in relation to Somalia, but which might apply more widely. [6] This theory proposes that recognition is declaratory when the new state’s status is not disputed, but that it is constitutive (or semi-constitutive) when the state’s personality is disputed.

Practically, in today’s world, for a community to recognize as a state by the United Nations, it has to qualify the attributes of statehood. However, as the act of recognition is the free will of each State, even in the case of recognition by U.N., the States, which did not vote in favor, are not deemed to have recognized a new State. [7] India also considers the legal qualifications a state must comply in order to be recognized. The recognition is widely influenced by political, economical and strategic considerations.

Three main functions of recognition must be separately considered [8] :

1. In the general international law which imposes state responsibility for external actions, recognition is granted by a declaratory process. Such an approach is necessary in order to avoid the possibility of hostile confrontations. Any community which meets the standards of statehood must be treated with all the respect due to a foreign state.

2. This declaratory standard does not apply to matters which international law leaves to the discretion of each state, such as the exchange of diplomatic representatives, which may be called political recognition. Since these matters are merely discretionary, the constitutive theory provides a better description of them.

3. In cases involving private law transactions, considerations of commercial and general convenience dictate that acts of an unrecognized government taking effect upon persons or chattels within its physical control are recognized if these persons or chattels later come within another jurisdiction. Hence, recognition of foreign acts which take place abroad is properly declaratory. The same considerations, however, dictate the opposite result in relation to acts-in-the-law of the non-recognizing state, especially when the unrecognized government attempts to apply its legislation or directly to claim assets located in the non-recognizing state. Here recognition is properly constitutive.

Thus these are the two theories i.e. the constitutive theory and the declaratory theory through which the states can be recognized. Though it is complicated to analyze if the function of recognition under international law is constitutive or declaratory because both the theories are featured distinctively and sometimes used simultaneously by many commentators. It solely depends upon the circumstances of the situation in declaring and recognizing a new state.

Recognition in International Law: A Functional Reappraisal
Prof Pathan’s, S.P. Law Classes – Public International Law

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law

[2] https://blog.ipleaders.in/staterecognition/#:~:text=Under%20International%20Law%2C%20recognition%20of,as%20required%20by%20International%20Law .

[3] http://law.uok.edu.in/Files/5ce6c765-c013-446c-b6ac-b9de496f8751/Custom/UNIT_III_INTERNATIONAL_LAW.pdf

[4] https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/constitutional-law/declaratory-and-constitutive-theories-of-state.php

[5] LAW, POLITICS, AND THE CONCEPTION OF THE STATE IN STATE RECOGNITION THEORY, William Thomas Worster, http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/international/volume27n1/documents/worster.pdf

[6] Michael Schoiswohl, Status And (Human Rights) Obligations Of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes In International Law: The Case Of ‘Somaliland’ (2004).

[7] http://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-2203-recognition-of-states-and-governments-an-analysis.html

[8] Recognition in International Law: A Functional Reappraisal

This article has been written by Rutuja Dhotre, 4th Year BA.LLB Student at ILS Law College, Pune.

Also Read – State Succession, Recognition And Jurisdiction Under International Law

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29 Theorizing Recognition and International Personality

Rose Parfitt, Lecturer in Law at Kent Law School and an ARC Discovery Early Career Researcher at Melbourne Law School

Published: 02 November 2016
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This chapter examines the way in which the legal effect of recognition on international personality has been theorized. Bringing some of the most prominent theories of the relationship between recognition and international personality into conversation with some of their most recent and radical alternatives, the chapter considers why colonial patterns of inequality persist, in spite of the ‘rolling out’ of international personality globally. Is it possible that orthodox theories of this relationship have ‘determined’ these patterns in some way? The focus therefore is on international recognition (that is, inter-state recognition, as opposed to recognition of governments and belligerents), and on the personality of entities which identify (whether actually or potentially) as territorial (such as states, colonies, ‘mandates’, and indigenous peoples).

1 Introduction

The term international personality refers to ‘the capacity to be the bearer of rights and duties under international law’. 1 The history of this concept is often traced back to the efforts of an influential group of European international lawyers in the second half of the nineteenth century to construct a ‘positivist’ system of international law based on state consent. 2 For this reason, international personality tends to be understood as a formalized, more technical version of the ‘troubled’ and ‘unhelpful’ concept of sovereignty developed by scholars working in the natural law tradition. 3 In contrast to this older understanding of sovereignty as ‘something intrinsic, carrying with it certain natural rights’, Craven, for example, argues that the notion of international personality assumes ‘the existence of a systemic order that attributed a range of competences to certain designated actors’. 4 However, since only states can possess ‘full’ international personality under the positivist doctrine of international law, including rights to sovereign equality, self-defence, non-intervention, and territorial integrity, only states can do the attributing—whether directly, by means of ‘constitutive’ recognition, or indirectly through the formulation of rules of designation. Given the circular nature of this argument, the concept of international personality has come to be seen by Craven and others as emblematic of international law’s normative indeterminacy no less than the ‘unhelpful’ concept of sovereignty it sought to reformulate. 5

Nonetheless, the language of international personality has made it possible for many non-state entities to be endowed with international rights and duties, 6 including international organizations, peoples, individuals, multinational corporations, indigenous groups and, according to some scholars, even cities and animals. 7 This chapter does not aim, however, to provide either a taxonomy of international personality 8 or a history of recognition. 9 Instead, it will examine the way in which the legal effect of recognition on international personality has been theorized. It will therefore distance itself slightly from the indeterminacy thesis. Bringing some of the most prominent theories of the relationship between recognition and international personality into conversation with some of their most recent and radical alternatives, it will ask why colonial patterns of inequality persist, in spite of the globalization of international personality in the process of decolonization. Is it possible that orthodox theories of this relationship have ‘determined’ these patterns in some way? The focus will therefore be on international recognition (that is, inter-state recognition, as opposed to recognition of governments and belligerents), 10 and on the personality of entities which identify (whether actually or potentially) as territorial (such as states, colonies, ‘mandates’, and indigenous peoples). 11

The chapter begins with a theoretical history of the relationship between recognition and personality, starting with an examination of the work of GWF Hegel, before moving to the contemporary debate and its politics.

2 The Doctrines of Recognition and International Personality in Historical Perspective

The impact of Hegel’s philosophy of recognition and its role in the construction of individual ‘self-consciousness’ continues to reverberate throughout the social sciences. 12 Yet Hegel’s insistence that the relationship between individual recognition and ‘personality’ (one of the terms he used to signify fully realized ‘self-consciousness’) 13 found its parallel in the relationship between state recognition and the constitution of the ‘personality of the state’ 14 has received relatively little attention, given how fundamental this idea has been to international legal theorizing on this topic.

For Hegel, true self-consciousness or personality could be constituted only in and through its acknowledgement by another formally equal self-consciousness/personality. Such recognition, in turn, could only take place in the aftermath of a ‘life-and-death struggle’ between two as-yet-unrealized ‘consciousnesses’, each of which, being unrealized, he saw as being split between two conflicting ‘wills’—that of the Master (the ‘will to independence’) and Bondsman (the ‘will to dependence’). 15 Hegel’s point was to demonstrate that independence is in fact conditioned on dependence—that society and individuality are mutually constitutive. The ultimate form of society was, in his view, the European nation-state, characterized as a form of collective individual which likewise required the recognition of other states in order to obtain international personality. 16 However, the function of recognition in the international context was paradoxical in that the nation-state, being ‘the absolute power on earth’, 17 was ‘consequently a sovereign and independent entity in relation to others’, meaning that ‘the power of its sovereign’ must be a ‘purely internal matter’. 18 The relationship between independence and dependence therefore remains unresolved in the international context, meaning that international law must ‘always … be tainted with contingency’. 19

Personality in Hegel’s scheme was not, however, available to the ‘uncivilized’ individual or collective. Notoriously, he declared that ‘the African’, for example, was incapable of distinguishing ‘between himself as an individual and his essential universality’, and was therefore unable to participate in the necessarily reciprocal process of recognition. 20 It followed from the same logic, in his view, that ‘civilized nations’ (that is, Western European states) were entitled to ‘treat as barbarians other nations which are less advanced than they are’. 21

Hegel’s writings were published in the first decades of the nineteenth century, and quickly made an impact on the thinking of contemporary international lawyers. 22 Prior to the late eighteenth century, the question of the relationship between recognition and sovereignty had maintained a residual connection to the status of individual monarchs—actual living ‘persons’—and was therefore treated by jurists working in the natural law tradition as a strictly internal matter, beyond the scope of the ‘law of nations’. 23 ‘External legality followed from internal legality’, 24 such that one sovereign’s recognition of another had no function beyond the formal, at best evidentiary one of ‘declaring’ the latter’s existence. It followed from the same inside-out logic that non -recognition would be ‘tortious’. 25

Several jurists continued to insist upon the declaratory theory of recognition throughout the nineteenth century, such as De Martens, for whom it followed from the principle of sovereign equality that ‘ [u]‌n État naît et existe par lui-même ’ and therefore that ‘ en principe, la raiconnaissance est la constatation formelle d’un fait accompli ’. 26 However, a number of factors came together to give Hegel’s theory a special traction, encouraging the constitutive theory to become predominant from the 1860s, particularly in Britain and North America. One such factor concerned the revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which led to the emergence of many new states in the Americas and elsewhere. 27 Another, relatedly, was the gradual transformation of the ‘international’ from an inter-dynastic into an inter-state jurisdictional space. 28 Reflecting on these developments, advocates of the constitutive position insisted—on exactly the same grounds of sovereign equality—that existing international persons should be entitled to decide whether or not to accept the new rights and duties associated with an additional member of the ‘family of nations’. 29 Wheaton, for example, was one of the first to articulate a constitutive theory of recognition, in the second edition of his Elements of International Law (1863). 30 Wheaton’s argument—that while the ‘internal sovereignty of a State’ did not ‘depend on its recognition by other States’, a state’s ‘external sovereignty’ would ‘require recognition by other States in order to render it perfect and complete’ 31 —was taken directly from Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right . 32

A third factor leading to predominance of the constitutive position concerned the acceleration of European imperialism. Hegel’s philosophy, which posited recognition by those considering themselves to be ‘self-conscious’ as the condition for the attainment by (O)thers of personality, allowed the concept of civilization (already possessed of a long international legal history 33 ) to be fused with that of international personality, such that international rights and duties could be cast as something that only ‘civilized’ states could possess. What civilization meant in international legal terms was left unclear, 34 but idealized notions of European behaviour and institutions were certainly invoked. 35 The standard ‘test’ came to be whether a state’s ‘government was sufficiently stable to undertake binding commitments under international law and whether it was able and willing to protect adequately the life, liberty and property of foreigners’. 36 In this context, the quality of relativity attached to the constitutive theory of recognition gave it an advantage over its declaratory rival in allowing it to cope with supposedly anomalous entities like the Chinese, Japanese, and Ottoman Empires—entities which met the criteria for statehood, yet which European states were reluctant to treat on a basis of equality. Westlake, for instance, asserted that such entities had been partially recognized, and that it was possible to ‘[admit] outside states to parts of [international] law without necessarily admitting them to the whole of it’. 37

However, while its Eurocentric and indeed racist implications were overt, we should be wary of attributing international law’s complicity with colonialism exclusively to the so-called ‘standard of civilization’. For statehood (or the ‘standard of statehood’, as we might call it) was (and remains) just as exclusionary in its effects. 38 Although this exclusivity affected ‘wandering tribes’ within Europe as much as without, 39 the territorial state, its juridical personification and hence the very concept of international law itself are the combined product of a specifically European history, as Schmitt was later to argue. 40 For better (in his view) or worse, it was ‘[o]‌nly through the personalization of European territorial states’ that ‘a jurisprudence of interstate jus inter gentes [could] arise’. 41 The decision of the ‘professional’ international lawyers of the late nineteenth century to adopt the terminology of ‘personhood’, from Klüber to Bluntschli to Oppenheim, should therefore be understood as a decisive normative move, 42 with its roots in the ‘allegorical tendency’ of ‘Renaissance individualism’, which made it ‘customary for European jurists to think of a personification of political powers’. 43

In 1918, however, Europeans suddenly found themselves faced with the idea that ‘barbarians’ could be German 44 and that ‘Africans’ could be their vanquishers. 45 During the ensuing conceptual crisis, those attempting to make sense of recognition and personality entered enthusiastically into the interwar spirit of modernist experimentalism described by Berman. 46 Once again, international lawyers fell into two camps.

Broadly speaking, those supportive of the League of Nations system sought to emphasize the lawful (as opposed to ‘contingent’) nature of the newly institutionalized international legal system through the development of a set of innovative approaches to recognition. Building on a logic developed in the previous century, when the less-than-full personalities of several protectorates, such as Morocco, were constituted via multilateral treaties among the ‘great powers’, 47 one such approach interpreted accession to the Covenant (open, in theory, to colonies and to the British dominions as well as to states) as a form of collective constitutive recognition. 48 Under article 2(1), all entrants into the League, whatever their status, were required to meet the condition of being ‘fully self-governing’. Counter-intuitively, in other words, full self-government was deemed to be compatible with colonial rule—as long as the metropole in question was itself deemed to be ‘self-governing’. As this indicates, self-government under the League served a similar constitutive function to the nineteenth-century standard of civilization. 49 A second innovation concerned the new ‘national states’/‘national minorities’ regime constructed in Central and Eastern Europe, where the minorities commitments of these new states were interpreted as being ‘coeval’ with their ‘sovereignty’, 50 both of them having been constituted simultaneously in the minorities treaties concluded between these nascent states and the Allies at the end of the War. A third innovation was made by jurists associated with solidarist movement, who insisted that international personality was vested in the individual, rather than the state. 51 Nonetheless, as in Hegel, ‘primitive’ (that is, non-European) individuals tended to be cast even by this group of scholars as unready for this privilege. 52 Fourthly, with the inauguration of the mandates system a new, tripartite form of subjectivity was devised for the former colonies of the defeated Central powers which fell, at least in principle, somewhere between the non-personality of the colony and the full personality of the sovereign state. 53

In the second camp fell those, associated in particular with the rise of fascism, who considered the League system irrelevant, if not toxic. For such jurists, the contingency inherent in the relationship between recognition and international personality represented an advantage rather than a limitation. After all, the philosophy of fascism had no interest in subordinating the state to the individual or nation via principles like self-government or solidarity. On the contrary, as the Manifesto of Fascist Intellectuals declared (in overtly Hegelian terms), fascism advocated the sacrifice of the individual to an idea—‘fatherland’ ( Patria )—from which ‘his reason to live, his liberty and every one of his rights’ were derived. The (European) state should therefore be understood as a ‘process’ of continual ‘historical self-realization’, through which ‘the tradition … of civilization, far from remaining a dead memory of the past, assumes the form of a personality [ personalità ] conscious of the end it strives to realize’. 54

In the nearly seventy years that have passed since the collapse of the League and the defeat of fascism, the imperialistic logic and indeed the hubris of interwar modernism, whether in its pro- or anti-League manifestations, has been roundly defeated—or so it would seem. The first and most important step towards this supposed victory for equality was the conclusion of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in 1933—a direct attempt led by the Latin American states to check that hubris. In referring to ‘[t]‌he state as a person of international law’, the Convention famously elided the ‘objective’ concept of statehood with the ‘subjective’ concept of international personality before proclaiming that ‘[t]he political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states’. 55 Crucially, in this new iteration of the declaratory theory of recognition, ‘external legality’ followed not from ‘internal legality’ but rather from the ‘fact’ of statehood, as defined by the four supposedly objective criteria.

According to the mainstream perspective, the passage of the four ‘Montevideo’ criteria into customary international law marked the beginning of the end both for the constitutive theory and for the so-called ‘standard of civilization’ upon which it relied. 56 Already in 1947, Lauterpacht could declare that ‘[m]‌odern international law knows of no distinction, for the purposes of recognition, between civilized and uncivilized States’. 57 Yet to nomadic and other un-state-like peoples it was clear that juridical objectivity remains in the eye of the beholder. Indeed, the subjective, if not directly constitutive character of the post-1933 standard of statehood has become all the more obvious since decolonization (on the basis of the expressly anti-conditional ‘right of peoples to self-determination’, 58 coupled, however, with the principle of uti possidetis juris ) and the eventual collapse of Communism. Kelsen’s point that ‘in the province of law there are no absolute, directly evident facts, facts “in themselves”, but only facts established by the competent authority in a procedure prescribed by the legal order’ therefore remains as pertinent today as it was in 1941. 59 For if states are the only ‘competent authority’ available to establish the ‘fact’ of international personality, then it runs counter to the principle of sovereign equality that recognition—whether on the basis of a standard of civilization or ‘only’ one of statehood—could be anything but constitutive. Given the Eurocentric tendencies of both ‘standards’, one could, indeed, ask whether it is possible to make any meaningful distinction between the constitutive and declaratory theories of recognition at all.

In spite of these problems, the declaratory approach has remained predominant in mainstream theorizing on recognition throughout the post-1945 period, 60 and the compromise attempted by Lauterpacht—the argument that recognition was ‘declaratory of facts’ but ‘constitutive of rights’—did not make the transition to orthodoxy. 61 Those who acknowledge the difficulty of separating the declaratory and constitutive theories have tended to follow Crawford into the ambivalent position of rejecting the constitutive approach, with the qualification that ‘this does not mean that recognition does not have important legal and political effects’, including effects that are ‘properly speaking constitutive’. 62 This is clear, for example, from the response to the recognition practice associated with the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. 63 The Badinter Commission set up in 1991 to arbitrate the process of Yugoslavia’s ‘dissolution’ insisted (in three of its ten Opinions ) that recognition was ‘purely declaratory’ in its impact. 64 In the meantime, however, the European Commission (EC) states (under the auspices of which the Commission had been established) declared ‘their readiness to recognize’ whichever of the emerging republics had ‘constituted themselves on a democratic basis’ and accepted ‘international obligations … with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights’. 65 This return by the EC to a conditional form of recognition on the basis of what could very plausibly be construed as an updated standard of ‘civilization’ was coupled with an apparent downgrading of the importance of the criteria for statehood (as under the League). Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, was recognized in the midst of a civil war, before the four criteria had been met, 66 and was admitted to the United Nations (UN) (open only to states) 67 less than four months later. 68 In this situation, as Hillgruber argues, recognition ‘did not serve merely as a refutable assumption that the criteria [for statehood] had been met’, but ‘actually … as a substitute for these features, which were obviously missing’. 69

Thanks to this and other examples of recognition practice in the post-Cold War period, some mainstream theorists have begun to move towards a partial acceptance of the constitutive theory—although there is, naturally enough, some reluctance to refer explicitly to a new standard of civilization. 70 Structurally, however, the three criteria (as employed by the EC) of democracy, human rights, and the ‘rule of law’ do appear to have begun to fulfil the same function. Indeed, not only does this new ‘standard’ appear to be capable of compensating for certain of the criteria for statehood when these are deemed to have been met inadequately; it is also powerful enough, it seems, to revoke or downgrade aspects of the rights of existing international persons if these have been violated to a significant degree. 71

The next section will look more closely at the way in which these developments are starting to be theorized. It will begin with a brief examination of three mainstream approaches, all advocating the use of recognition to constitute and maintain forms of international personality that meet this new triple standard, before moving on to examine a broader set of concerns regarding recognition and personality that are emerging from the critical response to these mainstream approaches.

3 Contemporary Theories of Recognition and International Personality

Mainstream theoretical readings of the relationship between recognition and personality have tended to focus on constructing and disciplining what Nijman, in her intellectual history of international legal personality (‘ILP’), calls ‘well-functioning’ states. 72 Like the interwar solidarists, Nijman seeks to return ‘ILP’ to what she sees as its ‘original’ conceptualization as something vested not in the state, but in the individual. The ‘well-functioning state’, she argues, ‘has full ILP, but only derived from its citizens’. 73 Citing Hannah Arendt, Nijman argues that ‘[ c ] itizenship is a defining element of man’s humanity ’. 74 Thus,

[i]‌f a state does not live up to the demands of human rights law and thus fails to perform its primary function as a political community, another community, namely the international community, has to fill the void. ILP will then flow back to its initial source: the individual subject. 75

This perspective, of course, resonates closely with the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept recently taken up with some enthusiasm at the UN. 76 Under the rubric of ‘R2P’, states which fail to meet the new tripartite standard (democracy, human rights, the ‘rule of law’) can be singled out for intrusive projects of ‘reconstruction’ (as in post-invasion Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mali) or—if the transgression is serious enough to meet the bar of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and/or crimes against humanity—for forcible intervention (as in Libya in 2011). 77 Nijman’s argument also resonates, in the opposite direction, with the ‘earned sovereignty’ approach, proponents of which celebrate the trend towards requiring separatist ‘substate entities’ (such as Kosovo, Palestine, and South Sudan) to ‘earn’ their ‘sovereignty’ by meeting an institutional standard based explicitly on ‘the rule of law, democracy and human rights’. 78 The ‘consent of the international community in the form of international recognition’ is considered necessary to confirm the ‘final status’ of the new ‘sovereign’. 79

Yet the idea, implicit in all three of these new approaches, that ‘[t]‌o be a legal person’ (in Nijman’s sense of being the citizen of what she calls a ‘well-functioning’ state) ‘is a necessity for living a humane life’ 80 has worrying implications. After all, it was Hegel who first asserted that the ‘highest duty’ of individuals was ‘to be members of the state’—by which, as we have seen, he meant the ‘civilized’ state. Having traced the meaning of the term ‘civilization’ from that of white/European to ‘self-governing’ to ‘rule of law’, democracy and human rights-respecting, the question arises as to what should happen, as a matter of international law, when the legitimacy of a supposedly ‘well-functioning’ state is rejected by the individuals over which it claims jurisdiction. Are such individuals (identifying, perhaps, with groups as diverse as ETA, the Naxalites, Islamic State, the Tamil Tigers, and the IRA) then less than ‘human’? Hegel’s answer would certainly have been in the affirmative, and this new orthodoxy appears to tend in a similar direction.

Scholars associated with the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement 81 have been particularly alert to the implications of these new theoretical developments in the field of recognition and personality. 82 In their view, both the process through which international personality has been transferred to the ‘Third World’ and the ‘racialized’ form it has taken there have repeatedly belied the promise of liberation which ‘independence’ held out. Regarding process, Anghie gestures towards Fanon’s critique of Hegel’s recognition ‘dialectic’ to point out that the doctrine of constitutive recognition presented non-European peoples with ‘the fundamental contradiction of having to comply with authoritative European standards in order to win recognition and assert them’. 83 Regarding form, Anghie argues that it was only in the course of restricting ‘native personality’ to the capacity to cede land to Europeans, 84 or negating it entirely via the doctrine of terra nullius , 85 that positivist jurisprudence was able to develop a coherent concept of ‘full’ sovereignty/international personality. Mutua makes a similar argument in relation to Africa’s ‘juridical states’ which he describes as ‘timebombs ready to explode’. 86

Feminist and queer theorists of international law, meanwhile, have been among the most willing to confront the anthropomorphic terminology of ‘recognition’ and ‘personality’, focusing in particular on the image of the body. 87 Charlesworth and Chinkin, for example, draw on Naffine’s description of the individual legal subject as a ‘bounded, heterosexual male body’ against which bodies without ‘clear definition’ are recognized as ‘deviant and undeserving’ 88 to argue that the state (‘full’ international person) likewise has no ‘natural’ points of entry. Violation of the right of non-intervention therefore becomes the clearest possible breach of international law. 89 Yet many states, not to mention indigenous peoples and other non-state groups, have been unable to claim this kind of ‘bounded’ international personality, and have been constructed instead as having ‘permeable, negotiable, penetrable, vulnerable boundaries in the same way that women’s bodies have been constructed in criminal law’. 90 This distinction lends itself to an analogy ‘between the position of Third World states and that of women’. 91 As Ruskola points out, however, to assume that because ‘full’ international persons are gendered male then ‘colonized and conquered’ entities must be ‘gendered female’ is ‘a non sequitur ’, for international personality, like gender, ‘is neither a fixed attribute nor a logical conclusion, but a relational identity’. 92 Ruskola notes that even though the Chinese Empire, for example, had been an object of veneration for centuries before it was forcibly ‘opened’ to European trade, it came to be understood as ‘hypercivilized’, as ‘degenerating into senile old age’, which meant ‘[a]‌s an international person, it could therefore be dismissed as indolent and hopelessly effete’. 93 In this way,

[i]‌n China casual imperial penetrations were anticipated primarily to arouse a desire to assume a more manly posture [by ‘opening up’ its economy to free trade] … In contrast, rhetorically Europe’s full-scale continental rape of Africa suggested a desire to discipline , rather than arouse, Africa’s excessive, sexualized, and ungovernable hypermasculinity by means of brutal, calculated mass violence. 94

Unlike the critiques outlined so far, Marxist theorizing in this area does not see recognition as a mechanism for constituting certain ‘classes’ of international person as juridically unequal. 95 On the contrary, sovereign equality is an assumption to be taken seriously. Pashukanis, for example, pointed out that the function of formal equality in the international legal realm, as in domestic law, was to disguise and hence to perpetuate the vast material disparities upon which the capitalist system thrives. ‘[M]‌odern international law’ is therefore ‘the legal form of the struggle of the capitalist states among themselves for domination over the rest of the world’. 96 Building on this, Miéville suggests that the ‘classical’ imperialism of the nineteenth century, characterized by widespread formal inequality , was actually an ‘interruption’ to the logic of the expansion of sovereign equality and ‘free trade imperialism’, beginning in the eighteenth century. 97 No wonder, he argues, that decolonization has had so little impact on the global distribution of power and wealth—since ‘formal sovereign independence not only does not preclude domination, but can, through recognition, be the very institution by which domination is exercised ’. 98

A number of theoretical attempts have been also made to tackle the question of why—in spite of its questionable material benefits—statehood (and the ‘full’ range of rights and duties it implies) continues to be desired as the ultimate form of collective emancipation, from Scotland to Palestine to Mindanao. 99 In response to this question, Otomo has turned to feminist psychoanalytic theory to argue that the state form allows international legal subjects (self-constructed as male) deliberately to forget the constitutive (maternal) role of recognition in the constitution of subjectivity, and instead to see themselves as self -constituting—always-already possessed of international personality. The ‘encounter between sovereign states’ is thus ‘mediated by a specular identification with the Sun/Father/God, whose imagined gaze empowers the sovereign speaking subject[s]‌ to recognise themselves under the rubric of a masculine subjectivity’. 100 A two-pronged attempt to respond to the question of the state as an object of collective desire has also been made by the author of this chapter. I have drawn, in the first place, on Bakhtin’s concept of the dialogic to suggest that international personality, as constituted through recognition, might usefully be understood as hybrid: half-international legal Self; half-disciplinary Other. This can work against ‘peripheral’ international persons, but in certain contexts can also be mobilized for strategic purposes. 101 In the second place, my work in this area is indebted to the thinking of two Marxist theorists, Louis Althusseur and Bernard Edelman, and argues that interpellation (self-recognition) is just as important as external recognition to the process of ‘international legal reproduction’ (as I have called it). Interpellation is here understood as a double process, in which the reproduction of ‘free and equal’ individual subjectivity and ‘sovereign’ international subjectivity are harnessed together in the service of the expansion of the global ‘free’ market. 102 Nonetheless, and however the ‘mimetic desire’ for recognition is characterized, Ruskola’s point—that ‘Western incursions’ into Imperial China ‘did not constitute a violation of pre-existing sovereignty … but in fact the creation of a sovereignty on the Western model as something to be violated’—remains fundamental. 103

There remains to be examined an important set of demands for recognition and international personality which tend not to focus on statehood: those made by minorities and indigenous peoples. These demands often centre on the protection of cultures and identities. 104 In this context, Tourme-Jouannet has argued that a new ‘international law of recognition’ has emerged in the post-Cold War era in response to the demand of such groups for ‘a right to legal protection for their cultures and, for some, a claim for reparation of historical wrongs inflicted by colonization that bruised and spurned their identities’. 105 Tourme-Jouannet cites numerous multilateral protections for cultural diversity, 106 as well as declarations on minority and indigenous rights 107 and reparations for ‘historical crimes’ 108 to argue that ‘a legal status of difference has emerged alongside the legal status of equality in international law’. 109

Such a position is not without its critics, however. 110 For example, theorists of indigenous personality have, like Anghie, picked up Fanon’s point that post-colonial recognition simply does not fit into (and is thus excluded from) the reciprocal Hegelian template. 111 Moreover, as Bhandar points out, essentialization is not the only risk that comes with restricting indigenous rights to those which can be contained within the parameters of ‘culture’. For such recognition legitimizes a territorial dispossession based on racist ideas (also imported from Hegel) about the relationship between property and legal subjectivity. 112 This, Bhandar argues, has created a ‘fundamental paradox’ at the heart of indigenous personality, resulting from the insistence of the courts of settler states from Canada to Australia that evidence of continuous occupation dating from the ‘pre-sovereignty’ period must be demonstrated by indigenous land claimants. 113 Indigenous land rights are therefore recognized only if ‘defined in relation to Anglo-European norms of private property ownership and colonial sovereign power’ 114 —norms that are by definition alien to the culture whose ‘authenticity’ they are called upon to prove. Thus, although Western property norms have been ‘transformed with the ascendance of intangible and intellectual forms in an era of global capitalism’, the ‘dialectic of recognition’ remains ‘firmly embedded in a nineteenth century, modern conceptualization of the subject and property relations’, such that aboriginal personality remains bound ‘to the old tombstones of the triumvirate: culture, nation, land’. 115 Ultimately, then, Tourme-Jouannet’s position is vulnerable to the argument that the identification of indigenous subjectivity with indigenous ‘culture’ has allowed indigenous rights to be recognized only when these do not undermine the ‘foundations’ of the settler state—foundations which, from the indigenous perspective, are illegitimate.

4 Conclusion

In emphasizing the zigzagging theoretical trajectory both of doctrine and critique regarding the relationship between recognition and international personality, and the material effects of this trajectory on disadvantaged peoples, states, and other entities, I have attempted to impart some of my own sense of the negative impact that mainstream doctrines of recognition and international personality have had, and continue to have, on relations of domination globally.

As mentioned in the introduction, the oscillation of recognition doctrine between the ‘constitutive’ and the ‘declaratory’ positions, and the incapacity of the concept of international personality to resolve the ‘sovereignty paradox’, have led many scholars to the conclusion that these concepts, like international legal doctrine more generally, are normatively indeterminate. However, as many of the critics featured in Section 2 point out, when it comes to international legal subjectivity, the short straw seems always to be drawn by the Other—whether characterized by race, gender, sexual orientation, class, culture, or any other supposed marker of dialectical inferiority. The extent to which orthodox theories of recognition and personality have, as I have argued, played a role in determining global inequalities would seem to be connected, at least to some extent, with the resilience of Hegelian thinking in this area of international legal theory.

Hegel asserted, very simply but very effectively, that while all individuals are equally capable of being recognized and obtaining personality, some entities we might think of as individuals actually do not meet this more intuitive benchmark. It is therefore arguable that the problem lies not only with the doctrine of recognition and (international) personality, but also with the theoretical underpinnings of more fundamental, ostensibly ‘factual’ or ‘objective’ concepts like individuality, humanity and, in the international legal context, statehood. The task of collapsing the dichotomies on which these concepts rest—between subject and object, law and fact, constitution and declaration, and ultimately Self and Other—will be the next challenge for theorizing in this area.

J Crawford , The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn OUP Oxford 2006) at 32 .

M Craven , ‘Statehood, Self-Determination and Recognition’ in MD Evans (ed), International Law (3rd edn OUP Oxford 2010) 203–51, at 215–17 .

Creation of States (n 1 ) 32.

‘Statehood, Self-Determination and Recognition’ (n 2 ) 215.

M Koskenniemi , From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (reissue CUP Cambridge 2005) at 224–302 ; ‘Statehood, Self-Determination and Recognition’ (n 2 ) 217–20.

Creation of States (n 1 ) 28.

For an excellent collection see F Johns (ed), International Legal Personality (Ashgate Farnham 2010) . Additionally, on corporate personality, see eg JE Alvarez , ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ (2001) 9 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 1–36 ; on indigenous personality, see eg B Kingsbury , ‘Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law’ (2001) 34 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 189–250 ; and on animals, see eg Y Otomo and E Mussawir (eds), Law and the Question of the Animal: A Critical Jurisprudence (Routledge London 2013) .

See eg International Legal Personality (n 7 ).

See eg M Fabry , Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States since 1779 (OUP Oxford 2010) .

On which see eg H Lauterpacht , Recognition in International Law (CUP Cambridge 1947) at 87–174 (governments) and 175–328 (belligerents) ; T-C Chen , The International Law of Recognition, with Special Reference to Practice in Great Britain and the United States ( LC Green ed) (Praeger New York 1951) at 97–130 (governments) and 303–407 (belligerents) ; BR Roth , Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (OUP Oxford 1999) chs 5–7 (governments).

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State Recognition Essay

Updated state recognition essay notes.

Public International Law

Public International Law notes fully updated for recent exams at Oxford and Cambridge. These notes cover all the major LLB aspects and so are perfect for anyone doing an LLB in the UK or a great supplement for those doing LLBs abroad, whether that be in Ireland, Canada, Hong Kong or Malaysia (University of London). See if you like them by referring to the samples below. We've also included our previous years' authors free of charge, to give you some extra materials to refer to for the tricky topi...

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Free International Law Essay Examples & Topics

If you’re looking for international law essay examples or writing ideas, you’re in the right place. Our team has worked out a list of international law topics for an essay that can help you write your paper. We’ve explored why it’s worth your time to study it as well. Thus, first of all, we invite you to understand what international law is.

International law (same as public international law) is the set of legal rules, standards, principles, and norms between sovereign states and other international legal actors. These rules are recognized by most states and can be applied to govern the relationships between them.

So, why study it?

The primary purpose international law is maintaining peace and justice. That’s when the importance of international law becomes clear. Without it, countries would not be able to solve issues in an organized manner.

Another critical role of international law is promoting business-related and industrial development worldwide. International law and its principles view economic growth as a global public responsibility. Trading, negotiating, producing, and investing worldwide is possible due to standard norms and shared regulations.

11 International Law Essay Topics

To be able to write an exceptional international law essay, you need an excellent paper idea. Here you will get some amazing topics ! You can use these international law essay ideas for composing your paper or read them for inspiration.

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The evolution of antitrust laws in the UK.
Comparison of gun control laws in the US and Sweden.
Child labor in the global economy and laws against it.
Rules of private international law.
Conflicts of regulations in public international laws.
Why do nations have to obey modern international law?
New international commercial court drafting of laws.
Reasons why the former first lady of Ivory Coast is tried for crimes against humanity.
Palestinian territory occupied: possible ways to resolve the conflict.
“Access the Sea” case in Bolivia and Chile.
Influence of the United Nations on modern international law.

7 International Law Essay Questions

In this paragraph, we’ve combined a list of international law essay questions. They are useful for numerous reasons, some of which we’ve already explained above. The key aspect is that they can help you practice writing international public law essays.

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List the theories that explain the relationships between domestic and international law.

In this essay, a student is invited to explore the relationships between domestic and international laws. Indeed, these relationships are genuinely complex. While listing theories, try to answer the question about the position of domestic law within the international one.

Explain what is the role of international law in the modern world?

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Analyze legal systems of Asia and Africa.

An analysis of these two legal systems can be a fascinating endeavor. Additionally, explain what the difference between “laws” and “legal systems” is.

Illustrate legal justifications for the use of force?

Here, we urge students to explain the legal thinking behind the implementation of force. Illustrate when and how legal entities can apply the laws on the use of power.

What do you think about Kosovo as a state?

It’s a pretty personal question. However, be mindful of basing your response on the laws and principles of international law. A great topic that can capture the reader’s attention if delivered correctly.

Show the importance of recognition within the international legal system.

Here you should demonstrate what importance acknowledgment plays in international law. Additionally, enumerate the conditions nations should fulfill to be recognized.

Discuss the extent to which international law protects the rights of minorities?

When answering this essay question, keep in mind how international law defines minorities and what it does to protect these groups. Explain who can claim minority rights.

11 International Law Research Paper Topics

Below, we’ve collected interesting and easy international law topics for research papers. Check them out!

The role of international law in solving global environmental issues.
How to balance international obligations regarding human rights and state sovereignty.
The international criminal court’s effectiveness and challenges.
How international trade law impacts global economic relations.
Protecting civilians in war zones according to international humanitarian law.
How international refugee law evolved: challenges and responses.
The role of international law in combating transnational organized crime.
Ways of balancing innovation and access to knowledge according to international intellectual property law.
Historical and current conflicts related to territorial disputes.
Indigenous peoples and their rights under international law.
Effectiveness and limitations of the United Nations peacekeeping operations.

15 Public International Law Assignment Topics

This collection of public international law essay topics delves into diverse areas of the subject. Check them out below:

Liability regarding state responsibility for environmental damage.
How international organizations promote global health and well-being.
What legal challenges does international law face in the digital age?
Ways of balancing preservation and security in protecting cultural heritage during armed conflicts.
The rights and obligations of states during the refugee crisis.
International legal approaches and cooperation in combating transnational terrorism.
International trade law and dispute resolution in global commerce.
The right to self-determination in indigenous peoples in the context of international legal frameworks.
State obligations in mitigating climate change.
Analysis of the responsibility to protect (r2p) and its implementation challenges.
Violations of international humanitarian law in non-state armed groups.
The use of force in international law during humanitarian interventions.
Corporate accountability for violations of human rights: what are the legal avenues for redress?
International criminal law and accountability for war crimes.
Ways of balancing maritime interests and environmental conservation.

Thank you so much for reading our article. We hope it can help you in your next international law assignment. Now you can check the free essays below to see how other students handled the task.

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Middle East Crisis U.S. Criticizes Israel for Failure to Protect Civilians in Gaza Conflict

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Smoke rising after a strike in Rafah, in southern Gaza. Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Displaced Palestinians evacuating Rafah, the southernmost city in Gaza.
Displaced Palestinians on the beach in Deir al Balah in central Gaza. Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
People leaving Rafah, in southern Gaza. -/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Israeli soldiers in southern Israel near the Gaza Strip border on Thursday. Abir Sultan/EPA, via Shutterstock
An injured Palestinian child being treated at a hospital in Rafah. Ismael Abu Dayyah/Associated Press
Mourning a relative killed in a strike in Rafah. Ismael Abu Dayyah/Associated Press
An injured child in Rafah. Hatem Khaled/Reuters

Follow live news updates on the crisis in the Middle East .

The U.S. criticizes Israel for failure to protect civilians in the Gaza conflict.

The Biden administration believes that Israel has most likely violated international standards in failing to protect civilians in Gaza but has not found specific instances that would justify the withholding of military aid, the State Department told Congress on Friday.

In the administration’s most detailed assessment of Israel’s conduct in Gaza, the State Department said in a written report that Israel “has the knowledge, experience and tools to implement best practices for mitigating civilian harm in its military operations.”

But it added that “the results on the ground, including high levels of civilian casualties, raise substantial questions” as to whether the Israel Defense Forces are making sufficient use of those tools.

Even so, the report — which seemed at odds with itself in places — said the United States had no hard proof of Israeli violations. It noted the difficulty of collecting reliable information from Gaza, Hamas’s tactic of operating in civilian areas and the fact that “Israel has not shared complete information to verify” whether U.S. weapons have been used in specific incidents alleged to have involved human rights law violations.

The report, mandated by President Biden, also makes a distinction between the general possibility that Israel has violated the law and any conclusions about specific incidents that would prove it. It deems that assurances Israel provided in March that it would use U.S. arms consistent with international law are “credible and reliable,” and thus allow the continued flow of U.S. military aid.

The conclusions are unrelated to Mr. Biden’s recent decision to delay the delivery to Israel of 3,500 bombs and his review of other weapons shipments. The president has said those actions were in response to Israel’s stated plans to invade the southern Gaza city of Rafah.

The report said its findings were hampered in part by the challenges of collecting reliable information from the war zone and the way Hamas operates in densely populated areas. It also stressed that Israel has begun pursuing possible accountability for suspected violations of the law, a key component in the U.S. assessment about whether to provide military aid to allies accused of human rights violations.

Israel has opened criminal investigations into the conduct of its military in Gaza, the report said, and the Israel Defense Forces “are examining hundreds of incidents” that may involve wartime misconduct.

The report also did not find that Israel had intentionally obstructed humanitarian aid into Gaza.

While it concluded that both “action and inaction by Israel” had slowed the flow of aid into Gaza, which is desperately short of necessities like food and medicine, it said that “we do not currently assess that the Israeli government is prohibiting or otherwise restricting the transport or delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance” into the territory.

Such a finding would have triggered a U.S. law barring military aid to countries that block such assistance.

Brian Finucane, a former State Department lawyer now with International Crisis Group, said the report “bends over backwards” to avoid concluding that Israel violated any laws, a finding that would place major new pressure on Mr. Biden to restrict arms to the country.

Mr. Finucane, a critic of Israel’s military operations, said that the report was “more forthcoming” than he had expected, but that he still found it “watered down” and heavily “lawyered.”

The findings further angered a vocal minority of Democrats in Congress who have grown increasingly critical of Israel’s conduct in Gaza. They argue that Israel has indiscriminately killed civilians with American arms and intentionally hindered U.S.-supplied humanitarian aid.

Either would violate U.S. laws governing arms transfers to foreign militaries, as well as international humanitarian law, which is largely based on the Geneva Conventions.

The report did not define the meaning of its other criteria for Israel’s actions, “established best practices for mitigating civilian harm,” though it cited Defense Department guidelines on the subject released last year, which include some measures “not required by the law of war.”

“If this conduct complies with international standards, then God help us all,” Senator Chris Van Hollen, Democrat of Maryland, told reporters after the report’s release. “They don’t want to have to take any action to hold the Netanyahu government accountable for what’s happening,” he added, referring to Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.

Critics of Mr. Biden’s continuation of most military support to Israel had hoped that he would use the report as a justification for further restricting arms deliveries to the country. The United States provides Israel with $3.8 billion in annual military aid , and Congress last month approved an additional $14 billion in emergency funding.

Mr. Biden ordered the report with a national security memorandum known as NSM-20. It requires all recipients of U.S. military aid engaged in conflict to provide the United States with written assurances that they will comply with international law and not hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid provided by or supported by the U.S. government.

The report called on the secretary of state and the defense secretary to assess “any credible reports or allegations” that American weapons might have been used in violation of international law.

Since the president’s memorandum was issued, an independent task force formed in response issued a lengthy report citing dozens of examples of likely Israeli legal violations. That report found what it called Israel’s “systematic disregard for fundamental principles of international law,” including “attacks launched despite foreseeably disproportionate harm to civilians” in densely populated areas.

In a statement following the State Department report, the task force called the U.S. document “at best incomplete, and at worst intentionally misleading in defense of acts and behaviors that likely violate international humanitarian law and may amount to war crimes.”

“Once again, the Biden Administration has stared the facts in the face — and then pulled the curtains shut,” said the task force’s members, who include Josh Paul, a former State Department official who in October resigned in protest over U.S. military support for Israel.

The State Department report showed clear sympathy for Israel’s military challenge, repeating past statements by the Biden administration that Israel has a “right to defend itself” in the wake of the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks. It also noted that military experts call Gaza “as difficult a battlespace as any military has faced in modern warfare.”

“Because Hamas uses civilian infrastructure for military purposes and civilians as human shields, it is often difficult to determine facts on the ground in an active war zone of this nature and the presence of legitimate military targets across Gaza,” it said.

Even so, it singled out numerous specific incidents where Israel’s military had killed civilians or aid workers, the latter of which it called a “specific area of concern.”

Those episodes include the killing of seven World Central Kitchen workers in April. The report noted that Israel has dismissed officers and reprimanded commanders involved in that attack, which Israel has called “a grave mistake,” and is considering prosecutions.

Other episodes it cited included airstrikes on Oct. 31 and Nov. 1 on the crowded Jabaliya refugee camp, which reportedly killed dozens of civilians, including children. It noted Israel’s claim that it had targeted a senior Hamas commander and underground Hamas facilities at the site, and that its munitions had “led to the collapse of tunnels and the buildings and infrastructure above them.”

And while the report did not find that Israel had intentionally hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid, it listed several examples of ways in which its government had “a negative effect” on aid distribution. They included “extensive bureaucratic delays” and what it called the active involvement of some senior Israeli officials in protests or attacks on aid convoys.

The report was delivered to Congress two days after the deadline set by Mr. Biden’s February memorandum, arriving late on a Friday afternoon — the time of choice for government officials hoping to minimize an announcement’s public impact. Earlier that day, a White House spokesman, John F. Kirby, denied that the delay had any “nefarious” motive.

— Michael Crowley Reporting from Washington

The U.N. General Assembly adopts a resolution in support of Palestinian statehood.

U.n. general assembly backs palestinian membership bid, the united nations general assembly approved the resolution by a vote of 143 to 9 with 25 nations abstaining. the assembly can only grant full membership with the approval of the security council..

“A ‘yes’ vote is a vote for Palestinian existence. It is not against any state, but it is against the attempts to deprive us of our state. That is why the Israeli government is so opposed to it. Because they oppose our independence and the two-state solution altogether.” “This is your mirror. So that you can see exactly what you are inflicting upon the U.N. charter with this destructive vote. This is — You are shredding the U.N. Charter with your own hands.” “The result of the vote is as follows: in favor 143, against nine, abstentions 25. Draft resolution A/ES10/L30/Rev1 is adopted.” [cheering]

The United Nations General Assembly on Friday overwhelmingly adopted a resolution declaring that Palestinians qualify for full-members status at the United Nations, a highly symbolic move that reflects growing global solidarity with Palestinians and is a rebuke to Israel and the United States.

The resolution was approved by a vote of 143 to 9 with 25 nations abstaining. The Assembly broke into a big applause after the vote.

But the resolution does not mean a Palestinian state will be recognized and admitted to the United Nations as a full member anytime soon. The Assembly can only grant full membership with the approval of the Security Council, and, if history is a guide, the United States would almost inevitably wield its veto power to kill such a measure, as it did in April.

Even though a majority in the General Assembly have long supported Palestinian statehood, the resolution was the first time the body had voted on the issue of full membership. The resolution declares that “the State of Palestine is qualified for membership in the United Nations” under its charter rules and recommends that the Security Council reconsider the matter with a favorable outcome.

The resolution was prepared by the United Arab Emirates, the current chair of the U.N. Arab Group, and sponsored by 70 countries. The United States voted no, along with Hungary, Argentina, Papua New Guinea, Micronesia and Nauru.

“The vast majority of countries in this hall are fully aware of the legitimacy of the Palestinian bid and the justness of their cause, which faces fierce attempts to suppress it and render it meaningless today,” said the U.A.E. ambassador, Mohamed Abushahab, as he introduced the resolution on behalf of the Arab Group.

Though largely symbolic, the resolution does provide Palestinians with new diplomatic privileges. Palestinians can now sit among member states in alphabetical order; they can speak at General Assembly meetings on any topic instead of being limited to Palestinian affairs; they can submit proposals and amendments; and they can participate at U.N. conferences and international meetings organized by the Assembly and other United Nations entities.

The 193-member General Assembly took up the issue of Palestinian membership after the United States in April vetoed a resolution before the Security Council that would have recognized full membership for a Palestinian state. While a majority of council members supported the move, the United States said recognition of Palestinian statehood should be achieved through negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.

Frustration with the United States has been brewing for months among many senior U.N. officials and diplomats, including from allies such as France, because Washington has repeatedly blocked cease-fire resolutions at the Security Council and has staunchly supported Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza, even as civilian suffering has mounted.

“The U.S. is resigned to having another bad day at the U.N.,” said Richard Gowan, an expert on the U.N. for the International Crisis Group, a conflict prevention organization. But he added that the resolution “gives the Palestinians a boost without creating a breakdown over whether they are or are not now U.N. members.”

Riyad Mansour, the Palestinian ambassador to the U.N., told the Assembly ahead of the vote that Palestinians’ right to full membership at the U.N. and statehood “are not up for negotiations, they are our inherent rights as Palestinians.” He added that a vote against Palestinian statehood was a vote against the two-state solution.

Israel’s ambassador to the U.N., Gilad Erdan, a sharp critic of the U.N., said voting for a Palestinian state would be inviting “a state of terror” in its midst and rewarding “terrorists” who killed Jewish civilians with privileges and called member states endorsing it “Jew haters.”

Robert A. Wood, a U.S. ambassador to the U.N., said that while the U.S. supported a two-state solution as the only means for sustainable peace, “it remains the U.S. view that unilateral measures at the U.N. and on the ground will not advance this goal.”

Mr. Wood said that if the Assembly referred the issue back to the Council, it would have the same outcome again with the U.S. blocking the move.

The Palestinians are currently recognized by the U.N. as a nonmember observer state, a status granted to them in 2012 by the General Assembly. They do not have the right to vote on General Assembly resolutions or nominate any candidates to U.N. agencies.

France, a close U.S. ally and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, has supported the Palestinian bid for statehood breaking away from United States’ stance at the U.N. both at the Council and the Assembly vote. “The time has come for the United Nations to take action with a view to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on the basis of the two-state solution,” said Nicolas de Rivière, France’s ambassador to the U.N., in his address on Friday.

The Assembly session, which was expected to flow over to Monday because of the long list of speakers, was not without moments of performative drama.

Mr. Erdan, Israel’s ambassador, held up the picture of Hamas’s military leader, Yahya Sinwar, considered the architect of the Oct. 7 attacks on Israel, with the word “President,” and then a transparent shredder, inserting a piece of paper inside it, and said the member states were “shredding the U.N. charter.”

Mr. Mansour, the Palestinian ambassador, at the end of his speech raised his fist in the air, visibly chocking back tears, and said “Free Palestine.” The Assembly broke into applause.

— Farnaz Fassihi

The White House defends voting ‘no’ on a U.N. resolution supporting Palestinian statehood.

A White House spokesman on Friday defended the United States’ decision to oppose a U.N. resolution declaring support for Palestinian statehood , saying that such a measure should be negotiated in the Middle East.

The United States was among a handful of holdouts as the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution declaring that Palestinians qualify for full membership at the United Nations. The vote was widely seen as a rebuke of Israel and the United States as global outrage mounts over the Israel-Hamas war.

John F. Kirby, a White House national security spokesman, said President Biden remained “fully and firmly committed” to a Palestinian state, but the U.N. resolution was not the way to establish it.

“We continue to believe in the power and promise of a two-state solution, and an independent state for the Palestinian people,” Mr. Kirby told reporters. “We also believe that the best way to do that is through direct negotiations with the parties and not through a vote of the U.N. of this kind.”

Friday’s vote comes as the ties between the United States and Israel, its closest ally in the Middle East, are tested over the war in Gaza. More than 34,000 people have died in Gaza, including both combatants and civilians, and the director of the World Food Program has said that parts of the Gaza Strip are experiencing a “full-blown famine.”

The United States is the biggest supplier of weapons to Israel, and Mr. Biden is hoping to use that leverage to get Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel to forgo a long-threatened invasion of Rafah, the southern Gaza city where more than one million Palestinians have taken refuge.

Mr. Biden has halted a shipment of bombs to Israel and said he would withhold artillery as well if Israel moved forward in Rafah. But the Israelis maintain they need to go into Rafah to finish destroying Hamas, which killed 1,200 people in the Oct. 7 terrorist attack it led on Israel.

The U.N. resolution does not establish a Palestinian state, but it does recognize Palestine to qualify for full-member status at the United Nations. Its membership will need to be approved by the U.N. Security Council, which includes the United States.

The United States has repeatedly wielded its veto power on the council to block U.N. resolutions calling for a cease-fire in Gaza.

The U.N. General Assembly took up Friday’s resolution after the United States vetoed in April a resolution that came before the Security Council that would have recognized full membership for a Palestinian state, which is considered a “nonmember observer state.”

The resolution that passed on Friday would extend to Palestinians new privileges, such as sitting among member states in alphabetical order, speaking at meetings on any topic instead of being limited to Palestinian affairs, and submitting proposals and amendments.

The resolution was prepared by the United Arab Emirates, the current chair of the U.N. Arab Group, and sponsored by 70 countries. It declares that “the State of Palestine is qualified for membership in the United Nations” under its charter rules and recommends that the Security Council reconsider the matter with a favorable outcome.”

The resolution’s adoption prompted rousing applause.

Farnaz Fassihi contributed reporting.

— Erica L. Green Reporting from Washington

Here is what we know about where aid can enter Gaza.

Following Israel’s incursion into Rafah this week, the Israeli military briefly shut down the Kerem Shalom crossing and seized the Gaza side of the Rafah crossing, choking the flow of desperately needed food, fuel and medical supplies at a time when experts believe parts of Gaza are already experiencing a famine and several have died from malnutrition.

According to United Nations data, the number of aid trucks entering Gaza hit a peak last week since October: A total of 1,674 aid trucks entered Gaza through the Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings, the main entry points of aid into the enclave. But since Sunday, no aid trucks have entered Gaza from either entry point, even after Israel said that it had reopened the Kerem Shalom crossing on Wednesday.

The entry of aid into Gaza has been heavily restricted by Israel since the war started, creating what aid experts say is a human-made hunger crisis. Humanitarians warn that the crisis will worsen without the fuel necessary for bakeries and hospitals to operate.

Here is a look at the major routes for aid into Gaza and their status.

Kerem Shalom

Israel shut down the Kerem Shalom crossing after a Hamas attack on Sunday killed four of its soldiers in the area.

On Wednesday, Israel said it had reopened the crossing, but the United Nations and others disputed that claim because no trucks were being allowed through. On Friday afternoon, Israel allowed at least 157,000 liters of fuel to enter , according to Scott Anderson, a senior official at UNRWA, the U.N. agency for Palestinians. But no humanitarian aid, which includes food and medical supplies, has entered since Sunday, he said.

Egypt, which plays an important role in facilitating aid collection and delivery, has complicated matters by resisting sending trucks to Kerem Shalom, according to several Western and Israeli officials ; American and Israeli officials believe that Egypt is putting pressure on Israel to curb its invasion of Rafah.

The Kerem Shalom crossing has been a major artery for aid into Gaza since it opened in December and is where most aid trucks now enter. Before Israel’s incursion into Rafah, an average of 185 trucks entered Kerem Shalom daily last week, peaking at 270 trucks last Friday, according to United Nations data. Aid groups have said for months that at least 300 trucks are needed daily to prevent further malnutrition and worsening hunger.

The Rafah crossing remains closed.

The crossing has been an important gate for injured and sick people to leave the enclave to receive medical treatment abroad. The Gazan Health Ministry has said that dozens of people with illnesses such as breast cancer and lymphoma have been unable to leave Gaza since Sunday.

The Erez crossing at Gaza’s northern border is open, but limited aid is trickling through, according to data from COGAT, the Israeli agency that oversees aid delivery in Gaza, and an UNRWA official. It is the only border crossing in the north and was only opened last month after pressure from President Biden.

COGAT said on its website that 36 aid trucks and one fuel truck passed through the Erez crossing on Thursday. Mr. Anderson said UNRWA sent 67 trucks through the Erez crossing on Wednesday and that nothing has passed through since. A reason for the discrepancy between the numbers and days was not immediately clear.

Sending more aid to northern Gaza would be crucial to prevent further malnutrition-related deaths in the area . In March, health experts projected that northern Gaza would soon face a famine, and, on Saturday, Cindy McCain, the executive director of the World Food Program, said that parts of Gaza were already in one. As of mid-April, Gazan health officials said that at least 28 children younger than 12 had died from malnutrition in hospitals and perhaps dozens more outside medical centers.

Since Gaza has no international pier of its own — Israel has for years prevented the construction of one — the U.S. military said in March that it would build a temporary pier to get aid in by sea, part of what it said was a multipronged effort to deliver humanitarian assistance to the enclave.

The Pentagon said on Thursday that the floating pier and the causeway had been completed but that bad weather and sea conditions had prevented their installation. They remain at the Israeli port of Ashdod.

An American cargo ship, called the Sagamore, departed from Cyprus on Thursday, the Pentagon said, and ship tracking websites show the ship positioned at Ashdod. The Sagamore is carrying more than 170 metric tons of nutrition bars, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development, but cannot be unloaded and distributed in Gaza until the pier is installed. It is unclear when that might be, as the Pentagon said the installation would be dependent on security and weather conditions.

COGAT said on Thursday that 117 packages were airdropped in northern Gaza that day. Airdrop operations only began in March to try to prevent a greater humanitarian disaster as hunger grew in the Palestinian territory. COGAT said 99 airdrop operations by nine donating countries, including the United States and Jordan, had been completed since March.

But airdrops have been criticized by aid experts as perhaps the most inefficient way to deliver aid into Gaza, and in some cases, deadly. Airdropped aid packages in March fell on several Palestinians in Gaza City , killing five and wounding several others, according to Gazan health officials. In another case , a dozen Palestinians drowned while trying to retrieve packages that had been intentionally dropped over the water to prevent further deaths if its parachutes failed to deploy.

— Gaya Gupta

South Africa again asks the U.N.’s top court to act against Israel in Gaza

Days after an Israeli military incursion into Rafah , in southern Gaza, South Africa once again asked the United Nations’ top court to issue constraints on Israel, saying “the very survival” of Palestinians in Gaza was under threat.

In filings disclosed by the International Court of Justice in The Hague on Friday, South Africa asked the court to order Israel to immediately withdraw from Rafah, Gaza’s southernmost city where more than a million Palestinians displaced by the war have sought shelter, and to “cease its military offensive” and allow “unimpeded access” to international officials, investigators and journalists.

South Africa’s latest move is part of a case the country filed in December in which it accused Israel of genocide. Since then, the court has ordered Israel to take action to prevent acts of genocide in Gaza and ordered the delivery of more humanitarian aid to Palestinians in the face of growing starvation in areas. But the court has not ordered Israel to stop its military campaign against Hamas.

Israel has strongly denied South Africa’s accusations and said that it had gone to great lengths to admit deliveries of food and fuel into Gaza and to lessen harm to civilians. It has also said that its war in Gaza was necessary to defend itself against the Oct. 7 attacks led by Hamas and other armed groups that killed more than 1,200 Israelis and led to the capture of about 250 others.

Friday’s request is the fourth time that South Africa has asked the U.N. court for temporary injunctions. The filings noted that conditions had deteriorated significantly for civilians sheltering in Gaza.

“Rafah is the last population center in Gaza that has not been substantially destroyed by Israel and as such the last refuge for Palestinians in Gaza,” South Africa stated.

The court has not indicated when it will respond to the South African request, but its rules require that it must give priority to petitions for emergency orders. The 15-judge court has no means of enforcing its orders.

The main case, dealing with the question of genocide, is not expected to start until next year.

— Marlise Simons Reporting from Paris

Cease-fire talks hit snag, in part, on how many hostages would be released in a first phase, officials say.

Talks involving Israeli and Hamas negotiators on a cease-fire and hostage release deal remain snagged over whether a truce would be permanent or temporary, and how many hostages would be freed in the first phase of an agreement, officials briefed on the matter said.

Israel and Hamas representatives left Egypt on Thursday after the latest round of indirect talks — they do not communicate with each other directly — without any deal in sight, the officials said. But U.S., Egyptian, and Qatari teams were still holding further discussions in Egypt.

Hamas is still demanding that Israel abide by a permanent cease-fire and completely withdraw from Gaza as part of any truce, said Mousa Abu Marzouk, a member of Hamas’s political leadership. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has said Israel cannot end the war as long as Hamas’s rule in Gaza remains intact. On Friday, Hamas declared that Israel’s rejection of a framework that Qatar and Egypt had proposed, and Hamas had approved, had “brought matters back to square one.”

Mr. Abu Marzouk added that another obstacle in the talks is how many living hostages held in Gaza would be released during the first phase of a multistage cease-fire. His account was confirmed by an Israeli official and another official briefed on the negotiation. Both spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic negotiations.

Palestinian armed groups still hold approximately 132 hostages in Gaza, the vast majority of them seized during the Hamas-led attack on Oct. 7, according to the Israeli authorities. But Israel says it has also determined that at least 36 of them are dead.

Israel had initially demanded that Hamas release 40 hostages in the first phase of a cease-fire, including old captives, ill people and women, both civilians and soldiers. Male Israeli soldiers, seen by Hamas as higher-value captives, would be released in the second phase of the truce.

A recent Israeli proposal made a concession, reducing the number of living hostages Israel was demanding to 33 during the first tranche, according to the officials familiar with the talks.

On Monday, Hamas told negotiators it did not have enough living hostages for the first phase of agreement and said the 33 turned over would include both living hostages and the bodies of those who had died in captivity, two U.S. officials said on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to speak publicly.

But during this week’s meetings in Egypt — mediated in part by William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director — the Israeli negotiating team said that Hamas must release 33 living hostages during the first phase, said Mr. Abu Marzouk, the senior Hamas official, and one of the officials briefed on the talks. If the group could not muster that number, Israel demanded they release some captive Israeli male soldiers as well, said Mr. Abu Marzouk.

On Friday, Egypt’s Foreign Ministry said both Israel and Hamas needed to “show flexibility” in the talks so as to “reach an agreement for a truce that would put an end to the humanitarian tragedy.”

Aaron Boxerman contributed reporting.

— Adam Rasgon and Julian E. Barnes

People leaving Rafah describe yet another fearful flight from Israeli assaults.

Manal al-Wakeel and her extended family of 30 people thought they were going home.

Displaced from their home in Gaza City months ago, Ms. al-Wakeel and relatives began packing their bags on Monday and preparing to dismantle their tent in Rafah, at the southern edge of the Gaza Strip.

Hamas had announced that it had accepted a cease-fire proposal from Qatar and Egypt, leaving many Gazans thinking that a truce was imminent. Their joy was short-lived; it soon became clear that Hamas was not talking about the same proposal endorsed days earlier by Israel, which said the two sides remained far apart.

Instead, Israeli warplanes dropped leaflets in eastern Rafah telling people to flee and move to what Israel called a humanitarian zone to the north, as the Israeli military bombarded the area. Gazan health officials say that dozens have been killed since Israel’s incursion into parts of Rafah this week.

“We thought that day a cease-fire was possible,” said Ms. al-Wakeel, 48, who helped the aid group World Central Kitchen prepare hot meals.

She and her family had been sheltering near the Abu Yousef al-Najjar Hospital, in an area battered by Israeli airstrikes and ground combat. The director of the hospital, Dr. Marwan al-Hams, said on Monday that it had received the bodies of 26 people killed by Israeli fire, and treated 50 who were wounded. The hospital was evacuated the next day.

So rather than return home, on Tuesday night Ms. al-Wakeel, her husband, her 11 children and other relatives found a semi-truck that would take them and their belongings, including suitcases of clothes, pots and pans and tents, for 2,500 shekels — about $670 — in search of another place to stay.

They left Rafah around midnight and made their way north along with hundreds of tuk-tuks, trucks, cars and donkey-carts full of other displaced families and their possessions.

“It was a scary night, the truck was moving slowly because of the heavy load on it,” she said.

Once out of Rafah, they made frequent stops at schools and other buildings, desperately looking for any empty place for them to shelter. But every place was full.

Others couldn’t find a place, either, and Ms. al-Wakeel saw many people sleeping by the side of the road next to whatever belongings they had fled with.

At a U.N. school in Deir El-Balah, a young man suggested they stay in an empty concrete building — with no windows — that belonged to the Hamas-led government’s ministry of social development.

“It looked like a dangerous place,” she said, adding that they had been told that a woman and her daughter had previously been killed in one of the building’s rooms by an Israeli missile.

But they were too afraid to continue roaming around in the darkness, and decided to spend the night there and look for a safer place come morning.

“I feel so sad and disappointed for what happened to Rafah as it was stable for us there,” she said. “We have spent so much time having to arrange new places for ourselves again and we feel depressed and so exhausted from repeating the same suffering.”

Saeda al-Nemnem, 42, had given birth to twins less than a month before Israel dropped the leaflets over where they were sheltering in Rafah, ordering them to leave. Her family, also displaced from Gaza City, dispatched a relative to look for a truck that could ferry them north, despite the intense Israeli airstrikes at the time.

The relative, Mohammed al-Jojo, was killed by an Israeli strike on the tractor he was riding, she said.

He “was killed when he was getting us out of that area to a safer place,” she said. “I feel I caused his death.”

Despite the dangers in getting on the road, staying where they were in Rafah was no safer.

Along the terrifying journey to the city of Khan Younis, where she and her family of eight found shelter in a room attached to Al Aqsa University’s main building, they could hear what seemed like explosions from Israeli bombs, missiles and artillery, she said.

“My children’s heartbeats were so high that I could feel them,” she said. It was the heaviest bombardment she had ever heard, she said, “so close and so terrifying for me and my children.”

— Raja Abdulrahim and Bilal Shbair Reporting from Jerusalem and from Khan Younis, in the Gaza Strip

More than 100,000 have fled Rafah, the U.N. says, as Israeli bombardment intensifies.

With fears rising that Israel will move ahead with a long-planned full-scale invasion of Rafah, the United Nations said Friday that more than 100,000 people had fled since Israel ordered people to leave parts of the city and intensified a bombardment that Gazan health officials say has killed dozens of people.

As Israeli troops continued to exchange fire with Palestinian fighters near Rafah on Friday, according to both the Israeli military and Hamas, people were packing up their tents and leaving the southern Gazan city and its surrounding areas where more than a million Palestinians had sought shelter in trucks, cars and donkey carts.

Many of them have already been displaced multiple times by Israel’s war in Gaza over the past seven months.

“Around 110,000 people have now fled Rafah looking for safety,” the main United Nations agency that aids Palestinians, known as UNRWA, posted online on Friday. “But nowhere is safe in the #GazaStrip & living conditions are atrocious.” On Thursday, a U.N. official said that 79,000 people had left since Israel issued its evacuation order.

“The only hope is an immediate #Ceasefire ,” UNRWA said.

Israel seized control of the Gaza side of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt in what it called a “limited operation,” and intense fighting has continued on the eastern edge of the city since. The Israeli military said on Friday that its aircraft had struck Hamas members and rocket-launching sites at several locations in the Rafah area over the past day, while Hamas said its forces had fired mortars on Israeli troops east of the city.

The Israeli security cabinet agreed on Thursday night to expand the operation in Rafah, two officials said, but it was not clear what that would mean in practical terms.

Fighting continues in other areas of Gaza, and on Friday, the Israeli military said four of its soldiers were killed and two were seriously injured by an explosive device near Gaza City, in the northern part of the territory. Israeli forces seized the north months ago but have been unable to control it completely, repeatedly battling militants there.

In an apparent sign of the militants’ staying power, Hamas took responsibility for a rocket attack, the first one since December that was launched from Gaza and triggered air-raid sirens in the southern Israeli city of Beersheba. Rockets were fired at Israel from both Rafah and central Gaza, according to the Israeli military. There were no reports of injuries or serious damage.

Israel has designated what it calls a safe zone for Gazans fleeing Rafah, including Al-Mawasi , a coastal section of Gaza it has advised people to go to for months. But the United Nations has said it is neither safe nor equipped to receive them.

On Friday, UNICEF’s senior emergency coordinator in the Gaza Strip, Hamish Young, said from Rafah that in his 30 years working on large-scale humanitarian emergencies “I’ve never been involved in a situation as devastating, complex or erratic as this.”

“Yesterday, I walked around Al-Mawasi,” Mr. Young said. “The roads to Mawasi are jammed — many hundreds of trucks, buses, cars and donkey carts loaded with people and possessions.”

“People I speak with tell me they are exhausted, terrified and know life in Al-Mawasi will, again, impossibly, be harder,” he said. “Families lack proper sanitation facilities, drinking water and shelter.”

— Raja Abdulrahim and Bilal Shbair

Actions by Israel and Egypt are restricting Gaza aid routes.

For a few weeks, after extraordinary international pressure and warnings of an imminent famine in the Gaza Strip, Israel announced new steps to increase humanitarian aid and more supplies entered the territory.

But the flow of aid, the vast majority of which goes through two border crossings in southern Gaza, has come to a near-total stop this week, first closed off by Israel and then further restricted, officials say, by Egypt.

Israel shut down the Kerem Shalom crossing after a Hamas rocket attack nearby killed four Israeli soldiers last Sunday. The next day, Israeli forces seized and closed the Gaza side of the other crossing, at Rafah on the Egyptian border, as part of what they have described as a limited military operation against Hamas, and raised the Israeli flag over the crossing.

Although Israel has reopened Kerem Shalom and some fuel has gone into Gaza from there, humanitarian aid like food and medicines has not been allowed through the crossing since last Sunday, according to Scott Anderson, a senior official at UNRWA, the main U.N. agency that aids Gaza.

One reason is that Egypt, where most of the aid for Gaza is collected and loaded, is resisting sending trucks toward Kerem Shalom, according to two U.S. officials and another Western official who are involved in the aid operation, as well as two Israeli officials. The American and Israeli officials believe that Egypt is trying to put pressure on Israel to pull back from the Rafah operation.

Another official familiar with the negotiations said U.S. officials — including William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, who was in Cairo this week for Gaza cease-fire talks — have been trying to persuade Egypt to dispatch the trucks. But Egypt has rebuffed the pressure, saying it will not allow aid to flow to Kerem Shalom while Israel has closed the Rafah crossing, and casting the situation as a matter of sovereignty , a United Nations official said.

All the officials spoke on condition that they not be named because of the sensitivity of the aid talks and the cease-fire negotiations. A spokesman for Egypt’s government declined to comment.

Egypt plays a vital role in the Gaza relief effort. Much of the international aid bound for Gaza is collected in the Egyptian city of El Arish, about 30 miles from the Gaza border, where it is loaded onto trucks and sent to the Israeli border for inspections before being allowed into Gaza.

Egypt has grown increasingly nervous about Israel’s Rafah operation, in part over deep-seated fears it will push Palestinian refugees onto Egyptian soil — an outcome Egypt views as a national security threat. Israel’s presence on the Egypt-Gaza border, a border Egypt is supposed to control, has also drawn heavy domestic criticism.

Egyptian concerns are not the only factor complicating the use of Kerem Shalom. The Western official said that Israeli military activity and fighting near Kerem Shalom have partly destroyed the roads, making it extremely difficult for aid trucks to navigate into Gaza.

With fighting continuing, the area is also considered unsafe for aid workers, according to one of the U.S. officials and the U.N. official, who said that a U.N. contractor near Kerem Shalom was shot at by Israeli forces on Wednesday.

An Israeli military spokesman, Maj. Nir Dinar, declined to comment on the incident, but blamed Hamas for preventing aid from entering. While Kerem Shalom was accepting aid deliveries, he said, it had been closed in previous days only after Hamas fired on the crossing three times this week, killing Israeli soldiers.

“Israel is doing everything to enable” aid to enter, Major Dinar said.

On Friday, the Israeli authorities permitted at least 157,000 liters of fuel to enter southern Gaza through the Kerem Shalom crossing, said Mr. Anderson, the UNRWA official. Gaza’s power grid stopped functioning early in the war, leaving hospitals, bakeries, shelters and other essential facilities dependent on generators for electricity, but this week they were in growing danger of running out of fuel.

While aid deliveries rose in April and the first days of May, before the Rafah operation, aid groups said Israel was not allowing nearly enough into Gaza to stave off famine or the collapse of the health care and sanitation systems. Now that tens of thousands more civilians are fleeing Rafah to areas with little infrastructure set up to care for them and Gazan hospitals are running low on fuel , the United Nations and aid groups say the situation has become far more dire .

Julian E. Barnes , Gaya Gupta and Aaron Boxerman contributed reporting.

— Vivian Yee and Ronen Bergman

Here’s why Rafah and Gaza’s southern border are strategically important in the war.

Tens of thousands of people have fled the city of Rafah, in southern Gaza, this week in response to an evacuation order from Israeli forces who took control of a border crossing there with Egypt and have bombarded the area as part of their campaign against Hamas.

Gaza’s eight-mile-long southern frontier with Egypt is critical to Palestinians. One reason is that it is the territory’s only land border that does not adjoin Israel. But that also makes it vital for Israeli security interests.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has repeatedly said that his government sees it as critical to seize control of a buffer strip along the southern edge of Gaza, from Israel’s border to the Mediterranean, known in Israel as the Philadelphi Corridor.

Here is a look at why Rafah has taken on outsize political significance in the war:

Why is Rafah important?

In essence, because of geography. Israel began its ground invasion of Gaza in the north in late October and, since then, has expanded its campaign southward, fighting a series of battles to dismantle the main battalions of the military wing of Hamas, the Qassam Brigades.

Military experts and Israeli officials say that the last remaining battalions are in Rafah, along with Hamas’s military leaders. In addition, Israeli officials say that most of the remaining hostages taken on Oct. 7, more than 100 people, are being held in tunnels under Rafah.

For months, Mr. Netanyahu has said his government wants to eradicate Hamas entirely, making Rafah the logical next destination in its military campaign. But Rafah, a city of around 170,000 before the war, has swollen to more than one million as Gazans driven from their homes in other parts of the enclave have taken shelter there.

Conditions there are catastrophic, with inadequate shelter, sanitation, medical care, food and fuel.

Rafah is also the base for international humanitarian work in Gaza, and it is the funnel through which most aid flows.

Hamas rocket fire from Rafah killed four Israeli soldiers on Sunday, after which Israel sent ground forces to seize the border crossing at Rafah and close it. It also closed the primary aid crossing into Israel, which has since been reopened, though the supplies passing through there are limited.

Why does the border matter to Hamas and Gaza?

At least 12 tunnels wide enough to carry trucks have been constructed under the buffer strip in recent decades, according to Ahron Bregman, a political scientist and expert in Middle East security issues at King’s College in London, who is a former Israeli military officer. The tunnels act as a conduit for commercial imports into Gaza, which are important for Gazans, given Israel’s partial blockade of the territory since 2007, and for the Egyptian and Palestinian business leaders who control the trade.

But the cross-border tunnels are also important for Hamas and have allowed it to smuggle weapons, money, building materials and personnel into Gaza over the years, Mr. Bregman said.

“This is the way they can get in and out without asking the Israelis,” Mr. Bregman said. “This is the only outlet for Hamas at the moment.” He said that unless the tunnels were blocked, Hamas could rebuild its military capacity after the war.

What is Egypt’s interest in the Rafah border?

During other regional conflicts, Egypt has opened its borders to refugees. But the government of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi fears that, given the chance, large numbers of Palestinian civilians would rush across the border under military pressure from Israel.

Even if they initially only intended to stay for the duration of the war, the Egyptian government is concerned that their stay could become prolonged and that they could be a destabilizing political force in Egypt and a burden on its economy. The government also sees Hamas as an enemy and opposes giving it a foothold in Egypt. Hamas began as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist movement that was strongly linked to the government Mr. el-Sisi overthrew in 2013, and that his government has suppressed.

Egypt has warned Israel to avoid doing anything that could force Gazans across the border or threaten a landmark peace agreement signed by the two countries in 1979.

Egypt has stationed border guards along the Gaza border for decades, but it reinforced that presence after the Oct. 7 Hamas-led assault on Israel.

— Matthew Mpoke Bigg

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Recognition of States and Governments in International Law
There are two main international law aspects to the recognition process. Recognition can play a role in the international legality of the object of recognition: sometimes, a state is or is not a state legally because, amongst other things, other states have decided to treat it as such. The recognition itself is regulated by international law ...
PDF Political Realities of Recognition of States Contrary to the Bindings
Unlike the constitutive theory, the declaratory theory claims that an entity can be accepted as a State as soon as it fulfills the criteria of Statehood, its existence as a subject of international law and recognition only declares this fact. If a State is a fact, this makes recognition "a formal political action.
Statehood and Recognition in International Law: A Post-Colonial
International lawyers would simply argue about international law short of a systematised set of rules about the determination of those entities that qualify as states. It is true that the practice of recognition of states and governments had long been the object of scholarly studies.
EXPLAINING THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION
155 ibid 148, arguing that '[n]on-recognition as a State in response to a violation of international law has, in contrast to the politically motivated non-recognition of a State, a clearly defined scope. In the case of non-recognition as a State, it is not the individual State's subjective will to recognize … but the objective legal status ...
Recognition in International Law
Recognition simultaneously constitutes a means for its author to make known its own view of a situation, including the legal consequences, if any, that the author attributes to the situation and on which the author intends to base its policy. With a few exceptions, recognition remains discretionary. Any subject of international law decides for ...
Recognition in International Law
Cambridge University Press, 2012 - Law - 504 pages. Originally published by Hersch Lauterpacht in 1947, this book presents a detailed study of recognition in international law, examining its crucial significance in relation to statehood, governments and belligerency. The author develops a strong argument for positioning recognition within the ...
The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie
Professor Ian Brownlie, CBE, OC, FBA, DCL held the Chichele Chair of Public International Law at the University of Oxford from 1980 to 1999. Before that he taught at Oxford, Nottingham, and the London School of Economics. He was widely recognized as one of the leading international lawyers of our time, and as well-known and appreciated for his ...
Legal officials, the rule of recognition, and international law
Expand 1.4 The rule of recognition and international law 1.4 The rule of recognition and international law 1.4.1 Not a System but a Set 1.4.1 Not a System but a Set 1.4.2 International Rules of Change and Adjudication 1.4.2 International Rules of Change and Adjudication
Recognition of Governments and Customary International Law
In the lead essay in this symposium, Professor Erika de Wet contends that notwithstanding all of the post-Cold War enthusiasm for a right to democratic governance and the non-recognition of governments resulting from coups and unconstitutional changes of government, a customary international law norm on the nonrecognition of governments established anti-democratically has not emerged.
The subjects of international law (Chapter 4)
This focus on states still applies, and makes for difficult discussions on the legal standing of other entities. It is now generally recognized that entities such as intergovernmental organizations (the UN, the EU, the IMF or the WTO) are to be regarded as subjects of international law - and this was ultimately confirmed by the ICJ in the ...
The 'Duty' of Non-Recognition in Contemporary International Law: Issues
This became known as the doctrine of non-recognition and was regarded as an appropriate, but largely discretionary, response by individual states, and the international community generally, to particularly serious breaches of international law.
Recognition of States under International Law
Share & spread the love Contents hide 1. Introduction 2. Meaning of State Recognition in Public International Law 3. Recognition of State 4. Essentials for recognition as a state under Public International Law 5. Legal effects of state recognition in Public International Law 6. Theories of recognition in international law 6.1. 1. Consecutive theory of […]
Recognition of a State under International Law
De jure recognition is granted when the state fulfils all the essential condition of states along with sufficient control and permanency. 3. De facto recognition is a primary step towards grant of de jure recognition. De jure recognition can be granted either with or without grant of de facto recognition. 4.
PDF Essays on International Law
narrow sense 'private international law' is synonymous with the concept of the 'conflict of laws', although the former may be wider than the latter. Private international law may, for instance, include a situation in which a multilateral agreement gives rise to rights upon which private persons may
Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice
See also I. Brownlie, 'Recognition in Theory and Practice', in R. MacDonald and D. Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (1986), 634: 'In the literature the theories have tended to stand in front of the issues and to have assumed a "theological" role as a body ...
Recognition Of A State Under International Law
Definition of Recognition. "In recognizing state as a member of the international community, the existing state declares that in their opinion the new state fulfills the condition of statehood as required by the International law.". - Prof. Oppenheim. "It is a political community acquiring or satisfying the requirements of statehood ...
Theorizing Recognition and International Personality
The term international personality refers to 'the capacity to be the bearer of rights and duties under international law'. 1 The history of this concept is often traced back to the efforts of an influential group of European international lawyers in the second half of the nineteenth century to construct a 'positivist' system of international law based on state consent. 2 For this ...
State Recognition Essay
Buy the full version of these notes or essay plans and more in our Public International Law Notes. Oxbridge Notes' prizewinning note marketplace has been servingstudents since 2010 with premium study materials. Reap the benefits of joined-up learning and earn higher grades, just like our 75,000+ happy customers.
Free International Law Essay Examples & Topic Ideas
Welcome to our list of international law essay examples & writing ideas! Here, you will find international law topics for an essay, presentation, thesis, research paper, or any other assignment. ... Recognition in International Affairs . However, debates in international law raise the question of whether merely satisfying the 1933 Montevideo ...
With I.C.C. Arrest Warrants, Let Justice Take Its Course
Mr. Kaye is a law professor at the University of California, Irvine. In seeking the arrests of senior leaders of Israel and Hamas, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has given the ...
Middle East Crisis: U.S. Criticizes Israel for Failure to Protect
It deems that assurances Israel provided in March that it would use U.S. arms consistent with international law are "credible and reliable," and thus allow the continued flow of U.S. military aid.