research work on terrorism

By Bastian Herre, Veronika Samborska, Hannah Ritchie, Joe Hasell, Edouard Mathieu and Max Roser

Terrorism is the threat or use of violence to intimidate or coerce in the pursuit of political or ideological goals. It is usually understood to be done by non-state actors — individuals or organizations not part of the government.

Terrorism can take many forms, including bombings, armed assaults, hijackings, or hostage-taking. Its targets can also vary and can be aimed at civilians, state actors, or public infrastructure.

Globally, terrorist attacks and deaths are rare. But this varies a lot worldwide: in some countries, they are common and on the rise, while in others, there are few attacks or none.

Terrorism is also a big concern for people across the world. Attacks are rare, but often shocking, as they are meant to scare and subdue.

This page provides data and research on how common terrorism is, how it differs across countries, and whether it is becoming more or less frequent over time.

Key Insights on Terrorism

Terrorism is a rare cause of death globally.

Globally, around 20,000 people died from terrorism in 2019.

This meant it caused an estimated 1 in 2000 deaths that year.

This is shown in the chart, which lays out what people died from. You can find terrorism in the bottom right-hand corner.

Terrorism is not only a much rarer cause of death than non-communicable or infectious diseases; it is also a rare cause of violent death: more than 4 times as many people die in armed conflicts, and more than ten times as many die from homicides. 1

While the number of terrorism deaths can change a lot from year to year — in 2014, almost 45,000 people died in terrorist attacks, while in 2010, it was less than 8,000 — the average over the last decade was close to the 2019 number, at around 24,000 per year.

While terrorism is a rare cause of death globally, it is more common in some countries and regions .

What you should know about this data

• We rely on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 2 to measure terrorism deaths.
• The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threat or use of violence to achieve a political, economic, religious, or social goal through intimidation or coercion by a non-state actor. Learn more in our technical article on the GTD .
• Because the data is based on news reports, attacks, and deaths may be underreported in countries with sparser media, especially during early years.
• Data for other causes of death comes from the Global Burden of Disease study by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), published in 2019.

Terrorism affects some countries much more than others

There are very large differences in the prevalence of terrorism across the world. Many countries experience few to no attacks and deaths. Others experience hundreds or thousands a year.

The map shows deaths from terrorism around the world. The distribution of terrorist attacks looks similar.

Most attacks happen in South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Deaths are even more concentrated in some regions. In them, terrorism deaths can account for several percent of all deaths in a year.

The countries most affected by terrorism can change frequently. In 2020, almost half of the people who died from terrorism were in Afghanistan, while in 2016, Iraq was the most affected, where a third of all terrorism deaths occurred.

Terrorism has increased in some parts of the world, but decreased in others

Terrorism trends have been very different across the world’s regions.

The chart shows terrorism deaths in various regions since 1970.

Importantly, because the estimates are based on news reports, attacks, and deaths may be underreported in countries with sparser media, especially during early years.

To help show the trends within regions, the axis scales between regions are not identical. But when comparing regions, you can see that terrorism deaths have been much more common in some than in others.

Global deaths from terrorism have been higher over the last decade than in the 1990s and 2000s – even when data collection had improved significantly. But they have fallen again in recent years.

This global trend is driven by increased terrorism deaths in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, there has been a decline in deaths in more recent years in these regions, especially in the Middle East and North Africa.

In Western Europe, deaths from terrorism have declined in recent decades. A few deadly attacks, however, have meant that deaths have varied a lot from year to year.

Deaths from terrorism in North America are typically low – but the September 11 attacks in the United States in 2001 stand out. South America has seen a sustained decrease in terrorism.

The global and regional trends are broadly similar if we look at attacks instead of deaths.

Most terrorist attacks target private citizens, the military, and the police

Terrorist attacks have different targets, and some are much more common than others.

The chart shows the global number of terrorist attacks by the intended target.

Most attacks target private citizens, the military and police, and other government institutions. Attacks on religious and educational institutions, non-government organizations, and journalists are rare. Attacks on tourists are very rare.

This looks similar when we examine deaths from terrorism by the intended target 3 : most people globally die in attacks that target private citizens or their property, the military, and the police.

Many people worry about terrorism, even in countries where it is rare

In almost every country, concern about terrorist attacks is high. This is even true in countries where they are rare .

The chart shows the share of respondents in representative surveys that worried “very much” or “a great deal” about a terrorist attack.

In most countries, more than half of all people said they are worried about terrorism. In some, it was more than 80%.

When we compare the share of people worried about terrorism to how many people die from it, we see that concerns are also high in countries that rarely experience terrorism.

This means that terrorism’s reach goes much farther than the people who experience attacks themselves or have loved ones get injured or die in them.

The goal of terrorism is often to intimidate people. Surveys show that this is often successful.

• We rely on the World Values Survey (WVS) 4 to measure concerns about terrorism.
• The WVS provides data from representative surveys taken by tens of thousands of people in countries around the world.

Research & Writing

The Global Terrorism Database: how do researchers measure terrorism?

There are different approaches to measuring terrorism. Here is the approach of the Global Terrorism Database, a leading source of terrorism data.

Bastian Herre

Causes of death globally: what do people die from?

To make progress towards a healthier world we need to have a good understanding of what health problems we face today.

More Articles on Terrorism

Why do some terrorist attacks receive more media attention than others.

Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser

Airline hijackings were once common but are very rare today

Hannah Ritchie

Interactive Charts on Terrorism

Acknowledgements.

We thank Cam Appel for his contributions to previous versions of this topic page.

Armed conflicts can include terrorist attacks, but they do not necessarily seek to coerce and intimidate or targets civilians.

Homicides differ from terrorism because they are not committed in the pursuit of political or ideological goals.

START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism). 2021. Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [Data set] . University of Maryland.

Importantly, this includes bystanders who were not the intended target. So, an attack targeting members of the military may still kill more civilians who happened to be nearby.

Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen (eds.). 2022. World Values Survey: All Rounds - Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain & Vienna, Austria: JD Systems Institute & WVSA Secretariat. Dataset Version 3.0.0. doi:10.14281/18241.17

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Extreme political violence

Terrorism is illegitimate violence directed at civilians for political purposes.

Description

The two major kinds of terrorism are state terrorism and oppositional terrorism. State terrorism is directed by government agencies, while oppositional terrorism is carried out by non-state groups. Each of these subdivides into domestic and international categories. Domestic terrorism is planned and performed within one country, while international terrorism is orchestrated in one country and accomplished in another (Ganor 2002 ).

The connections between terrorism and quality of life are fourfold. Terrorist attacks may cause changes in quality of life. Aspects of quality of life may make terrorist attacks more or less likely. Quality of life may shape the way people think about terrorism. The experience of terrorism may affect the way people assess their quality of life.

State terrorism far surpasses oppositional terrorism in its impact on quality...

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Barker, J. (2023). Terrorism. In: Maggino, F. (eds) Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17299-1_2997

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Cyberterrorism as a global threat: a review on repercussions and countermeasures

Saman iftikhar.

Faculty of Computer Studies, Arab Open University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

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The following information was supplied regarding data availability:

This is a literature review.

An act of cyberterrorism involves using the internet and other forms of information and communication technology to threaten or cause bodily harm to gain political or ideological power through threat or intimidation. Data theft, data manipulation, and disruption of essential services are all forms of cyberattacks. As digital infrastructure becomes more critical and entry barriers for malicious actors decrease, cyberterrorism has become a growing concern. Detecting, responding, and preventing this crime presents unique challenges for law enforcement and governments, which require a multifaceted approach. Cyberterrorism can have devastating effects on a wide range of people and organizations. A country’s reputation and stability can be damaged, financial losses can occur, and in some cases, even lives can be lost. As a result of cyberattacks, critical infrastructure, such as power grids, hospitals, and transportation systems, can also be disrupted, leading to widespread disruptions and distress. The past ten years have seen several cyber-attacks around the globe including WannaCry attack (2017), Yahoo data breaches (2013–2014), OPM data breach (2015), SolarWinds supply chain attack (2020) etc . This study covers some of the cyberterrorism events that have happened in the past ten years, their target countries, their devastating effects, their impacts on nation’s economy, political instability, and measures adopted to counter them over the passage of time. Our survey-based research on cyberterrorism will complement existing literature by providing valuable empirical data, understanding of perceptions and awareness, and insights into targeted populations. It can contribute to the development of better measurement tools, strategies, and policies for countering cyberterrorism.

Introduction

Cyberterrorism refers to the utilization of internet, information mediums and communication platforms to conduct terrorist attacks or to promote terrorist causes. These attacks can take many forms, such as disseminating propaganda, stealing or manipulation of data, or disrupting critical infrastructure. It is also possible to refer to it as an act of unauthorized attacks and threat-making against computers, networks, and the data they house and disseminate ( Theohary & Rollins, 2015 ). To achieve a political or social goal, this is done through intimidating or threatening a government or its citizens. High intensity cyberattacks can also inflict violence against persons or property, or at the very least enough damage to inspire fear. Most of the time, cyberterrorism can result in death or physical harm, an explosion, a plane accident, water pollution, or a major economic or political loss. If it has a large effect, cyberterrorism may be conducted against essential infrastructure. Attacks that interfere with unnecessary services or are merely a nuisance do not need to be reported. Cyberterrorism is the deliberate use of cyber capabilities, often by non-state actors, with the primary intention of causing widespread fear, panic, or disruption in a population, government, or organization. Acts of cyberterrorism typically involve politically, ideologically, or socially motivated attacks that target critical infrastructure, result in significant harm, or pose a grave threat to national security. What distinguishes cyberterrorism from other cyberattacks, such as cybercrime or hacktivism, is the explicit intent to incite terror or destabilize societies, often in pursuit of political or ideological goals, rather than purely financial gain or the pursuit of social or ethical objectives. Cyberterrorism seeks to create fear, chaos, and mistrust on a larger scale, often with the potential for real-world harm or destruction.

This idea is not sufficiently understood. Recent attempts to broaden the definition of cyberterrorism to encompass hacktivism and the use of the Internet by terrorists to further conventional terrorism is primarily to blame for the uncertainty around the term. The biggest online threat posed by a non-state terrorist group comes from their capacity to use the Internet for purposes other than cyber-terrorism, such as fund-raising, target research, and supporter recruitment. Although cyber-terrorism may arise in the future, online crime, hacktivism, and cyber-warfare pose more immediate threats ( Kenney, 2015 ). A striking feature of our understanding of cybercrime is the variety of terms used to describe it. Despite the wide range of terminology used, there is one common thread that stands out. In earlier ways of thinking about misuse of information technology, this was called ‘crime by computer.’ Pre-Internet, computers were the primary target of crime, so this seemed like an appropriate name. Even though networked computing became widespread in the 1990s, this term has continued to be used. Until 2000, it was the most used term for crimes related to information technology. Other words, such as e-crime, online crime, digital crime, net crime, techno-crime, Internet crime, or even hi-tech crime, have all been used at various points in time. In the past, the phrase used to characterize the crime was computer crime. Academic literature on cybercrime contains two times as many references to this term. However, by 2018, the situation had significantly changed. In scholarly sources between 2001 and 2018, there were twice as many references to cybercrime as to ‘computer crime’, making cybercrime the preferred term of choice ( Kapto, 2013 ). There has been a cybercrime problem for more than three decades in various forms. As technology has become more widely used and its criminal potential has become more widely recognized, some forms of cyber-attack reported by industry seem to have been increasing in scale and breadth. Public awareness has also increased, as has recognition by governments, businesses, and legal systems. It has been difficult to accurately measure cyber-crime scale and trends (not just attacks), or assess the harms and impacts caused by successful attacks ( Furnell & Dowling, 2019 ). Cyberwarfare is the umbrella word for attacks on and defenses against computer networks, as well as unique technological activities. Cyberwarfare is the term used to describe when a country utilizes digital attacks, such as computer viruses and hacking, to damage, kill, and destroy another country’s critical computer systems. In the future, hackers will fight alongside traditional weaponry like guns and missiles, attacking an adversary’s infrastructure using computer code. Cyberwarfare has emerged as a regular and deadly facet of international conflict in a world still filled with spies, hackers, and top-secret digital weapons programs. However, now there is a genuine risk of situations quickly spiraling out of control due to the continuous weapons competition in cyberwarfare and the absence of defined guidelines governing online combat ( Ranger, 2018 ).

Cyberterrorism is a growing concern because of the increasing reliance on information technology in many aspects of society and the potential for significant disruption or harm caused by cyber-attacks. It had a significant impact globally and continues to threaten the various aspects of a nation’s stability. One of the biggest effects of cyberattacks is the interruption of vital infrastructure, such as transportation networks, power grids, and banking networks. Directed attacks on these systems can have widespread consequences including blackouts, transportation delays, and financial losses ( Caplan, 2013 ). In addition, cyberterrorism has been used to spread propaganda and manipulate public opinion, as well as to steal sensitive information, such as intellectual property or personal data. The fear of cyberterrorism has also led to increased spending on cybersecurity measures by governments and private companies. The world has been affected in several ways by the act of cyber-attacks including infrastructural damage, monetary crisis, economic crisis, the spread of propaganda or misinformation, loss of sensitive information, and privacy invasion etc. Cyberterrorism can lead to significant financial losses for businesses and governments, as well as damage to a country’s reputation and economic stability. It can be used to spread propaganda and manipulate public opinion, which can lead to social and political instability. Cyber-attacks can result in the theft of sensitive information, such as intellectual property or personal data, which can have profound consequences for individuals and organizations. The fear of getting engaged in the vicious act of cyber-invasion has led to increased spending on cybersecurity measures by governments and private companies. Cyberattacks can result in the loss of privacy, as personal data is stolen or made public ( Foltz, 2004 ). Overall, cyberterrorism can cause significant disruption and harm, both to individuals and society. This survey paper is intended for a wide range of audiences, including businesses, companies, government bodies and individuals to get a varied awareness about all these threats to them.

Our survey-based research on cyberterrorism will make unique contributions to the existing literature in several ways. It will provide a structured means of collecting empirical data on various aspects of cyberterrorism. This data can offer insights into the prevalence, patterns, and motivations of cyberterrorist activities, which may not be as readily available through other research methods. Moreover, public or expert perceptions and awareness of cyberterrorism can help assess how different groups perceive the threat, its severity, and the measures they believe are necessary to counter it. It will develop and refine measurement tools and metrics specific to cyberterrorism. This can lead to more accurate assessments of its impact and effectiveness in different contexts. Researchers can target specific populations or groups, such as cybersecurity professionals, government officials, or the public. This targeted approach can provide valuable insights into the views and experiences of these groups regarding cyberterrorism. They can also conduct comparative analyses by collecting data from multiple sources or over time. This can help track changes in attitudes, awareness, and perceptions related to cyberterrorism. This research can reveal vulnerabilities and preparedness levels among organizations, governments, or individuals. This information can be crucial for developing effective strategies to counter cyberterrorism. In addition to quantitative data, surveys can include open-ended questions, which provide qualitative insights into the nuanced perspectives and experiences related to cyberterrorism. These results can inform the development of policy recommendations and strategies for governments, organizations, and other stakeholders in their efforts to prevent and respond to cyberterrorism. In Addition, risk assessment can be done by examining the perceived and actual risks associated with cyberterrorism. This can help prioritize resources and responses. Finally, public opinion can be revealed on issues related to cyberterrorism, which can influence political will and shape government policies and actions in response to the threat.

Motivation behind survey

Lack of comprehensive, actual-world case studies is one gap in the cyberterrorism literature and study, currently in existence. While several studies have examined the general trends and patterns of cyberattacks, in-depth examination of occurrences is lacking. This makes it challenging to completely comprehend the complexity of various cyberattacks and the unique difficulties that governments and businesses have in reacting to them. The inadequate attention paid to the effects of cyberterrorism is another flaw in the literature and study that has already been done. Less study has been done on the long-term impacts of cyberattacks on people, organizations, and society, even though there is a lot of literature on many types of cyberattacks that have been conducted and the countermeasures that have been used. This encompasses the effects of cyberterrorism on the economy, the mind, and society. It is critical to comprehend these effects to create effective defenses and evaluate the overall effect of cyberattacks. The amount of research on the countermeasures used by nations is equally limited, necessitating more thorough analyses of their efficacy.

To ensure a comprehensive and unbiased analysis of the topic of cyberterrorism, the literature and studies used in this paper were selected from a variety of reputable sources, including academic journals, government reports, and news articles. The sources were carefully chosen to ensure that they covered a wide range of perspectives and viewpoints on the topic. Additionally, the literature review and case studies were selected based on their relevance to the research question and their availability of detailed information. The literature review was performed by considering studies from different regions (Middle East, East Asia, USA, Russia, France) and covering different periods (last 10 to 15 years). Furthermore, an effort was made to ensure that the countermeasures adopted by various countries were evaluated in a neutral manner, considering the effectiveness of the measures and not the political background of the countries. All sources were critically evaluated to ensure that they were credible and unbiased.

Survey methodology

The survey methodology used in this paper consisted of a thorough review of literature on the topic of cyberterrorism and its repercussions, as well as countermeasures adopted by various nations, regions, states, and countries. The literature review covered a range of sources, including academic journals, latest survey papers, government reports, and news articles. The focus of the literature review was on instances of cyberterrorism that have occurred in the Middle East, East Asia, USA, Russia, and France over the past 10-15 years. The literature review aimed to identify the key trends and patterns in terms of the types of cyberattacks that have been carried out, the sectors that have been targeted, and the repercussions of these attacks. In addition to the literature review, the study also included a qualitative analysis of case studies of specific cyberterrorism incidents that have occurred in the mentioned regions and around the globe. The studies, papers, articles, and other sources considered for this article were selected based on their relevance to the research question and their availability of detailed information and were analyzed in terms of the types of attacks, the sectors targeted, the repercussions, and the countermeasures that were adopted. Finally, the study also included a review of the countermeasures adopted by various countries against future cyber-attacks. The review of countermeasures looked at the various organizations, sectors, agencies, strategies, and technologies that have been created, developed, and implemented by countries in the mentioned regions and around the world to protect against cyberattacks. The review aimed to identify the most effective countermeasures and to identify any gaps in the existing strategies. Overall, the survey methodology used in this paper aimed to provide a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the topic of cyberterrorism, its repercussions, and the countermeasures adopted by various countries. The combination of literature review, case studies, and review of countermeasures provided a holistic view of the topic, highlighting the key trends, patterns, and gaps in the existing research. Figure 1 . shows some of the methods through which cyberterrorists carry out the vicious act of cyberterrorism. Some of the common methods through which cyberterrorism is carried out include:

Malware: Malicious software, such as viruses, worms, Trojans, and ransomware, can be used to compromise computer systems and steal sensitive information, disrupt critical infrastructure, or create chaos. Cyberterrorists may develop or deploy malware to achieve their objectives.

Phishing: Phishing attacks involve the use of deceptive emails, websites, or messages to trick individuals into revealing sensitive information like login credentials, financial details, or personal data. These tactics can be used to gather intelligence or access critical systems.

Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks: DoS and DDoS attacks involve overwhelming a target’s computer systems or network with excessive traffic, causing them to become unavailable. Cyberterrorists may use these attacks to disrupt the operation of critical infrastructure or services.

Social engineering: Social engineering techniques involve manipulating individuals into revealing confidential information or performing actions that may compromise security. Cyberterrorists may impersonate trusted individuals or entities to gain access to sensitive data or systems.

SQL injection: SQL injection attacks target vulnerabilities in web applications that use SQL databases. Cyberterrorists can exploit these vulnerabilities to access, manipulate, or exfiltrate data from databases, potentially causing significant damage.

Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks: MITM attacks intercept and alter communications between two parties, often without their knowledge. Cyberterrorists can use MITM attacks to eavesdrop on sensitive information, manipulate messages, or compromise the security of communication channels.

Ransomware: Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts a victim’s data, making it inaccessible until a ransom is paid. Cyberterrorists may deploy ransomware to disrupt critical systems or extort money from targeted organizations.

Insider threats: Insider threats involve individuals within an organization who intentionally or unintentionally aid cyberterrorists in their activities. These individuals may have access to critical information or systems.

Stuxnet-Like attacks: Stuxnet is a famous example of a targeted cyberattack that specifically aimed at disrupting industrial control systems, such as those used in nuclear facilities. Cyberterrorists might target critical infrastructure systems to cause physical harm or destruction.

Zero-Day exploits: Cyberterrorists may employ unknown vulnerabilities in software or hardware systems known as zero-day exploits to gain unauthorized access or control over systems. These vulnerabilities are typically undisclosed to the software vendor or the public.

Cyberterrorists often use a combination of these methods to achieve their goals, and their motivations can vary widely, including political, ideological, financial, or simply causing chaos and disruption. It is crucial for individuals, organizations, and governments to implement strong cybersecurity measures to defend against cyberterrorism and its various tactics.

The selection of cyberterrorism events involves a multifaceted approach that combines methods such as incident reporting, threat intelligence, attribution analysis, open-source information, government reports, academic studies, international collaboration, legal frameworks, classification tools, expert consultations, historical analysis, and government threat assessments. These methods collectively aid in identifying and categorizing events that align with specific criteria, including significance, intent, targeting, and impact. However, event selection may entail a degree of subjectivity and interpretation, depending on the research objectives and the availability of data and resources. The selection criteria for cyberterrorism events encompass attributes such as the event’s significance in terms of damage or threat, clear attribution to a cyberterrorist entity, a political or ideological motive, targeted critical infrastructure or national security interests, specific methodologies like malware or DDoS attacks, the intent to cause fear or panic, coordinated efforts by a group, the scope and scale of impact, geopolitical context, adherence to legal definitions, and the potential for interpreting the actors’ intent based on available evidence. However, the selection process is hindered by challenges including attribution difficulties, subjective motive interpretation, underreporting, discrepancies in event classification, the evolving nature of cyberterrorism tactics, and potential bias or political influence.

Impact of cyberterrorism on nation’s economy

Cyber-attacks can have a significant impact on a country’s economy. Some of the ways in which cyber-attacks can impact a country’s economy include direct financial losses, decreased productivity, increased budget for installing security measures against invasion, financial theft, and damaged reputation in front of the entire world. Cyber-attacks can result in direct financial losses for businesses and governments, as well as damage to a country’s reputation and economic stability. These invasions can disrupt the operation of businesses and organizations, leading to decreased productivity and lost revenue. Governments and businesses may need to spend more on cybersecurity measures to protect themselves from future attacks. The theft of sensitive information, such as intellectual property or trade secrets, can harm a country’s economy by giving competitors an advantage. can damage a country’s reputation, leading to a loss of trust and confidence in its businesses and institutions ( Hua & Bapna, 2013 ). This may affect the nation’s capacity to draw foreign investment and travelers. In general, cyber-attacks can have major effects on a nation’s economy, hence it is crucial for governments and corporations to take precautions against these risks. Most significantly, when a nation is a victim of a significant cyberattack, its reputation suffers, which causes people to lose faith in its institutions and companies. This can impact the country’s ability to attract investment, which is an important source of revenue for many countries. There have been several instances in which cyber-attacks have contributed to economic crises. In 2017, the NotPetya ransomware attack ( Fayi, 2018 ) affected businesses and government agencies in Ukraine and other countries, leading to direct financial losses and decreased productivity. The attack was estimated to have cost businesses billions of dollars. In 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attack ( Mohurle & Patil, 2017 ) affected businesses and government agencies in more than 150 countries, leading to direct financial losses and decreased productivity. The attack was estimated to have cost businesses billions of dollars. SolarWinds, a significant supplier of IT monitoring software, was found to have been infiltrated ( Wolff, Growley & Gruden, 2021 ) in 2020, allowing a group of hacker’s access to the networks of SolarWinds’ clients. Numerous companies and government entities in the US and worldwide were impacted by the attack, which resulted in immediate financial losses and lost productivity. The historical nature of cybercrime in Pakistan ( Akram, Mir & Rehman, 2023 ) reveals two main types of cyberattacks: low-level attacks from individual Indian hackers and attacks from both local and international hackers seeking financial gains. One significant incident involved the hacking of Meezan Bank, resulting in the exposure of 69,189 card details for sale and causing approximately $3.5 million in data loss for the bank. Additionally, K-electric experienced a security breach, with hackers demanding a $3.5 million ransom. However, the ransom doubled to $7 million after a week, but K-electric did not comply, leading to the leaked online sale of stolen information, including sensitive customer data such as names, addresses, CNIC, and bank account details. Despite the severity of the situation, K-electric did not pay the ransom nor take sufficient measures to improve their cybersecurity, ultimately resulting in the hacker leaking 8.5 GB of data. These incidents highlight the urgent need for better cybersecurity measures in Pakistan to protect against such threats and safeguard sensitive information.

Role of cyberterrorism in political instability

Cyberterrorism can also have a significant impact on politics in several ways including disruption of elections, spread of misinformation, propaganda, invasion of state secrets and privacy eruption. Cyberattacks on election systems or campaigns can sabotage the electoral process and erode public trust in the fairness of elections. Cyber terrorists may use the internet and social media to spread propaganda and manipulate public opinion, which can influence political events and shape public policy. Cyber-attacks on communication systems, such as email or phone networks, can hinder the ability of political leaders and organizations to communicate with each other and with the public. Cyber-attacks that result in the loss of privacy can undermine trust in political leaders and institutions ( Weimann, 2005 ). Overall, cyberterrorism can have profound consequences for the political landscape of a country and can contribute to social and political instability. If the purpose of attackers is to disrupt elections, attacks on voting systems or infrastructure can disrupt the voting process and prevent people from casting their ballots. The culprits may spread misinformation or propaganda through social media and other online platforms to influence the outcome of elections. Attacks on political campaigns can disrupt campaign operations and compromise sensitive campaign data. Invasion of election systems or campaigns can undermine trust in the electoral process and lead to a loss of confidence in the integrity of elections. Cyber terrorists may use the internet and social media to spread propaganda and manipulate public opinion, which can lead to social and political instability and potentially the collapse of a government ( Golase, 2022 ). They can result in the loss of privacy or sensitive information thus undermining trust in a government and can potentially lead to its collapse. It is difficult to say with certainty whether any government has fallen solely because of cyberterrorism, as most major events have multiple causes. However, there have been several instances in which cyber-attacks have played a role in social and political instability and the downfall of governments. In 2011 ( Rahimi, 2011 ), a series of protests and uprisings swept across the Middle East and North Africa, leading to the overthrow of several governments. The use of social media to organize and disseminate information played a significant role in the Arab Spring, and some experts believe that cyber-attacks on government communication systems may have contributed to the instability. During the 2016 US presidential election ( Berghel, 2017 ), Russian hackers were found to have targeted the campaign of Hillary Clinton and hacked the email accounts of Democratic Party officials, leading to the release of sensitive information through WikiLeaks. Some experts believe that these attacks may have influenced the outcome of the election. In 2020 ( Voltz, 2021 ), it was discovered that a group of hackers had compromised the software of SolarWinds, a major provider of IT management software, to gain access to the networks of SolarWinds’ customers. The attack affected several government agencies in the United States, leading to concerns about the integrity of the US government’s systems and the potential for further damage. The concept of cyberterrorism can be traced back to the 1990s ( Baldassarre, 2023a ), when the rise of the Internet and discussions on the “information society” raised concerns about potential risks for the highly networked US. This notion of cyberterrorism evoked psychological fear, combining apprehension of random violence with distrust of computer technology. After the 9/11 attacks, cyberterrorism gained prominence in security and terrorism discourse, and debates over national security attracted political actors with broader agendas. The media played a role in sensationalizing cyberterrorism, leading to misuses of the term and overblown reactions to incidents, which muddled the understanding of the actual threat posed by cyberterrorism.

The post-9/11 era ( Bastug, Onat & Guler, 2023 ) saw an emergence of a lucrative industry dedicated to countering cyberterrorism, with think tanks, experts, and private companies actively addressing the issue. Government investment and public concern heightened, with warnings from high-level officials and media coverage further fueling anxiety. However, this climate of heightened attention has led to instances of labeling hacking and cybercrimes as “cyberterrorism” without a precise definition. To better grasp the true danger of cyberterrorism, it is essential to define the term accurately and distinguish between actual threats and broader concerns about cybersecurity. In summary, the concept of cyberterrorism emerged in the 1990s, evoking psychological fear and becoming a focal point after the 9/11 attacks. The subsequent years witnessed both political and economic investments in countering cyberterrorism, along with media sensationalism that muddled the understanding of the actual threat. A clear and precise definition is crucial to differentiate genuine cyberterrorism incidents from cybersecurity concerns.

Cyberterrorism: how it affected the Middle East

Cyberterrorism has recently had a significant negative impact on the Middle East. A variety of cyberattacks have been launched against the area, including assaults on vital infrastructure, the dissemination of propaganda on social media and other online platforms, and the interruption of communication networks. In addition, the region has also been the source of several cyber-attacks, with a few state-sponsored hacking groups operating in the region ( Venkatachary, Prasad & Samikannu, 2018 ). The impact of these attacks has been significant, causing disruption and harm to individuals and societies in the region. The impact of cyber-attacks has been varying depending on a few factors as well the location and infrastructure of countries. However, some countries in the the Middle East region have been the target of many cyber-attacks and have experienced significant disruption as a result. Iran ( Rudner, 2013 ) has been the subject of several cyberattacks, including the Stuxnet worm that disrupted the nation’s nuclear program and the Shamoon malware that erased data from tens of thousands of computers at Saudi Arabia’s Aramco and Qatar’s RasGas. Several cyberattacks have also targeted Saudi Arabia ( Elnaim, 2013 ), notably the Shamoon virus and the “Cutting Sword of Justice” breach, which were directed at the nation’s infrastructure to produce natural gas and oil. Tens of thousands of computers at the Qatari natural gas business RasGas and the Saudi Arabian oil major Aramco had their data destroyed by the Shamoon malware. The attack was believed to have been carried out by Iranian hackers while a group calling itself the “Cutting Sword of Justice” hacked into the computer systems of Saudi Arabian oil and natural gas company Saudi Aramco and released sensitive data online. The group claimed to be protesting Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy and human rights record.

The United Arab Emirates has also been the target of several cyber-attacks, including the “Hack the UAE” campaign ( Shires, 2020 ), which targeted government websites, and the “Sea Turtle” campaign, which targeted several organizations in the country. In 2017, it was discovered that a group of hackers known as “Sea Turtle” had been conducting cyber espionage campaigns against several organizations in the UAE and other countries in the Middle East. The group was believed to be state sponsored ( Neagu & Savu, 2019 ). In 2017, the UAE was targeted by the advanced persistent threat group belonging to DarkHotel, which was believed to be operating out of North Korea. The group targeted a few organizations in the UAE with malware ( Alrawi et al., 2021 ). On 29 December 2022, a hacker downloaded private code repositories using limited swiped employee tokens, however neither Slack’s main codebase nor any client data were contained in the repositories. Slack is one of the most popular workplace communication applications as a result. The hack may have been carried out by an external threat actor, as the owning authority said there was no impact on its code or service as they immediately invalidated those stolen tokens and that the unauthorized access did not stem from a weakness intrinsic to the business. On December 4th, 2023, a data gathering sale including more than 200 million Twitter profiles began. A 59 GB RAR bundle containing the stolen material was made public. The scrapers utilizing earlier data collections were able to compromise the vulnerable API. Microsoft Azure services were susceptible to server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks on January 17, 2023, due to four vulnerabilities. Azure Functions, Azure Machine Learning, and Azure Digital Twins were among the services offered. If these SSRF flaws had gone unpatched, they might have had a big effect on Microsoft Azure Services. These vulnerabilities were mitigated because of Microsoft’s quick response, which was done before they could do any significant harm ( Onat et al., 2022 ).

cyberterrorism: how it affected the East Asia

Eastern Asia is one of those regions that have been heavily affected by Cyberterrorism. As a result of inter-regional and intra-regional competition, the prominent countries of East Asia have been indulged in a few cyber-attacks. There have been several cyber-attacks on China in recent years. A wave of cyberattacks known as “Titan Rain” in the middle of the 2000s attacked various American government and military institutions ( Taddeo, 2017 ) as well as businesses in a few other nations. The attacks were believed to have been carried out by hackers based in China. In 2009, it was discovered that a group of hackers had compromised the computer systems of a few organizations in China, including government agencies and embassies. The group, known as “GhostNet” was believed to be based in China ( Ghose et al., 2019 ). It was uncovered in 2015 that China has been launching massive denial-of-service assaults against websites in other nations using a device known as the “Great Cannon”. It was thought that the attacks were a retaliation for criticism of China’s human rights record. Overall, these examples show that China has been the target as well as the base for a few cyber-attacks. Japan has also been the target of cyber warfare over the passage of years. Several Japanese websites, including the government website, were subjected to a series of denial-of-service assaults in 2014 by a gang of hackers going by the name of “Lizard Squad” ( Lunsford & Boahn, 2015 ). In 2015, a group of hackers launched the “OpJapan” campaign, targeting several Japanese websites and organizations. The organization asserted that they were in opposition to Japan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal. In 2017, the “WannaCry” ransomware attack affected businesses and government agencies in more than 150 countries, including Japan. The attack was estimated to have cost businesses billions of dollars ( Chow, Yau & Li, 2015 ).

Korea has had some instances of its own when it comes to falling under the radar of cyberterrorism. In 2013, a series of cyber-attacks known as “Dark Seoul” targeted the computer systems of banks and media organizations in South Korea ( Marpaung & Lee, 2013 ). The attacks were believed to be the work of North Korean hackers. The Sony Pictures Entertainment computer systems were breached in 2014 ( Afful-Dadzie et al., 2016 ), which resulted in the disclosure of confidential information and the postponement of the release of the film “The Interview,” which was critical of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The incident was attributed to North Korea by the US authorities. In 2017, the “WannaCry” ransomware attack ( Kao & Hsiao, 2018 ) affected businesses and government agencies in more than 150 countries, including South Korea. The attack was estimated to have cost businesses billions of dollars. Some prominent instances of cyberterrorism in Hong Kong include the “GhostNet” attacks, Operation Aurora, and Tibetan Sun. In 2009, it was discovered that a group of hackers had compromised the computer systems of several organizations in Hong Kong, including government agencies and embassies. The group, known as “GhostNet,” was believed to be based in China. In 2010, a series of cyber-attacks known as “Operation Aurora” ( Kim, Kim & Park, 2014 ) targeted several companies in Hong Kong and other countries, including Google. The attacks were believed to be the work of hackers based in China. In 2018, it was discovered that a group of hackers had compromised the computer systems of the Tibetan government-in-exile and other Tibetan organizations. The group, known as “Tibetan Sun,” was believed to be based in China ( McVey, 2015 ). Therefore, it can be observed that just like the Middle East, East Asia has also been the victim of many cyberterrorisms acts over the years and these threats continue to rise in the future as well.

Cyberterrorism: a global cyber-massacre

As this study discussed in the previous sections about the role and impact of cyberterrorism on Middle East and East Asia, the rest of the world has also fallen prey to this vicious act many a times that makes cyberterrorism a global massacre. USA, one the strongest economic and defense states fell victim to cyber-invasion on several occasions. In 1998, a hacker named “Lozano” launched a series of cyber-attacks on several US government websites, including the websites of the Department of Defense and the US Air Force. In 1999, a series of cyber-attacks known as “Moonlight Maze” targeted several US government agencies, as well as universities and research institutions. The attacks were believed to be the work of Russian hackers ( Dawson, 2015 ). In 2016, Russian hackers were found to have targeted the campaign of Hillary Clinton and hacked the email accounts of Democratic Party officials, leading to the release of sensitive information through WikiLeaks ( Nakashima, 2016 ). Some experts believe that these attacks may have influenced the outcome of the election. In 2020, it was discovered that a group of hackers had compromised the software of SolarWinds, a major provider of IT management software, to gain access to the networks of SolarWinds’ customers. The attack affected several government agencies in the United States, leading to concerns about the integrity of the US government’s systems and the potential for further damage.

The United Kingdom has had its share of numerous cyber incidents. In 2007, a series of cyber-attacks targeted the computer systems of Estonian government agencies, banks, and media outlets. The attacks were believed to be the work of Russian hackers. In 2012, a group of hackers known as “Darkleech” targeted the websites of a few UK businesses, including the Daily Mail and the BBC. The group was believed to be based in Russia ( Radhakrishnan, Menon & Nath, 2019 ). In 2018, the UK government accused Russia of carrying out a cyber-attack on the country’s foreign office and other government agencies. Russia has been always in the news whenever any incident of cyberterrorism is reported anywhere in the world. The reason for this is the involvement of Russian hackers and terrorists behind some of the major cyber-attacks that have happened around the globe. Russian hackers were thought to have carried both the Moonlight Maze assaults in 1999 and the Estonia cyberattacks in 2007. In 2018, the UK government accused Russia of carrying out a cyber-attack on the country’s foreign office and other government agencies ( Lam, 2018 ). Australia has also been dealing with this act along with other nations. In 2018, the Australian Cyber Security Centre was targeted by a cyber-attack. The attack was believed to be the work of a foreign state-sponsored group. In 2015, a group of hackers launched the “OpAustralia” campaign, targeting several Australian websites and organizations. The group claimed to be protesting the Australian government’s proposed data retention laws ( Hardy & Williams, 2014 ). Some of the vulnerabilities were discovered and patched relatively quickly, while others remained unpatched for a longer period, leaving systems and devices at risk. Zero Day was a Chrome browser zero-day vulnerability. It was found in 2022 and gave hackers the ability to run arbitrary code on a user’s computer by tricking them into visiting a malicious website. Although the flaw was fixed in a subsequent version of Chrome, many users remained at risk until they updated.

Peeking from the conclusions and instances discussed in the previous sections, it can be deduced that Cyberterrorism is a global problem for several reasons. First, the internet is a global network that allows hackers to target individuals and organizations around the world. This means that cyber-attacks can have a global impact, even if they are launched from an individual location. Second, the global nature of the internet makes it difficult to track the origins of cyber-attacks. Hackers can use a variety of techniques to obscure their identity and location, making it difficult to identify the perpetrators of cyber-attacks and hold them accountable. The increasing reliance on the internet and digital technologies has made businesses and governments around the world more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. As increasingly critical systems and infrastructure are connected to the internet, the potential for harm from cyber-attacks increases. Overall, the global nature of the internet and the increasing reliance on digital technologies make cyberterrorism a global problem that requires international cooperation to be addressed. As it intersects with various value systems in various nations, combating cyberterrorism presents a challenging problem. One country’s definition of cyberterrorism may differ from another’s definition of resistance or war. Based on geopolitical factors, historical conflicts, and ideological differences, different contexts are understood differently by cyberterrorism ( Tehrani, Manap & Taji, 2013 ). For instance, in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, a cyberterrorist aiming for the United States might be viewed as a soldier defending their interests in Russia. It is challenging to develop a consistent, global strategy for addressing cyberterrorism because of the various perspectives and interpretations of this problem. Additionally, there are significant difficulties in combating cyberterrorism related to cross-border enforcement. Because cyberspace has no borders, cyberterrorists can operate from one country while carrying out attacks in another. The speed and anonymity offered by the digital world are difficult for traditional legal systems and jurisdictional boundaries to keep up with. To identify, investigate, and prosecute cyberterrorists, international cooperation becomes crucial. However, ineffective cross-border enforcement efforts are hampered by disparities in legal systems, political unrest, and contrasting priorities. To effectively combat cyberterrorism and hold perpetrators accountable, it is essential to close these gaps and build strong international partnerships. The section below provides an overview of some of the cyberattacks that happened in recent years across the globe. Figure 2 gives a quick look of these cyberattacks.

Code Red and Nimda Worms (2001): Code Red and Nimda were two significant worms that targeted Microsoft IIS web servers in 2001. Code Red exploited a vulnerability to deface websites, while Nimda was a multi-vector worm that spread through various means, causing widespread disruptions ( Sharma, 2011 ).

MyDoom (2004): MyDoom was a widespread email-based worm that carried a payload designed to launch DDoS attacks against various websites. It was one of the fastest-spreading worms at the time ( Chau, 2007 ).

Sasser Worm (2004): Sasser was a computer worm that exploited a vulnerability in Windows operating systems. It caused widespread infections and system instability ( Labir, 2004 ).

Stuxnet (2010): Stuxnet was a highly sophisticated worm designed to target industrial control systems, particularly those used in Iran’s nuclear facilities. It was the first known worm specifically developed for cyber-espionage and sabotage. The primary target was Iran’s nuclear program, with a specific focus on centrifuge controls. It caused physical damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and demonstrated the potential for cyberterrorism to have real-world, destructive consequences. It marked a significant shift in the landscape of cyber threats ( Collins & McCombie, 2012 ).

Yahoo data breaches (2013 and 2014): Yahoo experienced two massive data breaches that exposed the personal information of billions of users. The breaches were disclosed years later, leading to significant consequences for the company ( Whitler & Farris, 2017 ).

Sony pictures hack (2014): Sony Pictures Entertainment was the target of a cyberattack by a group calling themselves the “Guardians of Peace.” The attack resulted in the leakage of sensitive corporate data and unreleased films, causing significant damage to the company. The primary target was Sony Pictures Entertainment. The attack had severe consequences for the company, including financial losses, reputational damage, and legal implications. It also raised concerns about the impact of cyberterrorism on the entertainment industry ( Ismail, 2017 ).

WannaCry ransomware (2017): WannaCry was a global ransomware attack that exploited a Windows vulnerability. It infected hundreds of thousands of computers in over 150 countries, encrypting data and demanding a ransom for decryption ( Mohurle & Patil, 2017 ).

NotPetya (2017): NotPetya was a destructive ransomware attack that initially masqueraded as a ransomware campaign but had a much broader impact. It exploited a vulnerability in a tax software widely used in Ukraine, spreading through software updates to organizations around the world. It primarily targeted Ukraine, affecting government agencies, financial institutions, and critical infrastructure. However, it quickly spread globally, impacting companies like Maersk, FedEx, and Merck. The attack caused widespread disruption and financial losses, particularly for affected multinational companies. It also raised concerns about the potential for cyberterrorism to cause physical harm, given its impact on critical infrastructure ( Fayi, 2018 ).

Equifax data breach (2017): Equifax, one of the major credit reporting agencies in the United States, suffered a massive data breach that exposed the personal information of millions of individuals. It had significant implications for affected individuals’ financial security ( Primoff & Kess, 2017 ).

SolarWinds supply chain attack (2020): A sophisticated supply chain attack compromised SolarWinds’ software update mechanism, allowing attackers to distribute malware to thousands of SolarWinds customers. The primary targets were US government agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and the Pentagon, as well as private sector organizations. The attack exposed sensitive government and corporate data, raising concerns about the potential for cyberterrorism to compromise national security and critical infrastructure. It prompted a significant cybersecurity response and diplomatic efforts ( Wolff, Growley & Gruden, 2021 ).

Colonial Pipeline ransomware (2021): Colonial Pipeline, a major US fuel pipeline operator, was targeted by a ransomware attack. DarkSide, a cybercriminal group, was responsible for the attack, which involved encrypting the company’s systems and demanding a ransom for decryption. The attack directly affected Colonial Pipeline, disrupting fuel supplies along the East Coast of the United States. The attack led to fuel shortages, panic buying, and significant economic disruption. Colonial Pipeline paid a substantial ransom to regain control of its systems ( Dudley & Golden, 2021 ; Leu et al., 2023 ).

These are just a few examples of recent high-profile cyberattacks and data breaches. Cybersecurity threats continue to evolve, and organizations and governments are constantly working to enhance their security measures to defend against these and future attacks. It’s important to stay informed about cybersecurity developments and best practices to protect against such threats.

The attribution and prosecution of cyberterrorism incidents pose several challenges, primarily due to the anonymous and cross-border nature of cyber activities. For example, cyberterrorists often operate under pseudonyms or with a high degree of anonymity, making it challenging to identify the actual individuals or groups responsible for the attacks. Malicious actors can deliberately mislead investigators by attributing their attacks to others, complicating accurate attribution. Cyberterrorism incidents can span multiple countries, which raises jurisdictional issues and complexities in coordinating international investigations and prosecutions. Cyberterrorists may compromise and use the infrastructure of third-party entities, making it difficult to trace the source of the attack back to the actual perpetrators. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) groups maintain persistent access to systems and cover their tracks, making detection and attribution more challenging. The use of encryption and anonymization tools can obfuscate communications and hide the origin of attacks. Some cyberterrorism incidents may be linked to nation-states, which can complicate the attribution process due to diplomatic and geopolitical considerations. In some cases, countries may be reluctant to share evidence or collaborate in cyberterrorism investigations, hindering the attribution process. The political implications of attributing cyberterrorism to specific state or non-state actors can affect the willingness to prosecute or take punitive actions. Developing and maintaining strong digital forensics capabilities is essential for attribution, but not all countries or organizations have the required expertise and resources. Balancing the need for effective cybersecurity with privacy and civil liberties concerns can be challenging, especially in cases involving surveillance and data collection. Meeting the legal burden of proof in court, especially when attributing an attack to specific individuals or groups, can be demanding and may require substantial evidence. Despite these challenges, efforts are ongoing to improve attribution and prosecution of cyberterrorism incidents. This includes enhancing international cooperation, sharing threat intelligence, developing more sophisticated forensic techniques, and strengthening cybersecurity laws and regulations. Addressing these challenges is crucial for deterring cyberterrorist activities and holding malicious actors accountable ( Tehrani, Manap & Taji, 2013 ).

Cyberterrorism: preventions and countermeasures

The consequences of a cyber-attack can be severe, so it is important to take measures to fight cyberterrorism since cyberattacks can have severe consequences. There is a potential of economic loss, damage to a country’s reputation and stability, and even the loss of life due to cyberterrorism. There can also be widespread disruptions and chaos when critical infrastructure, such as power grids and hospitals, are disrupted. The security and reliability of technology can also be undermined by cyberattacks, making people uncertain about the security and reliability of their systems ( Leu et al., 2023 ). Taking preventative measures and mitigating the potential consequences of a cyberattack are two of the most important measures individuals and organizations can take to reduce their risks of being victimized by a cyberattack. Here we will discuss the preventive measures in the form of sections.

Role of network and system security against cyberterrorism

Security of networks and systems is a critical component of protecting yourself from cyberterrorism. Cyberattacks are often directed at networks and systems to gain access to sensitive information or disrupt operations, which is often the goal of cyberattacks. Organizations can reduce the risk of these types of attacks by implementing effective security measures and reducing the consequences of these attacks by implementing these measures. Security of networks and systems can only be achieved by combining technical controls, such as firewalls and antivirus software, with non-technical controls, such as employee training and incident response plans. Technical controls assist in preventing unauthorized access to networks and systems, whilst non-technical controls serve to guarantee that staff are aware of the importance of cybersecurity and are informed of what to do in the case of an attack ( Leu et al., 2023 ). To ensure that their security measures remain effective against the changing threats landscape, it is imperative that organizations regularly review and update their security measures. The measures taken to address these vulnerabilities may include implementing innovative technology, such as intrusion detection systems and network monitoring tools, and conducting regular security assessments to identify and address potential vulnerabilities.

It is also important for organizations to have a plan in place for responding to a cyberattack, which should include identifying key personnel and establishing clear channels of communication in the event of a cyberattack. There are several network and system security measures ( Klein, 2015 ) that can be adopted to prevent cyberterrorism such as, ensuring the use of strong, unique passwords and enabling two-factor authentication, keeping all the software and security system up to date with latest security patches, using authenticated and strict firewalls, implementing intrusion systems that may alert administration of the potential breach, utilizing a trusted antivirus software, conducting regular security assessments to identify network and system vulnerabilities, implementing access control mechanisms to limit the access of unauthorized users towards sensitive data, having a plan in place in case of a cyber-attack, making sure that employees are educated about cybersecurity best practices, such as not sharing passwords and not clicking on suspicious links etc.

Cyberterrorism: legal explication and procedures

Global legal systems have been significantly impacted by cyberterrorism. The exploitation of information and communications technologies (ICT) by terrorists, especially the Internet and new technologies that allow for anonymous communication, is a growing worry. An all-encompassing cybersecurity strategy is being developed by the UN Office of Counterterrorism. While some nations have passed national anti-cyberterrorism legislation ( e.g. , Kenya’s Section 33 of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act of 2018 and Pakistan’s Section 10 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act of 2016), cyberterrorism is not expressly forbidden by international law. The concept of cyberterrorism has permeated China’s expansive national security agenda, which aims to thoroughly manage, regulate, securitize, and monitor its cyber sovereignty, as demonstrated by Chinese legislation, policies, and judicial practice. This indicates that China has adopted a comprehensive strategy to manage and govern its cyberspace to safeguard its interests in national security ( Khater, 2023 ). Cyberterrorism has a wide range of effects on the US legal system, including those on the criminal justice system, national security, the economy, and civil liberties. The threat that cyberterrorism poses to conventional investigation techniques is one of the most important effects it has on the US legal system. It can be challenging to identify and apprehend those responsible for cyberattacks since they frequently come from people or organizations spread throughout the globe. The investigation and prosecution process are further complicated by the fact that cyberattacks can be launched from any location with an internet connection. As a result, the legal system has had to create fresh approaches to investigating and trying cases of cyberterrorism. To prevent cyberterrorism, the United States has implemented a few legal measures and laws. For instance, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) of 1986 makes several computer-related offences, like hacking and unauthorized access to computer systems, illegal. Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Patriot Act, which increased government surveillance capabilities and permitted the gathering of electronic communications data ( Wei, 2022 ).

To address cybersecurity and cybercrime, Russia has implemented several laws. The “Yarovaya Law,” which mandates communication carriers to preserve user data for up to three years and give the FSB access to this data, was passed by the State Duma (Russia’s lower house of parliament) in 2016. The law’s opponents claim that it infringes users’ privacy and gives the government excessive authority to track and regulate online activities. Russia has also entered into alliances and agreements of cooperation with other nations. To increase cooperation in avoiding cyberattacks and fostering the development of global norms and regulations in cyberspace, Russia and China issued a joint statement on cooperation in the field of international information security in 2020. Cyberterrorism has been criminalized internationally through a variety of legal means, including legislative, regulatory, and law enforcement activities. The creation of international legal frameworks that offer direction on the prevention and prosecution of cybercrimes has been a significant undertaking. As an illustration, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, adopted in 2001, offers a framework for harmonizing national legislation on cybercrime and promotes international collaboration in the prevention and prosecution of cybercrime. many nations have created their own laws and rules. The CFAA and the Patriot Act, for instance, give the US government the legal authority to investigate and prosecute cybercrimes, and the NIST has created a framework for enhancing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure ( Baldassarre, 2023 ). Given that cyberattacks frequently come from outside national borders, international collaboration is also essential in the fight against cyberterrorism. To encourage data exchange and collaborative research, many nations have formed alliances and agreements. For instance, to encourage cooperation on cybersecurity and cybercrime issues, the US and the UK joined the US-UK Cybersecurity Dialogue. In conclusion, a variety of international legal measures have been taken to combat cyberterrorism, including the creation of international legal frameworks, the development of national legislation and regulations, the establishment of specialized units to combat cybercrime, and the encouragement of global cooperation and partnerships. It is expected that nations will continue to develop and adapt legal measures and policies to handle this expanding threat as cyberterrorism develops. Figure 3 . shows some of the mainstream countermeasures that a state must adopt to face off the cyberterrorism challenge. These countermeasures can enhance a state’s cybersecurity posture and help protect against cyber threats. Here is a more detailed breakdown of each countermeasure:

Education and awareness: Promoting cybersecurity education and awareness among the public, government employees, and critical infrastructure operators is essential to ensure that individuals and organizations are aware of potential threats and how to mitigate them.

Robust cyber defense: Developing and maintaining strong cybersecurity measures, including firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and antivirus software, is crucial to prevent and respond to cyberattacks effectively.

International cooperation: Collaboration with other countries and international organizations is essential to share threat intelligence, investigate cyber incidents, and develop a coordinated global response to cyberterrorism.

Research and development: Investment in cybersecurity research and development is necessary to stay ahead of emerging threats and develop innovative technologies and strategies to protect against cyberterrorism.

Cyber incident response: Establishing a well-defined incident response plan helps in effectively managing and mitigating the impact of cyber incidents when they occur.

Strong legal framework: Implementing and enforcing cybersecurity laws and regulations provides a legal basis for prosecuting cybercriminals and deterring malicious actors.

International agreements and norms: Participating in and promoting international agreements, norms, and treaties related to cyberspace can help establish rules of behavior and cooperation in the digital domain.

Continuous monitoring and intelligence: Continuous monitoring of networks and systems, along with intelligence gathering and analysis, allows for early detection of cyber threats and better decision-making in response to those threats.

Collaboration with the private sector: Collaboration with private sector organizations, which often own and operate critical infrastructure, is vital. Public–private partnerships can improve information sharing and enhance cybersecurity measures.

By implementing these countermeasures, states can significantly improve their resilience against cyberterrorism and other cyber threats. It is important to adapt and evolve these measures to address the evolving nature of cyber threats and to stay proactive in safeguarding national security and critical infrastructure.

Analysis of impact—economic, social, and political

The economic, social, and political consequences of cyberattacks, including cyberterrorism, are far-reaching and profound:

Economic consequences

Cyberattacks resulted in significant financial losses for affected organizations due to theft, fraud, or business disruption with substantial recovery costs, including cybersecurity investments. When customer data is compromised, or services are disrupted, businesses may experience reputational damage that can lead to a loss of customer trust and reduced revenue. Rising cyber insurance premiums and deductibles have burdened businesses, impacting their operational costs. Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure have disrupted supply chains, affecting production, delivery, and the overall economy.

Social consequences

Data breaches have led to the exposure of sensitive personal information, eroding individuals’ privacy and potentially leading to identity theft or fraud. The fear and anxiety generated by cyberterrorism attacks have a psychological impact on individuals and society, eroding feelings of security and trust. In some cases, particularly when critical services are disrupted, social unrest has occurred as people became frustrated with the inability to access essential services.

Political consequences

Cyberattacks on government institutions, defense systems, or critical infrastructure posed a significant national security threat, potentially compromising a nation’s ability to defend itself. State-sponsored cyberattacks or cyber espionage escalated international tensions and strained diplomatic relations between countries. High-profile cyberattacks have led to policy changes, new regulations, and increased government involvement in cybersecurity, which has affected businesses and individuals. Failures to protect against cyberattacks eroded public trust in government and its ability to ensure national security and infrastructure resilience.

Countering cyberterrorism: global policies and procedures

The threat must be countered no matter how critical it is. Therefore, with the ever-growing threat of cyberterrorism, various global policies and countermeasures have been put in place. As part of China’s efforts to counter the threat of cyberterrorism within its borders, there have been several steps taken ( Yagya & Ashurova, 2023 ). As part of the State Council’s cybersecurity plan released last year, the country outlined measures to strengthen the country’s cyber defenses, such as improving the country’s ability to detect and respond to cyber threats as well as enhancing critical infrastructure protection from cyber-attacks. To protect itself against cyberattacks, China has implemented several technical measures in addition to these efforts. To secure networks and systems, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and other technologies are used. China has also passed a few cybersecurity rules and laws, such as the People’s Republic of China’s Cyber Security Law, which took effect in 2017. This law’s goals are to safeguard the confidential information of the nation’s residents, as well as the key infrastructure of the federal government and the nation’s overall cybersecurity. Additionally, China has established several cybersecurity agencies and organizations for the purpose of coordinating efforts to combat cyber threats. The National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team Coordination Center (CNCERT), which coordinates the response to cyber emergencies, and the Cyberspace Administration of China, which oversees managing the nation’s cybersecurity policy, are two of the organizations in charge of doing so.

Several agencies and organizations within the United States have been charged with addressing the threat of cyberterrorism and protecting against cyberattacks to counter it. Among the responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure against cyber threats, as well as the coordination of efforts to combat cyberattacks. Information sharing and incident response are handled by the National Cyber Security and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), a division of the DHS. Investigations and prosecutions of cybercrimes, including cyberterrorism, are the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ( Qi, Shao & Zheng, 2018 ). To protect military systems and networks from cyberattacks, the Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented a few cybersecurity initiatives. Several laws and regulations have also been implemented by the United States to address cybersecurity. Among them are the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 ( Cunningham, 2021 ; Tran, 2016 ) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018. They establish a framework for sharing information and responding to incidents, as well as strengthening critical infrastructure’s cybersecurity. Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) is responsible for investigating and prosecuting cybercrimes, as well as protecting against cyber threats. Russia’s Federal Protective Service (FSO) protects the government’s communications and information systems from cyberattacks ( Fischer, 2017 ). The Federal Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC), which oversees cybersecurity, regulates Russia’s key infrastructure industries. Russia has enacted a few laws and regulations that address cybersecurity, in addition to the Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies, and the Protection of Information. Also, it describes how government agencies and companies should respond to cyber threats and how personal information should be secured. [Cyber] risks are described in detail.

Saudi Arabia has established National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) responsible for coordinating efforts to protect against cyber threats and promoting cybersecurity in Saudi Arabia ( Hindocha, 2020 ). Under the National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA), cybersecurity measures are implemented in the country and regulations are complied with. Among other things, Saudi Arabia has a cybercrime law that criminalizes cyberterrorism as well. Individuals and organizations involved in cybercrimes can be investigated and prosecuted under this law. The Saudi Arabian National Cybersecurity Regulations and the Saudi Arabian National Cybersecurity Strategy address cybersecurity. The regulations aim to strengthen the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure and establish a framework for sharing information and responding to incidents. Two of the institutions and organizations that have been formed by Saudi Arabia to combat the effects of cybercrime are the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) and the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), respectively ( Alshammari & Singh, 2018 ; Alzubaidi, 2021 ). UAE’s National Electronic Security Authority (NESA) oversees cybersecurity measures and protects the nation from cyber threats ( Al Mazari et al., 2018 ; Younies & Na, 2020 ). Several cyber security agencies and organizations have been established to address cyber threats, including the National Crisis and Disaster Management Authority (NCEMA) and National Computer Emergency Response Team (aeCERT) ( Grzegorzewski, 2020 ). In Iran, the National Cyberspace Center (NCC) is responsible for coordinating efforts to protect against cyber threats and promote cybersecurity ( Makarova, 2021 ). Several cybersecurity agencies and organizations have been established in Iran to coordinate efforts to address cyber threats, such as the Center for Strategic Studies on Cyberspace (CSSC) and the National Computer Emergency Response Team (MAHER) ( Solgi, Khodaverdi & Poustinchi, 2022 ).

Similarly, countries like France ( Vitel & Bliddal, 2015 ), Turkey ( Atalay & Sanci, 2015 ), Germany ( Lapotnikova, 2019 ), England ( Loveday, 2018 ), Japan ( Christou & Nitta, 2018 ), Hong Kong ( Chang, 2020 ), Korea ( Park, 2021 ), Belgium ( Chang, 2020 ), Malaysia ( Chang, 2020 ), Indonesia, India ( Chang, 2020 ), Pakistan ( Munir & Gondal, 2017 ), and other countries around the globe have their own dedicated Agencies and institutions that specifically look for any kind of intrusion or invasion from an external source and look to counter it on the spot. Furthermore, all the nations have their own set of rules, mechanisms, laws, and procedures to prevent any kind of inter-regional or intraregional cyberterrorism activity. These preventive measures help in reduction of cyberterrorism up to a massive extent it but, with the passage of time, the technology is getting advanced, and attackers are finding innovative ways of breaching into the security. That is why it is essential to keep monitoring the effects of latest cyber-attacks and proposed countermeasures against them. Table S1 shows an overview of some of the literature works that covered the concept, worldwide causes and countermeasures of cyberterrorism that we have discussed in the previous sections.

Evolving nature of cyberterrorism—a forward-looking perspective

The evolving nature of cyberterrorism is marked by ever-changing tactics, new attack vectors, and shifting motivations. Current trends, emerging threats, and potential future scenarios highlight the need for continuous vigilance and adaptation in the realm of cyberterrorism. Nation-states are increasingly involved in cyberterrorism, using advanced tools and techniques to further their political and geopolitical goals. These state-sponsored cyberterrorist acts could include attacks on critical infrastructure, espionage, and disruption of services. The convergence of cyber and physical domains opens the door to more destructive cyberterrorist attacks. Future scenarios may involve targeted attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, potentially causing real-world harm and physical destruction. Cyberterrorist groups are adopting Advanced Persistent Threats (APT)-like tactics, techniques, and procedures to maintain long-term access to systems and stealthily conduct espionage or disruptive activities. Cyberterrorism increasingly involves information warfare, disinformation campaigns, and intellectual property theft. Future scenarios may see the use of deepfake technologies to manipulate information and sow confusion. The threat from insiders who have access to critical systems and sensitive data remains a significant concern. Insiders can facilitate cyberterrorism efforts or engage in malicious acts on their own. Ransomware attacks may become more destructive, with cyberterrorist groups employing encryption methods and demanding larger ransoms. Critical infrastructure could be targeted, causing widespread disruption and potential loss of life. As technologies like 5G, quantum computing, and AI continue to advance, cyberterrorists will exploit these developments to launch more sophisticated and hard-to-detect attacks. The globalization of cyberterrorism means that groups can launch attacks from anywhere in the world, making it challenging to attribute and counter their actions. The motives behind cyberterrorism may continue to diversify, including ideological, political, financial, and even environmental factors. Future scenarios may see eco-terrorism involving cyberattacks on energy infrastructure. Cyberterrorism may extend beyond national borders into the realm of international conflict, with attacks serving as a tool in broader geopolitical disputes ( Lim, 0000 ; Sharma, 2023 ; Brooks, 2023 ; Kaspersky, 2023 ).

Addressing these evolving threats requires a forward-looking perspective, focusing on robust cybersecurity measures, information sharing, international cooperation, the development of effective response strategies, and ongoing investment in cybersecurity research and development. Furthermore, public awareness and preparedness are crucial elements in mitigating the evolving nature of cyberterrorism and its potential consequences.

Policy recommendations

Enhancing cybersecurity and countering cyberterrorism effectively requires a comprehensive approach that involves governments and organizations. Governments should establish a national cybersecurity strategy that outlines clear objectives, roles, and responsibilities. To strengthen their legal frameworks, they should enact and enforce strong cybersecurity laws and regulations to hold malicious actors accountable. Additionally, cyberterrorism-related offenses should be defined and classified. They should implement protective measures for critical infrastructure, such as energy, transportation, and healthcare systems and conduct regular security assessments and audits. Moreover, governments should collaborate with other countries to share threat intelligence, investigate cross-border cybercrime and participate in international agreements and norms to promote responsible behavior in cyberspace. Similarly, they should work closely with the private sector to improve information sharing, develop best practices, and enhance collective defense. Meanwhile, they should invest in cybersecurity education and training programs to address the shortage of skilled cybersecurity professionals and promote cybersecurity awareness and best practices among the public. They should establish national incident response teams, conduct regular drills to prepare for cyber incidents and develop a clear chain of command for incident response. Finally, sharing of advanced threat intelligence among government agencies, private organizations, and international partners should be encouraged.

As far as organizations are concerned, they should educate employees about cybersecurity best practices, such as strong password management, recognizing phishing attempts and implement regular security awareness training programs. Then, they should implement strong access control mechanisms, grant employees the least privilege necessary for their roles, monitor and audit user activities, enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all critical systems and applications to enhance authentication security. Additionally, they should maintain up-to-date software, apply security patches promptly to address vulnerabilities, create a patch management process to ensure timely updates and segment networks to limit lateral movement for attackers and contain potential breaches. Moreover, Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solutions should be developed to monitor and analyze network activity for early threat detection and incident response. Cyber insurance policies should be purchased to mitigate financial risks associated with cyber incidents. Data encryption and backup techniques should be used to encrypt sensitive data at rest and in transit and to regularly back up data and ensure that backup systems are secure and accessible. Finally, organizations should assess and monitor the cybersecurity posture of third-party vendors and suppliers who have access to your systems or data. For that develop and test an incident response plan that includes steps for containment, eradication, and recovery ( IETF, 2007 ; ISO, 2009 ).

By following these policy recommendations and implementing these practical steps, governments and organizations can significantly enhance their cybersecurity and resilience against cyberterrorism and other cyber threats. A proactive and collaborative approach is crucial in the ever-evolving landscape of cyberspace.

Legal and ethical aspects

Legal and ethical considerations surrounding cyberterrorism are critical in addressing the complex challenges posed by acts of cyberterrorism. The international legal framework and national laws and regulations play a central role in defining, prosecuting, and preventing cyberterrorism. For example, the United Nations (UN) has been at the forefront of addressing cyberterrorism through its General Assembly resolutions, which encourage member states to cooperate and develop norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace ( Henderson, 2021 ). The Tallinn Manual, a non-binding document developed by experts, provides interpretations of existing international law applicable to cyberspace, offering guidance on the legal framework surrounding cyber operations ( Pipyros et al., 2018 ). The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, also known as the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, is a multilateral treaty aimed at harmonizing laws and enhancing international cooperation in combating cybercrime, which includes provisions related to cyberterrorism ( Wicki-Birchler, 2020 ).

Many countries have established specific laws and regulations related to cyberterrorism, outlining offenses, penalties, and prosecutorial authorities. These laws vary from one jurisdiction to another, but common elements include defining cyberterrorism-related offenses, such as hacking, data breaches, or DDoS attacks, and specifying punishments. Laws often address issues related to jurisdiction, attribution, and extradition, as cyberterrorism can involve actors and activities across borders. Determining the intent and attribution in cyberterrorism cases can be challenging, as it requires clear evidence to establish motive and identify the responsible actors. Balancing security and civil liberties, including privacy and freedom of expression, is an ongoing ethical concern. Measures taken to counter cyberterrorism must be proportionate and respectful of individual rights. Prosecution of cyberterrorists involves legal processes that need to account for digital evidence, chain of custody, and international cooperation. Ensuring accountability for state-sponsored cyberterrorism can be complex, as it may involve diplomatic negotiations, international law, and political considerations. Preventing cyberterrorism involves addressing root causes and vulnerabilities, such as improving cybersecurity, countering radicalization, and promoting international cooperation to deter malicious actors. Upholding human rights is essential in the context of cybersecurity and countering cyberterrorism, as overly broad or invasive measures can infringe on individual freedoms. In summary, the legal and ethical considerations surrounding cyberterrorism involve a complex interplay of international legal frameworks, national laws, and ethical dilemmas. The pursuit of a balance between security and individual rights, as well as the development of effective legal mechanisms for prosecution and prevention, remains a challenge in addressing the evolving nature of cyberterrorism ( Tehrani, 2017 ).

Future work

The future research on cyberterrorism should encompass various critical areas to provide a comprehensive understanding of this evolving threat landscape. Firstly, investigating perceptions and awareness among diverse stakeholders, such as individuals, organizations, and government agencies, will shed light on the level of preparedness and recognition of cyberterrorism risks. Secondly, analyzing the impact of cyberattacks on different sectors, including finance, healthcare, and critical infrastructure, will offer valuable insights into the potential consequences and vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. Additionally, evaluating the effectiveness of existing countermeasures and strategies, along with identifying emerging technological trends, can help inform policymakers and security experts on the best practices to mitigate cyber threats effectively. Another crucial aspect of survey-based research is the examination of international cooperation and collaboration in combating cyberterrorism. As cyberattacks transcend national borders, understanding the extent of information sharing, joint efforts, and international treaties can highlight areas where global cooperation can be strengthened. Furthermore, investigating the legal and policy frameworks of various countries in response to cyberterrorism is essential to identify gaps and inconsistencies, enabling the formulation of harmonized and effective cyber laws. Such research can also delve into public perception and media influence, as understanding how the public perceives cyberterrorism can impact response strategies and public policies.

Moreover, exploring the psychological impact of cyberterrorism on society is critical to understanding the fear and anxiety generated by such threats. Survey-based research can help assess the emotional and psychological responses of individuals and communities, informing strategies to alleviate distress and enhance resilience. Lastly, an essential aspect of this research involves anticipating future threats and trends in cyberterrorism. By analyzing historical patterns and emerging technologies, researchers can contribute to proactive cybersecurity measures and policy development. In conclusion, survey-based research on cyberterrorism should address these multifaceted areas to provide a comprehensive and valuable contribution to the field of cybersecurity and global efforts to combat this complex and rapidly evolving threat.

Conclusions

Cyberterrorism involves the exploitation of computer and internet-based technologies to commit acts of violence. A variety of methods can be used, including hacking into computer systems to steal sensitive information, spreading malware to disrupt operations, and inciting violence or sowing discord on social media. Financial losses, life losses, reputational damage, and loss of stability can all be the results of cyberterrorism. Global efforts are being made to increase cybersecurity and strengthen resilience of critical systems against these attacks, which is a growing concern for governments and businesses. As a part of these efforts, non-technical and technical measures, such as staff training and incident response plans, are being introduced. Examples of technological measures include firewalls and antivirus software. However, despite these efforts, cyberterrorism has continued to be a significant threat. This is due to the ever-changing nature of the internet, as well as the ever-increasing reliance on technology across all facets of society because of the ever-increasing use of technology. Both factors contribute to the continued existence of cyberterrorism. To protect themselves from this threat, individuals and organizations must remain vigilant and update their security measures regularly to protect against it. Our survey analyzing types of cyberattacks, sectors targeted, repercussions, and countermeasures reveals a diverse landscape of threats, with phishing, malware, and DDoS attacks being common, impacting sectors such as finance, healthcare, and government most severely. Our findings also highlight the economic and reputational damage incurred by organizations and governments, as well as the need for robust cybersecurity strategies. However, our limitations include challenges in obtaining comprehensive data due to underreporting, the dynamic nature of cyber threats that evolve rapidly, and potential selection bias based on the sources surveyed. Additionally, measuring the effectiveness of countermeasures remains a complex endeavor, and their adaptation is hindered by resource constraints and evolving attacker tactics. Since cyberterrorism is an ever-evolving issue, future research could focus on finding the impact of certain policies developed by certain countries over cyberterrorism.

Supplemental Information

Supplemental information 1, funding statement.

This work was supported by the Arab Open University Saudi Arabia through research group No. AOUKSA-524008. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Additional Information and Declarations

The author declares that she has no competing interests.

Saman Iftikhar conceived and designed the experiments, performed the experiments, analyzed the data, performed the computation work, prepared figures and/or tables, authored or reviewed drafts of the article, and approved the final draft.

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What NIJ Research Tells Us About Domestic Terrorism

Militant, nationalistic, white supremacist violent extremism has increased in the United States. In fact, the number of far-right attacks continues to outpace all other types of terrorism and domestic violent extremism. Since 1990, far-right extremists have committed far more ideologically motivated homicides than far-left or radical Islamist extremists, including 227 events that took more than 520 lives. [1] In this same period, far-left extremists committed 42 ideologically motivated attacks that took 78 lives. [2] A recent threat assessment by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security concluded that domestic violent extremists are an acute threat and highlighted a probability that COVID-19 pandemic-related stressors, long-standing ideological grievances related to immigration, and narratives surrounding electoral fraud will continue to serve as a justification for violent actions. [3]

Over the past 20 years, the body of research that examines terrorism and domestic violent extremism has grown exponentially. Studies have looked at the similarities and differences between radicalization to violent domestic ideologies and radicalization to foreign extremist ideologies. Research has found that radicalization processes and outcomes — and perhaps potential prevention and intervention points — vary by group structure and crime type. In addition, research has explored promising and effective approaches for how communities can respond to radicalization and prevent future attacks. [4]

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has played a unique role in the evolving literature on terrorism and violent extremism. NIJ has promoted the development of comprehensive terrorism databases to help inform criminal justice responses to terrorism, address the risk of terrorism to potential targets, examine the links between terrorism and other crimes, and study the organizational, structural, and cultural dynamics of terrorism. In 2012, the U.S. Congress requested that NIJ build on these focal points by funding “research targeted toward developing a better understanding of the domestic radicalization phenomenon and advancing evidence-based strategies for effective intervention and prevention.” [5] NIJ has since funded more than 50 research projects on domestic radicalization, which have led to a better understanding of the processes that result in violent action, factors that increase the risk of radicalizing to violence, and how best to prevent and respond to violent extremism.

This article discusses the findings of several NIJ-supported domestic radicalization studies that cover a range of individual and network-centered risk and protective factors that affect radicalization processes, including military involvement and online environments. The article also explores factors that shape the longevity of radicalization processes and their variation by group structure and crime type, and examines factors that affect pathways away from domestic extremism. It concludes with a discussion of how these findings can inform terrorism prevention strategies, criminal justice policy, and community-based prevention programming.

The Characteristics of U.S. Extremists and Individuals Who Commit Hate Crimes

Over the past two decades, research that seeks to understand individual-level engagement in violent extremism has grown tremendously. However, as the research field has developed, a gap has emerged between the increasingly sophisticated arguments that scholars use to explain extremism and the availability of data to test, refine, and validate theories of radicalization.

In 2012, NIJ funded the Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization project to address the data gap in radicalization research. [6] The project created the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) database, a cross-ideological repository of information on the characteristics of U.S. extremists. In 2017, NIJ supported a follow-on project [7] that sought to replicate the PIRUS data for individuals in the United States who commit hate crimes. This project yielded the Bias Incidents and Actors Study (BIAS) dataset, the first data resource for researchers and practitioners interested in understanding the risk and protective factors associated with committing hate crimes.

PIRUS and BIAS are designed to provide users with information on a wide range of factors that can play a role in a person’s radicalization to criminal activity. [8] These risk and protective factors can be divided into four domains: [9]

• The situational characteristics of the crimes, including whether the acts were premeditated or spontaneous, involved co-conspirators, or were committed while under the influence of drugs and alcohol.
• The characteristics of the victims, including whether targets were “hard” (for example, military bases, secure facilities) or “soft” (for example, businesses, public areas, private civilians) and whether the individuals had prior relationships with their victims.
• Factors that produce the social bonds that may protect against mobilization to violence, such as marriage, military service, work experience, and advanced education.
• Factors that may act as radicalization mechanisms and risk factors for violence, such as previous criminal activity, membership in extremist or hate groups, substance use, and mental illness.

The PIRUS and BIAS data have been used to generate insights on a range of important topics related to hate crime and extremism; however, there are three overarching findings common to both datasets: diversity in beliefs, diversity in behaviors, and diversity in characteristics.

Diversity in Beliefs

Although it is not uncommon for a particular ideology to dominate the public discourse around extremism, the PIRUS and BIAS data indicate that U.S. extremists and individuals who commit hate crimes routinely come from across the ideological spectrum, including far-right, far-left, Islamist, or single-issue ideologies. These ideologies break down into particular movements, or sub-ideologies. For instance, in 2018, the PIRUS data identified extremists associated with several anti-government movements, Second Amendment militias, the sovereign citizen movement, white supremacy, ecoterrorism, anarchism, the anti-abortion movement, the QAnon conspiracy theory, and others. [10] The prevalence of particular movements can ebb and flow over time depending on political climate and law enforcement priorities, but at no point in recent U.S. history has one set of beliefs completely dominated extremism or hate crime activity. [11] Furthermore, the PIRUS and BIAS data reveal that U.S. extremists and individuals who commit hate crimes are often motivated by overlapping views. For instance, it is common for individuals from the anti-government militia movement to adopt views of white supremacy or for those from the extremist environmental movement to take part in anarchist violence. Nearly 17% of the individuals in PIRUS were affiliated with more than one extremist group or sub-ideological movement, and nearly 15% of the individuals in BIAS selected the victims of their hate crimes because of multiple identity characteristics, such as race and sexual orientation. [12]

Diversity in Behaviors

Although radicalization to violence has been a primary topic in extremism and hate crime research, the PIRUS and BIAS data indicate that U.S. extremists and individuals who commit hate crimes often engage in a range of violent and nonviolent criminal activities. Indeed, 42% of PIRUS and nearly 30% of BIAS individual actors engaged exclusively in nonviolent crimes, such as property damage, financial schemes, and illegal demonstrations. [13] Moreover, the violent outcomes represented in the PIRUS and BIAS data vary in scope and type. For instance, approximately 15% of those in BIAS committed or planned to commit mass casualty crimes, while the remaining subjects targeted specific victims. [14] Similarly, nearly 50% of those in BIAS did not premeditate their crimes but rather acted spontaneously after chance encounters with their victims. [15]

Diversity in Characteristics

One of the more common conclusions of recent research on radicalization is that no single profile accurately captures the characteristics of the individuals who commit extremist and hate crimes. [16] The PIRUS and BIAS data support this finding, revealing that background characteristics vary considerably depending on ideological affiliations. For instance, white supremacists in PIRUS tend to be older and less well-educated and are more likely to have criminal histories than those who were inspired by foreign terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or those associated with the extremist environmental or anarchist movements. [17] Despite these differences, some risk and protective factors tend to separate violent from nonviolent individuals, regardless of ideology. [18] In the PIRUS data, individuals with criminal records, documented or suspected mental illness, and membership in extremist cliques are more often classified as violent, while those who are married with stable employment backgrounds are more likely to engage in nonviolent crimes. [19] Similarly, in BIAS, violent individuals are more likely to co-offend with peers, have criminal histories that include acts of violence, and offend while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. [20]

Military Experience and Domestic Violent Extremism

According to current statistics, individuals with military backgrounds represent 11.5% of the total known extremists who have committed violent and nonviolent crimes in the United States since 1990. [21] Although this percentage seems small, there has been a growing trend of (former) military members engaging in extremist offenses in recent years. An average of seven people with U.S. military backgrounds per year committed extremist crimes between 1990 and 2010. That rate has risen to an average of 29 people per year over the past decade. Also worth noting is that more than half (52%) of extremists with military experience are identified as violent.

Given the growth of violent domestic extremism among military personnel, the relationship between military service and radicalization has become a major concern. Prior NIJ-funded studies have identified military experience as a potential risk factor for attempted and actual terrorism. [22] The likelihood of radicalization and radicalization to violence increases when individuals have already left military service. [23] This research suggests that military service is not a social bond that inhibits extremist violence.

NIJ studies have also shown that individuals with military experience may be susceptible to recruitment by domestic violent extremist groups due to their unique skills, which an extremist group may perceive as contributing to the success of a terrorist attack. [24] Also, transitioning from military to civilian life appears to be a pull factor for engaging in violent extremism. [25] Indicators for potential involvement in extremism may include a lack of a sense of community, purpose, and belonging. If these indicators are identified early, community stakeholders — in partnership with military agencies — could have an opportunity to intervene. Although such knowledge is valuable, the role of military service in radicalization to violent extremism still requires study.

Differences in Violent Extremist Characteristics Between Military Veterans and Civilians

In 2019, NIJ funded researchers at the University of Southern California to study the link between military service and violent domestic extremism. They are also examining the differences between military veteran and civilian extremists in terms of their characteristics and social networks. [26] Although this study is ongoing, preliminary findings have been drawn from a secondary analysis of the American Terrorism Study data, which contain information on people federally indicted for terrorism-related crimes by the U.S. government between 1980 and 2002. [27] With these data, the researchers compared the demographic and homegrown violent extremist characteristics among military veterans and civilians. The demographic characteristics considered were age, race, sex, marital status, and education level. The homegrown violent extremist characteristics consisted of the length of group membership, type of terrorist group, role in the group, mode of recruitment into the group, primary target, and the state of indictment.

The research team observed significant differences between military veteran and civilian extremists across both demographic and homegrown violent extremist characteristics. First, they found that military veteran and civilian extremists differed with respect to age, sex, and marital status. Specifically, individuals with military service who engaged in homegrown violent extremism were more likely to be older, male, and in marital or cohabiting relationships than civilians who engaged in homegrown violent extremism. Second, analyses revealed that, compared to civilian extremists, military veteran extremists had greater affiliations with right-wing terrorist groups (versus left-wing, international, or other terrorist groups) and were more likely to hold leadership positions within these groups and either initiate a terrorist group or unite groups together. Finally, other than government/federal officials or buildings, which were the primary targets across all groups, the primary targets of veterans were diverse social groups, such as those belonging to racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups.

Implications of Transitioning Out of Military Service

The University of Southern California researchers intend to supplement these results by interviewing members from the social networks of military veterans and civilians who committed homegrown violent extremism between 2003 and 2019. The findings produced thus far are important, especially because the association between military experience and terrorism is understudied. Ultimately, these results suggest that people who transition from active duty to veteran status experience a nuanced, complex, and potentially lifelong process. Veterans who encounter difficulties during this transition and desire — but lack — a sense of community, purpose, and belonging after leaving the military may be attracted to the pull of domestic extremist groups. In these groups, veterans can lead and collaborate with others of similar ideologies to accomplish a shared mission akin to what they did in the military. For example, the military veterans in this study largely endorsed right-wing values; thus, perhaps something about the narratives of right-wing extremist groups compensates for the void felt when leaving military service. With such insights in mind, researchers recommend forming partnerships among civilians, the military, and veteran communities to identify and prevent violent extremism among U.S. veterans.

Longevity of Terrorist Plots in the United States

A major question for researchers and counterterrorism officials is how to prevent the next act of terrorism or violent extremism from occurring. As such, much attention has been paid to disrupted plots and successful interdiction tactics that ultimately led to arrest and indictment. Less attention has been given to what those responsible for acts of terrorism and violent extremism do to successfully evade detection and arrest. In other words, the focus has not been on what terrorists and violent extremists are doing “right.”

In 2013, NIJ funded researchers at the University of Arkansas’ Terrorism Research Center to study the sequencing of precursor behaviors for individuals who have been federally indicted in the United States for charges related to terrorism and domestic violent extremism. [28] Based on preliminary analyses, the researchers somewhat serendipitously observed lifespan differences between lone actors and those operating in small cells or more formalized groups. Consequently, it warranted a more comprehensive examination of the factors that increased the likelihood of terrorists and violent extremists evading arrest. NIJ funded the researchers to identify behaviors that improved the chances of plot longevity — or the ability for terrorists to commit acts of terrorism and evade capture by law enforcement — for individuals federally indicted on terrorism-related charges. [29]

Data on the longevity of terrorism and violent extremism plots come from the American Terrorism Study, the longest-running project on terrorism and violent extremism in the United States. With NIJ funding that began in 2003, [30] the American Terrorism Study maintains the most comprehensive dataset on temporally linked precursor behaviors and outcomes of terrorism and violent extremism plots. To examine plot longevity, the Arkansas researchers [31] limited their analyses to 346 federally indicted individuals who were linked to the planning or completion of a terrorist attack in the United States from 1980 to 2015. Longevity, or duration of their “terrorist lifespan,” is based on the date of a person’s involvement in their first preparatory activity and their “neutralizing” date (usually the date of arrest).

One of the key findings from this research is a correlation between significant declines in the lifespan of individual terrorists and major changes to the U.S. Attorney General guidelines established to combat terrorism and violent extremism in the United States. For example, those who began in the mid- to late 1970s, following Watergate, COINTELPRO, and the Privacy Act, had a median longevity of 2,230 days. In contrast, the median lifespan of terrorists who began operating in the mid-1980s decreased to 1,067 days. Later, in the early 2000s, it fell even further to 99 days, which reflects the FBI’s tighter focus on terrorism and violent extremism and guidelines granting law enforcement more discretion in the investigative techniques employed.

The researchers also found that the lifespans of terrorists and violent extremists vary significantly depending on key attributes, such as ideology, sex, and educational attainment. For example, environmental and extreme left-wing violent extremists tend to sustain themselves for relatively long periods of time (5.4 and 4.3 years, respectively), while the longevity of extreme right-wing and radical Islamist terrorists is, on average, two years or less.

Females federally indicted on charges related to terrorism and violent extremism also tend to have increased longevity compared to male terrorists and violent extremists, perhaps because of females’ disproportionate representation in longer-lasting extreme left-wing and environmental movements, as well as increased representation in left-wing group leadership roles. Females involved in terrorism and extremism are usually more educated, which is also associated with extended longevity. Further, females who play support roles in terrorism and extremist groups — as is more often the case for right-wing extremists and radical Islamist terrorists — also appear to have longer lifespans. In contrast, males have been more likely to engage in overtly criminal preparatory behavior and actual incident participation than females. Both types of behavior are significantly more likely to attract the attention of law enforcement and would be expected to shorten the longevity of both male and female terrorists and violent extremists.

Finally, longevity also depends on a plot’s sophistication and the extent of the planning required to carry it out. Less sophisticated plans or executed plots, or those using simpler and less advanced weapons, are generally associated with longer lifespans for terrorists and violent extremists. More sophisticated plots may provide greater potential for missteps by terrorists and violent extremists and leads for law enforcement. Additionally, more sophisticated plots are associated with more meetings with accomplices and necessitate extra preparation. Importantly, both the number of meetings and preparatory activities have been found to be negatively related to the successful completion of terrorist incidents, suggesting that early intervention or arrest are also linked to these two factors.

How Domestic Terrorists Use the Internet

Terrorists and terrorist groups use the internet to share propaganda and recruit new members. The internet provides a platform to strengthen their members’ commitment to the cause, encourage radicalized individuals to act, and coordinate legal and illegal activities. A recently published meta-analysis concluded, “Exposure to radical content online appears to have a larger relationship with radicalization than other media-related risk factors (for example, television usage, media exposure), and the impact of this relationship is most pronounced for the behavioral outcomes of radicalization.” [32]

In 2014, NIJ funded a study to develop a deeper understanding of what domestic terrorists discuss on the internet. [33] The study analyzed 18,120 posts from seven online web forums by and for individuals interested in the ideological far right. The research team read each post’s content and coded it for either quantitative or qualitative analyses depending on the project’s objective.

The project provided several important insights into terrorist use of the internet. First, the web forums included discussions about a variety of beliefs, such as gun rights, conspiracy theories, hate-based sentiments, and anti-government beliefs; however, the intensity of ideological expression was generally weak. The nature of the online environments that far-right groups use likely facilitates the diffusion of ideological agendas.

Second, the amount and type of involvement in these forums played a key role in radicalization. Posting behaviors changed over time. Users grew more ideological and radical as other users reinforced their ideas and connected their ideas to those from other forums. (It is important to note that the study focused on online expression and not conversion to offline violence.)

Third, far-right extremists were primarily interested in general technology issues. Discussions focused on encryption tools and methods (such as Tor), internet service providers and social media platforms, and law enforcement actions to surveil illicit activities online. These far-right extremists appeared more interested in defensive actions than sophisticated schemes for radicalization or offensive actions such as criminal cyberattacks.

The study used social network analyses to visualize user communications and network connections, focusing on individuals’ responses to posts made within threads to highlight interconnected associations between actors. The social network analyses indicated that far-right forums have a low network density, which suggests a degree of information recycling between key actors. The redundant connections between actors may slow the spread of new information. As a result, such forums may inefficiently distribute new knowledge due to their relatively insular nature. They may also be generally difficult to disrupt, as the participants’ language and behaviors reinforce others and create an echo chamber. These networks are similar to others observed in computer hacker communities and data theft forums, [34] which suggests that there may be consistencies in the nature of online dialogue regardless of the content.

The study also indicated that extreme external events usually did not affect posting behaviors. However, there were significant differences associated with conspiratorial, anti-Islamic, and anti-immigrant posts after the Boston Marathon bombing. It may be that violence or major disruptive events inspired by jihadist ideologies draw great responses from far-right groups relative to their own actions. The same appears to be true for the 2012 presidential election; the study observed increases both in the number of posts in the month after the election and in overt signs of individual ties or associations to far-right movements through self-claim posts, movement-related signatures, and usernames. These findings are consistent with other recent work comparing online mobilization after the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. [35]

Entering and Exiting White Supremacy in the United States

An NIJ-funded research team led by RTI International examined the complex social-psychological processes involved with entering, mobilizing, and exiting white supremacy in the United States. [36] The researchers conducted in-depth life history interviews with 47 former members of white supremacist groups in 24 states and two provinces in Canada. [37]

For this project, white supremacy referred to groups that reject essential democratic ideals, equality, and tolerance. A key organizing principle is that inherent differences between races and ethnicities position white and European ancestry above all others. Those interviewed were authoritarian, anti-liberal, or militant nationalists who had a general intolerance toward people of color. They had used violence to achieve their goals and supported a race war to eradicate the world of nonwhite people. [38]

The study led to several key findings about entering and exiting white supremacy in the United States.

Hate as Outcome

The study found that most people do not join white supremacist groups because they are adherents of a particular ideology. Rather, a combination of background factors increases the likelihood that someone will be susceptible to recruitment messaging (for example, propaganda). [39] Previous research has highlighted that hate or adherence to racist violence was an outcome of participation in white supremacist groups. [40] The commitment to white supremacist groups lacked a preexisting sense of racial grievance or hatred that motivated an individual to join the racist movement. [41] One former member reported having “no inkling of what [Nazism] really was other than what you saw on TV.” [42] The NIJ-funded study found that people joined white supremacist groups because they were angry, lonely, and isolated, and they were looking for opportunities to express their rage. [43]

Vulnerabilities as Precondition

The former white supremacists had various personal, psychological, and social vulnerabilities that made them strive for what psychologists have framed as developing a new possible self. [44] High levels of negative life experiences — including, but not limited to, maladjustment, abuse, and family instability — potentially make a person imagine a new, different, and more fulfilled self. [45] They can imagine an empowered future self with friends and a purpose. Extremist recruiters prey on these desires. The former white supremacists indicated high levels of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse as children; strained personal relationships; and general difficulties throughout their lives. These struggles made white supremacy seem like an improvement to their sense of self, as the group came with a ready-made set of friends, social events, and camaraderie among individuals with similarly rough pasts. Besides these social benefits, white supremacist groups provided members with a deeper sense of belonging and explanation for their life troubles, rooted in a sense of racial pride and empowerment.

Gradual, Nonlinear Exit

Most white supremacists in this country do not remain members for life. Rather, group membership is often temporary (but not always short-lived), and many become disillusioned and burnt out over time. The study showed that the exit process is gradual, as the former white supremacists reported slowly becoming dissatisfied with the ideology, tactics, or politics of a group. [46] They described an identity that became filled with negative encounters with other members, even breeding distrust. White supremacy requires the development of a totalizing identity that results in isolating members from nonextremists. This marginalization fosters a sense of social stigma that makes white supremacy less attractive and further supports disengagement and deradicalization processes.

This research reported that emotional dynamics create trajectories of development and decline in white supremacy and the role of disillusionment among the reasons why members exit the organization. [47] These analyses offer an explanation for how white supremacist organizations maintain solidarity even though many individuals stay in groups after losing their ideological commitment. They also demonstrate that exit from a group is a nonlinear process. [48] Meanwhile, in other analyses, the study team reported that, even after an individual exits a group, their white supremacist identity lingers with a residual effect. [49] That research likened hate to an addiction that creates an uncontrollable emotional, social, and cognitive hold over adherents, which has the ability to pull former members back into hate almost against their will. [50] The former white supremacists shared experiences in which music, environments, and images created desire, longing, and curiosity about their old lifestyle within the organization.

Opportunities

The NIJ-funded study found several blind spots in terms of identification and awareness among criminal legal system practitioners and other responders. This resulted in several missed opportunities for intervention and practical solutions. Exhibit 1 details four areas in which the study findings can contribute to criminal justice policy and practice. [51]

Exhibit 1. Missed Opportunities for Intervention and Practical Solutions

Policy Implications

The results of the NIJ-funded studies discussed in this article have several implications for policy and practice. First, they illustrate that extremism is complex and that successfully countering it will require a unified response that bridges law enforcement, community partners, health officials, and concerned citizens. To facilitate a shared understanding of the extremist threat, stakeholders engaged in counterextremism efforts routinely use findings from these studies to provide training to concerned family and friends about potential radicalization warning signs and how best to respond. They also use the findings to educate law enforcement, corrections and probation officers, and mental health professionals on the complexity of radicalization so they can accurately gauge and respond to extremism in their communities. These types of training initiatives will remain critical to counterextremism efforts as the threat continues to evolve.

Second, the studies highlight the importance of focusing criminal justice resources on domestic extremism. Although international terrorist organizations remain a threat, these studies show that domestic extremists continue to be responsible for most terrorist attacks in the United States. Historically, far fewer resources have been dedicated to the study of domestic extremism, leaving gaps in our understanding about terrorist trends, recruitment and retention processes, and online behaviors. Due in large part to NIJ’s commitment to funding research on domestic radicalization, considerable progress has recently been made in addressing these topics. But this work will need to continue if we hope to keep pace with the rapidly evolving threat landscape.

Finally, the studies highlight the need for communitywide partnerships that link government and nongovernment organizations in support of community-level prevention and intervention programs. Law enforcement and criminal justice resources for countering extremism are finite and scarce, making it imperative that we focus our research and support efforts on understanding what occurs before a crime takes place. As the studies reviewed in this article show, there is often an opportunity to intervene to help individuals exit extremism before they engage in criminal activity. Similarly, prevention efforts are needed in digital spaces where extremist narratives often flourish. Achieving these goals will require community members, policymakers, and practitioners to commit to supporting counterextremism efforts.

About This Article

This article was published as part of NIJ Journal issue number 285 . This article discusses the following awards:

• “Exploring the Social Networks of Homegrown Violent Extremist Military Veterans,” award number 2019-ZA-CX-0002
• “Sequencing Terrorists’ Precursor Behaviors: A Crime Specific Analysis,” award number 2013-ZA-BX-0001
• “Radicalization and the Longevity of American Terrorists: Factors Affecting Sustainability,” award number 2015-ZA-BX-0001
• “Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents,” award number 2003-DT-CX-0003
• “Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR),” award number 2012-ZA-BX-0005
• “A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders,” award number 2017-VF-GX-0003
• “Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA,” award number 2014-ZA-BX-0005
• “Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums, Social Media, and Technology To Enculturate and Radicalize Individuals to Violence,” award number 2014-ZA-BX-0004

Opinions or points of view expressed in this document represent a consensus of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position, policies, terminology, or posture of the U.S. Department of Justice on domestic violent extremism. The content is not intended to create, does not create, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.

[note 1] Celinet Duran, “ Far-Left Versus Far-Right Fatal Violence: An Empirical Assessment of the Prevalence of Ideologically Motivated Homicides in the United States ,” Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society 22 no. 2 (2021): 33-49; Joshua D. Freilich et al., “ Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) ,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26 no. 2 (2014): 372-384; and William Parkin, Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak, “ Did Far-Right Extremist Violence Really Spike in 2017? ” The Conversation, January 4, 2018.

[note 2] Duran, “ Far-Left Versus Far-Right Fatal Violence ”; Freilich et al., “ Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) ”; and Parkin, Freilich, and Chermak, “ Did Far-Right Extremist Violence Really Spike in 2017? ”

[note 3] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Threat Assessment: October 2020 , Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020, 4.

[note 4] Allison G. Smith, How Radicalization to Terrorism Occurs in the United States: What Research Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice Tells Us , Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June 2018, NCJ 250171; and Michael Wolfowicz, Badi Hasisi, and David Weisburd, “ What Are the Effects of Different Elements of Media on Radicalization Outcomes? A Systematic Review ,” Campbell Systematic Reviews 18 no. 2 (2022).

[note 5] Aisha Javed Qureshi, “ Understanding Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism: A National Issue Within a Global Context ,” NIJ Journal 282, August 2020.

[note 6] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) ,” at the University of Maryland, award number 2012-ZA-BX-0005.

[note 7] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders ,” at the University of Maryland, College Park, award number 2017-VF-GX-0003.

[note 8] The PIRUS and BIAS datasets are based on the same data collection methodologies and share similar goals. Both contain random samples of individuals who committed crimes in the United States that were motivated by their extremist ideologies or hate beliefs. The PIRUS dataset includes 2,225 individuals from 1948 to 2018, and BIAS is based on 966 cases from 1990 to 2018. Both datasets are collected entirely from public sources, including court records, online and print news, and public social media accounts. Both seek to capture individuals who promoted a range of extremist ideologies and hate beliefs. PIRUS, for instance, includes those whose crimes were associated with anti-government, white supremacist, environmental, anarchist, jihadist, and conspiracy theory movements. Similarly, BIAS includes individuals who selected victims based on their race, ethnicity, and nationality; sexual orientation and gender identity; religious affiliation; age; or disability.

[note 9] Michael Jensen and Gary LaFree, “ Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) ,” Final report to the National Institute of Justice, award number 2012-ZA-BX-0005, December 2016, NCJ 250481; and Michael A. Jensen, Elizabeth A. Yates, and Sheehan E. Kane, “ A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders ,” Final report to the National Institute of Justice, award number 2017-VF-GX-0003, February 2021, NCJ 300114.

[note 10] Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, “ Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) ,” Research Brief, College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], May 2020.

[note 11] Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) .”

[note 12] Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders .”

[note 13] Jensen and LaFree, “ Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) ”; and Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders .”

[note 14] Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, “ Characteristics and Targets of Mass Casualty Hate Crime Offenders ,” College Park, MD: START, 2020.

[note 15] Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders .”

[note 16] John Horgan, “ From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives From Psychology on Radicalization Into Terrorism ,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science  618 no. 1 (2008): 80-94.

[note 17] Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) .”

[note 18] Gary LaFree, “ Correlates of Violent Political Extremism in the United States ,” Criminology 56 no. 2 (2018): 233-268; Michael A. Jensen, Anita Atwell Seate, and Patrick A. James, “ Radicalization to Violence: A Pathway Approach To Studying Extremism ,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32 no. 5 (2020): 1067-1090; and Michael A. Jensen et al., “ The Link Between Prior Criminal Record and Violent Political Extremism in the United States ,” in Understanding Recruitment to Organized Crime and Terrorism, ed. David Weisburd et al. (New York: Springer, 2020), 121-146.

[note 19] Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “ Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) .”

[note 20] Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, “ Violent Hate Crime Offenders ,” College Park, MD: START, 2020.

[note 21] Unless otherwise noted, all data reported in this section originate from Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, Radicalization in the Ranks: An Assessment of the Scope and Nature of Criminal Extremism in the United States Military , College Park, MD: START, January 2022. In this project, extremists with military backgrounds consisted of active and nonactive personnel from all military branches and reserves, aside from the Space Force and Coast Guard Reserves. Individuals who were honorably discharged, dishonorably discharged, or otherwise violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice were excluded from the study. Also excluded were those discharged through court martial unless information about their criminal proceedings was publicly available.

[note 22] Allison G. Smith, Risk Factors and Indicators Associated With Radicalization to Terrorism in the United States: What Research Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice Tells Us , Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June 2018, NCJ 251789.

[note 23] Jensen and LaFree, “ Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) .”

[note 24] Smith, Risk Factors and Indicators Associated With Radicalization to Terrorism in the United States .

[note 25] Smith, Risk Factors and Indicators Associated With Radicalization to Terrorism in the United States .

[note 26] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ Exploring the Social Networks of Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) Military Veterans ,” at the University of Southern California, award number 2019-ZA-CX-0002.

[note 27] Unless otherwise noted, all data in this section come from Hazel R. Atuel and Carl A. Castro, “ Exploring Homegrown Violent Extremism Among Military Veterans and Civilians ,” The Military Psychologist 36 no. 3 (2021): 10-14.

[note 28] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ Sequencing Terrorists? Precursor Behaviors: A Crime Specific Analysis ,” at the University of Arkansas, award number 2013-ZA-BX-0001.

[note 29] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ Radicalization and the Longevity of American Terrorists: Factors Affecting Sustainability ,” at the University of Arkansas, award number 2015-ZA-BX-0001.

[note 30] National Institute of Justice funding award description, “ Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents ,” at the Board of Trustees, University of Arkansas, award number 2003-DT-CX-0003.

[note 31] Unless otherwise noted, all data in this section come from Brent L. Smith et al., “ The Longevity of American Terrorists: Factors Affecting Sustainability ,” Final Summary Overview, award number 2015-ZA-BX-0001, January 2021, NCJ 256035.

[note 32] Wolfowicz, Hasisi, and Weisburd, “ What Are the Effects of Different Elements of Media on Radicalization Outcomes ?”

[note 33] Unless otherwise noted, all data in this section come from Thomas J. Holt, Steve Chermak, and Joshua D. Freilich, “ An Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums, Social Media, and Technology To Enculturate and Radicalize Individuals to Violence ,” Final Summary Overview, award number 2014-ZA-BX-0004, January 2021, NCJ 256038.

[note 34] Thomas J. Holt and Adam M. Bossler, “Issues in the Prevention of Cybercrime,” in Cybercrime in Progress: Theory and Prevention of Technology-Enabled Offenses (New York: Routledge, 2016), 136-168.

[note 35] Ryan Scrivens et al., “ Triggered by Defeat or Victory? Assessing the Impact of Presidential Election Results on Extreme Right-Wing Mobilization Online ,” Deviant Behavior 42 no. 5 (2021): 630-645.

[note 36] Matthew DeMichele, Peter Simi, and Kathleen Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA ,” Final report to the National Institute of Justice, award number 2014-ZA-BX-0005, January 2021, NCJ 256037. 

[note 37] The project included three human rights groups (Anti-Defamation League, Simon Wiesenthal Center, and Southern Poverty Law Center) and Life After Hate, an organization that assists white supremacists in exiting the movement. The project partners helped develop a semi-structured interview protocol and provided contact information for initial interviewees. The study used a snowballing technique from these initial interviewees to identify former white supremacists who were in the public sphere to determine if they were interested in being interviewed. The interviews were conducted in places where the individuals would be comfortable, including hotel rooms, homes, places of work, coffee shops, restaurants, and parks. The interviews were in-depth accounts (lasting 6-8 hours each) of individuals’ backgrounds (for example, how they grew up), entry into white supremacy (for example, how they learned about the movement), mobilization (for example, rank and use of violence), and exit process (for example, initial doubts and barriers to exit). The completion of the project was a collaboration with equal contributions from Kathleen Blee, Matthew DeMichele, and Pete Simi and support from Mehr Latif and Steven Windisch.

[note 38] Steven Windisch et al., “ Understanding the Micro-Situational Dynamics of White Supremacist Violence in the United States ,” Perspectives on Terrorism 12 no. 6 (2018): 23-37.

[note 39] DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA .”

[note 40] Kathleen M. Blee et al., “ How Racial Violence Is Provoked and Channeled ,” Socio 9 (2017): 257-276.

[note 41] Blee et al., “ How Racial Violence Is Provoked and Channeled .”

[note 42] Blee et al., “ How Racial Violence Is Provoked and Channeled ,” 265.

[note 43] DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA .”

[note 44] Hazel Markus and Paula Nurius, “ Possible Selves ,” American Psychologist 41 no. 9 (1986): 954-969.

[note 45] Unless otherwise noted, all data in the remainder of this paragraph come from DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA .”

[note 46] All data in this paragraph come from DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA .”

[note 47] Mehr Latif et al., “ How Emotional Dynamics Maintain and Destroy White Supremacist Groups ,” Humanity & Society 42 no. 4 (2018): 480-501.

[note 48] Latif et al., “ How Emotional Dynamics Maintain and Destroy White Supremacist Groups .”

[note 49] Pete Simi et al., “ Addicted to Hate: Identity Residual Among Former White Supremacists ,” American Sociological Review 82 no. 6 (2017): 1167-1187.

[note 50] Simi et al., “ Addicted to Hate .”

[note 51] DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “ Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA .”

About the author

Steven Chermak, Ph.D., is a professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University and studies domestic terrorism and cyber offending. Matthew DeMichele, Ph.D., is a senior research sociologist at RTI and has conducted research on correctional population trends, risk prediction, terrorism/extremism prevention, and program evaluation. Jeff Gruenewald, Ph.D., is a professor and director of the Terrorism Research Center at the University of Arkansas and studies domestic violent extremism and hate crime. Michael Jensen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, where he leads the team on extremism in the United States. Raven Lewis, MA, is a Ph.D. candidate at Rutgers University in Newark, New Jersey, and a former research assistant at the National Institute of Justice, where she supported research efforts focused on domestic radicalization and violent extremism. Basia E. Lopez, MPA, is a social science analyst at the National Institute of Justice, where she leads the firearm violence and mass shootings research portfolio and co-leads the violent extremism and domestic radicalization research portfolio.

Cite this Article

Read more about:, related awards.

• Exploring the Social Networks of Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) Military Veterans
• SEQUENCING TERRORISTS? PRECURSOR BEHAVIORS:A CRIME SPECIFIC ANALYSIS
• Radicalization and the Longevity of American Terrorists: Factors Affecting Sustainability
• Pre-incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents
• Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization
• A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders
• Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research to Support Exit USA

A Department of Homeland Security Emeritus Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland

A consortium of researchers dedicated to improving the understanding of the human causes and consequences of terrorism

Research on terrorism and countering terrorism.

Social and behavioral research on terrorism has expanded dramatically. However, theoretical work that incorporates terrorism and collection of valid data on it has lagged behind theoretical work on other criminological subjects. Theorizing has been dominated by deterrence perspectives. Threats of severe consequence for terrorist acts in general show little promise, but there is evidence that increasing the certainty of consequences works in some situations. Research on terrorism will be improved if it moves beyond deterrence to include concepts drawn from legitimacy, strain, and situational perspectives. Limitations of traditional criminology data sources for studying terrorism have encouraged the development of open‐source‐event databases. The most comprehensive, created by combining the Global Terrorism Database with RAND‐MIPT data, documents more than 77,000 terrorist incidents from 1970 to 2006. Attacks peaked in the early 1990s and then declined substantially until 9/11. They have since substantially increased. The regional concentration of terrorism has moved from Western Europe in the 1970s, to Latin America in the 1980s, to the Middle East and Persian Gulf in the twenty‐first century. Despite the enormous resources devoted to countering terrorism, surprisingly little empirical information is available on which strategies are most effective.

Publication Information

LaFree, Gary, and Laura Dugan. 2009. "Research on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism." In Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, ed. Michael Tonry . Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/599201

Additional Info

Countering terrorism

• Last updated: 05 Dec. 2023 14:31

Terrorism is the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity. A persistent global issue that knows no border, nationality or religion, terrorism is a challenge that the international community must tackle together. NATO will continue to fight this threat with determination and in full solidarity. NATO’s work on counter-terrorism focuses on improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors.

A Polish Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialist walks towards a suspected improvised explosive device (IED) during Northern Challenge, a multinational exercise that takes place at the Icelandic Coast Guard facility in Keflavík, Iceland.

• NATO invoked its collective defence clause (Article 5) for the first and only time in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States.
• NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines focus Alliance efforts on three main areas: awareness, capabilities and engagement.
• NATO’s counter-terrorism work spans across the Alliance’s three core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.
• A comprehensive action plan defines and determines NATO’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism.
• A Terrorism Intelligence Cell has been established at NATO Headquarters.
• The NATO Secretary General’s Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism serves as the high-level focal point for all of NATO’s work on counter-terrorism and ensures that NATO’s response to terrorism remains strong, effective and coherent. 
• NATO advises and assists Iraqi security forces and institutions through NATO Mission Iraq and is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
• NATO supports the development of new capabilities and technologies to tackle the terrorist threat and to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack.
• NATO cooperates with partners and international organisations to leverage the full potential of each stakeholder engaged in the global counter-terrorism effort.
• The Alliance’s Strategic Concept recognises terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, as the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of NATO citizens and to international peace and prosperity.

Capabilities

Milestones in nato’s work on counter-terrorism.

In support of national authorities, NATO ensures shared awareness of the terrorist threat through consultations, enhanced intelligence-sharing and continuous strategic analysis and assessment.

Intelligence reporting at NATO is based on contributions from Allies’ intelligence services, both internal and external, civilian and military. The way NATO handles sensitive information has gradually evolved based on successive summit decisions and continuing reform of intelligence structures since 2010. Since 2017, the Joint Intelligence and Security Division at NATO benefits from increased sharing of intelligence between member services and the Alliance, and produces strategic analytical reports relating to terrorism and its links with other transnational threats.

Intelligence-sharing between NATO and partner countries’ agencies continues through the Intelligence Liaison Unit at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and an intelligence liaison cell at Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium. An intelligence cell at NATO Headquarters improves how NATO shares intelligence, including on foreign fighters.

NATO faces a range of threats arising from instability in the region to the south of the Alliance. NATO increases its understanding of these challenges and improves its ability to respond to them through the ‘Hub for the South’ based at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy. The Hub collects and analyses information, assesses potential threats and engages with partner countries and organisations.

Recognising the many different roles that men and women may play in terrorist groups, NATO is also seeking to integrate a gender perspective in all its counter-terrorism efforts, including training and education for Allies and partners, as well as policy and programme development. Likewise, the Alliance seeks to address all pillars of the human security agenda (including protection of civilians, preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence, countering trafficking in human beings, protection of children in armed conflict, cultural property protection) in its counter-terrorism work. 

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced the position of Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism in October 2023. The Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism serves as the high-level focal point for all of NATO’s work on counter-terrorism and ensures that NATO’s response to terrorism remains strong, effective and coherent. The current Special Coordinator is Assistant Secretary General for Operations Tom Goffus. 

The Alliance strives to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist threats. Capability development and work on innovative technologies are part of NATO’s core business, and methods that address asymmetric threats, including terrorism and the use of non-conventional weapons, are of particular relevance. Much of this work is conducted through the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work, which facilitates the development of capabilities to protect NATO forces, civilians and territory against attacks by terrorists, including those using unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) substances. NATO’s Centres of Excellence (COEs) are important contributors to many projects, providing expertise across a range of topics including technical exploitation, battlefield evidence, explosive ordnance disposal, military engineering, counter-IED, and network analysis and modelling.

NATO policies and practical frameworks in areas such as C-UAS, biometrics, battlefield evidence and technical exploitation also drive capability development in areas relevant to counter-terrorism. 

Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work

The Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW) was developed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and approved by NATO Leaders at the Istanbul Summit in 2004. With an initial focus on technological solutions to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks, the programme has since widened its scope to support comprehensive capability development. It now includes exercises, trials, development of prototypes and concepts, doctrine, policy, equipment, training and lessons learned, and interoperability demonstrations. The key aim of the DAT POW is to prevent non-conventional attacks, such as attacks with IEDs and UAS, and mitigate other challenges, such as attacks on critical infrastructure and the use of emerging and disruptive technologies by terrorists.

The DAT POW is based on the principle of common funding, whereby member countries pool resources within a NATO framework. Under the DAT POW, individual NATO countries, with support and contributions from other member countries and NATO bodies, lead projects to develop advanced technologies or counter-measures that meet the most urgent security needs in the face of terrorism and other asymmetric threats.

Most projects under the programme focus on finding solutions that can be fielded in the short term and that respond to the military needs of the Alliance – although the DAT POW also bridges the gap between long-term military requirements and urgent operational needs. The programme uses new or adapted technologies or methods to detect, disrupt and defeat asymmetric threats, covering a wide range of areas, including countering unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), biometrics, technical exploitation and countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED). The DAT POW is an integral contributor to NATO activities in the field of emerging and disruptive technologies, such as data, artificial intelligence and autonomous systems.. Through this programme, NATO is consulting with stakeholders from industry, the military and academia to explore how new technologies can be leveraged in the fight against terrorism.

Protection of harbours and ports

The safe and uninterrupted functioning of harbours and ports is critical to the global economy and it is essential for maritime assets to be made as secure as possible. The DAT POW supports the development of technologies that enhance maritime protection. This includes sensor nets, electro-optical detectors, rapid-reaction capabilities, underwater magnetic barriers and unmanned underwater vehicles. In 2022, under the leadership of France, the DAT POW supported the third iteration of "Cut Away", a multinational harbour exploration and clearance exercise.

Additionally, under the lead of the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) located in La Spezia, Italy, the DAT POW supports the use of advanced and immersive visualisation media (virtual and augmented reality) to enhance situational and spatial awareness in countering maritime IED threats in harbour protection.

Countering chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats

NATO places a high priority on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems to state and non-state actors, including terrorists. Ideally, terrorists will be prevented from acquiring and using such weapons, but should prevention fail, NATO is committed to  defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) hazards  that may pose a threat to the safety and security of Allied forces, territory and populations, and to supporting recovery efforts.

The NATO Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force is designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of CBRN agents. The Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in Czechia further enhances NATO’s capabilities. The DAT POW has also supported the Joint CBRN Defence COE in establishing and enhancing the NATO CBRN Reachback Capability, ensuring that CBRN expertise is available to the NATO Command Structure and Allied forces in theatres of operations.

The DAT POW also covers projects on the detection, identification and monitoring of CBRN substances, CBRN information management, physical protection, hazard management and CBRN medical counter-measures. Furthermore, the DAT POW facilitates training and exercises, including those conducted with live agents.

Explosive ordnance disposal and consequence management

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians are experts in detecting, rendering safe and disposing of dangerous weapons like landmines, IEDs and explosive remnants of war. The DAT POW supports EOD demonstrations and trials, led by the NATO EOD Centre of Excellence in Trencin, Slovakia, as well as the exercising of high-end EOD capabilities in the annual exercise Northern Challenge in Iceland. With DAT POW support, the EOD community has also tested integrated exoskeletons that technicians can wear to protect themselves while undertaking this dangerous work. The integration of emerging technologies such as augmented reality into EOD training is another DAT POW priority. The strong community of interest includes experts from partner countries, such as the Irish Defence Forces' Ordnance School.

Countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED)

NATO must remain prepared to counter  improvised explosive devices  (IEDs) in any land or maritime operation involving asymmetrical threats, in which force protection will remain a paramount priority. Several NATO bodies are leading the Alliance’s efforts on countering IEDs, including the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Centre of Excellence in Madrid, Spain. Various technologies to counter IEDs have been explored, particularly stand-off detection, the integration of innovative materials into protective coatings for vehicles and buildings and the use of artificial intelligence to fuse massive quantities of sensor data in order to detect suicide bombers. The DAT POW supports the annual Northern Challenge exercise, led by Iceland, which tests counter-IED and IED disposal abilities. The biennial Thor's Hammer electronic counter-measures trial series and the radio-controlled IED database are two innovative approaches regularly supported by the DAT POW, which are now also being leveraged to assist with countering unmanned aircraft systems. 

Countering unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS)

Terrorists have sought to use and manipulate various technologies in their operations, including easily available off-the-shelf technology. Drones, in particular, have been identified as a threat. Therefore, in February 2019, NATO Defence Ministers agreed a practical framework to counter unmanned aircraft systems. A new programme of work to help coordinate approaches and identify additional steps to address this threat was agreed in 2023 and is currently being implemented. 

NATO is also developing a C-UAS doctrine, which is expected to be adopted by the end of 2023.The DAT POW supports comprehensive capability development in the field of C-UAS through tests, evaluation, exercises, concept development and technical standardization. In 2021, the DAT POW supported an innovation challenge for the development of artificial intelligence / machine learning techniques to track, classify and identify drones as they fly within a defined area. At the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, a technology display for Heads of State and Government covered some of the latest challenges related to C-UAS and exploitation capabilities. 

Biometrics, battlefield evidence and technical exploitation

NATO is also addressing the use of information obtained on missions and operations. In 2018, Allies agreed a biometric data policy, consistent with applicable national and international law and subject to national requirements and restrictions. The policy enables biometric data collection to support NATO operations, based upon a mandate from the North Atlantic Council – NATO’s top political decision-making body. Furthermore, NATO's Strategic Commands have recognised that developing and improving this capability is a military requirement. The policy is particularly relevant to force protection and the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 highlights the acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and “urges Member States to expeditiously exchange information, through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms and in accordance with domestic and international law, concerning the identity of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.”

In October 2020, the NATO Battlefield Evidence Policy was approved. It aims to facilitate the sharing of information obtained on NATO missions and operations for law enforcement purposes. While the primary purpose of deployed military is to fulfil their operational objectives, troops often collect information or material on the battlefield, some of which may also be useful to support legal proceedings, including the prosecution of returning foreign terrorist fighters. In this regard, the policy also supports Allies in fulfilling their obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 in holding foreign fighters accountable. Cooperation with other international organisations, including the United Nations, INTERPOL and the European Union, is an important aspect of NATO’s work on battlefield evidence to ensure complementarity and added value. Since July 2021, NATO also has a Battlefield Evidence Programme of Work in place to guide the implementation of the Policy. Moreover, the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence is providing a series of hands-on battlefield evidence training courses to law enforcement and military from partner countries in the region to the south of the Alliance.

Also in October 2020, a Practical Framework for Technical Exploitation was agreed. Technical exploitation collects material that has been in the possession of terrorists and other adversaries – such as weapons, computers and cell phones – and uses scientific tools and analysis to support the identification of actors, their capabilities and intentions. It enables NATO forces to derive important information and intelligence from material and materiel collected on the battlefield to support military objectives, protect our forces or support law enforcement outcomes such as battlefield evidence. In June 2022, the first NATO Martial Vision Technical Exploitation Experiment took place in Burgos, Spain to test and assess relevant technical exploitation doctrine. Further experimentation and concept development are underway to ensure that NATO has the ability to derive operational and intelligence information from this valuable resource.

Operations and missions

As part of the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence, NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts extend through a variety of  operations and missions , both within NATO territory and beyond the Alliance’s borders.

Since 2017, NATO has been a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. As a member of the Coalition, NATO has been playing a key role in the fight against international terrorism, including through its former operational engagement in Afghanistan, through intelligence-sharing and through its work with partners with a view to projecting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allied Leaders agreed to provide direct support to the Global Coalition through the provision of NATO AWACS surveillance aircraft. The first patrols of NATO AWACS aircraft, operating from Konya Airfield in Türkiye, started in October 2016.

In February 2018, following a request by the Iraqi government and the Global Coalition, the Alliance decided to launch NATO Mission Iraq, a non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission. Its aim is to strengthen Iraqi security forces and institutions so that they are better able to prevent the return of Daesh/ISIS, to fight terrorism and to stabilise the country. In February 2021, Allied Defence Ministers, and in August 2023 the North Atlantic Council, agreed to expand the scope of the mission at the request of the Iraqi government. NATO operates in full respect of Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and coordinates and consults closely with other international partners like the Global Coalition, the United Nations and the European Union.

NATO also takes part in counter-terrorism in the high seas. NATO’s operation Sea Guardian is a flexible maritime security operation that is able to perform the full range of maritime security tasks, including countering terrorism at sea if required. Currently, Sea Guardian operates in the Mediterranean Sea. It succeeded Operation Active Endeavour, which was launched in 2001 under Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty as part of NATO’s immediate response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks to deter, detect and, if necessary, disrupt the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. Active Endeavour was terminated in October 2016.

Many other operations have had relevance to international counter-terrorism efforts. For example, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan, which began in 2003 and came to an end in 2014 - helped the government to expand its authority and implement security to prevent the country from once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorism. Following the end of ISAF, NATO launched the non-combat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. In April 2021, the Allies decided to start the withdrawal of RSM forces by 1 May 2021 and the mission was terminated in early September 2021.

Crisis management

NATO’s long-standing work on  civil preparedness , critical infrastructure protection and  crisis management  provides a resource that may serve both Allies and partners upon request. This field can relate directly to counter-terrorism, building resilience and ensuring appropriate planning and preparation for response to and recovery from terrorist acts.

National authorities are primarily responsible for protecting their populations and critical infrastructure against the consequences of terrorist attacks, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents and natural disasters. NATO can assist countries by developing non-binding advice and minimum standards and acting as a forum to exchange best practices and lessons learned to improve preparedness and national resilience. NATO has developed guidelines for enhancing civil-military cooperation in response to a CBRN incident and organises international courses for trainers of first responders to CBRN incidents. NATO guidance can also advise national authorities on warning the general public and alerting emergency responders. NATO can call on an extensive network of civil experts, from government and industry, to help respond to requests for assistance. Its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) coordinates responses to national requests for assistance following natural and human-made disasters including terrorist acts involving CBRN substances.

As the global counter-terrorism effort requires a holistic approach, Allies have resolved to strengthen outreach to and cooperation with partner countries and international actors.

With partners

Increasingly,  partners  are taking advantage of partnership mechanisms and individual cooperation agreements with NATO for counter-terrorism dialogue and tailored practical cooperation, including through defence capacity building.

For instance, the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) package for Jordan was reviewed in 2021 and now comprises 15 initiatives, including some that are specifically aimed at supporting Jordan in its counter-terrorism efforts, such as strategic communications, the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons, maritime and land border security and the development of a curriculum for Jordan’s counter-terrorism education and training. Counter-terrorism is also a high priority for partners such as Mauritania and Tunisia, for whom Allies agreed new DCB packages at the June 2022 Madrid Summit. In Madrid, Allies also agreed to offer tailored support measures to enhance the resilience of vulnerable partners against security challenges and malign foreign influence. To that end, NATO will scale up counter-terrorism engagement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, enabling the country to develop a whole-of-government approach in countering terrorism and to strengthen its capabilities in the areas of critical infrastructure protection and countering online radicalisation and hate speech. Additionally, NATO will provide advisory support through the NATO Defence Education Enhancement Programme for the standardization of counter-terrorism education in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Moldova.

Allies place particular emphasis on shared awareness, capacity-building, civil preparedness and crisis management to enable partners to identify and protect vulnerabilities and to prepare to fight terrorism more effectively. Countering improvised explosive devices, CBRN defence, the promotion of a whole-of-government approach and military border security are among NATO’s areas of work with partners. For example, in 2023, partners from the Middle East and North Africa will attend a CBRN Awareness for First Responders Course at the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence COE in order to build awareness of CBRN threats and the capacity of these partners to coordinate across military and civilian lines of response efforts. 

As a result of multinational collaboration through the Partnership for Peace Consortium, NATO launched its first standardized curriculum on counter-terrorism in June 2020, aiming to support interested Allies and partners in enhancing their capacities to develop national skills and improve counter-terrorism strategies. The curriculum also serves as a reference document to support partner countries in addressing their education and training requirements relevant for fighting terrorism, under the framework of NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). In 2021, the Alliance began using this standardized curriculum to deliver online courses to participants of the Odesa Military Academy and the National Defence University in Kyiv, Ukraine. Since 2023, the Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum modules and e-learning course are available on the NATO website for interested Allies and partners.

Partners also contribute expertise, experience and capabilities to NATO’s work in the domain of counter-terrorism capabilities development. For example, Australia and New Zealand are part of the DAT POW community and participate in the work on Electronic Counter Measures for Radio Controlled Improvised Devices.

Counter-terrorism is one of the key priorities of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. The SPS Programme enhances cooperation and dialogue between scientists and experts from Allies and partners, contributing to a better understanding of the terrorist threat, the development of detection and response measures, and fostering a network of experts. Activities coordinated by the SPS Programme include workshops, training courses and multi-year research and development projects that contribute to identifying methods for the protection of critical infrastructure, supplies and personnel; human factors in defence against terrorism; technologies to detect explosive devices and illicit activities; and risk management, best practices, and use of new technologies in response to terrorism. For example, since 2018, the SPS Programme has overseen DEXTER (short for Detection of Explosives and firearms to counter TERrorism). This flagship initiative is composed of a number of projects all working together to develop an integrated system of sensors and data fusion technologies capable of detecting explosives and concealed weapons in real time to help secure mass transport infrastructures, such as airports, metro and railway stations.  DEXTER was successfully tested in a live demonstration  at a metro station in Rome, Italy in May 2022. Eleven governmental and research institutions from five NATO Allies (Finland (which acceded to NATO in 2023), France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) and three partner countries (the Republic of Korea, Serbia and Ukraine) have participated in DEXTER.

With international actors

NATO cooperates with the UN, the EU, the Global-Counter Terrorism Forum, INTERPOL, and the OSCE to ensure that views and information are shared and that appropriate action can be taken more effectively in the fight against terrorism. Counter-terrorism capacity building and border security – specifically across the maritime and land domains – are two areas where NATO cooperates closely with other international organisations.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, international conventions and protocols against terrorism, together with relevant UN resolutions, provide common frameworks for efforts to combat terrorism. NATO works closely with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate as well as with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and many of its component organisations, including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. NATO’s Centres of Excellence and education and training opportunities are often relevant to UN counter-terrorism priorities, as is the specific area of explosives management. More broadly, NATO works closely with the UN agencies that play a leading role in responding to international disasters and in consequence management, including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the UN 1540 Committee. For example, in March 2019, NATO and the UN launched a joint project to improve CBRN resilience in Jordan, which has since been completed.

NATO and the European Union are committed to combatting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They exchange information regularly on counter-terrorism projects and on related activities such as work on the protection of civilian populations against CBRN attacks. Relations and regular staff talks with the European External Action Service’s counter-terrorism section, with the Council of the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator’s office and other parts of the EU help ensure mutual understanding and complementarity.

NATO maintains close relations with the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department’s Action against Terrorism Unit. Areas of joint interest between NATO and the OSCE include gender and terrorism, border security, a whole-of-government approach to counter-terrorism, as well as countering terrorist financing.

NATO also collaborates with INTERPOL on countering terrorism. A key issue of cooperation between the two organisations is battlefield evidence and the exchange of information collected by the military with law enforcement. For instance, INTERPOL is regularly providing expertise to NATO training courses for southern partners in this area.

NATO is also working with other regional organisations to address the terrorism threat. In April 2019, NATO and the African Union (AU) held their first joint counter-terrorism training in Algiers and in December 2019, NATO hosted the first counter-terrorism dialogue with the AU. Since then, the AU’s African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism has been briefing Allies regularly and further practical cooperation is under development.

The use of civilian aircraft as a weapon in the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to efforts to enhance aviation security. NATO contributed to improved civil-military coordination of air traffic control by working with EUROCONTROL, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the US Federal Aviation Administration, other major national aviation and security authorities, airlines and pilot associations and the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

NATO offers a range of  training and education  opportunities in the field of counter-terrorism to both Allies and partner countries. It draws on a wide network that includes the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; mobile training courses run out of Allied Joint Force Commands at Naples, Italy and Brunssum, the Netherlands; and the Centres of Excellence (COEs), which support the NATO Command Structure. There are almost 30 COEs accredited by NATO, several of which have links to the fight against terrorism. The Centre of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) in Ankara, Türkiye serves both as a location for meetings and as a catalyst for international dialogue and discussion on terrorism and counter-terrorism. The COE-DAT reaches out to over 50 countries and 40 organisations.

Opening of the first counter-terrorism course at the NATO-ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait

In 2021 and 2023, NATO delivered in-person counter-terrorism courses through Mobile Education and Training Teams at the NATO-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) Regional Centre in Kuwait, benefitting almost 50 participants from NATO partner countries in the Gulf.

expand timeline

The Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept identifies terrorism as one of the risks affecting NATO's security.

11 September 2001

Four coordinated terrorist attacks are launched by the terrorist group al-Qaeda on targets in the United States.

12 September 2001

Less than 24 hours after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO Allies and partner countries condemn the attacks in a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and offer their support to the United States, pledging to "undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism". Later that day, the Allies decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's collective defence clause, for the first time in NATO's history, if it is determined that the attack had been directed from abroad against the United States.

13-14 September 2001

Declarations of solidarity and support are given by Russia and Ukraine.

2 October 2001

The North Atlantic Council is briefed by a high-level US official on the results of investigations into the 9/11 attacks. The Council determines that the attacks would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

4 October 2001

NATO agrees on eight measures to support the United States:

• to enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
• to provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other countries which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
• to take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
• to backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
• to provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
• to provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO member countries for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures;
• that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve;
• that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to support operations against terrorism.

Mid-October 2001

NATO launches its first-ever operation against terrorism: Operation Eagle Assist. At the request of the United States, seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft are sent to help patrol the skies over the United States. The operation runs through to mid-May 2002, during which time 830 crewmembers from 13 NATO countries fly over 360 sorties. It is the first time that NATO military assets have been deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

26 October 2001

NATO launches its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States: Operation Active Endeavour. Elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces are sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking.

At their Reykjavik meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers decide that the Alliance will operate when and where necessary to fight terrorism. This landmark declaration effectively ends the debate on what constitutes NATO's area of operations and paves the way for the Alliance's future engagement with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

November 2002

At the Prague Summit, NATO Leaders express their determination to deter, defend and protect their populations, territory and forces from any armed attack from abroad, including by terrorists. To this end, they adopt a Prague package, aimed at adapting NATO to the challenge of terrorism. It comprises:

• a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism;
• a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T);
• five nuclear, biological and chemical defence initiatives;
• protection of civilian populations, including a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan;
• missile defence: Allies are examining options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance populations, territory and forces in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence;
• cyber defence;
• cooperation with other international organisations; and
• improved intelligence-sharing.

In addition, they decide to create the NATO Response Force, streamline the military command structure and launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment to better prepare NATO's military forces to face new challenges, including terrorism.

10 March 2003

Operation Active Endeavour is expanded to include escorting civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar. The remit is extended to the whole of the Mediterranean a year later.

11 August 2003

NATO takes lead of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF’s primary objective was to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorists.

NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, recognises that terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. It commits Allies to enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced threat analysis, more consultations with NATO's partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities.

At the Chicago Summit, NATO Leaders endorse new policy guidelines for Alliance work on counter-terrorism, which focus on improved threat awareness, adequate capabilities and enhanced engagement with partner countries and other international actors. The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism is subsumed into the overall NATO approach. The NATO Military Concept for Counter-Terrorism, which reflects the policy guidelines, becomes a public document in 2016.

Responsibility for security gradually transitions from ISAF to the Afghan security forces in a phased approach. The Afghan forces assume full security responsibility, and ISAF is brought to a close by the end of 2014.

1 January 2015

NATO’s Resolute Support Mission is launched to provide further training, advice and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions in order to help the Afghan National Unity Government to prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorism.

At the Warsaw Summit, Allied Leaders decide to provide support through NATO to the fight against ISIS. NATO AWACS aircraft will provide information to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS. NATO will begin training and capacity-building in Iraq, while continuing to train hundreds of Iraqi officers in Jordan. Allies will enhance ongoing cooperation with Jordan in areas such as cyber defence and countering roadside bombs.

Allies also undertake to promote information-sharing through the optimised use of multilateral platforms and to continue to seek to enhance cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters.

October 2016

Operation Active Endeavour is terminated and succeeded by Sea Guardian, a broader maritime operation in the Mediterranean. Sea Guardian is a flexible maritime operation that is able to perform the full range of maritime security tasks, if so decided by the North Atlantic Council.  

5 February 2017

NATO launches a new training programme in Iraq, teaching Iraqi security forces to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This is particularly relevant for territory newly liberated from ISIS occupation.

16 February 2017

Defence Ministers agree to create a new regional ‘Hub for the South’, based at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples. It will be a focal point for increasing both the Alliance’s understanding of the challenges stemming from the region, and its ability to respond to them.

31 March 2017

Foreign Ministers decide to step up their efforts inside Iraq, including with military medicine courses to train new paramedics, and with training to help maintain tanks and armoured fighting vehicles. 

25 May 2017 

At their meeting in Brussels, Allies agree an action plan to do more in the international fight against terrorism with: more AWACS flight time, more information-sharing and air-to-air refuelling; NATO’s membership in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS; the establishment of a new terrorism intelligence cell at NATO Headquarters and the appointment of a coordinator to oversee NATO’s efforts in the fight against terrorism.

5-6 December 2017

At their meeting, Foreign Ministers underline the continuing need to provide support to NATO’s southern partners in building counter-terrorism capabilities and institutions.  They reaffirm their full commitment to Allied efforts in training and assistance, building Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s security capacity, which is an important part of NATO’s contribution to the fight against terrorism. Ministers also note that NATO’s role within the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS will evolve as the Coalition moves from combat operations to stabilisation efforts.

NATO and the European Union agree to boost their cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including by strengthening the exchange of information, coordinating their counter-terrorism support for partner countries and working to improve national resilience to terrorist attacks.

15 February 2018

At their meeting, Defence Ministers agree to start planning for a NATO non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission in Iraq, at the request of the Iraqi government and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

11 July 2018

At the Brussels Summit, Allies decide to establish a non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission in Iraq and increase their assistance to the Afghan security forces, providing more trainers and extending financial support. They will continue to contribute to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and will also increase their support to partners to further develop their capacities to tackle terrorism. 

4-5 December 2018

Foreign Ministers agree an updated action plan on enhancing NATO’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism. It consolidates NATO’s counter-terrorism activities related to awareness, preparedness, capability development and engagement with partners.

14 February 2019

Defence Ministers endorse a practical framework to counter unmanned aircraft systems and a set of guidelines on civil-military cooperation in case of a potential CBRN terrorist attack.

4 December 2019

At their meeting on the occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary, Allied Leaders note an updated action plan to enhance NATO’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism. They also take stock of NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism, including the Alliance’s missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which continue to play a key role in preventing the resurgence of ISIS and other terrorist groups.

12-13 February 2020

Defence Ministers agree in principle to enhance NATO Mission Iraq by taking on some of the Global Coalition’s training activities.

12 June 2020

NATO launches its first standardized  Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum .

22-23 October 2020

NATO agrees a Battlefield Evidence Policy to facilitate the sharing of information obtained in NATO missions and operations for law enforcement purposes. At the same time, a Practical Framework for Technical Exploitation is approved.

NATO agrees a Programme of Work on Battlefield Evidence to guide the implementation of the 2020 Policy.

September 2021

Following the completion of the withdrawal of all Resolute Support Mission (RSM) forces from Afghanistan the previous month, RSM is terminated in early September. NATO Allies went into Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States to ensure that the country would not again become a safe haven for international terrorists to attack NATO member countries. Over the last two decades, there have been no terrorist attacks on Allied soil from Afghanistan. Any future Afghan government must ensure that Afghanistan never again serves as a safe haven for terrorists.

November/December 2021

At their meeting in Riga, NATO Foreign Ministers agree an updated action plan to enhance the Alliance’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism. The plan consolidates and guides all of NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts, covering awareness, capabilities and engagement. It also includes new areas such as terrorist misuse of technology, human security and countering terrorist financing.

29 June 2022

At the NATO Summit in Madrid, Allied Leaders adopt the Alliance’s 2022 Strategic Concept – a key document that defines the security challenges facing the Alliance and outlines the political and military tasks that NATO will carry out to address them. The Strategic Concept identifies terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, as the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of NATO citizens and to international peace and prosperity. It states that NATO will continue to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorist groups. Furthermore, the Alliance will enhance cooperation with the international community to tackle the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and will also enhance support to NATO’s partners, helping build their capacity to counter terrorism. 

11-12 July 2023

At the NATO Summit in Vilnius, Allied Leaders task the Council in permanent session to update NATO’s Policy Guidelines and Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism, and to reassess, in consultation with regional partners, the areas where NATO can provide civil-military assistance to partners in this field.

12 October 2023

The Secretary General announces the new position of the NATO Secretary General’s Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism.

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Article contents

• Norma Kolko Phillips Norma Kolko Phillips Health Sciences, Human Services and Nursing, Lehman College, City University of New York
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199975839.013.396
• Published online: 11 June 2013

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, social workers assumed a major role in providing services for people who were severely affected. A new literature was developed, relating to serving these individuals, families, organizations, and communities; responses of agencies and organizations to the needs of staff working with traumatized clients; and policy practice in response to restrictive government policies. Work with people affected by mass violence has emerged as a new field of practice within the profession.

• communal bereavement
• human rights violations
• mass violence
• organizational compassion
• policy practice
• September 11, 2001, attacks
• social justice
• social worker self-care

Deriving from the word “terror,” which in Latin refers to fear, “terrorism” is defined as “the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion” (Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 2003 ). Terrorist acts are targeted against specific population groups and national symbols with the intention of creating fear and intimidation, as well as personal and environmental destruction (Kastenbaum, 2007 ). Fear of recurrent attacks causes hypervigilance and a heightened sense of vulnerability among potential targets (Miller, 2004 ; Webb, 2004 ). Terrorist acts often reflect a battle of political or religious ideologies; a group's terror actions may represent its own struggle for liberation or may be a reaction to the liberation tactics of another group. State-sponsored terrorism may result in the development of insurgent groups committed to conflicting ideologies (DiNitto, 2007 ; Holody, 2004 ).

While terrorism has a long history throughout the world, within the United States the first mass terrorist attack occurred in 1993 at the World Trade Center in New York City, followed by an attack on the Alfred Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City in 1996 . However, it was not until the September 11, 2001 , attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the plane crash in rural Pennsylvania, that there was public recognition, both nationally and worldwide, of terrorism in the United States. At this juncture, the social work profession was called on by both public and voluntary organizations to participate in providing services to those severely affected by the attacks. Agencies, particularly the American Red Cross, recruited hundreds of social workers to assist those affected by loss, psychological and physical trauma, and the social and economic dislocations created by what for many were life-changing events. In fact, social workers constituted the largest single group of mental health professionals responding to the events of September 11, 2001 ( http://www.nasw.org ).

With this new and urgent role, social workers turned to the literature for theoretical understanding, intervention strategies, and research approaches related to helping people impacted by terrorism. While the social work literature in the United States included related topics such as crisis intervention, trauma, and work with people affected by natural disasters, only the interdisciplinary and international literature addressed terrorism and mass violence in depth (Quota et al., 1995 ; Weine et al., 2001 ). During the ensuing years an expanded social work literature on terrorism, mass violence, and trauma was published in the United States. Social work with people affected by mass violence emerged as a new field of practice as schools of social work developed courses and specializations in this area. The new social work literature focused on the areas of direct client practice with people affected by terrorism and war; the impact of this practice on agencies and social workers, including the responses of social service agencies and organizations to the needs of staff and policy practice, was aimed at promoting social justice in times of repressive government policies.

Direct Client Practice

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , the incidence of depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) increased dramatically (National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder); in Manhattan, home of the World Trade Center, it doubled (Galea et al., 2002 ). With the nation's attention on the psychological effects of the attacks, there was a shift in the attitude of the public toward mental health services, leading to new funding from federal, state, city, and voluntary sources, and a destigmatization of services. The importance of providing services not only to individuals but also to families, organizations, and communities of those who lost their lives and those who were deeply affected by the events was broadly recognized (Rosenfeld et al., 2005 ). Extensive media coverage enlarged the affected group, and some proclaimed that “protecting the public's mental health must be a component of the national defense” (Susser et al., 2002 , p. 70).

“First responders,” including police, fire, medical and other personnel, were recognized as a new client group needing immediate clinical intervention. The public learned clinical terms and concepts important for social workers and other mental health professionals were brought to the public's attention. For example, the diagnosis of PTSD was broadly recognized in those severely affected by the attacks, including first responders (Danieli & Dingman, 2005 ).

In addition to traditional intervention strategies, “ Critical Incident Stress Debriefing ( CISD ),” a first-step intervention to prevent and limit trauma symptoms, was found to be important immediately following the traumatic events (Mitchell, 1983 ). “Organizational bereavement” and “communal bereavement” were recognized as part of the healing process, as groups of people, whether in firehouses, police precincts, corporations, or other places of employment, and in schools, parks, or on the streets of affected communities, gathered to mourn together (Talbot, 2001 ; Zinner & Williams, 1999 ). Social workers also noted the role of spirituality and religious belief in the healing process for some clients (Gellman & Dane, 2004 ).

Intervention included response to “retraumatization,” as repressed memories of earlier traumatic events were revived. “Survivors' guilt,” common when one survives a tragedy in which family members, peers, colleagues, or others perish or are severely injured, affected all client groups (Castex, 2004 ). Other processes, such as “physiological responses to traumatic events” and “intergenerational transmission of trauma” also required the attention of the social work profession (Auerhahn & Laub, 1998 ; Elbert & Schauer, 2002 ).

These issues also apply to the military serving in unconventional warfare, such as in Iraq, where terrorism is common. Embedded and on-site journalists are also affected. In the light of the growing acknowledgment of the emotional toll of terrorism, mental health issues of military personnel and their families received increased media recognition. Social workers assumed a leadership role, both in battle areas and in military and veterans' hospitals (Hardaway, 2004 ). The need for intervention with veterans and their families became more pronounced with the ongoing war in Iraq, and military social work received more attention from the profession (DeAngelis, 2007 ).

Social Work within Agencies and Organizations

When there are numerous agencies involved in recovery, a coordinated effort among agencies and federations is essential to establish an effective service network, both for individuals and families affected by the traumatic event and for rebuilding communities (Krauskopf, 2005 ). Policies reflecting organizational compassion are critical in agencies and organizations responding to the aftermath of terrorist attacks (Dutton et al., 2002 ). Social workers with ongoing exposure to traumatized clients are at risk for developing trauma-related responses. Among these are compassion fatigue, a consequence of continuous work with traumatized clients that leaves workers drained emotionally and susceptible to depression and exhaustion; secondary trauma, resulting from an indirect exposure to a traumatic event that produces symptoms in the helper similar to the clients'; and shared trauma, which can occur when the client and social worker have experienced the same traumatic event (Cunningham, 2003 ; Tosone & Bialkin, 2004 ). Social workers, as clients, are also vulnerable to retraumatization.

Agency administrators and supervisors can introduce innovative strategies reflecting organizational compassion. Strategies that can be useful in protecting and supporting individual staff members and staff morale include staff debriefings, balanced caseloads so that clients assigned to a worker are not all experiencing similarly high degrees and symptoms of trauma, an open-door policy for supervision, and specialized trainings and consultations. Social worker self-care is an important concern as it can minimize the risks of developing trauma-related responses that may arise when working with traumatized clients. Agency administrators and supervisors can provide opportunities for rest, recreation, and leisure activities for staff members, particularly during times of crisis.

Social Welfare Policy and Advocacy

Terrorism leads to drastic national policy measures with far-reaching effects. Of great importance to social workers since the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 , has been the diversion of government funds from traditional domestic social welfare programs for populations-at-risk, not only to new services for people affected by the terrorist acts, but to antiterrorism and national security efforts. Restrictive government policies emerged following the development of the federal Department of Homeland Security and the USA PATRIOT Act (an acronym for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) as well as highly controversial government policies related to racial profiling, detentions, immigration, domestic surveillance, and involvements in war, which many social workers see as violations of the profession's core value of social justice. As a result, social workers and social work organizations have mobilized and taken action to combat policies challenging human rights and civil liberties (Mizrahi, 2003 ; Stoesen, 2004 , 2007 ). The profession will continue to face serious challenges in the future as the nation struggles with controversial issues such as balancing security with privacy and other individual freedoms.

• Auerhahn, N. , & Laub, D. (1998). Intergenerational memory of the Holocaust. In Y. Danieli (Ed.), International handbook of multigenerational legacies of trauma (pp. 21–41). New York: Plenum.
• Castex, G. M. (2004). Helping people retraumatized by mass violence. In S. L. A. Straussner & N. K. Phillips (Eds.), Understanding mass violence: A social work perspective (pp. 129–142). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
• Cunningham, M. (2003). The impact of trauma work on social work clinicians: Empirical findings. Social Work , 48(14), 451–459.
• Danieli, Y. , & Dingman, R. L. (Eds.). (2005). On the ground after September 11: Mental health responses and practical knowledge gained. Binghamton, NY: Haworth.
• DeAngelis, T. (2007, Oct. 20). Social workers help military families. http://www.naswdc.org/pressroom .
• DiNitto, D. M. (2007). Social welfare: Politics and public policy, 6th ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
• Dutton, J. E. , Frost, P. J. , Worline, M. C. , Lilius, J. M. , & Kanov, J. M. (2002). Leading in times of trauma. Harvard Business Review , 80(1), 55–61.
• Elbert, E. , & Schauer, M. (2002). Psychological trauma: Burnt into memory. Nature , 419, 883.
• Galea, S. , Ahern, J. , Resnick, H. , Kilpatrick, D. , Bucuvalas, M. , Gold, J. , et al. (2002, March 28). Psychological sequelae of the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City. New England Journal of Medicine , 346(13), 982–987.
• Gellman, A. , & Dane, B. (2004). The role of spirituality and religion in responding to mass violence. In S. L. A. Straussner & N. K. Phillips (Eds.), Understanding mass violence: A social work perspective (pp. 143–156). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
• Hardaway, T. (2004). Treatment of psychological trauma in children of military families. In M. B. Webb (Ed.), Mass trauma and violence: Helping families and children cope (pp. 259–282). New York: Guildford.
• Holody, R. (2004). Social justice in times of mass violence. In S. L. A. Straussner & N. K. Phillips (Eds.), Understanding mass violence: A social work perspective (pp. 187–199). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
• Kastenbaum, R. J. (2007). Death, society and human experience (9th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
• Krauskopf, J. (2005). Assisting people after disaster: The role and impact of a social services network created for disaster response and recovery. In Y. Danieli & R. Dingman (Eds.), On the ground after September 11: Mental health responses and practical knowledge gained (pp. 445–453). Binghamton, NY: Haworth.
• Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). (2003). Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc.
• Miller, M. (2004). Interventions with individuals and families affected by mass violence. In S. L. A. Straussner & N. K. Phillips (Eds.), Understanding mass violence: A social work perspective (pp. 23–40). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
• Mitchell, J. T. (1983). When disaster strikes: The critical incident stress debriefing process. Journal of Emergency Medical Services , 8, 36–39.
• Mizrahi, T. (2003, April). In time of war, a legacy of peace. NASW News , p. 3.
• National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorders. http://www.ncptsd.va.gov .
• Susser, E. S. , Herman, D. B. , & Aaron, B. (2002). Combating the terror of terrorism. Scientific American , 287, 70–78.
• Quota, S. , Punamaki, R. , & El Sarraj, E. (1995). The relations between traumatic experiences, activity, and cognitive and emotional responses among Palestinian children. International Journal of Psychology , 30, 289–304.
• Rosenfeld, L. B. , Caye, J. S. , Ayalon, O. , & Lahad, M. (2004). When their world falls apart: Helping families and children manage the effects of disasters. Washington, DC: NASW Press.
• Stoesen, L. (2004, July). End to Iraq prisoner abuse demanded. NASW News , 49(7), 1.
• Stoesen, L. (2007, February). Veterans aided with transition struggle. NASW News , 52, (4), p. 4.
• Talbot, M. (2001, December 9). Communal bereavement. New York Times Magazine , 62.
• Tosone, C. , & Bialkin, L. (2004). Mass violence and secondary trauma: Issues for the clinician. In S. L. A. Straussner & N. K. Phillips (Eds.), Understanding mass violence: A social work perspective (pp. 157–168). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
• Webb, N. B. (Ed.). (2004). Mass trauma and violence: Helping families and children cope. New York: Guilford.
• Weine, S. , Kuc, G. , Dzudza, E. , Razzano, L. , & Pavkovic, I. (2001). PTSD among Bosnian refugees: A survey of providers' knowledge, attitudes and service patterns. Community Mental Health Journal , 37, 261–271.
• Zinner, E. S. , & Williams, M. B. (Eds.). (1999). When a community weeps: Case studies in group survivorship. Philadelphia, PA: Brunner/Mazel.

Further Reading

• Greene, P. , Kane, D. , Christ, G. , Lynch, S. , & Corrigan, M. (2006). FDNY crisis counseling: Innovative responses to 9/11 firefighters, families, and communities. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
• Kaul, R. E. (2002). A social worker's account of 31 days responding to the Pentagon disaster: Crisis intervention training and self-care practices. Brief Treatment and Crisis Intervention , 2, 33–38.
• Shalev, A. (2002). Treating survivors in the immediate aftermath of traumatic events. In R. Yehuda (Ed.), Treating trauma survivors with PTSD. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Press.
• Schiff, M. (2006). Living in the shadow of terrorism: Psychological distress and alcohol use among religious and non-religious adolescents in Jerusalem. Social Science and Medicine , 62, 2301–2312.
• Steele, W. , & Raider, M. (2001). Structured sensory intervention for children, adolescents, and parents (SITCAP). New York: Mellen Press.
• Straussner, S. L. A. , & Phillips, N. K. , (Eds.). (2004). Understanding mass violence: A social work perspective. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
• http://www.bt.cdc.gov/mentalhealth/
• http://www.fema.gov/hazard/terrorism/index.shtm
• http://www.NASW.org
• http://www.ncptsd.va.gov
• http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/fact_shts/fs_self_care_disaster.html
• http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster
• http://www.socialwelfareactionalliance.org/links.html
• http://www.socialworkers.org/pace

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Modern Far-Right Terrorism Is a Repeat of Reconstruction-Era Themes

I n A Red Record , civil rights pioneer Ida B. Wells recounts the story of a lynching near Selma, Alabama, in which a young Black farmworker developed a consensual relationship with a white daughter of the household, and eventually fathered a child. Taken from jail, the man, Daniel Edwards, was hanged and his body filled with bullets. According to a contemporaneous dispatch, “Upon his back was found pinned this morning the following: Warning to all [N-words] that are too intimate with white girls. This the work of one hundred best citizens of the South Side.”

During the volume’s opening chapter, Wells recalls Frederick Douglass’s three “excuses” for the lynchings of Black men in the post-war South, each of which developed as the prior justification grew too implausible: white men sought to lynch Black men, Douglass argued in a posthumously published 1895 article , to stamp out “race riots,” to suppress the Black vote, and to protect the virtue of white women against Black rapes and assaults (the lie that would herald Edwards’ death sentence). “The orderly arrangement and periodicity of excuses are significant,” Douglass argued. “They show design, plan, purpose, and invention.”

Remarkably, though, over 100 years later, those three justifications are still among those that animate the far-right today—even though the range of targets has broadened. Indeed, each of Douglass’s justifications was an early manifestation of the same “ Great Replacement ” conspiracy theory—positing that an ongoing replacement of American whiteness is underway, orchestrated by Jews and elites—which motivates most white supremacist terrorism today. Most modern attacks, including the deadly white supremacist attack on Buffalo that occurred two years ago this week, repeat Reconstruction-era themes.

The “Great Replacement” theory, then, is not something new to the social media era or a more globalized world—it instead is fundamental to the very fabric of America, dating from the lynchings of the postbellum decades to modern acts of white supremacist terrorism as seen at Charleston, El Paso, Buffalo, and beyond. Further examination of the materials published as part of those attacks reveals language that hearkens back to the same excuses used for lynching in the Deep South.

Take, for instance, the justification that Black men deserved to be lynched because they were, to use Wells’ words, “alleged participants in an insurrection or riot.” Dylann Roof, murderer of nine Black parishioners at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, in 2015, evoked this urgency to protect white communities from Black violence, writing that “Segregation was not a bad thing. It was a defensive measure. Segregation did not exist to hold back [N-words]. It existed to protect us from them.” A manifesto penned by Payton Gendron, the shooter who targeted a supermarket in a predominantly Black neighborhood in Buffalo, New York, in May 2022, similarly outlined in no uncertain terms both his grievances against African Americans and his genocidal intent: “They are prone to violence and common criminal activity. We must remove blacks from our western civilizations.” These days, the bogeyman often takes the forms of perceived hordes of Antifa and Black Lives Matter rioters wreaking havoc on America’s streets. Kyle Rittenhouse traveled to Kenosha, in his own words, to “ protect ” businesses and people, before ultimately killing two protestors.

Read More: The Kyle Rittenhouse Verdict Makes Us All Less Safe

The complaint of minority dilutions of the white vote is similarly oft-uttered by today’s white supremacist terrorists. In fact, the replacement of white votes was one of the primary drivers behind Patrick Crusius’s assault on predominantly Latino shoppers at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, in August 2019. He killed 23. “They intend to use open borders, free healthcare for illegals, citizenship and more to enact a political coup by importing and then legalizing millions of new voters,” he wrote, going on to add, “They will turn Texas into an instrument of a political coup which will hasten the destruction of our country.” Gendron made similar claims: “Children of replacers do not stay children, they become adults and reproduce, creating more replacers to replace your people. They grow up and vote against your peoples own wishes, for the interests of their own people and identity.” In the post-Reconstruction years, the effort to suppress the Black vote (or what some termed “ Africanization ”) was ultimately successful—South Carolina, for instance, saw a drop in registered voters from more than 92,000 in 1876 to under 3,000 in 1898. Moreover, this model remains a popular tactic. As terrorism expert Daniel Byman reflects , “White racists’ victories during Reconstruction gave them a repertoire of violence to draw on in subsequent years when their superior social position faced new threats.” Indeed, similar declarations are now frequently issued by politicians and media figures on the political right, perhaps best encapsulated by X owner Elon Musk, who tweeted on May 9, “Given the massive influx of illegals from every country on Earth, 2024 will probably be the last election actually decided by US citizens.”

And finally, modern far-right terrorists still frequently invoke the same libelous assertion that white women must be protected from licentious Black men. In perhaps the most infamous example, Roof told victims during his rampage on Charleston, “I have to do it. You rape our women and you’re taking over our country. And you have to go.” Similarly, Gendron’s manifesto seethed, “Black youth are two and a half times as likely as White youth to have raped someone.” Both attacks accordingly conformed to Jamelle Bouie’s reflection in Slate after Charleston: “Make any list of anti-black terrorism in the United States, and you’ll also have a list of attacks justified by the specter of black rape.” In his manifesto, however, Roof offered perhaps an even more direct nod to his postbellum compatriots. “I have noticed a great disdain for race mixing White women within the White nationalists community, bordering on insanity,” he wrote. “These women are victims, and they can be saved. Stop.” Herein lies the “ benevolent sexism ” also inherent in Roof’s attack—the implication that white women are owned by white men, who therefore must nobly protect their property through violence.

Despite ideological echoes, though, perhaps the most important similarity is the deliberately public way in which these Black lives are taken. These Black bodies brutalized. Just as the Black men in the late-1800s who were supposedly sparking riots, voting against white interests, and raping white women were often hanged in public places as a warning to other would-be rebels against the established social order—as was Daniel Edwards’ horrific demise—modern white supremacist terrorism also seeks to create a spectacle. Today, the show often takes the form of a livestream , shared online to thousands of excited onlookers, while a manifesto is published as ideological testament to the crime. Conforming to the characteristics of lynching killings that terrorism scholar Tim Wilson called “rightist vigilantism that grew both highly ritualized and carnivalesque,” Gendron noted in his manifesto that “I think that live streaming this attack gives me some motivation in the way that I know that some people will be cheering for me.” As Georgetown University’s Emma Coleman Jordan wrote in the days after the horror at Buffalo, “As with the lynchings of the past, today’s racially-based attacks put Black suffering on display for the entertainment of a 21st century version of the White mob.”

Globalization and social progress have served to broaden the number of enemies against which the white supremacists targets their vitriol—adding immigrants, women, Jews, and the LGBTQ community to Black men and women—but they have not greatly altered their grievances. And, America’s Black population remains the foremost, enduring target. As terrorism scholar Brian Levin told TIME in May 2022, “Many people swim in this elastic, amorphous reservoir of grievance, where a constellation of new targets are identified all the time. But African Americans remain.” What’s more, those first two justifications behind far-right violence both during the postbellum years and today are actually platforms often defended by the political right—suggesting that political support continues to provide the veneer of legitimacy behind which extremist violence can be excused, if not encouraged . Buffalo also provided an important reminder that, despite the focus of much of Wells’ work being the Deep South, racist terrorism has never been a uniquely Southern phenomenon.

Incidents of mass racial violence such as the shooting at Charleston are often correctly decried as instances of “modern-day lynching.” What is remarkable, though, is how little the justifications themselves have shifted. The common thread, in the words of CeLillianne Green, is the “depth of hatred in the bone marrow of this country that supports the killing of the black body.” The only conclusion to be drawn, then, is a sober and pessimistic one—that America will not rid itself of its violent white supremacist plague without a deeper reckoning about the very origins of the country. Until then, prosecutors should consider pursuing white supremacist terrorists with charges that place their acts of violence within the proper historical context—such as the Emmett Till Anti-lynching Act , which President Joe Biden signed into law in 2022 after over a century of efforts to pass such legislation.

Meanwhile, for those of us in the public policy space, our solemn task is to continue to tell the stories of those taken by hatred far too soon as well as those who have fought back —and to loudly condemn those who continue choosing violence in pursuit of hatred. Or, as Wells puts it, “It becomes a painful duty […] to reproduce a record which shows that a large portion of the American people avow anarchy, condone murder and defy the contempt of civilization.” —With research support from Sinet Adous.

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Some thoughts on academic life and research, how do i choose research problems to work on.

I often get this question, as I’m sure many other researchers do: how do you choose which research problems you want to work on? Bassam Bamieh gave a nice answer to this question on the latest episode of the inControl podcast (which I highly recommend, by the way). He said that there are two common approaches to this: one is to be driven by a specific important problem (often one arising in an application) and keep trying various methods to solve this problem; another is to have a preferred set of tools and keep applying them to various problems (which is like having a hammer and looking for nails). As I was listening to Bassam’s explanation, I was thinking that I belong to neither of these two camps. It’s actually a bit difficult to explain how I go about selecting research projects, and this is what this post is about. I may be somewhat closer to the second way of thinking, in the sense that I’m more likely to be motivated by a solution method than by a problem itself. But I don’t get very excited about applying the same set of techniques over and over again. When getting started on a new project, it is important for me to see novelty in it. And it’s not just about novelty; it’s also about beauty, or at least elegance. What I really enjoy is seeing a nice solution or approach to a problem, one that I haven’t seen before and that appeals to my mathematical taste. I want to stress that for me to appreciate a mathematical concept or technique, it doesn’t necessarily need to be tied to an original research contribution that I’m trying to make. A concept or idea may not be new—it doesn’t matter, as long as it’s new to me. I derive a lot of pleasure from learning beautiful mathematical constructions and results when reading papers and books written by other people, and they don’t need to be related to my own research. Even an elegant solution to a high-school-level math problem can leave a lasting impression. (I have two teenage children, so I think about elementary math problems, puzzles, etc. quite regularly.) Occasionally, though, this feeling of excitement and delight appears when I do research, and it is those moments that help me formulate new research problems and directions. I suppose I should give a few examples to illustrate and better explain this process. When I was starting my postdoc, I learned that switching between stable linear systems may lead to instability, but that this doesn’t happen if the individual matrices defining the switched system commute with each other. This sparked my long-lasting interest in developing stability criteria for switched systems based on commutation relations (as I explain in much more detail in this recent article , which recounts several other similar moments of inspiration). As another example, at the 2003 CDC in Maui I was presenting my work on quantized feedback systems, and after my talk Dragan Nesic came up to me and suggested that my results could be alternatively derived using small-gain theorems. This idea led to a beautiful and completely new (for me) way of analyzing control algorithms that I have been developing and studying for several years prior to that. It also motivated a general approach to stability analysis of hybrid systems based on small-gain theorems (whose development can be traced from our early and quite accessible 2005 CDC paper to a much more comprehensive 2014 TAC paper ). As a much more recent example, at the 2018 CDC in Miami Beach I was presenting our work with Xiaobin Gao and Tamer Başar on stability of slowly time-varying and switched systems. At the end of the talk, someone from the audience asked me what happens when fast variation or switching is also present in the system. I hadn’t thought about this issue and wasn’t able to give a coherent answer on the spot. But later Hyungbo Shim, who also attended my talk and heard the question, told me that he had done some work on averaging for systems with slow and fast time variation, which he thought could be combined with our approach to treat systems where both slow and fast switching and time variation are present. Hyungbo and I decided to join efforts and work this out, and we now have several papers published or in preparation on this topic ( one of which he presented just last week at the 2024 HSCC). I think these examples make it clear that I don’t really have a systematic method for finding good research problems; instead, good research problems occasionally find me, usually when I talk to other people or study their work. But the process is not completely random, as I do have certain criteria that help me decide which ideas to pursue and which ones to discard. An interesting additional observation is that many of the interactions and encounters that turn out to be useful are not planned in advance—which is why it’s very important to have in-person meetings. When our conferences went online during Covid, I felt very uninspired and could not imagine that our field would survive in that mode for very long. I’m able to work quite well remotely on an already existing project using Zoom and email, but that initial spark of inspiration tends to come only during face-to-face conversations (and still only very rarely). Of course, other people have very different approaches to finding good research problems to work on. I hope you find one that works for you and brings you joy.

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Research: What Companies Don’t Know About How Workers Use AI

• Jeremie Brecheisen

Three Gallup studies shed light on when and why AI is being used at work — and how employees and customers really feel about it.

Leaders who are exploring how AI might fit into their business operations must not only navigate a vast and ever-changing landscape of tools, but they must also facilitate a significant cultural shift within their organizations. But research shows that leaders do not fully understand their employees’ use of, and readiness for, AI. In addition, a significant number of Americans do not trust business’ use of AI. This article offers three recommendations for leaders to find the right balance of control and trust around AI, including measuring how their employees currently use AI, cultivating trust by empowering managers, and adopting a purpose-led AI strategy that is driven by the company’s purpose instead of a rules-heavy strategy that is driven by fear.

If you’re a leader who wants to shift your workforce toward using AI, you need to do more than manage the implementation of new technologies. You need to initiate a profound cultural shift. At the heart of this cultural shift is trust. Whether the use case for AI is brief and experimental or sweeping and significant, a level of trust must exist between leaders and employees for the initiative to have any hope of success.

• Jeremie Brecheisen is a partner and managing director of The Gallup CHRO Roundtable.

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Health Equity

A New $250 Million Approach to Addressing Health Care Patients’ Food Insecurities

Penn plays a major scientific role in new initiative backed by the american heart association and rockefeller foundation-led consortium.

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University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine Professor and Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics Senior Fellow Kevin Volpp, MD, PhD , has become the Scientific Leader of a new national 10-year, $250 million research and advocacy program designed to find cost effective approaches to improving health through greater access to healthy food for patients with chronic conditions and food or nutrition insecurities (not enough food or unhealthy diets). The initiative is called Health Care by Food ™ (HCXF).

Coordinated by the American Heart Association with support from the Rockefeller Foundation and other funders, HCXF involves more than 100 researchers and members of 25 community-based organizations and food-related companies across the country.

Millions of Patients

“The vision for the Health Care by Food™ initiative is to accelerate a future in which millions of patients are receiving the benefit of healthy food to improve health,” said the Association’s Chief Science and Medical Officer Mariell Jessup, MD, FAHA . “It’s for providers to know how to target and use food is medicine programs to help prevent and manage disease, and for payers to have sufficient and objective cost and effectiveness evidence for reimbursing food is medicine programs.”

“We all know food is central to health outcomes and affects many different organ systems in the body,” said Volpp. “And yet we also know that Americans don’t have very healthy diets. This initiative is about generating evidence and tools to help the health sector design and scale programs that increase access to nutritious food, improve health and health equity, and reduce overall health care costs.”

Volpp, the Mark V. Pauly President’s Distinguished Professor at the Perelman School of Medicine and the Wharton School, and Director of the Penn Center for Health Incentives and Behavioral Economics (CHIBE) is an internationally-renowned expert in the field of behavioral economics.

About 20 CHIBE faculty members and staffers are involved in HCXF’s various task forces.

$8 Million in Initial Research Grants

In January, the Association’s HCXF program announced its first round of $8.4 million in research grants for 21 projects. The first in-person convening of all the participants took place on April 29-30 in the Wharton School’s Huntsman Hall on the Penn campus.

The gathering brought together researchers from 20 universities including Johns Hopkins, Yale, University of Kentucky, Ohio State University, Stanford University, Tufts, Duke, UNC Chapel Hill, and the University of Texas Houston, and; a dozen major health systems, including Geisinger, the Cleveland Clinic, and UCSF; collaborators from food delivery services, including Instacart and Fresh Connect; and state and local nutrition-related institutes and community based organizations such as God’s Love We Deliver, the Family Health Council of Central Pennsylvania, and Hispanic Health Council. The meeting was run as a design workshop with facilitation from Stacey Chang, MS , and Natalie Privett, PhD , who had created the Dell Institute for Design at the University of Texas at Austin’s Medical School before founding New Origin Studios .

Executive Vice President of the Rockefeller Foundation Elizabeth Yee told the audience: “The Foundation has made its mission to advance the well-being of humanity and tackle the big problems that stand in the way of this reality. One of the challenges that we see is the dichotomy that currently exists between our health care system and food systems. The U.S. currently has the lowest life expectancy among wealthy countries, while having the highest per capita health care spending. In other words, our current system is great at purchasing health care services, but not so great at buying health outcomes.”

Underserved Americans

“Initial research has shown us that food is medicine policy has the potential to address these problems and that we can greatly improve health outcomes, especially for underserved Americans, while reducing health care spending,” Yee continued. “But we need to better understand how to unlock that potential. And to do that, we need to build the evidence base to help us learn which programs work best for which patients. We need to figure out how to build the necessary infrastructure to deliver these programs across the country. And we need to ensure that we’re continually spreading awareness of the benefit of food is medicine to patients, providers, and payers.”

According to the most recent data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), in 2022, an estimated 44.2 million people in the United States lived in food-insecure households struggling to get enough affordable, nutritious food.

Current Research Projects

A sample of some of the currently funded 21 HCXF research project titles demonstrates the initiative’s focus on the food needs of underserved populations:

• “Bringing Healthy Meals and Nutrition Education to Underserved Communities: A Randomized Pilot Implementation Trial”
• “Development of a User-Centered Approach for Screening, Referral, and Enrollment in Food is Medicine Program Among Rural and Urban Adults”
• “Impact of a Community Health Worker Strategy on Produce Prescription Program Uptake Among People with Diabetes”
• “Enhancing Food is Medicine Interventions for Food Insecure Postpartum Women in Central Texas”
• “Loss-Framed Incentives and Choice Architecture Modification to Encourage Health Food Purchasing”

White House Conference on Hunger

The idea for what became the HCXF research initiative was first publicly announced at the September 2022 White House Conference on Hunger, Nutrition, and Health . Subsequently, the Association’s Journal Circulation published “ Food Is Medicine: A Presidential Advisory from the American Heart Association ,” a paper produced by a team headed by Volpp. The paper outlined the logic and blueprint for a national program to develop evidence to inform interventions that could drive nutrition-related sensitivities and solutions deeper into the daily operations of the national health system.

The advisory laid out the concept that initiative members are now implementing: “Food Is Medicine may be defined as the provision of healthy food resources to prevent, manage, or treat specific clinical conditions in coordination with the health care sector. Although the field has promise, relatively few studies have been conducted with designs that provide strong evidence of associations between Food Is Medicine interventions and health outcomes or health costs. Much work needs to be done to create a stronger body of evidence that convincingly demonstrates the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of different types of Food Is Medicine interventions while prioritizing a human-centered design approach to achieve high rates of patient engagement and sustained behavior change.”

Health System Buy-In

Volpp emphasized that health systems and insurer buy-ins are crucial to the success of the project. “There is growing recognition of the impact of social determinants of health and health behaviors among health systems and health plans,” Volpp said. “Part of the American Heart Association HCXF initiative’s goals will be to design program implementation in such a way so as to minimize incremental effort for the health system in referring patients with nutrition insecurity and chronic conditions, as appropriate, to food is medicine programs. As more and better evidence is developed it will become easier to know to which programs to refer individuals to help them improve their health as cost effectively as possible.”

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2024 Presidential Arts and Humanities Fellows selected to advance research, creative projects

BLOOMINGTON, Ind. — A signature Indiana University program that amplifies and accelerates the work of outstanding arts and humanities faculty recently selected its latest cohort. The Presidential Arts and Humanities Fellowship is an annual program that supports the work of IU faculty who are improving society and revitalizing communities through their research and creative activity, and poised to become national and international leaders in their fields.

Supported by the IU Office of the President and IU Research, and administered by the university’s assistant vice president for research, the fellowship awards $50,000 of flexible funding to each recipient to support a variety of needs as they pursue innovative research and creative projects. President Pamela Whitten started the program in 2022.

Along with funding, recipients gain access to professional development programming and advanced training in the areas of grant writing, scholarly communication with the public, media training and digital scholarship, among other specialized trainings.

The goal of the IU Presidential Arts and Humanities Fellowship program is to amplify and promote the rich and diverse opportunities within the arts and humanities at Indiana University and to ensure the recipients have continued success as they make impactful changes in their fields and in local, national and international communities.

“Congratulations to the 2024 Presidential Arts and Humanities Fellows,” Whitten said. “The recipients of this fellowship exemplify the standard that is set by our faculty at Indiana University, which has long been a leader in the arts and humanities. This fellowship represents the university’s steadfast commitment to supporting the pursuit of transformative research and creativity across our campuses, which helps us better understand the world and revitalizes communities.”

The 2024 IU Presidential Arts and Humanities Fellows are:

Allison Baker

Allison Baker is an associate professor of fine arts in the Herron School of Art and Design on IIU’s Indianapolis campus. She will construct a body of work and monumental public sculptures that memorialize the complexities of late-stage capitalism, illuminating the aspirations and struggles of the American working class and working poor.

Baker seeks to build monuments that challenge dominant narratives, humanize the ripple effects of poverty and create work that the American working class and working poor can see as a reflection of their own experiences in galleries and museums, which are spaces where they are seldom represented.

Emily Beckman

Emily Beckman is an associate professor and director of the Medical Humanities and Health Studies Program in the School of Liberal Arts on the Indianapolis campus. Beckman is co-founder of Build Community Give Care, a nonprofit organization that provides compassionate end-of-life care in Africa.

She will use the funding to support research addressing the need for palliative care education in Uganda. Outcomes will include a better understanding of the pathways available for palliative care education and access in Uganda, solutions for better retention in these educational programs and the development of medical humanities curricula at IU.

Catherine Bowman

Catherine Bowman , professor of English in the College of Arts and Sciences at IU Bloomington, is an award-winning poet, author of several collections of poetry and the editor of “Word of Mouth: Poems Featured on NPR’s ‘All Things Considered.’”

Bowman will use the fellowship funding for travel and archival research to make significant progress on her sixth poetry collection, tentatively titled “Volver, Volver: An Underworld Intergenre Pilgrimage.” The collection will imagine and recount various underworld encounters with several generations of women.

Andrew Goldman

Andrew Goldman is an assistant professor of music in music theory at the Jacobs School of Music and assistant professor of cognitive science in the College of Arts and Sciences. He directs the IU Music and Mind Lab , an interdisciplinary research group that investigates music perception and cognition and the role of music in the human condition.

Goldman will use the fellowship funding to explore the critical challenges and contributions of incorporating cognitive science into music studies. He will research how music cognition researchers’ historical and cultural situations have influenced their scientific work and the nature of their findings.

Raiford Guins

Raiford Guins is a professor and the director of Cinema and Media Studies at The Media School in Bloomington. He is also an adjunct professor of informatics. He plans to use the funds to support research travel that will aid in the development of his book, tentatively titled “Museum Games.”

The book will explore the emerging area of games and gaming culture in museums, libraries and archives worldwide. For example, the Strong National Museum of Play in Rochester, New York, recently completed a $70 million expansion, while The Nintendo Museum plans its long-anticipated opening in Kyoto, Japan, in 2024. Guins will detail the relatively new phenomenon of gaming museums and preservation from an academic perspective.

Lisa Lenoir

Lisa Lenoir is an assistant professor who teaches courses in The Media School’s new Fashion Media Program in Bloomington. Her research examines contemporary cultural phenomena in media discourses in journalism studies, activism and identity, and consumer culture.

Lenoir will use the funds to research the life and work of Chicago Defender journalist Mattie Smith Colin, a fashion and food editor who covered the return of Emmett Till’s body from Mississippi to Chicago in 1955. Lenoir will collect oral histories from people who knew Colin and review archival materials, compiling her findings into a digital bibliography.

Anja Matwijkiw

Anja Matwijkiw is a professor of philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at IU Northwest and affiliated faculty in the Institute for European Studies at IU Bloomington. She will use the funds to explore stakeholder philosophy and international law as it pertains to the United Nations rule of law.

Linda Pisano

Linda Pisano is chair and professor in the Department of Theatre, Drama and Contemporary Dance in the College of Arts and Sciences at IU Bloomington. Her fellowship is sponsored by the Big Ten Academic Alliance and the Vice Provost for Faculty and Academic Affairs.

Pisano will use the fellowship funding to research methods and mechanisms in cultivating new audiences, patrons and donors of the arts and humanities on university campuses during increasingly difficult times. Her research will include investigating interest in community outreach, education, socio-political advocacy and identity, among other areas. Pisano hopes to ensure that universities are communicating the value of arts and humanities as fundamental to their institutional identity and the public spaces they occupy.

Spencer Steenblik

Spencer Steenblik is an assistant professor of comprehensive design at the Eskenazi School of Art, Architecture + Design in Bloomington. He will use the funds to develop several projects, including producing and testing an innovative structural joint and pursuing a patent. The main goals are to develop full-scale experimental structures and installations that test new materials, technologies and design approaches and to highlight the need for more opportunities for young practitioners to engage in similar types of hands-on innovation.

The previous cohort of fellows made advancements across a multitude of disciplines with the funding and resources provided by the IU Presidential Arts and Humanities Fellowship, including composing a chamber music and AI opera that will premiere next year and erecting a floating monument that spotlights underrepresented communities in Chicago.

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How NASA Tracked the Most Intense Solar Storm in Decades

May 2024 has already proven to be a particularly stormy month for our Sun. During the first full week of May, a barrage of large solar flares and coronal mass ejections (CMEs) launched clouds of charged particles and magnetic fields toward Earth, creating the strongest solar storm to reach Earth in two decades — and possibly one of the strongest displays of auroras on record in the past 500 years.

We’ll be studying this event for years. It will help us test the limits of our models and understanding of solar storms.

Teresa Nieves-Chinchilla

Acting Director of NASA’s Moon to Mars (M2M) Space Weather Analysis Office

“We’ll be studying this event for years,” said Teresa Nieves-Chinchilla, acting director of NASA’s Moon to Mars (M2M) Space Weather Analysis Office. “It will help us test the limits of our models and understanding of solar storms.”

The first signs of the solar storm started late on May 7 with two strong solar flares. From May 7 – 11, multiple strong solar flares and at least seven CMEs stormed toward Earth. Eight of the flares in this period were the most powerful type, known as X-class, with the strongest peaking with a rating of X5.8. (Since then, the same solar region has released many more large flares, including an X8.7 flare — the most powerful flare seen this solar cycle — on May 14.)

Traveling at speeds up to 3 million mph, the CMEs bunched up in waves that reached Earth starting May 10, creating a long-lasting geomagnetic storm that reached a rating of G5 — the highest level on the geomagnetic storm scale, and one that hasn’t been seen since 2003.

“The CMEs all arrived largely at once, and the conditions were just right to create a really historic storm,” said Elizabeth MacDonald, NASA heliophysics citizen science lead and a space scientist at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland.

When the storm reached Earth, it created brilliant auroras seen around the globe. Auroras were even visible at unusually low latitudes, including the southern U.S. and northern India. The strongest auroras were seen the night of May 10, and they continued to illuminate night skies throughout the weekend. Thousands of reports submitted to the NASA-funded Aurorasaurus citizen science site are helping scientists study the event to learn more about auroras.

“Cameras — even standard cell phone cameras — are much more sensitive to the colors of the aurora than they were in the past,” MacDonald said. “By collecting photos from around the world, we have a huge opportunity to learn more about auroras through citizen science.”

By one measure of geomagnetic storm strength, called the disturbance storm time index which dates back to 1957, this storm was similar to historic storms in 1958 and 2003. And with reports of auroras visible to as low as 26 degrees magnetic latitude, this recent storm may compete with some of the lowest-latitude aurora sightings on record over the past five centuries, though scientists are still assessing this ranking.

“It’s a little hard to gauge storms over time because our technology is always changing,” said Delores Knipp, a research professor in the Smead Aerospace Engineering Science Department and a senior research associate at the NCAR High Altitude Observatory, in Boulder, Colorado. “Aurora visibility is not the perfect measure, but it allows us to compare over centuries.”

MacDonald encourages people to continue submitting aurora reports to Aurorasaurus.org , noting that even non-sightings are valuable for helping scientists understand the extent of the event.

Leading up to the storm, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Space Weather Prediction Center, which is responsible for forecasting solar storm impacts, sent notifications to operators of power grids and commercial satellites to help them mitigate potential impacts.

Warnings helped many NASA missions brace for the storm, with some spacecraft preemptively powering down certain instruments or systems to avoid issues. NASA's ICESat-2 — which studies polar ice sheets — entered safe mode, likely because of increased drag due to the storm.  

Looking Forward

Better data on how solar events influence Earth's upper atmosphere is crucial to understanding space weather's impact on satellites, crewed missions, and Earth- and space-based infrastructure. To date, only a few limited direct measurements exist in this region. But more are coming. Future missions, such as NASA’s Geospace Dynamics Constellation (GDC) and Dynamical Neutral Atmosphere-Ionosphere Coupling (DYNAMIC), will be able to see and measure exactly how Earth’s atmosphere responds to the energy influxes that occur during solar storms like this one. Such measurements will also be valuable as NASA sends astronauts to the Moon with the Artemis missions and, later, to Mars.

The solar region responsible for the recent stormy weather is now turning around the backside of the Sun, where its impacts can’t reach Earth. However, that doesn’t mean the storm is over. NASA’s Solar TErrestrial RElations Observatory (STEREO), currently located at about 12 degrees ahead of Earth in its orbit, will continue watching the active region an additional day after it is no longer visible from Earth.

“The active region is just starting to come into view of Mars,” said Jamie Favors, director for the NASA Space Weather Program at NASA Headquarters in Washington. “We’re already starting to capture some data at Mars, so this story only continues.”

By Mara Johnson-Groh NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Md.

Media Contact: Sarah Frazier NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Md.

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• A Majority of Latinas Feel Pressure To Support Their Families or To Succeed at Work

Expectations to excel at work and to do housework, be beautiful and start a family are top pressures

Table of contents.

• The impact of gender, Hispanic identity and skin color on the lives of Latinas
• 2. Pressures Latinas face in their lives
• 3. Life satisfaction and sources of joy for Latinas
• Acknowledgments
• The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Pew Research Center surveyed 5,078 Hispanic adults, including 2,600 Hispanic women, in an effort to better understand Latinas’ life experiences, the pressures they face and where they find joy. The survey was conducted from Nov. 6 to Nov. 19, 2023, and includes 1,524 respondents from the Center’s American Trends Panel and an additional 3,554 from Ipsos’ KnowledgePanel.

Respondents on both panels are recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. Recruiting panelists by mail ensures that nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. This gives us confidence that any sample can represent the whole population (see our Methods 101 explainer on random sampling). For more information on this survey, refer to its methodology and questionnaire .

The terms  Hispanic  and  Latino  are used interchangeably in this report. 

The terms Latinas and Hispanic women are used interchangeably throughout this report to refer to U.S. adult women who self-identify as Hispanic or Latino, regardless of their racial identity. 

Foreign born  refers to persons born outside of the 50 U.S. states or the District of Columbia. For the purposes of this report, foreign born also refers to those born in Puerto Rico. Although individuals born in Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens by birth, they are grouped with the foreign born because they are born into a Spanish-dominant culture and because on many points their attitudes, views and beliefs are much closer to those of Hispanics born outside the U.S. than to Hispanics born in the 50 U.S. states or D.C., even those who identify themselves as being of Puerto Rican origin. 

The terms  foreign born  and  immigrant  are used interchangeably in this report. Immigrants are also considered first-generation Americans. 

U.S. born  refers to persons born in the 50 U.S. states or D.C. 

Second generation  refers to people born in the 50 U.S. states or D.C. with at least one immigrant parent.  

Third or higher generation  refers to people born in the 50 U.S. states or D.C., with both parents born in the 50 U.S. states or D.C. 

Throughout this report, Democrats are respondents who identify politically with the Democratic Party or those who are independent or identify with some other party but lean toward the Democratic Party. Similarly, Republicans are those who identify politically with the Republican Party and those who are independent or identify with some other party but lean toward the Republican Party.

More than half of Latinas say they often feel pressure to provide for their loved ones at home or succeed in their jobs, mirroring the life stressors experienced by women across the United States today.

Latinas feel cross-pressured in other ways too, as they juggle cultural expectations around gender roles rooted in Latin America and those rooted in the U.S. Majorities of Latinas say that U.S. Hispanic women face pressure to do housework, be beautiful and start families.

Despite these life pressures, 88% of Latinas are either extremely or very satisfied (56%) or somewhat satisfied (32%) with their family life. And 86% say they are extremely or very happy (43%) or somewhat happy (43%) with how things are going in their lives these days.

At 22.2 million, Latinas account for 17% of all adult women in the U.S. today. The population grew 5.6 million from 2010 to 2022, the largest increase of any major female racial or ethnic group.

Moreover, most Latina adults have recent immigrant connections, with 77% being either immigrants themselves (52%) or having at least one immigrant parent (25%). 1

Some Latinas in the U.S. grow up with traditional cultural values carried over from Latin America. This can produce pressure from family or a community to place the needs of others ahead of their own, be passive or subordinate to others, or be virtuous or chaste – characteristics related to marianismo . At the same time, some Latinas may also feel pressure to achieve success in their own right in academics or a career .

These findings emerge from Pew Research Center’s bilingual National Survey of Latinos, conducted Nov. 6-19, 2023, among 5,078 Hispanic adults. The survey explores what it’s like to be a Latina in the U.S. today.

In addition to life pressures ( Chapter 2 ), the report explores Latinas’ views on sexism against women in media, schools, family and the workplace, and their experiences with harassment and discrimination ( Chapter 1 ). Other topics include Latinas’ views of their general happiness and life satisfaction and where they find joy in life ( Chapter 3 ).

Pressures Latinas say they face at home and work

• 53% of Latinas say they often feel pressure to support their family in some way, by caring for children or elderly family members, supporting their family financially or living close to family.
• 39% of Latinas say they often feel pressure to be successful in their job or career.
• Overall, 63% of Latinas say they often feel family pressures or work pressures.

Hispanic men also feel life pressures. About half (49%) of Hispanic men say they often feel pressure to support their family in some way, and 40% say they face pressure to be successful at work. Overall, 59% of Hispanic men say they often feel pressure from family or work.

However, Latinas are more likely to say Hispanic women face pressures such as cooking and cleaning at home, being pleasant to others, and starting a family than to say this about Hispanic men. Among Latinas:

• 68% of Latinas say Hispanic women face a great deal or fair amount of pressure to cook and clean at home, compared with 19% who say the same is true for Hispanic men.
• 62% say Hispanic women face pressure to be beautiful, such as by dressing nicely, wearing makeup or doing their hair and nails. By comparison, 37% of Latinas say Hispanic men face pressure to be handsome, such as by dressing nicely or styling their hair.
• 56% say Hispanic women face pressure to get married and have children, while 36% say the same of Hispanic men.

Hispanic men generally agree that Hispanic women face more pressure than Hispanic men to do things associated with gender roles for women. For example, 57% of Hispanic men say Hispanic women face pressure to cook and clean at home, compared with 18% who say Hispanic men face this pressure.

Among Latina adults, those who are U.S. born are more likely than immigrants to say Hispanic women as a group face pressure to do things tied to idealized gender roles.

• 66% of U.S.-born Latinas say Hispanic women face a great deal or fair amount of pressure to get married and have children, compared with 47% of Latina immigrants who say U.S. Hispanic women face these pressures.
• 76% of U.S.-born Latinas say Hispanic women in the U.S. face a great deal or fair amount of pressure to cook and clean at home, compared with 59% of immigrant Latinas.
• 68% of U.S.-born Latinas say Hispanic women face a great deal or fair amount of pressure to be beautiful, compared with 56% of immigrant Latinas.

About half of Hispanic women say sexism against women is a problem in different settings, including at work and in entertainment media. Hispanic men are less likely to say so.

• 52% of Hispanic women say sexism against women is at least a somewhat big problem in the workplace, compared with 44% of Hispanic men.
• 48% of Hispanic women say sexism against women is a problem in schools, while 37% of Hispanic men say this.
• Among English speakers, 50% of Hispanic women say sexism against women is a problem in English-language music, compared with 40% of Hispanic men. 2
• Among Hispanic adults, 47% of women say sexism against women is a problem in English-language movies and TV, versus 36% of men.
• Among Spanish speakers, 46% of Hispanic women say sexism against women is a problem in Spanish-language movies and TV, compared with 36% of Hispanic men. 3

Latinas’ views vary by age on pressures, sexism and harassment

Younger Latinas are more likely than older Latinas to say:

• They often face pressure to succeed at work or live close to their family ( Chapter 2 ).
• Sexism against women is a big problem in the workplace ( Chapter 1 ).
• They have experienced harassment or discrimination in the past year ( Chapter 1 ).

For new research on the economic gains Latinas have made in the last two decades, read “ Half of Latinas Say Hispanic Women’s Situation Has Improved Over the Past Decade, Expect More Gains .”

• Latinas’ population size and growth rate from 2010 to 2022 were calculated using the 2010 and 2022 American Community Surveys through IPUMS. Latinas’ shares that are foreign born or second generation were calculated using the 2023 Current Population Survey ASEC, also through IPUMS. ↩
• Asked only of those who say they can carry on a conversation in English at least “a little.” ↩
• Asked only of those who say they can carry on a conversation in Spanish at least “a little.” ↩

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Half of Latinas Say Hispanic Women’s Situation Has Improved in the Past Decade and Expect More Gains

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