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Landmark Cases in Special Education Law

Landmark cases in special education law.

In the United States legal system, judicial decisions play an important role in determining what a particular law means. This type of law is known as “Case Law.” Case Law is developed when courts are asked to resolve disputes that are occurring between two or more parties, and the court must interpret what the law means in a given situation. Through this process, the meaning of phrases such as “Least Restrictive Environment” and “Meaningful Educational Benefit” evolve as various courts decide cases and set precedents. A precedent is a rule established in a previous court case that is either binding or persuasive depending on which court issued the decision. Below are some of the cases that are important to special education law and the precedents they have created.

U.S. Supreme Court Decisions

Cases decided by the United States Supreme Court are binding on courts all across the country. As a result, when the Supreme Court interprets a statute or makes a determination in a particular case, all lower courts must use that determination when deciding cases. In some instances, however, the Supreme Court leaves room in a decision that allows individual states to make their own determination – for example, in 2005 the Supreme Court decided that the party requesting a due process hearing under the IDEA has the burden of persuasion to establish his or her claims, but the Court expressly declined to determine whether states may legislate the burden of proof. In 2008, New Jersey enacted a law placing the burden of proof and production in all requests for a due process hearing, whether filed by the parent or the school district, on the school district.

• Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) – In this landmark civil rights decision, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a separate education for African-American children was not an equal education, concluding that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place and that ‘separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.'” This decision provided parents of children with disabilities and disability rights activists the constitutional foundation to press for equal educational opportunities for all children, including those with developmental and other disabilities.
• Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) – This was the first special education case decided by the Supreme Court. In this case, the Court held that an IEP must be reasonably calculated for a child to receive educational benefit, but the school district is not required to provide every service necessary to maximize a child’s potential.
• Irving Independent Sch. Dist. v. Amber Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984) – The Court held that provision of clean intermittent catheterization was a “related service” under the IDEA and not a “medical service,” because the service was necessary for the student to attend school. The services requested did not fall within the medical exclusion because they need not be performed by a physician. The Court noted that “Congress sought primarily to make public education available to handicapped children and to make such access meaningful.”
• Burlington Sch. Committee v. Mass. Bd. of Ed., 471 U. S. 359 (1985) – The Court established, for the first time, the right of parents to be reimbursed for their expenditures for private special education. This decision (together with the Court’s decision in Florence v. Carter) generally stands for the proposition that a school district may be required to reimburse parents for tuition and other expenses related to a private school placement when (1) the IEP and placement offered by the school district were inadequate or inappropriate (in other words, where the school district failed to offer FAPE) (2) the parents’ private placement was appropriate for their child’s needs, and (3) the balance of the equities favors reimbursement. The Court also explained that in an IDEA dispute, a court has broad authority to fashion appropriate relief considering equitable factors, which will effectuate the purposes underlying the Act, and that the IDEA provides “procedural safeguards to ensure the full participation of the parents and proper resolution of substantive disagreements.”
• Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) – The Court addressed the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, explaining that in enacting “stay put”, Congress intended “to strip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students … from school.” The Court also noted that the IEP is the “centerpiece of the [IDEA’s] education delivery system” and explained that “Congress repeatedly emphasized throughout the Act the importance and indeed the necessity of parental participation in both the development of the IEP and any subsequent assessments of its effectiveness.”
• Florence County School District Four v. Shannon Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993) – The Court discussed the standards pursuant to which a parent may obtain reimbursement for a private educational placement. Importantly, the Court determined that reimbursement does not necessarily require that the private school meet the IDEA’s definition of free appropriate public education; the private school does not necessarily have to meet the state education standards.
• Buckhannon v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (2001) –  The Court ruled that in order to obtain attorney fees as a “prevailing party,” the party must secure either a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree.
• Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) –  The Court held that, absent a state statute to the contrary, the party seeking relief bears the burden of proof in an administrative due process proceeding.
• Arlington v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) –  The Court held that a provision of the IDEA authorizing “reasonable attorneys’ fees for prevailing parents does not authorize the recovery of fees for expert’s services.
• Jacob Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 550 U.S. 516 (2007) – Here, the Court determined that parents may pursue claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) on their own behalf, as the rights conferred to parents under the Act exist independently from the rights of their child.

U.S. Court of Appeals Decisions

There are 13 appellate courts that sit below the U.S. Supreme Court, and they are the U.S. Courts of Appeals. A court of appeals hears challenges to District Court decisions from courts located within its circuit. The U.S. District Court of New Jersey sits within the Third Judicial Circuit. Decisions made in the Third Circuit are binding in all New Jersey courts. Decisions made in other Circuit Courts are influential when the same issue has not previously been addressed by the Third Circuit. Below are some of the important special education decisions that have been issued by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

• Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1990) –  The Third Circuit held that compensatory education is available to respond to situations where a school district flagrantly fails to comply with the requirements of IDEA.
• Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3rd Cir. 1993) – Children with disabilities are entitled to be educated in the Least Restrictive Environment (LRE) that is appropriate to meet their needs. In this case, the Court adopted a two part test to determine whether a child has been placed in the least restrictive environment. It must first be determined whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplementary aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily. In making this determination, courts should consider several factors, including: (i) whether the school district has made reasonable efforts to accommodate the child in a regular classroom; (ii) the educational benefits available to the child in a regular class, with appropriate supplementary aids and services, as compared to the benefits provided in a special education class; and (iii) the possible negative effects of the inclusion of the child on the education of the other students in the class. If placement outside the regular classroom is necessary, then it must be determined whether the child is mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate, i.e., whether efforts have been made to include the child in school programs with non-disabled children whenever possible. Thus, disabled children should be mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate and their removal from the regular education environment should occur only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
• Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1998) –  The Third Circuit has held that the educational benefit to which each student is entitled must be more than “trivial,” it must be “meaningful.” The Third Circuit inferred that Congress must have envisioned that “significant learning” would occur. The Court recognized the difficulty of measuring this benefit and concluded that the question of whether the benefit is de minimis must be answered in relation to the child’s potential. Thus the standard was set, a FAPE requires “significant learning” and “meaningful benefit.”
• Ridgewood Board of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3rd Cir. 1999) – In this case, the Third Circuit held that “the provision of merely “more than a trivial educational benefit” does not meet the [Polk] standard . . . . Rowley and Polk reject a bright-line rule on the amount of benefit required of an appropriate IEP in favor of an approach requiring a student-by-student analysis that carefully considers the student’s individual abilities.
• T.R. v. Kingwood Township, 205 F.3d 572 (3rd Cir. 2000) – In this case, the Court clarified that the Least Restrictive Environment (LRE) is the one that, to the greatest extent possible, satisfactorily educates the disabled child with non-disabled children, in the same school the child would attend if the child were not disabled. T.R. involved a preschool aged child who was offered placement in an in-district classroom where half the children were disabled and half were typically developing, which the Court held was a “hybrid” program and therefore not the LRE.
• G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District Authority, No. 14-1397 (3rd Cir. 2015) – This case clarified how to interpret IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations. The Court held that the IDEA’s statute of limitations creates a “discovery rule” approach, in which the statute begins to run on the date the parents knew or should have known of the FAPE violation, rather than an “occurrence rule” approach, wherein the statute of limitations period would begin to run on the actual date of the violation. Based on this clarification, parents would be required to file a request for due process within two years of the date they knew, or should have known, their child was denied a FAPE. If the parents of a student reasonably do not discover the denial of a FAPE to their child for many years, so long as the parents file within two years of discovering it, the parents have no limit on the number of years for which they can seek relief.

Contact New Jersey Special Education Attorney Lori E. Arons, Esq. Today to Discuss Your Case

The laws related to special education and educational rights in the United States are extremely complicated and lawyers who have been practicing for years may have little or no experience with this area of law. For this reason, it is critical for parents of children with special needs to retain a lawyer who understands the unique issues that arise in this area of law and are familiar with the various state and federal laws, regulations, and court decisions that can have an impact on the way a case will be resolved.

Lori E. Arons, Esq. is a skilled NJ special education lawyer who has been through the IEP process with her own children, and is personally invested in ensuring that kids with special needs get the education to which they are legally entitled. To schedule a consultation with Lori, call our office today or send us an email through our online contact form.

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Special Education Caselaw U.S. Supreme Court l Courts of Appeals l District Courts Noteworthy Cases l Special Education Year in Review Books & Video Training

The Special Education Caselaw section of the Wrightslaw Special Education Law Library is organized as follows.

Decisions from the U. S. Supreme Court are listed first, beginning with Board of Ed. v. Amy Rowley (1982). Decisions from U. S. Courts of Appeals are next, followed by noteworthy decisions from U. S. Districts Courts and administrative decisions.

The Caselaw Library includes a sample of decisions on special education legal issues and does not include every important decision since the law was enacted. If you are looking for Complaints filed in federal court, please check the Federal Court Complaints page. If you are looking for articles about legal issues, please check the Articles and Analyses page .

For additional information about cases and legal research, please check the Directory of Legal and Advocacy Resources . For articles about special education law and advocacy topics, frequently asked questions, and newsletter archives, please go to the Advocacy Library.

New in 2021

Rogich v. Clark County School District, (Nevada, 2021). Methodology and procedural safeguards case. School district failed to provide an IEP that identified an Orton-Gillingham based methodology or structured literacy format that teachers would have to use to meet the needs of a child with dyslexia; school district refused to accept the parents' offer to pay to train teachers in an effective structured literacy method; IEP teams failed to adequately review evaluations provided by parents and failed to "meaningfully consider parents' concerns for enhancing their child's education." Judge held that telling parents "Trust us to provide what she needs" is "not sufficient."

S.S. v. Cobb Co. Sch. Dist. (N.D. GA 2021) - When "a due process complaint is dismissed without an evidentiary hearing and the reviewing court lacks findings and conclusions on the merits of the plaintiff's claims . . . remand is the most appropriate remedy." Case remanded for due process hearing.

S.C. v. Lincoln Co. Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2021) - Administrative law judge held that school district failed to provide child with Prader-Willi Syndrome with a FAPE because child required "total food security" in a schoolwide environment to obtain a meaningful educational benefit; ordered placement at an educational center where these needs could be met. District Court denied parent's request for "stay put". Ninth Circuit reversed denial, remanded for entry of stay-put order at the educational center at school district's expense.

*** M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union School District . First decision from a Court of Appeals after the Supreme Court issued their decision in Endrew F. M.C. v. Antelope Valley will be a Wrightslaw 2017 Case of the Year.

In Phyllene W. v. Huntsville City (AL) Bd. of Ed. (11th Cir. 2015) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of a Hearing Officer and of a U. S. District Court and ruled in favor of the parent and child. The Court explained that: "[T]he Board violated . . . IDEA by failing to evaluate M.W. when faced with evidence that she suffered from a suspected hearing impairment. As a result of its failure to obtain necessary medical information regarding M.W.'s hearing, the Board further failed to provide her with a FAPE. The lack of medical information rendered the accomplishment of the IDEA's goals impossible because no meaningful IEP was developed, and the IEPs put into place lacked necessary elements with respect to the services that M.W. should have been provided. In short, the Board's failure to evaluate M.W. with respect to her hearing loss deprived M.W. of the opportunity to benefit educationally from an appropriate IEP." Doug C. v. Hawaii (9th Cir. 2013) - Important decision about parental participation at IEP meetings. "All special education staff who conduct IEP meetings should be familiar with this landmark ruling about IEP meetings and parental participation" (Pete Wright) Read Pete's analysis of case. Pete's YouTube discussion is here. The original decision is here.

F. H. v. Memphis City Schools (6th Cir. 2014) - Parent filed suit against school after child was verbally, physically, and sexually abused by his aides at school. School entered into Settlement Agreement with the parent, then refused to honor the Agreement. Court found that Sec. 1983 claims do not require exhaustion under IDEA and that settlement agreement is enforceable in courts.

A.C. v. Shelby County (6th Cir. 2013) - Pro-child 504 retaliation decision in which a principal filed false child abuse allegations against child's parents. For a case of this nature to proceed, there must be a finding that the school district retaliated against the parents for asserting their rights under Section 504. The Sixth Circuit's 29 page opinion does an exceptional job of explaining the basis and criteria needed for a successful Section 504 suit to proceed against a school district. Original decision as issued by the Court is located here. The Wrightslaw reformatted version with highlights is located here.

Special Education Legal Developments and Cases ("Year in Review") Books

The Year in Review books include all special education decisions in IDEA and Section 504 cases issued by the U.S. Courts of Appeal for that year, and include cases about discrimination in daycare centers, private schools, medical licensing board exams, and higher education; damages; higher standards for IEPs and Least Restrictive Environment. The Table of Decisions includes the date, court, synopsis of legal issues, outcome, and prevailing party in the cases. The entry for each case includes the factual background, legal issue(s), and holding of the case.

All Year in Review books are available as immediate PDF downloads from the Wrightslaw Store and as Print books from Amazon.

Decisions from U.S. Supreme Court (issued prior to our "Year in Review" series which began in 2015)

Brown v. Bd of Education , 347 U. S. 483 (1954) . In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court found that segregated public schools are inherently unequal; decision is relevant to children in segregated special education placements.

Davis v. Monroe Bd. of Education (1999) . U. S. Supreme Court decision in sexual harrassment case.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, et.al (2002) . The Supreme Court ruled that the Cleveland voucher program for students who attend failing schools is constitutional and does not violate the Establishment Clause. Schaffer v. Weast , 546 U. S. _(2005) Supreme Court held that the burden of proof in a due process hearing that challenges an IEP is placed upon the party seeking relief. Read How Will the Decision in Schaffer v. Weast Affect You? by Peter Wright, Esq.

Bd of Ed of City of New York v. Tom F (2007) . The question before the Court was whether parents of a child who has never received special education from the public school district can obtain reimbursement for a unilateral private placement. The U. S. Supreme Court issued a split decision (4-4) in the case . Justice Kennedy recused himself. The favorable decision stands for families who live in the Second Circuit - Connecticut, New York, and Vermont. Read about the key events in A Short History of New York Bd of Education v. Tom F., on Behalf of Gilbert F . Fitzgerald v. Barnstable , 555 U.S. 246 (2009). In a unanimous decision, the Court reinstated the lawsuit filed by the parents under Title IX, which bars gender discrimination at schools that receive federal funds, and under Section 1983, a broader civil rights law. Forest Grove School District v. T.A . (2009) In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that IDEA allows reimbursement for private special education services, even when the child did not previously receive special education services from the public school. Read decision. / Read analysis. Safford v. Redding , 557 U.S.__ (2009). Court held that school officials violated a thirteen year old girl's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure when they strip searched her after receiving a "tip"that the girl possessed ibuprofen. Virginia Office of Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart (2011) Supreme Court held that the Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy (VOPA) can sue the state and pursue other legal remedies necessary to fulfill their duty to advocate for people with disabilities. J. D. B. v. North Carolina (2011) - Where police interrogated a 13 year old middle school student at school but did not give a Miranda warning, Supreme Court holds that a child's age is relevant to the Miranda custody analysis. Reversed and remanded. To Top

Decisions from U. S. Courts of Appeals (issued prior to our "Year in Review" series which began in 2015)

A.K., a minor by his Parents and Next Friends J.K. and E.S., v. Alexandria City School Bd . (4th Cir. 2007) - Decision affirmed policies served by the requirement of a formal written offer that creates "a clear record of the educational placement and other services offered to the parents." The school district's "offer of an unspecified 'private day school' was essentially no offer at all.

Amanda C. v. Clark Co Sch. Dist. & Nevada Dept. of Ed , (9th Cir. 2001) This strongly written decision cites research about ABA/Lovaas treatment; describes purposes of the IDEA; IEPs and proceduralsafeguards. District's failure to provide parents with evaluations adversely affected parents' ability to make decisions and damaged child; district failed to provide FAPE; standard of review in two-tier system; credibility of witnesses.

Cedar Rapids v. Garret   (8th Cir. 1998) This case on behalf of a child who needed related services to attend school was later heard by the U. S. Supreme Court; download decision by the Supreme Court . 

Collingsru v. Palmyra Bd. of Education   (3rd Cir. 1998) Can a non-attorney parent represent his or her child in court? Why? Why not?

Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Hartford Bd of Educ, Hartford Public Schools and Robert Henry, Sup. of Schools (2nd Cir 2006)  The Court held that the P & A has a statutory responsibility to investigate suspected cases of abuse and neglect of individuals with disabilities or mental illness and found probable cause that "multiple individuals have been subjected to abuse or neglect" at Hartford Transitional Academy.  Covington v. Knox Co (TN) (6th Cir. 2000) Decision in "time-out Room" abuse case; creates exceptions to exhaustion requirement in damages cases. In html

Disability Rights Wisconsin, Inc., v. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Public Instruction & Elizabeth Burmaster, Superintendent of Public Instruction (7th Cir. 2006) The decision includes a detailed description of the responsibilities of P & As to protect individuals with disabilities, limitations on confidentiality under the Family Educational Rights to Privacy Act, and other issues.

Zachary Deal v. Hamilton County TN Board of Ed (6th Cir. 2004) Wide-ranging decision about standard of review, additional evidence, judicial notice, procedural & substantive IDEA violations, FAPE, educational benefit, predetermination of placement, failure to include regular ed teacher, reimbursement.

Fales v. Garst  (8th Cir. 2001) Three special ed teachers filed suit against principal who tried to block them from advocating for students; free speech v. employers rights.  In pdf     In Word   Complaint in Fales v. Garst Lisa Ryan Fitzgerald, etc., et. al. v. Barnstable School Committtee, et. al. , 504 F. 3d 165. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that plaintiffs were precluded from using section 1983 to redress deprivations of Title IX, a federal statutory right, and a federal constitutional right under the Equal Protection Clause under applicable Supreme Court doctrine. In January 2009, the Supreme Court reversed. Florence County School Dist. IV v. Shannon Carter   (4th Cir. 1991) After Florence County lost in District Court , they appealed to the Fourth Circuit. While arguing that four months a year of progress in reading was appropriate, the district also argued that because Trident Academy was not on the State's "approved" list, Shannon's parents should not be reimbursed for the placement. Court discussed"least restrictive environment" and a contrary Second Circuit case. This ruling for Shannon created a "split" among circuits that opened the door to an appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court in Florence County School District Four v. Shannon Carter . Forest Grove Sch. Dist v. T.A . (9th Cir. 2008) - In a 2-1 decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that parents who unilaterally enroll their disabled child to a private school may be entitled to tuition reimbursement from the school district although the child never received special education from the district. On 1/16/09, The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. (see 2011 District Court decision in Forest Grove v. T.A. )

Forest Grove v. T.A .-II . On remand from the Supreme Court, the U.S. District Court holds that boy had drug and behavior problems; that parental placement in a private school was for non-disability reasons so parents not entitled to reimbursement for his tuition. In a split decision, the 9th Circuit upheld the District Court's ruling. Read new decision in Forest Grove v. T.A.-2 (4/27/11)

G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schools (4th Cir. 2003). ABA/Lovaas case; rights of children who attend Dept of Defense schools; FAPE & educational benefit; methodology; reimbursement for home-based Lovaas program; procedural safeguards and notice by parents; compensatory education for failure to provide FAPE; prevailing party status & attorneys fees.

G. v. Cumberland Valle y (3rd Cir. 1999) Tuition reimbursement for 2 children with dyslexia, LRE and "vigorous advocacy" by parents. C.B. v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist . (9th Cir 2011) - California school failed to provide FAPE. Child's guardian withdrew child from public school and placed child in Reading & Language Center, a non-public program. ALJ found that child received "significant educational benefits," but only ordered reimbursement for half of tuition because private program did not meet all child's needs. District Court reversed ALJ, awarded full reimbursement. School appealed. 9th Cir. upheld Dist. Ct decision. HH v. Moffett & Chesterfield School Bd (4th 2009) - Special ed teacher and a assistant restrained child in her wheelchair for hours during the school day while they ignored her, verbally abused her, and schemed to deprive her of educational services. In an unpublished decision, the Court held that their conduct "violated H.H.’s clearly established right to freedom from undue restraint under the Fourteenth Amendment, and Appellants are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law." Hartmann v. Loudoun County (4th Cir. 1997) inclusion and LRE for child with autism.  Joseph James v. Upper Arlington Sch. District (6th Cir. 2000) Decision about tuition reimbursement for child with dyslexia, statute of limitations, procedural safeguards. pdf   html

KM v. Tustin Unified School District (9th Cir. 2013) - Court of Appeals issued decision about the relationship between IDEA, Section 504 and ADA AA. The Court relied on a brief filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, located here.

Knable v. Bexley City Sch. District (6th Cir. 2001) Case about child with behavior disorder; includes discussion of IEPs, draft IEPs, IEP requirements, tuition reimbursement, placement, burden of proof, more.

L.B. and J.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo UT School District (10th Cir. 2004) Parents of child with autism reimbursed for ABA therapy and private preschool which was LRE; impartiality of hearing officer.

ISD No. 284 Wayzata Schools v. A.C . (8th Cir. 2001) Decision about need to pay costs of residential program for child with emotional and behavioral problems; overturns ruling in federal district court that residential placement was not "educationally necessary." Mackey v. Arlington Central School District, State Education Dept (2nd Cir. 2004) In "stay-put" / pendency case, Court finds that parents are entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition because earlier denial was a result of delays and an untimely decision by the state review officer. Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Regional School District (1st Cir. 2003) Decision breaks new ground, Court rules that parents can pursue IDEA claims in federal court without an attorney. M.L. v. Federal Way School District (WA) (9th Cir. 2004) Court found that the failure to include a regular education teacher on the IEP team was a serious procedural error that led to a loss of educational opportunity and a denial of FAPE.

Polera v. Bd Ed. Newburgh City Sch. Dist . (2nd Cir. 2002) In damages case under Section 504 and ADA, court rules that disabled child must first exhaust administrative remedies under IDEA. Decision includes extensive discussion of relief under statutes, compensatory and punitive damages, exhaustion requirement, and futility exception. Porter v. Bd of Trustees of Manhattan Beach USD (9th Cir. 2002)- Parents of child for whom special education program was ordered by hearing officer were not required to seek new hearing nor comply with state’s complaint procedure before suing for failure to fully implement the program; that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar a federal court from granting prospective injunctive relief.

R.E., M.E., et al v. NYC Dept of Education (2nd Cir. 2012) - 2nd Circuit adopts the “snap-shot” rule to judge the adequacy of an IEP written in Burlington/Carter reimbursement cases; held that retrospective testimony about additional services that the also district "would have provided," but which were not offered in the IEP, cannot be used to rehabilitate an IEP or prove its adequacy. School Bd of Henrico County VA v. Z.P (4th Cir. 2005) Parents of child with autism rejected traditional public school preschool program and requested tuition reimbursement for private program that utilized one-on-one ABA therapy. Other issues included deference to hearing officer as fact finder and deference to professional educators.

Sellers v. Manassas , (4th Cir. 1998) Court finds that damages are not available under IDEA and Section 504. Settlegoode v. Portland Public Schools , (9th Cir 2004) Court upheld jury verdict, reinstated 1 million dollar award to special ed teacher who was retaliated against and fired for advocating for her students; decision clarifies freedom of speech for teachers. Decision in pdf T. R. v. Kingwood Township (NJ) (3rd Cir. 2000) Court clarifies FAPE and "meaningful benefit," requirement about continuum of placements; requirement to provide a free appropriate education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment.  W.B. v. Matula (3rd Cir. 1995) Court found that damages available under Section 504, IDEA, and Section 1983 when district refused to evaluate, classify and provide appropriate services to disabled child; decision also addressed exhaustion, qualified immunity, due process; decision superceded by a later decision that damages not available under IDEA.

Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District (2nd Cir. 1998) Case about tuition reimbursement, maximizing v. appropriate; parents are not entitled to what is "best" for their children. Weast v. Schaffer (4th Cir. 2004) Decision focuses on parental knowledge and burden of proof; appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. U. S. Supreme Court granted cert on 2/22/05 .

Charter School in Contempt, Must Pay $176,722 - On November 4, 2013, pursuant to the "stay-put / pendency" statute (20 USC 1415(f)), the U.S. District Court of Arizona held the "tuition-free, public charter" Flagstaff Arts and Leadership Academy in contempt of Court and ordered them to pay $176,722.00 for the child's private placement by November 15, 2013 or face further sanctions. (Click here for ruling of Contempt and Order to pay.) While the child was enrolled in the charter school, the parents contested the IEP, removed the child to a private placement, and requested a due process hearing. The Administrative Law Judge ruled in their favor, (click here for decision). The school appealed and the parent's attorney, Hope Kirsch filed a Counterclaim. (Click here for Counterclaim) . The Charter School asserted that they could not afford to pay. The Court noted that their problem is "an allocation of resources problem, not an absence of resources."

PV v. Philadelphia - The US District Court Judge approved the case as a class action suit;held that changing placements of children with autism without convening IEP meetings, excluding parents participation, providing minimal notice about new placements, and educational placement decisions made by division directors were violations of the IDEA. Burriola v. Greater Toledo YMCA (W.D. OH 2001) In ADA case, federal Judge issued injunction, orders day care center to readmit child with autism; staff must be trained; discussion of reasonable accommodations, exhaustion, training. In pdf    In html Analysis of Burriola case by Tom Zraik, attorney for child. Shannon Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. IV . (SC 1990) - Tuition reimbursement case that was appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court; decision focuses on an appropriate program and IEP for Shannon, a child with dyslexia.

Community Consolidated Sch. Dist. #93 v. John F. (IL) (N.D. IL 2000) Important discipline case; procedural violations, prior written notice requirements, manifestation determination review, suspensions for more than 10 days, expedited hearings, special education and related services under IDEA, "passing grades" and FAPE, homebound instruction violates LRE, more. In Word     In pdf Jarron Draper v. Atlanta Public School District [Draper II] (N.D. GA 2008) Court denies motion by Atlanta Public Schools (“APS”) to dismiss Jarron’s civil rights claims that APS discriminated against him, harassed him, and retaliated against him and his family; requesting damages under Section 504. (PDF) Jarron Draper v. Atlanta Independent School System [Draper I] (N.D. GA 2007) - School district misdiagnosed a dyslexic boy as mentally retarded, placed him in self-contained program for years where he did not learn to read. School district failed to complete three-year reevaluation, as required by law. The Court ordered the school system to provide J.D. with compensatory education at private special education school for four years or until he graduates with a regular high school diploma.

Evans v. Rhinebeck Central Sch Dist , (S.D. NY 1996) Excellent case about tuition reimbursement, procedural and substantive issues, FAPE, dyslexia, objective measurement of progress.

Gerstmyer v. Howard Co. Schools   (MD 1994) Tuition reimbursement for private non-special ed school; inappropropriate IEP goals and objectives for child with dyslexia. Parent's counsel, Wayne Steedman charted new territory with this case. Goleta Union Elementary Sch. Dist v. Andrew Ordway (C.D. Cal. 2002). Judge rules that school administrator was personally liable for damages under the Civil Rights Act for violating a mother's right to get a "free appropriate public education" for her special-needs son, as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (Dec 2002). (in pdf) Henrico County School Board v. R. T. (E.D. VA 2006). Tuition reimbursement case for young child with autism; comparison of TEACCH and ABA; FAPE and least restrictive environment; deference to decision of hearing officer; witness credibility; impact of low expectations and "an insufficient focus on applying replicable research on proven methods of teaching and learning"

Jacob Winkelman v. Parma City School District (N.D. OH 2005) . Challenging the decision of the State Board of Education that the District's proposed program was the LRE and provided FAPE under IDEA, the Winkelmans requested, as pro se litigants, that the district court reverse the administrative decisions and reimburse them for the cost of all education related services and placements. The court denied the Winkelmans' motion and granted the District's motion. JP v. School Board of Hanover County VA (E.D. VA 2008). Tuition reimbursement case for child with autism. In JP-1 (2006), the District Court judge found the hearing officer's decision regarding witness testimony inadequate, charted out child's test scores and determined that school district did not provide FAPE. In February 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the District Court to determine if the 2005 IEP provided FAPE.) UPDATE : In December 2008, the Court issued a new decision in JP v. School Board of Hanover County VA (E.D. VA 2008) and found that the "State Hearing Officer's decision was not consistent with the record, that HCPS did not provide JP with a FAPE during the 2005-2006 school year because it did not proffer an IEP that was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit. The Court held that private placement at Dominion School was appropriate and JP's parents are entitled to tuition reimbursement. J.L. and M.L., and their minor daughter, K.L. v. Mercer Island (WA) School District - In finding that the standards for a free appropriate public education described by the Supreme Court decision in Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley are no longer relevant, the Court cited changes in recent IDEA reauthorizations that are so significant "that any citation to pre-1997 case law on special education is suspect." Update: On 01/13/10, this decision was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judith Scruggs, Administratix of Estate of Daniel Scruggs v. Meriden Bd of Ed., E. Ruocco, M. B. Iacobelli, and Donna Mule (U. S. District Court, Connecticut, 2005). Suit for actual and punitive damages against school board, superintendent, vice principal and guidance counselor under IDEA, ADA, 504, 42 USC 1983, 1985 and 1986. Child bullied, harrassed in school for years while school personnel looked on, did nothing. Child committed suicide. Includes a discussion of why parent did not have to exhaust admininistrative remedies under IDEA. Stefan Jaynes v. Newport News Public Schools (E.D. VA 2000) Parents reimbursed for ABA Lovaas program for child with autism, procedural safeguards, notice, statute of limitations. Appealed to Fourth Circuit (2000).   In pdf    In Word

Tereance D. and Wanda D. v. Sch. Dist. Philadelphia (E.D. PA 2008) - District failed to provide FAPE for many years; performed inadequate evaluations; misdiagnosed child as mentally retarded and emotionally disturbed; misled the parent about her son's rights to autism services and ESY services, more.

Bd. of Ed of Kanawha WV v. Michael M . (W VA 2000), IEPs, "appropriate", burden of proof, autism, reimbursement for ABA program. Excellent discussion of an "appropriate" program; recommended reading for attorneys who represent children with disabilities and their witnesses.  Order re: home-based Lovaas /ABA program .

Daniel Lawyer v. Chesterfield Sch. Bd (E.D. VA 1993) This decision includes good discussion about factors to consider in extended school year (ESY), including regression and recoupment, autism and neurological windows of opportunity.

Mr. X v. NY (S.D. NY 1997) Excellent case includes comprehensive discussion of autism, Lovaas, ABA therapy and TEACCH.

Reusch v. Fountain (MD) One of the earliest and leading cases about extended school year (ESY). Linda Sturm v. Rocky Hill Bd of Ed (CT 2005) Special ed teacher can sue school district for retaliation because Section 504 includes anti-retaliation provisions and courts have extended protection against retaliation for those who advocate for the disabled.

T. H. v. Palatine , (N.D. IL 1999) Comprehensive decision in ABA-Lovaas case. Includes thorough discussion of the IEP process, the need to individualize the IEP, methodology and placement issues. (This decision is in pdf format) To Top

Other Noteworthy Decisions + Documents

Offfice of Civil Rights, Restraint/Seclusion - Prince William County, VA

On July 23, 2014, OCR found that the school district violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by "failing to re-evaluate students to determine if they needed additional or different related aids and services given the frequent use of restraint, seclusion, and . . . removing students from their classrooms to an isolated area." Click here to read the letter.

U.S. Dept of Justice v. Day Care Center

On November 27, 2013, the USDOJ and Camelot Day Care Center in Edmond, OK entered into a Settlement Agreement. The child, with Down Syndrome and toileting issues, was denied participation in field trips. In addition to paying $3,000 to the parents, the child will have a full year, tuition free, at Camelot. Click here to read the Settlement Agreement.

The parents' " Letter to the Stranger " and James Brody's description of the due process hearing are among dozens of articles in The Advocacy Libraries . 

Zachary Deal v. Hamilton Dept of Educ (TN Due Process Decision 2001) The administrative law judge issues 45 page decision after a 27-day due process hearing ; finds procedural safeguards and LRE violations; substantive violations; discusses credibility problems with school witnesses re: closed minds, evasiveness.

U.S. Supreme Court cases are supreme. Cases from U. S. Courts of Appeals are the next highest level of judicial decisions. Rulings from a U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals have binding authority over the Courts in the states of that Circuit. 

It is important to stay on top of the rulings of  the U. S. Courts of Appeals. States may not be bound by a ruling from a different circuit but may rely upon a decision as "persuasive authority ." When the Circuits have " split" rulings on the same issue, i.e., different legal outcomes from similar issues of fact and or law, these cases have a higher probability of being accepted for review by the U. S. Supreme Court. This is what happened in Shannon Carter's case.

Parents, as you read these cases, do not focus on your child's disability and how the facts in the case are different from your child. Substitute your child's disability with the one discussed in the case. While the facts may change, so often the legal principles are the same, without regard to the particular disability. Do not have tunnel vision as you read. Consciously think about how the ruling in this case relates to your child. To Top Last Revised: 10/18/2021

Significant Special Education Cases

M.a. v. newark public schools.

In 2001, ELC with co-counsel Gibbons Del Deo, filed a class action lawsuit against Newark Public Schools and the New Jersey Department of Education, alleging that Newark and the State failed to identify, locate, refer and evaluate students with disabilities for special education services, failed to provide these students with appropriate special education services, and failed to provide “compensatory education” for the deprived services. The  complaint  also charged the State with failure to monitor school districts and failure to provide appropriate relief in response to special education complaint investigation requests. [Docket No. 01-cv-3389 (US District Court for the District of NJ) Docket No. 02-1799 (US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit)] 

Status:  Plaintiffs obtained a  preliminary injunction  on behalf of two of the named plaintiffs, and withstood extensive  motions to dismiss  from both sets of defendants. In a  decision  from the Third Circuit, the Court affirmed both the preliminary injunction and the denial of the motions to dismiss. After a prolonged and unsuccessful attempt to settle the matter, the district court  certified the class in 2009  in response to the motion brought by ELC, Gibbons and newly-added co-counsel, Seton Hall Law School Center for Social Justice. The parties then conducted additional discovery and again commenced settlement discussions. The parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, which was endorsed by the Court in 2012. The  Settlement Agreement  calls for the provision of special education services on a timely basis, “compensatory education” for students who did not receive timely services, implementation of a comprehensive special education database, mandatory staff training, extensive reporting of compliance activities, guidelines for corrective action if warranted and independent monitoring of special education services. Newark has issued two Compliance Reports ( July 2012  and  February 2013 ), and the State has instituted one  Corrective Action Plan . ELC is monitoring NPS and State compliance with the Settlement Agreement and, together with Seton Hall, prepared parent training materials in  English ,  Spanish ,  Portuguese  and  Creole , and is training parents across the district.

A.R. v. Freehold Regional High School Board of Education

ELC, with the support of several  pro bono  attorneys, filed a motion on behalf of a group of disability advocacy organizations to appear as  amici curiae  in this case regarding who should bear the burden of proof in a due process hearing when a school district seeks to change a child’s special education Individualized Education Program (IEP). The  amicus  brief  argued that, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court case of  Schaffer v. Weast , the burden is on the district when it seeks to change the IEP, even where the parent files the hearing request to challenge the school district’s action. The brief additionally explained why placing the burden of proof on parents in such cases would be unfair, violate public policy and undermine the goals of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. (United States District Court for the District of NJ Docket No. 06-cv-03849)

Status:  Shortly after ELC filed the  amicus  brief, the school district settled the case with the student and the matter was dismissed. Subsequently, ELC successfully spearheaded an advocacy effort, with other New Jersey special education practitioners, that resulted in the passage of legislation imposing the burden of proof at special education hearings on school districts in all cases.

A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools

ELC filed a federal lawsuit to challenge the failure of a school district, the state education department, and individual employees to identify and remediate A.W.’s dyslexia. The case reached the Third Circuit twice, with the Court holding in the  first decision  (2003), that the state defendants had waived sovereign immunity by accepting federal financial assistance and could therefore be sued under IDEA and Section 504 and, in the  second decision  (2007), that individual state defendants could not be held liable under Section 1983. A.W.’s claims against his school district and NJDOE were successfully resolved through settlement. [341 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2003), 486 F. 3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007)]

Baer v. Klagholz

In 2001, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on eight challenges to the State’s special education regulations brought by the Education Law Center and co-counsel. The Appellate Division ruling included the mandate that school districts provide parents with evaluation reports prior to eligibility determination meetings, that all students with disabilities receive assessments to determine appropriate post-secondary outcomes, that the pool of community rehabilitation programs for older students include those programs that serve students with the most severe disabilities, and that the scope of IDEA’s disciplinary rights and protections be broadened to comply with federal law. [Docket No. A-7451-97T3 (Superior Court of NJ, Appellate Division)] 

Status:  Plaintiffs were subsequently successful in a contested motion for prevailing party attorney’s fees.

Disability Rights New Jersey v. New Jersey Department of Education

In 2007, ELC, together with  pro bono  co-counsel, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey challenging the New Jersey Department of Education’s failure to educate children with disabilities in the least restrictive environment as mandated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. [Docket No. 07-cv-02978 (US District Court for the District of NJ) Docket No. 08-8059 (United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit)] 

Status:  In February 2014, the parties entered into a historic  Settlement Agreement  designed to improve New Jersey’s implementation of IDEA’s mandate that students with disabilities receive an appropriate education in the least restrictive environment. The Agreement’s requirements include: a needs assessment to be completed in the 75+ school districts with the worst track record in inclusion, heightened oversight of districts that segregate a disproportional number of students of color with disabilities, extensive training and technical assistance, specially designated state and local inclusion facilitators, parental input regarding district failures, and oversight by a stakeholder committee comprised of disability advocates.

P.N. v. Clementon Board of Education

ELC filed an  amicus  brief  in this case in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on its behalf and on behalf of numerous disability and education advocacy organizations. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, recognizing that “prevailing party” attorney’s fees are available to students with disabilities who resolve their educational disputes with districts via a stipulated settlement agreement entered into by an administrative law judge. Citing to ELC’s  amicus  brief, which detailed the important role the attorney’s fee provision plays for poor parents, the Third Circuit noted that it was “particularly troubl[ed]” by the District Court’s holding that reimbursement of a $425 psychologist fee was “de minimis” and did not support a prevailing party finding. ELC then represented the plaintiff in the United States Supreme Court, where it successfully urged the Court to deny the Defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari [Docket No. 04-4705 (United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit) Docket No. 06-7 (US Supreme Court) Docket No. 02-1351 (District Court for the District of NJ)]. 

Status:  Plaintiffs were subsequently successful in a contested motion for prevailing party attorney’s fees before the District Court.

SPAN v. Hendricks

ELC represented SPAN in challenging the State’s failure to complete an  independent study  of the census-based funding methodology for special education by June 2010, as required by the School Funding Reform Act. While the litigation was pending, the State released its independent study of the special education census funding method in the State school aid formula. (Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Docket No. A-000852-10)

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The Supreme Court Rules In Favor Of A Special Education Student

Anya Kamenetz

Cory Turner

U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the unanimous opinion in today's ruling. Andrew Harnik/AP hide caption

U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the unanimous opinion in today's ruling.

School districts must give students with disabilities the chance to make meaningful, "appropriately ambitious" progress, the Supreme Court said Wednesday in an 8-0 ruling.

The decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District could have far-reaching implications for the 6.5 million students with disabilities in the United States.

The case centered on a child with autism and attention deficit disorder whose parents removed him from public school in fifth grade. He went on to make better progress in a private school. His parents argued that the individualized education plan provided by the public school was inadequate, and they sued to compel the school district to pay his private school tuition.

The Supreme Court today sided with the family, overturning a lower court ruling in the school district's favor.

The federal Individuals With Disabilities Education Act guarantees a "free appropriate public education" to all students with disabilities. Today's opinion held that "appropriate" goes further than what the lower courts had held.

Live Coverage: Neil Gorsuch's Testimony In Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing

"It cannot be right that the IDEA generally contemplates grade-level advancement for children with disabilities who are fully integrated in the regular classroom, but is satisfied with barely more than de minimis progress for children who are not," read the opinion, signed by Chief Justice John Roberts.

The case drew a dozen friend of the court briefs from advocates for students with disabilities who argued that it is time to increase rigor, expectations and accommodations for all.

"A standard more meaningful than just above trivial is the norm today," wrote the National Association of State Directors of Special Education .

The ruling seems likely to increase pressure from families and advocates in that direction.

Significantly, Judge Neil Gorsuch, currently in confirmation hearings for the Supreme Court's vacant ninth seat, has repeatedly ruled the other way on similar cases .

IDEA's standard of a "free appropriate public education," reads Gorsuch's opinion in one of these cases , also about an autistic child in Colorado, "is not an onerous one." His precedent was directly contradicted by the Supreme Court this week.

Texas Sen. John Cornyn questioned him in light of this new ruling during his hearing , asking:

"Why ... did you want to lower the bar so low? "

Gorsuch responded that he had made a mistake. "I was wrong, Senator, because I was bound by circuit precedent, and I'm sorry."

Special education clash: Supreme Court sides unanimously for student with disability

WASHINGTON – The Supreme Court sided unanimously Tuesday with a student who is deaf and  who sought to sue his school for damages over profound lapses in his education, a case that experts say could give parents of students with disabilities more leverage as they negotiate for the education of their children.

Central to the case was the story of Miguel Perez, who enrolled in the Sturgis Public School District in Michigan at age 9 and brought home As and Bs on report cards for more than a decade . Months before graduation, Perez's parents learned that he would not receive a diploma and that aides the school assigned to him did not know sign language. 

Though the legal question raised by the case is technical, its outcome "holds consequences not just for Mr. Perez but for a great many children with disabilities and their parents," Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote for the unanimous court .

What to know about the Supreme Court's special education decision 

• The case, Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, involved the interplay between two federal laws, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, or IDEA, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. At issue was whether students may sue a school for damages under the ADA when they haven’t exhausted the administrative process required by the IDEA.
• In the unanimous decision Tuesday, the high court  ruled that Perez didn't need to exhaust the requirements of the IDEA process before filing a lawsuit for damages under the ADA. 
• The decision may help parents and schools clarify one piece of a byzantine puzzle of laws that govern the nation's 7.2 million special education  students. Experts have predicted it may give parents more leverage in their negotiation with schools. 

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What happened with Miguel Perez?  

Perez's journey through the 3,000-student school district in Sturgis highlights the challenges faced by many  students who have disabilities .

His family says school officials misrepresented the qualifications of his aide. They say that aide, in later years, was assigned to other duties, leaving Perez  unable to communicate with anyone  for hours every day. And Perez was promoted through each grade level despite not having a grasp of the curriculum, his attorneys say.

Perez filed a complaint with Michigan officials in 2017 accusing his school of violating state and federal laws, including the IDEA. Before that complaint was resolved, the district offered to settle, agreeing to pay for Perez to attend the Michigan School for the Deaf.

Explainer: How one student's Supreme Court case could make schools more accountable

Perez's family took the settlement.

His family then sued the district under the Americans with Disability Act for discrimination, seeking unspecified monetary damages. A federal district court dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that Perez had not exhausted the required IDEA process because he accepted the settlement. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit agreed. Perez appealed to the Supreme Court in late 2021.

What do school districts say about the impact of the Perez case? 

Art Ebert, the district's superintendent, declined to address the claims raised in the suit – he wasn't leading the district when Perez attended Sturgis – but he said in an email this month that because of the experience, the district would "gain knowledge, insight, and understanding that will help us maximize every student's true potential."

Schools say they are concerned that allowing parents to sue for damages more easily will inject a legal battle over money into the IDEA process, which is intended to quickly address students' needs. School districts might be forced to approach that process differently if their actions could be used against them in a suit for damages. 

What are they saying? 

• Roman Martinez, a veteran Supreme Court lawyer who argued the case on behalf of Perez, said the court's ruling "vindicates the rights of students with disabilities to obtain full relief when they suffer discrimination." Perez and his family, he said, "look forward to pursuing their legal claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act."
• Attorneys for the school district did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Sasha Pudelski, advocacy director of the School Superintendents Association, said the group has "deep concerns with injecting a legal battle over money into the IDEA process and how this ruling may undermine parents' willingness to collaborate with districts in crafting an appropriate special education program for a child. The only thing that's clear from this decision is that it will lead to more litigation for school districts."

Contributing: Alia Wong 

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Supreme Court Decisions

July 3, 2006 – January 11, 2010 RL33444

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is both a grants statute and a civil rights statute. It provides federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE. Originally enacted in 1975, the act responded to increased awareness of the need to educate children with disabilities, and to judicial decisions requiring that states provide an education for children with disabilities if they provided an education for children without disabilities. Since its enactment, the Supreme Court has addressed several issues arising under the act, including the interpretation of FAPE, the interpretation of the “stay-put” provision in the due process requirements, and interpretations of related services. This report discusses the Supreme Court’s decisions under IDEA.

Introduction

Free appropriate public education, statutory provision, hendrick hudson central school district v. rowley, private school placement, supreme court decisions, related services, statutory provisions, procedural safeguards, background and statutory provisions, honig v. doe, attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, burden of proof, schaffer v. weast, parental rights to bring suit pro se.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is both a grants statute and a civil rights statute. It provides federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE. Originally enacted in 1975, the act responded to increased awareness of the need to educate children with disabilities, and to judicial decisions requiring that states provide an education for children with disabilities if they provided an education for children without disabilities. Since its enactment, the Supreme Court has addressed several issues arising under the act, including the interpretation of FAPE, the interpretation of the "stay-put" provision in the due process requirements, and interpretations of related services. This report discusses the Supreme Court's decisions under IDEA.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 1 is both a grants statute and a civil rights statute. It provides federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE. Originally enacted in 1975, the act responded to increased awareness of the need to educate children with disabilities, and to judicial decisions requiring that states provide an education for children with disabilities if they provided an education for children without disabilities. 2 Since its enactment, the Supreme Court has addressed several issues arising under the act, including the interpretation of FAPE, the interpretation of the "stay-put" provision in the due process requirements, and interpretations of related services. The Supreme Court's most recent IDEA decision is Forest Grove School District v. T.A. 3 where the Court held that IDEA authorized reimbursement for private special education services when a public school fails to provide FAPE and the private school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special education services through the public school. This report discusses the Supreme Court's decisions under IDEA.

The core requirement of IDEA is that a state must provide children with disabilities a free appropriate public education in order to receive federal funding under the act. 4 FAPE is defined in the statute as meaning "special education and related services that—(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 614(d)." 5

Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley , 6 decided in 1982, was the first IDEA case to reach the Supreme Court. 7 When the IDEA complaint was first filed, Amy Rowley was a deaf first grader whose parents were also deaf. Her individualized education program (IEP) provided that she should be educated in a regular classroom, use an FM hearing aid, and receive instruction from a tutor for the deaf for one hour each day and from a speech therapist for three hours each week. Amy's parents agreed with parts of the IEP but insisted that she be provided a sign-language interpreter in all her academic classes. The request for an interpreter was denied, and the Rowleys pursued their due process remedies. The district court found that Amy was a remarkably well-adjusted child who had an extraordinary rapport with her teachers. The court also found that Amy was performing better than the average child in her class and was advancing easily from grade to grade but was understanding considerably less of what goes on in class than she could if she were not deaf. This disparity between Amy's achievement and her potential led the district court to conclude that she was not receiving a free appropriate public education. This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.

The Supreme Court noted that there was no substantive language in IDEA regarding the level of education to be accorded to children with disabilities and observed that "(i)mplicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a 'free appropriate public education' is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child." 8 The Court concluded that "the 'basic floor of opportunity' provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child." 9 The Court held that the requirement of FAPE is met when a child is provided with personalized instruction with sufficient support services to benefit educationally from that instruction. This instruction must be provided at public expense, meet the state's educational standards, must approximate the grade levels used in the state's regular education, and must comport with the child's IEP. The Court found that when a child with a disability is mainstreamed, "the system itself monitors the educational progress of the child.... The grading and advancement system thus constitutes an important factor in determining educational benefit." 10 Therefore, the IEP "should be formulated in accordance with the requirements of the Act and, if the child is being educated in the regular classrooms of the public education system, should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade." 11

However, the states are not required to "maximize" each child's potential. 12 If the child is progressing from grade to grade and making measurable and adequate gains, the FAPE requirement is met.

The Supreme Court also stated that in ensuring that the requirements of the act have been met, courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the states. The primary responsibility for formulating the education provided was left by IDEA to state and local educational agencies. As the Court noted, determining when children with disabilities are "receiving sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the Act presents a more difficult problem" 13 than complying with requirements for access to education. Due to the wide spectrum of disabilities, the Court did not attempt to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits and confined its analysis to the facts of the case.

Rowley remains a seminal decision under IDEA and is often cited by courts attempting to determine the parameters of a free appropriate public education. However, the lower courts have varied in how expansively they have interpreted Rowley , with some courts interpreting Rowley to support schools' IEPs if the procedural requirements have been met, even if the educational progress is minimal. For example, in Fort Zumwalt School District v. Clynes , 14 the eighth circuit emphasized Rowley ' s "access to education" requirement and held that the IEP was adequate. The court noted that the child was making progress, earning passing marks and advancing to the next grade, despite reading proficiency scores in the second to ninth percentile. However, the dissenting opinion described the child's achievement as "trivial" and argued that "(t)his cannot be the sort of education Congress had in mind when it enacted IDEA." 15 Other courts have read Rowley more expansively. For example, in Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16 , 16 the third circuit examined the "some educational benefit" language in Rowley and held that it required an IEP to provide more than de minimis educational benefit. 17 Similarly, the fifth circuit, in Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. School District v. Michael F. , 18 quoted from Rowley and concluded that "the educational benefit that an IEP is designed to achieve must be 'meaningful.'" 19 In order to determine whether an IEP meets this standard, the Cypress-Fairbanks court identified four factors: (1) the program is individualized, (2) the program is administered in the least restrictive environment, (3) the services are provided in a coordinated and collaborative manner, and (4) positive academic and nonacademic benefits are demonstrated. 20 Other courts have looked at academic achievement testing, as well as grades, to measure educational benefit. For example, in Houston Independent School Dist. v. Bobby R. , 21 the court looked at the child's scores on the Woodcock Johnson intelligence and achievement test to determine the child's educational progress. 22

The application of the Supreme Court's analysis in Rowley to current controversies is somewhat confused by the change in the usage of the term "educational standards." Although the Supreme Court in Rowley required that the instruction given to a child with a disability meet the state's educational standards, the term "educational standards" has taken on a different meaning in recent years. Currently, the term "educational standards" is likely to refer to specific content-based standards that delineate what a child should know and be able to perform at various points in his or her educational career.

The 1997 Amendments to IDEA 23 reflected the standards-based education movement. P.L. 105-17 significantly changed the IEP requirements and required that the IEP include, among others, a statement of the child's present levels of educational performance, including the effect of the child's disability on the child's involvement and progress in the general curriculum, and a statement of measurable annual goals designed to enable the child to progress in the general curriculum. 24 In addition, in the statement of findings for the 2004 reauthorization, P.L. 108-446 states that "[a]lmost 30 years of research and experience has demonstrated that the education of children with disabilities can be made more effective by—(A) having high expectations for such children and ensuring their access to the general curriculum in the regular classroom to the maximum extent possible.... " 25

The Supreme Court in Rowley held that FAPE requires that "the 'basic floor of opportunity' provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child" and that the instruction must meet the state's educational standards. 26 Given the fact that the standards-based education movement, as reflected in IDEA and the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA), 27 has raised the standards from what was required in the version of the law the Supreme Court interpreted, questions could be raised concerning the current application of Rowley . It could be argued that because the Supreme Court emphasized that courts must not impose their view of preferable educational methods on the states, the change in the standards does not affect the core of the Court's Rowley holding. However, the Court also stated that the child's access to education must be sufficient to confer "some educational benefit" and that states are not required to "maximize" each child's potential. The Supreme Court has not overruled Rowley , and it could be argued that the Rowley standard is flexible enough not to present a conflict with subsequent changes in educational law relating to standards-based instruction. On the other hand, one commentator has argued that the Supreme Court would not reach the same decision today as it did in Rowley . "The cryptic and intangible Rowley standard of benefit is rightfully dying, if not already dead. By focusing on standards for all students, and participation and progress in the general curriculum, IDEA '97 illuminates a more objective and quantifiable approach to the subjective Rowley benefit analysis developed through subsequent case law." 28

Given the fact that the standards-based education movement, as reflected in IDEA and NCLBA, has raised the standards from what was required in the version of the law the Supreme Court interpreted in Rowley , questions have been raised concerning the current application of Rowley . Parents of students with disabilities have argued that FAPE requirements have been changed by NCLBA in several cases but have not yet been successful. 29

Issues concerning what services are required for children with disabilities placed in private schools, and who is to pay for these services, have been a continuing source of controversy under IDEA. 30 Under current law, a child with a disability may be placed in a private school by the local educational agency (LEA) or state educational agency (SEA) as a means of fulfilling the FAPE requirement for the child. In this situation, the full cost is paid for by the LEA or the SEA. A child with a disability may also be unilaterally placed in a private school by his or her parents. In this situation, the cost of the private school placement is not paid by the LEA unless a hearing officer or a court makes certain findings. However, IDEA does require some services for children in private schools, even if they are unilaterally placed there by their parents. 31 IDEA, as amended, states in part:

(ii) Reimbursement for Private School Placement.—If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of the enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment. 32

The current statutory provisions regarding private schools are the result of several major amendments, and the majority of the Supreme Court decisions on private schools were decided prior to the statutory changes. However, two recent Supreme Court cases, Board of Education of the City School District o f the City of New York v. Tom F. 33 and Forest Grove School District v. T.A. , 34 have addressed the question of whether IDEA allows for tuition reimbursement for parents who placed their child in a private school without ever having received special education from the public school under the current statutory provisions.

In School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts , 35 the father of a child with specific learning disabilities rejected a proposed IEP and placed the child, at his own expense, in a state-approved private school for special education. In an unanimous decision written by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the statutory provision granting courts the right to grant such relief as the court deems appropriate includes the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for private school expenditures. However, this reimbursement is permitted only if a court ultimately determines that the private school placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the act.

In the subsequent unanimous decision of Florence County School District Four v. Carter , 36 the Supreme Court was again presented with a situation in which parents had unilaterally placed a child with a disability in a private school, alleging that the public school's proposed IEP did not meet IDEA requirements. The district court and the fourth circuit court of appeals found that the proposed IEP violated IDEA. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the issue was whether the parents were barred from reimbursement because the private school did not meet the IDEA requirements for a free appropriate public education. The Court held that reimbursement cannot be barred because of noncompliance with the requirements because these requirements in part require that the education be provided at public expense and under public supervision and direction 37 and that "these requirements do not make sense in the context of a parental placement." 38 Similarly, the failure of the private school to meet state education standards did not bar reimbursement. "Parents' failure to select a program known to be approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement." 39

In the 2007 decision Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York v. Tom F. , 40 the Court, dividing 4-4, allowed an appeals court ruling on private school reimbursement to stand. The court of appeals had held that parents of a child with a disability are entitled to private school reimbursement even though the student had never received special education services from the school district. The Court's per curiam decision did not set a precedent for lower courts, and therefore the issue about whether reimbursement for private school tuition may be made when the child has not received public special education services remained unsettled. On October 15, 2007, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in another case presenting the same issue. 41

In the Supreme Court's most recent IDEA decision, Forest Grove School District v. T.A. , 42 the Supreme Court ruled definitively on the private school reimbursement issue. In this case, T.A. originally attended a public high school where he had been evaluated for a disability, but not been diagnosed with one, in an evaluation that a hearing officer later concluded was "legally inadequate." As a result, T.A. did not qualify for special education services and did not receive an IEP. Eventually T.A.'s parents placed him in a private academy following a diagnosis of ADHD by a private specialist, and the parents subsequently requested a due process hearing about the school district's evaluation of T.A. Because the school district did not offer T.A. FAPE and the private school placement was appropriate, the hearing officer ultimately ordered the district to reimburse T.A.'s parents for the cost of tuition. Upon judicial review, the district court found that the 1997 Amendments to IDEA barred reimbursement of private school tuition for students who have not yet received special education services through the public schools, but the court of appeals reversed the decision. Noting a circuit split on this issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the appellate court's decision. Analyzing the statutory language and Congress's intent in passing the 1997 Amendments to IDEA, the Court held that IDEA authorized reimbursement for private special education services when a public school fails to provide FAPE and the private school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special education services through the public school. The Court emphasized that "[i]t would be particularly strange for the Act to provide a remedy ... when a school district offers a child inadequate ... [special education] services but to leave parents without relief in the more egregious situation in which the school district unreasonably denies a child access to such services altogether."

As noted above, IDEA's requirement of a free appropriate public education is the cornerstone of the act. FAPE is defined in part as requiring "special education and related services." 43 Related services are defined as meaning

transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech-language pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, school nurse services designed to enable a child with a disability to receive a free appropriate public education as described in the individualized education program of the child, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services, and medical services , except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposed only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children. 44

Two of the Supreme Court's decisions under IDEA have involved the concept of related services, and both have involved the issue of what is a medical service. In Irving Independent School District v. Tatro , 45 the Court examined the case of an eight-year-old girl with spina bifida who required clean intermittent catheterization (CIC), and held that the school must provide the service. The Court held that services affecting both the medical and educational needs of a child must be provided under IDEA if (1) the child has a disability so as to require special education, (2) the service is necessary to help a child with a disability benefit from special education, and (3) a nurse or other qualified person who is not a physician can provide the service. Services that could be provided outside the school day would not need to be provided. Tatro drew a bright line between services that had to be provided by a doctor and those that could be provided by a person who was not a physician. However, after Tatro , some courts of appeals did not apply this bright line but used other factors, such as the nature and extent of services. This set the stage for another Supreme Court decision in 1999, Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F. 46

Garret F. involved a child who was paralyzed from the neck down as a result of a motorcycle accident when he was four years old. The child retained his mental capacities and was described by the Court as a "friendly, creative, and intelligent young man." For a number of years, his family arranged for his physical care during the school day, but eventually they requested the school to accept financial responsibility for his health-care services. Because the child was ventilator-dependent, these services were fairly substantial and included providing suction on his tracheotomy tube and manually pumping air through an air bag when suction is being provided. In addition, he needed assistance with catheterization and eating. The school denied the parents' request and proposed a test for related services in which the outcome would depend on a series of factors, such as whether the care was continuous and the cost of the services. The Court rejected this proposed test and used the same reasoning it had used in Tatro , finding that the medical services exclusion from the definition was limited to the services of physician or a hospital. This holding, the Court stated, was in keeping with the overarching purpose of IDEA "to open the door of public education to all qualified children." 47

In enacting P.L. 94-142 , the original version of IDEA, Congress provided grants to the states to help pay for education for children with disabilities and also delineated specific requirements the states must follow to receive these federal funds. This public law contained a requirement that if there is a dispute between the school and the parents of a child with a disability, the child "stays put" in his or her current educational placement until the dispute is resolved using the due process procedures set forth in the statute. The concept of "stay put" was placed in the statute to help eliminate the then common discriminatory practice of expelling children with disabilities from school. A revised "stay put" provision remains as law in the current version of IDEA. 48

In 1988, the question of whether there was an implied exception to the "stay put" rule was presented to the Supreme Court in Honig v. Doe . 49 Honig involved emotionally disturbed children, one of whom had choked another student with sufficient force to leave abrasions on the child's neck and who had kicked out a window while he was being escorted to the principal's office. The other child in the Honig case had been involved in stealing, extorting money, and making lewd comments. The school had sought expulsion, but the Supreme Court disagreed finding that "Congress very much meant to strip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students, particularly emotionally disturbed students, from school." 50 However, the Court observed that this holding did "not leave educators hamstrung.... Where a student poses an immediate threat to the safety of others, officials may temporarily suspend him or her for up to 10 school days.... And in those cases in which the parents of a truly dangerous child adamantly refuse to permit any change in placement, the 10-day respite gives school officials an opportunity to invoke the aid of the courts under section 1415(e)(2), which empowers courts to grant any appropriate relief." 51 This statement about the school's right to seek judicial relief has come to be know as a Honig injunction.

The Supreme Court's interpretation of IDEA in Honig did not quell all concerns about discipline and children with disabilities. In 1994, Congress amended IDEA's "stay put" provision to give schools the unilateral authority to remove a child with a disability to an interim alternative educational setting if the child was determined to have brought a firearm to school. This provision was expanded in the IDEA Amendments of 1997 to include weapons (not just firearms) and drugs, and is further expanded in the 2004 reauthorization to include situations where a student has inflicted serious bodily injury upon another person while at school.

Although the original version of IDEA, P.L. 94-142 , contained no specific provision for attorneys' fees, prevailing parties used section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 52 or section 1988 of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act, 53 to seek fees. However, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson 54 held that the only remedies for prevailing parties under IDEA were those contained in that statute. The statute was described as "a comprehensive scheme set up by Congress to aid the States in complying with their constitutional obligations to provide public education for handicapped children." 55 The Court further noted that allowing the use of other statutes to provide for attorneys' fees would "be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme." 56

The Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson was controversial. In response, Congress in 1986 enacted the Handicapped Children's Protection Act, which provided for attorneys' fees under IDEA. 57 These provisions were amended in 1997. The P.L. 105-17 amendments allowed the reduction of attorneys' fees if the attorney representing the parents did not provide the LEA with timely and specific information about the child and the basis of the dispute, and specifically excluded the payment of attorneys' fees for most individualized education plan (IEP) meetings. The 2004 IDEA reauthorization, P.L. 108-446 , kept many of the previous provisions on attorneys' fees but also made several additions. These include allowing attorneys' fees for the state educational agency (SEA) or the local educational agency (LEA) against the parent or the parent's attorney in certain situations. 58

Although there is no specific provision allowing a court to award prevailing parents expert witness fees, the language regarding attorneys' fees has been interpreted by some lower courts to allow such an award. IDEA's statutory language states in relevant part: "in any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs—(I) to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.... " 59

The parents in Arlington Central School District v. Murphy 60 argued that the language on costs encompassed the payment of expert witness fees. To support this argument, they pointed to the legislative history of the Handicapped Children's Protection Act, 61 which stated that "[t]he conferees intend that the term 'attorneys' fees as part of the costs' include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses." 62

The Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Alito, held that IDEA does not authorize prevailing parents to recover fees they have paid to experts. The majority opinion first observed that the holding was "guided by the fact that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the Spending Clause." 63 This was seen as significant because if Congress attaches conditions to a state's acceptance of funds, the conditions must be unambiguous and provide clear notice. The majority concluded that IDEA's statutory language did not provide this clear notice and that the legislative history was unconvincing and "simply not enough" under these circumstances. 64

Legislation, H.R. 2740 , 111 th Congress, would amend IDEA to include the fees of expert witnesses. H.R. 2740 specifically provided that "the term 'attorneys' fees' shall include the fees of expert witness, including reasonable costs of any test or evaluation necessary for the preparation of the parent or guardian's case in the action or proceeding."

IDEA contains detailed due process requirements to ensure the provision of FAPE. These include the opportunity for an impartial due process hearing. 65 However, the statute contains no specific provision relating to which party has the burden of proof in a due process hearing, and the courts of appeals were split in their interpretations of who bore the burden of proof.

The Supreme Court in Schaffer v. Weast , 66 held that the burden of proof regarding an allegedly inadequate IEP in an IDEA due process hearing rests with the party seeking the relief. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, first observed that "absent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise, ... we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief." 67 Justice O'Connor then examined, and rejected, various reasons advanced to support the argument that the burden of proof should be on the school system. The Supreme Court noted that the most plausible argument advanced by the parents was that in the interest of fairness, the burden of proof should not be placed on a party when the facts are "peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary." 68 School districts were seen as having a "natural advantage" regarding the information, but Justice O'Connor did not find this to be determinative because "Congress addressed this when it obliged schools to safeguard the procedural rights of parents and to share information with them." 69 The Court noted that IDEA provides parents with the right to review records, to have an independent educational evaluation, to have details about options considered by the school district as well as disclosure of evaluations and recommendations, and to receive attorneys' fees in the discretion of a court if they prevail. Justice O'Connor concluded that "[t]hese protections ensure that the school bears no unique informational advantage." 70

In Winkelman v. Parma City School District , 71 the Supreme Court examined the issue of whether IDEA permits parents who are not attorneys to bring suit in court, either on their own behalf or as representatives of their child. The Court held that such pro se suits were permitted for parents suing with regard to their own rights. In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court concluded that IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights that encompass a child's entitlement to a free appropriate public education and that these rights are not limited to procedural or reimbursement issues.

In arriving at this holding, Justice Kennedy observed that "a proper interpretation of the Act requires a consideration of the entire statutory scheme." The Court examined IDEA's statutory language, noting that one of the purposes of IDEA is "to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected." 72 This language was found to refer to rights for both parents and children with disabilities. Similarly, the Court found that the establishment of procedural rights was required "to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected." 73 These provisions were found to support the finding that the parents of a child with a disability have "a particular and personal interest" in the goals of IDEA and that "IDEA includes provisions conveying rights to parents as well as to children."

The rights that IDEA provides for parents were found to encompass not only procedural but also substantive rights. Justice Kennedy observed, "IDEA does not differentiate, through isolated references to various procedures and remedies, between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents." It was argued that granting these rights would increase the costs to the states because parents may bring more lawsuits if they do not have the financial constraint of paying for an attorney. However, the Court found that these concerns were not sufficient to support an argument under the Spending Clause that IDEA failed to provide clear notice before a new condition or obligation was placed on a recipient of funds. In addition, Justice Kennedy observed that IDEA specifically allows courts to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing educational agency when a parent has brought an action for an "improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation." 74

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. These Justices would have held that parents have the right to proceed pro se under IDEA when they seek reimbursement for private school tuition or for violations of the parents' procedural rights. However, Justices Scalia and Thomas would not have allowed such suits when the suits sought a judicial determination that the child's free appropriate public education was substantively inadequate.

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Important Special Education Cases

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We’ve organized important special education cases to help parents learn about their rights.  The below cases each arose under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

Burden of Proof

Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005)

In Schaffer , the Supreme Court considered whether parents or school districts have the burden of proof in special education due process hearings.  The Court determined that whichever party files a due process complaint has the burden of proof.  So, if a parent files a complaint alleging a denial of FAPE, the parent must prove the denial.

Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)

Hendrick Hudson School District v. Rowley (1982)

Rowley  is widely viewed as the landmark case in special education. In the decision, the Supreme Court identified the standard for FAPE.  The court held that FAPE requires that a child’s Individualized Education Program (IEP) be designed to allow her to receive educational benefit.  Since the case was decided, courts across the country have elaborated on this standard. For example, in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, courts have held that a child must be provided the opportunity to make meaningful educational benefit.

Polk v. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit (1988)

Polk  put forward the standard for FAPE in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which encompasses Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  In  Polk,  the court stated that the primary goals of the IDEA are to foster self-sufficiency and provide students with disabilities full educational opportunity.  Given these goals, the court held that FAPE requires students to be provided an opportunity to make meaningful progress in all major areas of need.

Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. (1999)

In  Ridgewood , the Third Circuit Court of Appeals offered further guidance regarding the standard for FAPE. The court found that a student’s IEP did not provide him FAPE because it failed to enable him to receive “significant learning” and “meaningful benefit.”  The court rejected the Ridgewood Board of Education’s argument that the student received FAPE because his IEP provided him with “more than trivial educational benefit.”  In addition, the court held that the Board failed to give adequate consideration to the student’s high intellectual potential when it crafted his IEP.

Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District (2017)

In Endrew F. , the Supreme Court revisited the standard for FAPE.  The question presented to the Court was: What is the level of educational benefit that school districts must confer on children with disabilities to provide them FAPE, as guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)?  And the Court concluded that school districts must offer children an IEP that is reasonably calculated to enable each child to make progress appropriate for that child’s circumstances.

Least Restrictive Environment (LRE)

Oberti v. Board of Education of the Borough of Clementon (1993)

In  Oberti , the Third Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a two-part test for assessing compliance with the IDEA’s LRE requirement. First, a court must consider “whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplementary aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily.” Factors the court should consider in applying this prong are: (1) the steps the school district has taken to accommodate the child in a regular classroom; (2) the child’s ability to receive an educational benefit from regular education; and (3) the effect the disabled child’s presence has on the regular classroom. Second, if the court finds that placement outside of a regular classroom is necessary for the child’s educational benefit, it must evaluate “whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate, i.e., whether the school has made efforts to include the child in school programs with nondisabled children whenever possible.”

T.R. v. Kingwood Board of Education (2000)

In  T.R. , the Third Circuit analyzed the LRE issue in the context of preschools. The court held that a school district that does not operated a regular preschool program is not required to create one in order to create an LRE for students with disabilities. However, the district must take into account a continuum of possible alternative placement options when formulating an IEP, including placing students with disabilities in private school programs for non-disabled preschool children.

Stay Put Protection

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).

The Supreme Court in Honig held that the “stay-put” provision of the IDEA prohibits state or local school authorities from excluding a child with a disability from the classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct that relates to the child’s disability.  (The stay-put provision requires that a child remain in his then-current placement while statutory “proceedings” to resolve a dispute about the placement are pending.)

M.R. v. Ridley School District, 744 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2014).

In M.R. , the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that, when a hearing officer determines that a child’s educational placement is appropriate, the child is entitled to stay put in that placement throughout all federal disputes about the placement.

Tuition Reimbursement

Florence County School District v. Carter (1993)  &  Burlington School Committee v. Mass. Department of Educ. (1985)

Although  Carter  was decided 8 years after  Burlington , these cases are often cited together; their holdings are commonly referred to as the “Carter-Burlington Test.” Courts use the Carter-Burlington Test to determine whether a parent should receive reimbursement for private school tuition under the IDEA. The Test has 3 parts:

1. Did the school district provide the student with an appropriate education?

2. If not, was the placement chosen by the parent appropriate?

3. Do the equities favor reimbursement?

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N. D. V. REYKDAL, No. 23-35580 (9th Cir. 2024)

The case involves a group of disabled students who sued the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction in Washington State. The students claimed that the state's practice of discontinuing special education services at the end of the school year in which a student turns 21 violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The IDEA generally requires states to provide special education to disabled students until their 22nd birthday, but allows states to discontinue services as early as age 18 if providing special education to older students would be inconsistent with state law or practice. The students argued that because Washington offers certain adult-education programs to 21-year-olds, it should also be required to provide special education to disabled 21-year-olds. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the students' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the students had not shown that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted. The court also concluded that the students were not likely to succeed on the merits of their claim because the adult-education programs in Washington charged a tuition fee, and therefore did not constitute "free public education." The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the students had a high likelihood of success on the merits of their claim because the availability of the adult-education programs in Washington triggered an obligation under the IDEA to provide special education to disabled 21-year-olds. The court also found that the students would suffer irreparable harm from the denial of access to special education. The court concluded that the balance of hardships tipped in the students' favor and that an injunction would be in the public interest.

Court Description: Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The panel vacated the district court’s order denying plaintiff students’ motion for a preliminary injunction regarding the State of Washington’s obligation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to provide special education to disabled 21-year-olds, and remanded for further proceedings. The IDEA permits a State to discontinue special education services as early as age 18 if providing special education to students up to age 22 “would be inconsistent with State law or practice . . . respecting the provision of public education to children” of the same age. The State of Washington cuts off special education services at the end of the school year in which a student turns 21. Although the State’s public schools also cut off eligibility for nondisabled students at age 21, the State offers certain adult-education programs to 21-year-olds. The panel held that it had jurisdiction, and the appeal was not moot, because one of the named plaintiffs had yet to turn 22, and defendants did not show that he had become ineligible for special education due to receipt of a diploma, nor that relief such as reinstatement to special education would be impossible for him. Assuming without deciding that the plaintiffs sought a mandatory rather than a prohibitory injunction, the panel held that, even under the standards applicable to mandatory injunctions, the district court abused its discretion in denying an injunction. Applying E.R.K. ex rel. R.K. v. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 728 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2013), and agreeing with the First and Second Circuits, the panel concluded that the plaintiffs had a high likelihood of success on the merits of their claim because the availability in Washington of the adult-education programs, a form of free public education for nondisabled 21-year-olds, triggered an obligation under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) to provide special education to disabled 21-year-olds. The panel further held that, in the absence of a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm from the denial of access to special education. The panel concluded that the balance of hardships tipped in the plaintiffs’ favor and that an injunction would be in the public interest. The panel therefore vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings including the entry of a preliminary injunction.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

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A Guide to Special Education Terms

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The number of students in special education has increased steadily in the last four decades , with parents more readily seeking additional support and more students being diagnosed with conditions, like attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and autism spectrum disorder.

In the wake of the pandemic, though, districts struggle to hire and—more importantly—keep their special education teachers, who are often beleaguered by stressful working conditions and a lack of resources.

Even as the field shifts to address workforce shortages, with some states considering extra pay for special education and others eyeing how artificial intelligence could lessen the burden of increased workloads, students with disabilities make up roughly 13 percent of the school population, said Natasha Strassfeld, an assistant professor in the department of special education at the University of Texas at Austin.

These are key terms educators should know.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act , or IDEA , is a federal law that establishes the rights of students with disabilities and their families.

First passed in 1975 and most recently reauthorized in 2004, the act provides grant funding to states that agree to the federal government’s vision for educating students with disabilities, said Strassfeld.

Students must be identified, evaluated, and deemed as IDEA eligible for the state to use federal money to educate that child. There are 13 categories under which a student could be eligible, including physical and intellectual disabilities.

There are about seven million students served under IDEA, said Strassfeld.

An Individualized Education Program , or IEP , is a legally binding contract between a school district and a family with a child with a disability. Under IDEA, students are afforded an IEP, said Dia Jackson, senior researcher for special education, equity, and tiered systems of support at the American Institutes of Research.

IEPs spell out what area a student has a disability in, how it impacts learning, and what the school will do to address those needs, such as providing speech or occupational therapy, more intensive instructional supports, and accommodations, including for standardized tests and other learning goals.

The number of IEPs is increasing in schools as conditions, like autism spectrum disorder, or ADHD, are being diagnosed more readily.

All students with disabilities are protected under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which requires schools to make “reasonable accommodation” for students with disabilities.

Educators don’t have to make specially designed instruction plans under a 504, but students can get certain accommodations, like elevator passes if a student is in a wheelchair, Jackson said.

“It’s a slightly different focus, but both play out in schools,” Jackson said.

Individualized family services plans , or IFSPs, are developed for children up to age 3 who need help with communication, social-emotional skills, and physical needs, Strassfeld said.

Like an IEP, the plan is made in collaboration with a parent or guardian, along with professionals such as a child care provider, religious leaders, or doctors. The document outlines a plan for families to help seek services—such as speech and language therapy, occupational therapy, medical services, and more—but is focused more on the family’s goals rather than strictly educational goals, Strassfeld said.

“While they’re focusing on pre-education goals, primarily at that age, we’re thinking about that child as being a part of a component of a family,” she said.

The right to a Free Appropriate Public Education , or FAPE , means that for every IDEA-eligible student, services must be provided at no cost to the student or their family, must be appropriate for the needs of the child, and have to be education oriented, Strassfeld said.

With FAPE, there is also the concept of least restrictive environment, or LRE, Jackson said. Students should be included to the fullest extent possible in mainstream classrooms and be challenged but appropriately supported, alongside their general education peers.

That’s not without its challenges, however, Strassfeld said.

“IDEA essentially is premised on the philosophical notion that it is that easy. It’s a real challenge for school districts,” she said, adding that as parents and advocates examine special education through disability justice and disability studies lenses, there are more critiques of the model.

Jackson said that she’s heard criticism along these lines: When students with disabilities aren’t prepared for a general education environment, or when general education teachers don’t have training on special education.

Response to intervention , or RTI , came as an amendment to IDEA in 2004 to help earlier identify students who are struggling before they begin failing, Jackson said, and begin giving them additional support through a tiered process. Generally, all students receive “tier I” instruction on grade-level standards. Then, students who need additional help get more intensive supports. That could look like a teacher working one-on-one, or in small groups, helping target specific areas to improve learning.

Intervention is an evidence-based program meant to address a specific learning or social-emotional need. It can be done in a general education classroom, and looks like regular teaching, Jackson said, but it uses particular materials and involves collecting data on progress.

The term RTI has evolved into multitiered system of supports , or MTSS , which is also a preventative framework, but goes beyond academics to consider the infrastructure districts need to implement MTSS, Jackson said.

“The shift to MTSS is meant to be more inclusive of the infrastructure as well as inclusive of social-emotional learning as well as academics,” she said.

A functional behavior assessment , or FBA , is a way for educators to collect data on student behavior, and what is triggering certain unwanted behavior, Jackson said.

For instance, she said, if a teacher has a student who has autism and, when they get upset, they throw a chair, an FBA could be conducted.

Once that analysis is collected, a behavior intervention plan , or BIP , is developed, describing what the behavior is, how often it happens, and what will be done to address it.

FBAs and BIPs are not without concerns, however, as students with disabilities—especially students of color—are more likely to face exclusionary discipline, such as suspension and expulsion.

“A lot of times, it is a subjective judgment call if a student is exhibiting ‘appropriate behavior’ or not,” Jackson said. “There’s a lot of potential bias that goes into discipline of students and behavior management.”

It’s one example of disproportionality , where an ethnic or racial group is over- or under-represented in certain areas. For instance, Jackson said, students of color with disabilities are over-represented in discipline, on being identified as having a disability, and being placed in more restrictive environments.

Restraint and seclusion are practices used in public schools as a response to student behavior that limits their movement and aims to deescalate them, by either physically limiting their movement (restraint) or isolating them from others (seclusion), according to previous EdWeek reporting .

The practice of physically restraining students with disabilities or placing them in isolation has been heavily scrutinized, but is still used in some states.

It should only be used in extreme cases when a student is at risk to harm themselves or others, Jackson said, but never as a behavior management technique, or as punishment. Students have been harmed, or even killed, as a result of restraints , Jackson said. Students of color are over-represented in the population who are restrained and isolated, Jackson added.

Even still, there are educators who don’t want to see the practices completely banned, Jackson said.

“Teachers have been hurt by students or they’ve been hurt in the midst of a restraint so they still want to have the option available,” she said. “It’s an issue of not having training in another alternative, so they feel like: ‘This is the only way I can handle this particular student, or type of student, because I don’t know anything else.’”

Strassfeld said that there’s been more focus on the practice alongside excessive force in law enforcement.

“There’s been discussion that disability advocates have had about criminalization of behaviors that a person has no control over, and this type of force seems to deny the humanity of people who perhaps are exhibiting behaviors they are not able to control,” she said.

Education Issues, Explained

Vanessa Solis, Associate Design Director contributed to this article.

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