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• Virtue Ethics Essays

Virtue Ethics Essays (Examples)

835+ documents containing “virtue ethics” .

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Virtue ethics.

Virtue Ethics: The Good and the Bad About Virtue Ethics The philosophy of virtue ethics holds that being a 'good person' or what one might call 'character' is the most important determinant of moral action. Virtue ethics is considered to be one of the major philosophical orientations in the field of normative ethics, along with consequentialism and deontology (Hursthouse 2010). Many consider it to be the oldest form of ethics, harkening back to Plato and Aristotle's attempts to define what constituted a good and moral person. Virtue ethics fell out of favor for many years, but there has been a revitalization of interest in the concept, in the wake of controversies over the flaws of consequentialism and deontology. To understand the strengths (and also some of the weaknesses) of virtue ethics, it is essential to understand the ethical systems to which the modern incarnation of virtue ethics was responding. The system….

Alexander, Larry & Michael Moore. (2007). Deontological ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved:  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/#DeoFoiCon 

Hursthouse, Rosalind. (2010). Virtue Ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Retrieved:  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/ethics-virtue

Virtue Ethics Virtue-based vs. duty-based ethics: arguments and examples from Victor Hugo, Aristotle, Bernard Mayo, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and William Frankena In the study of ethics and morality, there have been theoretical foundations in which it was argued that morality comes with being rather than doing, or that a true moral life is one that is a product of doing instead of being. Or, oftentimes, theoreticians and philosophers contend that morality must bear an existence of both concepts -- that is, that morality entails both doing and being. In the study of the works of the philosophers and writers Victor Hugo, Aristotle, Bernard Mayo, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and William Frankena, it becomes evident that they have various opinions about the issue at hand: is morality simply a matter of doing good works, or one must have the right principles in order to become moral? Through their writings, each had contented their stance or position concerning….

Virtue Ethics Over the Centuries

This will allow someone to move beyond the different emotions, so that they can be able to see how the different actions will affect the world around them. Despite some of the obvious weaknesses, you can be able to determine the most appropriate course of action, by asking questions and gaining more information. Once this achieved, you will have a greater sense of enlightenment, because you were able to see other views that could affect a situation. This is significant because it underscores how you can apply virtue ethics, to determine the most appropriate course of action. At which point, a person will have a sense of superiority by understanding the overall big picture. In this aspect, Aristotle is saying that to effectively apply virtue ethics requires that you must have a thirst for continuous knowledge and always use flexibility. When you put these two factors together, you will….

Bibliography

"Virtue Ethics." 194 -- 198. Print.

Swanton, Christine. "Virtue and Action." Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford Press, 2003. 249 -- 254. Print.  http://books.google.com.jm/books?id=7zYg7G-ukKkC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Swanton,+Christine.+drawbacks+virtue+ethics&source=bl&ots=EFCyzUoekB&sig=lAjDLWk2aOSTC2Ez9z50l9Ub7lQ&hl=en&ei=O-HMS-3bIJTC8wTVpITCBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAYQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false 

Wattles, J. "From Greek Reciprocity to Cosmopolitan Idealism." The Golden Rule. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 37 -- 39. Print  http://books.google.com/books?id=2ki3wFNNBEkC&pg=PA38&dq=golden+rule++aristotle&ei=puXMS4bQNoKuygS9yqCNCw&cd=4#v=onepage&q=golden%20rule%20%20aristotle&f=false

Virtue Ethics' Refers to the

The question here arises, why did we have to return to ancient philosophy of virtue ethics? But interestingly while a great deal of credit is given to Aristotle and Plato, the modern moral philosophers such as Anscombe, Foot, Murdoch, Slote had mentioned in very precise terms the problems they found in Aristotelian ethics. They must have absorbed the writings of ancient philosophers since a lot is said about the moral philosophies of these great thinkers in books of modern philosophers, still the father of modern moral philosopher was not blind to the problems of following ancient terms and values. In his famous paper on the subject, Anscombe wrote: Anyone who has read Aristotle Ethics and has also read modern moral philosophy must have been struck by the great contrasts between them. The concepts which are prominent among the moderns seem to be lacking, or at any rate buried or far in….

GEM Anscombe. "Modern Moral Philosophy" reprinted in Virtue Ethics. Roger Crisp, Michael Slote edition. (1997) Oxford University Press- Oxford Publication.

Virtue Ethics Virtue Theory Utilitarianism

Deontological ethics are based on other theories that focus on duty and obligation. Immanuel Kant (1785) argued that an individual should "always act in such a way that you can also will that the maxim of your action become universal law" (p. v). It can be argued that Kant's arguments are echoed in a quote often attributed to Ghandi, "Be the change you want to see in the world" (Lewis, 2011). In other words, deontological ethics contend that individuals should lead by example and establish moral precedent through their virtuous actions. Each of these theories is seen every day through in our actions and decisions. One of the virtue theories that I strive to embody is Eudemonism, which encourages me to be the best that I can be, and put forth the effort necessary to be successful in my endeavors. I believe that by being the best person I can….

References:

Athanassoulis, N. (2004, August 28). Virtue Ethics. Keele University, United Kingdom.

Updated 7 July 2010. Retrieved 15 April 2013.

Bentham, J. (1776). Fragment on Government. Retrieved 15 April 2013, from  http://www.constitution.org/jb/frag_gov.htm 

Day, C.D. (1997). Notes on utilitarianism. Retrieved 15 April 2013, from  http://webs.wofford.edu/kaycd/ethics/util.htm

virtues the proper starting point for ethical theory? The debate about virtue ethics Main issues Critical analysis of virtue ethics criticism Virtues should be the starting point for ethical theory This paper revolves around the question that whether or not virtues are an appropriate starting point for ethical theory. I have presented the main criticism on virtue ethics theory followed by the defense of this theory by renowned virtue ethicists. There are three main schools of thought that have presented theories regarding ethics. In traditional normative ethical theories, deontologist, etiologist, and virtue ethics are the three perspectives. Virtue ethics has been gaining popularity as an alternative theory to deontologist and etiologist perspective of ethics. Main concerns in the virtue ethics approach are with the character, personality, environment and reasoning of the individual who acts. The main criticism of virtue ethics theory is that it does not provide action guidance. The criticism has been effectively….

Works Cited

Armstrong, Alan E. "Towards a strong virtue ethics for nursing practice." Nursing Philosophy 7.3 (2006): 110-124.

Driver, Julia. "Virtue theory." Contemporary debates in moral theory. Blackwell, 2006.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. "Normative virtue ethics." ETHICA (2013): 645-665.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Virtue Ethics vs Ethical Egoism

Debate on Human Space Exploration on MarsIn the 21st century, life on earth became increasingly inhospitable: nuclear war between great powers had decimated the globe. Technology had advanced to the point where space exploration on Mars had become possible. The only question now was whether mankind should make that leap and take its adventures to a new planet. Mankind might be ready for space exploration on Mars, but was the universe ready for mankind?The question of whether or not to colonize Mars had been a topic of debate for many years. Some scientists believed that it was our moral responsibility to explore and colonize other planets, while others believed that it was both too risky and too expensive. Still, some others, arguing from an ethical point of view, said that mankind was replete with all sorts of moral problems and that to permit him to colonize a new planet would….

Ashby, M. A. (2021). The Shifts in Human Consciousness. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 18(1), 1-4.

Fischer, J. M. (2020). What\\\\\\'s with Free Will?: Ethics and Religion After Neuroscience. Wipf and Stock Publishers.

Tilley, J. J. (2022). Does Psychological Egoism Entail Ethical Egoism?. The Review of Metaphysics, 76(1), 115-133.

Virtue Ethics and Nursing Care for Abortion Services

Nurses and the Ethics of Abortion Abortion and Virtue Ethics In the Crossfire: Nurses and the Ethics of Abortion In the Crossfire: Nurses and the Ethics of Abortion Nebraska's Attorney General, Jon Bruning, announced his efforts to revoke the license of the only nurse working at Dr. Leoy Carhart's abortion clinic in a suburb of Omaha (Funk, 2013). The revocation proceedings are based on allegations of substandard care and the delegation of patient care to unlicensed staff. Should the Attorney General be successful, Carhart would be faced with the task of hiring another nurse at a clinic that has been the focus frequent and aggressive anti-abortion activities. The news article by Funk (2013) highlights Dr. Carhart's past successes in challenging restrictive abortion laws before the U.S. Supreme Court, thereby implying the most recent allegations may be contaminated by motivations other than a concern for patient health and safety. Such events are no longer rare in….

ANA. (2010). Reproductive health: ANA position statement. Retrieved 11 Mar. 2014 from  http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/Policy-Advocacy/Positions-and-Resolutions/ANAPositionStatements/Position-Statements-Alphabetically/Reproductive-Health.html .

Armstrong, A.E. (2006). Towards a strong virtue ethics for nursing practice. Nursing Philosophy, 7, 110-124.

Burlone, S., Edelman, A.B., Caughey, A.B., Trussell, J., Dantas, S., & Rodriquez, M.I., (2013). Extending contraceptive coverage under the Affordable Care Act saves public funds. Contraception, 87(2), 143-8.

Dehlendorf, C., Park, S.Y., Emeremni, C.A., Comer, D., Vincett, K., & Borrero, S. (2014). Racial/ethnic disparities in contraceptive use: Variation by age and women's reproductive experiences. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, published online ahead of prine 1 Feb. 2014, doi: 10.1016/j.ajog.2014.01.037.

Religion Libertarianism and Virtue Ethics Religion Is

Religion, Libertarianism and Virtue Ethics Religion is a social institution, which grows out of individuals' collective attempt to structure and understand the university (McGonigal, 2012). It is a natural consequence of human behavior and social groups. It endeavors to explain occurrences and social inequalities. In so doing, religion tends to justify inequalities, thus, provides a foundation for religious identification, which often breeds social conflict (McGonigal). Libertarianism is a political philosophy, which claims that every person is the absolute owner of his own life (New World Encyclopedia, 2008). It believes that a person can do anything with himself or property for as long as he respects the rights of others to their own lives and properties. As an ethical theory, libertarianism asserts that the best political, social, and economic system is one, which governs the least. It confers the greatest personal or individual liberty while minimizing government action, regulation and sanction. It opposes….

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carabelli, C. (2012). About sexual harassment in the workplace. eHow: Demand Media,

Inc. Retrieved on June 19, 2012 from http://www.ehow.com/info_8180410_sexual-harassment-workplace.html

Frazier, L. (2012). What is the difference between teleological and deontological ethics?

eHow: Demand Media, Inc. Retrieved on June 19, 2012 from http://www.ehow.com/info_8286914_difference-between-teleological-deontological-ethics.html

Ethical Perspectives Virtue Ethics Generally Virtue Ethics

Ethical Perspectives Virtue Ethics Generally, virtue ethics emphasizes the motivation, or reason, for any particular act to determine whether or not it is ethical (Hursthouse, 1999). For example, if a person you know with certainty is totally innocent of a crime for which police are seeking to take him into custody, virtue ethics would permit you to lie to the authorities about his whereabouts and to permit that person to decide what he wants to do (including flee the state if that is his choice). As long as your true motivation was morally defensible (such as to protect an innocent person from wrongful arrest or prosecution) as opposed to motivated by a non-virtuous reason (such as for pay), virtue ethics would support your decision (Hursthouse, 1999). Utilitarian Ethics Generally, utilitarian ethics emphasizes the effect of a course of action on the entire community (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). In the same case involving the person….

Beauchamp, T.L. And Childress, J.F. (2009). Principles of Biomedical Ethics, (6th

Edition). New York: Oxford University Press.

Halbert, T. And Ingulli, E. (2008). Law & Ethics in the Business Environment. Cincinnati:

West Legal Studies.

How to Apply Virtue Ethics to Daily Life

The broadest area of my life that requires certain virtues in order to do well is friendship. To be a good friend demands virtue; the bond of friendship can be easily broken when a person exhibits poor moral character. One reason why friendship depends on virtue is that friendship also requires trust. A friend is called someone who we can lean on, or whose shoulder we can cry on. In order to lean on someone, we need to be vulnerable with that person and vulnerability requires trust. The “telos” of friendship is rooted in the basic human need for intimacy, connection with others, and a healthy social life. Having close friends also leads to what Aristotle called eudaimonia, which means “happiness” or “flourishing,” (Hursthouse, 2016, p. 1). A person does not need to be extraverted, or around people all the time to experience eudaimonia but does at some point need….

Aristotle's Virtue Ethics the Question

Like Aristotle's virtue-based ethics, utilitarians believe that happiness is the ultimate goal of human life and therefore of any ethical system that can be devised. Also like Aristotle, they perceived that to be virtuous required society; being virtuous when completely alone is impossible, as there is no one to be un-virtuous towards. This also means that individual happiness cannot be the only consideration in utilitarian ethics, but that the happiness or pleasure of the society must be measured to determine an act's ethical quality. Those acts which increased pleasure, or utility, were good; those which diminished utility, bad. In this way, the utilitarian view of achieving happiness departed widely from Aristotle's. For him, happiness was a matter of personal fulfillment through the cultivation of virtues -- internal personal characteristics, not the act itself or its consequences, were the determiners of ethical behavior. In this way, Aristotle's system of virtue ethics….

Objections to Virtue Ethics My

60). We condemn someone as immoral who refuses to help a motorist by the side of the road, but not someone who refuses to help a child with his or her extraneous cash -- personal 'gut' instinct in virtue ethics is prioritized morally over the end results, which Singer sees as faulty reasoning. A third objection to virtue ethics is that it is culturally 'bound' to Western concepts of the self. In many societies, moral character is not based upon individual philosophy, but a sense of collective obligation. "Virtue ethics changes the kind of question we ask about ethics. Where deontology and consequentialism concern themselves with the right action, virtue ethics is concerned with the good life and what kinds of persons we should be" (Athanassoulis, 2010). However, philosophers who argue against a principle of moral relativism would state that this is not necessarily a 'bad thing' (Midgley 1981). Merely because….

Athanassoulis, Nafsika. (2010, July 7). Virtue ethics. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Retrieved September 20, 2010 at  http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/ 

Midgley, Mary. (1981). Trying out one's sword. From Heart and mind.

Singer, Peter. (1999, September 5). The Singer solution to world poverty. The New York Times.

Analyzing Preference for Virtue Ethics Theory

Preference for Virtue Ethics Theory The virtue Ethics Theory is one of the most pragmatic moral theories as it addresses virtues that mould human character in its attempt to describe the good. The theory suggests that a good life and general well-being results from embracing virtues. It goes further to describe good, holistic life; proposing that it is a life that is lived in harmony with others around. In his view of humans, Aristotle considered people as both social and rational beings. It is evident that humans tend to coexist in groups. Therefore, the theory considers the group as being more important than an individual. The primary virtues encompassed are temperance, justice, courage and practical wisdom. All the virtues work in consonance. Thus, it would not be of much help to have one and not the others. Courage and temperance have a moral inclination. They help us build bravery. Self-control on….

WORKS CITED

Audi, Robert. "Virtue Ethics as A Resource In Business." Business Ethics Quarterly 22.2 (2012): 273-291. Business Source Complete. Web. 4 Apr. 2016.

Boss, Judith A. Ethics for Life: A Text with Readings. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2011. Print.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. "Virtue Ethics." Stanford University. Stanford University, 2003. Web. 04 Apr. 2016.

Slote, Michael. "From Morality to Virtue." University Press Scholarship. 1995. Web. 05 Apr. 2016.

Existentialism and Virtue Ethics Existentialism

The three approaches to ethics today involve whether one does good out of (1) the need to maximize the well-being of the human race, (2) the need to live according to a moral rule ("Do unto others as you would have others do unto you") or (3) the belief that helping people is charitable and benevolent (virtue ethics). The Virtue Ethicists' central concepts are virtue, practical wisdom and eudaimonia. A virtue, such as honesty, generosity, caring and helping, is not something learned or practiced until it becomes a habit. It is a disposition that comes from a mindset that cannot be observed by others in a single act. A virtuous person has thought about why it is valuable to be honest and caring and has taken it to be part of their disposition. They do not find otherwise in their life and are shocked whenever they do not find it….

Annas, Julia. The Morality of Happiness. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993

Crowell, Steven. "Existentialism." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. 2004.

Dreyfus, Harold. What Computers Can't Do: The Limits of Artificial Intelligence. New York: Harper Colophon. 1979.

Haugeland, John. Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 1998.

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1. The Essence of Thomas Aquinas's Natural Law Theory: An Exploration of Its Foundations and Implications Discuss the metaphysical and ethical principles that underpin Aquinas's natural law theory. Analyze the concept of the eternal law and its relationship to the natural law. Examine the role of human reason in discerning the precepts of natural law and their binding force. 2. The Harmony of Faith and Reason in Aquinas's Summa Theologica: A Critical Examination Trace the development of Aquinas's understanding of the relationship between faith and reason. Explore the arguments Aquinas presents for the compatibility of faith and reason. Evaluate the strengths....

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I. Introduction A. Background and Significance - Emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and its increasing presence in society - Potential benefits of AI, such as automation, efficiency, and personalized experiences B. Ethical Concerns - Ethical implications of AI in areas such as: - Privacy and data security - Job displacement and economic inequality - Bias and discrimination - Automation of decision-making and accountability II. Literature Review A. Existing Research on Ethical Implications of AI - Review of previous studies that have examined ethical issues related to AI - Identification of key ethical concerns and perspectives B. Theoretical Frameworks - Discussion of ethical theories that can be applied to AI, such as: ....

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The dynamic intersection between philosophical ethics and Christian theology is a complex and rich area of study that involves examining the moral principles and values that guide human behavior and decision-making, in both secular and religious contexts. This paper aims to explore this intersection, tracing the historical development of ethical thought in Western philosophy and Christian theology, and examining the ways in which these two disciplines have influenced each other over time. One of the central themes in this exploration is the concept of moral realism, which asserts that moral values and principles are objective and independent of human beliefs or....

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Business - Ethics

Virtue Ethics: The Good and the Bad About Virtue Ethics The philosophy of virtue ethics holds that being a 'good person' or what one might call 'character' is the most…

Virtue Ethics Virtue-based vs. duty-based ethics: arguments and examples from Victor Hugo, Aristotle, Bernard Mayo, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and William Frankena In the study of ethics and morality, there have been theoretical…

This will allow someone to move beyond the different emotions, so that they can be able to see how the different actions will affect the world around them.…

The question here arises, why did we have to return to ancient philosophy of virtue ethics? But interestingly while a great deal of credit is given to Aristotle and…

Deontological ethics are based on other theories that focus on duty and obligation. Immanuel Kant (1785) argued that an individual should "always act in such a way that…

Research Paper

virtues the proper starting point for ethical theory? The debate about virtue ethics Main issues Critical analysis of virtue ethics criticism Virtues should be the starting point for ethical theory This paper revolves…

Ethics / Morality

Debate on Human Space Exploration on MarsIn the 21st century, life on earth became increasingly inhospitable: nuclear war between great powers had decimated the globe. Technology had advanced to…

Women's Issues - Abortion

Nurses and the Ethics of Abortion Abortion and Virtue Ethics In the Crossfire: Nurses and the Ethics of Abortion In the Crossfire: Nurses and the Ethics of Abortion Nebraska's Attorney General, Jon Bruning,…

Religion, Libertarianism and Virtue Ethics Religion is a social institution, which grows out of individuals' collective attempt to structure and understand the university (McGonigal, 2012). It is a natural consequence…

Ethical Perspectives Virtue Ethics Generally, virtue ethics emphasizes the motivation, or reason, for any particular act to determine whether or not it is ethical (Hursthouse, 1999). For example, if a person…

The broadest area of my life that requires certain virtues in order to do well is friendship. To be a good friend demands virtue; the bond of friendship can…

Like Aristotle's virtue-based ethics, utilitarians believe that happiness is the ultimate goal of human life and therefore of any ethical system that can be devised. Also like Aristotle,…

60). We condemn someone as immoral who refuses to help a motorist by the side of the road, but not someone who refuses to help a child with his…

Law - Constitutional Law

Preference for Virtue Ethics Theory The virtue Ethics Theory is one of the most pragmatic moral theories as it addresses virtues that mould human character in its attempt to describe…

Black Studies - Philosophy

The three approaches to ethics today involve whether one does good out of (1) the need to maximize the well-being of the human race, (2) the need to…

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Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.

This is not to say that only virtue ethicists attend to virtues, any more than it is to say that only consequentialists attend to consequences or only deontologists to rules. Each of the above-mentioned approaches can make room for virtues, consequences, and rules. Indeed, any plausible normative ethical theory will have something to say about all three. What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental. Rather, virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them.

We begin by discussing two concepts that are central to all forms of virtue ethics, namely, virtue and practical wisdom. Then we note some of the features that distinguish different virtue ethical theories from one another before turning to objections that have been raised against virtue ethics and responses offered on its behalf. We conclude with a look at some of the directions in which future research might develop.

1.2 Practical Wisdom

2.1 eudaimonist virtue ethics, 2.2 agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, 2.3 target-centered virtue ethics, 2.4 platonistic virtue ethics, 3. objections to virtue ethics, 4. future directions, other internet resources, related entries, 1. preliminaries.

In the West, virtue ethics’ founding fathers are Plato and Aristotle, and in the East it can be traced back to Mencius and Confucius. It persisted as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-American philosophy in the late 1950s. It was heralded by Anscombe’s famous article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (Anscombe 1958) which crystallized an increasing dissatisfaction with the forms of deontology and utilitarianism then prevailing. Neither of them, at that time, paid attention to a number of topics that had always figured in the virtue ethics tradition—virtues and vices, motives and moral character, moral education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of what sorts of persons we should be and how we should live.

Its re-emergence had an invigorating effect on the other two approaches, many of whose proponents then began to address these topics in the terms of their favoured theory. (One consequence of this has been that it is now necessary to distinguish “virtue ethics” (the third approach) from “virtue theory”, a term which includes accounts of virtue within the other approaches.) Interest in Kant’s virtue theory has redirected philosophers’ attention to Kant’s long neglected Doctrine of Virtue , and utilitarians have developed consequentialist virtue theories (Driver 2001; Hurka 2001). It has also generated virtue ethical readings of philosophers other than Plato and Aristotle, such as Martineau, Hume and Nietzsche, and thereby different forms of virtue ethics have developed (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003, 2011a).

Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take a “neo-Aristotelian” or eudaimonist form (see section 2), almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are arête (excellence or virtue), phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing). (See Annas 2011 for a short, clear, and authoritative account of all three.) We discuss the first two in the remainder of this section. Eudaimonia is discussed in connection with eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics in the next.

A virtue is an excellent trait of character. It is a disposition, well entrenched in its possessor—something that, as we say, goes all the way down, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. A significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing and does not cheat. If such actions are done merely because the agent thinks that honesty is the best policy, or because they fear being caught out, rather than through recognising “To do otherwise would be dishonest” as the relevant reason, they are not the actions of an honest person. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. The honest person recognises “That would be a lie” as a strong (though perhaps not overriding) reason for not making certain statements in certain circumstances, and gives due, but not overriding, weight to “That would be the truth” as a reason for making them.

An honest person’s reasons and choices with respect to honest and dishonest actions reflect her views about honesty, truth, and deception—but of course such views manifest themselves with respect to other actions, and to emotional reactions as well. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplores dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed through deception rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased (as appropriate) when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on. Given that a virtue is such a multi-track disposition, it would obviously be reckless to attribute one to an agent on the basis of a single observed action or even a series of similar actions, especially if you don’t know the agent’s reasons for doing as she did (Sreenivasan 2002).

Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal (Athanassoulis 2000). Most people who can truly be described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can truly be described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spots—little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones, may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent.

Further, it is not easy to get one’s emotions in harmony with one’s rational recognition of certain reasons for action. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. Following (and adapting) Aristotle, virtue ethicists draw a distinction between full or perfect virtue and “continence”, or strength of will. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.

Describing the continent as “falling short” of perfect virtue appears to go against the intuition that there is something particularly admirable about people who manage to act well when it is especially hard for them to do so, but the plausibility of this depends on exactly what “makes it hard” (Foot 1978: 11–14). If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts—say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help—then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her character—the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of others—then it is not.

Another way in which one can easily fall short of full virtue is through lacking phronesis —moral or practical wisdom.

The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts and feels as she should. These are commonly accepted truisms. But it is equally common, in relation to particular (putative) examples of virtues to give these truisms up. We may say of someone that he is generous or honest “to a fault”. It is commonly asserted that someone’s compassion might lead them to act wrongly, to tell a lie they should not have told, for example, in their desire to prevent someone else’s hurt feelings. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid. So it would appear that generosity, honesty, compassion and courage despite being virtues, are sometimes faults. Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good person—or, if it is still held to be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! How have we arrived at such an odd conclusion?

The answer lies in too ready an acceptance of ordinary usage, which permits a fairly wide-ranging application of many of the virtue terms, combined, perhaps, with a modern readiness to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or inclination, not by rational choice. If one thinks of generosity or honesty as the disposition to be moved to action by generous or honest impulses such as the desire to give or to speak the truth, if one thinks of compassion as the disposition to be moved by the sufferings of others and to act on that emotion, if one thinks of courage as mere fearlessness or the willingness to face danger, then it will indeed seem obvious that these are all dispositions that can lead to their possessor’s acting wrongly. But it is also obvious, as soon as it is stated, that these are dispositions that can be possessed by children, and although children thus endowed (bar the “courageous” disposition) would undoubtedly be very nice children, we would not say that they were morally virtuous or admirable people. The ordinary usage, or the reliance on motivation by inclination, gives us what Aristotle calls “natural virtue”—a proto version of full virtue awaiting perfection by phronesis or practical wisdom.

Aristotle makes a number of specific remarks about phronesis that are the subject of much scholarly debate, but the (related) modern concept is best understood by thinking of what the virtuous morally mature adult has that nice children, including nice adolescents, lack. Both the virtuous adult and the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends. A virtuous adult is not, of course, infallible and may also, on occasion, fail to do what she intended to do through lack of knowledge, but only on those occasions on which the lack of knowledge is not culpable. So, for example, children and adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken. Such ignorance in small children is rarely, if ever culpable. Adults, on the other hand, are culpable if they mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint. They are also culpable if their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is mistaken. It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him.

Quite generally, given that good intentions are intentions to act well or “do the right thing”, we may say that practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation—the capacity to recognise, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom.

One is that it characteristically comes only with experience of life. Amongst the morally relevant features of a situation may be the likely consequences, for the people involved, of a certain action, and this is something that adolescents are notoriously clueless about precisely because they are inexperienced. It is part of practical wisdom to be wise about human beings and human life. (It should go without saying that the virtuous are mindful of the consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not?)

The second is the practically wise agent’s capacity to recognise some features of a situation as more important than others, or indeed, in that situation, as the only relevant ones. The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, with their under-developed virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or benevolence or justice.

These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well.

2. Forms of Virtue Ethics

While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central and practical wisdom required, they differ in how they combine these and other concepts to illuminate what we should do in particular contexts and how we should live our lives as a whole. In what follows we sketch four distinct forms taken by contemporary virtue ethics, namely, a) eudaimonist virtue ethics, b) agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, c) target-centered virtue ethics, and d) Platonistic virtue ethics.

The distinctive feature of eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics is that they define virtues in terms of their relationship to eudaimonia . A virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues, the eudaimonist claims, precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia .

The concept of eudaimonia , a key term in ancient Greek moral philosophy, is standardly translated as “happiness” or “flourishing” and occasionally as “well-being.” Each translation has its disadvantages. The trouble with “flourishing” is that animals and even plants can flourish but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings. The trouble with “happiness” is that in ordinary conversation it connotes something subjectively determined. It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy. If I think I am happy then I am—it is not something I can be wrong about (barring advanced cases of self-deception). Contrast my being healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was flourishing but be wrong. In this respect, “flourishing” is a better translation than “happiness”. It is all too easy to be mistaken about whether one’s life is eudaimon (the adjective from eudaimonia ) not simply because it is easy to deceive oneself, but because it is easy to have a mistaken conception of eudaimonia , or of what it is to live well as a human being, believing it to consist largely in physical pleasure or luxury for example.

Eudaimonia is, avowedly, a moralized or value-laden concept of happiness, something like “true” or “real” happiness or “the sort of happiness worth seeking or having.” It is thereby the sort of concept about which there can be substantial disagreement between people with different views about human life that cannot be resolved by appeal to some external standard on which, despite their different views, the parties to the disagreement concur (Hursthouse 1999: 188–189).

Most versions of virtue ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. This supreme good is not conceived of as an independently defined state (made up of, say, a list of non-moral goods that does not include virtuous activity) which exercise of the virtues might be thought to promote. It is, within virtue ethics, already conceived of as something of which virtuous activity is at least partially constitutive (Kraut 1989). Thereby virtue ethicists claim that a human life devoted to physical pleasure or the acquisition of wealth is not eudaimon , but a wasted life.

But although all standard versions of virtue ethics insist on that conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia , further links are matters of dispute and generate different versions. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient—what is also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck. For Plato and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia (Annas 1993).

According to eudaimonist virtue ethics, the good life is the eudaimon life, and the virtues are what enable a human being to be eudaimon because the virtues just are those character traits that benefit their possessor in that way, barring bad luck. So there is a link between eudaimonia and what confers virtue status on a character trait. (For a discussion of the differences between eudaimonists see Baril 2014. For recent defenses of eudaimonism see Annas 2011; LeBar 2013b; Badhwar 2014; and Bloomfield 2014.)

Rather than deriving the normativity of virtue from the value of eudaimonia , agent-based virtue ethicists argue that other forms of normativity—including the value of eudaimonia —are traced back to and ultimately explained in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents.

It is unclear how many other forms of normativity must be explained in terms of the qualities of agents in order for a theory to count as agent-based. The two best-known agent-based theorists, Michael Slote and Linda Zagzebski, trace a wide range of normative qualities back to the qualities of agents. For example, Slote defines rightness and wrongness in terms of agents’ motivations: “[A]gent-based virtue ethics … understands rightness in terms of good motivations and wrongness in terms of the having of bad (or insufficiently good) motives” (2001: 14). Similarly, he explains the goodness of an action, the value of eudaimonia , the justice of a law or social institution, and the normativity of practical rationality in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents (2001: 99–100, 154, 2000). Zagzebski likewise defines right and wrong actions by reference to the emotions, motives, and dispositions of virtuous and vicious agents. For example, “A wrong act = an act that the phronimos characteristically would not do, and he would feel guilty if he did = an act such that it is not the case that he might do it = an act that expresses a vice = an act that is against a requirement of virtue (the virtuous self)” (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Her definitions of duties, good and bad ends, and good and bad states of affairs are similarly grounded in the motivational and dispositional states of exemplary agents (1998, 2004, 2010).

However, there could also be less ambitious agent-based approaches to virtue ethics (see Slote 1997). At the very least, an agent-based approach must be committed to explaining what one should do by reference to the motivational and dispositional states of agents. But this is not yet a sufficient condition for counting as an agent-based approach, since the same condition will be met by every virtue ethical account. For a theory to count as an agent-based form of virtue ethics it must also be the case that the normative properties of motivations and dispositions cannot be explained in terms of the normative properties of something else (such as eudaimonia or states of affairs) which is taken to be more fundamental.

Beyond this basic commitment, there is room for agent-based theories to be developed in a number of different directions. The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities. For Slote what matters are this particular agent’s actual motives and dispositions . The goodness of action A, for example, is derived from the agent’s motives when she performs A. If those motives are good then the action is good, if not then not. On Zagzebski’s account, by contrast, a good or bad, right or wrong action is defined not by this agent’s actual motives but rather by whether this is the sort of action a virtuously motivated agent would perform (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Appeal to the virtuous agent’s hypothetical motives and dispositions enables Zagzebski to distinguish between performing the right action and doing so for the right reasons (a distinction that, as Brady (2004) observes, Slote has trouble drawing).

Another point on which agent-based forms of virtue ethics might differ concerns how one identifies virtuous motivations and dispositions. According to Zagzebski’s exemplarist account, “We do not have criteria for goodness in advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness” (Zagzebski 2004: 41). As we observe the people around us, we find ourselves wanting to be like some of them (in at least some respects) and not wanting to be like others. The former provide us with positive exemplars and the latter with negative ones. Our understanding of better and worse motivations and virtuous and vicious dispositions is grounded in these primitive responses to exemplars (2004: 53). This is not to say that every time we act we stop and ask ourselves what one of our exemplars would do in this situations. Our moral concepts become more refined over time as we encounter a wider variety of exemplars and begin to draw systematic connections between them, noting what they have in common, how they differ, and which of these commonalities and differences matter, morally speaking. Recognizable motivational profiles emerge and come to be labeled as virtues or vices, and these, in turn, shape our understanding of the obligations we have and the ends we should pursue. However, even though the systematising of moral thought can travel a long way from our starting point, according to the exemplarist it never reaches a stage where reference to exemplars is replaced by the recognition of something more fundamental. At the end of the day, according to the exemplarist, our moral system still rests on our basic propensity to take a liking (or disliking) to exemplars. Nevertheless, one could be an agent-based theorist without advancing the exemplarist’s account of the origins or reference conditions for judgments of good and bad, virtuous and vicious.

The touchstone for eudaimonist virtue ethicists is a flourishing human life. For agent-based virtue ethicists it is an exemplary agent’s motivations. The target-centered view developed by Christine Swanton (2003), by contrast, begins with our existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as elaborate as an entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits involve.

A complete account of virtue will map out 1) its field , 2) its mode of responsiveness, 3) its basis of moral acknowledgment, and 4) its target . Different virtues are concerned with different fields . Courage, for example, is concerned with what might harm us, whereas generosity is concerned with the sharing of time, talent, and property. The basis of acknowledgment of a virtue is the feature within the virtue’s field to which it responds. To continue with our previous examples, generosity is attentive to the benefits that others might enjoy through one’s agency, and courage responds to threats to value, status, or the bonds that exist between oneself and particular others, and the fear such threats might generate. A virtue’s mode has to do with how it responds to the bases of acknowledgment within its field. Generosity promotes a good, namely, another’s benefit, whereas courage defends a value, bond, or status. Finally, a virtue’s target is that at which it is aimed. Courage aims to control fear and handle danger, while generosity aims to share time, talents, or possessions with others in ways that benefit them.

A virtue , on a target-centered account, “is a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way” (Swanton 2003: 19). A virtuous act is an act that hits the target of a virtue, which is to say that it succeeds in responding to items in its field in the specified way (233). Providing a target-centered definition of a right action requires us to move beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the actions that follow from it. This is because a single action context may involve a number of different, overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose. But love for my family might make a different use of my time and attention. In order to define right action a target-centered view must explain how we handle different virtues’ conflicting claims on our resources. There are at least three different ways to address this challenge. A perfectionist target-centered account would stipulate, “An act is right if and only if it is overall virtuous, and that entails that it is the, or a, best action possible in the circumstances” (239–240). A more permissive target-centered account would not identify ‘right’ with ‘best’, but would allow an action to count as right provided “it is good enough even if not the (or a) best action” (240). A minimalist target-centered account would not even require an action to be good in order to be right. On such a view, “An act is right if and only if it is not overall vicious” (240). (For further discussion of target-centered virtue ethics see Van Zyl 2014; and Smith 2016).

The fourth form a virtue ethic might adopt takes its inspiration from Plato. The Socrates of Plato’s dialogues devotes a great deal of time to asking his fellow Athenians to explain the nature of virtues like justice, courage, piety, and wisdom. So it is clear that Plato counts as a virtue theorist. But it is a matter of some debate whether he should be read as a virtue ethicist (White 2015). What is not open to debate is whether Plato has had an important influence on the contemporary revival of interest in virtue ethics. A number of those who have contributed to the revival have done so as Plato scholars (e.g., Prior 1991; Kamtekar 1998; Annas 1999; and Reshotko 2006). However, often they have ended up championing a eudaimonist version of virtue ethics (see Prior 2001 and Annas 2011), rather than a version that would warrant a separate classification. Nevertheless, there are two variants that call for distinct treatment.

Timothy Chappell takes the defining feature of Platonistic virtue ethics to be that “Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good” (2014). Chappell follows Iris Murdoch in arguing that “In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego” (Murdoch 1971: 51). Constantly attending to our needs, our desires, our passions, and our thoughts skews our perspective on what the world is actually like and blinds us to the goods around us. Contemplating the goodness of something we encounter—which is to say, carefully attending to it “for its own sake, in order to understand it” (Chappell 2014: 300)—breaks this natural tendency by drawing our attention away from ourselves. Contemplating such goodness with regularity makes room for new habits of thought that focus more readily and more honestly on things other than the self. It alters the quality of our consciousness. And “anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity, and realism is to be connected with virtue” (Murdoch 1971: 82). The virtues get defined, then, in terms of qualities that help one “pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is” (91). And good agency is defined by the possession and exercise of such virtues. Within Chappell’s and Murdoch’s framework, then, not all normative properties get defined in terms of virtue. Goodness, in particular, is not so defined. But the kind of goodness which is possible for creatures like us is defined by virtue, and any answer to the question of what one should do or how one should live will appeal to the virtues.

Another Platonistic variant of virtue ethics is exemplified by Robert Merrihew Adams. Unlike Murdoch and Chappell, his starting point is not a set of claims about our consciousness of goodness. Rather, he begins with an account of the metaphysics of goodness. Like Murdoch and others influenced by Platonism, Adams’s account of goodness is built around a conception of a supremely perfect good. And like Augustine, Adams takes that perfect good to be God. God is both the exemplification and the source of all goodness. Other things are good, he suggests, to the extent that they resemble God (Adams 1999).

The resemblance requirement identifies a necessary condition for being good, but it does not yet give us a sufficient condition. This is because there are ways in which finite creatures might resemble God that would not be suitable to the type of creature they are. For example, if God were all-knowing, then the belief, “I am all-knowing,” would be a suitable belief for God to have. In God, such a belief—because true—would be part of God’s perfection. However, as neither you nor I are all-knowing, the belief, “I am all-knowing,” in one of us would not be good. To rule out such cases we need to introduce another factor. That factor is the fitting response to goodness, which Adams suggests is love. Adams uses love to weed out problematic resemblances: “being excellent in the way that a finite thing can be consists in resembling God in a way that could serve God as a reason for loving the thing” (Adams 1999: 36).

Virtues come into the account as one of the ways in which some things (namely, persons) could resemble God. “[M]ost of the excellences that are most important to us, and of whose value we are most confident, are excellences of persons or of qualities or actions or works or lives or stories of persons” (1999: 42). This is one of the reasons Adams offers for conceiving of the ideal of perfection as a personal God, rather than an impersonal form of the Good. Many of the excellences of persons of which we are most confident are virtues such as love, wisdom, justice, patience, and generosity. And within many theistic traditions, including Adams’s own Christian tradition, such virtues are commonly attributed to divine agents.

A Platonistic account like the one Adams puts forward in Finite and Infinite Goods clearly does not derive all other normative properties from the virtues (for a discussion of the relationship between this view and the one he puts forward in A Theory of Virtue (2006) see Pettigrove 2014). Goodness provides the normative foundation. Virtues are not built on that foundation; rather, as one of the varieties of goodness of whose value we are most confident, virtues form part of the foundation. Obligations, by contrast, come into the account at a different level. Moral obligations, Adams argues, are determined by the expectations and demands that “arise in a relationship or system of relationships that is good or valuable” (1999: 244). Other things being equal, the more virtuous the parties to the relationship, the more binding the obligation. Thus, within Adams’s account, the good (which includes virtue) is prior to the right. However, once good relationships have given rise to obligations, those obligations take on a life of their own. Their bindingness is not traced directly to considerations of goodness. Rather, they are determined by the expectations of the parties and the demands of the relationship.

A number of objections have been raised against virtue ethics, some of which bear more directly on one form of virtue ethics than on others. In this section we consider eight objections, namely, the a) application, b) adequacy, c) relativism, d) conflict, e) self-effacement, f) justification, g) egoism, and h) situationist problems.

a) In the early days of virtue ethics’ revival, the approach was associated with an “anti-codifiability” thesis about ethics, directed against the prevailing pretensions of normative theory. At the time, utilitarians and deontologists commonly (though not universally) held that the task of ethical theory was to come up with a code consisting of universal rules or principles (possibly only one, as in the case of act-utilitarianism) which would have two significant features: i) the rule(s) would amount to a decision procedure for determining what the right action was in any particular case; ii) the rule(s) would be stated in such terms that any non-virtuous person could understand and apply it (them) correctly.

Virtue ethicists maintained, contrary to these two claims, that it was quite unrealistic to imagine that there could be such a code (see, in particular, McDowell 1979). The results of attempts to produce and employ such a code, in the heady days of the 1960s and 1970s, when medical and then bioethics boomed and bloomed, tended to support the virtue ethicists’ claim. More and more utilitarians and deontologists found themselves agreed on their general rules but on opposite sides of the controversial moral issues in contemporary discussion. It came to be recognised that moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, and judgement informed by experience— phronesis in short—is needed to apply rules or principles correctly. Hence many (though by no means all) utilitarians and deontologists have explicitly abandoned (ii) and much less emphasis is placed on (i).

Nevertheless, the complaint that virtue ethics does not produce codifiable principles is still a commonly voiced criticism of the approach, expressed as the objection that it is, in principle, unable to provide action-guidance.

Initially, the objection was based on a misunderstanding. Blinkered by slogans that described virtue ethics as “concerned with Being rather than Doing,” as addressing “What sort of person should I be?” but not “What should I do?” as being “agent-centered rather than act-centered,” its critics maintained that it was unable to provide action-guidance. Hence, rather than being a normative rival to utilitarian and deontological ethics, it could claim to be no more than a valuable supplement to them. The rather odd idea was that all virtue ethics could offer was, “Identify a moral exemplar and do what he would do,” as though the university student trying to decide whether to study music (her preference) or engineering (her parents’ preference) was supposed to ask herself, “What would Socrates study if he were in my circumstances?”

But the objection failed to take note of Anscombe’s hint that a great deal of specific action guidance could be found in rules employing the virtue and vice terms (“v-rules”) such as “Do what is honest/charitable; do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable” (Hursthouse 1999). (It is a noteworthy feature of our virtue and vice vocabulary that, although our list of generally recognised virtue terms is comparatively short, our list of vice terms is remarkably, and usefully, long, far exceeding anything that anyone who thinks in terms of standard deontological rules has ever come up with. Much invaluable action guidance comes from avoiding courses of action that would be irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet, tactless, arrogant, unsympathetic, cold, incautious, unenterprising, pusillanimous, feeble, presumptuous, rude, hypocritical, self-indulgent, materialistic, grasping, short-sighted, vindictive, calculating, ungrateful, grudging, brutal, profligate, disloyal, and on and on.)

(b) A closely related objection has to do with whether virtue ethics can provide an adequate account of right action. This worry can take two forms. (i) One might think a virtue ethical account of right action is extensionally inadequate. It is possible to perform a right action without being virtuous and a virtuous person can occasionally perform the wrong action without that calling her virtue into question. If virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for right action, one might wonder whether the relationship between rightness/wrongness and virtue/vice is close enough for the former to be identified in terms of the latter. (ii) Alternatively, even if one thought it possible to produce a virtue ethical account that picked out all (and only) right actions, one might still think that at least in some cases virtue is not what explains rightness (Adams 2006:6–8).

Some virtue ethicists respond to the adequacy objection by rejecting the assumption that virtue ethics ought to be in the business of providing an account of right action in the first place. Following in the footsteps of Anscombe (1958) and MacIntyre (1985), Talbot Brewer (2009) argues that to work with the categories of rightness and wrongness is already to get off on the wrong foot. Contemporary conceptions of right and wrong action, built as they are around a notion of moral duty that presupposes a framework of divine (or moral) law or around a conception of obligation that is defined in contrast to self-interest, carry baggage the virtue ethicist is better off without. Virtue ethics can address the questions of how one should live, what kind of person one should become, and even what one should do without that committing it to providing an account of ‘right action’. One might choose, instead, to work with aretaic concepts (defined in terms of virtues and vices) and axiological concepts (defined in terms of good and bad, better and worse) and leave out deontic notions (like right/wrong action, duty, and obligation) altogether.

Other virtue ethicists wish to retain the concept of right action but note that in the current philosophical discussion a number of distinct qualities march under that banner. In some contexts, ‘right action’ identifies the best action an agent might perform in the circumstances. In others, it designates an action that is commendable (even if not the best possible). In still others, it picks out actions that are not blameworthy (even if not commendable). A virtue ethicist might choose to define one of these—for example, the best action—in terms of virtues and vices, but appeal to other normative concepts—such as legitimate expectations—when defining other conceptions of right action.

As we observed in section 2, a virtue ethical account need not attempt to reduce all other normative concepts to virtues and vices. What is required is simply (i) that virtue is not reduced to some other normative concept that is taken to be more fundamental and (ii) that some other normative concepts are explained in terms of virtue and vice. This takes the sting out of the adequacy objection, which is most compelling against versions of virtue ethics that attempt to define all of the senses of ‘right action’ in terms of virtues. Appealing to virtues and vices makes it much easier to achieve extensional adequacy. Making room for normative concepts that are not taken to be reducible to virtue and vice concepts makes it even easier to generate a theory that is both extensionally and explanatorily adequate. Whether one needs other concepts and, if so, how many, is still a matter of debate among virtue ethicists, as is the question of whether virtue ethics even ought to be offering an account of right action. Either way virtue ethicists have resources available to them to address the adequacy objection.

Insofar as the different versions of virtue ethics all retain an emphasis on the virtues, they are open to the familiar problem of (c) the charge of cultural relativity. Is it not the case that different cultures embody different virtues, (MacIntyre 1985) and hence that the v-rules will pick out actions as right or wrong only relative to a particular culture? Different replies have been made to this charge. One—the tu quoque , or “partners in crime” response—exhibits a quite familiar pattern in virtue ethicists’ defensive strategy (Solomon 1988). They admit that, for them, cultural relativism is a challenge, but point out that it is just as much a problem for the other two approaches. The (putative) cultural variation in character traits regarded as virtues is no greater—indeed markedly less—than the cultural variation in rules of conduct, and different cultures have different ideas about what constitutes happiness or welfare. That cultural relativity should be a problem common to all three approaches is hardly surprising. It is related, after all, to the “justification problem” ( see below ) the quite general metaethical problem of justifying one’s moral beliefs to those who disagree, whether they be moral sceptics, pluralists or from another culture.

A bolder strategy involves claiming that virtue ethics has less difficulty with cultural relativity than the other two approaches. Much cultural disagreement arises, it may be claimed, from local understandings of the virtues, but the virtues themselves are not relative to culture (Nussbaum 1993).

Another objection to which the tu quoque response is partially appropriate is (d) “the conflict problem.” What does virtue ethics have to say about dilemmas—cases in which, apparently, the requirements of different virtues conflict because they point in opposed directions? Charity prompts me to kill the person who would be better off dead, but justice forbids it. Honesty points to telling the hurtful truth, kindness and compassion to remaining silent or even lying. What shall I do? Of course, the same sorts of dilemmas are generated by conflicts between deontological rules. Deontology and virtue ethics share the conflict problem (and are happy to take it on board rather than follow some of the utilitarians in their consequentialist resolutions of such dilemmas) and in fact their strategies for responding to it are parallel. Both aim to resolve a number of dilemmas by arguing that the conflict is merely apparent; a discriminating understanding of the virtues or rules in question, possessed only by those with practical wisdom, will perceive that, in this particular case, the virtues do not make opposing demands or that one rule outranks another, or has a certain exception clause built into it. Whether this is all there is to it depends on whether there are any irresolvable dilemmas. If there are, proponents of either normative approach may point out reasonably that it could only be a mistake to offer a resolution of what is, ex hypothesi , irresolvable.

Another problem arguably shared by all three approaches is (e), that of being self-effacing. An ethical theory is self-effacing if, roughly, whatever it claims justifies a particular action, or makes it right, had better not be the agent’s motive for doing it. Michael Stocker (1976) originally introduced it as a problem for deontology and consequentialism. He pointed out that the agent who, rightly, visits a friend in hospital will rather lessen the impact of his visit on her if he tells her either that he is doing it because it is his duty or because he thought it would maximize the general happiness. But as Simon Keller observes, she won’t be any better pleased if he tells her that he is visiting her because it is what a virtuous agent would do, so virtue ethics would appear to have the problem too (Keller 2007). However, virtue ethics’ defenders have argued that not all forms of virtue ethics are subject to this objection (Pettigrove 2011) and those that are are not seriously undermined by the problem (Martinez 2011).

Another problem for virtue ethics, which is shared by both utilitarianism and deontology, is (f) “the justification problem.” Abstractly conceived, this is the problem of how we justify or ground our ethical beliefs, an issue that is hotly debated at the level of metaethics. In its particular versions, for deontology there is the question of how to justify its claims that certain moral rules are the correct ones, and for utilitarianism of how to justify its claim that all that really matters morally are consequences for happiness or well-being. For virtue ethics, the problem concerns the question of which character traits are the virtues.

In the metaethical debate, there is widespread disagreement about the possibility of providing an external foundation for ethics—“external” in the sense of being external to ethical beliefs—and the same disagreement is found amongst deontologists and utilitarians. Some believe that their normative ethics can be placed on a secure basis, resistant to any form of scepticism, such as what anyone rationally desires, or would accept or agree on, regardless of their ethical outlook; others that it cannot.

Virtue ethicists have eschewed any attempt to ground virtue ethics in an external foundation while continuing to maintain that their claims can be validated. Some follow a form of Rawls’s coherentist approach (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003); neo-Aristotelians a form of ethical naturalism.

A misunderstanding of eudaimonia as an unmoralized concept leads some critics to suppose that the neo-Aristotelians are attempting to ground their claims in a scientific account of human nature and what counts, for a human being, as flourishing. Others assume that, if this is not what they are doing, they cannot be validating their claims that, for example, justice, charity, courage, and generosity are virtues. Either they are illegitimately helping themselves to Aristotle’s discredited natural teleology (Williams 1985) or producing mere rationalizations of their own personal or culturally inculcated values. But McDowell, Foot, MacIntyre and Hursthouse have all outlined versions of a third way between these two extremes. Eudaimonia in virtue ethics, is indeed a moralized concept, but it is not only that. Claims about what constitutes flourishing for human beings no more float free of scientific facts about what human beings are like than ethological claims about what constitutes flourishing for elephants. In both cases, the truth of the claims depends in part on what kind of animal they are and what capacities, desires and interests the humans or elephants have.

The best available science today (including evolutionary theory and psychology) supports rather than undermines the ancient Greek assumption that we are social animals, like elephants and wolves and unlike polar bears. No rationalizing explanation in terms of anything like a social contract is needed to explain why we choose to live together, subjugating our egoistic desires in order to secure the advantages of co-operation. Like other social animals, our natural impulses are not solely directed towards our own pleasures and preservation, but include altruistic and cooperative ones.

This basic fact about us should make more comprehensible the claim that the virtues are at least partially constitutive of human flourishing and also undercut the objection that virtue ethics is, in some sense, egoistic.

(g) The egoism objection has a number of sources. One is a simple confusion. Once it is understood that the fully virtuous agent characteristically does what she should without inner conflict, it is triumphantly asserted that “she is only doing what she wants to do and hence is being selfish.” So when the generous person gives gladly, as the generous are wont to do, it turns out she is not generous and unselfish after all, or at least not as generous as the one who greedily wants to hang on to everything she has but forces herself to give because she thinks she should! A related version ascribes bizarre reasons to the virtuous agent, unjustifiably assuming that she acts as she does because she believes that acting thus on this occasion will help her to achieve eudaimonia. But “the virtuous agent” is just “the agent with the virtues” and it is part of our ordinary understanding of the virtue terms that each carries with it its own typical range of reasons for acting. The virtuous agent acts as she does because she believes that someone’s suffering will be averted, or someone benefited, or the truth established, or a debt repaid, or … thereby.

It is the exercise of the virtues during one’s life that is held to be at least partially constitutive of eudaimonia , and this is consistent with recognising that bad luck may land the virtuous agent in circumstances that require her to give up her life. Given the sorts of considerations that courageous, honest, loyal, charitable people wholeheartedly recognise as reasons for action, they may find themselves compelled to face danger for a worthwhile end, to speak out in someone’s defence, or refuse to reveal the names of their comrades, even when they know that this will inevitably lead to their execution, to share their last crust and face starvation. On the view that the exercise of the virtues is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia , such cases are described as those in which the virtuous agent sees that, as things have unfortunately turned out, eudaimonia is not possible for them (Foot 2001, 95). On the Stoical view that it is both necessary and sufficient, a eudaimon life is a life that has been successfully lived (where “success” of course is not to be understood in a materialistic way) and such people die knowing not only that they have made a success of their lives but that they have also brought their lives to a markedly successful completion. Either way, such heroic acts can hardly be regarded as egoistic.

A lingering suggestion of egoism may be found in the misconceived distinction between so-called “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” virtues. Those who have been insulated from the ancient tradition tend to regard justice and benevolence as real virtues, which benefit others but not their possessor, and prudence, fortitude and providence (the virtue whose opposite is “improvidence” or being a spendthrift) as not real virtues at all because they benefit only their possessor. This is a mistake on two counts. Firstly, justice and benevolence do, in general, benefit their possessors, since without them eudaimonia is not possible. Secondly, given that we live together, as social animals, the “self-regarding” virtues do benefit others—those who lack them are a great drain on, and sometimes grief to, those who are close to them (as parents with improvident or imprudent adult offspring know only too well).

The most recent objection (h) to virtue ethics claims that work in “situationist” social psychology shows that there are no such things as character traits and thereby no such things as virtues for virtue ethics to be about (Doris 1998; Harman 1999). In reply, some virtue ethicists have argued that the social psychologists’ studies are irrelevant to the multi-track disposition (see above) that a virtue is supposed to be (Sreenivasan 2002; Kamtekar 2004). Mindful of just how multi-track it is, they agree that it would be reckless in the extreme to ascribe a demanding virtue such as charity to people of whom they know no more than that they have exhibited conventional decency; this would indeed be “a fundamental attribution error.” Others have worked to develop alternative, empirically grounded conceptions of character traits (Snow 2010; Miller 2013 and 2014; however see Upton 2016 for objections to Miller). There have been other responses as well (summarized helpfully in Prinz 2009 and Miller 2014). Notable among these is a response by Adams (2006, echoing Merritt 2000) who steers a middle road between “no character traits at all” and the exacting standard of the Aristotelian conception of virtue which, because of its emphasis on phronesis, requires a high level of character integration. On his conception, character traits may be “frail and fragmentary” but still virtues, and not uncommon. But giving up the idea that practical wisdom is the heart of all the virtues, as Adams has to do, is a substantial sacrifice, as Russell (2009) and Kamtekar (2010) argue.

Even though the “situationist challenge” has left traditional virtue ethicists unmoved, it has generated a healthy engagement with empirical psychological literature, which has also been fuelled by the growing literature on Foot’s Natural Goodness and, quite independently, an upsurge of interest in character education (see below).

Over the past thirty-five years most of those contributing to the revival of virtue ethics have worked within a neo-Aristotelian, eudaimonist framework. However, as noted in section 2, other forms of virtue ethics have begun to emerge. Theorists have begun to turn to philosophers like Hutcheson, Hume, Nietzsche, Martineau, and Heidegger for resources they might use to develop alternatives (see Russell 2006; Swanton 2013 and 2015; Taylor 2015; and Harcourt 2015). Others have turned their attention eastward, exploring Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions (Yu 2007; Slingerland 2011; Finnigan and Tanaka 2011; McRae 2012; Angle and Slote 2013; Davis 2014; Flanagan 2015; Perrett and Pettigrove 2015; and Sim 2015). These explorations promise to open up new avenues for the development of virtue ethics.

Although virtue ethics has grown remarkably in the last thirty-five years, it is still very much in the minority, particularly in the area of applied ethics. Many editors of big textbook collections on “moral problems” or “applied ethics” now try to include articles representative of each of the three normative approaches but are often unable to find a virtue ethics article addressing a particular issue. This is sometimes, no doubt, because “the” issue has been set up as a deontologicial/utilitarian debate, but it is often simply because no virtue ethicist has yet written on the topic. However, the last decade has seen an increase in the amount of attention applied virtue ethics has received (Walker and Ivanhoe 2007; Hartman 2013; Austin 2014; Van Hooft 2014; and Annas 2015). This area can certainly be expected to grow in the future, and it looks as though applying virtue ethics in the field of environmental ethics may prove particularly fruitful (Sandler 2007; Hursthouse 2007, 2011; Zwolinski and Schmidtz 2013; Cafaro 2015).

Whether virtue ethics can be expected to grow into “virtue politics”—i.e. to extend from moral philosophy into political philosophy—is not so clear. Gisela Striker (2006) has argued that Aristotle’s ethics cannot be understood adequately without attending to its place in his politics. That suggests that at least those virtue ethicists who take their inspiration from Aristotle should have resources to offer for the development of virtue politics. But, while Plato and Aristotle can be great inspirations as far as virtue ethics is concerned, neither, on the face of it, are attractive sources of insight where politics is concerned. However, recent work suggests that Aristotelian ideas can, after all, generate a satisfyingly liberal political philosophy (Nussbaum 2006; LeBar 2013a). Moreover, as noted above, virtue ethics does not have to be neo-Aristotelian. It may be that the virtue ethics of Hutcheson and Hume can be naturally extended into a modern political philosophy (Hursthouse 1990–91; Slote 1993).

Following Plato and Aristotle, modern virtue ethics has always emphasised the importance of moral education, not as the inculcation of rules but as the training of character. There is now a growing movement towards virtues education, amongst both academics (Carr 1999; Athanassoulis 2014; Curren 2015) and teachers in the classroom. One exciting thing about research in this area is its engagement with other academic disciplines, including psychology, educational theory, and theology (see Cline 2015; and Snow 2015).

Finally, one of the more productive developments of virtue ethics has come through the study of particular virtues and vices. There are now a number of careful studies of the cardinal virtues and capital vices (Pieper 1966; Taylor 2006; Curzer 2012; Timpe and Boyd 2014). Others have explored less widely discussed virtues or vices, such as civility, decency, truthfulness, ambition, and meekness (Calhoun 2000; Kekes 2002; Williams 2002; and Pettigrove 2007 and 2012). One of the questions these studies raise is “How many virtues are there?” A second is, “How are these virtues related to one another?” Some virtue ethicists have been happy to work on the assumption that there is no principled reason for limiting the number of virtues and plenty of reason for positing a plurality of them (Swanton 2003; Battaly 2015). Others have been concerned that such an open-handed approach to the virtues will make it difficult for virtue ethicists to come up with an adequate account of right action or deal with the conflict problem discussed above. Dan Russell has proposed cardinality and a version of the unity thesis as a solution to what he calls “the enumeration problem” (the problem of too many virtues). The apparent proliferation of virtues can be significantly reduced if we group virtues together with some being cardinal and others subordinate extensions of those cardinal virtues. Possible conflicts between the remaining virtues can then be managed if they are tied together in some way as part of a unified whole (Russell 2009). This highlights two important avenues for future research, one of which explores individual virtues and the other of which analyses how they might be related to one another.

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• Perrett, Roy and Glen Pettigrove, 2015, “Hindu Virtue Ethics,” in Besser-Jones and Slote (2015), pp. 51–62.
• Pettigrove, Glen, 2007, “Ambitions,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 10 (1): 53–68.
• –––, 2011, “Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?” Journal of Ethics , 15 (3): 191–207.
• –––, 2012, “Meekness and ‘Moral’ Anger,” Ethics , 122 (2): 341–370.
• –––, 2018, “Alternatives to Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics,” in Snow (ed.) 2018, pp. 359–376.
• ––– and Christine Swanton (eds.), 2022, Neglected Virtues , New York: Routledge.
• Pieper, Josef, 1966, The Four Cardinal Virtues , Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
• Pinsent, Andrew, 2013, The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics , New York: Routledge.
• Price, A.W., 2011, Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Prinz, Jesse, 2009, “The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics,” Journal of Ethics , 13: 117–44.
• Prior, William, 1991, Virtue and Knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics , New York: Routledge.
• Reed, Philip, 2016, “Empirical Adequacy and Virtue Ethics,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 19: 343–357.
• Reid, Jeremy, 2019, “Virtue, Rule-Following, and Absolute Prohibitions,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association , 5: 78–97.
• Reshotko, Naomi, 2006, Socratic Virtue: Making the Best of the Neither-Good-Nor-Bad , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Roberts, Robert, 2017, “Varities of Virtue Ethics,” in Carr, et al. (2017), pp. 17–34.
• Rogers, Tristan, 2020, “Virtue Ethics and Political Authority,” Journal of Social Philosophy , 51: 303–321.
• Russell, Daniel C., 2008a, “Agent-Based Virtue Ethics and the Fundamentality of Virtue,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 45: 329–48.
• –––, 2008b, “That ‘Ought’ Does Not Imply ‘Right’: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics,” Southern Journal of Philosophy , 46: 299–315.
• –––, 2009, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues , New York: Oxford University Press.
• ––– (ed.), 2013, The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Russell, Paul, 2006, “Moral Sense and Virtue in Hume’s Ethics,” in Chappell (2006), pp. 158–170.
• Sandler, Ronald, 2007, Character and Environment: A Virtue-Oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics , New York: Columbia University Press.
• Sanford, Jonathan, 2015, Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics , Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press.
• Sim, May, 2015, “Why Confucius’ Ethics is a Virtue Ethics,” in Besser-Jones and Slote (2015), pp. 63–76.
• Singh, Keshav, 2021, “Vice and Virtue in Sikh Ethics,” The Monist , 104: 319–336.
• Slingerland, Edward, 2011, “The Situationist Critique and Early Confucian Virtue Ethics,” Ethics , 121 (2): 390–419.
• Slote, Michael, 1993, “Virtue Ethics and Democratic Values,” Journal of Social Philosophy , 14: 5–37.
• –––, 1997, “Virtue Ethics”, in Marcia Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote, Three Methods of Ethics , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 175–238.
• –––, 2001, Morals from Motives , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2010, Moral Sentimentalism , New York: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2011, The Impossibility of Perfection: Aristotle, Feminism, and the Complexities of Ethics , New York, Oxford University Press.
• Smith, Nicholas R., 2017, “Right-Makers and the Targets of the Virtues,” Journal of Value Inquiry , 51: 311–326.
• –––, 2018, “Right Action as Virtuous Action,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 96: 241–254.
• Snow, Nancy, 2010, Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory , New York: Routledge.
• ––– (ed.), 2015, Cultivating Virtue , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2016, “Virtue Acquisition: The Paradox of Striving,” Journal of Moral Education , 45: 179–191.
• ––– (ed.), 2018, The Oxford Handbook of Virtue , New York: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2020, Contemporary Virtue Ethics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Solomon, David, 1988, “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 13: 428–41, reprinted in Statman 1997.
• Sreenivasan, Gopal, 2002, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” Mind , 111 (January): 47–68.
• Stalnaker, Aaron, 2019, Mastery, Dependence, and the Ethics of Authority , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Stangl, Rebecca, 2010, “Asymmetrical Virtue Particularism,” Ethics , 121: 37–57.
• –––, 2015, “Taking Moral Risks and Becoming Virtuous,” in Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Theology, and Psychology , Christian Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel, and William Fleeson (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 215–232.
• –––, 2020, Neither Heroes nor Saints: Ordinary Virtue, Extraordinary Virtue, and Self-Cultivation , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Star, Daniel, 2015, Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Statman, D. (ed.), 1997, Virtue Ethics , Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
• Steyl, Steven, 2019, “The Virtue of Care,” Hypatia , 34: 507–526.
• Stichter, Matt, 2011, “Virtues, Skills, and Right Action,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 14: 73–86.
• Striker, Gisela, 2006, “Aristotle’s Ethics as Political Science”, in Burkhard Reis (ed.), The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 127–141.
• Stocker, Michael, 1976, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” Journal of Philosophy , 14: 453–66.
• Svensson, Frans, 2010, “Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 13: 255–71.
• Swanton, Christine, 2003, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2009, “Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Demandingness,” in T. Chappell (ed.), The Problem of Moral Demandingness: New Philosophical Essays , Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 104–122.
• –––, 2011a, “Nietzsche and the Virtues of Mature Egoism,” in Simon May (ed.), Cambridge Critical Guide to Nietzsche’s ‘On the Genealogy of Morality’, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 285–308.
• –––, 2011b, “Virtue Ethics,” in Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics , New York: Continuum, 190–213.
• –––, 2013, “A New Metaphysics for Virtue Ethics: Heidegger Meets Hume,” in Julia Peters (ed.), Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective , New York: Routledge, pp. 177–194.
• –––, 2015, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche , Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
• –––, 2021, Target Centred Virtue Ethics , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Taylor, Gabriele, 2006, Deadly Vices , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Taylor, Jacqueline, 2002, “Hume on the Standard of Virtue,” Journal of Ethics , 6: 43–62.
• –––, 2006, “Virtue and the Evaluation of Character,” in Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise , Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 276–295.
• –––, 2008, “Hume on Beauty and Virtue,” in Elizabeth Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume , Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 273–292.
• Tessman, Lisa, 2005, Burdened Virtues , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Timpe, Kevin and Craig Boyd (eds.), 2014, Virtues and Their Vices , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Toner, Christopher, 2006, “The Self-Centeredness Objection to Virtue Ethics,” Philosophy , 81: 595–618.
• –––, 2010, “Virtue Ethics and The Nature and Forms of Egoism,” Journal of Philosophical Research , 35: 323–52.
• Upton, Candace (ed.), 2009, Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate , a pair of special issues of The Journal of Ethics , 13 (2/3).
• –––, 2016, “The Empirical Argument Against Virtue,” Journal of Ethics , 20: 335–371.
• Vallor, Shannon, 2016, Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a Future Worth Wanting , New York: Oxford University Press.
• van Hooft, Stan (ed.), 2014, The Handbook of Virtue Ethics , Durham: Acumen.
• van Zyl, Liezl, 2009, “Agent-Based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance,” Journal of Moral Philosophy , 6 (1): 50–69.
• –––, 2010, “Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 28 (1): 80–92.
• –––, 2014, “Right Action and the Targets of Virtue,” in van Hooft (2014), pp. 118–129.
• –––, 2019, Virtue Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction , New York: Routledge.
• Vigani, Denise, 2017, “Is Patience a Virtue?” Journal of Value Inquiry , 51: 327–340.
• –––, 2019, “Virtuous Construal: In Defense of Silencing,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association , 5: 229–245.
• Vogler, Candace, 2013, “Natural Virtue and Proper Upbringing,” in Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspectives , Julia Peters (ed.), New York: Routledge.
• –––, 2020, “Aristotelian Necessity,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement , 87: 101–110.
• Walker, Rebecca L. and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), 2007, Working Virtue , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Watson, Gary, 1990, “On the Primacy of Character,” in Flanagan and Rorty, pp. 449–83, reprinted in Statman, 1997.
• Welchman, Jennifer (ed.), 2006, The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Readings in Virtue Ethics , Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
• White, Nicholas, 2015, “Plato and the Ethics of Virtue,” in Besser-Jones and Slote (2015), pp. 3–15.
• Williams, Bernard, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 2002, Truth and Truthfulness , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Wilson, Alan, 2018, “Honesty as a Virtue,” Metaphilosophy , 49: 262–280.
• Wynn, Mark, 2020, Spiritual Traditions and the Virtues: Living between Heaven and Earth , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Yu, Jiyuan, 2007, The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue , New York: Routledge.
• Zagzebski, Linda, 1996, Virtues of the Mind , New York: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1998, “The Virtues of God and the Foundations of Ethics,” Faith and Philosophy , 15 (4): 538–553.
• –––, 2004, Divine Motivation Theory , New York: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2017, Exemplarist Moral Theory , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Zwolinski, Matt and David Schmidtz, 2013, “Environmental Virtue Ethics,” in Russell (2013), pp. 221–239.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Bibliography on Virtue Ethics (in PDF, listed alphabetically), and Bibliography on Virtue Ethics (in PDF, listed chronologically), by Jörg Schroth.

Aristotle | character, moral | character, moral: empirical approaches | consequentialism | ethics: deontological | moral dilemmas

Acknowledgments

Parts of the introductory material above repeat what was said in the Introduction and first chapter of On Virtue Ethics (Hursthouse 1999).

Copyright © 2022 by Rosalind Hursthouse Glen Pettigrove < glen . pettigrove @ glasgow . ac . uk >

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Home — Essay Samples — Philosophy — Ethics and Moral Philosophy — Virtue Ethics

Essays on Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics essay topics for college students.

As a college student, choosing the right essay topic is crucial to your success. It's not just about fulfilling an assignment; it's an opportunity to explore your interests, exercise critical thinking, and showcase your creativity. Here, we provide you with a comprehensive list of Virtue Ethics essay topics to inspire and guide you in your writing endeavors.

Essay Types and Topics

Argumentative essay.

• The Role of Virtue Ethics in Modern Society
• Challenges in Applying Virtue Ethics to Business Practices
• The Relationship Between Virtue Ethics and Personal Happiness

Example Paragraph:

In today's fast-paced world, the concept of virtue ethics has become increasingly relevant. As individuals and businesses navigate ethical dilemmas, the role of virtue ethics in shaping our decisions cannot be overlooked. This essay will explore the challenges and opportunities of applying virtue ethics in modern society, shedding light on its impact on personal and professional lives.

By examining the challenges and opportunities of applying virtue ethics in modern society, it becomes evident that this ethical framework offers valuable insights into our decision-making processes. As we strive for personal and professional growth, embracing virtue ethics can lead to a more fulfilling and purposeful life.

Compare and Contrast Essay

• Virtue Ethics vs. Utilitarianism: A Comparative Analysis
• The Role of Virtue Ethics in Eastern vs. Western Philosophies
• Applying Virtue Ethics to Personal vs. Professional Decision Making

Descriptive Essay

• The Virtuous Life: A Personal Reflection
• An Exploration of Virtue Ethics in Literature and Art
• The Ethical Landscape: A Descriptive Analysis of Virtue Ethics in Contemporary Society

Persuasive Essay

• Why Virtue Ethics Should Be Integrated into Business Education
• The Ethical Imperative: Convincing Others to Embrace Virtue Ethics
• Advocating for a Virtue Ethics Approach in Political Decision Making

Narrative Essay

• A Personal Experience That Shaped My Understanding of Virtue Ethics
• The Journey to Virtue: A Narrative Exploration of Moral Development
• Discovering Virtue: A Narrative Reflection on Ethical Transformation

Engagement and Creativity

As you explore these essay topics, we encourage you to engage with the concepts of virtue ethics in a creative and thoughtful manner. Consider how you can infuse your unique perspective and experiences into your writing, making your essays both informative and personally meaningful.

Educational Value

Each essay type offers unique opportunities for learning and skill development. An argumentative essay allows you to hone your analytical thinking and persuasive writing skills, while a descriptive essay provides a platform for honing your descriptive abilities. A narrative essay, on the other hand, enables you to practice storytelling and narrative techniques, fostering a deeper understanding of virtue ethics through personal experiences.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Virtue Ethics

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Mr. Rogers, Virtue Ethics and Servant Leadership

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Ethical Dilemma Analysis: Consequentialist, Deontological, and Virtue Ethics Approach

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How to Become a Gentleman

The virtue of giving, applying ethical principles, the concept of human dignity, relevant topics.

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Aristotle’s – The Ethics of Virtue Essay

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Ethics is defined as the attempt to investigate the key aspects and the human conduct fundamental principles, further, it also focuses on the examination of universal values, that is, the males and females’ essential equality, obeying the land law, caring about safety and health of one’s natural environment. Aristotle starts with a principal idea that there are differences in opinion as per matters regarding what is good for human beings and so that we resolve this problem, we must get a solution to this problem. Ethics is not a theory of discipline since our inquiry as to what is good for human beings is not just gathering knowledge, but to be able to achieve a unique state of fulfillment in case of development a fuller acceptance of issue to thrive (Broadie, p. 48).

In the paper, I am going to focus on Aristotle’s theory of mean. I should stress from the very beginning that Aristotle’s understanding of virtues in the form of mean states lies in the idea that human beings should be of strong and resistant character especially according to our present situation. For instance, the expression of anger and high temper is necessary for the sake of a person’s reaction to certain irritations, however, at other times; our situation can call for a great deal of anger. He implies here that, the proportionateness is according to how extreme a situation is.

Aristotle is showing a commitment to saying that anger should not be allowed to achieve the point of overriding reason. It implies that passion usually leads to an extreme level when one is about to lose a temper. He never strives to reject the possibility that one can be filled with anger without reaching a particular extreme.

Hardie (54) says that we are to distinguish between various points of focus to this subject; each of which we call “a doctrine of the mean”. Thus, there exists the perspective disclosing the fact that every virtue state takes place between two vices: that of excess or extremity, and one more of deprivation or deficiency. Further on, there is the fact that whenever a well-behaved person or virtuous opts for performing morally acceptable action, he is to be presented as one who aims at the act intermediating between alternatives that he rejects. We can object to the second objective.

I can start my criticism by considering that sometimes virtuous acts are to be disclosed according to Aristotle’s definitions. In case I try to concentrate on the present to provide my lover with, I am likely to look for an appropriate amount being neither deficient nor excessive. But in many cases, problems challenging a virtuous agent cannot be regarded as a theme related to this quantitative analysis. Deciding between attending a date or not and instead of respecting a competing obligation, it would never be prudent to describe this as a search for a mean between extremes. Broadie (50) argues that the objection is perceived as a doctrine of my actions in the role of an ethical agent and case of deliberation. To overcome this objection, Aristotle focuses on the judge to determine the guilt of a defendant.

He is not to concentrate on a quantitative question; he attempts to decide the evidence of crime committed and is not focusing on action quantity being the middle element of extremes (Hardie, p. 59).

This essay has attempted to explain Aristotle’s theory of mean, why I disagree with it, and the possible circumstances under which it is found inapplicable. It also focuses on some of the reasons why it is subject to objection.

• Broadie, S. “Ethics with Aristotle’s Perspective”. OUP.1998:45-98
• Hardie, W.R. “Aristotle- Ethical Theory .” (2 nd Edition) Oxford: The Clarendon Press.1980:23-61
• Concepts and Strategies in Negotiation
• Sewage and Urban Run-Offs
• Causes of Temper Tantrums
• Moral Being and Vicious Individual by Kant
• Foundations and Concepts of Ethical Relativism
• Utilitarianism: John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham
• Ethical Systems According to Different Authors
• Kant’s Ethical Theory: Rational and Free Choices
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Essay Samples on Virtue

Virtue ethics in deontology and other philosophical theories.

What was a recent moral dilemma that occurred in your life? How did you traverse it? One path would have been the Deontological approach which is to follow the rules. Another way would have been to consider the consequences of each decision and choose the...

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The Main Goal And Purpose Of Utilitarianism And Virtue Ethics

Act-utilitarianism and virtue ethics are two philosophic theories that have the common goal of happiness. Both theories have a purpose, and they can be used to guide our life based on our actions. Even though these two philosophic ideas were created with good intentions to...

• Utilitarianism

John Winthrop and the Virtue of the Wealthy in Society

Winthrop believes that virtue is based on the community with others and it should be shown through the relationship between one another. He shown this when he used the quote, “Wee enterertaine each other in brotherly love affection. Wee must be willing to abridge ourselves...

• John Winthrop
• Religious Beliefs

Courage as One of the Most Important Virtues

Courage: the state or quality of mind or spirit that enables a person to face difficulty, danger, pain or vicissitudes with self-possession without fear. According to the thesaurus dictionary we can also define courage as the mental or moral strength of venture, persevere, and withstand...

Virtue of Philosophic Thinkers, Aristotle and Confucius

Virtue is a characteristic in which every being should strive for. After reading Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Confucius’ Analects, I believe virtue is both a state of mind and actions that reflect a high moral value; you are respectful and mindful of all actions and...

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Relevance of Virtue Among Other Goods in Life

"Wealth does not bring about excellence (virtue), but excellence (virtue) makes wealth and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively." (30b2-4). The virtue can be both a source of money and also something that leads people sometimes (or even often) to forgo making...

Female Virtue and the Authentic Self

In the eighteenth century, a woman’s honesty or her virtue became her way prove her truth through her words and deeds and establish an authentic self. In Samuel Richardson’s letter Pamela, the author shows the power struggle between men and women of that time through...

The Concept Of 'Virtue' In Business

The concept of 'virtue' has a long history in moral philosophy that has always proven difficult to be expressed as each individual draws their own definition of its true meaning. This subject is becoming more important in the cultural climate we live in and for...

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Best topics on Virtue

1. Virtue Ethics In Deontology And Other Philosophical Theories

2. The Main Goal And Purpose Of Utilitarianism And Virtue Ethics

3. John Winthrop and the Virtue of the Wealthy in Society

4. Courage as One of the Most Important Virtues

5. Virtue of Philosophic Thinkers, Aristotle and Confucius

6. Relevance of Virtue Among Other Goods in Life

7. Female Virtue and the Authentic Self

8. The Concept Of ‘Virtue’ In Business

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• Meaning of Life
• Immanuel Kant
• Ethics in Everyday Life

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Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics Essays

A personal prescription for eudaimonia: blending wisdom from plato, aristotle, stoicism, and epicureanism, popular essay topics.

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Aristotle Virtue Ethicss

This essay about Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics explores the timeless wisdom of ancient Greek philosophy in navigating moral dilemmas and ethical decision-making. It illuminates the concept of eudaimonia, emphasizing human flourishing and the pursuit of virtue as the key to a fulfilling life. Through the lens of the golden mean, Aristotle’s framework advocates for finding balance and moderation in character development. Furthermore, it discusses the importance of moral education and habituation in shaping virtuous behavior. The essay also highlights the societal dimension of Virtue Ethics, particularly in the context of friendship and community, underscoring the role of mutual goodwill and shared values in fostering human excellence.

How it works

In the vast realm of ethical philosophy, Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics stands as a beacon of enlightenment, guiding moral seekers through the labyrinth of human existence. Steeped in the wisdom of ancient Greece, Aristotle’s insights transcend epochs, offering a kaleidoscopic view of virtue and the art of living well. At its core, Virtue Ethics beckons individuals to embark on a journey of self-discovery and moral refinement, weaving a tapestry of character and conduct that reflects the essence of human excellence.

Central to Aristotle’s ethical tapestry is the concept of eudaimonia, a multifaceted gem that gleams with the promise of human flourishing. Like a compass guiding sailors through stormy seas, eudaimonia points towards a destination beyond mere survival—a destination marked by fulfillment, purpose, and inner harmony. Unlike the rigid structures of rule-based ethics or the utilitarian calculus of consequences, Virtue Ethics invites individuals to navigate the contours of their own moral landscape, charting a course towards the golden mean—the delicate balance between excess and deficiency.

Aristotle’s vision of virtue is not static but dynamic, akin to a garden that requires diligent cultivation and care. Just as a skilled gardener tends to the soil, nurturing seeds of virtue to fruition, so too must individuals tend to the garden of their souls, cultivating habits that reflect the beauty of moral excellence. Through practice and repetition, virtues such as courage, temperance, and justice take root, transforming character and shaping destiny. It is through the daily rituals of thought and action that the ethical tapestry of one’s life is woven, each thread contributing to the vibrant mosaic of human flourishing.

Furthermore, Aristotle’s ethical odyssey extends beyond the individual to encompass the fabric of society itself. In his exploration of friendship, Aristotle unveils the intricate threads that bind individuals together in bonds of mutual affection and solidarity. True friendship, he posits, is not merely a transactional exchange of goods or services but a sacred communion of souls—a communion that nurtures virtue, fosters trust, and celebrates the shared journey towards eudaimonia. In the tapestry of human relationships, friendship serves as both warp and weft, interlacing individual lives into a cohesive fabric of community and belonging.

In conclusion, Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics invites us to embark on an odyssey of moral discovery—a journey that transcends time and space, weaving together the threads of virtue, eudaimonia, and friendship into a rich tapestry of human excellence. As we navigate the complexities of ethical decision-making and moral dilemmas, let us heed the wisdom of Aristotle, embracing the challenge of self-cultivation and the promise of a life well-lived.

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9.4 Virtue Ethics

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Identify the central principles of virtue ethics.
• Distinguish the major features of Confucianism.
• Evaluate Aristotle’s moral theory.

Virtue ethics takes a character-centered approach to morality. Whereas Mohists and utilitarians look to consequences to determine the rightness of an action and deontologists maintain that a right action is the one that conforms to moral rules and norms, virtue ethicists argue that right action flows from good character traits or dispositions. We become a good person, then, through the cultivation of character, self-reflection, and self-perfection.

There is often a connection between the virtuous life and the good life in virtue ethics because of its emphasis on character and self-cultivation. Through virtuous development, we realize and perfect ourselves, laying the foundation for a good life. In Justice as a Virtue , for example, Mark LeBar (2020) notes that “on the Greek eudaimonist views (including here Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus) our reasons for action arise from our interest in [ eudaimonia , or] a happy life.” The ancient Greeks thought the aim of life was eudaimonia . Though eudaimonia is often translated as “happiness,” it means something closer to “a flourishing life.” Confucianism , with its strong emphasis on repairing the fractured social world, connects the promotion of virtuous development and social order. Confucians believe virtuous action is informed by social roles and relationships, such that promoting virtuous development also promotes social order.

Confucianism

As discussed earlier, the Warring States period in ancient China (ca. 475–221 BCE) was a period marked by warfare, social unrest, and suffering. Warfare during this period was common because China was comprised of small states that were not politically unified. New philosophical approaches were developed to promote social harmony, peace, and a better life. This period in China’s history is also sometimes referred to as the era of the “Hundred Schools of Thought” because the development of new philosophical approaches led to cultural expansion and intellectual development. Mohism, Daoism, and Confucianism developed in ancient China during this period. Daoism and Confucianism would later spread to Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, where they would be adopted and changed in response to local social and cultural circumstances.

Confucius (551–479 BCE) rose from lowly positions to become a minister in the government of a province in eastern China. After a political conflict with the hereditary aristocracy, Confucius resigned his position and began traveling to other kingdoms and teaching. Confucius’s teachings centered on virtue, veering into practical subjects such as social obligations, ritual performance, and governance. During his lifetime, Confucius despaired that his advice to rulers fell on deaf ears: “How can I be like a bitter gourd that hangs from the end of a string and can not be eaten?” (Analects 17:7). He did not foresee that his work and ideas would influence society, politics, and culture in East Asia for over 2000 years.

Confucius is credited with authoring or editing the classical texts that became the curriculum of the imperial exams, which applicants had to pass to obtain positions in government. His words, sayings, and exchanges with rulers and his disciples were written down and recorded in the Lun Yu , or the Analects of Confucius , which has heavily influenced the moral and social practice in China and elsewhere.

Relational Aspect of Virtue

Like Mohism, Confucianism aimed to restore social order and harmony by establishing moral and social norms. Confucius believed the way to achieve this was through an ordered, hierarchical society in which people know their place in relationship to other people. Confucius said, “There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son” (Analects, 7:11). In Confucianism, relationships and social roles shape moral responsibilities and structure moral life.

A cornerstone of Confucian virtue is filial piety . Confucius felt that the role of the father was to care for and educate his son, but the duty of the son must be to respect his father by obediently abiding by his wishes. “While a man's father is alive, look at the bent of his will; when his father is dead, look at his conduct. If for three years he does not alter from the way of his father, he may be called filial” (Analects, 1:11). Indeed, when the Duke of Sheh informed Confucius that his subjects were so truthful that if their father stole a sheep, they would bear witness to it, Confucius replied, “Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this.” The devotion of the son to the father is more important than what Kant would call the universal moral law of truth telling.

There is therefore an important relational aspect of virtue that a moral person must understand. The virtuous person must not only be aware of and care for others but must understand the “human dance,” or the complex practices and relationships that we participate in and that define social life (Wong 2021). The more we begin to understand the “human dance,” the more we grasp how we relate to one another and how social roles and relationships must be accounted for to act virtuously.

Ritual and Ren

Important to both early and late Confucian ethics is the concept of li (ritual and practice). Li plays an important role in the transformation of character. These rituals are a guide or become a means by which we develop and start to understand our moral responsibilities. Sacrificial offerings to parents and other ancestors after their death, for example, cultivate filial piety. By carrying out rituals, we transform our character and become more sensitive to the complexities of human interaction and social life.

In later Confucian thought, the concept of li takes on a broader role and denotes the customs and practices that are a blueprint for many kinds of respectful behavior (Wong 2021). In this way, it relates to ren , a concept that refers to someone with complete virtue or specific virtues needed to achieve moral excellence. Confucians maintain that it is possible to perfect human nature through personal development and transformation. They believe society will improve if people abide by moral and social norms and focus on perfecting themselves. The aim is to live according to the dao . The word dao means “way” in the sense of a road or path of virtue.

Junzi and Self-Perfection

Confucius used the term junzi to refer to an exemplary figure who lives according to the dao . This figure is an ethical ideal that reminds us that self-perfection can be achieved through practice, self-transformation, and a deep understanding of social relationships and norms. A junzi knows what is right and chooses it, taking into account social roles and norms, while serving as a role model. Whenever we act, our actions are observed by others. If we act morally and strive to embody the ethical ideal, we can become an example for others to follow, someone they can look to and emulate.

The Ethical Ruler

Any person of any status can become a junzi . Yet, it was particularly important that rulers strive toward this ideal because their subjects would then follow this ideal. When the ruler Chi K’ang consulted with Confucius about what to do about the number of thieves in his domain, Confucius responded, “If you, sir, were not covetous, although you should reward them to do it, they would not steal” (Analects, 7:18).

Confucius thought social problems were rooted in the elite’s behavior and, in particular, in their pursuit of their own benefit to the detriment of the people. Hence, government officials must model personal integrity, understand the needs of the communities over which they exercised authority, and place the welfare of the people over and above their own (Koller 2007, 204).

In adherence to the ethical code, a ruler’s subjects must show obedience to honorable people and emulate those higher up in the social hierarchy. Chi K’ang, responding to Confucius’s suggestion regarding thievery, asked Confucius, “What do you say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the principled?” Confucius replied that there was no need to kill at all. “Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good.” Confucius believed that the relationship between rulers and their subjects is and should be like that between the wind and the grass. “The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it” (Analects, 7:19).

Japanese Confucianism

Although Confucianism was initially developed in China, it spread to Japan in the mid-sixth century, via Korea, and developed its own unique attributes. Confucianism is one of the dominant philosophical teachings in Japan. As in China, Japanese Confucianism focuses on teaching individual perfection and moral development, fostering harmonious and healthy familial relations, and promoting a functioning and prosperous society. In Japan, Confucianism has been changed and transformed in response to local social and cultural factors. For example, Confucianism and Buddhism were introduced around the same time in Japan. It is therefore not uncommon to find variations of Japanese Confucianism that integrate ideas and beliefs from Buddhism. Some neo-Confucian philosophers like Zhu Xi, for example, developed “Confucian thinking after earlier study and practice of Chan Buddhism” (Tucker 2018).

Aristotelianism

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was a preeminent ancient Greek philosopher. He studied with Plato (ca. 429–347 BCE) at the Academy , a fraternal organization where participants pursued knowledge and self-development. After Plato’s death, Aristotle traveled, tutored the boy who would later become Alexander the Great, and among other things, established his own place of learning, dedicated to the god Apollo (Shields 2020).

Aristotle spent his life in the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom. His extant works today represent only a portion of his total life’s work, much of which was lost to history. During his life, Aristotle was, for example, principal to the creation of logic, created the first system of classification for animals, and wrote on diverse topics of philosophical interest. Along with his teacher, Plato, Aristotle is considered one of the pillars of Western philosophy.

Human Flourishing as the Goal of Human Action

In the first line of Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , he observes that “[every] art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1094a). If everything we do aims at some good, he argues, then there must be a final or highest good that is the end of all action (life’s telos ), which is eudaimonia , the flourishing life (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097a34–b25). Everything else we pursue is pursued for the sake of this end.

Connections

See the chapter on epistemology for more on the topic of eudaimonia .

Nicomachean Ethics is a practical exploration of the flourishing life and how to live it. Aristotle, like other ancient Greek and Roman philosophers (e.g., Plato and the Stoics), asserts that virtuous development is central to human flourishing. Virtue (or aretê ) means “excellence. We determine something’s virtue, Aristotle argued, by identifying its peculiar function or purpose because “the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097b25–1098a15). We might reasonably say, for example, that a knife’s function is to cut. A sharp knife that cuts extremely well is an excellent (or virtuous) knife. The sharp knife realizes its function and embodies excellence (or it is an excellent representation of knife-ness).

Aristotle assumed our rational capacity makes us distinct from other (living) things. He identifies rationality as the unique function of human beings and says that human virtue, or excellence, is therefore realized through the development or perfection of reason. For Aristotle, virtuous development is the transformation and perfection of character in accordance with reason. While most thinkers (like Aristotle and Kant) assign similar significance to reason, it is interesting to note how they arrive at such different theories.

Deliberation, Practical Wisdom, and Character

To exercise or possess virtue is to demonstrate excellent character. For ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, the pursuit of intentional, directed self-development to cultivate virtues is the pursuit of excellence. Someone with a virtuous character is consistent, firm, self-controlled, and well-off. Aristotle characterized the virtuous character state as the mean between two vice states, deficiency and excess. He thought each person naturally tends toward one of the extreme (or vice) states. We cultivate virtue when we bring our character into alignment with the “mean or intermediate state with regard to” feelings and actions, and in doing so we become “well off in relation to our feelings and actions” (Homiak 2019).

Being virtuous requires more than simply developing a habit or character trait. An individual must voluntarily choose the right action, the virtuous state; know why they chose it; and do so from a consistent, firm character. To voluntarily choose virtue requires reflection, self-awareness, and deliberation. Virtuous actions, Aristotle claims, should “accord with the correct reason” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1103b30). The virtuous person chooses what is right after deliberation that is informed by practical wisdom and experience. Through a deliberative process we identify the choice that is consistent with the mean state.

The Role of Habit

Aristotle proposed that humans “are made perfect by habit” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1103a10–33). Habit therefore plays an important role in our virtuous development. When we practice doing what’s right, we get better at choosing the right action in different circumstances. Through habituation we gain practice and familiarity, we bring about dispositions or tendencies, and we gain the requisite practical experience to identify the reasons why a certain action should be chosen in diverse situations. Habit, in short, allows us to gain important practical experience and a certain familiarity with choosing and doing the right thing. The more we reinforce doing the right thing, the more we grow accustomed to recognizing what’s right in different circumstances. Through habit we become more aware of which action is supported by reason and why, and get better at choosing it.

Habit and repetition develop dispositions. In Nicomachean Ethics , for example, Aristotle reminds us of the importance of upbringing. A good upbringing will promote the formation of positive dispositions, making one’s tendencies closer to the mean state. A bad upbringing, in contrast, will promote the formation of negative dispositions, making one’s tendencies farther from the mean state (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1095b5).

Read Like a Philosopher

Artistotle on virtue.

Read this passage from from Book II of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics , considering what Aristotle means when he states that moral virtues come about as a result of habit. How should individuals make use of the two types of virtue to become virtuous?

Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance, the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyreplayers are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.

Social Relationships and Friendship

Aristotle was careful to note in Nicomachean Ethics that virtuous development alone does not make a flourishing life, though it is central to it. In addition to virtuous development, Aristotle thought things like success, friendships, and other external goods contributed to eudaimonia .

In Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle points out that humans are social (or political) beings (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097b10). It’s not surprising, then, that, like Confucius, Aristotle thinks social relations are important for our rational and virtuous development.

When we interact with others who have common goals and interests, we are more likely to progress and realize our rational powers. Social relations afford us opportunities to learn, practice, and engage in rational pursuits with other people. The ancient Greek schools (e.g., Plato’s Academy, Aristotle’s Lyceum , and Epicurus’s Gardens) exemplify the ways individuals benefit from social relations. These ancient schools offered a meeting place where those interested in knowledge and the pursuit of wisdom could participate in these activities together.

Through social relations, we also develop an important sense of community and take an interest in the flourishing of others. We see ourselves as connected to others, and through our interactions we develop social virtues like generosity and friendliness (Homiak 2019). Moreover, as we develop social virtues and gain a deeper understanding of the reasons why what is right, is right, we realize that an individual’s ability to flourish and thrive is improved when the community flourishes. Social relations and political friendships are useful for increasing the amount of good we can do for the community (Kraut 2018).

The important role Aristotle assigns to friendship in a flourishing life is evidenced by the fact that he devotes two out of the ten books of Nicomachean Ethics (Books VIII and IX) to a discussion of it. He notes that it would be odd, “when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169a35–b20). Aristotle distinguishes between incidental friendships and perfect friendships . Incidental friendships are based on and defined by either utility or pleasure. Such friendships are casual relationships where each person participates only because they get something (utility or pleasure) from it. These friendships neither contribute to our happiness nor do they foster virtuous development.

Unlike incidental friendships, perfect friendships are relationships that foster and strengthen our virtuous development. The love that binds a perfect friendship is based on the good or on the goodness of the characters of the individuals involved. Aristotle believed that perfect friends wish each other well simply because they love each other and want each other to do well, not because they expect something (utility or pleasure) from the other. He points out that “those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1156a27–b17). Aristotle argues that the happy man needs (true) friends because such friendships make it possible for them to “contemplate worthy [or virtuous] actions and actions that are [their] own” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169b20–1170a6). This affords the good individual the opportunity to contemplate worthy actions that are not their own (i.e., they are their friend’s) while still thinking of these actions as in some sense being their own because their friend is another self. On Aristotle’s account, we see a true friend as another self because we are truly invested in our friend’s life and “we ought to wish what is good for his sake” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1155b17–1156a5).

Perfect friendships afford us opportunities to grow and develop, to better ourselves—something we do not get from other relationships. Aristotle therefore argues that a “certain training in virtue arises also from the company of the good” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1170a6–30). Our perfect friend provides perspective that helps us in our development and contributes to our happiness because we get to participate in and experience our friend’s happiness as our own. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that Aristotle considered true friends “the greatest of external goods” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169a35–b20).

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• Authors: Nathan Smith
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• Book title: Introduction to Philosophy
• Publication date: Jun 15, 2022
• Location: Houston, Texas
• Book URL: https://openstax.org/books/introduction-philosophy/pages/1-introduction
• Section URL: https://openstax.org/books/introduction-philosophy/pages/9-4-virtue-ethics

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How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues

Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy

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Contains 14 specially commissioned papers on aspects of virtue ethics, and a substantial introduction that also serves as an introduction to virtue ethics. Topics covered include the practical application of the theory, ancient views, partiality, Kant, utilitarianism, human nature, natural and artificial virtues, virtues and the good, vices, emotions, politics, feminism and moral education, and community.

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Aristotle and Virtue Ethics

Explore the importance, advantages, application, and other aspects of virtue ethics theory with the help of our reflective essay sample! Get some ideas for your virtue ethics essay!

Virtue Ethics: Essay Introduction

The good girl movie, aristotle virtue ethics theory, application of the theory, personal reflection, virtue ethics: essay conclusion, works cited.

Aristotle holds that virtues originate from actions that human beings perform because one can either be a good or bad person based on actions. In his ethics, Aristotle asserts that whatever activities human beings do ultimately lead to a good or a bad end. Desire and passion compel human beings to pursue certain activities so that they can achieve certain ends, which determine virtue. If there were no desired ends, human beings would pursue activities in vain.

Human beings seek to achieve legitimate ends so that they can obtain happiness in life. Aristotle argues that human actions determine virtues that one achieves and subsequently influence happiness1. For example, a marriage partner who has experienced an unhappy marriage will struggle extremely hard to achieve a happy life out there with friends. Therefore, how does Aristotle’s virtue theory apply to The Good Girl movie?

The movie shows the story of a young woman, Justine, who is so troubled in her marriage because she has no children. Justine is 30 years old and has been unable to conceive because her husband, Phil, is impotent, according to the diagnosis of a doctor. Phil is sterile because he has continually abused drugs, which has permanently made him unable to make his wife conceive. Troubled by dying marriage, Justine planned to seek a man who would make her happy in life by giving her a baby.

Luckily, Justine found a young man aged 22, Holden, who was particularly attractive and mysterious2. From then, Justine and Holden continued with their secret love affair until when her workmates and friends discovered it. Discovery of their secret affair put Justine in a dilemma, as she was already pregnant and did not know what to tell Phil. Justine wanted to save her marriage and, at the same time, keep the baby by marrying Holden. However, Justine and Phil reconciled and lived happily after that with their daughter.

According to Aristotle’s ethical theory, virtues result from human actions, for the perception of the moral character of a person emanates from various activities. Human actions and activities aim at attaining excellence, which is a virtue in every aspect of life. According to Aristotle, every art and pursuit aims at attaining the good, which is a virtue that all human beings cherish3. Synchronized actions focus on achieving one objective or more objectives as ends of excellence.

The difference between plants or animals and human being is a rational principle. The rational principle gives human beings the ability to think and act. Through thoughts, a human being can coordinate actions that determine ethics because actions describe ethics. For instance, ’a good player’ and ’a bad player,’ in this case, good and bad, are descriptions of the action of playing, and they portray the virtues of players.

Actions are imperative in achieving virtues since no one can have virtues by a mere theoretical understanding of what ethics are. Thus, due to diversity and degree of actions, it is extraordinarily complicated to attribute certain actions to specified virtues, making ethics subjective.

The ethics theory further asserts that there are two types of virtues, moral and intellectual virtues; moral virtues emanate from habits, while intellectual virtue is an innate characteristic that undergoes a transformation in the course of life due to teaching and experience. Nature gives primary moral virtues, and through perfection by habitual activities, one attains given moral virtues. Since habituation is a process of achieving ethics for one to be excellent in a certain field, one should continually learn and exercise.

For example, one becomes a runner by running; likewise, people become good when they do good and bad by doing bad things. The emphasis here is that actions have a direct relation with virtues, for virtues cannot occur without actions.

Then, what actions are responsible for certain virtues? Confusingly, the same action produces both a virtue and vice. For instance, in playing as an action, we have both good and bad players. Aristotle argues that virtues exist in a continuum of excess and deficiency of actions, and thus, virtue occurs as an intermediate4. It, therefore, shows that deficiency or excess of action results in vices while intermediate actions give virtues.

Given that Aristotle’s ethics theory postulates that human actions determine their virtues, The Good Girl movie portrays a scenario where Justine’s actions led her to achieve happiness. For many years, Justine had been in a troubled marriage that was gradually dying since Phil was unable to make her conceive. In pursuit of happiness, Justine thought of the best way of achieving happiness amidst the daunting challenges of her marriage that seemed not to end unless she did something about them.

According to Aristotle, actions form the basis of virtue, for they determine goodness or badness as unique ends of actions, but since human beings aim at achieving a good end, happiness is then an end of actions5. Thus, Justine was struggling to achieve happiness in her marriage and life, as well.

The movie has termed her a ‘good’ girl because she thought of the best way of conceiving a baby so that she could achieve happiness in marriage and life. In her troubles, Justine had three options: to tolerate the hard life of marriage, to divorce her husband, or to conceive through a love affair. Relating to Aristotle’s ethical theory, deficiency and excess of action cause a vice that leads to an unhappy life.

Thus, the option of tolerating fruitless marriage life would have been a deficient action, while the option of divorce would have been an excessive action. Hence, the option of conceiving through a love affair, because her husband was sterile, enabled her to have a girl child who made their marriage happy again after reconciliation. Aristotle argues that intermediate passions and actions are the recipes to virtues that lead to happiness6. Therefore, Justine obtained happiness through intermediate passions and actions.

Aristotle’s ethical theory effectively describes how virtues occur in society. The assertion that human actions and passions aim at achieving good is a complex concept that needs elaboration since some actions ultimately lead to vice, no matter their moderation. For instance, an action such as killing has no moderation and hence lacks virtue. Moreover, since human actions are diverse, it is difficult to classify virtues according to diverse actions because it would lead to ambiguity.

Therefore, if actions only determine moral virtues according to Aristotle’s ethics theory, there could be indefinite virtues in society, proving that ethics are not only complex but also subjective. Assertions like human actions determine virtues pose a serious threat to ethical theories because it demands continued teaching of morality. If human moral values constantly change due to the influence of actions, then it is a daunting task to control moral virtues.

Regarding Aristotle concept of moderation, it is quite evident that intermediate actions yield virtues while extreme actions cause vices. The concept is particularly valuable as it shows that the moderation of human actions plays a significant role in shaping one’s morality through habituation.

In the case study of The Good Girl movie, Justine was able to moderate her actions so that she could achieve happiness in life, and she eventually became a ‘good’ girl. Thus, deficiency and excess of action cause vice, while an intermediate of an action results in virtue and happiness.

Since humans do not have stable character traits, ethical theories provide the basis for the understanding of moral virtues, but achieving the virtues demands actions. Knowing what actions give certain moral virtues enables one to pursue morality by habitually exercising them. As in the case of Justine in The Good Girl movie, one needs to know that excesses or deficiencies of actions will result in vices, and moderation of actions is vital in achieving desired virtues.

Pleasures and pains accompany the pursuit of actions because excessive pleasures result in overindulgence, which is a vice, while too much pain results in serious fear, which is also a vice. Hence, moderation of actions enables one to achieve moral virtues, though it is hard to determine what the actions are and the extent of exercising them.

Ross, William. Nicomachean Ethics: Aristotle . Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999.

Weschler, Raymond. “The Good Girl.” Drama and Comedy , 2002: 1-23.

1 William Ross. Nicomachean Ethics: Aristotle . Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999, 14

2, Raymond Weschler. “The Good Girl.” Drama and Comedy , 2002: 1.

3 William Ross. Nicomachean Ethics: Aristotle . Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999.

4 William Ross. (1999): 28

5 William Ross. (1999): 10

6 William Ross. (1999): 31

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Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems

Rebecca L. Walker and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems , Oxford University Press, 2007, 319pp., $85.00 (hbk), ISBN 978199271658.

Reviewed by David Carr, University of Edinburgh

As is now familiar, a virtue ethical approach to ethics and moral philosophy, for the most part drawing on Aristotle, was revived around the middle of the last century. As the editors to this new collection of essays on virtue ethics also note, this revival was probably mainly inspired by the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe who used virtue ethical ideas mainly as a stick to beat the dominant ethical theories of the day, utilitarianism and (Kantian) deontology. Anscombe's own observations were fairly programmatic and she wrote little on virtue herself; but many philosophers were quick to pursue her pioneering suggestions and over the course of the past half-century, virtue ethics has developed into a potent third force in contemporary ethics and moral philosophy -- and is now commonly regarded as a serious rival to Kantian ethics of duty and utilitarian ethics of utility. It has also, as philosophical theories are apt to do, greatly diversified over the years: there are almost as many approaches to virtue ethics as there are virtue ethicists, and just as much disagreement between them about the ethical character and status of virtue. Elsewhere, I have identified a number of distinct varieties of virtue ethics: these include the mainstream Aristotelian (eudaemonistic) virtue ethics of (apparently) Anscombe, Peter Geach and Philippa Foot; the moral realist virtue ethics of John MacDowell; the idealist or social constructivist account of Alasdair MacIntyre; the 'sentimentalist' (to use the term adopted in this book) approach of Michael Slote; and the 'pluralist' theory of Christine Swanton.

But the theoretical questions raised by these different perspectives have no less significant practical implications -- since it is generally considered by its advocates to be a virtue of virtue ethics that it is directly addressed to down-to-earth developmental issues concerning the cultivation and formation of human character. For Aristotle (criticizing the moral hyper-rationalism of Plato), the acquisition of virtue is a profoundly practical matter and as well showing much interest in the mechanics of character formation, he is also greatly exercised by the significance of such qualities for effective public, civic and political life and participation. It is in this sprit that the editors have brought together thirteen essays by scholars working in a variety of professional fields: Nel Noddings on caring in education; Edmund Pelegrino on medical professionalism; Jeffery Blustein on doctoring and self-forgiveness; Jennifer Ralden on professional virtue in psychiatry; Annette Baier on trust in medicine; Rosalind Hursthouse on environmental ethics; Rebecca Walker on ethical treatment of animals; Peter Koller on virtue and law; Christine Swanton on virtue and role ethics in business; Lawrence Blum on race and virtue; Nancy Sherman on anger and virtue in a military context; Michael Slote on virtue and famine; and Philip Ivanhoe on virtue and filial piety (in Confucian thought). All of these essays raise interesting questions and issues; however, I shall not attempt to address them all in the space of this short review.

Further to this, indeed, the editors mildly complain that the practical implications of virtue ethics have been hitherto rather neglected in the literature. In the event, however, there is rather more in this field than the editors (and contributors) acknowledge or have recognised. For a start, substantial work has been done in educational philosophy by a number of orthodox virtue ethicists and a major collection of essays on virtue ethics and education (containing essays by some of the contributors to this volume, and favourably reviewed by another) appeared a few years ago under the editorship of this reviewer and an Amsterdam colleague (Carr and Steutel 1999). Again, there has been a fair amount of virtue ethical work on professional and other wider public and social issues: Raja Halwani's recent collection on sex and ethics (2007), for example, explicitly sets out to address sexual morality from a virtue ethical and/or theoretical direction. All the same, the appearance of additional work in this general field might well be welcomed. That said, in so far as the stated aim of this collection is to show how public and professional issues might be usefully addressed from a distinctively virtue ethical -- as opposed to a deontological or utilitarian -- perspective, it may yet be asked how well it succeeds in doing so. In relation to this question, it may first be noted that the editorial introduction devotes some attention to a common distinction between virtue theory and virtue ethics. According to this distinction, in so far as any and all discussions of virtue might fall under the rubric of virtue theory, virtue theory has a wider scope than virtue ethics. For whereas Kantian and utilitarian accounts which regard the development or cultivation of virtues as of some (motivational) moral importance would count as theories of virtue, they are yet not virtue ethical accounts in so far as they do not -- unlike (allegedly) Aristotle's view -- give ethical primacy to the cultivation of dispositional (aretaic) qualities over (deontic) principles.

To be sure, as with most such philosophical distinctions, things are not quite so clear cut and there are cases where we might be hard put to know whether a particular account was virtue ethical or not: but there is enough broad direction here to rule out certain accounts as virtue ethical, since some (Kant's or Mill's say) would define a virtue in terms of obedience to independently established ethical principles rather than understanding qualities of character as somehow (virtue ethically) prior to any and all determinations of such principles. However, while the editors of this volume clearly see this distinction as significant for the general direction of this collection, they are not at all resolute in maintaining it: on the one hand, they recognise the difficulty of strictly observing any such distinction, but on the other they are also emphatic that 'not anything goes' in virtue ethics. But such apparent indecision about whether or not it matters whether a theory is virtue ethical arguably creates something of a dilemma here: either the distinction does matter for the distinctive identity of the collection, in which case accounts of virtue from other ethical perspectives would need to be ruled out as lacking the relevant virtue ethical character; or it doesn't matter, in which case this may be little more than a general collection of essays on practical ethics under a somewhat misleading trades description. In the event, it seems to me that this collection is significantly caught on the second horn of this dilemma: it is not an especially virtue ethics-focused collection, a significant proportion of the contributors are not virtue ethicists, and one rather suspects -- given the rather loose grasp that some contributors seem to have on the idea of a virtue as such -- that some of them do not have much real interest in virtues at all.

Indeed, there can hardly be a better case in point here than the leading article by Nel Noddings. Noddings is a highly regarded writer on ethics and education, but she is not a virtue ethicist -- and (whatever she has chosen to say here) she has previously opposed any virtue ethical interpretation of her favoured topic of care in debate with virtue ethicists such as Michael Slote. The main direction from which she has been influenced would seem to be Hume rather than Aristotle, and it is revealing that she apparently thinks (p. 59) that virtue ethics sides with care ethics in rejecting moral principles (when it is quite clear that the great champions of virtue ethics from Aristotle through Aquinas to (say) Geach and MacIntyre take various kinds of (fixed and other) principles very seriously indeed). As she has repeatedly argued, her care ethics is focused primarily on the quality of human relationships and association (and of institutions) rather than upon the development of individual dispositions, and she is not much (at least ethically) concerned -- as much mainstream virtue ethics is -- with goals of individual development and perfection. From this viewpoint, on the assumption that this volume is about the public and professional significance of virtue ethics, it may be said that there are several educational philosophers of international reputation who might have better served to show how key virtue ethical concepts might be given distinctive and significant application to education and teaching. It is also clear (as the editors admit) that other contributions to this volume -- irrespective of any other merits -- either do not take a virtue ethical perspective (such as Peter Koller on law and morality), or have only tenuous or tangential connections to virtue ethics.

To be sure, while such departures from the avowed editorial intent of this volume may well disappoint the expectations of some readers, it does not detract from the overall high academic and professional standard of the contributions to this volume -- most of which are well turned and have something of general applied ethical significance to say. Moreover, a proportion of the essays do seem to be fairly on professed editorial target. Indeed, despite the fact that her virtue ethical connections are not exactly impeccable (given her well known Kantian leanings), Nancy Sherman's insightful exploration of the place of anger in (specifically military) virtue meets the general aims of this volume about as well as could be wished. As might also be expected, some of the key figures of contemporary virtue ethics who are represented in the volume -- perhaps particularly Hursthouse, Slote and Swanton -- also offer relevant chapters that do engage directly with aspects of the distinctive contribution of virtue ethics to problems of applied and professional ethics. That said, some of these and other essays in this collection also raise -- in what also seem to me fairly problematic ways -- at least two crucial issues about how virtue could or should be understood in contexts of applied ethics.

The first of these is an issue of some potential conceptual inflation involved in the idea of suggesting or inventing 'new' virtues. One place in which this issue arises is in Hursthouse's essay in which, for various reasons, she suggests the development of a new virtue of respect for nature. (This suggestion is also connected in various ways with her apparent rejection of eudaimonistic foundations for virtue -- which also seems to me mistaken: the fact that we do not use eudaimonistic reasons to dissuade children from being cruel to animals does not invalidate the Aristotelian appeal to human flourishing to explain why -- at another more theoretical level -- we value virtue.)   But Hursthouse's new virtue is also supplemented in this work by (at least) Blustein's self-forgiveness and Blum's respect for blackness. To cut a long story short, however, I think that all of these 'new' virtues involve some confusion between virtues as such and particular problems or topics to which (old) virtues may be addressed. There may perhaps be Aristotelian excesses and defects in taking a person's racial background into account in some contexts, but the virtue that gets it right is not respecting blackness, but justice . Indeed, in so far as Blum's 'respecting blackness' is not something we should always morally expect, even in the presence of blackness, there would seem to be not just confusion but also some dangerous absurdity in regarding it as a virtue.

The second (not unrelated) problematic issue raised in several places in this work concerns the relationship between the familiar virtues of ordinary human moral association and so-called virtues of 'role' -- specifically required in this or that professional or vocational context -- that may sometimes appear to conflict with ordinary moral virtues. This problem is brought into sharp relief by the examples of some contributors (for instance, by Radden's suggestion that psychiatrists may be drawn to 'feign virtue' as a means to helping the recovery of patients) and it is directly addressed by Christine Swanton, who argues that role virtues are nevertheless reconcilable with 'prototype' virtues, in so far as the former are in the last resort accountable to the standards of the latter. Once again, despite the ingenuity of Swanton's case, one may doubt whether this is the right thing to say. Clearly, there are conflicts between prototype virtues and what a particular professional role requires as right conduct. It is professionally right for soldiers to obey orders without question (at any rate in the heat of battle), which means that it may -- from a military standpoint -- be professionally right to kill people or endanger the lives of civilians; but it is hardly virtuous to do so. So, while one might well wish (along with Swanton) to bring business or other professional practice more in line with 'regular' virtue, it might be a better move here simply to deny that role virtues are virtues in anything other than some secondary or derivative sense. Once more, the problem may be that regarding the standards required for the successful prosecution of this or that professional role as expressive of genuine virtue is just unnecessarily and unhelpfully inflationary. In the context of education and teaching, it is professionally desirable that teachers should behave honestly, fairly and with self-control; but the best sort of teacher is arguably not the one who feigns honesty, fairness and self-control but the one who actually is honest, fair and self-controlled. From the virtue ethical viewpoint, the aim of professional ethics should be to produce virtuous teachers rather than practitioners of 'role virtues'.

While space precludes further detailed comment on individual contributions to this collection, this should not be taken to imply that any essays not mentioned are of little or no interest. On the contrary, there is work here of potential interest to a range of professional and public fields of concern. As already indicated, however, I would not regard this volume as a particularly well-focused or coherent collection of essays on the practical application of virtue ethics as such. Indeed, I am inclined to wonder whether a newcomer to virtue ethics would get a very good sense from this volume of the distinctive character and basic themes of virtue ethics -- and, from this viewpoint, the editors might have better devoted the space given to résumés of contributors' essays to some more detailed stage-setting of the basic form, themes and wider literature of (Aristotelian and/or other) virtue ethics. However, as a general collection of contemporary work on applied ethics -- or even perhaps of virtue theory -- the collection fares rather better, and contains much of respectable quality and of general interest to scholars working in a fair range of applied ethical fields.

Carr, D. and Steutel, J. (eds) (1999) Virtue Ethics and Moral Education , London: Routledge.

Halwani, R. (ed) (2007) Sex and Ethics: Essays on Sexuality, Virtue and the Good Life , Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Virtue ethics

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Introduction

• Its guiding question: What should I do?
• Emphasis on character, not on individual actions. The goodness comes from the people that perform the act not vice versa, this means that the good people here is the one that performs the act.
• It is based on the character of the person that you are helping if he is someone that has patience or benevolence he has virtues, and if he is someone that has cowardice or laziness, etc he has vices and he is not a virtuous person.
• To have a virtue is to respond to some certain sorts of situations or circumstances in the appropriate way, for example: having courage in a difficult or dangerous situation.
• Good people are virtuous and they don’t have vices.
• “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”
• “Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature.”
• Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.”

Bibliography

• Wikipedia, “Deontological ethics”. May 26, 2010.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontological_ethics
• “W.D.Ross Moral Theory”http://www.hu.mtu.edu/~tlockha/hu329ov8.htm
• Wikipedia, “Immanuel Kant “.May 26, 2010. http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant
• “Virtue Ethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy . 2003. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/

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Essay on Virtue Ethics

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Virtue, when I hear that word I think of value and morality and only good people can be virtuous. When I hear the word ethics I think of good versus evil, wrong and right. Now when the two are put together you get virtue ethics. You may wonder what can virtue ethics possibly mean. It’s just two words put together to form some type of fancy theory. Well this paper will discuss virtue ethics and the philosophy behind it. Virtue ethics is a theory that focuses on character development and what virtues one should obtain to be who they are supposed to be, as oppose to actions. An example of virtue ethics would be someone who is patient, kind, loving, generous, temperance, courage and flourishing as oppose to a person who lies, cheats, and …show more content…

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The statistics are shocking. In the United States, nearly 100,000 people are listed on a national database for kidney transplantation, but perhaps three-quarters of them will die before an appropriate match is found. Yet the choice to make a live, non-directed donation is relatively rare. As Lane hears from others and experiences for herself, many friends and relatives regard the would-be donor as crazy.

Among the interesting interviewees is psychology professor Abigail Marsh, whose personal history prompted her interest in understanding the neural and cognitive basis of empathy, altruism, aggression and psychopathy. When studying brain scans of people diagnosed with psychopathy, Marsh hypothesized that perhaps they represented one end of a continuum, and that the brains of people expressing more empathy than the average joe would also be differently wired. 

Marsh explains that the brain’s amygdala is linked to all of our sensory processing systems and gives a corresponding emotional response to the information processed. Psychopathic brains have amygdalas that on average are up to 20% smaller than normal people. Altruistic people have amygdalas which are around 8% larger than average. The scan she performs on Lane proves that the filmmaker’s amygdala is quite large.

Meanwhile, advocate and author Dr. Sally Satel, a recipient of a donated kidney, makes a compelling argument for government legislated rewards for altruistic organ donation, since it is against the law for a recipient to offer cash or other financial benefits to a donor and for a donor to accept them. Given that non-directed donations comprise only 2% of all the kidney transplants performed and black-market organs comprise 10%, the title of her book neatly sums up the problem: “Altruism Is Not Enough.” Archival footage showing a 1984 Senate inquiry (chaired by a young Al Gore) into an organs-for-money scheme shows that doctors have been thinking about this issue for some time.

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• Production: (Documentary) A Spinning Nancy presentation of a Sandbox Films production, in association with Olive Hill Media, Impact Partners. (World sales: Submarine Entertainment, NY.) Producer: Gabriel Sedgwick. Executive producers: Greg Boustead, Jessica Harrop, Tim Lee, Michael Cho, Mimi Rode.
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"Virtue Ethics and Adultery" by Raja Halwani. 72 Virtue Ethics Essay Topics & Research Titles at StudyCorgi Virtue ethics is an ethical theory that emphasizes character above behavior. The concept underscores the importance of mentality and personality. Virtue ethics would not support the decision of breaking the contract on the grounds of loyalty. The concepts of holding to one's word are at play here. The Importance of Virtue Ethics: [Essay Example], 656 words Ethics, virtue ethics is a prominent and influential approach that focuses on the moral character of individuals and the virtues they embody. Unlike other ethical theories that prioritize rules, consequences, or duties, virtue ethics emphasizes the development of virtuous traits and the cultivation of moral excellence. This essay will explore the significance of virtue ethics in contemporary ... 141 Virtue Essay Topic Ideas & Examples Philosophy Terms: Justice, Happiness, Power and Virtue. Socrates argues that autocratic leadership is an important structure of ensuring that the rule of law is followed and that the common good of all societal members is enhanced. Price Gouging and Virtue: "Justice" by Michael Sandel. Virtue Ethics Essays: Examples, Topics, & Outlines Virtue Ethics Virtue-based vs. duty-based ethics: arguments and examples from Victor Hugo, Aristotle, Bernard Mayo, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and William Frankena In the study of ethics and morality, there have been theoretical foundations in which it was argued that morality comes with being rather than doing, or that a true moral life is one that is a product of doing instead of being. Virtue Ethics Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). 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This paper seeks to derive a unique prescription for meaningful living by introducing aspects ... Aristotle Virtue Ethicss This essay about Aristotle's Virtue Ethics explores the timeless wisdom of ancient Greek philosophy in navigating moral dilemmas and ethical decision-making. It illuminates the concept of eudaimonia, emphasizing human flourishing and the pursuit of virtue as the key to a fulfilling life. ... Kitsch under the Title of Taste and Ethics. The ... 9.4 Virtue Ethics Nicomachean Ethics is a practical exploration of the flourishing life and how to live it. Aristotle, like other ancient Greek and Roman philosophers (e.g., Plato and the Stoics), asserts that virtuous development is central to human flourishing. Virtue (or aretê) means "excellence. We determine something's virtue, Aristotle argued, by ... How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues Abstract. Contains 14 specially commissioned papers on aspects of virtue ethics, and a substantial introduction that also serves as an introduction to virtue ethics. Topics covered include the practical application of the theory, ancient views, partiality, Kant, utilitarianism, human nature, natural and artificial virtues, virtues and the good ... Aristotle and Virtue Ethics Aristotle Virtue Ethics Theory. According to Aristotle's ethical theory, virtues result from human actions, for the perception of the moral character of a person emanates from various activities. Human actions and activities aim at attaining excellence, which is a virtue in every aspect of life. According to Aristotle, every art and pursuit ... Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems As the editors to this new collection of essays on virtue ethics also note, this revival was probably mainly inspired by the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe who used virtue ethical ideas mainly as a stick to beat the dominant ethical theories of the day, utilitarianism and (Kantian) deontology. Anscombe's own observations were fairly ... Virtue ethics Virtue ethics is a system of ethics that emphasizes on the virtues or the moral character of the people. This means that it is based on what the person had done if he has done bad things then he has a bad moral character. Supposing that someone needs help then, someone that practices the virtue ethics will eventually help him if he is a good ... Essay on Virtue Ethics Virtue ethics is a theory that focuses on character development and what virtues one should obtain to be who they are supposed to be, as oppose to actions. An example of virtue ethics would be someone who is patient, kind, loving, generous, temperance, courage and flourishing as oppose to a person who lies, cheats, and …show more content…. 'Confessions of a Good Samaritan' Review: Penny Lane's Altruism Essay An exploration of the science, history and ethics of organ donation in the context of the filmmaker's kidney donation. Despite being a tad too long and a trifle repetitive, the documentary essay ... COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES OF NEMSU-MAIN CAMPUS CLUSTER 1 COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES OF NEMSU-MAIN CAMPUS CLUSTER 1 - JUNE 24, 2024-TECHNICAL CREW POV- DISCLAIMER: No copyright infringement is intended. I do not... Postleitzahl 140050 Postleitzahl 140050 befindet sich in Kraskowo. Postleitzahlen in der Nähe enthalten 140051. Betrachten Sie Karten und finden Sie mehr Informationen zu Postleitzahl 140050 auf Cybo. Category:Vereya urban settlement Subcategories. This category has the following 2 subcategories, out of 2 total. S. Simbukhovo‎ (7 F) Kratovo, Russia Kratovo (Russian: Кра́тово) is an urban locality (a suburban (dacha) settlement) in Ramensky District of Moscow Oblast, Russia, located 40 kilometers (25 mi) southeast of Moscow.Population: 8,277 (2010 Russian census); 6,855 (2002 Census); 6,295 (1989 Soviet census) . Zoe Williams of The Guardian wrote that Kratovo "resembles a Russian Guildford with high hedges, gigantic trees, the ... File:Kratovo, Moscow Oblast, Russia You are free: to share - to copy, distribute and transmit the work; to remix - to adapt the work; Under the following conditions: attribution - You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. assignment essay homework paper phd report resume review speech thesis