the power of mind essay

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Stanford University School of Medicine blog

Mind this: Research reveals the power of the mind

From that tangle of cells in our heads arises the elusive, but uber-powerful, mind -- the swirl of thoughts and perceptions that forms our sense of self.

Researchers are homing in on the mind by learning ever more about what it can do and how it can change.

"Our minds aren't passive observers, simply perceiving reality as it is. Our minds actually change reality," said Alia Crum , PhD, who directs the Stanford Mind and Body Lab in a recent Stanford News feature .

Her work is revealing how the mind can shape perceptions and health, as described in the piece:

People who believe doing physical work in a job counts as exercise  live longer lives , independent of how much exercise they actually get. Likewise, telling people a milkshake they drank was 'indulgent' made them feel more full . Telling them a drink they were consuming had caffeine  raised their blood pressure .

The mind also plays a critical role in the perception of pain, as research by clinical psychologist  Beth Darnall , PhD, has shown. More from the piece:

'Pain is highly responsive to each person's psychology and mindset,' Darnall said. Those who expect worse pain, ruminate on it and feel helpless about it - what's called pain catastrophizing - feel more intense pain, stay longer in hospitals after surgery and often require more painkillers. On the other hand, those who shift to a positive mindset feel less pain, spend less time in hospitals and require fewer pain medications.

Darnall's team is develop methods to intervene and reduce the need for opioid use, as well as pain experienced by both those with chronic pain and people recovering from surgery.

Curious about what else the mind can do? The features dives into its effects on learning, life, social belonging and more.

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You see life through your own unique lens. This is your mindset – the assumptions and expectations you hold about yourself, your life and the situations around you. Research shows that mindsets play a significant role in determining life’s outcomes. By understanding, adapting and shifting your mindset, you can improve your health, decrease your stress and become more resilient to life’s challenges.

To learn more about mindsets and how to change them, BeWell spoke to Dr. Jacob Towery, adjunct clinical instructor in the department of psychiatry at Stanford University.

Mindsets help you to simplify.

Mindsets are a set of assumptions that help you distill complex worldviews into digestible information and then set expectations based on this input. For example, you may believe that becoming sick with cancer would be catastrophic or that going on a diet would be challenging and depriving. These belief systems help you set expectations, plan for the worst and guide decisions based on these assumptions.

While mindsets can be helpful for distilling information and managing expectations, they can also be maladaptive, lead to interpersonal problems and feelings of guilt, inadequacy, sadness and anxiety. Dr. Towery observes that it is common to hold onto mindsets that were adaptive at one point in life but have since become maladaptive. For example, it might have been helpful to believe that others cannot be trusted if you were betrayed at a young age, but this belief may lead to interpersonal issues at a later stage of life. 

Dr. Towery assures, “the good news is mindsets are highly changeable, and if you are willing to learn the technology of changing your mindset and defeating your distorted thoughts, you can have significantly more happiness.”

Having a fixed or growth mindset affects your worldview. 

You may have heard of “fixed” and “growth” mindsets. These terms were coined by Stanford researcher and professor Carol Dweck, Ph.D.  to describe belief systems about your ability to change, grow and develop over time. If you believe your qualities are essentially unchangeable or “fixed,” you may be less open to mistakes because setbacks are seen as inherent, and impinging on future success. For example, if you have a fixed mindset and have trouble connecting with others at an event, you may see this as evidence that you will never be able to socially connect, leading to social anxiety and avoidance. 

With a growth mindset, you know that you can change over time, and therefore you are more open to reflect, learn and grow from challenges. Because failure is less threatening, you are more willing to embrace life’s challenges, take feedback as a learning opportunity and continue to learn and grow throughout life. With a growth mindset, you are also less likely to personalize setbacks. For example, in the scenario above, you might reflect that the cause of your social difficulty had more to do with the environment at the event than a personal inability to socialize.  

With a fixed mindset, it can be hard to find motivation to work through perceived weaknesses, because the ability to change may seem as hopeless as changing your eye color. In contrast, with a growth mindset, you’ll see your perceived weakness as a challenge that can be motivating — and even fun — to overcome.

As Dweck writes in “Mindset,” “…as you begin to understand the fixed and growth mindsets, you will see exactly how one thing leads to another — how a belief that your qualities are carved in stone leads to a host of thoughts and actions, and how a belief that your qualities can be cultivated leads to a host of different thoughts and actions, taking you down an entirely different road.”

Dr. Towery gives a personal example, “In my own life, I was dissatisfied with my singing abilities and decided to take singing lessons for nine months. While you won’t be hearing me on the radio any time soon, my singing is remarkably less terrible than it used to be before the lessons.” He describes that it was fun to learn that singing is a skill that can be cultivated rather than something innate and immutable.

Mindsets can impact your reality.

Mindsets can impact your outcomes by determining the way you think, feel and even physiologically respond to some situations. A 2007 study revealed that increased awareness of physical activity resulted in health benefits like weight loss and decreased blood pressure.   To further investigate this phenomenon, a 2011 study was conducted to test physiological satiation in relationship to mindset around certain foods. The study revealed that participants’ satiety aligned with their mindset around the food they were consuming more than the food’s nutritional content.  

Another example of how mindset affects physiology was shown in a 2012 study on the association between stress perception, health and mortality.  Kelly McGonigal references the study in her 2013 TED talk, explaining that participants who experienced high levels of stress had an increased risk of death, but only if  they believed stress to be harmful. Those who experienced high stress levels but did not see it as harmful were no more likely to die. McGonigal encourages developing more positive mindsets around stress, and to perceive your body’s physiological responses to stress – like a pounding heart and racing mind – as your body’s natural response to rise to the challenge and overcome it, as opposed to a signal that something is wrong.

Dr. Towery points out the impact of mindset on the effect of medications. “There is a powerful phenomenon in medicine known as the placebo effect, in which if someone believes they are going to derive benefits from taking a particular medication, they often do. In fact, regardless of the disease or condition, about 30-40% of people can have significant improvement in their symptoms even when taking a placebo (sugar) pill, if they believe that the pill is going to be helpful.” 

“Equally fascinating,” Towery observes, “is the ‘nocebo-effect,’ a psychological response based on a person’s expectations around side effects. When a physician emphasizes the potential side effects of a medicine, and the patient believes they will develop those symptoms, even if given a sugar pill, these patients can develop the adverse side effects, just based on what their mind expects.” 

Science is just beginning to validate the power of the mind-body relationship. Mindset matters, so it is important to pay attention to your belief systems—where they come from, how valid they are, and how they impact your quality of life.

You can change your mindset.

Although your mindset about topics like appearance and success are largely influenced by outside factors, the brain is neuroplastic, meaning neural networks can continue to grow, change and reorganize throughout the lifespan. By challenging yourself with new experiences and perspectives, you can form new neural connections — or mindsets — at any point in life.

Even a fixed mindset is not set in stone. You can change your mindset by learning and consciously choosing to believe that your characteristics are not predetermined and that you can continue to grow over time.

According to Towery, “The exciting news about mindsets is that they are absolutely changeable. The entire field of cognitive therapy is based on the idea that thoughts determine feelings and that you can learn powerful techniques to modify distorted thoughts and self-defeating beliefs.  For those that want to learn how, I recommend reading the book “Feeling Great” by David Burns, MD and doing all of the writing sections.  A competent cognitive therapist can also teach you how to change your mindset, even in a small number of sessions.”

Dr. Towery says that the most rewarding part of his work is helping people transform distorted beliefs like “I’m a failure” to more realistic thoughts like “I didn’t perform well, but I can better prepare next time and it will probably go much better.”

Towery encourages questioning self-defeating thoughts and creating new narratives that are more self-serving. If you develop a growth mindset, setbacks can become learning opportunities and there is always another chance to improve and feel better. 

• http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0345472322/ref=as_li_qf_sp_asin_il_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0345472322&linkCode=as2&tag=farnamstreet-20&linkId=ZYKJHPHELN46AOWM
• https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3196007/Langer_ExcersisePlaceboEffect.pdf?sequence=1%3FviewType=Print&viewClass=Print
• https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21574706/
• https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22201278/
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RcGyVTAoXEU&t=722s
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vTDYtwqKBI8
• https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2F0022-3514.75.1.33

Revision of May 20, 2009

Reid was traditionally known primarily as one of a group of anti-Humean Scottish philosophers of "common sense," along with such lesser lights as James Oswald and James Beattie. Kant criticized these philosophers particularly harshly ( Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics , Preface). Reid's reputation suffered along with that of his fellows, and it is only in the last half of the twentieth century that he has finally emerged as a philosopher to be taken seriously.

Until fairly recently Reid was best known for his account of the history of modern philosophy. According to Reid, Descartes replaced the ancient account of mind with a new one that contained the seeds of its own destruction. After Descartes, philosophers who adopted his main priniciple became more and more skeptical: Locke was more skeptical than Descartes, Berkeley than Locke, and Hume embraced universal skepticism. (See, for example, Inquiry , Conclusion.)

It seems to be a peculiar strain of humour in this author, to set out in his introduction by promising, with a grave face, no less than a complete system of the sciences, upon a foundation entirely new--to wit, that of human nature--when the intention of the whole work is to show, that there is neither human nature nor science in the world. ( Inquiry , Chapter I, Section V)

We begin our discussion of Reid with his account of the descent from the Cartesian theory of ideas to Humean universal skepticism, as Reid recounts it in the Conclusion of the Inquiry . (For the version found in the 1785 Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , click here .)

• By reasoning analogically from known properties of material things
• By directly observing the operations of the mind

Reid credited Descartes with having broken free of analogical reasoning, at least to some extent. Descartes claimed that the mind is entirely distinct from the body, and that any "impressions" or "images" of objects are to be found in the body, not in the mind. When Descartes looked into his own mind (thus conceiving the mind properly), he found that he was essentially a thinking thing, a being endowed with understanding and will, both of which are not material.

But that is not the end of the story. For along with understanding and will, Descartes found his mind to be endowed with a faculty he called "sense" (though this was not strictly part of his essence). Sense is a passive faculty. When it senses, the mind is imprinted with ideas which are not the product of its will.

And here it is that Descartes made his fatal error. His description of the faculty of sense was the product of analogical reasoning, not of direct observation. The "ideas of sensation" are not literally images, such as those spread out upon the retina, but they are understood by analogy with images. And these alleged "ideas of sensation" form an impenetrable barrier between ourselves and the physical world.

Descartes himself did not reap the whirlwind that he had sown. Ultimately, ideas of sensation are treated by Descartes as being mere aids that allow us to avoid what harm us. The real knowledge of the world is gained through innate ideas, most notably that of God. The British philosophers cast off this safety net and wagered their fortune on experience alone. For Locke , all the materials on which the mind bases its judgments about the world beyond it are delivered through sensation. Locke argued that some of the ideas of sensation, the ideas of secondary qualities, do not resemble the qualities in the bodies which cause them. But Berkeley proved that the same reasoning applies to the ideas of primary qualities. His conclusion, according to Reid, followed inevitably from Locke's starting point: the only being we can attribute to bodies is being perceived.

as the Bishop [Berkeley] undid the whole material world, this author, upon the same grounds, undoes the world of spirits, and leaves nothing in nature but ideas and impressions, without any subject on which they may be impressed. ( Inquiry , Chapter I, Introduction, Section V)

Common Sense

It may be observed, that the defects and blemishes in the received philosophy concerning the mind, which have most exposed it to the contempt and ridicule of sensible men, have chiefly been owing to this--that the votaries of this Philosophy, from a natural prejudice in her favour, have endeavoured to extend her jurisdiction beyond its just limits, and to call to her bar the dictates of Common Sense.( Inquiry , Chapter I, Introduction, Section IV)

Philosophy . . . has no other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them. Severed from this root, its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots. ( Inquiry , Chapter I, Introduction, Section VII)

On the other hand, it is easy to see why philosophers would be inclined to criticize a system that takes common sense as its starting point. The views of ordinary, non-philosophical people seem to be quite unreflective and indeed riddled with error. Philosophers have tended to view their task as being to rise above the common view of things and present a more lofty picture of the universe. Reid does not fall victim to this kind of criticism, however. His account of "common sense," as outlined in the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Essay VI, Chapter 2, was itself a philosophical one.

Reid begins by explaining what is "common" about "common sense." He thought that common sense is something which nearly all human beings have. The only ones who lack it are defective in some way, victims of "lunacy." A person who, through some natural mental defect, believes he is made of glass has departed from common sense. And a skeptical philosopher who does not believe that mind-independent bodies exist has similarly taken leave of common sense. The difference is that the philosopher abandons common sense not due to a mental defect, but rather due to the influence of metaphysical arguments. So Reid describes a skeptic as a victim of "metaphysical lunacy."

Now what about the "sense" of "common sense?" Here Reid had in mind what we now would call good judgment. When we say of a person that he "has no sense," we describe him as having a strong tendency to misjudge things. On the other hand, a sensible person is one who judges well. Reid regarded this as the fundamental meaning of "sense." He found such a notion in all languages and in all ages.

So nearly everybody has a tendency to make good judgments, at least about everyday matters. This can be seen in the fact that people carry on their day-to-day lives in a more-or-less competent way. But there is more to Reid's notion of common sense than this. Specifically, Reid saw common sense as belief in what is self-evident. We have the beliefs of common sense because God has endowed us with them. Whatever deviates from what is self-evident is, by definition, absurd. So, as Reid saw it, the kind of skepticism he found in Berkeley and Hume is absurd because it contradicts the beliefs of common sense.

Self-Evidence

It is important to be clear about what Reid meant when he called beliefs of common sense "self-evident." Evidence itself is "whatever is a ground of belief. To believe without evidence is a weakness which every man is concerned to avoid, and which every man wishes to avoid" ( Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Essay II, Chapter XX). Beliefs that are self-evident do not depend on anything but themselves as a source of evidence for their truth. Reid follows Aristotle in noting that if there are no self-evident first principles, there would be an infinite regress of reasons. To believe in first principles is as natural as swallowing, and needs as little instruction ( Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Essay IV, Chapter IV).

What is contingent is the consequence of some will or power. Contingent self-evident beliefs thus admit of the possibility of doubt. In the case of the belief that I see an object before me, for example, "I seem to want [lack] that evidence which I can best comprehend, and which gives perfect satisfaction to an inquisitive mind" ( Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Essay II, Chapter XX).

A further distinction can be drawn in the domain of contingent self-evident beliefs. Some are quite general while others are particular. Reid called the former "first principles," including the following ( Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Essay VI, Chapter V):

• The existence of everything of which I am conscious.
• The thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person.
• Those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be.
• The natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious.
• We have some degree of power over our own actions and what we will.
• We continue to exist as identical beings, as far back as we can distinctly remember.
• What is to be in the phenomena of nature will probably be like what has been.

Sensation and Preception

In Essay II, "Of Judgment," of Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Reid presents his own theory of perception. We begin with Chapter V, "Of Perception." Perception is an operation of the mind, and as such it is observed directly. But it is only when one has attended to and reflected upon one's perceivings that one gets a "distinct notion" of the operation of perception.

• A conception or notion of the object that is perceived.
• An irresistible belief that the object presently exists.
• The fact that the belief in the existence of the object is "immediate, and not the effect of reasoning."

If the power of perceiving external objects in certain circumstances, be a part of the original constitution of the human mind, all attempts to account for it will be in vain. No other account can be given of the constitution of things, but the will of Him that made them. ( Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Essay II, Chapter V).

In addition to the perceiving mind, the operation of perception, and the perceived object, Reid recognizes a fourth element of perception of external objects: sensations. "Almost all our perceptions have corresponding sensations which constantly accompany them" ( Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Essay II, Chapter XVI).

He had a just notion of sensations, and saw that it was impossible that anything in an insentient being could resemble them; a thing so evident in itself, that it seems wonderful that it should have been so long unknown. ( Essays on the Intellectual Powers of the Mind , Essay II, Chapter XVI)

If there is no resemblance between our sensations and the objects of perception, then how do we know what qualities the objects of perception have? Reid's answer is found in the first element of perception of an external object: that it always contains a conception or notion of the object perceived. When this notion is "direct and distinct," as it is in the case of "extension, divisibility, figure, motion, solidity, hardness, softeness, and fluidity," then we perceive qualities in the perceived object just as they exist in the object ( Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Essay II, Chapter XVII). Thus Reid thought that Locke's notion of primary qualities has "a just foundation" for distinguishing them from secondary qualities.

Nonetheless, Reid saw a problem in Locke's treatment of primary qualities, since Locke claimed that they are known by sensation. Reid comments on Locke's description of the idea of solidity. Even if we could by a difficult abstraction isolate the feeling we get in squeezing a football (as in Locke's example), the feeling "is no more like hardness in a body, than the sensation of sound is like vibration in the sounding body" ( Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Essay II, Chapter XVII). The conception of hardness we do have is that of "such a cohesion of its parts as requires a great force to displace them."

The distinctness of our conceptions of primary qualities makes them amenable to scientific investigation. "Their various modifications are precisely defined in the imagination, and thereby capable of being compared, and their relations determined with precision and certainty" ( Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Essay II, Chapter XVII).

Our notions of the secondary qualities of the objects of perception are not so distinct as those of primary qualities, and hence "may be a subject of dispute." We do not know what the heat of the fire is, though we know that something in the fire causes our perception of its heat. Thus we have only a relative notion of the quality of heat: it is the cause of known effects. Reid was optimistic that future scientific investigation would reveal the true nature of the secondary qualities.

While sensations do not resemble the bodies that produce them, they nonetheless are the vehicles of our correct conceptions of bodies. Reid does not attempt to give any explanation of the manner in which sensations give rise to the corresponding conceptions.

Consider the sensations produced by my grasping an ivory ball in my hand. The sensation is not round and hard, yet I have a conviction that I am feeling a round, hard body. The connection is simply a design feature of the human being: "By the constitution of my nature, the sensation carries along with it the conception and belief of a round hard body really existing in my hand" ( Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , Essay VI, Chapter V).

Reid and Hume

A final point concerns Reid's portrayal of Hume as an extreme skeptic. Hume acknowledged that his philosophy is very skeptical, but does it really depart from common sense? Hume explicity recognized that nature prevents us from being skeptics with respect to the independent existence of bodies for more than short periods of time. He conceded that the same kind of judgments Reid called "common sense" come naturally to the ordinary person.

Indeed, he ingenuously acknowledges, that it was only in solitude and retirement that he could yield any assent to his own philosophy; society, like day-light, dispelled the darkness and fog of scepticism, and made him yield to the dominion of common sense. ( Inquiry , Chapter I, Introduction, Section V; see Hume's Treatise , Book I, Part IV, Section 7 )

One difference between the philosophers is that Hume described our "natural" beliefs as being the fictitious products of the imagination, rather than as "a gift from Heaven" or a product of "the will of Him who made us." Hume was skeptical about any explanation of the human condition which appeals to the supernatural, especially when a wholly natural explanation can be given in its stead. It is better to recognize the extreme limitations of our power of judgment than to invent a divine basis for judgment which can never be proved to exist or even to be very probable. (See especially his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Section XI of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding .)

Reid, on the other hand, held that a belief in intelligent design is self-evident. Moreover, he thought that Hume's attempt to explain all the workings of the human mind by his meager three principles of association produces only a caricature of the human being ( Inquiry , Chapter I, Introduction, Section VI). Hume, for his part, believed that with his principles he had properly accounted for all the phenomena of the human mind. This aspect of the debate between Hume and Reid, between a purely empirical account of man and one which situates him in a meaningful, created, universe, continues to the present day.

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Kant’s View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self

Even though Kant himself held that his view of the mind and consciousness were inessential to his main purpose, some of the ideas central to his point of view came to have an enormous influence on his successors. Some of his ideas are now central to cognitive science, for example. Other ideas equally central to his point of view had little influence on subsequent work. In this article, first we survey Kant’s model as a whole and the claims in it that have been influential. Then we examine his claims about consciousness of self specifically. Many of his ideas that have not been influential are ideas about the consciousness of self. Indeed, even though he achieved remarkable insights into consciousness of self, many of these insights next appeared only about 200 years later, in the 1960s and 1970s.

1. A Sketch of Kant’s View of the Mind

2.1 transcendental aesthetic, 2.2 metaphysical deduction, 2.3 transcendental deduction, 1 st edition, 2.4 attack on the paralogisms, 1 st edition.

• 2.5 Two Discussions of the mind in the 2 nd -edition TD and Other Discussions

3.2.1 Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition

3.2.2 synthesis of reproduction in imagination, 3.2.3 synthesis of recognition in a concept, 3.3 synthesis: a 90° turn, 3.4 unity of consciousness, 4.1 thesis 1: two kinds of consciousness of self.

• 4.2 Thesis 2: Representational Base of Consciousness of Self
• 4.3 Thesis 3: Conscious Only of How One Appears to Oneself

4.4 Thesis 4: Referential Machinery of Consciousness of Self

4.5 thesis 5: no manifold in consciousness of self, 4.6 thesis 6: consciousness of self is not knowledge of self, 4.7 thesis 7: conscious of self as single, common subject of experience, 5. knowledge of the mind, 6. where kant has and has not influenced contemporary cognitive research, other internet resources, related entries.

In this article, we will focus on Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) work on the mind and consciousness of self and related issues.

Some commentators believe that Kant’s views on the mind are dependent on his idealism (he called it transcendental idealism). For the most part, that is not so. At worst, most of what he said about the mind and consciousness can be detached from his idealism. Though often viewed as a quintessentially German philosopher, Kant is said to have been one-quarter Scottish. Some philosophers (often Scottish) hold that ‘Kant’ is a Germanization of the Scottish name ‘Candt’, though many scholars now reject the idea. It is noteworthy, however, that his work on epistemology, which led him to his ideas about the mind, was a response to Hume as much as to any other philosopher.

In general structure, Kant’s model of the mind was the dominant model in the empirical psychology that flowed from his work and then again, after a hiatus during which behaviourism reigned supreme (roughly 1910 to 1965), toward the end of the 20 th century, especially in cognitive science. Central elements of the models of the mind of thinkers otherwise as different as Sigmund Freud and Jerry Fodor are broadly Kantian, for example.

Three ideas define the basic shape (‘cognitive architecture’) of Kant’s model and one its dominant method. They have all become part of the foundation of cognitive science.

• The mind is a complex set of abilities (functions). (As Meerbote 1989 and many others have observed, Kant held a functionalist view of the mind almost 200 years before functionalism was officially articulated in the 1960s by Hilary Putnam and others.)
• The functions crucial for mental, knowledge-generating activity are spatio-temporal processing of, and application of concepts to, sensory inputs. Cognition requires concepts as well as percepts.
• These functions are forms of what Kant called synthesis. Synthesis (and the unity in consciousness required for synthesis) are central to cognition.

These three ideas are fundamental to most thinking about cognition now. Kant’s most important method, the transcendental method, is also at the heart of contemporary cognitive science.

• To study the mind, infer the conditions necessary for experience. Arguments having this structure are called transcendental arguments .

Translated into contemporary terms, the core of this method is inference to the best explanation, the method of postulating unobservable mental mechanisms in order to explain observed behaviour.

To be sure, Kant thought that he could get more out of his transcendental arguments than just ‘best explanations’. He thought that he could get a priori (experience independent) knowledge out of them. Kant had a tripartite doctrine of the a priori. He held that some features of the mind and its knowledge had a priori origins, i.e., must be in the mind prior to experience (because using them is necessary to have experience). That mind and knowledge have these features are a priori truths, i.e., necessary and universal (B3/4) [ 1 ] . And we can come to know these truths, or that they are a priori at any rate, only by using a priori methods, i.e., we cannot learn these things from experience (B3) (Brook 1993). Kant thought that transcendental arguments were a priori or yielded the a priori in all three ways. Nonetheless, at the heart of this method is inference to the best explanation. When introspection fell out of favour about 100 years ago, the alternative approach adopted was exactly this approach. Its nonempirical roots in Kant notwithstanding, it is now the major method used by experimental cognitive scientists.

Other topics equally central to Kant’s approach to the mind have hardly been discussed by cognitive science. These include, as we will see near the end, a kind of synthesis that for Kant was essential to minds like ours and what struck him as the most striking features of consciousness of self. Far from his model having been superseded by cognitive science, some things central to the model have not even been assimilated by it.

2. Kant’s Critical Project and How the Mind Fits Into It

The major works so far as Kant’s views on the mind are concerned are the monumental Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) and his little, late Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View , first published in 1798 only six years before his death. Since the Anthropology was worked up from notes for popular lectures, it is often superficial compared to CPR. Kant’s view of the mind arose from his general philosophical project in CPR the following way. Kant aimed among other things to,

• Justify our conviction that physics, like mathematics, is a body of necessary and universal truth.
• Insulate religion, including belief in immortality, and free will from the corrosive effects of this very same science.

Kant accepted without reservation that “God, freedom and immortality” (1781/7, Bxxx) exist but feared that, if science were relevant to their existence at all, it would provide reasons to doubt that they exist. As he saw it and very fortunately, science cannot touch these questions. “I have found it necessary to deny knowledge , … in order to make room for faith.” (Bxxx, his italics).

Laying the foundation for pursuit of the first aim, which as he saw it was no less than the aim of showing why physics is a science, was what led Kant to his views about how the mind works. He approached the grounding of physics by asking: What are the necessary conditions of experience (A96)? Put simply, he held that for our experience, and therefore our minds, to be as they are, the way that our experience is tied together must reflect the way that, according to physics, says objects in the world must be tied together. Seeing this connection also tells us a lot about what our minds must be like.

In pursuit of the second aim, Kant criticized some arguments of his predecessors that entailed if sound that we can know more about the mind’s consciousness of itself than Kant could allow. Mounting these criticisms led him to some extraordinarily penetrating ideas about our consciousness of ourselves.

In CPR, Kant discussed the mind only in connection with his main projects, never in its own right, so his treatment is remarkably scattered and sketchy. As he put it, “Enquiry … [into] the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests … is of great importance for my chief purpose, … [but] does not form an essential part of it” (Axvii). Indeed, Kant offers no sustained, focussed discussion of the mind anywhere in his work except the popular Anthropology, which, as we just said, is quite superficial.

In addition, the two chapters of CPR in which most of Kant’s remarks on the mind occur, the chapter on the Transcendental Deduction (TD) and the chapter on what he called Paralogisms (faulty arguments about the mind mounted by his predecessors) were the two chapters that gave him the greatest difficulty. (They contain some of the most impenetrable prose ever written.) Kant completely rewrote the main body of both chapters for the second edition (though not the introductions, interestingly).

In the two editions of CPR, there are seven main discussions of the mind. The first is in the Transcendental Aesthetic, the second is in what is usually called the Metaphysical Deduction (for this term, see below). Then there are two discussions of it in the first-edition TD, in parts 1 to 3 of Section 2 (A98 up to A110) and in the whole of Section 3 (A115-A127) [ 2 ] and two more in the second-edition TD, from B129 to B140 and from B153 to B159, the latter seemingly added as a kind of supplement. The seventh and last is found in the first edition version of Kant’s attack on the Paralogisms, in the course of which he says things of the utmost interest about consciousness of and reference to self. (What little was retained of these remarks in the second edition was moved to the completely rewritten TD.) For understanding Kant on the mind and self-knowledge, the first edition of CPR is far more valuable than the second edition. Kant’s discussion proceeds through the following stages.

Kant calls the first stage the Transcendental Aesthetic. [ 3 ] It is about what space and time must be like, and how we must handle them, if our experience is to have the spatial and temporal properties that it has. This question about the necessary conditions of experience is for Kant a ‘transcendental’ question and the strategy of proceeding by trying to find answers to such questions is, as we said, the strategy of transcendental argument.

Here Kant advances one of his most notorious views: that whatever it is that impinges on us from the mind-independent world does not come located in a spatial nor even a temporal matrix (A37=B54fn.). Rather, it is the mind that organizes this ‘manifold of raw intuition’, as he called it, spatially and temporally. The mind has two pure forms of intuition, space and time, built into it to allow it to do so. (‘Pure’ means ‘not derived from experience’.)

These claims are very problematic. For example, they invite the question, in virtue of what is the mind constrained to locate a bit of information at one spatial or temporal location rather than another? Kant seems to have had no answer to this question (Falkenstein 1995; Brook 1998). Most commentators have found Kant’s claim that space and time are only in the mind, not at all in the mind-independent world, to be implausible.

The activity of locating items in the ‘forms of intuition’, space and time, is one of the three kinds of what Kant called synthesis and discussed in the chapter on the Transcendental Deduction. It is not entirely clear how the two discussions relate.

The Aesthetic is about the conditions of experience, Kant’s official project. The chapter leading up to the Transcendental Deduction, The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding (but generally called the Metaphysical Deduction because of a remark that Kant once made, B159) has a very different starting point.

Starting from (and, Bvii, taking for granted the adequacy of) Aristotelian logic (the syllogisms and the formal concepts that Aristotle called categories), Kant proceeds by analysis to draw out the implications of these concepts and syllogisms for the conceptual structure (the “function of thought in judgment” (A70=B95)) within which all thought and experience must take place. The result is what Kant called the Categories . That is to say, Kant tries to deduce the conceptual structure of experience from the components of Aristotelian logic.

Thus, in Kant’s thought about the mind early in CPR , there is not one central movement but two, one in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the other in the Metaphysical Deduction. The first is a move up from experience (of objects) to the necessary conditions of such experience. The second is a move down from the Aristotelian functions of judgment to the concepts that we have to use in judging, namely, the Categories. One is inference up from experience, the other deduction down from conceptual structures of the most abstract kind.

Then we get to the second chapter of the Transcendental Logic, the brilliant and baffling Transcendental Deduction (TD). Recall the two movements just discussed, the one from experience to its conditions and the one from Aristotelian functions of judgment to the concepts that we must use in all judging (the Categories). This duality led Kant to his famous question of right ( quid juris) (A84=B116): with what right do we apply the Categories, which are not acquired from experience, to the contents of experience? (A85=B117). Kant’s problem here is not as arcane as it might seem. It reflects an important question: How is it that the world as we experience it conforms to our logic? In briefest form, Kant thought that the trick to showing how it is possible for the Categories to apply to experience is to show that it is necessary that they apply (A97). [ 4 ]

TD has two sides, though Kant never treats them separately. He once called them the objective and the subjective deductions (Axvii). The objective deduction is about the conceptual and other cognitive conditions of having representations of objects. It is Kant’s answer to the quid juris question. Exactly how the objective deduction goes is highly controversial, a controversy that we will sidestep here. The subjective deduction is about what the mind, the “subjective sources” of understanding (A97), must as a consequence be like. The subjective deduction is what mainly interests us.

Kant argues as follows. Our experiences have objects, that is, they are about something. The objects of our experiences are discrete, unified particulars. To have such particulars available to it, the mind must construct them based on sensible input. To construct them, the mind must do three kinds of synthesis. It must generate temporal and spatial structure (Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition). It must associate spatio-temporally structured items with other spatio-temporally structured items (Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination). And it must recognize items using concepts, the Categories in particular (Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept). This threefold doctrine of synthesis is one of the cornerstones of Kant’s model of the mind. We will consider it in more detail in the next Section.

The ‘deduction of the categories’ should now be complete. Strangely enough, the chapter has only nicely got started. In the first edition version, for example, we have only reached A106, about one-third of the way through the chapter. At this point, Kant introduces the notion of transcendental apperception for the first time and the unity of such apperception, the unity of consciousness. Evidently, something is happening (something, moreover, not at all well heralded in the text). We will see what when we discuss Kant’s doctrine of synthesis below.

We can now understand in more detail why Kant said that the subjective deduction is inessential (Axvii). Since the objective deduction is about the conditions of representations having objects, a better name for it might have been ‘deduction of the object’. Similarly, a better name for the subjective deduction might have been ‘the deduction of the subject’ or ‘the deduction of the subject’s nature’. The latter enquiry was inessential to Kant’s main critical project because the main project was to defend the synthetic a priori credentials of physics in the objective deduction. From this point of view, anything uncovered about the nature and functioning of the mind was a happy accident.

The chapter on the Paralogisms, the first of the three parts of Kant’s second project, contains Kant’s most original insights into the nature of consciousness of the self. In the first edition, he seems to have achieved a stable position on self-consciousness only as late as this chapter. Certainly his position was not stable in TD. Even his famous term for consciousness of self, ‘I think’, occurs for the first time only in the introduction to the chapter on the Paralogisms. His target is claims that we know what the mind is like. Whatever the merits of Kant’s attack on these claims, in the course of mounting it, he made some very deep-running observations about consciousness and knowledge of self.

To summarize: in the first edition, TD contains most of what Kant had to say about synthesis and unity, but little on the nature of consciousness of self. The chapter on the Paralogisms contains most of what he has to say about consciousness of self.

2.5 The Two Discussions in the 2 nd -edition TD and Other Discussions

As we said, Kant rewrote both TD and the chapter on the Paralogisms for the second edition of CPR , leaving only their introductions intact. In the course of doing so, he moved the topic of consciousness of self from the chapter on the Paralogisms to the second discussion of the mind in the new TD. The new version of the Paralogisms chapter is then built around a different and, so far as theory of mind is concerned, much less interesting strategy. The relationship of the old and new versions of the chapters is complicated (Brook 1994, Ch. 9). Here we will just note that the underlying doctrine of the mind does not seem to change very much.

CPR contains other discussions of the mind, discussions that remained the same in both editions. The appendix on what Kant called Leibniz’ Amphiboly contains the first explicit discussion of an important general metaphysical notion, numerical identity (being one object at and over time), and contains the first argument in CPR for the proposition that sensible input is needed for knowledge. (Kant asserts this many times earlier but assertion is not argument.) In the Antinomies, the discussion of the Second Antinomy contains some interesting remarks about the simplicity of the soul and there is a discussion of free will in the Solution to the Third Antinomy. The mind also appears a few times in the Doctrine of Method, particularly in a couple of glosses of the attack mounted against the Paralogisms. (A784=B812ff is perhaps the most interesting.)

In other new material prepared for the second edition, we find a first gloss on the topic of self-consciousness as early as the Aesthetic (B68). The mind also appears in a new passage called the Refutation of Idealism, where Kant attempts to tie the possibility of one sort of consciousness of self to consciousness of permanence in something other than ourselves, in a way he thought to be inconsistent with Berkeleian idealism. This new Refutation of Idealism has often been viewed as a replacement for the argument against the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition. There are problems with this view, the most important of which is that the second edition still has a separate fourth Paralogism (B409). That said, though the new passage utilizes self-consciousness in a highly original way, it says little that is new about it.

Elsewhere in his work, the only sustained discussion of the mind and consciousness is, as we said, his little, late Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View . By ‘anthropology’ Kant meant the study of human beings from the point of view of their (psychologically-controlled) behaviour, especially their behaviour toward one another, and of the things revealed in behaviour such as character. Though Kant sometimes contrasted anthropology as a legitimate study with what he understood empirical psychology to be, namely, psychology based on introspective observation, he meant by anthropology something fairly close to what we now mean by behavioural or experimental psychology.

3. Kant’s View of the Mind

Turning now to Kant’s view of the mind, we will start with a point about method: Kant held surprisingly strong and not entirely consistent views on the empirical study of the mind. The empirical method for doing psychology that Kant discussed was introspection.

Sometimes he held such study to be hopeless. The key text on psychology is in The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science . There Kant tell us that “the empirical doctrine of the soul … must remain even further removed than chemistry from the rank of what may be called a natural science proper” (Ak. IV:471). (In Kant’s defence, there was nothing resembling a single unified theory of chemical reactions in his time.) The contents of introspection, in his terms inner sense, cannot be studied scientifically for at least five reasons.

First, having only one universal dimension and one that they are only represented to have at that, namely, distribution in time, the contents of inner sense cannot be quantified; thus no mathematical model of them is possible. Second, “the manifold of internal observation is separated only by mere thought”. That is to say, only the introspective observer distinguishes the items one from another; there are no real distinctions among the items themselves. Third, these items “cannot be kept separate” in a way that would allow us to connect them again “at will”, by which Kant presumably means, according to the dictates of our developing theory. Fourth, “another thinking subject [does not] submit to our investigations in such a way as to be conformable to our purposes” – the only thinking subject whose inner sense one can investigate is oneself. Finally and most damningly, “even the observation itself alters and distorts the state of the object observed” (1786, Ak. IV:471). Indeed, introspection can be bad for the health: it is a road to “mental illness” (‘Illuminism and Terrorism’, 1798, Ak. VII:133; see 161).

In these critical passages, it is not clear why he didn’t respect what he called anthropology more highly as an empirical study of the mind, given that he himself did it. He did so elsewhere. In the Anthropology , for example, he links ‘self-observation’ and observation of others and calls them both sources of anthropology (Ak. VII:142–3).

Whatever, no kind of empirical psychology can yield necessary truths about the mind. In the light of this limitation, how should we study the mind? Kant’s answer was: transcendental method using transcendental arguments (notions introduced earlier). If we cannot observe the connections among the denizens of inner sense to any purpose, we can study what the mind must be like and what capacities and structures (in Kant’s jargon, faculties) it must have if it is to represent things as it does. With this method we can find universally true, that is to say, ‘transcendental’ psychological propositions. We have already seen what some of them are: minds must be able to synthesize and minds must have a distinctive unity, for example. Let us turn now to these substantive claims.

3.2 Synthesis and Faculties

We have already discussed Kant’s view of the mind’s handling of space and time, so we can proceed directly to his doctrine of synthesis. As Kant put it in one of his most famous passages, “Concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51=B75). Experience requires both percepts and concepts. As we might say now, to discriminate, we need information; but for information to be of any use to us, we must organize the information. This organization is provided by acts of synthesis.

By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one knowledge [A77=B103]

If the doctrine of space and time is the first major part of his model of the mind, the doctrine of synthesis is the second. Kant claimed, as we saw earlier, that three kinds of synthesis are required to organize information, namely apprehending in intuition, reproducing in imagination, and recognizing in concepts (A97-A105). Each of the three kinds of synthesis relates to a different aspect of Kant’s fundamental duality of intuition and concept. Synthesis of apprehension concerns raw perceptual input, synthesis of recognition concerns concepts, and synthesis of reproduction in imagination allows the mind to go from the one to the other.

They also relate to three fundamental faculties of the mind. One is the province of Sensibility, one is the province of Understanding, and the one in the middle is the province of a faculty that has a far less settled position than the other two, namely, Imagination (see A120).

The first two, apprehension and reproduction, are inseparable; one cannot occur without the other (A102). The third, recognition, requires the other two but is not required by them. It seems that only the third requires the use of concepts; this problem of non-concept-using syntheses and their relationship to use of the categories becomes a substantial issue in the second edition (see B150ff.), where Kant tries to save the universality of the objective deduction by arguing that all three kinds of syntheses are required to represent objects.

Acts of synthesis are performed on that to which we are passive in experience, namely intuitions ( Anschauungen). Intuitions are quite different from sense-data as classically understood; we can become conscious of intuitions only after acts of synthesis and only by inference from these acts, not directly. Thus they are something more like theoretical entities (better, events) postulated to explain something in what we do recognize. What they explain is the non-conceptual element in representations, an element over which we have no control. Intuitions determine how our representations will serve to confirm or refute theories, aid or impede our efforts to reach various goals.

The synthesis of apprehension is somewhat more shadowy than the other two. In the second edition, the idea does not even appear until §26, i.e., late in TD. At A120, Kant tells us that apprehending impressions is taking them up into the activity of imagination, i.e., into the faculty of the mind that becomes conscious of images. He tells us that we can achieve the kind of differentiation we need to take them up only “in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another” (A99). Kant uses the term ‘impression’ ( Eindrucke ) rarely; it seems to be in the same camp as ‘appearance’ ( Erscheinung ) and ‘intuition’ ( Anschauung ).

The idea behind the strange saying just quoted seems to be this. Kant seems to have believed that we can become conscious of only one new item at a time. Thus a group of simultaneous ‘impressions’ all arriving at the same time would be indistinguishable, “for each representation [ Vorstellung ], in so far as it is contained in a single moment , can never be anything but absolute unity” (A99). Kant’s use of Vorstellung , with its suggestion of synthesized, conceptualized organization, may have been unfortunate, but what I think he meant is this. Prior to synthesis and conceptual organization, a manifold of intuitions would be an undifferentiated unit, a seamless, buzzing confusion. Thus, to distinguish one impression from another, we must give them separate locations. Kant speaks only of temporal location but he may very well have had spatial location in mind, too.

The synthesis of apprehension is closely related to the Transcendental Aesthetic. Indeed, it is the doing of what the Aesthetic tells us that the mind has to be able to do with respect to locating items in time and space (time anyway).

The synthesis of reproduction in imagination has two elements, a synthesis proper and associations necessary for performing that synthesis. (Kant explicitly treats them as separate on A125: “recognition, reproduction, association, apprehension”.) Both start from the appearances, as Kant now calls them, which the synthesis of apprehension has located in time. At first glance, the synthesis of reproduction looks very much like memory ; however, it is actually quite different from memory. It is a matter of retaining earlier intuitions in such a way that certain other representations can “bring about a transition of the mind” to these earlier representations, even in the absence of any current representation of them (A100). Such transitions are the result of the setting up of associations (which, moreover, need not be conscious) and do not require memory. Likewise, no recognition of any sort need be involved; that the earlier representations have become associated with later ones is not something that we need recognize. Memory and recognition are the jobs of synthesis of recognition, yet to come.

To our ears now, it is a little strange to find Kant calling this activity of reproduction and the activity of apprehension acts of imagination . Kant describes the function he had in mind as “a blind but indispensable function of the soul” (A78=B103), so he meant something rather different from what we now mean by the term ‘imagination’ (A120 and fn.). For Kant, imagination is a connecting of elements by forming an image: “… imagination has to bring the manifold of intuitions into the form of an image” (A120). If ‘imagination’ is understood in its root sense of image-making and we see imagination not as opposed to but as part of perception, then Kant’s choice of term becomes less peculiar.

The third kind of synthesis is synthesis of recognition in a concept. To experience objects for Kant, first I have to relate the materials out of which they are constructed to one another temporally and spatially. They may not require use of concepts. Then I have to apply at least the following kinds of concepts: concepts of number, of quality, and of modality (I am experiencing something real or fictitious). These are three of the four kinds of concepts that Kant had identified as Categories. Note that we have so far not mentioned the fourth, relational concepts.

In Kant’s view, recognition requires memory; reproduction is not memory but memory does enter now. The argument goes as follows.

[A merely reproduced] manifold of representation would never … form a whole, since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it. If, in counting, I forget that the units, which now hover before me, have been added to one another in succession, I should never know that a total is being produced through this successive addition of unit to unit … [A103; see A78=B104].

In fact, as this passage tells us, synthesis into an object by an act of recognition requires two things. One is memory. The other is that something in the past representations must be recognized as related to present ones. And to recognize that earlier and later representations are both representing a single object, we must use a concept, a rule (A121, A126). In fact, we must use a number of concepts: number, quality, modality, and, of course, the specific empirical concept of the object we are recognizing.

Immediately after introducing recognition, Kant brings apperception and the unity of apperception into the discussion. The acts by which we achieve recognition under concepts are acts of apperception. By ‘apperception’, Kant means the faculty or capacity for judging in accord with a rule, for applying concepts. Apperceiving is an activity necessary for and parallel to perceiving (A120). This is one of the senses in which Leibniz used the term, too. To achieve recognition of a unified object, the mind must perform an act of judgment; it must find how various represented elements are connected to one another. This judgment is an act of apperception. Apperception is the faculty that performs syntheses of recognition (A115). Note that we are not yet dealing with transcendental apperception.

To sum up: For experiences to have objects, acts of recognition that apply concepts to spatio-temporally ordered material are required. Representation requires recognition. Moreover, objects of representation share a general structure. They are all some number of something, they all have qualities, and they all have an existence-status. (Put this way, Kant’s claim that the categories are required for knowledge looks quite plausible.)

With the synthesis of recognition, TD should be close to complete. Kant merely needs to argue that these concepts must include the categories, which he does at A111, and that should be that.

But that is not that. In fact, as we said earlier, we are only about one-third of the way through the chapter. The syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition of single objects march in a single temporal/object-generational line. Suddenly at A106 Kant makes a kind of 90 o turn. From the generation of a representation of individual objects of experience over time , he suddenly turns to a form of recognition that requires the unification and recognition of multiple objects existing at the same time. He moves from acts of recognition of individual objects to unified acts of recognition of multiple objects which “stand along side one another in one experience” (A108). This 90 o turn is a pivotal moment in TD and has received less attention than it deserves.

The move that Kant makes next is interesting. He argues that the mind could not use concepts so as to have unified objects of representation if its consciousness were not itself unified (A107–108). Why does consciousness and its unity appear here? We have been exploring what is necessary to have experience. Why would it matter if, in addition, unified consciousness were necessary? As Walker (1978, p. 77) and Guyer (1987, pp. 94–5) have shown, Kant did not need to start from anything about the mind to deduce the Categories. (A famous footnote in The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science [Ak. IV:474fn.] is Kant’s best-known comment on this issue.) So why does he suddenly introduce unified consciousness?

So far Kant has ‘deduced’ only three of the four kinds of categorical concepts, number, quality, and modality. He has said nothing about the relational categories. For Kant, this would have been a crucial gap. One of his keenest overall objectives in CPR is to show that physics is a real science. To do this, he thinks that he needs to show that we must use the concept of causality in experience. Thus, causality is likely the category that he cared more about than all the other categories put together. Yet up to A106, Kant has said nothing about the relational categories in general or causality in particular. By A111, however, Kant is talking about the use of the relational categories and by A112 causality is front and centre. So it is natural to suppose that, in Kant’s view at least, the material between A106 and A111 contains an argument for the necessity of applying the relational categories, even though he never says so.

Up to A106, Kant has talked about nothing but normal individual objects: a triangle and its three sides, a body and its shape and impenetrability. At A107, he suddenly begins to talk about tying together multiple represented objects, indeed “all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one experience” (A108). The solution to the problem of showing that we have to use the category of causality must lie somewhere in this activity of tying multiple objects together.

The passage between A106 and A111 is blindingly difficult. It takes up transcendental apperception, the unity and identity of the mind, and the mind’s consciousness of itself as the subject of all its representations (A106–108). I think that this passage introduces either a new stage or even a new starting point for TD. Here many commentators (Strawson, Henrich, Guyer) would think immediately of self-consciousness. Kant did use consciousness of self as a starting point for deductions, at B130 in the B-edition for example. But that is not what appears here, not in the initial paragraphs anyway.

What Kant does say is this. Our experience is “one experience”; “all possible appearances … stand alongside one another in one experience” (A108). We have “one and the same general experience” of “all … the various perceptions” (A110), “a connected whole of human knowledge” (A121). Let us call this general experience a global representation .

Transcendental apperception (hereafter TA) now enters. It is the ability to tie ‘all appearances’ together into ‘one experience’.

This transcendental unity of apperception forms out of all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws. [A108]

It performs a “synthesis of all appearances according to concepts”, “whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension … to a transcendental unity” (A108). This, he thought, requires unified consciousness. Unified consciousness is required for another reason, too. Representations

can [so much as] represent something to me only in so far as they belong with all others to one consciousness. Therefore, they must at least be capable of being so connected [A116].

The introduction of unified consciousness opens up an important new opportunity. Kant can now explore the necessary conditions of conscious content being unified in this way. To make a long story short, Kant now argues that conscious content could have the unity that it does only if the contents themselves are tied together causally. [ 5 ]

With this, his deduction of the relational categories is complete and his defence of the necessity of physics is under way. The notion of unified consciousness to which Kant is appealing here is interesting in its own right, so let us turn to it next. [ 6 ]

For Kant, consciousness being unified is a central feature of the mind, our kind of mind at any rate. In fact, being a single integrated group of experiences (roughly, one person’s experiences) requires two kinds of unity.

• The consciousness that this subject has of represented objects and/or representations must be unified.

The first requirement may look trivial but it is not. For Hume, for example, what makes a group of experiences one person’s experiences is that they are associated with one another in an appropriate way (the so-called bundle theory), not that they have a common subject. The need for a subject arises from two straightforward considerations: representations not only represent something, they represent it to someone; and, representations are not given to us – to become a representation, sensory inputs must be processed by an integrated cognitive system. Kant may have been conscious of both these points, but beyond identifying the need, he had little to say about what the subject of experience might be like, so we will say no more about it. (We will, however, say something about what its consciousness of itself is like later.)

Kant seems to have used the terms ‘ unity of consciousness ’ (A103) and ‘unity of apperception’ (A105, A108) interchangeably. The well-known argument at the beginning of the first edition attack on the second paralogism (A352) focuses on this unity at a given time (among other things) and what can (or rather, cannot) be inferred from this about the nature of the mind (a topic to which we will return below). The attack on the third paralogism focuses on what can be inferred from unified consciousness over time. These are all from the first edition of CPR . In the second edition, Kant makes remarks about unity unlike anything in the first edition, for example, “this unity … is not the category of unity” (B131). The unity of consciousness and Kant’s views on it are complicated issues but some of the most important points include the following.

By ‘unity of consciousness’, Kant seems to have the following in mind: I am conscious not only of single experiences but of a great many experiences at the same time. The same is true of actions; I can do and be conscious of doing a number of actions at the same time. In addition to such synchronic unity, many global representations, as we called them, display temporal unity: current representation is combined with retained earlier representation. (Temporal unity is often a feature of synthesis of recognition.) Any representation that we acquire in a series of temporal steps, such as hearing a sentence, will have unity across time (A104; A352).

Kant himself did not explicate his notion of unified consciousness but here is one plausible articulation of the notion at work in his writings.

The unity of consciousness = df. (i) a single act of consciousness, which (ii) makes one conscious of a number of representations and/or objects of representation in such a way that to be conscious by having any members of this group is also to be conscious by having others in the group and of at least some of them as a group.

As this definition makes clear, consciousness being unified is more than just being one state of consciousness. Unified consciousness is not just singular, it is unified.

Kant placed great emphasis on the unity of consciousness, both positively and negatively. Positively, he held that conceptualized representation has to be unified both at and across time. Negatively, from a mind having unified consciousness, he held that nothing follows concerning its composition, its identity, especially its identity across time , nor its materiality or immateriality. He argued these points in his attacks on the second, third and fourth Paralogisms.

4. Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of Self

Many commentators hold that consciousness of self is central to the Critical philosophy. There is reason to question this: unified consciousness is central, but consciousness of self? That is not so clear. Whatever, the topic is intrinsically interesting and Kant achieved some remarkable insights into it. Strangely, none of his immediate successors took them up after his death and they next appeared at the earliest in Wittgenstein (1934–5) and perhaps not until Shoemaker (1968). Kant never discussed consciousness of self in its own right, only in the context of pursuing other objectives, and his remarks on the topic are extremely scattered. When we pull his various remarks together, we can see that Kant advanced at least seven major theses about consciousness of and knowledge of self . We will consider them one-by-one.

The first thesis:

• There are two kinds of consciousness of self: consciousness of oneself and one’s psychological states in inner sense and consciousness of oneself and one’s states via performing acts of apperception.

Kant’s term for the former was ‘empirical self-consciousness’. A leading term for the latter was ‘transcendental apperception’ (TA). (Kant used the term ‘TA’ in two very different ways, as the name for a faculty of synthesis and as the name for what he also referred to as the ‘I think’, namely, one’s consciousness of oneself as subject.) Here is a passage from the Anthropology in which Kant distinguishes the two kinds of consciousness of self very clearly:

… the “I” of reflection contains no manifold and is always the same in every judgment … Inner experience , on the other hand, contains the matter of consciousness and a manifold of empirical inner intuition: … [1798, Ak. VII:141–2, emphases in the original].

The two kinds of consciousness of self have very different sources.

The source of empirical self-consciousness is what Kant called inner sense. He did not work out his notion of inner sense at all well. Here are just a few of the problems. Kant insists that all representational states are in inner sense, including those representing the objects of outer sense (i.e., spatially located objects):

Whatever the origins of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced through inner causes, whether they arise a priori , or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. [A98–9]

However, he also says that the object of inner sense is the soul, the object of outer sense the body (including one’s own). He comes close to denying that we can be conscious of the denizens of inner sense—they do not represent inner objects and have no manifold of their own. Yet he also says that we can be conscious of them — representations can themselves be objects of representations, indeed, representations can make us conscious of themselves. In its role as a form of or means to consciousness of self, apperception ought to be part of inner sense. Yet Kant regularly contrasted apperception, a means to consciousness of oneself and one’s acts of thinking, with inner sense as a means to consciousness of—what? Presumably, particular representations: perceptions, imaginings, memories, etc. Here is another passage from the Anthropology :

§24. Inner sense is not pure apperception, consciousness of what we are doing; for this belongs to the power of thinking. It is, rather, consciousness of what we undergo as we are affected by the play of our own thoughts. This consciousness rests on inner intuition, and so on the relation of ideas (as they are either simultaneous or successive). [1798, Ak. VII:161]

Kant makes the same distinction in CPR :

… the I that I think is distinct from the I that it, itself, intuits …; I am given to myself beyond that which is given in intuition, and yet know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am … [B155].

Since most of Kant’s most interesting remarks about consciousness of and knowledge of self concern consciousness of oneself, the ‘I of reflection’ via acts of apperception, we will focus on it, though empirical consciousness of self will appear again briefly from time to time.

4.2 Thesis 2: Representational Base of Consciousness of Oneself and One’s States

How does apperception give rise to consciousness of oneself and one’s states? In the passage just quoted from the Anthropology, notice the phrase “consciousness of what we are doing” — doing. The way in which one becomes conscious of an act of representing is not by receiving intuitions but by doing it: “synthesis …, as an act, … is conscious to itself, even without sensibility” (B153); “… this representation is an act of spontaneity , that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility” (B132).

Equally, we can be conscious of ourselves as subject merely by doing acts of representing. No further representation is needed.

Man, … who knows the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses [A546=B574].

How does one’s consciousness of oneself in one’s acts of representing work? Consider the sentence:

I am looking at the words on the screen in front of me.

Kant’s claim seems to be that the representation of the words on the screen is all the experience I need to be conscious not just of the words and the screen but also of the act of seeing them and of who is seeing them, namely, me. A single representation can do all three jobs. Let us call an act of representing that can make one conscious of its object, itself and oneself as its subject the representational base of consciousness of these three items. [ 7 ] Kant’s second major thesis is,

• Most ordinary representations generated by most ordinary acts of synthesis provide the representational base of consciousness of oneself and one’s states.

Note that this representational base is the base not only of consciousness of one’s representational states. It is also the base of consciousness of oneself as the subject of those states—as the thing that has and does them. Though it is hard to know for sure, Kant would probably have denied that consciousness of oneself in inner sense can make one conscious of oneself as subject, of oneself as oneself, in this way.

For Kant, this distinction between consciousness of oneself and one’s states by doing acts of synthesis and consciousness of oneself and one’s states as the objects of particular representations is of fundamental importance. When one is conscious of oneself and one’s states by doing cognitive and perceptual acts, one is conscious of oneself as spontaneous, rational, self-legislating, free—as the doer of deeds, not just as a passive receptacle for representations: “I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination” (B158–159), of “the activity of the self” (B68) (Sellars, 1970–1; Pippin, 1987).

So far we have focussed on individual representations. For Kant, however, the representations that serve as the representational base of consciousness of oneself as subject are usually much ‘bigger’ than that, i.e., contain multiple objects and often multiple representations of them tied together into what Kant called ‘general experience’.

When we speak of different experiences, we can refer only to the various perceptions, all of which belong to one and the same general experience. This thoroughgoing synthetic unity of perceptions is the form of experience; it is nothing less than the synthetic unity of appearances in accordance with concepts [A110].

This general experience is the global representation introduced earlier. When I am conscious of many objects and/or representations of them as the single object of a single global representation, the latter representation is all the representation I need to be conscious not just of the global object but also of myself as the common subject of all the constituent representations.

The mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations… if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordinates all [the manifold] … to a transcendental unity… [A108].

I am conscious of myself as the single common subject of a certain group of experiences by being conscious of “the identity of the consciousness in … conjoined … representations” (B133).

4.3 Thesis 3: Consciousness in Inner Sense is Only of How One Appears to Oneself

Neither consciousness of self by doing apperceptive acts nor empirical consciousness of self as the object of particular representations yields knowledge of oneself as one is. On pain of putting his right to believe in immortality as an article of faith at risk, Kant absolutely had to claim this. As he put it,

it would be a great stumbling block, or rather would be the one unanswerable objection, to our whole critique if it were possible to prove a priori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances. [B409]

The same would hold for all other properties of thinking beings. Since Kant also sometimes viewed immortality, i.e., personal continuity beyond death, as a foundation of morality, morality could also be at risk. So Kant had powerful motives to maintain that one does not know oneself as one is. Yet, according to him, we seem to know at least some things about ourselves, namely, how we must function, and it would be implausible to maintain that one never conscious of one’s real self at all. Kant’s response to these pressures is ingenious.

First, he treats inner sense: When we know ourselves as the object of a representation in inner sense, we “know even ourselves only .. as appearance …” (A278).

Inner … sense … represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. For we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected [by ourselves] (B153).

This is the third thesis:

• In inner sense, one is conscious of oneself only as one appears to oneself, not as one is.

So when we seem to be directly conscious of features of ourselves, we in fact have the same kind of consciousness of them as we have of features of things in general—we appear to ourselves to be like this, that or the other, in just the way that we know of any object only as it appears to us.

Then he turns to consciousness of oneself and one’s states by doing apperceptive acts. This is a knottier problem. Here we will consider only consciousness of oneself as subject. Certainly by the second edition, Kant had come to see how implausible it would be to maintain that one has no consciousness of oneself, one’s real self, at all when one is conscious of oneself as the subject of one’s experience, agent of one’s acts, by having these experiences and doing those acts. In the 2 nd edition, he reflects this sensitivity as early as B68; at B153, he goes so far as to say that an apparent contradiction is involved.

Furthermore, when we are conscious of ourselves as subject and agent by doing acts of apperceiving, we do appear to ourselves to be substantial, simple and continuing. He had to explain these appearances away; doing so was one of his aims, indeed, in his attacks on the second and third Paralogisms. Thus, Kant had strong motives to give consciousness of self as subject special treatment. The view that proposes is puzzling. I am not consciousness of myself as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself but only “that I am” (B157). To understand what he might mean here, we need a couple of intermediate theses. They contain the remarkable insights into reference to and consciousness of self mentioned earlier.

Kant generated the special treatment he needed by focussing first on reference to self. Here are some of the things that he said about reference to oneself as subject. It is a consciousness of self in which “nothing manifold is given.” (B135). In the kind of reference in which we gain this consciousness of self, we “denote” but do not “represent” ourselves (A382). We designate ourselves without noting “any quality whatsoever” in ourselves (A355). This yields his fourth thesis about consciousness of and knowledge of self.

• The referential machinery used to obtain consciousness of self as subject requires no identifying (or other) ascription of properties to oneself.

This is a remarkably penetrating claim; remember, the study of reference and semantics generally is usually thought to have begun only with Frege. Kant is anticipating two important theses about reference to self that next saw the light of day only 200 years later.

• In such cases, first-person indexicals (I, me, my, mine) cannot be analysed out in favour of anything else, in particular anything descriptionlike (the essential indexical) (Perry 1979).

Was Kant actually aware of (1) and/or (2) or had he just stumbled across something that later philosophers recognized as significant?

One standard argument for (1) goes as follows:

My use of the word ‘I’ as the subject of [statements such as ‘I feel pain’ or ‘I see a canary’] is not due to my having identified as myself something [otherwise recognized] of which I know, or believe, or wish to say, that the predicate of my statement applies to it [Shoemaker 1968, pp.558].

A standard argument for (2), that certain indexicals are essential, goes as follows. To know that I wrote a certain book a few years ago, it is not enough to know that someone over six feet tall wrote that book, or that someone who teaches philosophy at a particular university wrote that book, or … or … or … , for I could know all these things without knowing that it was me who has these properties (and I could know that it was me who wrote that book and not know that any of these things are properties of me). As Shoemaker puts it,

… no matter how detailed a token-reflexive-free description of a person is, … it cannot possibly entail that I am that person [1968, pp. 560].

Kant unquestionably articulated the argument for (1):

In attaching ‘I’ to our thoughts, we designate the subject only transcendentally … without noting in it any quality whatsoever—in fact, without knowing anything of it either directly or by inference [A355].

This transcendental designation, i.e., referring to oneself using ‘I’ without ‘noting any quality’ in oneself, has some unusual features. One can refer to oneself in a variety of ways, of course: as the person in the mirror, as the person born on such and such a date in such and such a place, as the first person to do X , and so on, but one way of referring to oneself is special: it does not require identifying or indeed any ascription to oneself. So Kant tells us. [ 9 ]

The question is more complicated with respect to (2). We cannot go into the complexities here (see Brook 2001). Here we will just note three passages in which Kant may be referring to the essential indexical or something like it.

The subject of the categories cannot by thinking the categories [i.e. applying them to objects] acquire a concept of itself as an object of the categories. For in order to think them, its pure self-consciousness, which is what was to be explained, must itself be presupposed. [B422]

The phrase ‘its pure self-consciousness’ seems to refer to consciousness of oneself as subject. If so, the passage may be saying that judgments about oneself, i.e., ascriptions of properties to oneself, ‘presuppose … pure self-consciousness’, i.e., consciousness of oneself via an act of ascription-free transcendental designation.

Now compare this, “it is … very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose to know any object … .” (A402), and this,

Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X . It is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept whatsoever, but can only revolve in a perpetual circle, since any judgment upon it has always already made use of its representation. [A346=B404]

The last clause is the key one: “any judgment upon it has always already made use of its representation”. Kant seems to be saying that to know that anything is true of me, I must first know that it is me of whom it is true. This is something very like the essential indexical claim.

If reference to self takes place without ‘noting any properties’ of oneself, the consciousness that results will also have some special features.

The most important special feature is that, in this kind of consciousness of self, one is not, or need not be, conscious of any properties of oneself, certainly not any particular properties. One has the same consciousness of self no matter what else one is conscious of — thinking, perceiving, laughing, being miserable, or whatever. Kant expressed the thought this way,

through the ‘I’, as simple representation, nothing manifold is given. [B135]

the I that I think is distinct from the I that it … intuits …; I am given to myself beyond that which is given in intuition. [B155]

We now have the fifth thesis to be found in Kant:

• When one is conscious of oneself as subject, one has a bare consciousness of self in which “nothing manifold is given.”

Since, on Kant’s view, one can refer to oneself as oneself without knowing any properties of oneself, not just identifying properties, ‘non-ascriptive reference to self’ might capture what is special about this form of consciousness of self better than Shoemaker’s ‘self-reference without identification’.

Transcendental designation immediately yields the distinction that Kant needs to allow that one is conscious of oneself as one is, not just of an appearance of self, and yet deny knowledge of oneself as one is. If consciousness of self ascribes nothing to the self, it can be a “bare … consciousness of self [as one is]” and yet yield no knowledge of self—it is “very far from being a knowledge of the self” (B158). This thesis returns us to consciousness of self as subject:

• When one is conscious of oneself as subject, one’s bare consciousness of self yields no knowledge of self.

In Kant’s own work, he then put the idea of transcendental designation to work to explain how one can appear to oneself to be substantial, simple and persisting without these appearances reflecting how one actually is. The reason that one appears in these ways is not that the self is some strange, indefinable being. It is because of the kind of referring that we do to become conscious of oneself as subject. Given how long ago he worked, Kant’s insights into this kind of referring are nothing short of amazing.

The last of Kant’s seven theses about consciousness of self is an idea that we already met when we discussed the unity of consciousness:

• When we are conscious of ourselves as subject, we are conscious of ourselves as the “single common subject” [CPR, A350] of a number of representations.

What Kant likely had in mind is nicely captured in a remark of Bennett’s (1974, p. 83): to think of myself as a plurality of things is to think of my being conscious of this plurality, “and that pre-requires an undivided me .” Unlike one of anything else, it is not optional that I think of myself as one subject across a variety of experiences (A107).

The remarks just noted about ‘bare consciousness’ and so on by no means exhaust the concerns that can be raised about Kant and what we can know about the mind. His official view has to be: nothing — about the mind’s structure and what it is composed of, at any rate, we can know nothing. As we have seen, Kant not only maintained this but did some ingenious wiggling to account for the apparent counter-evidence. But that is not the end of the story, for two reasons.

First, whatever the commitments of his philosophy, Kant the person believed that the soul is simple and persists beyond death; he found materialism utterly repugnant (1783, Ak. IV, end of §46). This is an interesting psychological fact about Kant but needs no further discussion.

Second and more importantly, Kant in fact held that we do have knowledge of the mind as it is. In particular, we know that it has forms of intuition in which it must locate things spatially and temporally, that it must synthesize the raw manifold of intuition in three ways, that its consciousness must be unified, and so on — all the aspects of the model examined above.

To square his beliefs about what we cannot know and what we do know about the mind, Kant could have made at least two moves. He could have said that we know these things only ‘transcendentally’, that is to say, by inference to the necessary conditions of experience. We do not know them directly, in some sense of ‘directly’, so we don’t have intuitive, i.e., sense-derived knowledge of them. Or he could have said that ontological neutrality about structure and composition is compatible with knowledge of function. As we saw, Kant’s conception of the mind is functionalist—to understand the mind, we must study what it does and can do, its functions—and the doctrine that function does not dictate form is at the heart of contemporary functionalism. According to functionalism, we can gain knowledge of the mind’s functions while knowing little or nothing about how the mind is built. Approached this way, Kant’s view that we know nothing of the structure and composition of the mind would just be a radical version of this functionalist idea. Either move would restore consistency among his various claims about knowledge of the mind.

We will close by returning to the question of Kant’s relationship to contemporary cognitive research. As we saw, some of Kant’s most characteristic doctrines about the mind are now built into the very foundations of cognitive science. We laid out what they were. Interestingly, some of the others have played little or no role.

Consider the two forms of Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept. In the form of binding, the phenomenon that he had in mind in the first kind of synthesis is now widely studied. Indeed, one model, Anne Treisman’s (1980) three-stage model, is very similar to all three stages of synthesis in Kant. According to Treisman and her colleagues, object recognition proceeds in three stages: first feature detection, then location of features on a map of locations, and then integration and identification of objects under concepts. This compares directly to Kant’s three-stage model of apprehension of features, association of features (reproduction), and recognition of integrated groups of under concepts (A98-A106). However, Kant’s second kind of recognition under concepts, the activity of tying multiple representations together into a global representation (A107–14), has received little attention.

The same was true until recently of the unity of consciousness and Kant’s work on it. However, this is changing. In the past twenty years, the unity of consciousness has come back onto the research agenda and there are now hundreds of papers and a number of books on the topic. However, claims such as Kant’s that a certain form of synthesis and certain links among the contents of experience are required for unity continue to be ignored in cognitive science, though a few philosophers have done some work on them (Brook 2004). The same is true of Kant’s views on consciousness of self; cognitive science has paid no attention to non-ascriptive identification of self and the idea of the essential indexical. Here, too, a few philosophers have worked on these issues, apparently without knowing of Kant’s contribution (Brook & DeVidi, 2001), but not cognitive scientists.

In short, the dominant model of the mind in contemporary cognitive science is Kantian, but some of his most distinctive contributions have not been taken into it (Brook, 2004).

Primary Literature

The Cambridge Edition of the Work of Immanuel Kant in Translation has translations into English complete with scholarly apparatus of nearly all Kant’s writings. It is probably the best single source for Kant’s works in English. Except for references to the Critique of Pure Reason , all references will include the volume number and where appropriate the page number of the Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Koniglichen Preussischen Academie der Wissenschaften, 29 Vols. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter et al., 1902– [in the format, Ak. XX:yy]).

• Kant, I. (1781/1787) Critique of Pure Reason , P. Guyer and A. Wood (trans.), Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. (The passages quoted in the article above generally follow this translation and/or the Kemp Smith translation but all translations were checked.) References to CPR are in the standard pagination of the 1 st (A) and 2 nd (B) editions. A reference to only one edition means that the passage appeared only in that edition.)
• Kant, I. (1783) Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , P. Carus (trans.), revised and with an Introduction by James Ellington, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishers, 1977 (Ak. IV).
• Kant, I. (1786) The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science , translated and with an Introduction by James Ellington, Indianapolis, IN: Library of Liberal Arts, 1970. (Ak. IV).
• Kant, I. (1798) Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View , Mary Gregor (trans.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974 (Ak. VII).

Works on Kant on the Mind and Consciousness

Thanks to Julian Wuerth for help with this section.

In the past two decades alone, of the order of 45,000 new books and new editions by or about Kant have been published. Thus, any bibliography is bound to be incomplete. In what follows, we have focused on books of the past ten years or so in English that are having an influence, along with a few important earlier commentaries. General bibliographies are readily available on the websites listed later.

• Allais, Lucy, 2009. “Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 47(3): 383–413.
• –––, 2015. Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and His Realism , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Allison, H., 1983 [2004]. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense , 1st edition 1983, 2nd edition 2004, New Haven: Yale University Press.
• –––, 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2015. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Altman, M. C., 2007. A Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason , Boulder, CO: Westview Press
• Ameriks, K., 1983. “Kant and Guyer on Apperception”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 65: 174–86.
• –––, 1990. “Kant, Fichte, and Short Arguments to Idealism”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 72: 63–85.
• –––, 2000. Kant’s Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason , 2 nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2006. Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy As Critical Interpretation , Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Aquila, Richard, 1989. Matter in Mind , Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
• Banham, G., 2006. Kant’s Transcendental Imagination , Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
• Beck, L. W., 2002. Selected Essays on Kant (North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 6), Rochester NY: North American Kant Society. [NAKS has published an excellent series of roughly annual books on Kant. Some more examples will be cited below.]
• Beiser, F. C., 2006. The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
• Bennett, J., 1966. Kant’s Analytic , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1974. Kant’s Dialectic , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Bird, G., 2006. The Revolutionary Kant , Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing
• –––, 2009. A Companion to Kant , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
• Brook, A., 1993. “Kant’s A Priori Methods for Recognizing Necessary Truths”, in Return of the A Priori , Philip Hanson and Bruce Hunter (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume), 18: 215–52.
• –––, 1994. Kant and the Mind , Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1998. “Critical Notice of L. Falkenstein, Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic ”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 29: 247–68.
• –––, 2001. “Kant on self-reference and self-awareness”, in A. Brook and R. DeVidi (eds.) 2001.
• –––, 2004. “Kant, cognitive science, and contemporary neo-Kantianism”, in D. Zahavi (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies (special issue), 11: 1–25.
• Buroker, J. V., 2006. Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’: An Introduction (Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Caranti, L., 2007. Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy: The Kantian Critique of Cartesian Scepticism (Toronto Studies in Philosophy), Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
• Carl, Wolfgang, 1989. Der Schweigende Kant: Die Entwürfe zu einer Deduktion der Kategorien vor 1781 , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
• Caygill, H., 1995. A Kant Dictionary , Oxford: Blackwell Publishers
• Chignell, Andrew, 2017. “Can’t Kant Cognize himself? Or, A Problem for (Almost) Every Interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism”, in Kant and the Philosophy of Mind , A. Gomes and A. Stephenson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Choi, Yoon, 2019. “Spontaneity and Self-Consciousness in the Groundwork and the B-Critique ”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 49(7): 936–955.
• Cohen, A., 2009. Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology and History , Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers.
• –––, 2014. Kant on Emotions and Value , Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers.
• –––, 2014. Critical Guide to Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Deimling, Wiebke, 2014. “Kant’s Pragmatic Concept of Emotions,” in Kant on Emotion and Value , Alix Cohen (ed.), London: Palgrave Macmillan.
• –––, 2018. “Two Different Kinds of Value? Kant on Feeling and Moral Cognition”, Kant and the Faculty of Feeling , Kelly Sorensen and Diane Williamson (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Dickerson, A.B., 2007. Kant on Representation and Objectivity , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
• Dyck, Corey W., 2014. Kant and Rational Psychology , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Easton, P.A. (ed.), 1997. Logic and the Workings of the Mind (North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy: Volume 5), Rochester NA: North American Kant Society.
• Emundts, Dina, 2017. “Kant’s Ideal of Self-Knowledge,” in Self-Knowledge. A History , Ursula Renz (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 183–198.
• –––, 2013. “Kant über Selbstbewusstsein”, in Self, World, Art. Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel , Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 51–78.
• Falkenstein, L., 1995. Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic , Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
• Forster, M. N., 2008. Kant and Skepticism , Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press
• Friedman, M., 1992. Kant and the Exact Sciences , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
• Frierson, Patrick R., 2003. Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Gardner, S., 2012. Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason (Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks), London: Routledge Francis Taylor.
• Ginsborg, H., 1990. The Role of Taste in Kant’s Theory of Cognition (Routledge Library Editions: Kant). London: Routledge Francis Taylor.
• Glock, H.-J., 2003. Strawson and Kant (Mind Association Occasional Series), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Goldman, A., 2012. Kant and the Subject of Critique: On the Regulative Role of the Psychological Idea , South Bend, IN: University of Indiana Press.
• Grier, M., 2007. Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Modern European Philosophy), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Guyer, P., 1980. “Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis.” American Philosophical Quarterly , 17: 205–12.
• –––, 1987. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge , Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2005. Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays , Oxford: Oxford University Press
• –––, 2006. Kant (Series: Routledge Philosophers), London: Routledge Taylor
• –––, 1987. The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
• –––, 2008. Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant’s Response to Hume , Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press
• Guyer, P. (ed.), 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Kant , Cambridge:Cambridge University Press
• ––– (ed.), 2010. The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason , Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Hall, B., M. Black and M. Sheffield, 2010. The Arguments of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Hanna, R., 2004. Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2006. Kant, Science, and Human Nature , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2015. The Rational Human Condition 5—Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Heidemann, D., 2012. Kant and Non-Conceptual Content , London: Routledge Taylor Francis.
• Hems, N., D. Schulting and G. Banham (eds.), 2012. The Continuum Companion to Kant , London: Continuum Publishers.
• Henrich, D., 1976. Identität und Objektivität , Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitäts-Verlag.
• Höffe, Otfried, 1994. Immanuel Kant , Marshall Farrier (trans.), Albany: SUNY Press.
• Horstmann, Rolf-Peter, 1993. “Kants Paralogismen”, Kant-Studien , 84: 408-25.
• Hogan, Desmond, 2009. “How to Know Unknowable Things in Themselves”, Noûs , 43(1): 49–63.
• Howell, R., 1992. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction , Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishers
• –––, (2001). “Kant, the ‘I Think’, and Self-Awareness”, in Kant’s Legacy. Essays in Honor of Lewis White Beck , Cicovacki, Predrag (ed.), Rochester NY: University of Rochester Press, 117–152.
• Huneman, P., 2007. Understanding Purpose: Kant and the Philosophy of Biology (North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy: Volume 9), Rochester NA: North American Kant Society.
• Jacobs, B. and Kain, P. (eds.), 2007. Essays on Kant’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
• Jauernig, Anja, 2019. “Finite minds and their representations in Leibniz and Kant”, in Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism , Sally Sedgwick and Dina Edmundts (eds.), Berlin: de Gruyter, 47–80.
• Keller, P., 1998. Kant and the Demands of Self-consciousness , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Kitcher, P., 1984. “Kant’s Real Self,” in Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy , Allen W. Wood (ed.), Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 113–147.
• –––, 1990. Kant’s Transcendental Psychology , New York: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2011. Kant’s Thinker , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kleingeld, P., 2011. Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Klemme, Heiner, 1996. Kants Philosophie des Subjekts. Systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Selbstbewußtsein und Selbsterkenntnis , Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
• Kneller, J., 2007. Kant and the Power of Imagination , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Korsgaard, Christine M., 1990. The Standpoint of Practical Reason , New York: Garland.
• –––, 1989. “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit”, Philosophy and Public Affairs , 18(2): 101–132.
• –––, 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kraus, Katharina, 2019. “The Parity and Disparity between Inner and Outer Experience in Kant”, Kantian Review 24(2): 171–195.
• –––, 2020. Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation: The Nature of Inner Experience , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Kreimendahl, Lothar, 1990. Kant—Der Durchbruch von 1769 , Köln: Jürgen Dinter.
• Kuehn, M., 2001. Kant: A Biography , Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Kukla, R. (ed.), 2006. Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
• Laywine, A., 1993. Kant’s Early Metaphysics and the Origins of the Critical Philosophy (North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy: Volume 3), Rochester NA: North American Kant Society.
• Longuenesse, Béatrice, 1998. Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason , Charles T. Wolfe (trans.), Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 2005. Kant on the Human Standpoint , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2007. “Kant’s ‘I think’ versus Descartes’ ‘I am a Thing that Thinks’”, in Kant and the Early Moderns , Beatrice Longuenesse and Daniel Garber (eds.), Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 9–31.
• –––, 2017. I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Louden, R., 2011. Kant’s Human Being: Essays on His Theory of Human Nature , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Marshall, Colin, 2013. “Kant’s one self and the appearance/thing in itself distinction,” Kant-Studien , 104(4): 421–441.
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• Melnick, Arthur, 2009. Kant’s Theory of the Self , New York: Routledge Taylor Francis.
• Meerbote, R., 1989. “Kant’s functionalism,” in J. C.Smith (ed.), Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science , Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel.
• –––, 1982. “Wille and Willkür in Kant’s Theory of Action,” in Moltke S. Gram (ed.), Interpreting Kant , Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 69–84.
• Merritt, Melissa, 2018. Kant on Reflection and Virtue , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Mohr, Georg, 1991. Das sinnliche Ich. Innerer Sinn und Bewußtsein bei Kant , Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann.
• Neiman, Susan, 1997. The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Newton, Alexandra, 2019. “Kant and the transparency of the mind,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 49(7): 890–915.
• Peters, Julia, 2018. “Kant’s Gesinnung”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 56(3): 497–518.
• Pippin, R., 1987. “Kant on the spontaneity of mind”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 17: 449–476.
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• Reinhold, Carl Leonhard, 1790 [1975]. “Erörterung des Begriffs von der Freiheit des Willens”, in Materialien zu Kants “Kritik der praktischen Vernunft” , Rüdiger Bittner and Konrad Cramer (eds.), Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
• Rosefeldt, Tobias, 2000. Das logische Ich: Kant über den Gehalt des Begriffes von sich selbst (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung), Berlin: Philo.
• Rosenberg, Jay F., 1987. “‘I Think’: Some Reflections on Kant’s Paralogisms”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 10: 503–30.
• Sassen, B., 2000. Kant’s Early Critics , Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
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• Scruton, R., 2011. Kant , New York: Sterling Publishers.
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Other References

• Brook, A., 2001, “The unity of consciousness”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2001 Edition) , Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2001/entries/consciousness-unity/ >.
• Brook, A. and DeVidi, R. (eds.), 2001. Self-Reference and Self-Awareness , Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
• Perry, J., 2001, “The essential indexical”, in Brook and DeVidi 2001.
• Shoemaker, S., 1968. “Self-reference and self-awareness”, in Brook and DeVidi (eds.) 2001
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• Treisman, A., and Glade, G., 1980. “A feature-integration theory of attention”, Cognitive Psychology , 12: 97–136.
• Wittgenstein, L., 1934–5. Blue and Brown Books , Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Kant on the Web and the NAKS site listed below contain links to many other sites.

• Kant on the Web , maintained by Steve Palmquist, Hong Kong Baptist University. Contains a bibliography of translations of Kant up to 2011 and much else.
• North American Kant Society (NAKS) .

a priori justification and knowledge | consciousness: unity of | Descartes, René | functionalism | idealism | Kant, Immanuel | Kant, Immanuel: and Hume on causality | Kant, Immanuel: and Hume on morality | Kant, Immanuel: philosophy of science | Kant, Immanuel: transcendental arguments | Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm | Reid, Thomas | self-consciousness

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Paul Guyer, Paul Raymont, Rick DeVidi, Julian Wuerth, Kirsta Anderson, and an anonymous referee for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for very helpful comments.

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The Power of the Mind - Essay Example

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Understanding The Power of Mindset: What is a Mindset & Why Does it Matter?

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• October 11, 2023

Mindset is more than just a fleeting thought or belief; it’s the lens through which we view the world. It’s the filter that colors our experiences and determines our responses to challenges and opportunities. It’s the difference between seeing an obstacle as an insurmountable wall or a stepping stone on the path to growth.

Fixed Mindset vs. Growth Mindset

Our mindset can be classified into two primary categories: the fixed mindset and the growth mindset. A fixed mindset sees abilities and intelligence as static traits, etched in stone from birth. In contrast, a growth mindset views these attributes as dynamic, capable of expansion through effort, learning, and resilience.

Think of the fixed mindset as a stagnant pool, hesitant to adapt or change. It shies away from challenges, fearing that failure will validate its perceived limitations. On the flip side, the growth mindset resembles a flowing river, eagerly embracing challenges as opportunities for growth and personal development.

The Science Behind Mindset

What makes mindset even more intriguing is that it isn’t just a philosophical concept; it’s grounded in science. Our brains, marvels of adaptability, are in a constant state of transformation based on our thoughts and experiences. This phenomenon, known as neuroplasticity, underscores the notion that our mindset can physically mold our brain’s structure and function.

Impact on Wellbeing and Success

In this extensive exploration of the power of mindset, we delve deeper into the definitions, types, and profound influence it wields over our lives. We peel back the layers of scientific understanding that validate its significance. And, most importantly, we provide practical steps and insights to help you cultivate a growth-oriented mindset.

Join us in this quest to understand the very essence of mindset and discover why it matters more than you might ever have imagined .

Defining Mindset

Mindset, in its essence, is the lens through which we perceive and interact with the world around us. It’s the cognitive filter that shapes our thoughts, beliefs, and responses to life’s myriad experiences. But to truly understand the power of mindset, we must first define it and explore its foundational principles.

A Lens of Perception

At its core, mindset represents a set of deeply ingrained attitudes and beliefs that influence our interpretation of reality. Imagine it as the pair of glasses through which we view the world, determining whether we see opportunities or obstacles, growth or stagnation, success or failure.

The Origin of Mindset

The concept of mindset has its roots in the field of psychology, where it was first introduced by psychologist Carol Dweck. Dweck’s groundbreaking work in the late 20th century shed light on the pivotal role mindset plays in shaping human behavior and achievement. Since then, it has become a pivotal subject of study, revealing its profound impact on various aspects of life.

Influence on Perception and Behavior

Our mindset serves as the curator of our mental landscape. It affects how we perceive challenges, setbacks, and opportunities. With a growth mindset, we see challenges as opportunities to learn and grow. In contrast, a fixed mindset tends to perceive challenges as threats to our abilities.

Furthermore, mindset plays a significant role in our behaviors and actions. It dictates whether we embrace challenges with resilience or retreat from them in fear. It determines whether we pursue self-improvement or settle for the status quo.

A Spectrum of Mindsets

While the most commonly discussed mindsets are the fixed mindset and the growth mindset, it’s crucial to recognize that mindset exists along a spectrum. At any given moment, our mindset may lean more toward fixed or growth, influenced by our beliefs, experiences, and emotions.

In essence, mindset is not a fixed trait; it’s malleable. We have the capacity to shift and reshape our mindset, opening the door to personal growth and transformative change. This very capacity is what makes understanding mindset a powerful tool for personal development.

As we delve deeper into the exploration of mindset, we’ll move beyond mere definitions and venture into the fascinating world of the different types of mindsets. In the following sections, we’ll uncover the fixed mindset’s limitations and the boundless possibilities of the growth mindset. Together, we’ll embark on a journey to harness the power of mindset for a more fulfilling and successful life.

Types of Mindsets

The Fixed Mindset

A fixed mindset is characterized by the belief that abilities and intelligence are static traits. Individuals with a fixed mindset often avoid challenges to maintain a sense of competence. Failure is viewed as a reflection of inherent limitations, leading to a fear of making mistakes.

The fixed mindset can limit personal and professional growth, as it discourages taking risks and embracing new experiences. It fosters a preference for staying in one’s comfort zone rather than pursuing opportunities for learning and development.

Individuals with a fixed mindset may become discouraged in the face of setbacks and may give up on challenging goals.

Real-World Examples

A student who believes that their intelligence is fixed may avoid taking on challenging courses for fear of receiving a lower grade.

An employee with a fixed mindset may resist taking on new responsibilities at work to avoid the possibility of failure.

The Growth Mindset

A growth mindset is characterized by the belief that abilities and intelligence can be developed through effort, learning, and perseverance.

Individuals with a growth mindset embrace challenges as opportunities for personal growth and improvement. Failure is seen as a natural part of the learning process, and setbacks are viewed as opportunities to learn and adapt.

The growth mindset fosters resilience in the face of challenges, as individuals believe in their capacity to improve over time. It encourages a passion for learning and a willingness to take on new challenges and experiences.

Individuals with a growth mindset tend to have a more positive outlook on life and a greater sense of self-efficacy.

A student with a growth mindset approaches difficult subjects with enthusiasm, knowing that effort and learning will lead to improvement.

An entrepreneur with a growth mindset views setbacks as valuable learning experiences and persists in pursuing their goals.

The Spectrum of Mindsets

It’s important to note that mindsets exist along a spectrum, and individuals may exhibit characteristics of both fixed and growth mindsets in different situations. Understanding this spectrum allows us to recognize that mindset is not a fixed trait; it can be cultivated and developed.

As we explore the power of mindset further, we’ll delve into the practical implications of these mindsets in our lives. We’ll discover how a growth mindset can lead to personal and p rofessional success  and how to transition from a fixed mindset to a growth-oriented perspective.

The fixed mindset is a lens through which individuals perceive their abilities and intelligence as static, innate traits. In this section, we’ll delve deeper into the characteristics, impact, and limitations of a fixed mindset.

Characteristics of a Fixed Mindset:

Fear of Failure: Individuals with a fixed mindset often fear failure as it is seen as a confirmation of their inherent limitations. This fear can lead to risk aversion and a reluctance to take on challenges.

Avoidance of Challenges: To maintain a sense of competence, those with a fixed mindset may avoid situations that could potentially expose their shortcomings. This avoidance can hinder personal and professional growth.

Belief in Fixed Intelligence: In a fixed mindset, intelligence is perceived as a fixed trait, and the belief is that one either has it or doesn’t. This belief can limit the pursuit of new knowledge and skills.

Impact of a Fixed Mindset

The fixed mindset imposes significant limitations on individuals’ lives:

Stagnation: Individuals may remain stagnant in their comfort zones, avoiding opportunities for growth and development.

Lack of Resilience: When faced with setbacks or failures, those with a fixed mindset may become discouraged and give up easily.

Underachievement: The fear of making mistakes or failing to meet high expectations can lead to underachievement and missed opportunities.

Academic Performance: A student with a fixed mindset may avoid enrolling in challenging courses because they fear receiving a lower grade and the associated blow to their self-esteem.

Professional Growth: In the workplace, employees with a fixed mindset may resist taking on new responsibilities or projects that require them to step outside their comfort zone.

Transitioning from a Fixed Mindset

In the following sections, we’ll explore the transformative power of adopting a growth mindset. We’ll discover how it leads to resilience, a passion for learning, and a more positive outlook on life. By understanding the limitations of a fixed mindset, we open the door to personal growth and success.

The growth mindset represents a profound shift in perspective, where individuals believe that abilities and intelligence can be developed through effort, learning, and resilience. In this section, we’ll explore the attributes, benefits, and real-world examples of a growth mindset.

Characteristics of a Growth Mindset:

Embrace of Challenges: Individuals with a growth mindset welcome challenges as opportunities for growth and development. They see setbacks as stepping stones toward improvement.

View of Failure as Learning: Failure is not a source of shame but a valuable learning experience. A growth mindset encourages individuals to analyze failures, adapt, and persevere.

Passion for Learning: Those with a growth mindset have a natural enthusiasm for learning and acquiring new knowledge and skills. They understand that effort is a path to mastery.

Benefits of a Growth Mindset:

A growth mindset brings about a range of positive outcomes:

Resilience: Individuals with a growth mindset are resilient in the face of challenges, bouncing back from setbacks with determination.

Positive Outlook: They tend to have a more positive outlook on life, seeing opportunities even in difficult situations.

Continuous Improvement: The passion for learning drives continuous improvement, leading to personal and professional success.

Academic Success: A student with a growth mindset may actively seek out challenging courses, viewing them as opportunities to expand their knowledge.

Entrepreneurial Pursuits: Entrepreneurs with a growth mindset are more likely to persevere through the challenges of starting a business, viewing failures as steps toward eventual success.

Cultivating a Growth Mindset

The transition from a fixed mindset to a growth mindset is achievable:

Self-Awareness: Recognizing the presence of a fixed mindset is the first step. Awareness allows individuals to challenge their limiting beliefs.

Effort and Learning: Emphasize the value of effort and learning over immediate success. Encourage a willingness to make mistakes and learn from them.

Continuous Growth: Foster a culture of continuous growth and improvement, both personally and professionally.

As we explore further in this article, we’ll delve into the practical applications of a growth mindset in various aspects of life. We’ll discover how it can drive personal and professional success, resilience, and a more fulfilling life. By understanding and embracing the principles of a growth mindset, individuals can unlock their potential and achieve their goals.

While mindset may sound like a philosophical concept, it has solid grounding in scientific research. In this section, we’ll explore the fascinating science behind mindset, including neuroplasticity and the brain’s adaptability.

Neuroplasticity: The Brain’s Remarkable Ability to Adapt

At the heart of understanding mindset is the concept of neuroplasticity—the brain’s remarkable capacity to change and adapt in response to experiences, thoughts, and learning. This phenomenon challenges the notion that our abilities and intelligence are fixed from birth.

The Plastic Brain: Neuroplasticity reveals that our brains are highly adaptable, constantly forming new neural connections and pathways in response to learning and experiences.

Shaping Thought Patterns: Mindset plays a pivotal role in determining the thought patterns that activate and strengthen specific neural pathways. A growth mindset, for instance, encourages the brain to seek opportunities for learning and improvement.

The Role of Mindset in Brain Plasticity

Mindset influences neuroplasticity in profound ways:

Growth Mindset and Learning: A growth mindset aligns with the brain’s natural inclination for learning and adaptability. When individuals believe in their capacity to grow and improve, their brains are more receptive to new knowledge and skills.

Fixed Mindset and Limitations: Conversely, a fixed mindset can restrict the brain’s adaptability. Believing in fixed intelligence may limit the exploration of new concepts and skills.

Research Findings Supporting Mindset

Psychology and neuroscience research offer compelling evidence supporting the concept of mindset:

Impact on Behavior: Studies show that individuals with a growth mindset tend to engage in more effortful learning and are more likely to persist in the face of challenges.

Brain Structure Changes: Research indicates that the brain structure can change in response to mindset shifts. The adoption of a growth mindset can lead to the development of new neural pathways associated with learning and skill improvement.

Resilience and Stress Reduction: A growth mindset has been linked to increased resilience and reduced stress levels, demonstrating its profound impact on mental health.

Embracing the Power of Mindset and Science

As we progress through this article, we’ll continue to explore the practical applications of mindset, how it influences various aspects of life, and provide guidance on cultivating a growth-oriented mindset. By doing so, we empower ourselves to harness the science of mindset for personal growth and success.

The Impact of Mindset on Wellbeing

Mindset extends its influence beyond cognitive patterns; it has a profound impact on our overall wellbeing. In this section, we’ll explore the connection between mindset and mental health, stress reduction, and overall life satisfaction.

Mindset and Mental Health:

A growth mindset contributes to improved mental health in several ways:

Reduced Anxiety: Embracing a growth mindset can reduce anxiety as individuals become more comfortable with the idea of making mistakes and facing challenges.

Increased Resilience: Those with a growth mindset are better equipped to bounce back from setbacks, contributing to overall emotional resilience.

Positive Self-Image: A growth mindset fosters a positive self-image, as individuals recognize their capacity for improvement and growth.

Mindset and Stress Reduction:

Stress is an inevitable part of life, but mindset influences how we perceive and respond to it:

Stress Reduction: Individuals with a growth mindset tend to view stress as a manageable challenge rather than an overwhelming burden.

Coping Mechanisms: A growth mindset encourages the development of healthy coping mechanisms, such as seeking support, problem-solving, and maintaining a sense of perspective.

Emotional Wellbeing: A growth mindset contributes to improved emotional wellbeing, reducing the negative impact of stress on mental health.

Mindset and Overall Life Satisfaction:

Mindset plays a significant role in shaping overall life satisfaction:

Fulfillment: A growth mindset promotes a sense of fulfillment as individuals actively pursue personal growth and development.

Positive Outlook: It encourages a positive outlook on life, leading to greater satisfaction in both personal and professional realms.

Relationships: A growth mindset can enhance relationships by fostering understanding, empathy, and effective communication.

Practical Techniques for Cultivating a Growth Mindset for Wellbeing

Mindfulness Meditation: Mindfulness practices can help individuals become more aware of their thought patterns and emotions, enabling them to shift toward a growth mindset.

Positive Affirmations: Repeating positive affirmations can reinforce a growth-oriented perspective and boost self-confidence.

Seeking Support: Engaging in conversations with mentors, therapists, or supportive friends can provide valuable insights and encouragement.

In the upcoming sections, we’ll continue to explore the practical applications of mindset in various life domains. By understanding the impact of mindset on mental health and overall wellbeing, individuals can take proactive steps toward a more fulfilling and balanced life.

Mindset in Practice

Understanding the concept of mindset is essential, but to harness its power, we must put it into practice. In this section, we’ll provide actionable steps and practical techniques for readers to assess and improve their mindset.

Assessing Your Current Mindset:

Self-Reflection: Engage in self-reflection to identify your current mindset tendencies. Do you lean more toward a fixed or growth mindset in different areas of life?

Identifying Limiting Beliefs: Identify specific limiting beliefs you may hold about your abilities, intelligence, or potential for growth.

Transitioning to a Growth Mindset:

Embrace Challenges: Embrace challenges as opportunities for learning and growth. Take on new challenges, even if they seem daunting.

Learn from Setbacks: Learn from setbacks and failures. Analyze past failures, extract lessons, and apply them to future endeavors.

Cultivate a Love for Learning: Inspire a passion for continuous learning through books, courses, or resources related to personal development and skill acquisition.

Practical Exercises for Developing a Growth Mindset:

Mindful Self-Talk: Practice mindful self-talk by challenging negative or limiting beliefs with more growth-oriented affirmations.

Goal Setting: Set realistic yet challenging goals that align with your areas of interest and growth opportunities.

Journaling: Journal as a means of tracking personal growth, recording achievements, and reflecting on setbacks.

Maintaining a Growth-Oriented Lifestyle:

Surround Yourself with Positivity: Build a supportive network of friends, mentors, and colleagues who embrace a growth mindset.

Seek Feedback: Actively seek feedback from others and view it as a valuable source of growth.

Stay Resilient: Setbacks are part of the growth process. Remain resilient and persistent in the face of challenges.

Mindset in Different Life Domains

Mindset is a powerful predictor of success in various aspects of life. In this section, we’ll explore how adopting a growth mindset can lead to personal and professional success, resilience, and the achievement of meaningful goals.

The Growth Mindset Advantage:

Resilience in the Face of Challenges: A growth mindset equips individuals with the resilience needed to persevere through setbacks and adversity.

Embracing Challenges: Those with a growth mindset are more likely to take on challenging tasks and see them as opportunities for growth.

Mindset and Goal Setting:

Setting Ambitious Goals: A growth mindset encourages individuals to set ambitious and meaningful goals, as they believe in their capacity to achieve them.

Pursuit of Mastery: Individuals with a growth mindset are more likely to pursue mastery in their chosen fields, leading to expertise and recognition.

Overcoming Obstacles:

Adapting to Change: A growth mindset enables individuals to adapt to change and navigate uncertain circumstances effectively.

Learning from Failure: View failure as a valuable learning experience and a stepping stone toward success.

The Role of Mindset in Leadership:

Effective Leadership: Leaders who embody a growth mindset tend to be more adaptable, open to feedback, and capable of inspiring and motivating their teams.

Organizational Success: Organizations that foster a growth mindset culture tend to be more innovative, agile, and successful in achieving their objectives.

Unleashing Your Potential

The transformative power of a growth mindset: it can lead to success, resilience, and personal fulfillment.

I encourage readers to reflect on their own mindset and take steps to cultivate a growth-oriented perspective.

Ultimately, the path to unlocking one’s full potential begins with the belief in the power of mindset .

As we reach the conclusion of our exploration into the power of mindset, it’s essential to recap the key takeaways and emphasize the significance of mindset in shaping our lives.

The Power of a Growth Mindset

Resilience : A growth mindset equips individuals with the resilience needed to bounce back from setbacks and face challenges with determination.

Continuous Improvement : A growth mindset fosters a passion for learning, leading to continuous improvement in all aspects of life.

Practical Applications

Personal Growth: Actively cultivate a growth-oriented mindset in your personal and professional lives.

Success: Adopting a growth mindset can be a powerful predictor of success in various domains, from education to entrepreneurship.

Embrace the Power of Mindset with BrainTap

As we conclude our journey into the transformative power of mindset, I invite you to take a significant step towards your personal growth and wellbeing by exploring the resources and tools offered by BrainTap .

Unlock Your Full Potential With BrainTap

BrainTap understands the profound impact of mindset on mental health, stress reduction, and overall life satisfaction.

We believe in your limitless potential to grow, adapt, and thrive. That’s why we offer a range of guided audio programs and tools designed to support your journey towards a growth-oriented mindset.

BrainTap & Mindset

Positive Affirmations: Access audio programs that reinforce positive affirmations, fostering a belief in your capacity for growth and success.

Resilience Training: Explore resilience-building programs that empower you to face challenges with courage and determination, just as a growth mindset encourages.

Start Your Journey Today

By embracing the power of mindset with BrainTap , you can actively cultivate a growth-oriented perspective that will propel you towards personal and professional success. Begin your journey today by exploring our extensive library of audio programs and resources designed to unlock your full potential.

Join the Mindset Revolution

Together, we can create a world where individuals embrace the power of mindset, leading to personal growth, resilience, and a more fulfilling life. Join us in this mindset revolution, and let’s embark on this transformative journey together .

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The BrainTap Headset Bluetooth model has a 12-month manufacturer’s warranty that covers any flaws or defects that the headset shipped with. Any sort of sustained physical damage is not covered under warranty .  All other products or equipment come with a 30-day manufacturer’s warranty unless otherwise stated.  Please reference your User Manual to view the complete warranty policy.  Should you experience any difficulty with your equipment or accessories, we recommend first checking the troubleshooting guidelines in the User Manual included with the headset or reference our online Knowledge Base for headset tips and troubleshooting steps. If you are still having trouble and your headset is within the warranty period, call our Help Desk at 302-721-6677 or fill out an online support ticket  for further assistance.  If the item needs to be returned to BrainTap offices for assessment and replacement, you will be asked to provide proof of purchase and will be issued a Return Merchandise Authorization (RMA) number and shipping instructions.   Items without proof of purchase will not be accepted for RMA.

Return Merchandise Authorization (RMA) Policy

A Return Merchandize Authorization (RMA) is a numbered authorization provided to permit the return of a product. Any product returned to BrainTap offices for testing, trade-in or refund must be accompanied by an RMA issued by our Help Desk. Please note that RMAs expire 15 days after issue. Returns postmarked after the expiration date will not be accepted. Please be sure to ship your return item promptly.

Out of Warranty Support Options

Should you experience any difficulty with your equipment or accessories, we recommend first checking the troubleshooting guidelines in the User Manual reference our online Knowledge Base for headset tips and troubleshooting steps. Even if your headset is outside of the warranty period, you can reach out to our Help Desk via phone at 302-721-6677 or online by filling out a  support ticket for further help.  If the product is determined to require replacement after troubleshooting, there is an option for an out of warranty trade-in and replacement for a fee. We do not offer repair services for out of warranty products.

Satisfaction Guarantee & Equipment Return Policy

There is a 45-day return policy on all products and packages purchased directly from BrainTap unless otherwise stated. BrainTap headsets purchased from a retail outlet or 3 rd party must be returned to the place of purchase and are subject to the return policy of the seller.   All returns must have proof of purchase and a Return Merchandise Authorization (RMA) number or the return will not be accepted . All products returns are subject to a 15% restocking fee. The return period begins on the day you received your order.  To initiate the return process, reach out to our Help Desk via phone at 302-721-6677 or submit an online support ticket .

Shipping Fees

Shipping fees, if any, including duties and import taxes for international shipments, are non-refundable. In all instances, return shipping fees are the responsibility of the purchaser.

Membership Subscriptions

You may cancel your membership/program/subscription with a 30-day notice by logging into your account on BrainTap.com. Click the account icon at the top right of the page, then click the profile icon on the top right-hand side and then click Billing. Once you are on the Billing page you will be able to “Manage Subscriptions & Payment” where you can cancel your subscription.

All subscribers are required to provide a 30-day cancellation notice prior to terminating their subscription. This policy is implemented to ensure a smooth transition for both subscribers and the service provider, allowing for adequate time to process cancellation requests and manage subscription changes.

Calculation of 30-Day Notice Period: The 30-day cancellation notice period will be calculated from the next monthly payment due date following the receipt of the cancellation request. For example, if a subscriber submits a cancellation request on the 5th of the month and their next monthly payment is due on the 15th of the same month, the 30-day notice period will commence from the 15th of the month and extend until the 15th of the following month. Free trials are exempt from this 30-day notice policy and may be canceled at any time prior to the first payment due date without payment or penalty.

Refund Processing Time

It takes approximately 10 – 14 days to process a return. If you have any questions regarding your refund, refer / respond to your original support ticket or create a new  support ticket  and one of our customer support representatives will contact you.

Terms and Conditions

Terms and Conditions of Use:

Last updated: January 30, 2024

This is an agreement between you and BrainTap, Inc. (with its affiliates, “BrainTap”, “we” or “us”) regarding the digital audio-recorded motivational programs and creative visualization sessions operated by BrainTap Technologies (the “Service”). Additionally, please read the site’s Privacy Policy.

By signing up for or using the Service, you agree to the following terms:

Your Account

If you do not have a BrainTap membership, you will need to establish an account with BrainTap.com to use the Service. Your payment methods on file with your BrainTap.com account will be used for your BrainTap account and the BrainTap Brain Fitness mobile application.

Membership/Programs/Subscription Plans

By subscribing to BrainTap’s mobile app, users are granted access to use the app on up to two devices . Each device is permitted up to five plays per day. The BrainTap Brain Fitness mobile app subscription is intended for personal use only. Commercial use in a business is strictly prohibited unless said business has an official Professional Partner License issued by BrainTap, Inc. BrainTap reserves the right to modify the subscription terms and limitations at any time without prior notice. Users are encouraged to review the terms periodically for any updates or changes. If you sign up for a membership/program/subscription plan, you agree to the terms, conditions and limitations associated with them that are posted on our websites or applications.

Promotional and Membership/Program/Subscription Content

We may make content available to you from time to time through the Service for which a purchase is not required. You will have access to this content only for so long as we make it available generally or, where it is provided as a benefit of a membership plan, for so long as you remain an active member of your plan in good standing. We may also remove this content from your account, devices and applications, or otherwise restrict your ability to access it.

Content Availability

We may add or remove purchasable, promotional and membership content (collectively, “Content”) from our catalog, membership plans and our Service at any time and make no guarantee as to the availability of specific Content in any membership plan or as to any minimum amount of Content in any membership plan. Some of our Content may be offered in limited territories or to limited membership levels. We may use geo-filtering technology to restrict access outside of those territories.

Fees and Renewal

Fees for purchased program content, membership plans, subscriptions, and other services will be stated at the time of your purchase or sign-up, as applicable, and provided in our help pages. The fees for membership plans may vary. Fees may be subject to tax and are non-refundable unless otherwise outlined herein. We only accept credit card and (most) debit cards for payment of membership fees. Please do not sign up for a program with a “check” or “ATM” card.

If your membership plan or subscription involves a recurring payment of a fee, unless you notify us 30 days before a charge that you want to cancel or do not want to automatically renew your membership or subscription, you understand it will automatically continue each month, and you authorize us (without notice to you, unless required by applicable law) to collect the then-applicable fees and any taxes using any credit card we have on record for you. All cancellations require a 30-day notice to allow time for processing.

If all credit cards we have on file for you are declined for payment of your membership or subscription fees, we may cancel your membership or subscription, as applicable, unless you provide us with a new credit card. If you provide us with a new credit card and are successfully charged before your membership or subscription is cancelled, your new membership or subscription period will be based on the original renewal date and not the date of the successful charge.

Membership/Program/Subscription Cancellation

Service Restrictions

We reserve the right to accept or refuse membership or to restrict use of the Service at our discretion. You may not transfer or assign your membership or any Service benefits. You may not use the Service for any commercial purposes without a written license to do so. If you would like to use any of the Services in a business setting, please contact us for information.  We may take actions we deem reasonably necessary to prevent fraud and abuse, including placing restrictions on the amount of content or other services that can be accessed from the Service at any one time.

Content Restrictions

All content is protected by Federal copyright law. You may not (i) transfer, copy, share, or display Content, except as permitted in this Agreement; (ii) sell, rent, lease, distribute, or broadcast any Content; (iii) remove any proprietary notices or labels on Content; (iv) attempt to disable, bypass, modify, defeat, or otherwise circumvent any digital rights management or other protection system applied to Content or used as part of the Service; or (v) use the Service or Content for any commercial or illegal purpose.

Promotional Trial Memberships

We sometimes offer certain customers various trial or other promotional memberships, which are subject to the Terms except as otherwise stated in the promotional offers. We reserve the right, in our sole discretion, to determine your eligibility. Trial members may, at any time (through your “My Account”), choose not to continue paid memberships/subscriptions by cancelling prior to the end of the trial period. If a trial offer or a promotion requires you to have a valid payment instrument on file, such as a credit card or other permitted payment method, we may validate that payment method, including by requesting a temporary authorization from the financial institution issuing your payment instrument. If we determine that your payment instrument is invalid, without limiting any of our other rights, we may revoke any benefits, Credits or Content you may have received as part of the offer.

Agreement Changes

We may, at our discretion, change the Terms and all elements of them and any aspect of the Service without notice to you. If any change to the Terms is found invalid, void, or for any reason unenforceable, that change is sever-able and does not affect the validity and enforce-ability of any remaining changes and the remainder of the Terms. Your continued use of the Service after we change the Terms constitutes your acceptance of the changes. If you do not agree to any changes, you must not use the Service and must cancel your membership.

Termination by Us

Our business may change over time and we reserve the right to cancel the Service and any membership plan in whole or in part, and to terminate your membership and use of the Service at our discretion without notice. If we do so, we will give you a prorated refund based on the number of days remaining in your membership unless we terminate your membership for conduct that we determine, in our discretion, violates the Terms, violates any applicable law, involves fraud or misuse of the Service, or is harmful to our interests or another user. Our failure to insist upon or enforce your strict compliance with the Terms will not constitute a waiver of any of our rights.

Acceptance of terms of use and amendments

Each time you use or cause access to this website or any BrainTap application, you agree to be bound by these Terms of use, as amended from time to time with or without notice to you. In addition, if you are using a particular service on this website or accessed via this website, you will be subject to any rules or guidelines applicable to those services, and they will be incorporated by reference within these Terms of use. Additionally, please read the site’s Privacy policy and Warranty and Return policy if applicable.

The site editor’s service

This website and the services provided to you on and via this website are provided on an “AS IS” basis. You agree that the site editor reserves the right to modify or discontinue provision of this website and its services, and to remove the data you provide, either temporarily or permanently, at any time, without notice and without any liability towards you. The site editor will not be held responsible or liable for timeliness, removal of information, failure to store information, inaccuracy of information, or improper delivery of information.

Your responsibilities and registration obligations

In order to use this website, certain parts of it, or our mobile application, you may be required to register for a user account on this website; in this case, you agree to provide truthful information when requested, and — if a minimum age is required for eligibility for a user account — you undertake that you are at least the required age. By registering for a user account, you explicitly agree to this site’s Terms of use, including any amendments made by the site editor that are published herein.

Registration and password

You are responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of your password, and you will be responsible for all usage of your user account and/or user name, whether authorized or not authorized by you. You agree to immediately notify the site editor of any unauthorized use of your user account, username or password.

Your conduct

You agree that all information or data of any kind, whether text, software, code, music or sound, photographs or graphics, video or other materials (“content”), made available publicly or privately, will be under the sole responsibility of the person providing the said content, or of the person whose user account is used. You agree that this website may expose you to content that may be objectionable or offensive. The site editor will not be responsible to you in any way for content displayed on this website, nor for any error or omission.

By using this website or any service provided, you explicitly agree that:

(a) you will not provide any content or conduct yourself in any way that may be construed as: unlawful; illegal; threatening; harmful; abusive; harassing; stalking; tortuous; defamatory; libelous; vulgar; obscene; offensive; objectionable; pornographic; designed to interfere with or disrupt the operation of this website or any service provided; infected with a virus or other destructive or deleterious programming routine; giving rise to civil or criminal liability; or in violation of an applicable local, national or international law;

(b) you will not impersonate or misrepresent your association with any person or entity; you will not forge or otherwise seek to conceal or misrepresent the origin of any content provided by you;

(c) you will not collect or harvest any information about other users;

(d) you will not provide, and you will not use this website to provide, any content or service in any commercial manner, or in any manner that would involve junk mail, spam, chain letters, pyramid schemes, or any other form of unauthorized advertising or commerce; you will not use this website to promote or operate any service or content without the site editor’s prior written consent;

(e) you will not provide any content that may give rise to the site editor being held civilly or criminally liable, or that may be considered a violation of any local, national or international law, including — but not limited to — laws relating to copyrights, trademarks, patents, or trade secrets.

Submission of content on this website

By providing any content to this website:

(a) you agree to grant the site editor a worldwide, royalty-free, perpetual, non-exclusive right and license (including any moral rights or other necessary rights.) to use, display, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, distribute, perform, promote, archive, translate, and to create derivative works and compilations, in whole or in part. Such license will apply with respect to any form, media, technology already known at the time of provision or developed subsequently;

(b) you warrant and represent that you have all legal, moral, and other rights that may be necessary to grant the site editor the license specified in this section;

(c) you acknowledge and agree that the site editor will have the right (but not obligation), at the site editor’s entire discretion, to refuse to publish, or to remove, or to block access to any content you provide, at any time and for any reason, with or without notice.

Third-party services

Goods and services of third parties may be advertised and/or may be made available on or through this website. Representations made regarding products and services provided by third parties will be governed by the policies and representations made by these third parties. The site editor will not in any manner be liable for or responsible for any of your dealings or interaction with third parties.

Indemnification

You agree to indemnify and hold harmless the site editor and the site editor’s representatives, subsidiaries, affiliates, related parties, officers, directors, employees, agents, independent contractors, advertisers, partners, and co-branders, from any claim or demand, including reasonable legal fees, that may be filed by any third party, arising out of your conduct or connection with this website or our services, including by not limited to services provided via our mobile application(s), your provision of content, your violation of these Terms of use, or any other violation by you of the rights of another person or party.

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES

YOU UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT YOUR USE OF THIS WEBSITE AND OF ANY SERVICES OR CONTENT PROVIDED (THE “SERVICE”) IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. SERVICES AND CONTENT ARE PROVIDED TO YOU “AS IS”, AND THE SITE EDITOR EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER IMPLIED OR EXPRESS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANT-ABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT.

THE SITE EDITOR MAKES NO WARRANTY, EITHER IMPLIED OR EXPRESS, THAT ANY PART OF THE SERVICE WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, ERROR-FREE, VIRUS-FREE, TIMELY, SECURE, ACCURATE, RELIABLE, OR OF ANY QUALITY, NOR IS IT WARRANTED EITHER IMPLICITLY OR EXPRESSLY THAT ANY CONTENT IS SAFE IN ANY MANNER FOR DOWNLOAD. YOU UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT NEITHER THE SITE EDITOR NOR ANY PARTICIPANT IN THE SERVICE PROVIDES PROFESSIONAL ADVICE OF ANY KIND AND THAT ANY ADVICE OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION OBTAINED VIA THIS WEBSITE MAY BE USED SOLELY AT YOUR OWN RISK, AND THAT THE SITE EDITOR WILL NOT BE HELD LIABLE IN ANY WAY.

Some jurisdictions may not allow disclaimers of implied warranties, and certain statements in the above disclaimer may not apply to you as regards implied warranties; the other terms and conditions remain enforceable notwithstanding.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

YOU EXPRESSLY UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT THE SITE EDITOR WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; THIS INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF PROFITS, GOODWILL, USE, DATA OR OTHER INTANGIBLE LOSSES (EVEN IF THE SITE EDITOR HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES), RESULTING FROM (I) THE USE OF SERVICES OR THE INABILITY TO USE SERVICES, (II) THE COST OF OBTAINING SUBSTITUTE GOODS AND/OR SERVICES RESULTING FROM ANY TRANSACTION ENTERED INTO ON THROUGH SERVICES, (III) UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO OR ALTERATION OF YOUR DATA TRANSMISSIONS, (IV) STATEMENTS BY ANY THIRD PARTY OR CONDUCT OF ANY THIRD PARTY USING SERVICES, OR (V) ANY OTHER MATTER RELATING TO SERVICES.

In some jurisdictions, it is not permitted to limit liability and, therefore, such limitations may not apply to you.

Reservation of rights

The site editor reserves all of the site editor’s rights, including but not limited to any and all copyrights, trademarks, patents, trade secrets, and any other proprietary right that the site editor may have in respect to this website, its content, and goods and services that may be provided. The use of the site editor’s rights and property requires the site editor’s prior written consent. By making services available to you, the site editor is not providing you with any implied or express licenses or rights, and you will have no rights to make any commercial use of this website or provided services without the site owner/editor’s prior written consent.

Notification of copyright infringement

If you believe that your property has been used in any way that could be considered a copyright infringement or a violation of your intellectual property rights, the site editor’s copyright agent may be contacted via:

e-mail to the site administrator

[email protected]

Applicable law

You agree that these Terms of use and any dispute arising out of your use of this website or products or services provided will be governed by and construed in accordance with local laws applicable at the site editor’s domicile, notwithstanding any differences between the said applicable legislation and legislation in force at your location. By registering for a user account on this website, or by using this website and the services it provides, you accept that jurisdiction is granted to the courts having jurisdiction over the site editor’s domicile, and that any disputes will be heard by the said courts.

Miscellaneous information

(i) In the event that any provision of these Terms of use is deemed to conflict with legislation by a court with jurisdiction over the parties, the said provision will be interpreted to reflect the original intentions of the parties in accordance with applicable law, and the remainder of these Terms of use will remain valid and applicable; (ii) The failure of either party to assert any right under these Terms of use will not be considered to be a waiver of that party’s right, and the said right will remain in full force and effect; (iii) You agree that any claim or cause in respect of this website or its services must be filed within one (1) year after such claim or cause arose, or the said claim or cause will be forever barred, without regard to any contrary legislation; (iv) The site editor may assign the site editor’s rights and obligations under these Terms of use; in this event, the site editor will be relieved of any further obligation.

Privacy Policy

We know that you care how your information is used, and we appreciate your trust that we will use it carefully and sensibly. This notice describes our privacy policy. By visiting us, you are accepting the privacy policy described below.

1.   What Personal Information Do We Collect?

• Information You Provide.  We receive and store information you enter.  For example, when you search for or buy a product or service, or when you supply information such as your address, phone number or credit card. You can choose not to provide certain information, but then you might not be able to take advantage of some of our features.  We use the information that you provide for such purposes as responding to your requests, customizing future shopping for you, improving our website, and communicating with you. We do not store your credit data in our system after the sale – it is used for checkout purposes only. In addition, if you choose, we may share your information with other companies who provide goods or services that you are interested in.  Please see the “opt-in/opt-out” selection in Section 4 of this policy.
• Cookies. Like many websites, we use “cookies”.  Cookies are small programs that we transfer to your hard drive that allow us to recognize you and to provide you with a customized shopping experience.  If you do not want us to use cookies, you can easily disable them by going to the toolbar of your web browser, and clicking on the “help” button.  Follow the instructions that will prevent the browser from accepting cookies, or set the browser to inform you when you receive a new cookie.  In addition, you may visit this and other websites anonymously through the use of utilities provided by other private companies.
• Other Information: Every computer has an IP (Internet Protocol) address.  IP addresses of computers used to visit this site are noted.  In addition, we automatically collect other information such as email addresses, browser types, operating systems, and the URL addresses of sites clicked to and from this site.
• Information from Other Sources.  We might receive information about you from other sources and add it to our account information.  This may include updated delivery and address information from our shippers or other sources so that we can correct our records and deliver your next purchase or communication more easily.

2.   How Do We Use Your Information?

• Customized Shopping.  We use your information to better serve you by providing a customized shopping experience.  As noted above, you may “opt-out” of this customization, or even visit and shop anonymously.
• Agents. We employ other companies and individuals to perform functions on our behalf. Examples include delivering packages, sending postal mail and e-mail, and processing credit card payments. They have access to personal information needed to perform their functions, but may not use it for other purposes.
• Special Offers.  We may send you special offers from time to time, unless you choose to “opt-out” of receiving such offers.  In addition, we may also send you special offers from other companies.  Again, you may “opt-out”.  If we send you offers from other businesses, we do not share your personal information with them.  The offers come directly through us.  Please see the “opt-in/opt-out” selection at the end of this policy.
• Business Transfers. As we continue to develop our business, we might sell or buy stores or assets. In such transactions, customer information generally is one of the transferred business assets. Also, in the unlikely event that we are acquired, customer information will be one of the transferred assets.
• Law Enforcement.   If we receive a lawful court order to release account or other personal information then we will comply with the law.  We will also release information when necessary to protect the life, safety or property of others. This includes exchanging information with other companies and organizations for fraud protection and credit risk reduction.

3.   How Do We Protect the Security of Your Information?

• We work to protect the security of your information during transmission by using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) software, which encrypts information you input.
• We use encryption to protect your information contained in our customer list.
• We use a firewall to protect against unlawful intrusion.
• We limit access to your information on a “need to know” basis.
• We reveal only the last five digits of your credit card numbers when confirming an order. Of course, we transmit the entire credit card number to the appropriate credit card company during order processing.
• It is important for you to protect against unauthorized access to your password and to your computer. Be sure to sign off when finished using a shared computer.
• No system can guarantee absolute security, just as the finest lock can not guarantee physical security.  However, we take every reasonable precaution to assure that your data is secure.

4.   Your Choice:   Opt-in or Opt-out. It is your choice whether to receive emails or special offers from us or others.  The following section provides you with this choice.  Please note the default settings.

• Please send me email or other mail informing me of special offers of your products and services.
• Please do not send me email or other mail informing me of special offers of your products or services.
• Please send me email or other mail informing me of special offers of related products or services from other companies.
• Please do not send me email or other mail informing me of special offers of related products or services from other companies.

5.   Children:   We do not sell products or services to children. If you are under 18, you may use this site only with involvement of a parent or guardian.

6.   Other Websites:   Various Web sites may be linked to from this site.  If you link to another site, your privacy depends on the policy of that site.  We strongly urge you to check their privacy policy.  Not all sites guarantee that they will not share your personally identifiable information with others.  You may also wish to consult privacy guidelines such as those recommended by the Online Privacy Alliance ( www.privacyalliance.org ).

7.   Contact Us:   If you would like to learn more about our privacy policy, or to access your personally identifiable information contained on our website, you may contact us via the  Contact Us  page. You will be required to provide identifier information to assure that this information is not released to others.  We reserve the right to modify this policy in the future.  If we do so, notice will be posted on our home page.

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The Power of Positive Thinking

Klaus Vedfelt / Getty Images

What Is Positive Thinking?

• Benefits of Positive Thinking

How to Practice Positive Thinking

Potential pitfalls of positive thinking, frequently asked questions.

Do you tend to see the glass as half empty or half full? You have probably heard that question plenty of times. Your answer relates directly to the concept of positive thinking and whether you have a positive or negative outlook on life. Positive thinking plays an important role in positive psychology , a subfield devoted to the study of what makes people happy and fulfilled.

Research has found that positive thinking can aid in stress management and even plays an important role in your overall health and well-being. It can help combat feelings of low self-esteem, improve physical health, and help brighten your overall outlook on life.

This article discusses what positive thinking is and the health benefits of being positive. It also explores some of the strategies you can use to become a more positive thinker.

Positive thinking means approaching life's challenges with a positive outlook. It doesn't mean seeing the world through rose-colored lenses by ignoring or glossing over the negative aspects of life.

Positive thinking does not necessarily mean avoiding difficult situations. Instead, positive thinking means making the most of potential obstacles, trying to see the best in other people, and viewing yourself and your abilities in a positive light.

Some researchers, including positive psychologist Martin Seligman , frame positive thinking in terms of explanatory style. Your explanatory style is how you explain why events happened.

• Optimistic explanatory style : People with an optimistic explanatory style tend to give themselves credit when good things happen and typically blame outside forces for bad outcomes. They also tend to see negative events as temporary and atypical.
• Pessimistic explanatory style : People with a pessimistic explanatory style often blame themselves when bad things happen, but fail to give themselves adequate credit for successful outcomes. They also have a tendency to view negative events as expected and lasting. As you can imagine, blaming yourself for events outside of your control or viewing these unfortunate events as a persistent part of your life can have a detrimental impact on your state of mind.

Positive thinkers are more apt to use an optimistic explanatory style, but the way in which people attribute events can also vary depending upon the exact situation. For example, a person who is generally a positive thinker might use a more pessimistic explanatory style in particularly challenging situations, such as at work or at school.

While there are many factors that determine whether a person has a positive outlook, the way that they explain the events of their life, known as their explanatory style, plays an important role.

Positive Psychology vs. Positive Thinking

While the terms "positive thinking" and "positive psychology" are sometimes used interchangeably, it is important to understand that they are not the same thing. Positive thinking is about looking at things from a positive point of view. It is a type of thinking that focuses on maintaining a positive, optimistic attitude. Positive psychology is a branch of psychology that studies the effects of optimism, what causes it, and when it is best utilized.

Health Benefits of Positive Thinking

In recent years, the so-called "power of positive thinking" has gained a great deal of attention thanks to self-help books such as "The Secret." While these pop-psychology books often tout positive thinking or philosophies like the law of attraction as a sort of psychological panacea, empirical research has found that there are many very real health benefits linked to positive thinking and optimistic attitudes.

Positive thinking is linked to a wide range of health benefits, including:

• Better stress management and coping skills
• Enhanced psychological health
• Greater resistance to the common cold
• Increased physical well-being
• Longer life span
• Lower rates of depression
• Reduced risk of cardiovascular disease-related death

One study of 1,558 older adults found that positive thinking could also reduce frailty during old age.

A 2018 study published in the Journal of Aging Research found that having a positive mental attitude was linked to decreased mortality over a 35-year period. People who had a more positive outlook were also more likely to get regular physical exercise, avoid smoking, eat a healthier diet, and get more quality sleep.

Clearly, there are many benefits of positive thinking . But why, exactly, does positive thinking have such a strong impact on physical and mental health ?

One theory is that people who think positively tend to be less affected by stress. Research suggests that having more positive automatic thoughts helps people become more resilient in the face of life's stressful events. People who had high levels of positive thinking were more likely to walk away from stressful life events with a higher sense of the meaningfulness of life.

Another possibility is that people who think positively tend to live healthier lives in general; they may exercise more, follow a more nutritious diet, and avoid unhealthy behaviors.

While you might be more prone to negative thinking, there are strategies that you can use to become a more positive thinker. Practicing these strategies regularly can help you get in the habit of maintaining a more positive outlook on life.

• Notice your thoughts : Start paying attention to the type of thoughts you have each day. If you notice that many of them are negative, make a conscious effort to reframe how you are thinking in a more positive way.
• Write in a gratitude journal : Practicing gratitude can have a range of positive benefits and it can help you learn to develop a better outlook. Experiencing grateful thoughts helps people to feel more optimistic.
• Use positive self-talk : How you talk to yourself can play an important role in shaping your outlook. Studies have shown that shifting to more positive self-talk can have a positive impact on your emotions and how you respond to stress.

While there are many benefits to thinking positively, there are actually times when more realistic thinking is more advantageous. For example, in some situations, negative thinking can actually lead to more accurate decisions and outcomes.

Some research has found that negative thinking and moods can actually help people make better, more accurate judgments.

However, research suggests that realistic optimism might be the ideal. The results of a 2020 study published in the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin revealed that people who have mistaken expectations, whether those expectations are optimistic or pessimistic, tend to fare worse in terms of mental health when compared to realists.  

The authors of the study suggest that the disappointment that optimists experience when their high hopes are not realized can have a negative impact on well-being. This doesn't mean that people should strive to be pessimistic thinkers. since studies indicate that people with a negative outlook tend to fare the worst. Instead, having a generally positive outlook that is focused on realistic expectations may be the best approach. 

In some cases, inappropriately applied positive thinking can cross the line into what is known as toxic positivity . This involves insisting on maintaining a positive mindset no matter how upsetting, dire, or damaging a situation might be. This type of excessive positivity can impede authentic communication and cause people to experience feelings of shame or guilt if they struggle to maintain such an overly positive outlook.

Positive thinking can have pitfalls at times. While it is important to have an overall positive outlook, unrealistically high expectations can lead to disappointment. Being unable to accept any negative emotions, known as toxic positivity, can also have a negative effect on mental well-being.

A Word From Verywell

Even if you are not a natural-born optimist, there are things you can do to learn how to think more positively and become a positive thinker . One of the first steps is to focus on your own inner monologue and to pay attention to your self-talk.

Strategies that can improve your positive thinking include noticing your thoughts and making a conscious effort to shift from negative thoughts to more positive one. Practicing positive self-talk and practicing gratitude can also be helpful ways to start having a more positive outlook.

Positive thinking is important because it can have a beneficial impact on both physical and mental well-being. People who maintain a more positive outlook on life cope better with stress, have better immunity, and have a lower risk of premature death. Positive thinking also helps promote greater feelings of happiness and overall satisfaction with life.

Positive thinking has been shown to help people live healthier, happier lives. When they have a positive outlook, they are more likely to engage in healthy behaviors such as exercising, eating healthy, and getting plenty of rest. Downsides of positive thinking include the risk of forming overly high expectations that result in disappointment and being affected by toxic positivity.

Practicing mindfulness can be a way to build self-awareness and become more conscious of how your negative thoughts affect your moods and behaviors. As you become better at identifying negative thought patterns, you can then take steps to shift into a more positive mindset. Actively replacing negative thoughts with positive ones can help you eventually learn to become a more positive thinker.

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By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

What does Emerson say about self-reliance?

In Emerson's essay “ Self-Reliance ,” he boldly states society (especially today’s politically correct environment) hurts a person’s growth.

Emerson wrote that self-sufficiency gives a person in society the freedom they need to discover their true self and attain their true independence.

Believing that individualism, personal responsibility , and nonconformity were essential to a thriving society. But to get there, Emerson knew that each individual had to work on themselves to achieve this level of individualism. 

Today, we see society's breakdowns daily and wonder how we arrived at this state of society. One can see how the basic concepts of self-trust, self-awareness, and self-acceptance have significantly been ignored.

Who published self-reliance?

Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote the essay, published in 1841 as part of his first volume of collected essays titled "Essays: First Series."

It would go on to be known as Ralph Waldo Emerson's Self Reliance and one of the most well-known pieces of American literature.

The collection was published by James Munroe and Company.

What are the examples of self-reliance?

Examples of self-reliance can be as simple as tying your shoes and as complicated as following your inner voice and not conforming to paths set by society or religion.

Self-reliance can also be seen as getting things done without relying on others, being able to “pull your weight” by paying your bills, and caring for yourself and your family correctly.

Self-reliance involves relying on one's abilities, judgment, and resources to navigate life. Here are more examples of self-reliance seen today:

Entrepreneurship: Starting and running your own business, relying on your skills and determination to succeed.

Financial Independence: Managing your finances responsibly, saving money, and making sound investment decisions to secure your financial future.

Learning and Education: Taking the initiative to educate oneself, whether through formal education, self-directed learning, or acquiring new skills.

Problem-Solving: Tackling challenges independently, finding solutions to problems, and adapting to changing circumstances.

Personal Development: Taking responsibility for personal growth, setting goals, and working towards self-improvement.

Homesteading: Growing your food, raising livestock, or becoming self-sufficient in various aspects of daily life.

DIY Projects: Undertaking do-it-yourself projects, from home repairs to crafting, without relying on external help.

Living Off the Grid: Living independently from public utilities, generating your energy, and sourcing your water.

Decision-Making: Trusting your instincts and making decisions based on your values and beliefs rather than relying solely on external advice.

Crisis Management: Handling emergencies and crises with resilience and resourcefulness without depending on external assistance.

These examples illustrate different facets of self-reliance, emphasizing independence, resourcefulness, and the ability to navigate life autonomously.

What is the purpose of self reliance by Emerson?

In his essay, " Self Reliance, " Emerson's sole purpose is the want for people to avoid conformity. Emerson believed that in order for a man to truly be a man, he was to follow his own conscience and "do his own thing."

Essentially, do what you believe is right instead of blindly following society.

Why is it important to be self reliant?

While getting help from others, including friends and family, can be an essential part of your life and fulfilling. However, help may not always be available, or the assistance you receive may not be what you had hoped for.

It is for this reason that Emerson pushed for self-reliance. If a person were independent, could solve their problems, and fulfill their needs and desires, they would be a more vital member of society.

This can lead to growth in the following areas:

Empowerment: Self-reliance empowers individuals to take control of their lives. It fosters a sense of autonomy and the ability to make decisions independently.

Resilience: Developing self-reliance builds resilience, enabling individuals to bounce back from setbacks and face challenges with greater adaptability.

Personal Growth: Relying on oneself encourages continuous learning and personal growth. It motivates individuals to acquire new skills and knowledge.

Freedom: Self-reliance provides a sense of freedom from external dependencies. It reduces reliance on others for basic needs, decisions, or validation.

Confidence: Achieving goals through one's own efforts boosts confidence and self-esteem. It instills a belief in one's capabilities and strengthens a positive self-image.

Resourcefulness: Being self-reliant encourages resourcefulness. Individuals learn to solve problems creatively, adapt to changing circumstances, and make the most of available resources.

Adaptability: Self-reliant individuals are often more adaptable to change. They can navigate uncertainties with a proactive and positive mindset.

Reduced Stress: Dependence on others can lead to stress and anxiety, especially when waiting for external support. Self-reliance reduces reliance on external factors for emotional well-being.

Personal Responsibility: It promotes a sense of responsibility for one's own life and decisions. Self-reliant individuals are more likely to take ownership of their actions and outcomes.

Goal Achievement: Being self-reliant facilitates the pursuit and achievement of personal and professional goals. It allows individuals to overcome obstacles and stay focused on their objectives.

Overall, self-reliance contributes to personal empowerment, mental resilience, and the ability to lead a fulfilling and purposeful life. While collaboration and support from others are valuable, cultivating a strong sense of self-reliance enhances one's capacity to navigate life's challenges independently.

What did Emerson mean, "Envy is ignorance, imitation is suicide"?

According to Emerson, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to you independently, but every person is given a plot of ground to till. 

In other words, Emerson believed that a person's main focus in life is to work on oneself, increasing their maturity and intellect, and overcoming insecurities, which will allow a person to be self-reliant to the point where they no longer envy others but measure themselves against how they were the day before.

When we do become self-reliant, we focus on creating rather than imitating. Being someone we are not is just as damaging to the soul as suicide.

Envy is ignorance: Emerson suggests that feeling envious of others is a form of ignorance. Envy often arises from a lack of understanding or appreciation of one's unique qualities and potential. Instead of being envious, individuals should focus on discovering and developing their talents and strengths.

Imitation is suicide: Emerson extends the idea by stating that imitation, or blindly copying others, is a form of self-destruction. He argues that true individuality and personal growth come from expressing one's unique voice and ideas. In this context, imitation is seen as surrendering one's identity and creativity, leading to a kind of "spiritual death."

What are the transcendental elements in Emerson’s self-reliance?

The five predominant elements of Transcendentalism are nonconformity, self-reliance, free thought, confidence, and the importance of nature.

The Transcendentalism movement emerged in New England between 1820 and 1836. It is essential to differentiate this movement from Transcendental Meditation, a distinct practice.

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Transcendentalism is characterized as "an American literary, political, and philosophical movement of the early nineteenth century, centered around Ralph Waldo Emerson." A central tenet of this movement is the belief that individual purity can be 'corrupted' by society.

Are Emerson's writings referenced in pop culture?

Emerson has made it into popular culture. One such example is in the film Next Stop Wonderland released in 1998. The reference is a quote from Emerson's essay on Self Reliance, "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds."

This becomes a running theme in the film as a single woman (Hope Davis ), who is quite familiar with Emerson's writings and showcases several men taking her on dates, attempting to impress her by quoting the famous line, only to botch the line and also giving attribution to the wrong person. One gentleman says confidently it was W.C. Fields, while another matches the quote with Cicero. One goes as far as stating it was Karl Marx!

Why does Emerson say about self confidence?

Content is coming very soon.

Self-Reliance: The Complete Essay

Ne te quaesiveris extra."

Man is his own star; and the soul that can Render an honest and a perfect man, Commands all light, all influence, all fate ; Nothing to him falls early or too late. Our acts our angels are, or good or ill, Our fatal shadows that walk by us still." Epilogue to Beaumont and Fletcher's Honest Man's Fortune Cast the bantling on the rocks, Suckle him with the she-wolf's teat; Wintered with the hawk and fox, Power and speed be hands and feet.

Ralph Waldo Emerson left the ministry to pursue a career in writing and public speaking. Emerson became one of America's best known and best-loved 19th-century figures. More About Emerson

Ralph Waldo Emerson Self Reliance Summary

The essay “Self-Reliance,” written by Ralph Waldo Emerson, is, by far, his most famous piece of work. Emerson, a Transcendentalist, believed focusing on the purity and goodness of individualism and community with nature was vital for a strong society. Transcendentalists despise the corruption and conformity of human society and institutions. Published in 1841, the Self Reliance essay is a deep-dive into self-sufficiency as a virtue.

In the essay "Self-Reliance," Ralph Waldo Emerson advocates for individuals to trust in their own instincts and ideas rather than blindly following the opinions of society and its institutions. He argues that society encourages conformity, stifles individuality, and encourages readers to live authentically and self-sufficient lives.

Emerson also stresses the importance of being self-reliant, relying on one's own abilities and judgment rather than external validation or approval from others. He argues that people must be honest with themselves and seek to understand their own thoughts and feelings rather than blindly following the expectations of others. Through this essay, Emerson emphasizes the value of independence, self-discovery, and personal growth.

What is the Meaning of Self-Reliance?

I read the other day some verses written by an eminent painter which were original and not conventional. The soul always hears an admonition in such lines, let the subject be what it may. The sentiment they instill is of more value than any thought they may contain. To believe your own thought, to think that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men, — that is genius.

Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for the inmost in due time becomes the outmost,—— and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. Familiar as the voice of the mind is to each, the highest merit we ascribe to Moses, Plato, and Milton is, that they set at naught books and traditions, and spoke not what men but what they thought. A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light that flashes across his mind from within, more than the luster of the firmament of bards and sages. Yet he dismisses without notice his thought because it is his. In every work of genius, we recognize our own rejected thoughts: they come back to us with a certain alienated majesty.

Great works of art have no more affecting lessons for us than this. They teach us to abide by our spontaneous impression with good-humored inflexibility than most when the whole cry of voices is on the other side. Else, tomorrow a stranger will say with masterly good sense precisely what we have thought and felt all the time, and we shall be forced to take with shame our own opinion from another.

There is a time in every man's education when he arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for better, for worse, as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given to him to till. The power which resides in him is new in nature, and none but he knows what that is which he can do, nor does he know until he has tried. Not for nothing one face, one character, one fact, makes much impression on him, and another none. This sculpture in the memory is not without preestablished harmony. The eye was placed where one ray should fall, that it might testify of that particular ray. We but half express ourselves and are ashamed of that divine idea which each of us represents. It may be safely trusted as proportionate and of good issues, so it be faithfully imparted, but God will not have his work made manifest by cowards. A man is relieved and gay when he has put his heart into his work and done his best; but what he has said or done otherwise, shall give him no peace. It is a deliverance that does not deliver. In the attempt his genius deserts him; no muse befriends; no invention, no hope.

Trust Thyself: Every Heart Vibrates To That Iron String.

Accept the place the divine providence has found for you, the society of your contemporaries, and the connection of events. Great men have always done so, and confided themselves childlike to the genius of their age, betraying their perception that the absolutely trustworthy was seated at their heart, working through their hands, predominating in all their being. And we are now men, and must accept in the highest mind the same transcendent destiny; and not minors and invalids in a protected corner, not cowards fleeing before a revolution, but guides, redeemers, and benefactors, obeying the Almighty effort, and advancing on Chaos and the Dark.

What pretty oracles nature yields to us in this text, in the face and behaviour of children, babes, and even brutes! That divided and rebel mind, that distrust of a sentiment because our arithmetic has computed the strength and means opposed to our purpose, these have not. Their mind being whole, their eye is as yet unconquered, and when we look in their faces, we are disconcerted. Infancy conforms to nobody: all conform to it, so that one babe commonly makes four or five out of the adults who prattle and play to it. So God has armed youth and puberty and manhood no less with its own piquancy and charm, and made it enviable and gracious and its claims not to be put by, if it will stand by itself. Do not think the youth has no force, because he cannot speak to you and me. Hark! in the next room his voice is sufficiently clear and emphatic. It seems he knows how to speak to his contemporaries. Bashful or bold, then, he will know how to make us seniors very unnecessary.

The nonchalance of boys who are sure of a dinner, and would disdain as much as a lord to do or say aught to conciliate one, is the healthy attitude of human nature. A boy is in the parlour what the pit is in the playhouse; independent, irresponsible, looking out from his corner on such people and facts as pass by, he tries and sentences them on their merits, in the swift, summary way of boys, as good, bad, interesting, silly, eloquent, troublesome. He cumbers himself never about consequences, about interests: he gives an independent, genuine verdict. You must court him: he does not court you. But the man is, as it were, clapped into jail by his consciousness. As soon as he has once acted or spoken with eclat, he is a committed person, watched by the sympathy or the hatred of hundreds, whose affections must now enter into his account. There is no Lethe for this. Ah, that he could pass again into his neutrality! Who can thus avoid all pledges, and having observed, observe again from the same unaffected, unbiased, unbribable, unaffrighted innocence, must always be formidable. He would utter opinions on all passing affairs, which being seen to be not private, but necessary, would sink like darts into the ear of men, and put them in fear.

These are the voices which we hear in solitude, but they grow faint and inaudible as we enter into the world. Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members. Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It loves not realities and creators, but names and customs.

Whoso would be a man must be a nonconformist. He who would gather immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but must explore if it be goodness. Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind. Absolve you to yourself, and you shall have the suffrage of the world. I remember an answer which when quite young I was prompted to make to a valued adviser, who was wont to importune me with the dear old doctrines of the church. On my saying, What have I to do with the sacredness of traditions, if I live wholly from within? my friend suggested, — "But these impulses may be from below, not from above." I replied, "They do not seem to me to be such; but if I am the Devil's child, I will live then from the Devil." No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it. A man is to carry himself in the presence of all opposition, as if every thing were titular and ephemeral but he. I am ashamed to think how easily we capitulate to badges and names, to large societies and dead institutions. Every decent and well-spoken individual affects and sways me more than is right. I ought to go upright and vital, and speak the rude truth in all ways. If malice and vanity wear the coat of philanthropy, shall that pass? If an angry bigot assumes this bountiful cause of Abolition, and comes to me with his last news from Barbadoes, why should I not say to him, 'Go love thy infant; love thy wood-chopper: be good-natured and modest: have that grace; and never varnish your hard, uncharitable ambition with this incredible tenderness for black folk a thousand miles off. Thy love afar is spite at home.' Rough and graceless would be such greeting, but truth is handsomer than the affectation of love. Your goodness must have some edge to it, — else it is none. The doctrine of hatred must be preached as the counteraction of the doctrine of love when that pules and whines. I shun father and mother and wife and brother, when my genius calls me. The lintels of the door-post I would write on, Whim . It is somewhat better than whim at last I hope, but we cannot spend the day in explanation. Expect me not to show cause why I seek or why I exclude company. Then, again, do not tell me, as a good man did to-day, of my obligation to put all poor men in good situations. Are they my poor? I tell thee, thou foolish philanthropist, that I grudge the dollar, the dime, the cent, I give to such men as do not belong to me and to whom I do not belong. There is a class of persons to whom by all spiritual affinity I am bought and sold; for them I will go to prison, if need be; but your miscellaneous popular charities; the education at college of fools; the building of meeting-houses to the vain end to which many now stand; alms to sots; and the thousandfold Relief Societies; — though I confess with shame I sometimes succumb and give the dollar, it is a wicked dollar which by and by I shall have the manhood to withhold.

Virtues are, in the popular estimate, rather the exception than the rule. There is the man and his virtues. Men do what is called a good action, as some piece of courage or charity, much as they would pay a fine in expiation of daily non-appearance on parade. Their works are done as an apology or extenuation of their living in the world, — as invalids and the insane pay a high board. Their virtues are penances. I do not wish to expiate, but to live. My life is for itself and not for a spectacle. I much prefer that it should be of a lower strain, so it be genuine and equal, than that it should be glittering and unsteady. Wish it to be sound and sweet, and not to need diet and bleeding. The primary evidence I ask that you are a man, and refuse this appeal from the man to his actions. For myself it makes no difference that I know, whether I do or forbear those actions which are reckoned excellent. I cannot consent to pay for a privilege where I have intrinsic right. Few and mean as my gifts may be, I actually am, and do not need for my own assurance or the assurance of my fellows any secondary testimony.

What I must do is all that concerns me, not what the people think.

This rule, equally arduous in actual and in intellectual life, may serve for the whole distinction between greatness and meanness. It is the harder, because you will always find those who think they know what is your duty better than you know it. The easy thing in the world is to live after the world's opinion; it is easy in solitude to live after our own; but the great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude.

The objection to conforming to usages that have become dead to you is, that it scatters your force. It loses your time and blurs the impression of your character. If you maintain a dead church, contribute to a dead Bible-society, vote with a great party either for the government or against it, spread your table like base housekeepers, — under all these screens I have difficulty to detect the precise man you are. And, of course, so much force is withdrawn from your proper life. But do your work, and I shall know you. Do your work, and you shall reinforce yourself. A man must consider what a blindman's-buff is this game of conformity. If I know your sect, I anticipate your argument. I hear a preacher announce for his text and topic the expediency of one of the institutions of his church. Do I not know beforehand that not possibly can he say a new and spontaneous word? With all this ostentation of examining the grounds of the institution, do I not know that he will do no such thing? Do not I know that he is pledged to himself not to look but at one side, — the permitted side, not as a man, but as a parish minister? He is a retained attorney, and these airs of the bench are the emptiest affectation. Well, most men have bound their eyes with one or another handkerchief, and attached themselves to some one of these communities of opinion. This conformity makes them not false in a few particulars, authors of a few lies, but false in all particulars. Their every truth is not quite true. Their two is not the real two, their four not the real four; so that every word they say chagrins us, and we know not where to begin to set them right. Meantime nature is not slow to equip us in the prison-uniform of the party to which we adhere. We come to wear one cut of face and figure, and acquire by degrees the gentlest asinine expression. There is a mortifying experience in particular, which does not fail to wreak itself also in the general history; I mean "the foolish face of praise," the forced smile which we put on in company where we do not feel at ease in answer to conversation which does not interest us. The muscles, not spontaneously moved, but moved by a low usurping wilfulness, grow tight about the outline of the face with the most disagreeable sensation.

For nonconformity the world whips you with its displeasure. And therefore a man must know how to estimate a sour face. The by-standers look askance on him in the public street or in the friend's parlour. If this aversation had its origin in contempt and resistance like his own, he might well go home with a sad countenance; but the sour faces of the multitude, like their sweet faces, have no deep cause, but are put on and off as the wind blows and a newspaper directs. Yet is the discontent of the multitude more formidable than that of the senate and the college. It is easy enough for a firm man who knows the world to brook the rage of the cultivated classes. Their rage is decorous and prudent, for they are timid as being very vulnerable themselves. But when to their feminine rage the indignation of the people is added, when the ignorant and the poor are aroused, when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the bottom of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike as a trifle of no concernment.

The other terror that scares us from self-trust is our consistency; a reverence for our past act or word, because the eyes of others have no other data for computing our orbit than our past acts, and we are loath to disappoint them.

But why should you keep your head over your shoulder? Why drag about this corpse of your memory, lest you contradict somewhat you have stated in this or that public place? Suppose you should contradict yourself; what then? It seems to be a rule of wisdom never to rely on your memory alone, scarcely even in acts of pure memory, but to bring the past for judgment into the thousand-eyed present, and live ever in a new day. In your metaphysics you have denied personality to the Deity: yet when the devout motions of the soul come, yield to them heart and life, though they should clothe God with shape and color. Leave your theory, as Joseph his coat in the hand of the harlot, and flee.

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day. — 'Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunderstood.' — Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.

I suppose no man can violate his nature.

All the sallies of his will are rounded in by the law of his being, as the inequalities of Andes and Himmaleh are insignificant in the curve of the sphere. Nor does it matter how you gauge and try him. A character is like an acrostic or Alexandrian stanza; — read it forward, backward, or across, it still spells the same thing. In this pleasing, contrite wood-life which God allows me, let me record day by day my honest thought without prospect or retrospect, and, I cannot doubt, it will be found symmetrical, though I mean it not, and see it not. My book should smell of pines and resound with the hum of insects. The swallow over my window should interweave that thread or straw he carries in his bill into my web also. We pass for what we are. Character teaches above our wills. Men imagine that they communicate their virtue or vice only by overt actions, and do not see that virtue or vice emit a breath every moment.

There will be an agreement in whatever variety of actions, so they be each honest and natural in their hour. For of one will, the actions will be harmonious, however unlike they seem. These varieties are lost sight of at a little distance, at a little height of thought. One tendency unites them all. The voyage of the best ship is a zigzag line of a hundred tacks. See the line from a sufficient distance, and it straightens itself to the average tendency. Your genuine action will explain itself, and will explain your other genuine actions. Your conformity explains nothing. Act singly, and what you have already done singly will justify you now. Greatness appeals to the future. If I can be firm enough to-day to do right, and scorn eyes, I must have done so much right before as to defend me now. Be it how it will, do right now. Always scorn appearances, and you always may. The force of character is cumulative. All the foregone days of virtue work their health into this. What makes the majesty of the heroes of the senate and the field, which so fills the imagination? The consciousness of a train of great days and victories behind. They shed an united light on the advancing actor. He is attended as by a visible escort of angels. That is it which throws thunder into Chatham's voice, and dignity into Washington's port, and America into Adams's eye. Honor is venerable to us because it is no ephemeris. It is always ancient virtue. We worship it today because it is not of today. We love it and pay it homage, because it is not a trap for our love and homage, but is self-dependent, self-derived, and therefore of an old immaculate pedigree, even if shown in a young person.

I hope in these days we have heard the last of conformity and consistency. Let the words be gazetted and ridiculous henceforward. Instead of the gong for dinner, let us hear a whistle from the Spartan fife. Let us never bow and apologize more. A great man is coming to eat at my house. I do not wish to please him; He should wish to please me, that I wish. I will stand here for humanity, and though I would make it kind, I would make it true. Let us affront and reprimand the smooth mediocrity and squalid contentment of the times, and hurl in the face of custom, and trade, and office, the fact which is the upshot of all history, that there is a great responsible Thinker and Actor working wherever a man works; that a true man belongs to no other time or place, but is the centre of things. Where he is, there is nature. He measures you, and all men, and all events. Ordinarily, every body in society reminds us of somewhat else, or of some other person. Character, reality, reminds you of nothing else; it takes place of the whole creation. The man must be so much, that he must make all circumstances indifferent. Every true man is a cause, a country, and an age; requires infinite spaces and numbers and time fully to accomplish his design; — and posterity seem to follow his steps as a train of clients. A man Caesar is born, and for ages after we have a Roman Empire. Christ is born, and millions of minds so grow and cleave to his genius, that he is confounded with virtue and the possible of man. An institution is the lengthened shadow of one man; as, Monachism, of the Hermit Antony; the Reformation, of Luther; Quakerism, of Fox; Methodism, of Wesley; Abolition, of Clarkson. Scipio, Milton called "the height of Rome"; and all history resolves itself very easily into the biography of a few stout and earnest persons.

Let a man then know his worth, and keep things under his feet. Let him not peep or steal, or skulk up and down with the air of a charity-boy, a bastard, or an interloper, in the world which exists for him. But the man in the street, finding no worth in himself which corresponds to the force which built a tower or sculptured a marble god, feels poor when he looks on these. To him a palace, a statue, or a costly book have an alien and forbidding air, much like a gay equipage, and seem to say like that, 'Who are you, Sir?' Yet they all are his, suitors for his notice, petitioners to his faculties that they will come out and take possession. The picture waits for my verdict: it is not to command me, but I am to settle its claims to praise. That popular fable of the sot who was picked up dead drunk in the street, carried to the duke's house, washed and dressed and laid in the duke's bed, and, on his waking, treated with all obsequious ceremony like the duke, and assured that he had been insane, owes its popularity to the fact, that it symbolizes so well the state of man, who is in the world a sort of sot, but now and then wakes up, exercises his reason, and finds himself a true prince.

Our reading is mendicant and sycophantic. In history, our imagination plays us false. Kingdom and lordship, power and estate, are a gaudier vocabulary than private John and Edward in a small house and common day's work; but the things of life are the same to both; the sum total of both is the same. Why all this deference to Alfred, and Scanderbeg, and Gustavus? Suppose they were virtuous; did they wear out virtue? As great a stake depends on your private act to-day, as followed their public and renowned steps. When private men shall act with original views, the lustre will be transferred from the actions of kings to those of gentlemen.

The world has been instructed by its kings, who have so magnetized the eyes of nations. It has been taught by this colossal symbol the mutual reverence that is due from man to man. The joyful loyalty with which men have everywhere suffered the king, the noble, or the great proprietor to walk among them by a law of his own, make his own scale of men and things, and reverse theirs, pay for benefits not with money but with honor, and represent the law in his person, was the hieroglyphic by which they obscurely signified their consciousness of their own right and comeliness, the right of every man.

The magnetism which all original action exerts is explained when we inquire the reason of self-trust.

Who is the Trustee? What is the aboriginal Self, on which a universal reliance may be grounded? What is the nature and power of that science-baffling star, without parallax, without calculable elements, which shoots a ray of beauty even into trivial and impure actions, if the least mark of independence appear? The inquiry leads us to that source, at once the essence of genius, of virtue, and of life, which we call Spontaneity or Instinct. We denote this primary wisdom as Intuition, whilst all later teachings are tuitions. In that deep force, the last fact behind which analysis cannot go, all things find their common origin. For, the sense of being which in calm hours rises, we know not how, in the soul, is not diverse from things, from space, from light, from time, from man, but one with them, and proceeds obviously from the same source whence their life and being also proceed. We first share the life by which things exist, and afterwards see them as appearances in nature, and forget that we have shared their cause. Here is the fountain of action and of thought. Here are the lungs of that inspiration which giveth man wisdom, and which cannot be denied without impiety and atheism. We lie in the lap of immense intelligence, which makes us receivers of its truth and organs of its activity. When we discern justice, when we discern truth, we do nothing of ourselves, but allow a passage to its beams. If we ask whence this comes, if we seek to pry into the soul that causes, all philosophy is at fault. Its presence or its absence is all we can affirm. Every man discriminates between the voluntary acts of his mind, and his involuntary perceptions, and knows that to his involuntary perceptions a perfect faith is due. He may err in the expression of them, but he knows that these things are so, like day and night, not to be disputed. My wilful actions and acquisitions are but roving; — the idlest reverie, the faintest native emotion, command my curiosity and respect. Thoughtless people contradict as readily the statement of perceptions as of opinions, or rather much more readily; for, they do not distinguish between perception and notion. They fancy that I choose to see this or that thing. But perception is not whimsical, but fatal. If I see a trait, my children will see it after me, and in course of time, all mankind, — although it may chance that no one has seen it before me. For my perception of it is as much a fact as the sun.

The relations of the soul to the divine spirit are so pure, that it is profane to seek to interpose helps. It must be that when God speaketh he should communicate, not one thing, but all things; should fill the world with his voice; should scatter forth light, nature, time, souls, from the centre of the present thought; and new date and new create the whole. Whenever a mind is simple, and receives a divine wisdom, old things pass away, — means, teachers, texts, temples fall; it lives now, and absorbs past and future into the present hour. All things are made sacred by relation to it, — one as much as another. All things are dissolved to their centre by their cause, and, in the universal miracle, petty and particular miracles disappear. If, therefore, a man claims to know and speak of God, and carries you backward to the phraseology of some old mouldered nation in another country, in another world, believe him not. Is the acorn better than the oak which is its fulness and completion? Is the parent better than the child into whom he has cast his ripened being? Whence, then, this worship of the past? The centuries are conspirators against the sanity and authority of the soul. Time and space are but physiological colors which the eye makes, but the soul is light; where it is, is day; where it was, is night; and history is an impertinence and an injury, if it be anything more than a cheerful apologue or parable of my being and becoming.

Man is timid and apologetic; he is no longer upright; 'I think,' 'I am,' that he dares not say, but quotes some saint or sage. He is ashamed before the blade of grass or the blowing rose. These roses under my window make no reference to former roses or to better ones; they are for what they are; they exist with God today. There is no time to them. There is simply the rose; it is perfect in every moment of its existence. Before a leaf bud has burst, its whole life acts; in the full-blown flower there is no more; in the leafless root there is no less. Its nature is satisfied, and it satisfies nature, in all moments alike. But man postpones or remembers; he does not live in the present, but with reverted eye laments the past, or, heedless of the riches that surround him, stands on tiptoe to foresee the future. He cannot be happy and strong until he too lives with nature in the present, above time.

This should be plain enough. Yet see what strong intellects dare not yet hear God himself, unless he speak the phraseology of I know not what David, or Jeremiah, or Paul. We shall not always set so great a price on a few texts, on a few lives. We are like children who repeat by rote the sentences of grandames and tutors, and, as they grow older, of the men of talents and character they chance to see, — painfully recollecting the exact words they spoke; afterwards, when they come into the point of view which those had who uttered these sayings, they understand them, and are willing to let the words go; for, at any time, they can use words as good when occasion comes. If we live truly, we shall see truly. It is as easy for the strong man to be strong, as it is for the weak to be weak. When we have new perception, we shall gladly disburden the memory of its hoarded treasures as old rubbish. When a man lives with God, his voice shall be as sweet as the murmur of the brook and the rustle of the corn.

And now at last the highest truth on this subject remains unsaid; probably cannot be said; for all that we say is the far-off remembering of the intuition. That thought, by what I can now nearest approach to say it, is this. When good is near you, when you have life in yourself, it is not by any known or accustomed way; you shall not discern the foot-prints of any other; not see the face of man; and you shall not hear any name;—— the way, the thought, the good, shall be wholly strange and new. It shall exclude example and experience. You take the way from man, not to man. All persons that ever existed are its forgotten ministers. Fear and hope are alike beneath it. There is somewhat low even in hope. In the hour of vision, there is nothing that can be called gratitude, nor properly joy. The soul raised over passion beholds identity and eternal causation, perceives the self-existence of Truth and Right, and calms itself with knowing that all things go well. Vast spaces of nature, the Atlantic Ocean, the South Sea, — long intervals of time, years, centuries, — are of no account. This which I think and feel underlay every former state of life and circumstances, as it does underlie my present, and what is called life, and what is called death.

Life only avails, not the having lived.

Power ceases in the instant of repose; it resides in the moment of transition from a past to a new state, in the shooting of the gulf, in the darting to an aim. This one fact the world hates is that the soul becomes ; for that forever degrades the past, turns all riches to poverty, all reputation to a shame, confounds the saint with the rogue, shoves Jesus and Judas equally aside. Why, then, do we prate of self-reliance? Inasmuch as the soul is present, there will be power, not confidence but an agent. To talk of reliance is a poor external way of speaking. Speak rather of that which relies, because it works and is. Who has more obedience than I masters me, though he should not raise his finger. Round him I must revolve by the gravitation of spirits. We fancy it rhetoric, when we speak of eminent virtue. We do not yet see that virtue is Height, and that a man or a company of men, plastic and permeable to principles, by the law of nature must overpower and ride all cities, nations, kings, rich men, poets, who are not.

This is the ultimate fact which we so quickly reach on this, as on every topic, the resolution of all into the ever-blessed ONE. Self-existence is the attribute of the Supreme Cause, and it constitutes the measure of good by the degree in which it enters into all lower forms. All things real are so by so much virtue as they contain. Commerce, husbandry, hunting, whaling, war, eloquence , personal weight, are somewhat, and engage my respect as examples of its presence and impure action. I see the same law working in nature for conservation and growth. Power is in nature the essential measure of right. Nature suffers nothing to remain in her kingdoms which cannot help itself. The genesis and maturation of a planet, its poise and orbit, the bended tree recovering itself from the strong wind, the vital resources of every animal and vegetable, are demonstrations of the self-sufficing, and therefore self-relying soul.

Thus all concentrates: let us not rove; let us sit at home with the cause. Let us stun and astonish the intruding rabble of men and books and institutions, by a simple declaration of the divine fact. Bid the invaders take the shoes from off their feet, for God is here within. Let our simplicity judge them, and our docility to our own law demonstrate the poverty of nature and fortune beside our native riches.

But now we are a mob. Man does not stand in awe of man, nor is his genius admonished to stay at home, to put itself in communication with the internal ocean, but it goes abroad to beg a cup of water of the urns of other men. We must go alone. I like the silent church before the service begins, better than any preaching. How far off, how cool, how chaste the persons look, begirt each one with a precinct or sanctuary! So let us always sit. Why should we assume the faults of our friend, or wife, or father, or child, because they sit around our hearth, or are said to have the same blood? All men have my blood, and I have all men's. Not for that will I adopt their petulance or folly, even to the extent of being ashamed of it. But your isolation must not be mechanical, but spiritual, that is, must be elevation. At times the whole world seems to be in conspiracy to importune you with emphatic trifles. Friend, client, child, sickness, fear, want, charity, all knock at once at thy closet door, and say, — 'Come out unto us.' But keep thy state; come not into their confusion. The power men possess to annoy me, I give them by a weak curiosity. No man can come near me but through my act. "What we love that we have, but by desire we bereave ourselves of the love."

If we cannot at once rise to the sanctities of obedience and faith, let us at least resist our temptations; let us enter into the state of war, and wake Thor and Woden, courage and constancy, in our Saxon breasts. This is to be done in our smooth times by speaking the truth. Check this lying hospitality and lying affection. Live no longer to the expectation of these deceived and deceiving people with whom we converse. Say to them, O father, O mother, O wife, O brother, O friend, I have lived with you after appearances hitherto. Henceforward I am the truth's. Be it known unto you that henceforward I obey no law less than the eternal law. I will have no covenants but proximities. To nourish my parents, to support my family I shall endeavour, to be the chaste husband of one wife, — but these relations I must fill after a new and unprecedented way. I appeal from your customs that I must be myself. I cannot break myself any longer for you, or you. If you can love me for what I am, we shall be the happier. If you cannot, I will still seek to deserve that you should. I will not hide my tastes or aversions. I will so trust that what is deep is holy, that I will do strongly before the sun and moon whatever inly rejoices me, and the heart appoints. If you are noble, I will love you; I will not hurt you and myself by hypocritical attentions if you are not. If you are true, but not in the same truth with me, cleave to your companions; I will seek my own. I do this not selfishly, but humbly and truly. It is alike your interest, and mine, and all men's, however long we have dwelt in lies, to live in truth. Does this sound harsh today? You will soon love what is dictated by your nature as well as mine, and, if we follow the truth, it will bring us out safe at last. — But so you may give these friends pain. Yes, but I cannot sell my liberty and my power, to save their sensibility. Besides, all persons have their moments of reason, when they look out into the region of absolute truth; then will they justify me, and do the same thing.

The populace think that your rejection of popular standards is a rejection of all standard, and mere antinomianism; and the bold sensualist will use the name of philosophy to gild his crimes. But the law of consciousness abides. There are two confessionals, in one or the other of which we must be shriven. You may fulfil your round of duties by clearing yourself in the direct , or in the reflex way. Consider whether you have satisfied your relations to father, mother, cousin, neighbour, town, cat, and dog; whether any of these can upbraid you. But I may also neglect this reflex standard, and absolve me to myself. I have my own stern claims and perfect circle. It denies the name of duty to many offices that are called duties. But if I can discharge its debts, it enables me to dispense with the popular code. If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day.

And truly it demands something godlike in him who has cast off the common motives of humanity, and has ventured to trust himself for a taskmaster. High be his heart, faithful his will, clear his sight, that he may in good earnest be doctrine, society, law, to himself, that a simple purpose may be to him as strong as iron necessity is to others!

If any man consider the present aspects of what is called by distinction society , he will see the need of these ethics. The sinew and heart of man seem to be drawn out, and we are become timorous, desponding whimperers. We are afraid of truth, afraid of fortune, afraid of death, and afraid of each other. Our age yields no great and perfect persons. We want men and women who shall renovate life and our social state, but we see that most natures are insolvent, cannot satisfy their own wants, have an ambition out of all proportion to their practical force, and do lean and beg day and night continually. Our housekeeping is mendicant, our arts, our occupations, our marriages, our religion, we have not chosen, but society has chosen for us. We are parlour soldiers. We shun the rugged battle of fate , where strength is born.

If our young men miscarry in their first enterprises, they lose all heart.

Men say he is ruined if the young merchant fails . If the finest genius studies at one of our colleges, and is not installed in an office within one year afterwards in the cities or suburbs of Boston or New York, it seems to his friends and to himself that he is right in being disheartened, and in complaining the rest of his life. A sturdy lad from New Hampshire or Vermont, who in turn tries all the professions, who teams it , farms it , peddles , keeps a school, preaches, edits a newspaper, goes to Congress, buys a township, and so forth, in successive years, and always, like a cat, falls on his feet, is worth a hundred of these city dolls. He walks abreast with his days, and feels no shame in not 'studying a profession,' for he does not postpone his life, but lives already. He has not one chance, but a hundred chances. Let a Stoic open the resources of man, and tell men they are not leaning willows, but can and must detach themselves; that with the exercise of self-trust, new powers shall appear; that a man is the word made flesh, born to shed healing to the nations, that he should be ashamed of our compassion, and that the moment he acts from himself, tossing the laws, the books, idolatries, and customs out of the window, we pity him no more, but thank and revere him, — and that teacher shall restore the life of man to splendor, and make his name dear to all history.

It is easy to see that a greater self-reliance must work a revolution in all the offices and relations of men; in their religion; education; and in their pursuits; their modes of living; their association; in their property; in their speculative views.

1. In what prayers do men allow themselves! That which they call a holy office is not so much as brave and manly. Prayer looks abroad and asks for some foreign addition to come through some foreign virtue, and loses itself in endless mazes of natural and supernatural, and mediatorial and miraculous. It is prayer that craves a particular commodity, — anything less than all good, — is vicious. Prayer is the contemplation of the facts of life from the highest point of view. It is the soliloquy of a beholding and jubilant soul. It is the spirit of God pronouncing his works good. But prayer as a means to effect a private end is meanness and theft. It supposes dualism and not unity in nature and consciousness. As soon as the man is at one with God, he will not beg. He will then see prayer in all action. The prayer of the farmer kneeling in his field to weed it, the prayer of the rower kneeling with the stroke of his oar, are true prayers heard throughout nature, though for cheap ends. Caratach, in Fletcher's Bonduca, when admonished to inquire the mind of the god Audate, replies, —

"His hidden meaning lies in our endeavours; Our valors are our best gods."

Another sort of false prayers are our regrets. Discontent is the want of self-reliance: it is infirmity of will. Regret calamities, if you can thereby help the sufferer; if not, attend your own work, and already the evil begins to be repaired. Our sympathy is just as base. We come to them who weep foolishly, and sit down and cry for company, instead of imparting to them truth and health in rough electric shocks, putting them once more in communication with their own reason. The secret of fortune is joy in our hands. Welcome evermore to gods and men is the self-helping man. For him all doors are flung wide: him all tongues greet, all honors crown, all eyes follow with desire. Our love goes out to him and embraces him, because he did not need it. We solicitously and apologetically caress and celebrate him, because he held on his way and scorned our disapprobation. The gods love him because men hated him. "To the persevering mortal," said Zoroaster, "the blessed Immortals are swift."

As men's prayers are a disease of the will, so are their creeds a disease of the intellect . They say with those foolish Israelites, 'Let not God speak to us, lest we die. Speak thou, speak any man with us, and we will obey.' Everywhere I am hindered of meeting God in my brother, because he has shut his own temple doors, and recites fables merely of his brother's, or his brother's brother's God. Every new mind is a new classification. If it prove a mind of uncommon activity and power, a Locke, a Lavoisier, a Hutton, a Bentham, a Fourier, it imposes its classification on other men, and lo! a new system. In proportion to the depth of the thought, and so to the number of the objects it touches and brings within reach of the pupil, is his complacency. But chiefly is this apparent in creeds and churches, which are also classifications of some powerful mind acting on the elemental thought of duty, and man's relation to the Highest. Such as Calvinism, Quakerism, Swedenborgism. The pupil takes the same delight in subordinating everything to the new terminology, as a girl who has just learned botany in seeing a new earth and new seasons thereby. It will happen for a time, that the pupil will find his intellectual power has grown by the study of his master's mind. But in all unbalanced minds, the classification is idolized, passes for the end, and not for a speedily exhaustible means, so that the walls of the system blend to their eye in the remote horizon with the walls of the universe; the luminaries of heaven seem to them hung on the arch their master built. They cannot imagine how you aliens have any right to see, — how you can see; 'It must be somehow that you stole the light from us.' They do not yet perceive, that light, unsystematic, indomitable, will break into any cabin, even into theirs. Let them chirp awhile and call it their own. If they are honest and do well, presently their neat new pinfold will be too strait and low, will crack, will lean, will rot and vanish, and the immortal light, all young and joyful, million-orbed, million-colored, will beam over the universe as on the first morning.

2. It is for want of self-culture that the superstition of Travelling, whose idols are Italy, England, Egypt, retains its fascination for all educated Americans. They who made England, Italy, or Greece venerable in the imagination did so by sticking fast where they were, like an axis of the earth. In manly hours, we feel that duty is our place. The soul is no traveller; the wise man stays at home, and when his necessities, his duties, on any occasion call him from his house, or into foreign lands, he is at home still, and shall make men sensible by the expression of his countenance, that he goes the missionary of wisdom and virtue, and visits cities and men like a sovereign, and not like an interloper or a valet.

I have no churlish objection to the circumnavigation of the globe, for the purposes of art, of study, and benevolence, so that the man is first domesticated, or does not go abroad with the hope of finding somewhat greater than he knows. He who travels to be amused, or to get somewhat which he does not carry, travels away from himself, and grows old even in youth among old things. In Thebes, in Palmyra, his will and mind have become old and dilapidated as they. He carries ruins to ruins.

Travelling is a fool's paradise. Our first journeys discover to us the indifference of places. At home I dream that at Naples, at Rome, I can be intoxicated with beauty, and lose my sadness. I pack my trunk, embrace my friends, embark on the sea, and at last wake up in Naples, and there beside me is the stern fact, the sad self, unrelenting, identical, that I fled from. The Vatican, and the palaces I seek. But I am not intoxicated though I affect to be intoxicated with sights and suggestions. My giant goes with me wherever I go.

3. But the rage of travelling is a symptom of a deeper unsoundness affecting the whole intellectual action. The intellect is vagabond, and our system of education fosters restlessness. Our minds travel when our bodies are forced to stay at home. We imitate, and what is imitation but the travelling of the mind? Our houses are built with foreign taste; Shelves are garnished with foreign ornaments, but our opinions, our tastes, our faculties, lean, and follow the Past and the Distant. The soul created the arts wherever they have flourished. It was in his own mind that the artist sought his model. It was an application of his own thought to the thing to be done and the conditions to be observed. And why need we copy the Doric or the Gothic model? Beauty, convenience, grandeur of thought, and quaint expression are as near to us as to any, and if the American artist will study with hope and love the precise thing to be done by him, considering the climate, the soil, the length of the day, the wants of the people, the habit and form of the government, he will create a house in which all these will find themselves fitted, and taste and sentiment will be satisfied also.

Insist on yourself; never imitate. Your own gift you can present every moment with the cumulative force of a whole life's cultivation, but of the adopted talent of another, you have only an extemporaneous, half possession. That which each can do best, none but his Maker can teach him. No man yet knows what it is, nor can, till that person has exhibited it. Where is the master who could have taught Shakespeare? Where is the master who could have instructed Franklin, or Washington, or Bacon, or Newton? Every great man is a unique. The Scipionism of Scipio is precisely that part he could not borrow. Shakespeare will never be made by the study of Shakespeare. Do that which is assigned you, and you cannot hope too much or dare too much. There is at this moment for you an utterance brave and grand as that of the colossal chisel of Phidias, or trowel of the Egyptians, or the pen of Moses, or Dante, but different from all these. Not possibly will the soul all rich, all eloquent, with thousand-cloven tongue, deign to repeat itself; but if you can hear what these patriarchs say, surely you can reply to them in the same pitch of voice; for the ear and the tongue are two organs of one nature. Abide in the simple and noble regions of thy life, obey thy heart, and thou shalt reproduce the Foreworld again.

4. As our Religion, our Education, our Art look abroad, so does our spirit of society. All men plume themselves on the improvement of society, and no man improves.

Society never advances. It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other and undergoes continual changes; it is barbarous,  civilized, christianized, rich and it is scientific, but this change is not amelioration. For everything that is given, something is taken. Society acquires new arts, and loses old instincts. What a contrast between the well-clad, reading, writing, thinking American, with a watch, a pencil, and a bill of exchange in his pocket, and the naked New Zealander, whose property is a club, a spear, a mat, and an undivided twentieth of a shed to sleep under! But compare the health of the two men, and you shall see that the white man has lost his aboriginal strength. If the traveller tell us truly, strike the savage with a broad axe, and in a day or two, the flesh shall unite and heal as if you struck the blow into soft pitch, and the same blow shall send the white to his grave.

The civilized man has built a coach, but has lost the use of his feet. He is supported on crutches, but lacks so much support of muscle. He has a fine Geneva watch, but he fails of the skill to tell the hour by the sun. A Greenwich nautical almanac he has, and so being sure of the information when he wants it, the man in the street does not know a star in the sky. The solstice he does not observe, the equinox he knows as little, and the whole bright calendar of the year are without a dial in his mind. His note-books impair his memory; his libraries overload his wit; the insurance office increases the number of accidents; and it may be a question whether machinery does not encumber; whether we have not lost by refinement some energy, by a Christianity entrenched in establishments and forms, some vigor of wild virtue. For every Stoic was a Stoic, but in Christendom, where is the Christian?

There is no more deviation in the moral standard than in the standard of height or bulk. No greater men are now than ever were. A singular equality may be observed between the great men of the first and of the last ages; nor can all the science, art, religion, and philosophy of the nineteenth century avail to educate greater men than Plutarch's heroes, three or four and twenty centuries ago. Not in time is the race progressive. Phocion, Socrates, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, are great men, but they leave no class. He who is really of their class will not be called by their name, but will be his own man, and, in his turn, the founder of a sect. The arts and inventions of each period are only its costume, and do not invigorate men. The harm of the improved machinery may compensate its good. Hudson and Behring accomplished so much in their fishing boats, as to astonish Parry and Franklin, whose equipment exhausted the resources of science and art. Galileo, with an opera-glass, discovered a more splendid series of celestial phenomena than anyone since. Columbus found the New World in an undecked boat. It is curious to see the periodical disuse and perishing of means and machinery, which were introduced with loud laudation a few years or centuries before. The great genius returns to essential man. We reckoned the improvements of the art of war among the triumphs of science, and yet Napoleon conquered Europe by the bivouac, which consisted of falling back on naked valor and disencumbering it of all aids. The Emperor held it impossible to make a perfect army, says Las Casas, "without abolishing our arms, magazines, commissaries, and carriages, until, in imitation of the Roman custom, the soldier should receive his supply of corn, grind it in his hand-mill, and bake his bread himself."

Society is a wave. The wave moves onward, but the water of which it is composed does not. The same particle does not rise from the valley to the ridge. Its unity is only phenomenal. The persons who make up a nation today, next year die, and their experience with them.

And so the reliance on Property, including the reliance on governments which protect it, is the want of self-reliance. Men have looked away from themselves and at things so long, that they have come to esteem the religious, learned, and civil institutions as guards of property, and they deprecate assaults on these, because they feel them to be assaults on property. They measure their esteem of each other by what each has, and not by what each is. But a cultivated man becomes ashamed of his property, out of new respect for his nature. Especially he hates what he has, if he see that it is accidental, — came to him by inheritance, or gift, or crime; then he feels that it is not having; it does not belong to him, has no root in him, and merely lies there, because no revolution or no robber takes it away. But that which a man is does always by necessity acquire, and what the man acquires is living property, which does not wait the beck of rulers, or mobs, or revolutions, or fire, or storm, or bankruptcies, but perpetually renews itself wherever the man breathes. "Thy lot or portion of life," said the Caliph Ali, "is seeking after thee; therefore, be at rest from seeking after it." Our dependence on these foreign goods leads us to our slavish respect for numbers. The political parties meet in numerous conventions; the greater the concourse, and with each new uproar of announcement, The delegation from Essex! The Democrats from New Hampshire! The Whigs of Maine! the young patriot feels himself stronger than before by a new thousand of eyes and arms. In like manner the reformers summon conventions, and vote and resolve in multitude. Not so, O friends! will the God deign to enter and inhabit you, but by a method precisely the reverse. It is only as a man puts off all foreign support, and stands alone, that I see him to be strong and to prevail. He is weaker by every recruit to his banner. Is not a man better than a town? Ask nothing of men, and in the endless mutation, thou only firm column must presently appear the upholder of all that surrounds thee. He who knows that power is inborn, that he is weak because he has looked for good out of him and elsewhere, and so perceiving, throws himself unhesitatingly on his thought, instantly rights himself, stands in the erect position, commands his limbs, works miracles; just as a man who stands on his feet is stronger than a man who stands on his head.

So use all that is called Fortune. Most men gamble with her, and gain all, and lose all, as her wheel rolls. But do thou leave as unlawful these winnings, and deal with Cause and Effect, the chancellors of God. In the Will work and acquire, and thou hast chained the wheel of Chance, and shalt sit hereafter out of fear from her rotations. A political victory, a rise of rents, the recovery of your sick, or the return of your absent friend, or some other favorable event, raises your spirits, and you think good days are preparing for you. Do not believe it. Nothing can bring you peace but yourself. Nothing can bring you peace but the triumph of principles.

Which quotation from "Self-reliance" best summarizes Emerson’s view on belief in oneself?

One of the most famous quotes from Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Self-Reliance" that summarizes his view on belief in oneself is:

"Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string."

What does Emerson argue should be the basis of human actions in the second paragraph of “self-reliance”?

In the second paragraph of "Self-Reliance," Emerson argues that individual conscience, or a person's inner voice, should be the basis of human actions. He writes, "Whoso would be a man must be a nonconformist." He believes that society tends to impose conformity and discourage people from following their own inner truth and intuition. Emerson encourages individuals to trust themselves and to act according to their own beliefs, instead of being influenced by the opinions of others. He argues that this is the way to live a truly authentic and fulfilling life.

Which statement best describes Emerson’s opinion of communities, according to the first paragraph of society and solitude?

According to the first paragraph of Ralph Waldo Emerson's " Society and Solitude, " Emerson has a mixed opinion of communities. He recognizes the importance of social interaction and the benefits of being part of a community but also recognizes the limitations that come with it.

He writes, "Society everywhere is in a conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members." He argues that society can be limiting and restrictive, and can cause individuals to conform to norms and values that may not align with their own beliefs and desires. He believes that it is important for individuals to strike a balance between the benefits of social interaction and the need for solitude and self-discovery.

Which best describes Emerson’s central message to his contemporaries in "self-reliance"?

Ralph Waldo Emerson's central message to his contemporaries in "Self-Reliance" is to encourage individuals to trust in their own beliefs and instincts, and to break free from societal norms and expectations. He argues that individuals should have the courage to think for themselves and to live according to their own individual truth, rather than being influenced by the opinions of others. Through this message, he aims to empower people to live authentic and fulfilling lives, rather than living in conformity and compromise.

Yet, it is critical that we first possess the ability to conceive our own thoughts. Prior to venturing into the world, we must be intimately acquainted with our own selves and our individual minds. This sentiment echoes the concise maxim inscribed at the ancient Greek site of the Delphic Oracle: 'Know Thyself.'

In essence, Emerson's central message in "Self-Reliance" is to promote self-reliance and individualism as the key to a meaningful and purposeful life.

Understanding Emerson: "The American scholar" and his struggle for self-reliance.

Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-09982-0

Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Other works from ralph waldo emerson for book clubs, the over-soul.

There is a difference between one and another hour of life, in their authority and subsequent effect. Our faith comes in moments; our vice is habitual.

The American Scholar

An Oration delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society, at Cambridge, August 31, 1837

Essays First Series

Essays: First Series First published in 1841 as Essays. After Essays: Second Series was published in 1844, Emerson corrected this volume and republished it in 1847 as Essays: First Series.

Emerson's Essays

Research the collective works of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Read More Essay

Self-Reliance

Emerson's most famous work that can truly change your life. Check it out

Early Emerson Poems

America's best known and best-loved poems. More Poems

Home — Essay Samples — Psychology — Positive Attitude — The Power of a Positive Mindset

The Power of a Positive Mindset

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             Some say that the brain is one of the most powerful things one could possess. The mind can create and it can destroy; it should never be put to waste. No one knows the boundaries or the restrictions that the brain holds because no one has used it to its limit. No one has been able to use the brain to its full capacity. It seems as though Emily Dickinson is one of the many believers in the grandness of the brain and is well aware of the great power that the mind possesses. Some of Dickinson's works suggest that she has a great admiration and a very high regard for the supremacy of the mind. Two of her poems in particular, "The Brain-is wider than the Sky-" and "To Make a Prairie It Takes a Clover," appear to be unmistakable evidence of her attitudes and beliefs towards the magnificence and the grandeur that the brain and the mind hold.              In "The Brain-is wider than the Sky-," Dickinson compares the brain to other objects which could be considered to be grand. The never-ending sky, her first comparison, would seem minute, simply miniscule, compared to the width, the magnitude, of the brain. The enormity of both the sky and the brain are immeasurable. However, if one were to put both of them side by side, the vastness and the immensity of the sky could be very easily overtaken by that of the brain. The brain may seem as endless as the sky, but there must eventually be a boundary to which the sky can go, some kind of end, but the powerful brain knows no limits. There are no boundaries for the brain or for its capabilities to create and hold a variety and a large amount of information. The brain is so capable that it can hold both the sky and one's self with ease. She also creates an analogy with the depth of the sea and its capacity. If one were to hold the sea and the brain side by side, "Blue to Blue," the brain would be able to absorb the sea whole and still have space to absorb plenty...

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Essay on Positive Thinking

Positive thinking refers to a belief or mental attitude which makes us think that good things will happen eventually and our efforts will pay off sooner or later. It is the opposite of negative thinking which makes our mind full of stress and fear. Thus, an essay on positive thinking will show us how it reinforces thoughts like optimism and hope and works wonders.

Benefits of Positive Thinking

Let it be clear that positive thinking does not mean you do not notice the bad things in life. It means you try to find a solution in a productive way instead of whining about it. There are many benefits of positive thinking.

The first one is better health. Negative thinking gives rise to anxiety, stress, frustration and more. However, positive thinking helps you avoid all this and focus on staying healthy and doing better in life.

Further, it is essential for us to fight depression which positive thinking helps with. Similarly, it will also help us to relieve stress. Positive thinking overwhelms stress and it will allow you to get rid of stress.

As a result, positive thinking helps you live longer. It is because you will be free from diseases that form due to stress, anxiety and more. Moreover, it is also the key to success. Meaning to say, success becomes easier when you don’t bash yourself up.

Similarly, it also gives us more confidence. It boosts our self-esteem and helps in becoming more confident and self-assured. Therefore, we must certainly adopt positive thinking to make the most of our lives.

How to Build a Positive Thinking

There are many ways through which we can build positive thinking. To begin with, we must inculcate the habit of reading motivational and inspiring stories of people who are successful.

All this will help in motivating and inspiring you and showing you the right path. Moreover, it is important to never let negative thoughts thrive in your mind and work towards putting end to this habit.

You can do so by replacing your negative thoughts with constructive and positive reviews. Start to pay attention to your ideas and don’t pay heed to negative thoughts. Further, it is helpful to use affirmations.

These positive statements will truly sink into your subconscious mind and guide you to take better action. It will also help in visualising your dreams and getting the right means to achieve them fast.

Finally, always stay guard and gatekeep your mind to make important changes in life. In other words, do not be afraid to take actions. Keep yourself busy and do different things to avoid becoming cynical and remaining positive.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Conclusion of the Essay on Positive Thinking

To conclude, we must change our attitude and believe that we will succeed one day. Moreover, we also need to implement positive thinking techniques which will help us learn from our failures and stay focused. As positive thinking plays an essential role in our lives, we must make sure to adopt in our lives.

FAQ of Essay on Positive Thinking

Question 1: What is positive thinking?

Answer 1: Positive thinking is basically an optimistic attitude. In other words, it is the practice of focusing on the good in any given situation. This kind of thinking can have a big impact on your physical and mental health .

Question 2: Why is positive thinking important?

Answer 2: Positive thinking is important as it helps us with stress management and can even improve our health. Moreover, some studies show that personality traits like optimism can affect many areas of our health and well-being. Thus, positive thinking comes with optimism

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