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Case study: The War in Chechnya and its Aftermath

Holding a Decaying Empire Together: The War in Chechnya and its Aftermath

On 25 December 1991, the Soviet Union officially was dissolved, with the former superpower splitting into 15 individual states. Each of these entities had been a constituent ‘republic’ of the USSR built around one of the major ethnicities within the country—Russia itself was dominated by Russians, Ukraine by Ukrainians, and so forth. The 15 republics, however, actually greatly simplified the diversity of the Soviet state, which contained hundreds of distinct ethnic groups, many of which dominated a small piece of territory within a republic. In many cases, these groups had certain limited rights to govern themselves locally and independently of the larger republic of which they were a part.

The Chechens were one such group. Chechnya is located in Russia, in the mountainous Caucasus and bordering the now-independent country of Georgia. The total number of Chechens is small, although exact numbers are disputed—there are perhaps somewhat over two million Chechens, many of whom live outside Chechnya itself; the population of Chechnya itself is approximately 1.2 million, but this includes Ingush, Kumyks, Russians, and other non-Chechens. The great majority of Chechens are Muslims, and although Chechnya was incorporated into the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century (and Russia had influence in the region much earlier), their culture remains quite distinct from that of the Russians. During the Soviet period, Chechens were joined with another small Caucasian Muslim group, the Ingush, in a local governing entity.

            In September 1991, even before the Soviet Union officially dissolved, rebels under the leadership of a former Soviet Air Force general, Dzhokhar Dudayev, effectively seized control of Chechnya. The head of the Communist Party in Grozny, the Chechen capital, was killed. Shortly thereafter, Dudayev won a clearly corrupt ‘presidential election’ and issued a declaration of independence. The Chechen-Ingush government effectively dissolved, as Ingushetia stayed with Russia.

            At first, Moscow’s response to Chechnya’s supposed independence was weak. Russian troops sent to Grozny were quickly withdrawn, and the central government refused to take strong military action, treating the Chechen posture more as an annoyance than as a serious attempt to create a new country. Dudayev’s government was unstable—the latter had taken advantage of the unique circumstances accompanying the decline of the USSR to establish himself as the supposedly legitimate president of Chechnya, but he would be more accurately described as a warlord. From Moscow’s perspective, cautiously waiting for circumstances to change seemed to be a reasonable reaction to events in Chechnya.  

            In response to the Chechen situation and other demands for greater autonomy by ethnic entities and other local governments, the government of President Boris Yeltsin shaped the 1992 Federation Treaty, which was signed by virtually all local ethnic governments—but Chechnya refused to accede to the treaty, maintaining its claim to independence. In the meantime, Russians and other ethnic minorities fled Chechnya in considerable numbers. Organized crime was endemic in Chechnya, and spilled over into neighbouring areas, while low-level violence continued between Dudayev supporters and opponents, with the Russians assisting the latter. By mid-1994, the violence worsened, with Dudayev’s foes making a serious military effort to overthrow his regime. Russian aircraft began to bomb Grozny, and in December Russian troops invaded the region. [1] The conflict that has become known as the First Chechen War had begun.

The First Chechen War

Russian military commanders expected little meaningful resistance from the greatly outgunned Chechens, and planned their campaign accordingly. The Chechens, however, proved to be surprisingly effective, using mobile guerrilla tactics to inflict losses on Russian troops, many of whom were low-quality conscripts who had been stationed in nearby regions.

            The Russians quickly resorted to a crude counterinsurgency tactic: the massive use of firepower. Airstrikes and artillery were used indiscriminately, with little concern for infrastructural damage or civilian casualties. Russian forces were soon battering Grozny, by far the largest city in Chechnya, with munitions. As 1994 ended, the Russian Army’s ground forces moved into Grozny, [2] and vicious street fighting followed. The losses on both sides are debated, and the precise number of civilian and Chechen rebel deaths never will be known, but perhaps 25,000 civilians, as well as thousands of Russian troops and rebels, were killed in the conquest of the city. [3] The Russian Army succeeded in taking Grozny, but in the process virtually destroyed it.

            The conquest of Grozny illustrated very well what was to become, at least among foreign observers, the most noted aspect of the Russian war in Chechnya: a brutal indifference to civilian suffering. Not only was Russia unrestrained in its use of munitions, but it became ever clearer that the Russian Army was committing war crimes on a massive scale. Murder, rape, torture, looting, kidnapping, and other crimes were common, and this mistreatment in turn reinforced the Chechen desire for independence. [4]

            Although the rebels were able to inflict significant losses on the Russian military, the size and capabilities of the forces arrayed against them placed the Chechens at a serious military disadvantage. Seeking a ‘shortcut’ to strategic victory, and, perhaps more importantly, embittered by Russian mistreatment of the Chechen population, rebels increasingly began to undertake terrorist attacks in Russia itself. The most spectacular of these attacks, led by Shamil Basayev, involved the seizure of a hospital in the Russian city of Budyonnovsk in June 1995 and the holding of its staff and patients as hostages. To the humiliation of the Russian government, efforts to storm the hospital failed, with a substantial number of hostages and Russian troops being killed in the process. Moscow soon agreed to Chechen demands for peace talks and Basayev and his men were allowed to escape back to Chechnya, accompanied by a number of ‘volunteer hostages’, who were released once the rebels reached their destination. [5]

The Breathing Period: 1996–99

As the First Chechen War dragged on, opposition to the conflict grew within Russia. Public support decreased over time as Russian forces suffered far more casualties than had initially been expected and reports of the brutality of the fighting troubled many Russians. In the 1990s the Russian press was far freer than it is today, and there was considerable criticism of Moscow’s military mistakes and human rights abuses in the domestic press. (In recent years, Moscow has taken ever more stringent measures to limit press freedom, placing many formerly independent broadcasting outlets under state control and using measures such as huge fines to discipline, and in many cases force the closure of, print media outlets.)

            In April 1996, the Russian government scored a victory against the Chechen rebels when Dudayev was assassinated by Russian aircraft using ‘smart’ munitions. Aslan Maskhadov ultimately emerged as Dudayev’s successor. Maskhadov had been a senior military leader of the Chechen forces; like Dudayev, he had been a Soviet military officer earlier in his life. Shortly thereafter, in August, the Chechens retook Grozny. Yeltsin’s newly-appointed national security advisor, General Alexander Lebed—himself a major political figure who, a couple of months earlier, had been a candidate in the first round of the 1996 Russian presidential campaign—negotiated a ceasefire agreement that ended the First Chechen War. This was followed by a formal peace treaty in May of the next year.

            Although Russia did not acknowledge in the treaty that Chechnya was a wholly independent state, it also did not force the Chechens to back down from their claims of sovereignty—the document skirted this key issue. [6] Internationally, the treaty was seen as an admission of defeat by Russia, as it provided that Russian troops would leave Chechnya and that Moscow would compensate the Chechens for economic damage resulting from the war. In short, and leaving the issue of legal sovereignty aside, the treaty effectively acknowledged that Chechnya’s leaders de facto were independent of Moscow. Clearly, Russia had lost the First Chechen War.

            Peace in Chechnya would prove to be far from complete, however. Power struggles within the Chechen leadership continued; Maskhadov survived several assassination attempts—which often are blamed on his rival Basayev, the ‘hero’ of the Budyonnovsk hospital incident. Chechen terrorism within Russia continued, including attacks on apartment complexes and railway stations; additionally, Russian envoys and officials were killed in Chechnya. Perhaps most importantly, conflict boiled in neighbouring Dagestan, another majority-Muslim region of the Russian Federation—and the conflicts in the Caucasus were taking on strong religious overtones.

            Traditionally, Islam in the Caucasus had not been associated with harsh and radical theological beliefs, such as those associated with the Wahhabi tradition that emerged in the Saudi Peninsula. Rather, the Caucasian practice of Islam generally has been seen as relatively tolerant, influenced heavily by Sufi mysticism and cultural traditions that are condemned by Islamist extremists. In the early period of the Chechen conflict, religion played a relatively modest role—while religious differences between the Chechens and Orthodox Russians were a component in the Chechen desire for independence, it is clear that nationalism was a far more important factor than was sectarianism. As the bitter struggle continued, however, religion became increasingly important to the conflict. This was no doubt partly simply the result of the pressures of war, with Chechens turning to religion as a justification for sacrifice and a source of divine sanction for their costly struggle. Another important factor, however, was the substantial assistance that was pouring into Chechnya from outside Muslims—financial and other assistance was funnelled in and foreign jihadis came to fight the ‘infidel’ Russians. Saudis, Egyptians, Pakistanis, and others joined the war, but these outsiders had no interest in secular Chechen nationalism—they were Islamists who were interested in religious warfare. Moreover, for a number of years Wahhabi missionaries (largely funded by Saudi Arabia) had been active throughout the Caucasus, as well as in many other parts of the world, seeking to convert local Muslims to the very severe Wahhabi vision of Islam.

            Over time, Islamism became an increasingly powerful force in Chechnya, and Basayev took advantage of this to emerge as a key leader among religiously radical Chechens, with many local warlords and others becoming loyal to him. Maskhadov, who no doubt was concerned about being outflanked by rivals on issues of faith, in early 1999 announced that Chechnya would transition from secular law to sharia (Islamic law). This strained the Chechen government relationship with the Russians, who had no desire to see neighbours, much less a region they still considered a part of Russia, adopt characteristics associated with Islamic (or even Islamist) states.

            In August 1999, Basayev led a large force of Islamist fighters in an invasion of Dagestan. His goal was to assist local Islamists in establishing an independent Dagestan that would then be linked to Chechnya in a larger entity. The effort failed, with heavy losses to Basayev’s force. However, the invasion was taken very seriously indeed by Moscow—while the Chechen conflict had previously spilled into other regions, the sheer scale of Basayev’s offensive seemed to confirm that an independent Chechnya presented a major security threat to Russia.

            In early September, a series of bombings of apartment buildings occurred in Dagestan, Moscow, and the city of Volgodonsk in western Russia, killing approximately 300 Russians. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin publicly blamed Chechen rebels, but a curious incident occurred on 22 September: individuals associated with the FSB—the Russian internal security service, a successor of the Soviet KGB—were arrested while apparently planting a bomb in an apartment building in the city of Ryazan. Although the FSB soon claimed that the arrested men had been participating in a training exercise and that the explosives and detonator were not real, local police in Ryazan are known to have disagreed with these claims, and there is considerable speculation that the FSB actually committed the earlier bombings. The motive for such an action, apparently, would be to provide the Russian government—in particular, Putin, a former head of the FSB—with a pretext for an invasion of Chechnya. To this day, blame for the bombings is still debated, [7] although the official investigation fingered Arab terrorists fighting with the Chechens as the organizers of attacks and a number of individuals associated with the Chechen cause have been tried and jailed in Russia.

The Early Period of the Second Chechen War

In September 1999, Russia began to bomb targets in Chechnya, and this was soon followed by a ground invasion. At first, Russia indicated that it only sought to occupy the portion of Chechnya north of the Terek River, but Russian forces continued southward, and by November were bombarding Grozny. Russia also organized a pro-Moscow Chechen military force which played a significant role in the siege. The heavy air and artillery bombardment continued throughout December and into January, with most of the city being levelled. There was a very heavy flow of refugees out of Chechnya, and the Russian government made little effort to provide them with humanitarian assistance. [8] Reports of Russian excesses, and general disapproval for the invasion, resulted in considerable criticism from the West, including threats to curtail foreign aid and take other measures to punish Russia. Russia publicly expressed resentment at Western interference in the Chechen issue, [9] and outside efforts ultimately did little to improve conditions for most Chechens.

            Russia suffered major casualties during the battle for Grozny, and firefights in which isolated Russian units were ambushed by Chechen fighters proved to be particularly deadly. [10] Street-to-street urban warfare continued through December and into the new year, but by mid-January, circumstances clearly favoured the Russians, who, by completely surrounding the city, had cut Chechen logistics lines. With their forces suffering from dwindling food, ammunition, and other necessities, it was becoming clear to the Chechens that they must either attempt to withdraw from the city or surrender.

            An attempt by an encircled force to ‘break out’ from its trap is one of the riskiest of military manoeuvres. The Russians—who saw the Grozny battle as a chance to inflict catastrophic losses on the Chechens and perhaps finally to end the rebellion—had mined the areas surrounding the city and taken other measures to trap the Chechen fighters. The Chechens paid a high price when, as January ended, they finally attempted to escape: fatalities included a number of leaders, though most of the Chechen fighters escaped. However, soon thereafter the Chechens suffered another major defeat. Chechen forces seized the village of Komsomolskoe and attempted to hold it against Russian attack, but over the course of two weeks suffered at least several hundred, and perhaps as many as one thousand, fatalities before ultimately withdrawing.

            The Chechens retreated into the mountains of southern Chechnya so as to fight a guerrilla war against the Russians. An insurgency continued, but although the general intensity of the war appeared to wane over the long term, its geography spread to involve not just Ingushetia but also Dagestan.

The Later Second Chechen War and Afterward

In May 2000, Moscow announced that it would rule Chechnya directly and named Mufti Akhmed Kadyrov, a Chechen Muslim cleric, to oversee the region. [11] In March 2003, a new constitution was approved by Chechens in a referendum, but very serious questions were raised about the legitimacy of the balloting and it is probable that there was manipulation of the election returns. [12] In October of that year, Kadyrov was elected president of Chechnya, but, again, there were serious questions about the integrity of the balloting, and the same has been true of subsequent elections.

            War crimes against the Chechen population—committed by all sides in the conflict—continued, and mass graves were discovered throughout the region. The Russian government made some half-hearted efforts to eliminate war crimes, including a number of legal prosecutions. However, while it was very concerned that news of Russian depredations not leak out of Chechnya, it apparently remained rather unenergetic in actually preventing such abuses. Moscow continued to restrict media access, making it difficult for the international media to ascertain how Russian forces were conducting the counterinsurgency war. Perhaps part of the answer as to why this was the case is that, from the First Chechen War onward, Russia appears to have utilized a common counterinsurgency strategy in Chechnya: using brutality to batter the insurgent population so as to convince it that compliance with Moscow’s wishes is preferable to suffering the punishment for disobedience. [13] Of course, this was not an openly declared policy, but it may nonetheless be a real one.

            Chechen separatists continued to commit acts of guerrilla war and terrorism, both in Chechnya itself and outside the region. An active campaign of bombings, ambushes, and assassinations continued, with several important pro-Russian figures being killed, including Akhmed Kadyrov, who was killed by a bomb at a parade in May 2004. (His son, Ramzan Kadyrov, is the long-time Head of the Chechen Republic.) Russian troops were frequently killed in ambushes, but Chechen fighters generally avoided large-scale combat operations against the Russians. However, Chechen rebel leaders were nonetheless occasionally killed, often in murky circumstances—both Maskhadov and Basayev died (in March 2005 and July 2006, respectively), but precisely how they died, and who is responsible for their deaths, is contentious. Likewise, Chechen separatist leader Doku Umarov was allegedly poisoned in August 2013, and died the following month.

            It is notable that a variety of targets have been attacked by Chechen suicide bombers. Although suicide bombings are an increasingly common terrorist tactic in much of the world, Chechen suicide bombings are somewhat unusual in that many of the attacks have been committed by women; [14] globally, a substantial majority of suicide bombers are young men.

            Female terrorists played roles in the two most infamous terrorist attacks of the war, the seizing of hostages at a Moscow theatre in October 2002 and at a school in the Russian town of Beslan in September 2004. Both sieges ended violently, with Russian troops making botched attempts to rescue the hostages. In the case of the Moscow theatre, over 100 hostages were killed, while the events in Beslan resulted in the deaths of over 300 civilians, nearly 200 of them children. Both events have continued to be very controversial, with many Russians—as well as outside observers—blaming authorities for bungling their rescue efforts, with tragic results. [15]

The Second Chechen War officially finished in 2009, when Russia ended its counterterrorism operation and the leader of the separatist government, Akhmed Zakayev, called for a halt to armed resistance. Nevertheless, violence continued as the Caucasus Emirate, followed by Islamic State’s Caucasus Province, carried on the fight against Russia. In 2010, two female suicide bombers attacked the Moscow Metro; the next year, Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport was bombed. Nevertheless, casualties on all sides fell by more than half in the years following the official end to the war. Much of this reduction is credited to improving Russian counterterrorism techniques, leading to the deaths of high-ranking insurgent commanders and to the destruction of their infrastructure, as well as an exodus of fighters to other, more active conflict zones.

As the Second Chechen War dragged on, it grew ever more complex. What began as a separatist conflict increasingly took on the characteristics of an Islamist struggle throughout the entirety of the Russian Caucasus, and despite the official peace, political violence is a continuing problem in Chechnya. With the decrease in violence, jihadis became an export from Chechnya rather than an import, although some young Chechens continue to take up arms against the local Chechen government. With the official conclusion of the war, the Russian Army removed its presence in Chechnya and turned security tasks over to their allies in the Republic of Chechnya government. However, the fact that Russia was able to regain effective control of Chechnya (or, at least, of its major population centres) also illustrates one of the unattractive truths of counterinsurgency: a ‘winning ugly’ strategy can sometimes work.

            It is not necessarily always the case that failing to win ‘hearts and minds’ ensures the defeat of the counterinsurgent—it may sometimes be possible to achieve and maintain control of an area through overwhelming military force and sheer brutality. However, this also ensures that the occupier is hated and it should be expected that at least a minority of the occupied population will strike back with similar ruthlessness. Given the proven ability of the Chechens to undertake terrorist attacks on Russian soil, it is likely that Russia will continue to pay in blood to maintain control of Chechnya. Yet it is unlikely that Russian control will now be shaken; sometimes insurgents are able to extract a terrible price yet fail to achieve their core goals. What consequences may arise from increasing Islamic State ties to the region are unknown.

• How did the breakup of the Soviet Union create conditions that made the Chechen secession from Russia possible?
• What have been the strengths and weaknesses of Russian counterinsurgency strategy in Chechnya?
• What have been the strengths and weaknesses of the strategy of Chechen insurgents and terrorists?
• What, if any, role could the international community play in bringing the violence in Chechnya to an end?
• Is there any way in which the international community could have been more effective in preventing the war crimes that have occurred in the course of the conflicts in Chechnya?

http://csis.org/program/north-caucasus

https://www.rferl.org/p/5494.html

http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Chechnya.asp http://www.watchdog.cz/

[1] For a contemporaneous report on the ground invasion, see Michael Specter, ‘Russian Forces Move Into Rebel Region’, New York Times , 12 December 1994, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/12/world/russian-forces-move-into-rebel-region.html , accessed 24 November 2021.

[2] See Michael Specter, ‘Russians Enter Separatist Capital after Air and Ground Onslaught’, New York Times , 1 January 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/01/world/russians-enter-separatist-capital-after-air-and-ground-onslaught.html , accessed 24 November 2021.

[3] Writing in mid-1995, Paul Goble argues that at that point ‘a minimum of 40,000 people in the region’ had been killed by Russian forces. He also notes, ‘Perhaps 12,000 of the dead were ethnic Russians who lost their lives during the Russian attacks on the city of Grozny.’ ‘The Costs for Moscow of Its War in Chechnya are High and Continuing,’ Prism , 1(8), 23 June 1995, published online by the Jamestown Foundation at www.jamestown.org.

[4] Various Russian war crimes are described in Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (New York: New York University Press 1998), 228–55.

[5] See Steven Erlanger, ‘Russia Allows Rebels to Leave with Hostages’, New York Times , 20 June 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/20/world/russia-allows-rebels-to-leave-with-hostages.html , and Alessandra Stanley, ‘Chechen Gunmen who Raided Town Release Hostages’, New York Times , 21 June 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/21/world/chechen-gunmen-who-raided-town-release-hostages.html , both accessed 24 November 2021.

[6] Alessandra Stanley, ‘Yeltsin Signs Peace Treaty with Chechnya’, New York Times , 13 May 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/13/world/yeltsin-signs-peace-treaty-with-chechnya.html , accessed 24 November 2021.

[7] See Alexander Litvinenko and Yuri Felshtinsky, Blowing Up Russia: The Secret Plot to Bring Back KGB Terror (London: Gibson Square, 2007). Litvinenko, a former agent in the Russian intelligence establishment, was living in exile in Britain when he was poisoned with the radioactive element polonium in November 2006. It is widely suspected that the Russian government ordered Litvinenko’s assassination.

[8] See Michael R. Gordon, ‘Trickle of Chechen Refugees Brave a Risky Escape Route’, New York Times , 11 December 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/11/world/trickle-of-chechen-refugees-brave-a-risky-escape-route.html , accessed 24 November 2021.

[9] See Celestine Bohlen, ‘Russia Reacts Angrily Over Western Criticism in Chechnya’, New York Times , 8 December 1999, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/120899russia-imf.html , and Erik Eckholm, ‘A Bristling Yeltsin Reminds Clinton of Russia’s A-Arms’, New York Times , 10 December 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/10/world/a-bristling-yeltsin-reminds-clinton-of-russia-s-a-arms.html , both accessed 24 November 2021.

[10] See, for example, Michael Wines, ‘Rebels Hit Russian Troops Hard in Battle in the Chechen Capital’, New York Times , 16 December 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/16/world/rebels-hit-russian-troops-hard-in-battle-in-the-chechen-capital.html , accessed 24 November 2021.

[11] Michael R. Gordon, ‘Putin Names Chechen Cleric to Rule Separatist Republic’, New York Times , 13 June 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/13/world/putin-names-chechen-cleric-to-rule-separatist-republic.html , accessed 24 November 2021.

[12] See Lawrence A. Uzzell, ‘Referendum Results’, Chechnya Weekly , 4(10), 27 March 2003, published online at www.jamestown.org .

[13] The viciousness of both Russian and Chechen separatist forces is discussed in Anna Politkovskaya, trans. Alexander Burry and Tatiana Tulchinsky, A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

[14] See Steven Lee Myers, ‘Female Suicide Bombers Unnerve Russians’, New York Times , 7 August 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/07/world/female-suicide-bombers-unnerve-russians.html , accessed 24 November 2021.

[15] See C.J. Chivers, ‘Report on Russia Massacre Faults Officials’, New York Times , 29 December 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/29/world/europe/report-on-russia-massacre-faults-officials.html , accessed 24 November 2021.

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• > Journals
• > Nationalities Papers
• > Volume 51 Issue 6
• > Chechnya’s Paradiplomacy 2000–2020: The Emergence and...

Article contents

Introduction, paradiplomacy and the chechen case, paradiplomacy, governance, territorial acquisition, and the creation of chechnya’s institutions, chechnya’s paradiplomacy 2000–2020, conclusions, disclosures, chechnya’s paradiplomacy 2000–2020: the emergence and evolution of external relations of a reincorporated territory.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 April 2022

From the year 2000 on, Chechen official international relations – called “paradiplomacy” – have centered around legitimacy-building, security cooperation and investment attraction, priorities set by the republic’s first official, pro-Russian president, Akhmat Kadyrov (in office 2000–2004). Kadyrov’s successors, Alu Alkhanov (2004–2007) and Ramzan Kadyrov (2007–to date) developed Grozny’s international engagements further, introducing new partners – such as China – and new dimensions to the external action – such as militarization. At each step, Grozny operated between full autonomy and collaboration with Moscow, involving itself in high-level diplomacy and furthering Moscow’s agenda abroad, primarily in the Middle East. In this article, I argue that Chechen paradiplomacy is an instrument for the inclusion of Chechnya into the governance structures of Russia’s federal order. The argument rests on two premises: Chechnya’s paradiplomacy is framed by the Kremlin’s proactive support and coordination, and Chechnya’s paradiplomacy is closely connected to the Kremlin’s security priorities. Since reincorporation, Chechen paradiplomacy has not been an addition to Russian federal relations but an intrinsic part of the post-2000 political arrangement between Grozny and Moscow. To empirically ground this argument, I trace the evolution of Chechen paradiplomacy across the three post-incorporation presidencies, ending in 2020.

From 2015 on, the international relations of the Chechen Republic, a federal subject of the Russian Federation, have been brought to attention by their scope and influence in the Middle East. Today, Grozny is known to have deployed special forces in Syria, hold close contact with the leadership of the Gulf monarchies, and have a highly autonomous perspective on international affairs that occasionally clashes with Moscow. Indeed, Chechnya stands out as a region that has remained highly autonomous in spite of the centralizing trends in the Russian Federation. Because of this, Chechnya’s sub-state diplomacy (also called “paradiplomacy”; for a discussion of the concept, see Aguirre Reference Aguirre 1999 ) has been scrutinized by literature in the past (e.g., Cornago Reference Cornago 1999 ). Yet, a comprehensive analysis of the transformations of Chechen paradiplomacy is missing from the literature, and, as I argue below, the Chechen case is potentially revealing of certain central dynamics of paradiplomacy in general.

How to understand the agency that Chechnya has had at the international stage following its de facto reincorporation into Russia? What has driven and enabled Grozny to have the international role it currently has? The existing paradiplomacy literature has suggested a few different ways to understand the underlying political dynamics behind Grozny’s external action. First, Chechen paradiplomacy may be seen as a way of conflict management. In this account, Moscow gave Chechnya paradiplomacy competencies to deactivate the local conflict, making Chechnya’s case fall into the pattern of paradiplomacy as problem-solving (Joenniemi and Sergunin Reference Joenniemi and Sergunin 2014 ; Tavares Reference Tavares 2016 , 44). Second, Chechen paradiplomacy may be seen as part of the political bargain between the Kadyrov family and Putin to ensure Chechnya’s loyalty to the Russian Federation. According to this version, Moscow gave the Kadyrov clan the opportunity to entrench their autocratic rule over Chechnya in exchange for their services as intermediaries with the Muslim world (Luzin Reference Luzin 2018 ). Third, Chechen paradiplomacy can be seen as an outcome of center-region relations, bargaining, and the competition for federal funding. In this version, Grozny exploits Chechnya’s unique culture and connections to the Middle East to demonstrate the republic’s value to Moscow and, in turn, is rewarded with stability in federal funding (Makarychev and Yatsyk Reference Makarychev and Yatsyk 2018 , 917).

All these accounts overlap in their underlying assumption of paradiplomacy as the outcome of a win-win arrangement between Moscow and the pro-Russian Chechen leadership. Building on these interpretations, I trace the evolution of Chechen paradiplomacy and the ways it operationalizes Russian foreign policy. I proceed on the argument that Grozny’s international engagements were enabled and encouraged by Moscow since the territorial reincorporation of Chechnya in 2000. In an attempt to answer the questions regarding the facilitating conditions for Chechen paradiplomacy, this article pursues two objectives, an empirical one and a conceptual one. First, I trace the evolution of Chechen paradiplomacy to evince the interaction between opportunity structures and Grozny’s international agency in the 2000–2020 period. Second, on the basis of the preceding, I argue for the relevance of imposition in the creation of paradiplomacy institutions in newly incorporated regions. On the basis of established understandings of the role of leadership in paradiplomacy, I propose a periodization focused on the changing heads of the Chechen republic, namely Akhmat Kadyrov, Alu Alkhanov, and Ramzan Kadyrov. Because of my lack of access to Chechen officials, I rely on press reports and the existing literature to empirically ground my argument.

The article has two contributions to the literature. The reconstruction of Chechnya’s paradiplomacy 2000–2020 adds value to our understanding of its transformations by drawing attention to the long-term trends in Chechnya’s international relations. Then, by suggesting that Chechen paradiplomacy is a component of Russia’s sovereign reassertion over Chechnya, I draw attention to paradiplomacy institutions and their role in keeping newly incorporated regions governable. This interpretation adds to our broader understanding of paradiplomacy as it further elaborates on the political dynamics of the normalization of paradiplomacy in general (Cornago Reference Cornago 2010 ) and on the dynamics of territorial change in particular. In addition, as a secondary aim, this article adds to the challenge to the established notion that paradiplomacy is structurally bound to service provision (“low” politics) by exploring a case of militarized paradiplomacy.

Paradiplomacy is the label given to the broad phenomenon of the official relations between sub-state territorial governments (“regions” for short) and international partners, such as foreign companies, governments, non-governmental organizations, and other institutions based abroad. Whilst in the past it was considered to be an atypical phenomenon limited to Western, federal democracies, today it is considered to be a “normal” phenomenon (Cornago Reference Cornago 2010 ). This “normality” implies both expectations and prevalence in the world. Today, constituents and regional governments expect to have a right to carry out some form of international engagement, at a minimum for investment attraction. At most, sub-state regions can carry out a complex, rich, ambitious external action that includes cultural events, scientific exchange programs, trade and investment promotion, policy coordination, international events, among other activities, with foreign partners (Tavares Reference Tavares 2016 , 117–150). Regarding prevalence, there has been growing attention to the phenomenon of paradiplomacy beyond Europe and North America, where this scholarship began. Indeed, from 2000 on, there has been a proliferation of studies bringing in evidence of paradiplomacy in Africa, Asia, South America, the Middle East, among other parts of the world (Kuznetsov Reference Kuznetsov 2015 , 41–42).

This literature has proceeded on the basis of case studies as analyzed through a well-established conceptual grid (Lecours Reference Lecours 2002 , 93). The scholarship offers a wealth of typologies and a growing number of explanatory frameworks (Kuznetsov Reference Kuznetsov 2015 ). A thorough analysis of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper, yet a few contributions are important to highlight, as they offer the conceptual toolkit of the present study. Two pathbreaking works laid the conceptual basis for most of the literature on paradiplomacy. First, Ivo Duchacek’s work of paradiplomacy sheds light on the ways to analyze the international activities of sub-state governments as they respond to internal and external pressures and opportunities (Duchacek Reference Duchacek, Michelmann and Soldatos 1991 ). New approaches would specify that paradiplomacy can be a form of problem-solving and capacity-building (Joenniemi and Sergunin Reference Joenniemi and Sergunin 2014 ) or pursue primarily political, economic, cultural, or border-oriented agendas (Kuznetsov Reference Kuznetsov 2015 , 116). Second, Panayotis Soldatos’s ( Reference Soldatos 1991 ) work on center-region relations offers a typology to conceptualize harmonious and disharmonious relations between center and region regarding international matters. In addition, Lecours ( Reference Lecours 2002 ) adds a historical institutional outlook assessing the evolution of paradiplomacy; this perspective places the focus of analysis on the evolution of concrete institutions that govern, regulate, and articulate a region’s international relations ( Reference Lecours 2002 , 97; see also Bursens and Deforche Reference Bursens and Deforche 2010 ). Moreover, the institutional framework compels the incorporation of a broader understanding of the context in which paradiplomacy is embedded, namely to include the transformations of the country’s international relations and of the region’s own institutions. Finally, I focus here on the leadership changes as a key driver in change in paradiplomacy. Paradiplomacy is important for governors and regional elites as they frequently use it to promote their own leadership and invest in an international image. Then, many sub-state governments are set up in a way that foreign relations are concentrated in the executive – meaning that paradiplomacy tends to be structurally “executive driven” (Thurer and MacLaren Reference Thurer and Maclaren 2009 ; Tavares Reference Tavares 2016 , 41–42b; see Stremoukhov Reference Stremoukhov 2021 ). A focus on the executive power, pressures, and center-region relations are the main features of the conceptual grid used here to address the case of Chechnya.

The case of official (the one led by the pro-Russian leadership, as opposed to rebel leadership) Chechen paradiplomacy is revealing and worthwhile as a case study. First, the Chechen case challenges the established understandings of the relationship between paradiplomacy and what are considered the exclusive tools of statecraft. The idea of the exclusive realm of the state vis-à-vis paradiplomacy and regional governments was further elaborated upon by Bartmann ( Reference Bartmann 2006 , 544). According to Bartmann, the state, as the legitimate participant of the international system, decides whether its constituent regional governments may act abroad and to what extent. Typically, this conditions paradiplomacy to act only at the level of “low politics,” as these international interactions primarily focus on service provision and do not interfere in the exclusive purview of the state (see Tavares Reference Tavares 2016 , 6–7). Yet a growing literature has demonstrated the existence of instances where paradiplomacy impacts the “high politics” of diplomacy, security, and defense (Cornago Reference Cornago 1999 ; Morin and Poliquin Reference Morin and Poliquin 2016 ). For instance, Paquin presents ( Reference Paquin 2004 , 147–163) several ways in which paradiplomacy contributes to the security policy of states, listing regional bloc cohesion, participation in peace missions, and conflict management.

Paradiplomacy has been consistently present in the Russian Federation since 1991. During the 1990s, the decentralization of national politics and the relative power of regions over the federal center meant that regional governors had a large scope to act abroad autonomously. In turn, these regions were able to contribute to Russia’s globalization (Makarychev Reference Makarychev 2000 ). The tide turned in 2000 with the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s first term as president, and Russian regional politics began to gradually trend towards centralization and a diminution in the space for paradiplomacy. Some regions would remain especially active abroad, adapting to the changes in the distribution of power in center-region relations, yet the overall trend in federal politics has been towards a concentration of power in Moscow (Renaldi Reference Renaldi 2019 ; Stremoukhov Reference Stremoukhov 2021 ; Arteev and Kentros Klyszcz Reference Arteev and Klyszcz 2021 ).

Chechnya’s international relations have been described and scrutinized in the past from a variety of perspectives. To start, after the fall of Grozny in 2000, the non-official, rebel diplomacy has received attention from the literature (Akhmadov and Daniloff Reference Akhmadov and Daniloff 2013 ). As Chechnya was reincorporated into Russia following the capture of Grozny in 2000, the topic of Chechnya’s international relations became less pressing as a constitutive issue for regional security and Russia’s state integrity. Another strand of scholarship on Chechnya’s international relations focuses on the paradiplomacy of Grozny under Ramzan Kadyrov’s leadership (2007–to date). This official, “pro-Russian” paradiplomacy has been analyzed primarily through its special role in Russia’s overall international relations – namely as a bridge to the Middle East, with whom Chechnya has developed close relations (Hallbach Reference Halbach 2018 ; Pietrasiak and Słowikowski Reference Pietrasiak and Słowikowski 2018 ; Kosach Reference Kosach and Laruelle 2019 ). Then, some studies analyze the international dimension of the Chechen conflict, focusing on the relevant, overarching geopolitical factors (Avioutskii Reference Avioutskii 2005 ). Finally, Chechnya’s connections to other countries have been considered within studies of North Caucasus broader international relations, such as with China (Babayan Reference Babayan 2016 ).

This diverse scholarship approaches Chechnya’s international relations from several perspectives, involving various conceptual frameworks and sources of empirical evidence. Yet Grozny’s official paradiplomacy has been understudied in general, with change and continuity remaining unexplained. The presidencies of Akhmat Kadyrov and Alu Alkhanov are typically not contemplated at all or addressed only insofar as they connect to Ramzan Kadyrov’s own activities abroad. A gap is thus left in our understanding of the transformations of Chechnya’s official paradiplomacy and its post-2000 trajectory, which is the empirical contribution of this article.

In this article, I maintain the scope of “paradiplomacy” widely, incorporating the persistent, institutional elements of a region’s international activities ( pace Duran Reference Duran 2015 , 21). Functionally, many external relations initiatives of sub-state entities can amount to Track Two diplomacy, such as when the region helps to maintain channels of communication between the parent state and another government (Jones Reference Jones 2015 , 24). Much of Chechen paradiplomacy, especially during Ramzan Kadyrov’s tenure, revolved around such functions. Yet, this overlap with Track Two diplomacy leaves out the fact that paradiplomacy takes place at the “antechamber” of sovereignty (Bartmann Reference Bartmann 2006 ). Namely, essential to the concept of paradiplomacy is the affirmation of political subjectivity of an entity that has many of the core features of a state – in the Weberian sense, territory, population, and law. Consequently, whilst both paradiplomacy and Track Two diplomacy contemplate ad hoc and permanent initiatives, paradiplomacy is based on the capacities that the region’s governing institutions have. For instance, regions frequently have an executive-level institution with legal competencies for carrying out their external engagements. In the Chechen case, the creation of the (pro-Russian) Chechen Republic in 2000 involved not only Russia gaining control of the region’s territory but also building governing institutions that would facilitate the governance of the region as a Russian federal subject. This has been a critical challenge for Moscow, one approached through the creation of governing institutions for Chechnya that differed from those of other federal subjects (Avioutskii Reference Avioutskii 2005 , 134; Mac-Glandières Reference Mac-Glandières 2017 , 206). That some of these institutions have competencies for external engagements is significant and places my analytical focus on both Chechen paradiplomatic initiatives and the Chechen institutions involved.

This conceptual arrangement could be applied to any case where the creation of paradiplomacy institutions happened in a top-down process involving territorial conquest or reunification. To deploy this concept on Chechen paradiplomacy, I start from the fact that Chechnya’s institutions were created in the context of the re-incorporation of Chechnya into the Russian state. In particular, Cornago’s Foucaldian explanation for the normalization of paradiplomacy sheds light on the transformations of Chechen paradiplomacy. According to Cornago, top-down processes of globalization and regionalization – as well as bottom-up processes of center-region negotiation and local government mobilization – have led to paradiplomacy becoming prevalent throughout the planet (Cornago Reference Cornago 2010 ). Chechnya’s case is revealing of the underlying power dynamics involved in the process of normalization of paradiplomacy – namely, as a process meant to facilitate governance.

Chechnya’s case is revealing as it is a case where political institutions were imposed by force on a region, including the institutions for paradiplomacy (Cornago Reference Cornago 2010 , 30). The authority for Grozny to carry out its own external affairs was given from the Russian state as part of Moscow’s conflict management strategy in Chechnya. The close connection between Grozny’s international activities, Russia’s reassertion of sovereignty over Chechen territory, and the synergy between Grozny and Moscow on international affairs suggest that Chechen paradiplomacy is inherently connected to the emerging power structures in post-Communist Russia. This widened scope of Chechen official authority would persist beyond the immediate years after 2000 (see Mac-Glandières Reference Mac-Glandières 2017 , 209).

Regarding paradiplomacy specifically, its inclusion in the government structures imposed by Russia in Chechnya is revealing of the micro-dynamics of the normalization of paradiplomacy. Especially relevant to Cornago’s framework of normalization is Moscow’s encouragement and involvement of the pro-Russian Chechen leadership in international relations. Then, the international agenda of Chechnya was, from the start in 2000, connected to central elements of Russia’s sovereign power and national security. As the description below points to, Chechen paradiplomacy was meant to tackle perceived threats to the Russian state – from within (radicalization caused by lack of investment) and from without (government-in-exile and the perceived threat of foreign intervention). Later on, as Chechen paradiplomacy expanded into high-level diplomacy with Middle Eastern governments, the focus went from direct threats to Russia to capacity building, with the notable development of a Chechen expeditionary force. Yet, this military paradiplomacy has been regarded by Moscow as an integral part of its strategic reassertion over the Middle East. This perception has kept Grozny’s international agenda in close connection to Moscow’s power politics. In sum, it is possible to make the hypothesis that, from 2000 on, Moscow set out broad parameters for Grozny’s self-led diplomatic action, with said parameters designed to enhance the governance of Chechnya.

To ground this argument empirically, in the following, I describe the emergence of Chechen paradiplomacy and its evolution from 2000 on. I proceed by reconstructing the paradiplomacy of Akhmat Kadyrov and Alu Alkhanov in detail, to then offer a broader portrait of Ramzan Kadyrov’s expansive external activities. This way, the article tackles its conceptual aim of arguing for the relevance of institutions for paradiplomacy and its empirical aim of offering an account of change and continuity in Chechen paradiplomacy. To maintain a focused analysis, I center my attention on analyzing official visits abroad, leaving other forms of external engagement to a secondary place. As the analysis shows further below, the emergence and evolution of Chechen paradiplomacy have been closely connected to the evolution of Moscow’s statecraft in the Vladimir Putin era.

Emergence and Early Trends: The Akhmat Kadyrov Period 2000–2004

The emergence of the official, pro-Russian Chechen paradiplomacy is embedded in the security juncture that surrounded the aftermath of the second Chechen war. In 1999, responding to a Chechen incursion into neighboring Dagestan, Moscow launched a military campaign known as the second Chechen war that ended with the effective control of Chechnya by the year 2000 (Seely Reference Seely 2005 ; Galeotti Reference Galeotti 2014 ). Upon recapturing Chechnya, the Russian government faced several challenges: the remaining insurgent forces, the Chechen “government in exile” that claimed to be the legitimate government of Chechnya (Akhmadov and Daniloff Reference Akhmadov and Daniloff 2013 ), and international condemnation from the war (Russell Reference Russell 2007 , 162). To a great extent, these challenges were tackled within Chechnya. First, part of the secessionist leadership was co-opted; notably, Akhmat-Haji Kadyrov became the head of the pro-Russia Chechen administration in 2000. Akhmat Kadyrov was a significant figure among Chechnya’s rebel leadership. In 1995, he was appointed by the Chechen rebel leadership Chief Mufti of Grozny and developed a large following within Chechnya. Russia’s move to co-opt Akhmat Kadyrov is an instance of what Malejacq calls outsourcing security to a local warlord by Moscow ( Reference Malejacq 2020 , 22). The Kremlin presented Akhmat Kadyrov as a “reformed separatist,” a message that bolstered the claim that the war in Chechnya was not a war on Chechens but on terrorism (Souleimanov Reference Souleimanov 2015 , 102–104). Second, the enduring insurgency was countered by a heavy-handed security apparatus that drew its strength from effective incorporation of indigenous forces from co-opted Chechen political factions. These, the literature argues, are among the essential pillars for the endurance of the Kadyrov regime and the relative stability of Chechnya itself (Taylor Reference Taylor 2007 ; Souleimanov and Aliyev Reference Souleimanov and Aliyev 2016 ).

The international dimension was just as complex, necessitating proactive diplomacy to remedy the fallout from the war. Crucially, the Kremlin saw the presence of Arab fighters and international channels of funds and arms for the rebels as a threat (Polyakov Reference Polyakov 2001 , 62–94; Avioutskii Reference Avioutskii 2005 , 252; 261). Even worse, the Kremlin saw Russia’s diminished reputation in the Muslim world as connected to emerging terrorist threats as many international terrorist organizations claimed the Chechen cause (Esposito Reference Esposito 2003 , 22). The threat was becoming tangible already next to Chechnya, as the risk that Dagestan would follow its neighbor and become another trouble spot was present at the time (Ware and Kisriev Reference Ware and Kisriev 1998 ). Russian diplomacy was deployed extensively to meet these challenges. First, the Kremlin rhetorically aligned with Washington on the “war on terror” by painting the Chechen rebels as part of the same international “jihadi” terrorist network to which Al Qaeda and the Taliban belong. This move was meant to place Russia’s use of force within the accepted international norms on the use of force, and it had enough success to gain the implicit acquiescence of the West regarding its war on Chechnya (Russell Reference Russell 2007 ; Kentros Klyszcz Reference Kentros Klyszcz 2019 ). This diplomatic move, whilst relatively successful, did not address the lack of legitimacy of the imposed authorities in Grozny in international eyes, especially among the Chechen diaspora and in the Middle East.

Akhmat Kadyrov’s role in Moscow’s diplomacy would become clear soon after the Russian capture of Grozny and his appointment as acting head of the administration of Chechnya in June 2000. Between Akhmat Kadyrov’s appointment and his assassination in May 2004, Akhmat Kadyrov went on official visits abroad a number of times, among others to Egypt, Germany, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Switzerland, and the United States. In these visits, he met with government officials, international organizations, NGOs, religious authorities, and representatives of diaspora organizations. In the following, I recount these visits in light of their significance to Moscow’s security and diplomacy as described above. Akhmat Kadyrov’s visits abroad generally pursued two objectives: (1) advocating for the legitimacy of his administration against the claims of the rebel government-in-exile and (2) attracting funding for Chechnya’s post-war reconstruction. Regarding the former, we can find that purpose in all his visits abroad: in September 2001, Kadyrov visited Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria to advocate against the Chechen rebel government-in-exile. In particular, he asked the governments of these countries to close down the existing channels of material support for the Chechen rebels present in their countries. In the process, he aimed at building good relations with some of the Middle East states that were previously critical of Moscow’s Chechnya military campaign (Kommersant 2001 ). Kadyrov would go on to advocate for his government and against the rebel claims to legitimacy in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in November 2001 (Izvestia 2001 ), in Berlin in February 2002, at the United Nations in September 2003 (Kommersant 2003 ), at the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva in October 2003 (UNHR 2003 ), at the 10th meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Malaysia in October 2003, and in Saudi Arabia in January 2004. The OIC meeting stands out as an example of the coordination between Kadyrov and the Kremlin; it was in that meeting that Putin announced Russia’s intention to join the OIC. The move in general, and the inclusion of Kadyrov in Putin’s delegation in particular, was meant to dissuade the accusations of Islamophobia in Russia and as a driver of the second Chechen campaign (Kosach Reference Kosach and Laruelle 2019 , 5–7). The visit to the US in 2003 was also planned with a degree of cooperation with the Kremlin (RIA 2003a ). Some of these visits had a public diplomacy component, as Kadyrov met with NGOs in Berlin in his 2002 visit (DW 2002 ) and visited the Ground Zero site in New York accompanied by Russian and US journalists ( Nezavisimaya Gazeta 2003 ); further, part of the 2004 Saudi Arabia visit involved film screenings to convince the Saudi leadership and public of the illegitimacy of the Chechen rebel forces (Kommersant 2004 ). The topics of humanitarian aid and reconstruction were part of the discussions and agendas pursued by Kadyrov in most of these visits as well. Even though Russia was experiencing rapid economic growth in the 2000s, its ability and willingness to fully finance Chechnya’s reconstruction was limited. Thus, states, NGOs, diaspora communities, and international organizations were all courted by the Kremlin and Kadyrov for aid and reconstruction funds. For instance, part of the purpose of his September 2001 Middle East tour was to gain support among the Chechen diaspora abroad and to mobilize diaspora and governments to send humanitarian help to Chechnya. Illustrative of the challenges Grozny found in these outreach efforts at the time was that Kadyrov failed to meet with the Jordanian Chechen diaspora on that tour (Kommersant 2001 ). A subsequent tour to the Middle East in 2003 would again aim at improving the image of the North Caucasus in a number of countries of the region. In Jordan, the objective was, in Kadyrov’s words, “showing the Jordanians the truth about the situation in Chechnya” (RIA 2003b ), as it was in Libya. In that country, Kadyrov even met with President Muammar Gaddafi (Kommersant 2003a ). The 2001 visit to Strasbourg and the 2003 visit to the UN also included the topic of humanitarian aid, as Kadyrov advocated for international partners to commit to more aid for Chechnya’s reconstruction (Izvestia 2001 ).

Throughout many of these visits, especially those concerning Muslim-majority states and the OIC, the external engagement discourse adopted by Kadyrov acquired a religious dimension. As mentioned above, the Kremlin saw the discourse of “Russia’s war on Islam” as potentially threatening, so the religious credentials of Kadyrov were at the forefront of his paradiplomacy. The January 2004 visit to Saudi Arabia – Kadyrov’s first trip abroad after his election as president of Chechnya – is illustrative of how Chechen paradiplomacy at the time combined religious discourse, the pursuit of legitimacy, and the attraction of reconstruction funds. In Kadyrov’s words, the purpose of that visit was to tell the “Muslim” public “where is politics and where is banditism” (Kommersant 2004 ). In a press conference, Kadyrov emphasized that his journey to Saudi Arabia demonstrated that the claims by the maskhadovtsy Footnote 1 about Kadyrov’s supposed lack of faith were false (Kommersant 2004a ); to emphasize his devotion, Kadyrov carried out the “small hajj” pilgrimage during his visit. The visit also addressed investment as Kadyrov met with the Saudi business community and the president of the Islamic Development Bank (Kommersant 2004b ). This visit stands out as Kadyrov was then the head of the delegation – rather than merely a member as he was in the 2003 US visit. Due to a still adverse security situation, Saudi investments would not be forthcoming in the short term.

Finally, the government of Akhmat Kadyrov also saw the institutionalization of Chechen paradiplomacy. In the spring of 2000, a press and communications committee was created in the provisional (pro-Russian) government, to be upgraded into a ministry in August of that year. It was reorganized in 2001, and in 2003 it was merged with the Ministry of the Chechen Republic for Ethnic Affairs, Regional Policy and Foreign Relations. Footnote 2 The Ministry acknowledges that the context of its creation was the war and counter-insurgency campaign, namely, with the mission to advocate for the legitimacy of the (pro-Russian) Chechen government (Ministerstvo n.d .).

Chechen Paradiplomacy under Alu Alkhanov 2004–2007

Between the assassination of Akhmat Kadyrov by the Chechen Islamist rebels in May 2004 and the rise of his son Ramzan Kadyrov as Head of Chechnya in February 2007, Chechnya was governed by acting president Alu Alkhanov, Chechnya’s minister of interior. Like Akhmat Kadyrov, Alkhanov’s rise to the presidency was possible thanks to Kremlin support, both in the aftermath of Kadyrov’s assassination and in the rigged August 2004 election. Alkhanov’s presidency was marred by the still intense conflict with the Chechen rebels and the slow pace of reconstruction. Then, the September 2004 Beslan school siege brought renewed federal attention to the North Caucasus and increased the Kremlin’s drive to centralize power in the federation. Internal power competition also undermined Alkhanov’s position from the very start. Alkhanov’s deputy prime minister and Kadyrov’s son, Ramzan, would compete with him for the control of Chechnya’s government. In fact, some describe Alkhanov’s presidency as powerless, given the extent to which Chechnya’s institutions were de facto under Kadyrov’s control, especially the Chechen security forces (Vatchagaev Reference Vatchagaev 2006 ). In February 2007, Alkhanov stepped down in a move widely attributed to Kadyrov’s successful maneuvering in intra-Chechen politics and in his relationship with the Kremlin. Particularly important was Putin’s personal rapport with Kadyrov father and later with Kadyrov son. Chechnya’s paradiplomacy under Alkhanov showed the endurance of his predecessor’s agenda but also new innovations in Chechen paradiplomacy.

The changing fortunes of the Chechen insurgency and changes in the international environment would also impact Chechen paradiplomacy during Alkhanov’s tenure. In spite of the persistent low-intensity fight and the Beslan attack, the Chechen insurgency entered a period of decline during Alkhanov’s tenure. In 2004, the conflict “stagnated” with the parties locked into a confrontational logic (Baev Reference Baev 2004 ). By 2007, the insurgency reconstituted around Doku Umarov’s “Caucasus Emirate” organization, abolishing the separatist project of the past decade and a half. Then, the assassination of rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov in March 2005 and his commander Shamil Basayev in October 2005 marked the beginning of the end for the low-intensity war of the second Chechen war (Galeotti Reference Galeotti 2014 , 79). From then on, the consolidation of pro-Russian rule in Chechnya was seen as inevitable, which was the message that Alkhanov’s paradiplomacy was meant to convey abroad (Jamestown 2004 ). Nevertheless, instability in Chechnya would endure throughout the rest of the 2000 decade, hindering large-scale Russian private investment and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Yet the international dimension of the Chechen conflict would continue to improve in the eyes of the Kremlin. Crucially, foreign state support for the Chechen insurgency was becoming a less acute threat in Russia’s eyes. As the OIC granted Russia observer status in 2005 and Western states remained inconsequential in their criticisms about human rights violations in Chechnya, the need for proactive diplomacy diminished. The only exception was the break with Washington that happened in 2004 when the US adopted a perspective on Chechnya that distinguished radical and moderate Chechen rebels. This perspective, coupled with the 2003 Iraq invasion, renewed Moscow’s sense of insecurity in the Caucasus. This time, however, the perceived threat was no longer about secessionism but about US influence in the post-Soviet space (Williams Reference Williams 2004 , 206–207).

These changing domestic and international circumstances had an impact in the scope and character of Chechen paradiplomacy. Similar to his predecessor, Alkhanov’s paradiplomacy was harmonious with Moscow’s foreign policy, with many visits abroad being planned in coordination with and with support from Moscow. Also, like Akhmat Kadyrov, Alkhanov’s few visits abroad focused on funding Chechnya’s reconstruction, consolidating relations with certain Middle Eastern states, and advocating for the legitimacy of his government in front of international audiences. The only trend under Akhmat Kadyrov that Alkhanov paused was the official, public contact with Gaddafi. Then, some ongoing trends would change; for example, Western engagements were becoming less relevant compared with the Middle East. Three tours abroad are particularly revealing of these trends: Alkhanov’s Middle East tour in 2004, his visit to PACE in 2004, and his visit to China in 2006. Shortly after the assassination of Akhmat Kadyrov, a follow-up Middle East tour in Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia by Alkhanov in September 2004 reaffirmed Chechnya’s Middle East paradiplomacy. The main message, as before, was aimed against the rebels’ claims to legitimacy. The tour also aimed at improving the still negative image of the Chechen government in front of the diaspora. Regarding the Jordanian Chechen diaspora, there is no evidence that Alkhanov was substantially more successful than his predecessor in establishing himself as legitimate in their eyes (Jamestown 2004 ). In October 2004, Alkhanov visited PACE as a member of the Russian delegation. His message there centered on the renewal of the Chechen economy, reconstruction and the return of refugees. This message was meant to convey to the members of the Assembly the determination of Chechen and federal authorities to improve Chechens’ lives. Also, he dismissed the possibility of dialogue with the remaining rebels as advocated by some members of the Assembly; as mentioned above, Grozny and Moscow pushed the line that the remaining insurgents numbered in the hundreds. In spite of these attempts at improving the image of Chechnya’s official authorities, PACE voted in favor of condemning Russia’s human rights violations in Chechnya ( Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2004 ). Finally, in October 2006, Alkhanov headed a delegation to Zhejiang province, China, primarily with an economic agenda. During his stay, he extolled the growing stability of the republic, promoted business contacts, invited investment, and signed a bilateral cooperation agreement with the governor of Zhejiang ( Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2006 ). The China Development Bank would finance some of the promised investments into Chechnya, making China the first foreign country to invest in Chechnya’s economy (Moscow Times 2006 ). From that moment on, China would rise in prominence in Chechnya’s trade and investment (Babayan Reference Babayan 2016 , 6). Finally, the institutionalization of paradiplomacy in Chechnya would plateau under Alkhanov’s brief tenure. During his administration, the Ministry of the Chechen Republic for National Policy, Information and External Relations was reorganized once in 2005. The Ministry placed a greater emphasis on internal matters, with the external connections of Chechnya featuring less prominently in its mission (Stolitsa Plyus 2005 ; Stolitsa Plyus 2005a ). Yet, it would be under Alkhanov that the new concept of nationalities’ policy – which contemplates external relations – would be created, to be approved by his successor later on (see below).

An important trend outside of Alkhanov’s paradiplomacy was the diversification of means for Chechen external relations. Two in particular stand out in hindsight: the militarization of Chechen external relations and the rise in prominence of the Kadyrov Foundation as an arm of Chechen external relations policy. Regarding the former, during Alkhanov’s period, Chechen forces would become officially involved in Middle Eastern affairs. In October 2006, Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov mentioned that Chechen forces would join the Russian peacekeeping mission to Lebanon to protect a military engineer battalion operating there (Lenta 2006 ). The Chechen forces were considered by Moscow to be particularly suitable for deployment in the Middle East, given their experience and Muslim background. In addition, the improving security situation in Chechnya encouraged the Russian military to divert some resources from the Caucasus to other missions ( Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2006a ). As the security forces were under Ramzan Kadyrov’s control, it is possible that this decision involved him to at least some extent and that it was meant as a show of loyalty to Moscow (McGregor Reference McGregor 2006 ). The creation of the Akhmat Kadyrov Foundation in June 2004 would also have repercussions for Chechnya’s international relations, especially during Ramzan Kadyrov’s presidency. A lavishly funded and opaque NGO, the Kadyrov Foundation would promote Chechnya abroad through charitable actions, frequently through actions with religious symbolism. Oil wealth and a parallel tax system are credited as the sources of funding for this organization (RFERL 2015 ; Halbach Reference Halbach 2018 ).

Alkhanov, as weakened as his position was because of Ramzan Kadyrov’s de facto power and growing influence in Chechnya, was still the legitimate international face of Chechnya’s government. Consequently, he represented Chechnya abroad in his few official visits outside of Russia, albeit with an agenda broadly set by his predecessor. Further, this agenda remained harmonious with Moscow’s own foreign policy. In this sense, Alkhanov frequently connected Chechnya’s paradiplomacy to Russia’s foreign policy: “We would like to find common ground on many issues, especially in the field of business, economy, education, culture, religion, and this, in our opinion, could be facilitated by the simplification of the visa regime between Jordan and Russia,” Alkhanov said of his visit to Jordan (Belgorodskaia pravda 2004 ). As the economic fortune of Russia improved and Chechen reconstruction slowly went underway, the emphasis of Chechnya’s paradiplomacy shifted from aid to investment attraction, with early investments into Chechnya coming from China. In spite of his influence in the republic, Ramzan Kadyrov made no similar international visits as deputy prime minister. Yet, by October 2006, it was clear that he would succeed Alkhanov and become president of Chechnya ( Courrier International 2006 ).

Chechen Paradiplomacy under Ramzan Kadyrov 2007–2020: From the “War on Terror” to Confrontation with the West

Under Kadyrov, Chechnya’s international relations have grown in scope and importance, facilitated by a good disposition of the federal center and the further incorporation of Chechen paradiplomacy in the country’s foreign policy. In spite of the centralizing trends in the Russian Federation, Grozny was able to enhance its autonomy partly thanks to the Russian army withdrawal in 2009 (Souleimanov Reference Souleimanov 2015 , 102–104) and the fact that Putin considered Kadyrov to be an essential asset, both in the North Caucasus and abroad. The esteem of the Kremlin persisted even during Medvedev’s presidency (Black Reference Black 2015 , 53; Falkowski Reference Falkowski 2015 , 26–33). Kadyrov depends on Putin too, namely for federal transfers and regime security (Souleimanov and Jasutis Reference Souleimanov and Jasutis 2016 ). Then, since 2007, Russia’s confrontational stance towards the West made Grozny’s contacts with China and the Middle East more valuable, inducing Moscow to support their development. Simultaneously, the 2008 war with Georgia, the 2014 Sochi Olympics, the conflict in Ukraine, and the 2015 Syria campaign all made Russia’s southern flank even more sensitive for Moscow, bringing more attention to Chechnya’s regional role. Finally, from (at least) 2014 on, Moscow would increase the militarization of its foreign policy, in turn relying more on private military companies for plausible deniability in its power projection. Kadyrov – insisting on his loyalty to Moscow and his ability to quell the Chechen insurgency – also militarized Chechnya’s external relations, with Moscow’s support. In the following, I offer an overview based around the main features of Chechnya’s paradiplomacy under Ramzan Kadyrov, focusing on change and continuity from his predecessors’ times.

By 2007, paradiplomacy in the Russian Federation had changed extensively from the 1990s. Notably, the space for governors to act in disharmonious ways with the federal center had narrowed significantly (Renaldi Reference Renaldi 2019 ). From then on, paradiplomacy in Russia would diminish in intensity overall and progressively be driven by federal policy to focus on economic matters, trade, and investment attraction (Stremoukhov Reference Stremoukhov 2021 ). And yet, the importance of external engagements was clear from the start of the Ramzan Kadyrov presidency. The pace of his international activities was intense, meeting investors and making his first official visit abroad in the weeks following his investiture (RIA 2007 ; Vesti Respubliki 2007b ). Then, the institutionalization of external relations was clear from early on. The first decree issued by Ramzan Kadyrov as President on April 9, 2007, was “On the Concept of the State National Policy of the Chechen Republic,” Footnote 3 which tasked the Ministry of the Chechen Republic for National Policy, Press and Information with a new policy on nationalities, including on international connections. Regarding external engagements, the ministry was tasked with handling the external relations of the Chechen Republic on matters of trade, science, culture, sports, and partnerships with governments, investors, and the diaspora ( Vesti Respubliki 2007 ).

The geographic scope of official Chechen paradiplomacy has remained consistent in the Ramzan Kadyrov era, carrying its broad contours from his predecessors. Like Alkhanov, Kadyrov focused his official international activities on the Middle East, with Europe being mostly relegated to the target of covert operations. Russia’s own confrontational stance towards the West would set the stage for Kadyrov’s position towards Europe, yet this was not the case at the very start of his presidency. As evidence of a modicum of good will, the European Union allocated 20 million euros for the North Caucasus region, primarily targeting Chechnya and Ingushetia, under the circumstances of consolidating stability in Chechnya in 2007 (Black Reference Black 2015 , 50). Nevertheless, Kadyrov’s brutal rule would quickly erode Western interest in investment in Chechnya. In 2014, Kadyrov was sanctioned by the EU over his support of the Russian annexation of Crimea (Reuters 2014 ). Relations would sink further in 2017 following reports of widespread persecution against LGBT+ minorities in Chechnya that prompted international outcry as well as condemnation from the UN ( Novaya Gazeta 2017 ). In fact, Kadyrov would become the target of further sanctions from the US to a great extent as a response to his LGBT+ persecution campaign (NBC 2017 ). Since then, Kadyrov has disparaged the West, calling it a threat against Russia (RT 2017 ). France has also stood out as a target, particularly in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks (RT 2015a ). The lull in diplomatic engagements has not prevented some official Chechen external activities from continuing in Europe. Evidence of this is the announcement of a diaspora outreach agency that contemplates Europe in its scope. This has been referred to as an instrument to launder the reputation of Kadyrov’s covert operations in Europe (Jamestown 2020 ). While relations with Europe declined, relations with China improved, primarily in trade and investment, continuing the trend initiated under Alkhanov. Until 2010, China played a small role in Chechnya’s commerce, to then become one of the most important countries for Chechnya’s trade. Then, the Alkhanov-era economic partnership with Zhejiang province was renewed and enhanced further in 2013 (Babayan Reference Babayan 2016 , 5–6). Finally, in 2017, Chechnya opened its strategic oil extraction sector to foreign investment, specifically from China (Regnum 2017 ).

The importance of the Middle East for Chechnya’s external engagement under Kadyrov has been unparalleled, with engagements growing in intensity at a brisk pace from 2007 on. Illustrative of this turn to the Middle East was the “Eastern Alternative” project. Days after Kadyrov became president, the Chechen government began to plan to systematically court investment from the Middle East as an alternative to Western investors ( Vesti Respubliki 2007a ). Thus, unlike Alkhanov, Ramzan Kadyrov has sustained a highly engaged partnership with the Middle East throughout his tenure. Shortly after becoming president in August 2007, Kadyrov visited Saudi Arabia and met with King Abdullah (RIA 2007 ); since then, Kadyrov would have a high-level visit or tour to the Middle East at least once every year, if not more (Luzin Reference Luzin 2018 ). There has also been a greater degree of institutionalization, with Kadyrov creating a special representative to the Middle East soon after taking office. He would also have special envoys active in sensitive parts of the region, as was done in Libya (Kommersant 2019 ; Hauer Reference Hauer 2020 ). These engagements follow the trends set by Akhmat Kadyrov, such as meeting with the same heads of state in the Gulf monarchies and reviving public connections with Muammar Gaddafi (Lenta 2008 ; Grozny Inform 2010 ). These diplomatic relations have assisted Moscow in keeping open communication channels with the heads of state of the region (Luzin Reference Luzin 2018 ). At the same time, Kadyrov benefits from these high-level encounters to raise his personal profile inside and outside Russia. Namely, his legitimacy is confirmed from outside and his influence grows among Russia’s and Central Asia’s Muslims, especially among the Vainakh diaspora (Laruelle Reference Laruelle 2017 ; Markedonov Reference Markedonov 2017 ). In addition, these contacts reportedly help Chechnya gain foreign investment and establish business connections (BBC 2018 ; Luzin Reference Luzin 2018 ). While all Gulf monarchies have expressed interest and invested in Chechnya, the United Arab Emirate (UAE) stands out as an engaged investor. Namely, the UAE sees investment in Chechnya as a way to build rapport with Chechnya, given the latter’s involvement in those conflicts seen as strategic by the UAE (Karasik Reference Karasik 2017 ; National 2018 ). The attraction of foreign investment has also required Moscow’s initiative; by the mid-2010s Moscow was actively pursuing its Middle Eastern partners to invest in the North Caucasus (Blank Reference Blank 2016 ). These diplomatic maneuvers have been successful – although not without setbacks, such as the brief 2016 rift in diplomatic relations with Riyadh over Kadyrov’s condemnation of Wahhabism (Jamestown 2016 ).

Kadyrov’s Middle East paradiplomacy, like his father’s, relies to an extent on a discourse of religious kinship. Kadyrov has promoted a national discourse that portrays Chechnya as “naturally” Islamic and himself as a pious believer (Avedissian Reference Avedissian 2016 ). Externally, this policy has been operationalized in several ways. Chechnya’s place in world Islam has been articulated by hosting major international conferences of Islamic scholars, sponsoring the building of mosques abroad, engaging religious authorities in foreign states, and cultivating the image of a defender of Islam against the West and against the Islamic State organization (ISIS). The religious discourse may also be shaping Grozny’s choices in developing partnerships abroad; the relationship with the Palestinian Authority stands out as it substantiates and operationalizes Chechnya’s religious paradiplomacy discourse. Indeed, trade and diaspora connections are not substantive with the Palestinian territories, yet relations between Mahmoud Abbas and Kadyrov have been close since 2008. Emblematic of their rapport was Kadyrov being awarded the Star of Jerusalem Order to the service of Palestine in 2019 (Caucasian Knot 2008 ; RIA 2019 ). Kadyrov often embraces the cause of Palestine in public declarations, most recently speaking against the 2020 US Middle East peace plan for the region (Laruelle Reference Laruelle 2017 , 23; Gazeta 2020 ). Finally, religious discourse sometimes directly facilitates other external action goals. For instance, in 2008, the Mufti of Chechnya assisted a major Islamic conference in Libya, where he conveyed the official narrative of the state of Chechnya at the time against the competing rebel narratives (Grozny Inform 2008 ). Then, the Kadyrov Foundation contributes to Chechnya’s image abroad frequently with initiatives that feature a religious tone, such as building and restoring mosques abroad. The foundation has also sent aid to Myanmar and Somalia (RFERL 2016 ; Hauer Reference Hauer 2018 ; RT 2018 ).

Beyond the discourse on Islam, it is the convergence in security interests between Chechnya, Russia, and certain Middle Eastern countries – the Gulf monarchies above all – that has driven Grozny’s diplomacy in that region. Chief among these interests is the fight against international terrorist networks, starting with those connected to the Caucasus Emirate and, later, those to ISIS. Grozny’s interest in developing capabilities and partnerships for military paradiplomacy has been partly driven by the enduring threat of Russian-speaking fighters operating outside of or returning to the North Caucasus. To meet this challenge, Chechnya’s external action would gradually militarize, gaining diplomatic clout by participating in expeditionary campaigns in Lebanon – during Alkhanov’s period – and in Syria. In terms of cooperation, arms sales and international training are the main features of this military paradiplomacy (Hauer Reference Hauer 2019 ). Thanks to lavish federal transfers and the oil wealth of Chechnya, Kadyrov has been able to fund a Chechen military force and a “spetsnaz academy” for Chechen and international teams. This academy would become capable of training foreign specialists from 2019 on, although those ambitions were announced as early as 2016 (RT 2016 ; Hauer Reference Hauer 2018a ). Due to the covert nature of many elements of Chechen external action, it is hard to establish a clear timeline of the militarization of Chechnya’s paradiplomacy under Kadyrov beyond the Syrian war. The watershed moment was in 2014 when Chechen troops reportedly joined Russian operations in Ukraine, namely to fight the pro-Ukrainian Chechen battalions (Luzin Reference Luzin 2018 ; Galeotti Reference Galeotti 2019 , 55). While Chechen involvement became evident later on, much remains to be known about the scope and timing of the Chechen operation in Syria. In 2014, Kadyrov announced the creation of a Chechen special security unit meant to fight terrorism both in the North Caucasus and beyond. The potential threat of fighters coming to Russia was given as the rationale for the creation of this unit (MEMO 2014 ). In October 2015, shortly after Russia’s air campaign in Syria began, Kadyrov asked Putin to deploy Chechen fighters in Syria to fight ISIS (RT 2015 ). In October 2015, Kadyrov said that no Chechen forces were operating in Syria and that he would be ready to send special forces were Putin to request it (Reuters 2016 ). By 2016, it became known that Chechen forces were officially on the ground in Syria. The number of Chechen forces deployed officially as “military police” was reportedly no more than 500, with an additional 300–400 Ingush forces present (Hauer Reference Hauer 2017 ).

Chechnya’s expansive external relations have been primarily harmonious with the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Kadyrov’s cultivated public image has always been that of Putin’s loyal “soldier,” yet occasionally disagreements arise. The one incident that stands out is the 2017 spat over the Myanmar Rohingya crisis. During a large rally that took place on September 4, 2017, Kadyrov openly criticized the Kremlin for inaction over the Rohingya plight (France24 2017 ). For Kadyrov, the move was meant to position him as a world figure in Islam ( Wall Street Journal 2017 ). Whilst it did not sour center-regions relations for good, the incident illustrated the wide scope of freedom afforded to Grozny in internal and external matters (Markedonov Reference Markedonov 2017 ).

The Chechen case problematizes the distinction between internal and external politics. It also highlights the importance of top-down influence on a region in shaping the emergence and evolution of its paradiplomacy. The creation of Chechnya’s paradiplomacy institutions reflects Russia’s imperatives in the Chechen conflict, especially since the de facto incorporation of the breakaway territory in 2000. The account presented above shows continuity and change in Chechnya’s international relations as they developed for two decades. Unlike the often unharmonious paradiplomacy that featured among many constituents of the Russian Federation in the 1990s, Grozny’s paradiplomacy since 2000 was mostly in harmony with the Kremlin. Chechen paradiplomacy also featured a rich discursive and thematic scope. Further, unlike the broader trends in the federation post-2006, Chechen paradiplomacy remained intensive and maintained a broad scope of action. Adverse security and diplomatic junctures prompted Moscow to give Grozny extensive external autonomy unlike any other Russian region, in spite of the risk of disharmony in external matters. While frequently proceeding with Moscow’s encouragement and direction, Chechnya’s external relations have operated in a self-led manner, tightly directed by the head of the republic.

Chechnya’s case is revealing because of its extreme conditions (e.g., war, extensive autonomy in a federal framework), yet it is also indicative of a more general implicit condition underlying the normalization of paradiplomacy. Namely, Chechnya shows how sovereign state interests and sub-state diplomatic action meet. Central to this argument is the fact that Chechnya, like other sub-state entities, depends on some measure of state approval for carrying out its international activities. At the same time, however, the Russian state saw in the encouragement of Chechen paradiplomacy a legitimate instrument for its own strategic interests outside and inside the country. Instead of emerging from bottom-up pressures, Chechen paradiplomacy is an institution that was grafted onto the pro-Russian government by Moscow to pursue – however autonomously – an external agenda that facilitates Russia’s governance of Chechnya. Thus, paradiplomacy neatly aligns with the state’s goals regarding external interactions and internal governance.

Regarding the external dimension, Chechnya’s paradiplomacy contributes to Russia’s relations to the Middle East in numerous and essential ways. The circumstances of the emergence of this agenda (Moscow’s assertion of sovereignty over Chechnya and the building of a pro-Moscow arrangement in Chechen politics), the persistence of this agenda beyond those circumstances (the “defeat” of the insurgency and of the “NATO intervention”), and the importance of the agenda (ensuring Russian sovereignty, supporting its Middle East strategy) suggest that Chechen paradiplomacy has had a critical role in the Russian governance of Chechnya. In other words, Chechen paradiplomacy is a persistent institution that supports Moscow’s governance of Chechnya itself, both asserting its sovereignty over its territory, bolstering its claims to legitimacy, and even supporting its economic plans. To summarize the argument: Moscow pursued the creation of Chechnya’s self-led, highly-personalistic paradiplomacy, which in turn was meant to assist Moscow’s security imperatives in the context of the Chechen conflict.

The implications of this case study for the field of paradiplomacy is that it broadens the understanding of paradiplomacy, pointing to a central paradox in this phenomenon. The Chechen case suggests that paradiplomacy can be regarded by central governments as a mechanism for affirming their control of their constituent regions by, in fact, giving up a portion of the expected monopoly of external relations, even in the military sphere. In this light, the case of Chechnya further adds evidence of the blur between paradiplomacy and the exclusive functions of the state in diplomacy and security matters. This points to the relevance of institutions in cases of top-down creation of paradiplomacy, which is shown by describing the creation of Chechnya’s official external relations, their overlap with Russia’s foreign and security policy, and their institutionalization. The implications for the understanding of the case of Chechen paradiplomacy are more straightforward: first, Chechen paradiplomacy has remained mostly consistent in spite of changes of leadership; and second, Chechen paradiplomacy is neither a supplement to Russian foreign policy nor an outgrowth of the Kadyrov regime. Chechen paradiplomacy is an integral component of the post-war institutional arrangement that renders Chechnya governable by the Russian Federation.

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• Volume 51, Issue 6
• Ivan Ulises Klyszcz (a1)
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2022.8

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Live Coverage

Chechnya’s Grimmest Industry

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As awkwardly as a newborn foal struggling on spindly legs, Lena Meshcheryakova is learning how to curl her lips up at the corners to make a smile.

Drifting just beneath the surface of her 5-year-old world are the memories of a darker place: the cellar in Chechnya where she was held prisoner by kidnappers for nine months.

When she was freed at age 3, she had forgotten how to smile. She could barely even speak. But she knew how to pray like the devout Muslim Chechen men who had imprisoned her. The words she kept shouting out were “Allahu akbar!” (God is great!)

Lena, kidnapped from her Russian mother’s home in Grozny, the Chechen capital, was a victim of Chechnya’s most voracious industry, the trade in hostages and slaves. Thousands of people have been gobbled up by the Chechen kidnapping machine, which has ravaged Russia since 1994.

The stories of survivors are like the relics of some wild, half-forgotten era of warlords and lawless barbarism. Victims have been kept in earthen pits or small cells that are often scrawled with the initials of hundreds of earlier captives. They have been used as slaves to dig trenches or build large houses for relatives of the kidnappers.

The kidnappers have been known to mutilate their captives, even children, severing their ears or fingers. Gangs have sent videotaped recordings of mutilations and beheadings to relatives to terrify them into finding the ransom. Russian authorities have used the gruesome videos to feed anti-Chechen sentiment and boost public support for Moscow’s latest war in the separatist republic.

When the kidnapping industry reached its peak a few years ago, there was even a relatively open “slave market” in Grozny, near Minutka Square, where the names and details of human livestock circulated on lists for interested buyers. Gangs often traded hostages or stole them from one another.

In the years between Russia’s first war in Chechnya, from 1994 to 1996, and Moscow’s launch of a new war against Chechen rebels last fall, kidnapping was one of the biggest sources of enrichment for criminal gangs in an economy that had little else to offer but oil theft, arms trade, counterfeiting and drug smuggling.

The highly organized gangs hunted for victims among the wealthy clans from Chechnya and neighboring republics in southern Russia. Foreigners and Russian television journalists were in high demand.

There were even professional go-betweens who took a commission on ransom deals, visited victims in their cells and dictated the despairing letters that captives sent to relatives pleading for the ransom to be paid.

Nearly a thousand hostages are still being held or are dead, according to Russian Interior Ministry figures.

Most of the victims were kidnapped in Chechnya or nearby. But dozens of people were seized in Moscow and other cities and traveled under guard to Chechnya in trucks with hidden cells, buried under potatoes or furniture.

In at least one case, a hostage was doped and transported in a suitcase.

Piecing Together a Child’s Lost Months

In her new hometown of Prokhladny, near Nalchik in southern Russia, Lena Meshcheryakova is rediscovering a childhood world of smiling suns painted on kindergarten doors, posters with cotton ball sheep and lunchtime milk ladled from an enamel pail. Her mother, Tatyana, 44, is gradually putting together the jagged puzzle of what happened to Lena in the lost nine months of her captivity.

Back in her Grozny neighborhood, Tatyana Meshcheryakova, a kindergarten director, was resented as a Russian woman teaching the children of Chechens. She thinks that her family was a target for Chechen extremists because of it.

At 5:30 a.m. on Oct. 9, 1998, she awoke to the sounds of the neighborhood dogs barking. Then four armed men were in her room. They took away her child and a pair of inexpensive gold earrings.

The initial ransom, $15,000, might as well have been a million dollars for a woman who hadn’t been paid in four years. Nine months later, it had fallen to $1,000, and neighbors, colleagues and friends helped scrape together the money to buy her child’s life.

Before Meshcheryakova was reunited with Lena, doctors warned her to show no emotion and to get no closer than a handshake, in case of infection.

“But I decided to hug her, and when I did she was just skin and bone,” Meshcheryakova says. The child had lost all her hair. “She was a pitiful sight, all covered in scabies, her skin hanging loose. She had deep bedsores and could barely move. She weighed 9 kilograms [20 pounds] at 3 years of age.”

Lena couldn’t tell her mother the story. It finally emerged in painful scraps. She spoke of people named Ruslan and Shamil, who carried machine guns, and a bad-tempered woman called Larisa.

Lena’s ear was ripped, and she had a deep scar on her finger. “Larisa hit me with a knife for losing a slipper,” Lena explained to her mother.

She was terrified of people in camouflage and burst into tears whenever she saw a cellar. When her mother asked why she was always sitting with hands behind her back, Lena told her she was wearing handcuffs. She would greedily pounce on any crumbs that fell to the floor and lick the last tiny scrap from her plate.

Russian Soldiers See a Cause to Fight For

The kidnapping industry reached its crescendo in the lawless chaos after Russia was defeated in the first Chechen war. The kidnappings gave Russian soldiers a cause to fight for--which they lacked in the first war--and made it easy for them to hate all Chechens.

Despite the fact that Russia has captured most Chechen territory, there were still 73 kidnappings in southern Russia near Chechnya in the first half of this year.

According to the Interior Ministry’s organized-crime department, 1,807 people have been kidnapped since 1994. The figure excludes the thousands of Chechens abducted within the separatist republic and the many other people who didn’t go to the authorities for help.

“It’s not just a disorganized bunch of cutthroats. It’s a highly organized, well-oiled machine, and they’ve got contacts all over the North Caucasus,” says Mikhail Brenner, 45, a road construction engineer who was kidnapped in Ingushetia, a Russian republic neighboring Chechnya, in October 1998 along with four of his colleagues.

In the year of his captivity, dozens of people passed through his cell, with its filthy mattresses and bloodstained walls.

One of the five, Victor Zinchenko, 53, whose mother was a poverty-stricken widow, was beheaded in a green forest glade. The video of his death has been played countless times on Russian television, but the part never telecast shows his executioners kicking his severed head about like a football, says Brenner’s wife, Tatyana, who got the full version of the video in a parcel from the kidnappers.

Local Authorities Were Often Involved

After the withdrawal of the Russians from Chechnya in 1996, Moscow was impotent to stop the kidnappings or free the victims. The local Chechen government’s security service was no help, afraid of sparking clan vendettas.

In fact, the Chechen authorities were often involved in kidnappings. Aslanbek Kharikhanov, 31, of Mairtup village, left the Chechen police force in disgust because so many police cooperated with gangs or became kidnappers themselves. Chechnya’s customs service often kidnapped people while inspecting trains or buses.

Even ordinary Chechens played a role in the crimes.

Victims such as Brenner, who was guarded by old men with machine guns as he worked as a slave building houses, concluded that every Chechen supports the kidnapping industry. But ordinary Chechens are also terrified of the warlords and their armies.

Siryazhdin Idrisov, 37, a farmer from Mairtup, kept a man in his basement in the summer of 1997. The man, who looked about 45 and Russian, was brought to him by a warlord.

“What could I do? I couldn’t say no to a warlord,” Idrisov explains. “He said I would answer for the prisoner with my head or with the heads of my family members, and I knew he was serious. I suspect many other people in the village had the same problem, but we never shared it. We were just terrified, that is all.

“I was afraid the man would run away, so I kept the basement closed at all times. I fed him well; I gave him the same food my family had. I never spoke to him. But I felt sorry for him. He looked very sad and frightened at all times. I was quite relieved when the warlord came after 12 days and took him away.” The man’s fate is unknown.

Idrisov wouldn’t give the warlord’s name, saying, “I don’t want him to come and kill me.”

The heart of the industry was the town of Urus-Martan, about 15 miles southwest of Grozny, controlled by the notorious eight Akhmadov brothers, including Uvais Akhmadov, the town’s police chief.

Kirill Perchenko, 22, the son of a Moscow art dealer, was kidnapped in August 1999 from one of Moscow’s fashionable streets and trucked to Grozny. He was sold to Ramzan Akhmadov, one of the brothers, and saw hundreds of names, going back to 1992, scratched on the walls of the warlord’s cells.

The Akhmadovs had many rules for their prisoners. They had to keep their eyes down and weren’t allowed to meet a Chechen’s gaze. They worked at cobbling shoes, carrying water and other chores.

Several times, Perchenko was given 100 strokes with wooden sticks for using bad language. After the first month of frequent hard beatings, he says, he began to get used to the pain.

The beating that really sticks in his mind wasn’t the most painful one. A few Chechen boys, aged 5 or 6, were encouraged to hit him while a woman stood nearby, laughing.

He says that during his captivity he watched seven men being executed by his captors. One of his friends was bashed to death.

Once, a hostage, a Russian officer, attacked and wounded one of the guards with a knife. Punishment was immediate.

“They put him on the ground, and four hostages had to hold his arms and legs,” Perchenko remembers. “They took a two-handed saw and killed him. He was lying on his stomach screaming. They cut from the back. From the back you hit the spine first, and it’s very painful.”

“The next day they took us all out of our cell and cut off the head of an 82-year-old man they had taken in Grozny. They just took it off with a knife and said, ‘For Allah,’ before killing him. They put both [men’s] heads on poles. And they took out the heart of the old man and nailed it to a tree.”

Perchenko managed to escape after six months in captivity.

Only about 10% of hostages were freed by Russia’s organized-crime force, according to former Maj. Vyacheslav Izmailov, a crusading journalist from the Novaya Gazeta newspaper who has devoted himself to tracing and freeing hostages. Most were bought, a few escaped, and some were abandoned by gangs when Russia started bombing towns and villages after the second war began last fall.

With 950 unaccounted for in the Interior Ministry figures, it’s not clear how many died in Russia’s ferocious bombing campaign.

“Hostages say the most terrible thing they experienced was the Russian bombing,” says Izmailov, who believes the number of hostages is much higher than official figures suggest.

The least “lucrative” hostages are soldiers, says Mikhail Suntsov of the ministry’s organized-crime department.

Roman Tereshchenko, a 22-year-old soldier, was sold into slavery in Chechnya by another soldier, Vasily Pinigin, for a few hundred dollars in June 1998. Pinigin was convicted earlier this year and sentenced to eight years in prison. It was the only trial of its type, although there were several cases in which soldiers betrayed colleagues to kidnappers, either for money or to avoid being kidnapped themselves, Suntsov says.

The ransom for a soldier was usually $2,000 to $10,000, he says, and 10 times more for an officer.

Although kidnappings have been going on in Chechnya for centuries, the trade really took off in September 1996, when Russia ran out of captured Chechen rebels to exchange for Russian POWs.

The Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, passed an amnesty enabling convicted Chechens serving time for various crimes in Russian prisons to be swapped for captive Russian civilians and soldiers. A similar amnesty was passed late last year. Izmailov, who arranged many of the swaps, set a minimum of three Russians for every Chechen released.

The problem was that the rule implied that one Chechen life was worth three Russians. It was like pouring gasoline on the flames.

“Of course it helped create a market. But the people who split the atom did not know it would result in a nuclear bomb,” Izmailov says. “What other option did I have?”

Standing Blindfolded in a Self-Dug Grave

Telling their stories means reliving their captivity for men such as Maj. Vitaly Khapov, whose kidnappers clamped open his jaw and ground his teeth down with a metal file, or Brenner, who had to dig a grave and stand in it blindfolded while gunmen fired bullets past his ears.

Oscar Wilde wrote in his story “The Happy Prince” that there is no mystery so great as misery--but equally mysterious is the will to survive it.

All but one of Brenner’s teeth were knocked out in vicious beatings. The kidnappers’ aim was to break him.

“People like that can’t break your spirit,” Brenner says. “They could hardly even read or write properly. When a beast like that is beating you up, you try to watch in a detached way, thinking that this person being beaten up is much higher than the person beating him. He’s just a killing machine, beating you up.

“You feel hatred for them, of course, but all the time you have a feeling of derision. You try not to succumb to the pain.”

Brenner escaped last fall and walked for five days to neighboring Ingushetia, just in time to be asked to identify Zinchenko’s decomposing head, which had been found two weeks earlier under a bridge.

In November 1997, Vitaly Kozmenko, 73, was seized in Grozny by three men in camouflage and was held in several different cells and pits.

He spent two months in a grave-size pit under a house high in the southern Chechen mountains. His hands were painfully cuffed and his feet were chained, but he could walk a few paces.

The owner of the house was always masked. He was curt and cruel but brought a bucket for Kozmenko to relieve himself into and a few boards for him to sleep on. After three days in the pitch blackness, Kozmenko began having hallucinations and he explained the problem to his guard, who softened.

“I said, ‘What do I call you?’ He said, ‘Call me Sonny,’ and he called me Grandpa. I said, ‘Sonny, can you bring me a light?’ ”

With light he was able to write. Kozmenko still has a small scrap of worn cardboard, folded many times, that is covered in tiny illegible writing and hieroglyphics, his diary of two months in the pit.

Later, he was moved to a cellar in Mairtup village, where he was chained to a couch. Kozmenko’s limbs were so confined that he was almost sleepless, tormented by thoughts of being able to just rest one hand on his thigh. Somehow he persuaded his newest captor, Lechi, to unchain him for a night, despite the Chechen’s fear of reprisals if Kozmenko escaped.

After that, “I said: ‘Lechi, unchain me, open the door and leave the house. I’ll not run away.’ . . . He said, ‘To hell with them,’ and unchained me for good. And I started to learn to walk again.”

Lechi borrowed several books for his prisoner, facing embarrassment when a suspicious friend asked him why he had suddenly become so interested in reading.

“A man should not lose his spirit and should struggle to the end,” Kozmenko says. “I suffered a lot of excruciating pain, but I survived because I said to myself life is given to man just once. You should do all you can to stay alive.”

He was released after his wife, a lawyer, agreed to defend the case of a rich and powerful politician who was charged with inciting a coup in Dagestan, a republic neighboring Chechnya.

After 14 months in captivity, the first thing Kozmenko did when he got back to Moscow in January 1999 was to go to an ice hole in the frozen Moscow River and plunge in for an exhilarating dip.

‘Let There Always Be Blue Sky’

In Lena Meshcheryakova’s kindergarten, the words of a Russian nursery song decorate one wall: “Let there always be sunshine. Let there always be blue sky. Let there always be Mama. Let there always be me.” For all the other children, it’s just a pretty song, but for Lena the implied alternative is quite real.

Lena still has rings under her eyes, and her solemn little face rarely lights up. She still wakes up screaming about people coming to get her. She is often anxious and irritable, and whenever she sees Grozny mentioned on television, she begs for the promise that she will never have to go back there.

Lena and her mother, a widow, have been staying with a relative for months. Lately, there have been hints that it’s time to move on from the house in Prokhladny, but the mother can’t afford to buy her own place.

As Tatyana Meshcheryakova tells the story of her daughter’s survival, Lena plays nearby. She lets a ladybug run along her finger, then is chagrined by its apparent death due to her attention. She gently places the tiny insect on a matchbox.

Gradually, Lena is recovering. “Now she has even started to be naughty,” her mother says gratefully. “Thank God she was born. Thank God she’s here.”

“It’s moving! Look, Mama! It’s moving!” Lena shrieks excitedly as the ladybug picks itself up and begins to scurry away. And suddenly, Lena is smiling.

Sergei L. Loiko of The Times’ Moscow Bureau and special correspondent Mayerbek Nunayev contributed to this report. Dixon reported from Nalchik, Rostov-on-Don and Moscow. Nunayev reported from Mairtup.

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Robyn Dixon was a foreign correspondent for the Los Angeles Times. She has reported from China, sub-Saharan Africa, Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia and other parts of the former Soviet Union, as well as Afghanistan and Iraq. She left The Times in October 2019.

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Grozny Journal

Chechnya’s Capital Rises From the Ashes, Atop Hidden Horrors

By Andrew E. Kramer

• April 30, 2008

GROZNY, Russia — The surprise lay under tiles in the basement of the kindergarten on Kadyrov Street, found by laborers toiling here in the war zone turned construction site of Chechnya’s capital city.

The bodies were exhumed and reburied with respect, though with nary a pause in the banging of hammers and plastering of walls to accommodate a forensic study of the basement.

And that, human rights workers say, is nothing unusual in a city more or less at peace now, but with many grim basements and much rebuilding under way.

“People died there, and now they just build a school,” Natalia Estemirova, a researcher with Memorial, a human rights group, said in an interview. Her group documented the discovery of the bodies last summer at the Zvyozdochka, or Starlet, kindergarten.

She added: “We know people disappeared. We know that most of them were killed. And we know we need to look for them with a shovel.”

Any systematic forensic work, though, could revive prickly questions for the departing Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, about the prosecution of the war that, along with Russia’s economic revival, will serve as his legacy of the past eight years.

As a result, Russia’s general policy toward mass graves in Chechnya is to leave them undisturbed. There are 57 known but unopened mass graves in the republic of Chechnya, which is about the size of Connecticut. Countless smaller grave sites lie beneath the capital’s parks, courtyards and basements.

In Grozny, bulldozers, cranes and men with jackhammers work around and sometimes over graves from two wars, the first from 1994 to 1996 and the second that began in 1999. (The fighting now is sporadic and small in scale.) The city, besieged, bombarded and depopulated by war, has now become the scene of a frantic, oil-financed rebuilding effort. And the authorities point proudly to gleaming new buildings as symbols of the peace.

In the past year, after Russia installed the leader of one of its proxy militias, Ramzan Kadyrov, as president, 969 refugees have received new housing. A mosque that will accommodate 10,000 worshipers is rising on the central square, and scores of schools have been rebuilt.

Yet, the graves in Grozny remain a vexing problem. At least a half dozen have been moved to make room for the rebuilding.

In perhaps the most striking case, in April 2006, workers exhumed 57 bodies in Kirov Park to clear ground for a youth entertainment complex. During bombardments in 1999 and 2000, human rights workers say, residents buried relatives and unidentified victims in the park. Six bodies from that site were never identified, and were reburied in numbered graves in a cemetery.

“Many, many bodies are found,” Ms. Estemirova said.

The graves of Grozny grimly symbolize the peace that Russia has settled for here, one emphasizing physical reconstruction while leaving unaddressed the human scars of the war. There has been no systematic prosecution of war crimes or identification of the dead.

Just how many disappeared remains an open and contentious question. A human rights ombudsman for the Chechen government, Nurdi Nukhazhiyev, has identified 3,018 unsolved disappearances from the two wars. The remains of some of the missing surely are buried under construction sites.

The regional prosecutor has offered a lower figure, saying that 2,747 Chechen civilians have filed missing persons reports, and that 574 of those have been resolved. Memorial, Ms. Estemirova’s group, put the number of people who disappeared at 3,000 to 5,000.

The mass graves have raised tensions between Russia and Europe. The Council of Europe, the human rights monitor, has made a major issue of the exhuming of mass graves and the identification of victims and their killers.

“There are a great number of families who have lost members to abductions,” Thomas Hammarberg, the council’s human rights commissioner, said during a visit to Chechnya this month. “So many people were affected by this it cannot simply be swept under the carpet.”

But, of course, that is what is happening, as construction destroys evidence at the sites of war crimes. The building of the School for the Deaf on Minutka Square, for example, served as a temporary headquarters for Interior Ministry troops who became the focus of a rare, Russian war crimes investigation.

The basement, witnesses said, was used for torture. One Russian officer was convicted of murder. Yet in 2006, the basement was filled with debris, ostensibly to stabilize the site for rebuilding the school, Ms. Estemirova said.

And as building continues, even the question of how to link the names of the missing with the unidentified bodies in Grozny is contentious.

The Council of Europe is encouraging Russia to embrace systematic forensic work in the graves, before too many are disturbed by the building.

Mr. Kadyrov’s government has endorsed a proposal to provide information about the disappeared anonymously on the Internet, separating the question of identification from the politically charged issue of culpability.

Yet disappearances in Chechnya continue. As the Russian policy of “Chechenization” of the conflict has gained traction and, even critics grudgingly say, success in tamping down the violence, abuse by Russian soldiers has waned. Increasingly, the disappearances bear the hallmarks of Chechen-on-Chechen violence.

Many Grozny residents still live in ruins, with yawning gaps in the walls. The city, though, is largely peaceful. Merchants sell cigarettes, stuffed animals and Red Bull energy drinks on the streets. Young men in police uniforms loiter on the sidewalks, spitting out sesame seed husks, Kalashnikovs slung over their shoulders. And the construction boom continues unabated.

But the building provides little solace to Adeni Idalova, a Grozny resident missing two sons. “Our children will never walk on these sidewalks of gold,” she said. “What do we need them for?”