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Research Article

Reactions to Media Violence: It’s in the Brain of the Beholder

* E-mail: [email protected]

Affiliations Department of Psychiatry, Friedman Brain Institute, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, New York, United States of America, Department of Neuroscience, Friedman Brain Institute, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, New York, United States of America

Affiliations Department of Psychiatry, Friedman Brain Institute, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, New York, United States of America, Laboratory of Neuroimaging, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Bethesda, Maryland, United States of America

Affiliation Department of Psychiatry, Friedman Brain Institute, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, New York, United States of America

Affiliation Applied Mathematics and Statistics, SUNY, Stony Brook, New York, United States of America

Affiliation Laboratory of Neuroimaging, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Bethesda, Maryland, United States of America

Affiliation Medical Department, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York, United States of America

• Nelly Alia-Klein, 
• Gene-Jack Wang, 
• Rebecca N. Preston-Campbell, 
• Scott J. Moeller, 
• Muhammad A. Parvaz, 
• Wei Zhu, 
• Millard C. Jayne, 
• Chris Wong, 
• Dardo Tomasi, 

• Published: September 10, 2014
• https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0107260
• Reader Comments

Media portraying violence is part of daily exposures. The extent to which violent media exposure impacts brain and behavior has been debated. Yet there is not enough experimental data to inform this debate. We hypothesize that reaction to violent media is critically dependent on personality/trait differences between viewers, where those with the propensity for physical assault will respond to the media differently than controls. The source of the variability, we further hypothesize, is reflected in autonomic response and brain functioning that differentiate those with aggression tendencies from others. To test this hypothesis we pre-selected a group of aggressive individuals and non-aggressive controls from the normal healthy population; we documented brain, blood-pressure, and behavioral responses during resting baseline and while the groups were watching media violence and emotional media that did not portray violence. Positron Emission Tomography was used with [ 18 F]fluoro-deoxyglucose (FDG) to image brain metabolic activity, a marker of brain function, during rest and during film viewing while blood-pressure and mood ratings were intermittently collected. Results pointed to robust resting baseline differences between groups. Aggressive individuals had lower relative glucose metabolism in the medial orbitofrontal cortex correlating with poor self-control and greater glucose metabolism in other regions of the default-mode network (DMN) where precuneus correlated with negative emotionality. These brain results were similar while watching the violent media, during which aggressive viewers reported being more Inspired and Determined and less Upset and Nervous , and also showed a progressive decline in systolic blood-pressure compared to controls. Furthermore, the blood-pressure and brain activation in orbitofrontal cortex and precuneus were differentially coupled between the groups. These results demonstrate that individual differences in trait aggression strongly couple with brain, behavioral, and autonomic reactivity to media violence which should factor into debates about the impact of media violence on the public.

Citation: Alia-Klein N, Wang G-J, Preston-Campbell RN, Moeller SJ, Parvaz MA, Zhu W, et al. (2014) Reactions to Media Violence: It’s in the Brain of the Beholder. PLoS ONE 9(9): e107260. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0107260

Editor: Jonathan A. Coles, Glasgow University, United Kingdom

Received: May 5, 2014; Accepted: August 7, 2014; Published: September 10, 2014

This is an open-access article, free of all copyright, and may be freely reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, built upon, or otherwise used by anyone for any lawful purpose. The work is made available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication.

Data Availability: The authors confirm that, for approved reasons, some access restrictions apply to the data underlying the findings. All relevant brain and behavior data are provided in the supporting information files in excel format.

Funding: Funding was provided by (1) Brookhaven National Laboratory under contract DE-AC02-98CH10886, http://www.bnl.gov/world/ ; (2) National Institute of Mental Health: R01MH090134 (NAK), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/index.shtml ; and (3) National Institute of Mental Health NIDA and NIH K05DA020001 (JSF) and the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Intramural Program, http://www.drugabuse.gov/ and http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/ . The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exists.

Introduction

While visual media is replete with images of violence, only a small minority in the population engages in real-life violent behavior. Critically, whether a person will act violently depends on individual trait variations which play a prominent role in how visual media is experienced and processed [1] . Therefore, understanding the neurobiological underpinnings of those with aggressive personality traits above the documented norms, is an important prerequisite to the ongoing debate about media impact on behavior [2] . Enduring trait aggression reflects self-report of retaliatory motivation, with high face validity, where individuals endorse questions regarding the degree of their readiness to hurt others. It is emerging in the literature that aggressive individuals differ from non-aggressive individuals in their baseline, trait-like, neurobiological architecture [3] , suggesting involvement of the brain’s default mode network (DMN) [4] , [5] . The DMN forms a distributed circuit of connected brain systems that shows high and coherent metabolic activity or blood flow during awake yet passive resting states which may represent internal and self-referential processing [4] – [7] . The DMN includes regions typically spanning the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and precuneus, lateral inferior parietal gyrus (IPG), medial temporal gyrus (MTG), and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, including the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) [8] . We hypothesize that at resting baseline, individuals with high trait aggression will exhibit different brain metabolism patterns in the DMN including its ventromedial prefrontal regions, revealing fundamentally different internal preoccupations than those with normative trait aggression.

Stimuli with violent themes can prime, or perhaps facilitate existing trait tendencies [1] , [9] . The General Aggression Model (GAM) [10] outlines the processes by which exposure to violence can cause aggressive behavior through the interplay of enduring traits that drive internal states, coupled with congruent visual stimuli from the environment (e.g., violent media). Therefore, according to GAM, chronic exposure to violent images in the media reinforces existing aggressive traits, thereby preparing the individual towards future violence [11] , [12] . The OFC is specifically involved in elements of aggressive behaviors [13] – [15] through its role in prioritizing emotional cues according to intrinsic salience [16] . Likewise, gray matter deficits in the OFC have been observed in individuals with aggressive and violent behavior [17] . As such, we predict involvement of the OFC since it appears to be specifically involved in response to repeated media violence [18] , [19] . Individual differences in brain and behavior during visual media viewing can be further understood in the context of self-reported affective states and autonomic responses (or lack thereof) [20] , [21] . For example, self-reported distress and systolic blood pressure changes were observed in response to viewing violent media [1] , [21] . Cortical representations of emotion-dependent autonomic response (e.g., blood pressure) have been shown in the OFC, anterior cingulate, and insula in response to viewing violent media in healthy controls [22] .

To test our hypotheses regarding baseline and media viewing differences as a function of trait aggression, we recruited a group of healthy aggressive individuals with a history of assault behavior and a group of non-aggressive healthy controls. Measurements of glucose metabolism with [ 18 F]fluoro-deoxyglucose using positron emission tomography (PET) were obtained at three conditions: at resting baseline, during exposure to violent media, and during exposure to emotional, non-violent media. Blood pressure (BP) and behavioral ratings of state affect were collected intermittently during the movie presentations. We expected that aggressive individuals would have a distinct intrinsic brain activity pattern at resting baseline and during passive viewing of the violent media compared to emotional media.

Ethics Statement

This research protocol was approved by the ethical review board of Stony Brook University and conducted accordingly. All participants provided written informed consent prior to participation. Approval number BNL-381.

Participants

A total of 54 males who responded to advertisement for healthy controls and healthy individuals with history of physical fights, were evaluated for their physical assault tendencies and other inclusion/exclusion criteria. Individuals were initially screened by phone and then seen at Brookhaven National Laboratory by a physician for general exclusion criteria which included current or past psychiatric disorders (e.g., drug abuse or dependence), neurological disease, significant medical illness, current treatment with medication (including over the counter drugs) and head trauma with loss of consciousness >30 minutes. Normal physical examination and laboratory tests were required for entry and pre-scan urine tests ensured the absence of any psychoactive drugs. Individuals were classified as aggressive (Ag) or non-aggressive (Na) depending on their responses on the Physical Aggression subscale of the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (the physical aggression subscale correlates strongly with peer ratings of aggression demonstrating its concurrent validity) [23] . Of these 54 participants, only individuals who reported physical fights in the last year and scored at or higher than 75 th percentile on the Physical Aggression scale (Ag, n = 12) or those who reported they did not engage in physical fights and scored at 50 th percentile or below on the Physical Aggression scale (Na, n = 13) were chosen for the study (mean age 25.15) [23] . As planned, the participants differed on Physical Aggression (Ag, mean ± standard error 33.5±1.2; Na, 14.5±1.0, p<.0001). They also differed significantly on the other subscales of the Buss-Perry: Verbal Aggression (Ag, 18.8±1.0; Na, 11.6±1.2, p<.0001), Anger (Ag, 23.7±1.5; Na, 9.6±0.6, p<.0001), Hostility (Ag, 23.1±2.0; Na, 11.8±0.9, p<.0001) and the total score (Ag, 99.5±3.8; Na, 47.5±2.7, p<.0001). The two groups did not differ on age, handedness [24] , socio-economic status [25] , estimates of verbal and non-verbal intelligence [26] , [27] , and depression symptoms [28] . Participants were asked about their media habits including the number of hours they watched TV per day on weekdays and on weekends ( Table 1 ). The participants were monetarily compensated for their participation. It is important to note that the staff performing the media exposure, imaging, nursing, and questionnaire completion, were blind to the subject’s assignment as aggressive or non-aggressive.

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Personality and Behavioral Measures

In addition to the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire, the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ) [29] , a three-factor structural model of personality was used. As listed in Table 1 , the MPQ models three higher order dimensions of personality: Negative Emotionality (NEM, or Neuroticism ) reflecting tendency toward emotional distress, alienation from others and aggressive behavior; Positive Emotionality (PEM, or extraversion) reflecting enduring positive affect through interpersonal engagement, and Constraint measuring tendencies toward self-control. Several lines of evidence have shown that high levels of NEM as Neuroticism are robustly associated with violence and aggression [30] . Similarly, individuals with elevated scores of NEM tend to experience/report more frequent negative emotions such as anger and anxiety, perceive their environment as hostile/unfair, and often exhibit poor coping mechanisms in a stressful situation [31] . The three NEM sub-scales include Stress Reaction which is linked to low frustration tolerance; Aggression which reflects the tendency to respond with retaliatory response style; and Alienation which is the most predictive primary scale of aggressive behavior. We also assessed attention and inhibitory control using a performance based measure, the Attention Network Task (ANT), that captures reaction-time performance on Alerting (response readiness), Orienting (scanning and selection), and Conflict (inhibitory control) in attention [32] .

Imaging Conditions and State Reactivity

There were three 40-minute imaging conditions: resting baseline, where participants were instructed to rest with eyes open, a video presentation of violent scenes, and a video presentation of emotional scenes not portraying violence. The two videos (violent and emotional) were edited from R-rated movies and documentary films. The violent media presentation contained 20 scenes of violent acts encompassing the depiction of intentional acts of violence from one individual to another (e.g. interpersonal, shootings, street fights). The emotional media presentation contained 19 emotionally intense and action filled but non-violent scenes (e.g. people interacting during a natural disaster, sudden failures during competitive sports). The length of each of the violent or emotional scenes was between 1–4 minutes; these scenes were separated by a black screen that appeared for 30 seconds which signaled the next scene. The level of valence and intensity of each of the violent and emotional scenes was evaluated internally in the laboratory (data not shown) for valence and intensity and sequenced to optimize with the dynamics of FDG uptake (most intense scenes during the first 10 minutes of FDG uptake period). During the movie presentations, state levels of emotional reactivity were assessed using the Positive and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS) with adjectives of mood states (ranked from 1, slightly to 5, extremely) [33] . The PANAS was completed by the subjects 5 minutes before the media presentations, 10 minutes into the presentations, and at the end of the media presentations. Table 2 shows PANAS adjectives where differences were found between the groups at p<0.05 during the violent as compared to emotional media presentations. Systolic and diastolic BP was monitored with a compression cuff that operated automatically (Propaq Encore) on the participant’s non-dominant arm starting 5 minutes before the imaging and continued throughout the scanning sessions occurring at 5-minute intervals. For Figure 1 systolic BP data was first averaged within each group at each point in the time series during the violent and during the emotional media presentation. Then, the percentage changes in BP (delta) were calculated from the emotional to the violent media within each group [(violent-emotional)/emotional].

Ag (red) individuals show reduction in systolic blood pressure while watching the violent media versus Na (blue) individuals who show progressive increase in systolic blood pressure. Systolic blood pressure measures were averaged for each group at each time point and a percent change and a trend line were calculated (Y-axis). Error bars (joined and filled) reflect the standard deviation of the data that are presented.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0107260.g001

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0107260.t002

PET Imaging

The 25 subjects were scanned 3 times with PET-FDG in counterbalanced order on separate days and under 3 conditions: resting baseline, violent scenes, non-violent emotional scenes. The scanning procedure is standardized and was described before [34] . The violent and neutral video presentations started 10 min prior to FDG injection and continued for a total of 40 min. PET imaging was conducted with a Siemens HR+ tomograph (resolution 4.5×4.5×4.5 mm 3 full-width half-maximum, 63 slices) in 3D dynamic acquisition mode. Static emission scan started 35 min after FDG injection and continued for the next 20 min. Arterialized blood was used to measure FDG in plasma. During the uptake period of FDG, subjects were resting with eyes open (no stimulation) or watching a movie (violent or emotional) in a quiet dimly lit room with a nurse by their side to ensure that they did not fall asleep. Metabolic rates were computed using an extension of Sokoloff’s model [35] . The emission data for all the scans were corrected for attenuation and reconstructed using filtered back projection.

Image and Data Analyses

Prior to the analysis, each participant’s PET image was mapped onto the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template and smoothed via a Gaussian kernel with full width half maximum at 16 mm. Normalized metabolic images were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) [36] . The normalized images (relative images) were obtained by dividing the signal level of each voxel by the global mean, which was the average signal level of all voxels in the PET image. Analyses were performed in SPM8 with a flexible factor model design with one between-subject factor (Ag and Na groups) and one within-subject factor (baseline, violent, emotional conditions). Main effects of group were tested separately ( Figure 2 ) as well as group x condition interactions. The cluster threshold used was p<0.001, cluster extent >100; given the number of subjects, these parameters were chosen to ensure a minimum of t = 3.00 for each cluster reported. After the SPM results were obtained, cubic regions of interest (ROIs) with 125 voxels were centered at the peak coordinates of relevant activation clusters to compute average metabolic values within these ROIs. Pearson linear correlations were used to assess the association between average ROI measures and BP.

Left panel: Relative glucose metabolism (Y-axis) in Ag (red) and Na (blue) in response to the violent media. On the left of the dotted line are results from Ag>Na contrast and on the right of the dotted line are results from the Ag<Na contrast. Right panel: Glucose metabolism results in response to the emotional media Ag>Na. There were no significant results for Ag<Na. Standard error is presented in the corresponding error bars.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0107260.g002

The behavior and personality indices ( Table 1 ) were analyzed using independent-samples t-tests Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons [37] . The changes in BP (delta) were calculated from the emotional to the violent media within each group [(violent-emotional)/emotional] ( Figure 1 ). We tested whether the progressive change in systolic BP was significantly different between the groups with a general linear model (GLM), where time points and group were independent variables while the BP delta was the dependent variable. Two separate linear regression models were fitted within each group and used to test whether the delta in BP changed significantly over time and whether the slopes were significantly different between the groups. Analysis of PANAS responses to the violent and emotional media presentations was done by calculating differences in responses between violent and emotional presentations at 3 time points (pre, 10 min and end) using a GLM ( Table 2 ).

Traits, Inhibitory Control, and Resting Metabolism

As documented in Table 1 , the groups were not different on demographics and media exposure and no differences were found on MPQ personality traits of PEM which includes the subscales Well Being , Social Potency , Social Closeness and Achievement . Not surprisingly, the groups were substantially different on Negative Emotionality and inhibitory control. Individuals from the Ag group, reported more NEM, with high scores on the NEM subscales, Alienation , Aggression and Stress Reaction . The Ag group also demonstrated poor inhibitory control, reporting less self- Control on the MPQ and also showed increased latency to respond specifically in the Conflict condition of the ANT. This performance measure of inhibitory control correlated with self-reported aggression such that more latency as a result of conflict in attention was seen in those with more trait aggression as measured by two different self-report scales (Buss-Perry Physical Aggression scale r = .76, P<0.0001, and MPQ Aggression (r = .66, P<0.001).

The normalized brain metabolic measures were characterized by robust group effects at resting baseline, involving hyperactivity in the DMN and caudate, and dampened OFC metabolism in Ag as compared to Na ( Table 2 ). These resting metabolic measures in precuneus correlated positively across participants with NEM (R = .56, p<.01) and negatively with Control (R = −.46, 0<.05) whereas those in OFC showed the opposite pattern revealing a negative correlation with NEM (R = −.40, p<.05) and positive correlation with Control (R = .48, p<.05).

Glucose Metabolism and Mood Reactivity during Media Viewing

Listed in Table 2 are the main effects of group for each condition separately. These results show similar group differences at resting baseline than for the comparisons during violent media presentation, involving hyperactivity in the DMN and caudate, and dampened OFC metabolism in Ag than Na participants ( Figure 2, left panel ). While viewing the emotional media presentation, the only significant difference between groups was higher glucose metabolism in bilateral lingual gyrus in the Ag group ( Figure 2, right panel ). Group x condition interactions were not significant at our threshold or at a reduced threshold of p<0.005.

As documented in Table 3 , differences emerged between the groups in state reactivity 10 minutes into and at the end of the media presentations. During the violent media presentation as compared to the emotional media presentation, Ag participants when compared with the Na participants reported feeling less Upset ( Figure 3 ) and Nervous and more Inspired and Determined ( Table 3 ). In-line with the mood reactivity data, there were divergent responses between the groups in systolic BP across time. In the Na group, percent BP change progressively increased over time (t 16  = 3.26, p = 0.002) while in the Ag group, systolic BP progressively decreased (t 16  = −4.23, p = 0.0003) in response to the violent media as compared to emotional media ( Figure 1 ). A comparison of the trend lines between the groups shows that the trend lines were significantly opposite (F 1, 32  = 27.60, p<0.0001). Systolic and diastolic BP did not differ between the groups at resting baseline (p>0.05). Diastolic BP was not different between the groups in any of the conditions.

Self-report of being Upset immediately before, during, and at the end (EOV) of the violent media viewing. Standard error is presented in the corresponding error bars.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0107260.g003

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0107260.t003

To examine the coupling of BP with glucose metabolism between the groups, we conducted ROI analyses to assess the correlation between regional metabolism during the violent media exposure and changes in systolic BP at time 37 (when most accentuated differences in BP were found between groups, as shown in Figure 1 ). In the Na, increases in BP were positively associated with increased metabolism in the right OFC (x = 22, y = 34, z = −26; r = 0.74; p<0.005) whereas the correlation was negative in (r = −0.56, p<0.005) ( Figure 4 ) in whom decreases in BP were also associated with metabolism in precuneus (R = −.81, p<.001). That is, in Na participants increases in BP were associated with higher metabolism in OFC whereas in Ag participants decreases in BP were associated with increased metabolism in the OFC and precuneus.

On the y-axis is response in the OFC response to violent media compared with emotional media; on the x-axis is systolic BP change between violent media compared with emotional media at time 37 into the media viewing.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0107260.g004

This study documented brain, behavior, and blood-pressure response as a function of trait aggression. Results showed that Ag had heightened traits of NEM and poor inhibitory control compared to Na. These constitutional differences between the groups were apparent in their brain function at resting baseline and during the violent media viewing, where Ag had higher relative metabolism in the retrosplenial DMN, and lower relative metabolism in OFC, gyrus rectus, and posterior cerebellum. While watching the violent compared to emotional media, the Ag viewers reported being more Inspired and Determined, less Upset and Nervous, and showed a progressive decline in systolic blood-pressure compared with controls in whom systolic BP increased. Furthermore, the BP findings were differentially coupled with glucose metabolism between the groups. While viewing violent media, increased blood-pressure in Na was associated with increased metabolism in OFC; in Ag, the observed reduced blood-pressure was associated with increased metabolism in this same region and also in the precuneus.

The Value of Pre-Selection Based on Abnormal Aggression Traits

In pre-selecting participants based on trait aggression this study revealed important baseline differences in brain and behavior compared with controls. Elevated trait aggression is found specifically in individuals with associated disorders, such as antisocial personality disorder and intermittent explosive disorder, as it has straightforward face validity [38] . In addition to elevated trait aggression, Ag also reported more Alienation and Stress Reaction and demonstrated poor inhibitory control, as measured by the ANT conflict [39] , which are part of externalizing behaviors in adults [40] . Studies show that inhibitory control (as documented here using the ANT) play an important role in violent media effects and aggression [41] . Similarly, high levels of NEM as Neuroticism have shown robust connections with violence and aggression [30] . These results on characterizing personality in trait aggression, lend support to the GAM theory, documenting the specificity of trait aggression in its effects on other personality traits [42] and their potential cognitive substrates. Those who endorse few or no aggression items, hence, the Na group, scored at the norms in NEM and PEM, demonstrating that it is normative to endorse very few aggression questions, providing an adequate control for Ag. Importantly, PEM and its subscales were comparable between the groups, perhaps validating a characterization of trait aggression specifically involving NEM while having normative PEM [42] . Supportive of the GAM theory on the role of traits in media viewing, these trait results are important in setting the context of brain metabolism comparisons between the groups.

Characterization of Trait Aggression through Resting Brain Metabolism

The most robust finding in this study is relative hyperactivity of the DMN during resting baseline with relative hypoactivity of the OFC and cerebellum in Ag compared to Na. The documented over-activity in components of the DMN may reflect a neural marker of enduring traits fostering inwardly directed attention to self-referential information stemming from years of social and cognitive learning [43] . Each of the DMN nodes and their network is associated with awareness and conscious information processing [44] , mental imagery, perspective taking, and autobiographical memory retrieval [45] – [47] needed to facilitate an enduring brain activity pattern of behavioral patterns (i.e., trait) [48] , [49] . Several studies mapped DMN regions with trait profiles; for example, Neuroticism (NEM in this study), was associated with lower volumetric measures and lower metabolism of the OFC [50] , [51] in line with our results of hypoactive OFC in Ag. Conducting direct correlations between resting metabolism and NEM as well as with trait Control , we found that the lower resting metabolism in the OFC the higher were NEM and lower Control scores. In contrast the higher resting metabolism in precuneus the higher was NEM and lower Control trait scores. Supporting this finding are recent findings of higher precuneus with reduced conscientiousness and openness [49] both associated with NEM and characteristic of those with high trait aggression.

Other over activated regions at baseline among Ag participants included the sensory motor area and caudate. One could speculate that this increased activity during rest would have a role in compromised responses during a cognitive task. A recent study proposed that striatal dopamine circuits, particularly the caudate, may provide a mechanism for the active suppression of the DMN under conditions that require increased processing of external stimuli (e.g., an attention demanding cognitive task) relative to internal, self-directed processing [52] . This might be related to a recent finding where heightened trait aggression is associated with reduced dopamine in striatum [53] and that striatal dopamine influences the DMN to affect shifting between internal states and cognitive demands [54] .

Brain Metabolism during Violent Media Viewing

The fusiform gyrus was uniquely activated during violent media viewing in Ag, perhaps suggesting increased attention to facial representation of socially relevant cues [55] . Aside from the fusiform activation, while viewing the violent media presentation, the Ag participants compared with the Na showed similar patterns of activation as they had during resting baseline. As such, it appears that DMN regions are active during passive viewing of visual stimuli (e.g., movie) [56] , [57] . We postulate that the violent media condition reflects congruence between the trait and the visual stimuli, such that the stimuli are syntonic (oscillating together) with internal processing, perhaps indicating personal experience with this material. Since resting baseline refers to mind wondering, it could be that participants in the Ag group have had aggressive thoughts that were instigating similar brain networks as during violent media viewing. A study in children during exposure to violent media documented engagement of the posterior cingulate and hippocampi, which was postulated to link memory and emotion to motor activation integrating existing aggression-related thoughts, thereby making them strongly accessible scripts over time [58] . The amygdala is a likely target for cortical arousal in violence viewing. Mathiak and Weber (2006) documented amygdala activation during active game-play in fMRI environment [59] . Their activation pattern showed signal decrease in the amygdala during players’ virtual violent behavior. Our study did not document amygdala responses possibly as a result of the passive nature of the viewing violent media or alternatively, amygdala was not documented because of the temporal resolution differences between PET and fMRI.

Hypoactivity of the Orbitofrontal Cortex

In our study, the Ag participants showed a pattern of reduced OFC activity relative to the Na in the both resting baseline and violent media conditions. The OFC plays a role in externalizing/impulsive behavior, and regulating emotional and social behavior [13] , [60] – [64] . Specific damage to the OFC is associated with impulsive and aggressive behavior [64] , and individuals with such damage show little control over their emotions as well as limited awareness of the moral implications of their actions, and poor decision making [65] . Impulsive aggressive personality disordered patients demonstrate impaired emotion regulation, and exhibit blunted prefrontal, including OFC, metabolism in response to a serotonergic challenge [66] . Deficits in the orbitofrontal lobes as represented by atrophy, lesion, or hypoactive metabolism have been observed across a number of psychiatric populations prone to aggression (e.g., antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy, borderline personality disorder, intermittent explosive disorder) [66] – [68] and suggest that OFC hypo-function may be a common mechanism underlying the pathophysiology of aggressive behavior in general (e.g., both impulsive and premeditated forms). Hypoactivity of the OFC in this study and its correlation with high NEM and low Control scores further support the reliable implication of OFC in the externalizing continuum.

This OFC hypoactivity is consistent with other studies where exposure to violent media is associated with decreased OFC activation. In a study that examined components of the fronto-parietal network in response to aggressive video cues, reduced levels of OFC activation were found [19] . It is possible that OFC hypoactivation reflects desensitization to violence and disrupts the process of moral evaluation of the violent visual stimuli [69] .

Familiarity with violent material could breed desensitization [69] – [71] . It could be that Ag have exhibited reduced inhibition and blunted evaluative categorization of violent stimuli as supported in other studies [71] such that they demonstrate a response (physiological/behavioral/cortical) that is suggestive of an overall desensitization to media violence [72] , [73] .

Under-reactive Emotional and Autonomic Response to Violent Media

There is further evidence in this study supporting the desensitization hypothesis. The Ag group reported being less Nervous and Upset and more Inspired and Determined during the media violence (compared with emotional media) while their systolic BP progressively decreased. In stark contrast, The Na mood and BP responses to the violent media may be associated with a threat evaluation producing sympathetic activation, resulting in BP increase in the Na group. In a study with healthy adolescents, participants viewing violent movie clips experienced increased BP compared to baseline; however, prior exposure to violence was associated with lowered BP [21] . Autonomic under-arousal to threat stimuli has been documented in individuals who exhibit low levels of fear [74] . Angered subjects permitted to commit aggression against the person who had annoyed them often display a drop in systolic blood pressure. They seem to have experienced a physiological relaxation, as if they had satisfied their aggressive urges [75] , [76] .

Indeed, the documented pattern of BP under-reactivity in Ag was associated with hypoactivations in the OFC ( Figure 3 ) and hyperactivation of the precuneus. Behaviorally-evoked changes in cardiovascular (e.g., blood pressure, heart rate) and cardiac-autonomic (e.g., heart rate variability) activity are correlated directly with neural activity within areas of the anterior cingulate cortex, OFC, medial prefrontal cortices, and the amygdala and often in interaction with activity in the insula, and relay regions of the thalamus and brainstem [22] , [77] , [78] . Based on neuroimaging and lesion evidence, a neurobiological model of cardiovascular reactivity shows that physiological and behavioral reactions are instantiated in the corticolimbic brains systems (e.g., medial/prefrontal corticies, insula, and amygdala) [79] . Afferent feedback, appraised by the OFC is integral in generation of somatic markers which trigger an emotional response, subsequently biasing overt behavior [80] . It is important to note here, that these results are relative to responses to emotional media viewing. It appears from our results that non-violent, yet emotionally salient action stimuli increase BP in the Ag individuals, whereas violent stimuli have the opposite effect of decreasing BP in these individuals. The specificity of hypo-response to violent content supports our assertion that the effects of violent media on individuals depend on theme-related traits, in this case aggression, and the brain of the beholder.

There are several limitations in this study that constrain our interpretation power and generalizability. First, there may have been too few participants in the study to ascertain group by condition interactions and to conduct correlations between trait and brain measures. Second, the inclusion of males only in this study was done to control for potentially differential emotional reaction patterns of activation as a function of sex. However, this approach prevents us from making any claims about female response to violent media. Future studies must include females. Third, the experimental design did not include an acute test of aggression following the media condition. Future studies could include such a test to document aggressive responses following violent media as a function of brain response during the violent media. Fourth, there are brain activity results during violent video games finding anterior cingulate involvement [59] , [81] . These results may not be comparable to this study since playing video games requires task-dependent active attention compared to passive attention maintained during movie viewing as we show in our results; therefore more studies are needed to distinguish responses to media sources requiring active attention such as video games from those requiring only passive attention as movie scenes [82] .

Acknowledgments

The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of all members of the Brookhaven PET team for advice and assistance in different aspects of this study.

Author Contributions

Conceived and designed the experiments: NAK NDV RZG JSF GJW. Performed the experiments: NAK MCJ CW DT. Analyzed the data: NAK MAP WZ CW. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: WZ CW DT. Contributed to the writing of the manuscript: NAK SJM RPC RZG NDV MAP.

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The Influence of Media Violence on Intimate Partner Violence Perpetration: An Examination of Inmates’ Domestic Violence Convictions and Self-Reported Perpetration

Samantha m. gavin.

1 Department of Sociology and Criminology, St. Bonaventure University, 3261 West State Street, Plassmann Room A1, St. Bonaventure, NY 14778 USA

Nathan E. Kruis

2 Department of Criminal Justice, Penn State Altoona, 3000 Ivyside Park, Cypress Building, Room 101E, Altoona, PA 16601 USA

Research suggests that the representation of violence against women in the media has resulted in an increased acceptance of attitudes favoring domestic violence. While prior work has investigated the relationship between violent media exposure and violent crime, there has been little effort to empirically examine the relationship between specific forms of violent media exposure and the perpetration of intimate partner violence. Using data collected from a sample of 148 inmates, the current study seeks to help fill these gaps in the literature by examining the relationship between exposure to various forms of pleasurable violent media and the perpetration of intimate partner violence (i.e., conviction and self-reported). At the bivariate level, results indicate a significant positive relationship between exposure to pleasurable television violence and self-reported intimate partner abuse. However, this relationship is reduced to insignificant levels in multivariable modeling. Endorsement of domestic violence beliefs and victimization experience were found to be the strongest predictors of intimate partner violence perpetration. Potential policy implications based on findings are discussed within.

Introduction

In the United States, more than 12 million men and women become victims of domestic violence each year [ 76 ]. In fact, every minute, roughly 20 Americans are victimized at the hands of an intimate partner [ 3 ]. Although both men and women are abused by an intimate partner, women have a higher likelihood of such abuse, with those ages 18–34 years being at the highest risk of victimization. Moreover, it is estimated that approximately 1 in 4 women and 1 in 7 men experience violence at the hands of an intimate partner at some point in their lifetime [ 77 ].

According to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women [ 78 ], the representation of violence against women in the media has greatly increased over the years. Recent research suggests that women are commonly depicted as victims and sex objects in the media [ 12 , 69 ]. Portraying women in this way, media via pornography, pornographic movies, and music videos, has been found to increase attitudes which are supportive of violence, specifically sexual violence, against women. Notably, in relation to violence in general, research suggests that the media’s portrayal of women as sex objects and victims, tends to influence societal attitudes that are accepting of domestic violence, particularly violence against women [ 40 , 43 , 46 , 69 ].

Understanding the influence of media violence on an individual’s perceptions of domestic violence could help gain a better understanding of the factors that contribute to an individual’s domestic violence tendencies, as well as to gain a better understanding of how to lessen such tendencies. Not only can the influence of media violence on domestic violence perceptions be addressed, but specific media forms can be identified as to the level of influence that each form of media has on such perceptions as well. Understanding how exposure to media violence influences domestic violence perceptions, in comparison to the influence of media aggression on domestic violence perceptions, will allow for an overall perspective of how violent media in general influences domestic violence perpetration. Accordingly, the present study seeks to provide an empirical assessment of the relationship between violent media exposure and the perpetration of intimate partner abuse.

Literature Review

Although society believes that exposure to media violence 1 causes an individual to become violent, research has cast doubt on this belief, stating that violent media does not directly influence violent behavior at a highly correlated statistically significant level [ 2 , 4 , 21 , 22 , 65 , 85 ]. In relation to media aggression 2 and domestic violence perceptions however, research has demonstrated a relationship between the two variables [ 11 , 12 , 23 , 35 , 39 , 41 , 47 ], such that an increased level of exposure to media aggression, for example, video games and movies depicting aggression towards women, influences individuals to become more accepting of aggression toward women.

Domestic Violence

According to The United States Department of Justice [ 75 ], domestic violence is defined as “a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner” (para. 1). Emotional/psychological, verbal, physical, sexual, and financial abuse [ 42 , 84 ], as well as digital abuse, are the different types of abuse that can occur amongst intimate partners.

In the United States alone, domestic violence hotlines received approximately 20,000 calls per day [ 51 ], with at least five million incidents occurring each year [ 34 ]. With the COVID-19 pandemic, the likelihood for domestic violence incidents to occur increased, while a victim’s ability to call and report decreased [ 18 ], due to individuals being locked down at home, being laid-off, or working from home. In examining the 1 in 4 women and 1 in 7 men who experience domestic violence at the hands of an intimate partner, 1 in 3 and 1 in 4, respectively, have experienced physical abuse [ 3 ], with 1 in 7 women and 1 in 25 men obtaining injuries from the abuse [ 51 ]. In addition, 1 in 10 women have been raped by an intimate partner, while the data on the true extent of male rape victimization is relatively unknown [ 51 ]. Even though domestic violence crimes make up approximately 15% of all reported violent crimes [ 77 ], almost half go unreported [ 57 ], due to various reasons (i.e., concerns about privacy, desire to protect the offender, fear of reprisal [ 19 ], relationship to the perpetrator [ 20 ]).

There are several risk factors that increase an individual’s likelihood of perpetrating domestic violence. Individuals who witnessed domestic violence between their parents [ 1 , 17 , 44 , 49 , 61 , 73 ], or were abused as children themselves [ 32 , 44 , 68 , 71 , 79 , 81 ], are more likely to perpetrate domestic violence than individuals who did not witness or experience such abuse. Research has found men who witnessed abuse between their parents had higher risk ratios for committing intimate partner violence themselves [ 61 ] and were more likely to engage in such violence [ 49 ], than men who did not witness such violence as children. Research has also shown that male adolescents who witnessed mother-to-father violence were more likely to engage in dating violence themselves [ 73 ]. Similarly, scholars have found women who witnessed intimate partner violence between their parents were over 1.5 times more likely to engage in such violence themselves [ 49 ], and adolescent girls were more likely to engage in dating violence when they witnessed violence between their parents [ 73 ]. Child abuse victims were more likely to perpetrate intimate partner violence as they aged, with 23-year-olds demonstrating a significant relationship compared to 21-year-olds [ 44 ], and males who identified as child abuse victims were found to be four times more likely to engage in such violence than males who had no history of such abuse [ 49 ]. Overall, both males and females who experienced child-family violence 3 were more likely to engage in both reciprocal and nonreciprocal intimate partner violence [ 49 ].

Research has also found that being diagnosed with conduct disorder as a child or antisocial personality disorder as an adult, also increases the likelihood of domestic violence perpetration [ 7 , 8 , 17 , 31 , 45 , 81 ], with antisocial personality disorder being a mediating factor between child abuse and later intimate partner violence perpetration [ 81 ]. Additionally, individuals who demonstrate antisocial characteristics during adolescence are at an elevated risk of engaging in domestic violence as adults [ 45 ]. Another key factor that influences domestic violence perpetration is having hostile attitudes and beliefs [ 5 , 37 , 48 , 49 , 70 ], with such attitudes being more of a predictive factor of intimate partner abuse than conduct problems [ 8 ]. Both men and women who approve of intimate partner violence are more likely to engage in or reciprocate such violence compared to those without such perceptions [ 49 ].

Media Violence and Crime

Media violence and behavior.

It has been long speculated that media violence is directly related to violent behavior and perpetration of violent crime, such as intimate partner abuse [ 6 , 14 , 33 , 50 ]. However, research has found very weak evidence demonstrating a correlation between exposure to media violence and crime, with Pearson’s r correlations of less than 0.4 being indicated in most studies in this area [ 2 , 21 , 22 , 64 , 65 , 85 ]. In fact, Savage [ 64 ] determined that exposure to violent activities through the media does not have a statistically significant relationship with crime perpetration. Likewise, Ferguson and colleagues’ [ 21 , 22 ] work supported these findings, indicating that “exposure to television [violence] and video game violence were not significant predictors of violent crime” [ 21 ] (p. 396).

More recently, Savage and Yancey [ 65 ] conducted a meta-analysis of thirty two studies that tested the relationship between media violence (i.e., television or film) and criminal aggression. Lester (1989), Krittschnitt, Heath, and Ward (1986), Lagerspetz and Viemerö (1986), Phillips (1983), Berkowitz and Macaulay (1971), and Steuer, Applefield, and Smith (1971) were among the evaluated studies. Collectively, Savage and Yancey [ 65 ] concluded that the results from their analysis suggested that a relationship between violent media exposure and criminal aggression had not been established in the existing scholarly literature. Although there was evidence of a slight, positive effect of media violence on criminal aggression found for males. However, the authors noted several limitations among each of the evaluated studies that questions the generalizability of findings. As such, there is need for more work to be done in this area before firm conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between violent media exposure and violent behaviors.

Media aggression and violence against women

Although research has demonstrated a lack of or weak correlation between media violence and violent behavior, research has found a moderate positive correlation between exposure to media aggression and domestic violence perceptions. Such research has found significant relationships between exposure to media aggression and a variety of delinquent perceptions, ranging from views on rape [ 47 , 67 ] to domestic violence [ 11 , 12 , 39 ]. These views support and accept the rape of women and abusive tendencies towards an intimate partner.

For instance, Malamuth and Check [ 47 ] examined how exposure to movies that contained high levels of violence and sexual content, especially misogynistic content, influenced one’s perceptions. Individuals who watched such content were more likely to have rape-supportive attitudes than individuals who were not exposed to such movies. Simpson Beck and colleagues [ 67 ] found that rape supportive attitudes were more common among individuals who played video games that sexually objectified and degraded women. Such individuals were more likely to accept the belief that rape is an acceptable behavior and that it is the woman’s fault if she is raped, compared to individuals who did not play such video games.

Related, Cundiff [ 12 ] classified the songs on the Billboard’s Hot 100 chart between 2000 and 2010 into categories such as rape/sexual assault, demeaning language, physical violence, and sexual conquest, and found that throughout these songs, the objectification and control of women were common themes. In surveying individuals in relation to their exposure to such music, a positive correlation was found between an individual’s exposure to suggestive music, and their misogynous thinking [ 12 ]. Further, Fischer and Greitemeyer [ 23 ] found that individuals who listened to more aggressive music were more likely to have negative views of and act more aggressively towards women. Likewise, Kerig [ 39 ] and Coyne and colleagues [ 11 ] found that individuals who are exposed to higher levels of media aggression are more likely to perpetrate domestic violence offenses. This suggests that an increased exposure to media aggression influences an individual’s perceptions of domestic violence, and could, subsequently influence the perpetration of domestic violence.

Cultivation Theory

A theoretical explanation for a relationship between violent media exposure and the perpetration of violent crime can be found in Cultivation Theory. Cultivation Theory assumes that “when people are exposed to media content or other socialization agents, they gradually come to cultivate or adopt beliefs about the world that coincide with the images they have been viewing or messages they have been hearing” [ 28 ] (p. 22). Essentially, this cultivation manifests into individuals mistaking their “world reality” with the “media reality,” thus increasing the likelihood of violence [ 26 ] (p. 350). Individuals who are exposed to violent media, are more likely to perceive their reality as filled with the same level of violence, resulting in an increased likelihood of the individual acting violently themselves. By identifying one’s reality with the “media reality,” individuals create their own social constructs and begin to believe that the violence demonstrated in the media is acceptable in life as well.

This cultivation and social construction creation based off of media is demonstrated through Kahlor and Eastin’s [ 38 ] examination of the influence of television shows on rape myth acceptance. Individuals who watched soap operas demonstrated race myth acceptance and an “overestimation of false rape accusations”, while individuals who watched crime shows were less likely to demonstrate rape myth acceptance [ 38 ] (p. 215). This demonstrates how the type of television show an individual watches, can influence how and what individuals learn from such viewing.

In relation to domestic violence perception, individuals who are exposed to violence in intimate relationships, or sexual aggression, whether through the media or in real life, are more likely to support or accept such actions over time [ 12 , 28 ]. A longitudinal study conducted by Williams [ 82 ], examined cultivation effects on individuals who play video games. It was found that individuals who played video games at higher rates began to fear dangers which they experienced through the video games, demonstrating how individuals adopt beliefs based on their media exposure. Therefore, according to Cultivation Theory, individuals who are exposed to higher levels of violent media, are likely to learn from the media, and act based on this learning [ 12 , 28 , 82 ]. In relation to domestic violence, this work suggests that it is reasonable then to hypothesize that individuals who are exposed to higher levels of media violence are more likely to become supportive or accepting of domestic violence actions.

Limitations of Previous Work

While prior research has explored the relationship between exposure to media aggression and domestic violence perceptions [ 11 ], [ 12 , 23 , 39 , 47 , 67 ], to date, we are unaware of research that has focused specifically on exploring the relationship between one’s level of exposure to media violence and domestic violence perceptions. As a result, the relationship between violent media exposure and domestic violence has yet to be fully examined. Further, research focusing specifically on media aggression, media violence, and violence perpetration has predominately focused on specific types of media (i.e., video games, movies, songs), often with the media platform and materials provided to the study participants by researchers. To date little research has investigated multiple forms of self-exposure to violent media and criminal perpetration. Moreover, previous research has failed to examine the effects of pleasure gained from such exposure, as we speculate that individual’s will be less likely to engage in consumption of media they find unpleasurable. Subsequently, the effects of media exposure are largely dependent on one’s disposition toward the content – which, admittedly, over time can be shaped by the content itself. Thus, we suggest that prior tests focusing exclusively on simulated exposure without consideration of pleasure have been incomplete.

Moreover, while there are scales that measure domestic violence perceptions (e.g., The Perceptions of and Attitudes Toward Domestic Violence Questionnaire – Revised (PADV-R) , The Definitions of Domestic Violence Scale , The Attitudes toward the Use of Interpersonal Violence – Revised Scale , and various others compiled by Flood [ 25 ]), they are very specific in nature, making it difficult to use such scales outside of the specified nature for which they were created. In fact, these scales fail to examine the actual perceptions an individual has towards domestic violence, and when they do, they tend to examine domestic violence perpetrated by men, and not women. Thus, the current study sought to help fill some of these gaps in the literature.

Current Focus

There were three overarching goals driving the current project:

• First, we sought to create a psychometrically sound scale capable of measuring intrinsic endorsement of domestic violence beliefs.
• Second, we were interested in assessing the relationship between intrinsic endorsement of domestic violence beliefs and domestic violence perpetration.
• Third, we wanted to explore the relationship between various types of violent media exposure (i.e., video game, movie, television) and domestic violence perpetration.

Data and Method

The data used in this study came from a sample of incarcerated offenders in two jails in New York and a prison in West Virginia. A sample of 148 convicted offenders 4 were surveyed between April 2018 and September 2018. The sampling procedure was one of convenience, in a face-to-face manner. A student intern at the prison asked inmates with whom she came into contact if they would be willing to take the survey. Such surveys were administered individually. For one of the jails, all inmates participating in educational classes were asked by the researcher to take the survey. Such surveys were administered in a group setting. A sign-up sheet was also placed in each pod for inmates to sign-up for survey participation. Each individual on the list was brought to a room occupied by only the researcher, with surveys being administered individually. For the second jail, correctional officers made an announcement in one of the pods, asking those who were interested in participation to let them know. Such inmates were individually brought to a room occupied by the researcher with a plexiglass wall between them. The surveys were administered via paper hard copy, with a researcher present to answer any questions the participants had throughout the survey process. Due to working with a vulnerable population, confidentiality was key. Confidentiality was maintained by not allowing any correctional staff in the room when the surveys were taken, and informed consent documents were kept separate from the surveys. Respondents were informed that their decision to participate in the study was completely voluntary, and that information would not be shared with law enforcement or anyone within the jail.

Dependent Variables

Domestic violence perpetration.

Two measures were used to assess domestic violence perpetration. First, participants were asked if they had been convicted of a domestic violence offense. While this is a good indication of domestic violence perpetration, it is not the “best” measure, as many persons who commit domestic violence are never convicted of the crime. As such, we employed a second measure of domestic violence perpetration. Specifically, participants were also asked if they had ever abused an intimate partner. Response categories were a dichotomous “yes” (1) or “no” (0).

Independent Variables

Endorsement of domestic violence beliefs.

We were interested in assessing the relationship between the intrinsic endorsement of domestic violence beliefs and domestic violence perpetration. Unfortunately, at the time of the study, the research team was not aware of any psychometrically sound measure of intrinsic endorsement of domestic violence beliefs available in the scholarly literature. Thus, we sought to create one. Specifically, we used an eighteen-item self-report scale to capture respondents’ intrinsic support of domestic violence. Some items included, “A wife sometimes deserves to be hit by her husband,” “A husband who makes his wife jealous on purpose deserves to be hit,” and “A wife angry enough to hit her husband must really love him.” Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the eighteen items on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). Responses were summed to create a scale measure of intrinsic support of domestic violence beliefs with higher scores indicative of greater support of domestic violence. As indicated in Table ​ Table1, 1 , these items loaded onto one latent factor in an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.974).

Results from exploratory factor analysis (EFA) for endorsement of domestic violence beliefs

KSMO = .928 ( p  = .000). The scree plot indicated a clear break at the second factor, suggesting a one factor matrix. Extraction method: Principal axis. α = .974

Violent media exposure

Prior research assessing the relationship between violent media exposure and crime has found mixed results [ 2 , 11 , 12 , 21 – 23 , 39 , 47 , 64 , 65 , 67 , 85 ]. However, most of this work has employed only one measure of media exposure and has ignored the pleasure that one may receive from violent media – that is, whether they get enjoyment from the content. In an attempt to fill these gaps in the literature we considered three types of violent media exposure: (1) video games, (2) movies, and (3) television. Consistent with recommendations made by Savage and Yancey [ 65 ] our measures include an estimate of both media exposure (e.g., time) and rating of violence. Specifically, participants were asked to report the number of hours that they spent playing videogames, watching movies, and watching television each week. Next, they were asked to indicate the percentage of violence (0–100%) in the games, movies, and television they played and watched. Additionally, participants were asked to report how pleasurable they found the video games, movies, and television that they played and watched (coded, 0 = “Not Pleasurable” through 10 = “Very Pleasurable”). Responses to each of the three questions in the different blocks of media were multiplied together to create a scale measure assessing pleasurable violent media exposure with higher numbers indicative of greater pleasurable violent media exposure.

Control Variables

Four measures were used as control variables in this study: (1) age, (2) sex, (3) race, and (4) domestic violence victimization, as research has not examined if such victimization is related to victims’ perpetration of intimate partner violence. Specifically, participants were asked if they had ever been abused by an intimate partner. Responses were also dichotomous with 1 = “yes” and 0 = “no.” Age was a continuous variable ranging from 18 years old to 95 years old. Sex and race were dichotomous variables (i.e., 1 = “male” or “white” and 0 = “female” or “other”). Specifically, participants were asked if they had ever been abused by an intimate partner. Responses were also dichotomous with 1 = “yes” and 0 = “no.”

Analytic Strategy

Data analysis proceeded in three key stages. First, all data were cleaned, coded, and univariate analyses were constructed to assess measures of central tendency and measures of dispersion. Missing data were assessed using Little’s Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test. The significant MCAR test ( p  < 0.05) indicated that data were not missing at random, and as such, it would be inappropriate to impute the missing data for multivariable analyses. An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was also run to help support the creation of our intrinsic endorsement of domestic violence beliefs scale. A Principal Axis Factor Analysis (PAFA) was selected as the EFA technique because the constructs are latent. Second, bivariate analyses were run to support the construction of multivariable models. Third, multivariable models were constructed. Given the dichotomous coding of the two outcome measures assessing domestic violence perpetration, we used logistic regression as the primary multivariate analysis.

Descriptive Information

Table ​ Table2 2 displays the demographic information for the sample, as well as the descriptive statistics for key variables of interest. As indicated in Table ​ Table2, 2 , overall, the sample had an average age of 35.81 years. Most participants were male (91%) and identified as white (77%). About 45 percent of the sample reported being a victim of domestic violence. Regarding violent media exposure, participants indicated greater exposure to pleasurable violence in movies ( M  = 36.40, sd  = 41.87) than to pleasurable violence in television ( M  = 29.73, sd  = 38.73) and video games ( M  = 22.58, sd  = 38.66). In the aggregate, participants did not show much intrinsic support for domestic violence ( M  = 34.02, sd  = 18.22). However, 16.2 percent of the sample had been convicted of a domestic violence offense and 34.5 percent had admitted to abusing an intimate partner.

Descriptive statistics ( N  = 148)

Bivariate Correlations

Table ​ Table3 3 displays the results from zero-order correlations between variables of interest. As indicated in Table ​ Table3, 3 , only one variable, endorsement of domestic violence beliefs ( r  = 0.202, p  < 0.05), was statistically significantly correlated with a domestic violence conviction at the bivariate level. Results suggest that as one’s intrinsic support for domestic violence increases, so too does the likelihood that they have been convicted of a domestic violence offense. Interestingly, this variable was not statistically significantly correlated with the “self-reported” measure of domestic violence perpetration ( r  = 0.101, p  > 0.05). However, four other variables were found to be statistically significantly correlated with a participant’s self-reported domestic violence perpetration. These variables included being a male ( r  =  − 0.177, p  < 0.05), being a victim of domestic violence ( r  = 0.637, p  < 0.01), television violence ( r  = 0.179, p  < 0.05), and having a domestic violence conviction ( r  = 0.182, p  < 0.05). Results indicate that males were less likely to report abusing an intimate partner than were females. Further, results show that those who had been a victim of domestic violence, those who had greater exposure to pleasurable television violence, and those who had been convicted of a domestic violence offense, were more likely to report abusing an intimate partner than those in reference groups. The weak correlation between our two dependent measures supports the use of the two separate multivariable models reported below.

Correlations

Pearson product-moment correlations are reported. Two-tailed significance is reported

* p  ≤ .05, ** p  ≤ .01

Multivariable Models

Table ​ Table4 4 shows the results from logistic regression models estimating domestic violence convictions and self-reported domestic violence perpetration. The first model in Table ​ Table4 4 assessed the correlates of having a domestic violence conviction. Overall, the model fit the data well and explained about 14 percent of the variance in domestic violence in having a domestic violence conviction (Nagelkerke’s R 2  = 0.142). However, there was only one statistically significant predictor in that model, endorsement of domestic violence beliefs ( b  = 0.033, p  < 0.05). Results show that a one-unit increase in intrinsic support for domestic violence was associated with a 1.033 increase in the odds of being convicted of a domestic violence offense.

Logistic regression analyses predicting domestic violence

Unstandardized coefficients are presented, OR  = odds ratio. DV  = “Domestic Violence”

* p  < .05, ** p  < .01, *** p  < .001

The second model in Table ​ Table4 4 depicts the results from the logistic regression model estimating self-reported domestic violence perpetration. Overall, the model fit the data well and explained nearly 55 percent of the variance in abusing an intimate partner (Nagelkerke’s R 2  = 0.548). Interestingly, endorsement of domestic violence beliefs was not a significant predictor in this model ( b  = 0.004, p  > 0.05). In fact, the only statistically significant predictor in that model was our measure of domestic violence victimization ( b  =  − 3.533, p  < 0.001). Results suggest that victims of domestic violence were 34.48 times less likely to report abusing an intimate partner than were non-victims, controlling for all other relevant factors. It is important to note that none of the measures of exposure to pleasurable media violence were related to either of our measures of domestic violence perpetration [ 74 , 83 ].

Much of the prior work assessing the relationship between exposure to violent media and crime perpetration has ignored the pleasure component of media exposure and failed to assess multiple forms of violent media simultaneously while controlling for the endorsement of criminogenic beliefs and other relevant factors (e.g., prior victimization). The current exploratory project sought to help fill these gaps in the literature. Specifically, the current project had three main goals: (1) to establish a psychometrically sound measure of intrinsic support for domestic violence, (2) to assess the relationship between intrinsic support for domestic violence and domestic violence perpetration, and (3) to analyze the relationship between pleasurable violent media exposure and two different measures of domestic violence perpetration (i.e., conviction and “self-report”) while controlling for appropriate covariates (e.g., prior victimization, endorsement of domestic violence, etc.). Our research, using data from a sample of convicted offenders ( N  = 148), yielded several key findings worth further consideration.

First, results from Exploratory Factor Analysis showed that we were able to effectively create a psychometrically sound measure of intrinsic support for domestic violence. We encourage other researchers to adopt this 18-item measure of intrinsic support for domestic violence to use in future projects as both a predictor and an outcome measure. Future research should also explore how these beliefs come to be. Perhaps more importantly, though, through our data analyses we were able to establish a relationship between intrinsic support for domestic violence and being convicted of a domestic violence offense. That is, our results show that offenders who hold beliefs that favor the emotional and physical abuse of an intimate partner are more likely to have been convicted of a domestic violence offense than those who do not hold such views. This finding suggests that in order to help prevent domestic violence, researchers and practitioners need to develop strategies to avert, disrupt, or reverse the internalization of such beliefs. We suggest that targeting adolescents who are at risk of experiencing child abuse or witnessing abuse between their parents, may help prevent such individuals from internalizing the acceptance of such beliefs and reduce the chances that they will grow up to perpetrate domestic violence, as prior research indicates that they are a high-risk group 5 [ 36 , 52 ]. For partners who have already engaged in violence toward one another, cognitive behavioral therapy programs, such as Behavioral Couples Therapy [ 53 , 54 , 62 ], are effective at changing domestic violence perceptions and reducing future violence [ 29 , 63 ].

Second, we did not find much support for a relationship between violent media exposure and domestic violence perpetration, questioning the effects of media cultivation. At the bivariate level, pleasurable violent television exposure was found to exhibit a small, positive effect on self-reported intimate partner abuse ( r  < 0.20) [ 9 ]. This finding suggests that, at the bivariate level, as one’s exposure to pleasurable violent television increases, so too does the likelihood that they self-report abusing an intimate partner. However, this relationship was reduced to insignificant levels in a multivariable modeling controlling for age, gender, race, endorsement of domestic violence beliefs, and prior victimization. In fact, no measure of pleasurable violent media exposure was significantly related to domestic violence perpetration in multivariable modeling. Thus, the current study supports prior research indicating no relationship between media violence and violent crime perpetration [ 21 , 22 , 64 , 65 ], and suggests that other variables (i.e., endorsement of domestic violence beliefs, and victimization), not violent media, are responsible for driving individuals to committing violent crimes.

Third, our work highlights the importance of the role prior victimization plays in criminal perpetration. Interestingly, at the bivariate level, domestic violence victimization at the hands of an intimate partner was unrelated to a domestic violence conviction, but significantly and positively related to admitting to abusing an intimate partner. In fact, the relationship between being a victim of domestic violence and admitting to abusing an intimate partner was very strong ( r  = 0.637) [ 9 ]. This finding suggests that individuals who have been previously victimized at the hands of an intimate partner, are at an increased likelihood of abusing an intimate partner themselves. However, in multivariable modeling, this relationship switched directions, and prior victimization was found to be negatively related to self-reported domestic violence perpetration. In fact, with the addition of appropriate statistical controls in multivariable modeling, our findings suggest that those who had been abused by an intimate partner were more than 34 times less likely to report abusing an intimate partner. This is an interesting and difficult finding to interpret because it opposes prior work indicating that victimization experiences, especially among the young [ 32 , 44 , 71 , 81 ], and witnessing domestic violence [ 1 , 17 , 44 , 49 , 61 , 68 , 73 , 79 ], can be positively related to perpetration. Initially, we speculated that the reason for this observed relationship had to do with controlling for the endorsement of domestic violence beliefs. However, the significant negative relationship between victimization and domestic violence perpetration existed in auxiliary analyses that removed the variable assessing endorsement of domestic violence beliefs from statistical modeling. Thus, we offer two plausible explanation for the observed relationship. First, this finding may reflect some form of empathy that serves as a protective factor against domestic violence perpetration – controlling for other relevant factors, such as demographics, endorsements of domestic violence beliefs, and pleasurable violent media exposure. That is, victims of domestic violence understand the horrific pain caused by intimate partner abuse, and in an attempt to avoid instilling such pain onto their spouse, they refrain from acting out aggressively against them. Second, this finding may simply be the result of sampling error. There was no relationship found between domestic violence conviction and domestic violence victimization in statistical modeling. As such, the relationship found between domestic violence victimization and self-reported domestic violence perpetration could merely be due to the fact that the measure was self-reported. That is, it may be that victims of domestic violence are less willing to admit to domestic violence perpetration than non-victims, for whatever reason. Future research should explore these findings more in relation to these two hypotheses.

Limitations

There are several limitations to our study that warrant disclosure. First, results reported above come from a small convenience sample of offenders incarcerated in New York and West Virginia. Thus, the findings from this exploratory study are not generalizable beyond these parameters. Second, the data had temporal ordering constraints. The dependent and independent variables were collected at the same time. Accordingly, our use of the term “predictor” in multivariable modeling is more consistent with “correlation.” Due to temporal ordering issues, it is unknown if individuals prone to violence seek out violent media, or if violent media causes such individuals to become violent. Future research should employ probabilistic sampling techniques, collect data from more urban sites, and use longitudinal research designs. Third, our measures of violent media exposure were not ideal. Notably, while more robust than prior estimates of violent media exposure, our measures of violent media exposure looked at general media violence across three different types of media—television, movies, and video games. It would be better for future researchers to examine the impact of specific types of violence depicted in media, such as domestic violence, on specific types of violent crimes.

Future work should also take steps to better explore this relationship from a theoretical lens, such as Cultivation Theory, “mean world” hypothesis, and catharsis effects. Future work may also benefit from approaching this topic inductively, by asking respondents to list the media they consume and then exploring the relationship between this media consumption and various forms of crime. For instance, it may be prudent to explore the relationship between exposure to types of pornography and acceptance of domestic violence beliefs, and subsequently, perpetration rates. This could further provide evidence of a media cultivation or catharsis effect. Lastly, the survey questions used wording pertaining to “husband” and “wife,” thereby limiting the range of domestic violence. Future research should change the wording in the survey, to examine perceptions of domestic violence between intimate partners, and not just between spouses.

The relationship between exposure to violent media and crime perpetration is complex. Results from the current study suggest that exposure to various forms of pleasurable violent media is unrelated to domestic violence perpetration. When considering domestic violence perpetration, prior victimization experience and endorsement of domestic violence beliefs appear to be significant correlates worthy of future exploration and policy development.

This project received no funding for any element of the project, including study design, data collection, data analysis, or manuscript preparation.

Declarations

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

All research was conducted within the framework of the first author’s Institutional Review Board.

The study was approved by the institutional review board at the West Virginia Wesleyan College. The study was performed in accordance with the ethical standards as laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.

All participants were given and signed written informed consent documents prior to submitting data used in this study. The agreed to have their data collected and findings from it published.

1 Media violence is defined as various forms of media (i.e., television, music, video games, movies, Internet), that contain or portray acts of violence [ 10 ].

2 Media aggression, for the purpose of this study, is defined as various forms of media that contain or portray acts of aggression. Aggression is defined as: “[1)] a forceful action or procedure (such as an unprovoked attack), especially when intended to dominate or master; [2)] the practice of making attacks or encroachments; [and 3)] hostile, injurious, or destructive behavior or outlook, especially when caused by frustration” [ 13 ].

3 A combined measure of childhood physical abuse victimization and witnessing violence between parents [ 49 ].

4 Four respondents did not provide their biological sex.

5 Programs affective at reducing the likelihood of violence include, but are not limited to [ 50 ], Safe Dates [ 27 ], The Fourth R: Strategies for Healthy Teen Relationships [ 81 ], Expect Respect Support Groups [ 58 ], Nurse Family Partnership [ 15 , 55 , 56 ], Child Parent Centers [ 59 , 60 ], Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care [ 16 , 24 , 30 ], Shifting Boundaries [ 72 ], and Multisystemic Therapy [ 66 , 80 ].

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Media Violence Effects on Children, Adolescents and Young Adults

BY: CRAIG A. ANDERSON, MA, PhD

I killed my first Klingon in 1979. It took place in the computer center at Stanford University, where I was playing a new video game based on the Star Trek television series. I was an "early adopter" of the new technology of video games, and continued to be so for many years, first as a fan of this entertainment medium, and later as a researcher interested in the question of what environmental factors influence aggressive and violent behavior.

Of course, like most young men and women of that era, I had grown up witnessing thousands of killings and other acts of aggression in a wide array of television shows and films. Today's youth are even more inundated with media violence than past generations, mostly from entertainment sources but also from news and educational media. And even though the public remains largely unaware of the conclusiveness of more than six decades of research on the effects of exposure to screen media violence, the scientists most directly involved in this research know quite a bit about these effects.

The briefest summary of hundreds of scientific studies can be boiled down to two main points. First, exposure to media violence is a causal risk factor for physical aggression, both immediately after the exposure and months, even years, later. Second, in the absence of other known risk factors for violence, high exposure to media violence will not turn a normal well-adjusted child or adolescent into a mass killer.

SOME DEFINITIONS One reason for much of the confusion and debate among even highly educated citizens, health care professionals and even a few scientists is that when media violence researchers use certain terms and concepts, they have somewhat different meanings than when the general public uses the same words.

By "aggression," researchers mean "behavior that is intended to harm another person who does not wish to be harmed." Thus, hitting, kicking, pinching, stabbing and shooting are types of physical aggression.

Playing soccer or basketball or even football with energy and confidence are not usually considered acts of aggression, even though that is what most coaches mean when they exhort their charges to "play aggressively." Somehow, the phrase "play assertively" doesn't have the same ring to it.

By "violent behavior," most modern aggression and violence scholars mean "aggressive behavior (as defined above) that has a reasonable chance of causing harm serious enough to require medical attention." Note that the behavior does not have to actually cause the harm to be classified as violent; shooting at a person but missing still qualifies as a violent behavior.

By "media violence" we mean scenes and story lines in which at least one character behaves aggressively towards at least one other character, using the above definition of "aggression," not the definition of "violence." Thus, television shows, movies, and video games in which characters fight (Power Rangers, for example), or say mean things about each other (often called relational aggression), or kill bad guys, all are instances of media violence, even if there is no blood, no gore, no screaming in pain. By this definition, most modern video games rated by the video game industry as appropriate for children — up to 90 percent, by some estimates — are violent video games.

AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE Short-term and long-term effects of violent media use on aggressive behavior have been demonstrated by numerous studies across age, culture, gender, even personality types. Overall, the research literature suggests that media violence effects are not large, but they accumulate over time to produce significant changes in behavior that can significantly influence both individuals and society.

For example, one of the longest duration studies of the same individuals found that children exposed to lots of violent television shows at age 8 later became more violent adults at age 30, even after statistically controlling for how aggressive they were at age 8.

Similar long-term effects (up to three years, so far) on aggressive and violent behavior have been found for frequent exposure to violent video games. One six-month longitudinal study found that frequent violent video game play at the beginning of a school year was associated with a 25 percent increase in the likelihood of being in a physical fight during that year, even after controlling for whether or not the child had been in a fight the previous year.

Short-term experimental studies, in which children are randomly assigned to either a violent or nonviolent media exposure condition for a brief period, conclusively demonstrate that the media violence effects are causal. In one such study, for example, children who played a child-oriented violent video game (i.e., no blood, gore, screaming …) later attempted to deliver 47 percent more high-intensity punishments to another child than did children who had been randomly assigned to play a nonviolent video game. Even cartoonish media violence increases aggression.

In recent years, there have been several intervention studies designed to test whether reducing exposure to screen violence over several months or longer can reduce inappropriate aggressive behavior. These randomized control experiments have found that, yes, children and adolescents randomly assigned to the media intervention conditions show a decrease in aggression relative to those in the control conditions.

HOW MEDIA VIOLENCE INCREASES AGGRESSION How does exposure to media violence lead to increased aggressive behavior? Media violence scholars have identified several basic psychological processes involved. They differ somewhat for short-term versus long-term effects, but they all involve various types of learning.

Short-term effects are those that occur immediately after exposure. The main ways that media violence exposure increases aggression in the short term are:

• Direct imitation of the observed behavior
• Observational learning of attitudes, beliefs and expected benefits of aggression
• Increased excitation
• Priming of aggression-related ways of thinking and feeling

In essence, for at least a brief period after viewing or playing violent media, the exposed person thinks in more aggressive ways, feels more aggressive, perceives that others are hostile towards him or her and sees aggressive solutions as being more acceptable and beneficial.

The short-term effects typically dissipate quickly. However, with repeated exposure to violent media, the child or adolescent "learns" these short-term lessons in a more permanent way, just as practicing multiplication tables or playing chess improves performance on those skills. That is, the person comes to hold more positive beliefs about aggressive solutions to conflict, develops what is sometimes called a "hostile attribution bias" (a tendency to view ambiguous negative events in a hostile way) and becomes more confident that an aggressive action on their part will work.

There also is growing evidence that repeated exposure to blood, gore and other aspects of extremely violent media can lead to emotional desensitization to the pain and suffering of others. In turn, such desensitization can lead to increased aggression by removing one of the built-in brakes that normally inhibits aggression and violence. Furthermore, this desensitization effect reduces the likelihood of pro-social, empathetic, helping behavior when viewing a victim of violence.

Interestingly, these same basic learning and priming effects account for the fact that exposure to nonviolent, pro-social media can lead to increased pro-social behavior.

SCREEN TIME EFFECTS For a number of years, the American Academy of Pediatrics has recommended very strict limits on children's exposure to any types of screen media, including TVs and computers, primarily because of concern about attention deficits. For example, they recommend that children under the age of 2 years have no exposure to electronic screens, even nonviolent media. Recent research with children, adolescents and young adults suggests that both nonviolent and violent media contribute to real-world attention problems, such as attention deficit disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Furthermore, these attention problems are strongly linked to aggressive behavior, especially impulsive types of aggression.

Another emerging problem with video game usage goes by various addiction-related labels, such as video game addiction, internet addiction and internet/gaming disorder. Research across multiple countries and various measures of problematic game use suggests that about 8 percent of "gamers" have serious problems with their gaming habit. That is, their gaming activities interfere with significant aspects of their lives, such as interpersonal relationships, school or work activities. This newer research literature suggests that for some individuals, video game problems look much like gambling addiction.

MAGNITUDE OF HARM News media often report exaggerated claims about "the" cause of the most recent violent tragedy, whether it is a school shooting or another mass killing. Sometimes the cause that is hyped by these stories is violent video games; other times it is mental illness, or gun control, or lack of gun control.

Behavioral scientists (and reasonably thoughtful people in general) know that human behavior is complex, and it is affected by many variables. Violence researchers in particular know that such extreme events as homicide cannot be boiled down to a single cause. Instead, behavioral scientists (including violence scholars) rely on what is known as risk and resilience models, or risk and protective factors.

All consequential behavior is influenced by dozens (maybe hundreds) of risk and protective factors. In the violence domain, there are dozens of known risk and protective factors. Growing up in a violent household or seeing lots of violence in one's neighborhood are two such risk factors. Growing up in a nonviolent household and having warm, caring parents who are highly involved with child rearing are protective factors. From this perspective, exposure to media violence is one known risk factor for later inappropriate aggression and violence. It is not the most important risk factor; joining a violent gang is a good candidate for that title. But it also isn't the least important risk factor.

Indeed, some studies suggest that media violence exposure carries about the same risk potential as having abusive parents or antisocial parents. One major difference from other known risk factors for later aggression and violence is that parents and caregivers can relatively easily and inexpensively reduce a child's exposure to media violence.

WHY BELIEVE THIS ARTICLE? It is easy to find very vocal critics of the mainstream summary that I have presented in this article. A simple web search will generate links to any number of them. Many of the critics are supported by the media industries in one way or another, many are heavy users of violent media and so feel threatened by violence research (much like cigarette smokers once felt threatened by cancer research), some are threatened by anything they see as impinging on free-speech rights, and many are simply ignorant about the science. But, a few appear to have relevant scientific credentials. So, a reasonable question for a parent or health care professional to ask is why believe that exposure to media violence creates harmful effects, rather than maintain the much more comfortable position that there are no harmful effects.

The simple answer is this: Every major professional scientific body that has conducted reviews of the scientific literature has come to the same conclusion. This group includes the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the U.S. Surgeon General and the International Society for Research on Aggression, among others. I have posted these and other, similar reports online. 1

In 1972, former U.S. Surgeon General Jesse Steinfeld, MD, testified before the U.S. Senate on his assessment of the research on TV violence and behavior: "It is clear to me that the causal relationship between televised violence and antisocial behavior is sufficient to warrant appropriate and immediate remedial action," he said. "There comes a time when the data are sufficient to justify action. That time has come." 2

In response to one or two vocal critics of the mainstream research community and perhaps to pressure from other groups, the American Psychological Association created a new media violence assessment panel in 2013 to assess the association's 2005 statement and update it. They took a very unusual step to avoid any appearance of bias by excluding all major mainstream media violence scholars from the panel. Instead, the panel was composed of reputable psychological science scholars with expertise in developmental, social and related psychology domains, along with leading meta-analysis statistical experts. Their report, released in 2015, confirmed what the mainstream media violence research community has been saying for years: There are real and harmful effects of violent media.

Violent media are neither the harmless fun that the media industries and their apologists would like you to believe, nor are they the cause of the downfall of society that some alarmists proclaim. Nonetheless, electronic media in the 21st century dominate many children's and adolescents' waking hours, taking more time than any other activity, even time in school and interactions with parents. Thus, electronic media have become important socializing agents, agents that have a measurable impact.

Many of the effects of nonviolent electronic media are positive, but the vast majority of violent media effects are negative. Parents and other caregivers can mitigate the harmful effects of violent media in several ways, such as by increasing positive or "protective" factors in the child's environment, and by reducing exposure to violent media. This is not an easy task, but it can be done with little or no expense. The benefits of doing so are healthier, happier, more successful children, adolescents and young adults.

CRAIG A. ANDERSON is Distinguished Professor, Department of Psychology, and director of the Center for the Study of Violence, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa.

• http://public.psych.iastate.edu/caa/StatementsonMediaViolence.html .
• Jesse Feldman, statement in hearings before Subcommittee on Communications of Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, Serial #92-52 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972) 25-27.

Copyright © 2016 by the Catholic Health Association of the United States

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The role of media violence in violent behavior

Affiliation.

• 1 Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106-1248, USA. [email protected]
• PMID: 16533123
• DOI: 10.1146/annurev.publhealth.26.021304.144640

Media violence poses a threat to public health inasmuch as it leads to an increase in real-world violence and aggression. Research shows that fictional television and film violence contribute to both a short-term and a long-term increase in aggression and violence in young viewers. Television news violence also contributes to increased violence, principally in the form of imitative suicides and acts of aggression. Video games are clearly capable of producing an increase in aggression and violence in the short term, although no long-term longitudinal studies capable of demonstrating long-term effects have been conducted. The relationship between media violence and real-world violence and aggression is moderated by the nature of the media content and characteristics of and social influences on the individual exposed to that content. Still, the average overall size of the effect is large enough to place it in the category of known threats to public health.

Publication types

• Research Support, U.S. Gov't, P.H.S.
• Aggression / psychology*
• Mass Media*
• Public Health*
• United States
• Video Games
• Violence / psychology*

The Media and Sexual Violence Among Adolescents: Findings from a Qualitative Study of Educators Across Vietnam

• Original Paper
• Open access
• Published: 10 May 2024

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• Katherine M. Anderson   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-9675-3653 1 ,
• Alicia Macler 1 ,
• Irina Bergenfeld   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-2601-2854 2 ,
• Quach Thu Trang 3 &
• Kathryn M. Yount   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1917-1574 2 , 4  

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Growing access to technology and media has presented new avenues of influence on youth attitudes and norms regarding sexuality and sexual violence, as well as new technological pathways through which to perpetrate sexual violence. The aim of this research was to understand contextual influences on and needs for scale-up of sexual violence prevention programming in the media-violence context of Vietnam. We conducted 45 interviews with high school teachers ( n  = 15), university lecturers ( n  = 15), and affiliates from youth-focused community service organizations ( n  = 15) from across Vietnam. Additionally, we conducted four sector-specific focus groups with a sub-sample of interview participants ( k  = 4, n  = 22). Media and technology were brought up consistently in relation to sexual violence prevention and sexual health information. Key informants noted that, in Vietnam, generational differences in acceptability of sex and lack of comprehensive sexuality education intersect with new technological opportunities for exposure to sexual information and media. This creates a complex landscape that can promote sexual violence through priming processes, instigate mimicry of violent media, and presents new opportunities for the perpetration of sexual violence though technology. Development of comprehensive sexual education, including violence prevention education, is imperative, with consideration of age-specific needs for Vietnamese youth.

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Introduction

Prevalence of sexual violence globally in asia/pacific and in vietnam.

Sexual violence, defined as a sexual act committed or attempted in the absence of freely given consent, is a worldwide public health challenge (Basile et al., 2014 ). Sexual violence includes contact-based acts, such as non-consensual sexual intercourse, and non-contact-based acts, such as sexual harassment, unwanted exposure to sexual situations, and non-consensual filming and/or dissemination of explicit photographs (Basile et al., 2014 ). Globally, at least 35.6 percent of all women ages 15 years or older have reported experiencing sexual violence (World Health Organization (WHO), 2021 ). Men also may experience sexual violence; however, the global prevalence of exposure to sexual violence for men is much lower than for women (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation [IHME], 2017 ). Moreover, men are shown to perpetrate the majority of instances of sexual violence (James-Hawkins et al., 2019 ). Survivors of sexual violence are at heightened risk of experiencing immediate and long-term negative physical and mental health outcomes, as well as adverse social outcomes, such as diminished academic achievement (Amar & Gennaro, 2005 ; Fielding-Miller et al., 2021 ; Gonzales et al., 2005 ).

Southeast Asia has a high lifetime prevalence of physical or sexual violence by a partner or sexual violence by a non-partner; over 34% of women ages 15 to 49 in Southeast Asia report at least one of these experiences (WHO, 2021 ). In select countries of the Asia–Pacific region, 24.3% of men reported ever perpetrating sexual partner violence, and 10.9% of men had perpetrated non-partner rape in their lifetime (Fulu et al., 2013 ). Of men who reported non-partner rape, 57.6% reported perpetrating rape more than one time (Fulu et al., 2013 ). In Vietnam, sexual violence remains understudied and likely under-reported, though the available data suggest that sexual violence victimization is widespread (Pham, 2015 ; Winzer et al., 2019 ). According to the 2019 Vietnam survey of violence against women, 13.3% of women reported ever experiencing sexual violence by a husband or partner, and 9.0% reported ever experiencing sexual violence by a non-partner (MOLISA & UNFPA, 2020 ). However, other estimates gauge sexual violence victimization as more pervasive, with almost 20% of women 20 to 24 years reporting sexual violence victimization since the age of 15 (Le et al., 2019 ). Across age groups, adolescent women 15–19 years and young women 20–24 years are reported to experience the highest and second highest rates of non-partner sexual violence since age 15, at 24% and 17%, respectively (MOLISA & UNFPA, 2020 ).

Theories of Media and Violence

Several theories exist to explain how media influences cognition and behavior (Valkenburg et al., 2016 ), with variation by context, modality of the media, and predisposing personal factors. These include routine activity theory, which posits that individuals can be motivated to enact violence or another crime when an available victim, an offender, and the absence of a protective force or guardian for the potential victim converge (Aizenkot, 2022 ; Kumar et al., 2021 ; Madero-Hernandez & Fisher, 2012 ; Räsänen et al., 2016 ; Van Ouytsel et al., 2018 ) and social ecology theory, which emphasizes the role of the social environment (Lou et al., 2012 ; Stokols, 1992 ).

For purposes of the current analysis, we are informed by a combination of theories that conceptually overlap and build upon each other, including mimicry, sexual script theory, social cognitive theory, and cultivation theory. In the immediate aftermath of media exposure to violence, enacted violence is thought to operate through priming processes, arousal processes, and mimicking behaviors (Huesmann, 2007 ). The third of these, mimicry, is the imitation of behaviors seen in media (Huesmann, 2007 ), and is a common theme in theories of violence. Sexual script theory embraces the concept of mimicry by asserting that individuals model their sexual expectations, norms, desires, and decisions after portrayals of sex in their culture, such as in media (Wiederman, 2015 ), while social cognitive theory and social learning theory employ the similar concept of observational learning (Bandura, 2001 ; Bandura & Walters, 1977 ). Both social cognitive theory and social learning theory have been applied to the context of media, sexual activity, and violence (Brem et al., 2021 ; Hedrick, 2021 ; Hust et al., 2019 ; Marshall et al., 2021 ; Sun et al., 2016 ; Walker, 2021 ). Youth employ observational learning regularly as part of development (Fryling et al., 2011 ), including in cases of observed violence (Flannery et al., 2007 ). Observational learning typically occurs over time (Bandura, 2008 ), with replication of observed behaviors lasting well beyond the observed event (Fryling et al., 2011 ). According to cultivation theory, which also has been applied to media-violence research (Hedrick, 2021 ; Moorman, 2022 ), greater and repeated use of media is associated with greater acceptance of the norms and beliefs conveyed by that media (Morgan et al., 2014 ). Compounding this, repeated observation of arousing content can, in turn, cause desensitization, in which negative reactions to events like violence can become dampened over time, allowing viewing or participation in violence without negative affect (Huesmann, 2007 ). Notably, these theories lack significant consideration of youth as critical thinkers, with the assumption that they absorb witnessed behaviors with limited processing prior to reenactment. Literature supports more complex processes, such as emotion regulation and rumination (Brimmel et al., 2023 ; Felix et al., 2022 ; McComb & Mills, 2021 ), which we acknowledge and consider in our theoretical approach.

Pathways to Sexual Knowledge and Violence: Media Exposure and Use

Paradoxically, the global rise of technological connectivity has created new pathways to access sexual information and to execute sexual violence, the impacts of which may not be fully captured by existing data. Technology increasingly is used to access mass media sources, including informational media, such as news and informational websites, social media, such as social networking sites, or entertainment media, such as films. Most adolescents and young adults use the internet for health information-seeking (Buhi et al., 2009 ; Santor et al., 2007 ), with sexual health searched more often than any other health topic (Buhi et al., 2009 ). For many, the internet is the primary source of information, even with recognition that schools and medical professions may be better sources of information (Shih et al., 2015 ).

In Southeast Asia, an estimated 17% of individuals have used media to learn about sex (Gesselman et al., 2020 ). This gathering of information may lead to positive, neutral, or negative information about sex, to the extent that informational media and entertainment media may contribute indirectly to sexually violent behaviors, wherein content may reinforce harmful normative beliefs about sexual violence and may normalize or even promote contact- and non-contact forms of sexually violent behavior. This is aligned with theory of priming processes, wherein associations made in media are impressed upon viewers. Mobile sex-tech is technology used to enhance sexuality through information and connections with other people, such as through dating apps, among other activities (Gesselman et al., 2020 ). Sex-tech can be used for finding dating or sexual partners, and sending sexual images, videos, or message to others, known as sexting. In one study, an estimated 28.3% of individuals in Southeast Asia reported ever using sex-tech to find a sexual partner, and 60.1% had engaged in sexting, with approximately 45% having sent images and 28% having send videos (Gesselman et al., 2020 ). The anonymity of some of these platforms, as well as the independence with which they can be accessed by youth may lead to circumstances described by routine action theory, in which a lack of authority represents an opportunity for unhealthy action.

The rapid proliferation of internet and phone access also has vastly increased access to media that may contain biased framing of sexual violence, or sexually explicitly material (SEM), media demonstrating sexual acts, but not necessarily violent sexual acts (Owens et al., 2012 ; Peter & Valkenburg, 2016 ). An analysis of representation of sexual violence in German online news media found the perpetuation of rape myths and the portrayal of victims as weak and passive women (Schwark, 2017 ). In a study of English-language news articles from Pakistan, India, and the UK, it was found that gender-based violence messaging focused on rape, rather than sexual violence more broadly (Manzoor et al., 2023 ). Both studies demonstrate how prevailing ideologies normalizing sexual violence and minimizing different types of sexual violence may be perpetuated. While estimates of adolescent exposure to SEM vary globally (Peter & Valkenburg, 2016 ), studies in urban Vietnam confirm that large majorities of adolescents and emerging adults access SEM. A recent national study found that 84% of adolescents 15–18 years had ever been exposed to SEM (Nguyen et al., 2021 ), and a study of first-year male University students in Hanoi found that 41% had been exposed to media-based violent SEM in the prior 6 months (Bergenfeld et al., 2022a ). Direct viewing of this content may provoke mimicry of violence by viewers, in alignment with sexual script theory. Notably, exposure to SEM may occur through passive intake or through active seeking of explicit materials. A 2011 analysis demonstrated that 83% of the top 20 Nielsen-rated adolescent television shows contained SEM (Neilsen Company, 2011 ), while a more recent content analysis of popular Western television shows watched by teens and young adults reached similar conclusions about the common nature of sexual violence and sexual abuse (Kinsler et al., 2019 ). Other avenues for passive exposure to SEM include video games, music, music videos, and films (Peter & Valkenburg, 2016 ). In studies of pornography, which is inherently explicit and often actively sought out, 88% of videos included physical aggression or violence towards women (Bridges et al., 2010 ; Foubert et al., 2011 ). These represent additional opportunities for priming of the association of sex with violence, with cultivation theory suggesting that repeated use increases the likelihood of adopting the beliefs presented in media.

Some of these paths of exposure to media on sexual violence also are tools for sexually violent behavior. Initially consensual sexting may quickly transition to unwanted exposure to sexual images or videos if one party does not seek consent. Informational and social media forums to share comments can become a vehicle for written sexual harassment of an individual. Images or videos shared consensually with a partner can be harnessed for blackmail or nonconsensual sharing via media. These direct, non-contact forms of sexually violent behavior are known as Technology Facilitated Sexual Violence (TFSV). They may include the distribution of explicit photographs and videos without consent, the sharing of unsolicited explicit content, and the use of online platforms for sexual harassment (Powell & Henry, 2019 ). In some western countries, lifetime TFSV exposure may be as high as 17% (Patel & Roesch, 2022 ), with higher prevalence among youth (Gámez-Guadix et al., 2015 ; Powell & Henry, 2019 ). Moreover, social media provides opportunities to facilitate in-person contact and non-contact sexual violence. Conversations on social media, both anonymous and not, may become an opportunity to convince someone to have an in-person meeting, either consensually or through manipulation of power dynamics; one party may have the intent of perpetrating sexual violence, physically, through nonconsensual documentation of sexual behavior, or through other means.

Harms of Media/Technology on Violent Attitudes and Behavior

A growing body of evidence supports the harmful outcomes related to sexual material in media/technology, including the perpetuation of inequitable gender roles, rape mythology, negative self-worth, and sexually violent behavior. Several harmful outcomes also are associated with TFSV victimization, including technology use related to sex generally, such as sexting. In a Hong Kong-based study, individuals who took part in sexting had higher levels of body surveillance and shame than those who did not (Liong & Cheng, 2019 ); in some settings, youth may frame TFSV in dating relationships, such as demands to engage in sexting, as requests for “proof of love” (Fernet et al., 2023 ). Sexting itself has been associated with risky sexual behavior, substance use, depression (Gesselman et al., 2020 ) and self-harm among adolescents (Wachs et al., 2021 ).

In Western countries, exposure to SEM and especially violent SEM has been associated with more accepting attitudes about sexual violence and with sexually violent behavior (Rodenhizer & Edwards, 2019 ). In the global West and Asia, such exposure is associated with permissive sexual attitudes and gender-stereotypical sexual beliefs among adolescents (Peter & Valkenburg, 2016 ). Across studies, male study participants’ attitudes and behaviors regarding sexual and domestic violence were more strongly affected by exposure than females’ (Rodenhizer & Edwards, 2019 ). A recent meta-analysis found that greater overall media consumption was associated with higher rape myth acceptance (Hedrick, 2021 ), with general pornography, violent pornography, and sports media accounting for most of this association. In a recent longitudinal study in Vietnam, a dose–response relationship was observed between the frequency of exposure to violent SEM with non-contact and contact sexually violent (Bergenfeld et al., 2022a ).

Benefits of Media/Technology for Violence Prevention

Conversely, access and exposure to information on safe sexual behavior and the prevention of sexual violence can lead to positive outcomes among adolescents. Qualitative studies of women in the USA, Canada, and India have suggested that women who access non-violent sexual content associated this exposure with positive sexual exploration and development of sexual identity, opportunities for sex-positive education and exploration of readiness for sex, improved sexual connectedness in relationships, normalization of sexual desires, and improved acceptance of their bodies and sexualities (Arrington-Sanders et al., 2015 ; Attwood et al., 2018 ; Chowkhani, 2016 ; McKeown et al., 2018 ). Two qualitative studies conducted in urban Thailand and Vietnam found that adolescent girls use social media to develop their sexuality, express desires, and exercise sexual agency in settings where female expressions of sexuality are restricted and access to accurate sexual information is limited (Boonmongkon et al., 2013 ; Fongkaew & Fongkaew, 2016 ; Ngo et al., 2008 ). In a Hong Kong-based study, individuals who had participated in sexting had more comfort with nudity (Fernet et al., 2023 ), and sexting generally may contribute to increased emotional connection and satisfaction in relationships as well as freedom of sexual expression (Gesselman et al., 2020 ).

Social media also may provide a space for people to share sexual experiences and to seek support. In Hong Kong, “confessional” social media pages have enabled users to ask questions, seek advice around sex from peers, and receive peer support (Yeo & Chu, 2017 ). Social support, in turn, may indirectly reduce the risk of sexual violence victimization (Ybarra et al., 2015 ). In recent years, social media has been used strategically to disclose experiences of sexual violence and to provide social support to survivors (Alaggia & Wang, 2020 ), though some studies find that survivors of sexual violence do not reap the same benefits of public sharing of experiences as much as individuals who experienced less stigmatized trauma, such as a natural disaster (Delker et al., 2020 ). Also, the survivors of sexual violence may interpret and identify their experiences differently based on prevalence of sexual violence cases in the media (Newins et al., 2021 ).

Various forms of media have served as a tool to disseminate widely accurate and relevant information about sex and sexual violence to teen audiences (Todaro et al., 2018 ). Young people have cited increased comfort accessing information about sex online compared to other mediums (Lim et al., 2014 ), and reduced embarrassment for adolescents who are uncomfortable discussing sex with their parents (Lou et al., 2012 ). Qualitative research in Vietnam has found that parents would like accessible information about sex on the internet (Do et al., 2017 ). Numerous technology-based interventions relating to sexual violence exist, however, only a portion include content relating to violence prevention, rather than identification or survivor support, and those that do are largely focused on North America (Huang et al., 2022 ). In one systematic review of mobile sex-tech, which included 15 articles of technology-related interventions with sexual violence information, only 27% contained content on sexual violence prevention, and none contained information on the impacts of sexual violence (Huang et al., 2016 ). Nevertheless, two systematic reviews of tech-based interventions for intimate partner violence (IPV) found that IPV prevention in combination with access to telehealth services showed promise to reduce the risk of violence victimization (Anderson et al., 2021 ; El Morr & Layal, 2020 ), while a third did not identify any significant effects (Linde et al., 2020 ). Notably, the reviewed studies focused on interventions with women as potential victims, rather than men as potential perpetrators (Huang et al., 2022 ). While careful development is essential to prevent unintended consequences, such as increasing adherence to rape myths (Nicolla & Lazard, 2023 ), online programming in the U.S. and Vietnam have been successful in decreasing sexually violent behavior among university men (Yount et al., 2023b ; Salazar et al., 2014 ; Yount et al., 2020 ). In a randomized controlled trial of an “edutainment” program to reduce sexual violence, program participants had increased knowledge of the illegality of sexual violence and increased victim empathy (Yount et al., 2022 ), through which Vietnamese men had lower odds of past-year sexually violence behavior after program participation (Yount et al., 2023b ; Yount et al., 2020 ). This may demonstrate a pathway to reduced sexually violent behavior through the effective use of media with young people.

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the state of media usage relating to sexual violence among Vietnamese youth, according to educational and programmatic partners across Vietnam, using the research question “What is the perceived influence of social media on sexual violence among youth according to educators in Vietnam?” Further, we seek to describe the implications of media usage relating to sex and sexual violence, both positive and negative, and identify lessons and pathways to improve sexual health and sexual violence programming for Vietnamese youth. While literature is available on media, sex, and sexual violence globally and broadly in Southeast Asia, little of this research focuses on Vietnam specifically, and little from the perspective and framing of implementation of sexual violence prevention. This information may allow for effective, targeted programming and/or engagement in media to reduce sexual violence and promote gender equitable attitudes among youth.

Vietnam, located in Southeast Asia, is home to 96 million people, and 13.70% of the population are aged 15 to 24 years (General Statistical Office [GSO] of Vietnam, 2020 ). Fifty-four recognized ethnic groups are represented within the population of Vietnam, with 85% of individuals self-identifying as Kinh (Hiwasaki & Minh, 2022 ). Currently classified as a lower middle-income country, Vietnam’s population typically still resides in rural areas (70%) (World Bank, 2022 ); however, Vietnam has seen steady economic growth and diversification over the past 20 years, alongside declines in poverty (Do et al., 2021 ; Nguyen et al., 2020 ). Literacy is almost universal, and the gender gap in number of years of schooling is relatively narrow (United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 2022 ) though women less often participate in the workforce than men (69% v. 79%), and working women earn substantially less than their male counterparts (United Nations Development Program [UNDP]), 2022 ).

Nearly all individuals in urban and rural settings have access to electricity, and most (70%) of the Vietnamese population has access to the internet (Mobile Marketing Association, 2019 ). In 2019, there were 141 phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, and nearly all internet users are estimated to own a smartphone, such that over 80% of the population over age 15 is connected to online content (Mobile Marketing Association, 2019 ). Approximately 68% of the rural population own a smartphone, and as of 2019, was connected to the internet an average of 3 hours per day; of which 40% was spent on messaging apps in communication with others (Mobile Marketing Association, 2019 ).

As of 2019, 90% of young adults (18–29 years old) in Vietnam were using smartphones (Silver et al., 2019 ), while 72 million people (accounting for 73.7% of the population) use social media in Vietnam. Between January 2020 and January 2021 alone, the number of Vietnam’s social media users increased approximately by 10.8% (2021). Approximately 65% of Vietnamese youth (aged 16–30, N  = 1200) use the internet daily; a study of social media use among Vietnamese youth engage with social media for an average of 4.3 hours a day and primarily use it to talk with friends and receive updated news (Doan et al., 2022 ). Commonly used applications include Facebook, YouTube, and Zalo, with interactivity on YouTube and Zalo being highest with news and entertainment accounts (Doan et al., 2022 ; Hanns Seidel Foundation, 2021 ).

Social media in Vietnam is currently regulated under the Law on Cyber Security (National Assembly of Vietnam, 2018 ), and the Decision 874/QD-BTTTT (2021) on the Code of Conduct on social media, to protect “the national security,” relating to “moral values, culture, and traditions of Vietnamese people” (Ministry of Information & Communications, 2021 ; My, 2022 ) While no specific definition of these terms is provided, Decree 15/2020/ND-CP outlines financial punishment of 10 million VND to 20 million VND ($500—$1,000) for violation of regulations on use of social media, including “promoting bad customs, superstition, lustful materials which are not suitable for the nation’s fine customs and traditions.” In sum, access to smartphones, online media, and networking apps are widespread in Vietnam, particularly among youth, and laws regulating access to online content are nascent.

Participants

Recruitment strategies are described elsewhere (Yount et al., 2023a ). In brief, a multi-pronged approach was used to identify key informants from universities, high schools, and civil society organizations (CSOs) who conduct programs related to sexual and reproductive health and rights. Once initial potential participants were contacted, the research team employed snowball sampling to diversify the participant pool, with consideration to institutional setting (university, high school, CSO), region of Vietnam in which the institution was located (North, Central, South), and gender.

Participants were invited via email to complete interviews until a total sample of 45 was achieved, with an even distribution of 15 participants each from university, high school, and CSO settings. Of 45 interviewed participants, 32 were invited to participate in focus groups, based on their knowledge of sexual violence programming. A total of 22 individuals agreed to participate in focus group discussions, resulting in four focus groups: one with high school teachers ( n  = 7), two with university lecturers ( n  = 6 and n  = 3), and one with key informants from CSOs ( n  = 6).

Measures and Procedure

We conducted a qualitative study of key informants from high schools, universities, and civil society organizations (CSOs) across all regions of Vietnam, which included in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, a mixed-methods approach which is useful for research that has multiple objectives (Hennink et al., 2020 ). Overarching findings from the parent study are presented elsewhere (Yount et al., 2023a ). This analysis focuses on narrative segments related to the media, which was identified as a highly salient theme worthy of a separate, in-depth analysis.

In the parent qualitative study, the binational research team developed three guides for data collection. A semi-structured key informant interview guide contained open-ended questions about sexual violence among youth populations; gender and sexual norms among youth populations; causes, effects, and strategies to prevent sexual violence among youth; and factors influencing sexual violence prevention programming. Interviews were chosen to reduce social desirability bias, as recommended when discussing sensitive topics (Hennink et al., 2020 ). Two guides were developed for use in focus group discussions. Focus groups were selected for this objective as they allow for the identification of a range of perspectives and facilitate the justification of ideas (Hennink et al., 2020 ). First, a viewing guide elicited opinions and responses to the web-based sexual violence prevention program, GlobalConsent (Yount et al., 2022 ). The guide asked participants to rate on a five-point scale the feasibility and acceptability of program elements, and to elaborate upon their reasoning for the rating. The focus group facilitator collected the completed guides and used them in combination with a focus group guide to prompt discussion during the focus groups. The focus group guide aligned with the domains of the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR) (Damschroder et al., 2009 ). Questions were open-ended and assessed facilitators and barriers to sexual violence prevention programming, with prompts drawn from feedback in the viewing guide. This method was used to ascertain consensus, when possible. Of note, none of the data collection guides contained direct questions about social media, internet use, or technology-based sexual violence information dissemination other than reference to GlobalConsent. When participants raised these topics, facilitators asked follow-up questions to elucidate their opinions and experiences. All data collection forms have been previously published and are publicly available (Yount et al., 2023a ).

All data were collected using audio calls through the Zoom videoconferencing system. Two research staff members trained in qualitative research methods from the Center for Creative Initiatives in Health and Population completed data collection. At the beginning of each interview or focus group, the staff members explained the purpose of the study and reminded participants that they would not be asking for any private or potentially sensitive personal information. All interviews and focus groups were recorded using the Zoom videoconference platform. Interviews lasted 45–90 min, and focus groups lasted 120–150 min. Upon completion of data collection, interview participants were compensated with $20 USD. Focus group participants were compensated $30 USD for viewing GlobalConsent and completing the viewing guide materials, and $20 USD for participating in the focus group discussion.

Data Analysis

Data collectors saved digital recordings on a password-protected cloud-based research drive, and a professional transcription service transcribed all recordings verbatim. The research team verified random sections of the Vietnamese transcriptions against the original recordings. Verified Vietnamese transcripts then were translated into English, and a research team member proficient in the Vietnamese and English languages and cultures checked random segments of the English transcripts against the Vietnamese transcripts for accuracy of the translation and its meaning as intended in the original Vietnamese. Audio recordings were destroyed following quality checks of the written transcripts and translations.

Study team members analyzed the English transcripts using deductive and inductive techniques to identify initial themes and media-related sub-themes. Two doctoral-level study team members developed a codebook based on the interview guides and CFIR domains, inclusive of definitions, and revised it iteratively following repeated readings by other study team members. Team-based coding was used to code each transcript in MaxQDA.

All content related to media originally was coded using a single broad inductive code in the first round of coding. For this analysis, all coded segments related to media then were extracted and saved in a single document. Two graduate-level trained researchers independently reviewed this document to identify inductive sub-themes applicable to the data. The researchers then met to discuss the inductive sub-themes, reconcile discrepancies through inter-coder agreement, and to review the need for further theme identification. This latter step ultimately was not taken due to the high level of concurrence between the initially identified inductive subthemes. Inter-coder reliability was not calculated to avoid implied objectivity or undue precision (O’Connor & Joffe, 2020 ).

Finally, the coders created a salience matrix to visualize the presence or absence of each theme within each transcript, in order to qualitatively and quantitatively represent the salience of each them across all transcripts. Representative quotes for each sub-theme were identified to contextualize the findings with sector and gender of interview participants, and sector only for focus group participants, as statements were not individually identifiable in the focus groups. Participant characteristics are reported in Table  1 .

Accessibility and Quality of Information about Sex and Sexual Relationships

Many community partners, including more than half of participants employed as university lecturers or CSO affiliates, noted that media is highly accessible to young people in Vietnam, particularly through the internet, such that information about sex and sexual relationships can be easily found. Further, according to many participants, students seek out information independently, rather than rely upon schools to provide information. According to one participant, “Young people now have access to information easily, so they can learn things themselves. When we …distribute free condoms to advocate for safe sex, it comes to my surprise that students actually know about condoms” (University Lecturer, Woman). Another participant clarified that easy access to information about sex was generally a benefit of media access, specifically for young women, “ … nowadays, I think with the age of technology development, it would be easy for [young people] to look for information to help protect themselves [from unwanted pregnancy]” (University Lecturer, Woman).

A few participants described this high general access to information about sex as empowering for young people in Vietnam. One participant stated, for example, that “When they [the youth] need information, they are very proactive and find it very quickly themselves” (University Lecturer, Woman). However, several participants, and particularly participants affiliated with CSOs, expressed concern that the quality of available information on sex and sexual relationships is variable, and some “unregulated” available content may be inaccurate and may lack the comprehensiveness that adolescents need. One participant shared, “In recent years, access to the internet makes it easy for people to retrieve a lot of information, including unregulated ones, especially for adolescents and youth. People are not fully informed” (CSO Affiliate, Woman). Elaborating on this potential for youth to gain incomplete knowledge through internet sources, another participant noted, “…I can see that the young generation has learnt on their own via the internet … even though the young have somewhat an understanding about safer sex, their source of information is not adequate and they still lack orientation” (University Lecturer, Woman). This lack of orientation was seen as an important barrier to the practice of safe and consensual sex.

A few participants expressed additional concern about the volume and appropriateness of information available online, given the lack of formal sex/sexuality education, and given the willingness of students to actively see information themselves: “…sometimes the information is too much for them. …there really isn't anyone to teach them the skills to say no. So really they mostly depend on their instinct or information that they find out on their own rather than having orientation” (University Lecturer, Woman). When the information availabe online is “too much,” according to some participants, students may experience potentially harmful outcomes. Participants discussed how the abundance of ostensibly tempting, unregulated, and confusing information could overwhelm youth seeking information, with one participant explaining, “[online] we also receive many opinions, different kinds of feedback, even some pages, organizations, and activists …. I think it [creates] a rather chaotic environment …[Youth] can feel confused since they don't know which side to take, they are not sure which side is the right one” (CSO Affiliate, Woman).

About one third of participants from high school and university settings attributed this confusion to the lack of up-to-date “official” information, with one lecturer noting, “they have too much information and couldn’t find any official information,” calling the available official sources of information “extremely limited and old school” (University Lecturer, Woman). Many paricipants believed such official information was vital to provide young people with accurate information about sex. A CSO-affiliated participant shared,

Now it's easy, everyone has a smartphone. Google does not charge, so just google it. ... However, [youth] are not sure which document is official and standard. What they need the most is the most up-to-date materials with information and knowledge constantly updated. The source of information must be official and in accordance with the standards. (CSO Affiliate, Woman )

Despite substantial agreement across participants that youth needed more access to “official” information about sex, the meaning of “official” in the context of information on sex in the media varied. One participant distinguished information from medical sources and that from the government and schools, with the latter sources being indicated as preferrable, while medical sources, such as hospitals, may contribute to the potentially overwhelming, “unregulated” information online: “There are also many video clips or guideline on other social networks… Some hospitals also post these contents, both foreign and Vietnamese. [It’s] available, but maybe there’re too many, with no sources from the Government or schools.” (CSO Affiliate, Woman)

Other participants echoed the idea of “official” sources originating with the government, with one stating, “…online, I have not seen much. Besides, I think there is no official training program [on this topic] by the Ministry of Education yet” (CSO Affiliate, Woman). The absence of an official training program complicated the role of schools and universities, who were noted as potentially playing a significant role in the dissemination of information, but only once it exists: “And when the information is official, it will be shared by the school, the university, or the student community. It is also considered an official channel” (CSO Affiliate, Woman). Only one participant discussed non-governmental organizations as a source for “official” information: “If we talk about official sources of information, it is definitely the type of absolutely official sources like UNWOMEN or …multinational organizations working on gender. They provide much more credible information” (CSO Affiliate, Woman).

Media Depictions of Sexual Activity and Normalization of Sexual Violence

Some participants noted the lack of official information regarding sex and sexual relationships as intersecting meaningfully with narrow, sensational depictions of sexual violence and the normalization of sexual coercion, non-consent, and sugar-daddy relationships in the media. These depictions were described as occurring in the news media, television, and in online media content, including but not limited to pornography. One participant shared that the news media was not adept at conveying the complex nuances of sexual consent, arguing that this source of information was “unable to distinguish at a more delicate level, that things may start out as consensual, but could become non-consensual later” (University Lecturer, Woman). Only extreme cases of sexual violence were cited as worth covering by news media, masking other forms of sexual violence. As a focus-group discussion participant explained, “[the news media] only care about the major events … if there is a case where the students …make a girl to drink and it leads to a rape, and that spreads among students… [the media] will immediately jump in to investigate and interview” (University Lecturer). Further, according to another participant, the news media’s presentation of information on cases of sexual violence often ignore the voices and experiences of women and experts in the field.

Some participants also described the silencing of women’s experiences relating to sex and sexual violence as common in the movies. Some participants described movies from Southeast Asia as reinforcing rigid gender stereotypes, including women’s passivity and submission to masculine coercion, as well as the normalization of non-consent. A CSO affiliate shared, “…for example, in Chinese and Korean dramas, we may see scenes where the female character doesn't like it, but the male keeps kissing, and then, in the end, those two have a sweet night. I feel such things are injected into girls’ heads” (CSO Affiliate, Woman). One high-school teacher corroborated the above depiction of sex in Southeast Asian movies in this way:

…in Korean/Chinese movies or love novels that the young usually read and watch, the main characters typically force their partner into having unwanted sex or physical contacts, such as hugs or kisses. Consequently, the readers form a notion that it is okay for the male to force such activities, and the female does like it. (High School Teacher, Woman)

Reinforcing the normalization of sexual violence and non-consent in mainstream movies available to Vietnamese youth, some participants, particularly university lecturers, discussed how pornography contains harmful depictions of sexual activity that they believe drives a desire among men to imitate, including violent behaviors or behaviors that would make female partners uncomfortable. As demonstrated by the experiences of one university lecturer, exposure to pornographic material was expansive, and occurred from a young age:

…men from old to young have seen this type of [sexually explicit] film and are influenced by the erotic and sadistic elements in the film. These factors often stimulate the curiosity of men and make them want to try more. Young people are especially curious about this issue. I once did a project to provide computers for elementary schools …after 6 months of operation, when I accessed the search history, there were many pornographic websites in it. The 5th graders at that school watched sex movies. Even though they did not type the right words, they still watched and even discussed the contents of the movies. (University Lecturer, Man)

Some participants believed that youth generally were not aware that violent actions portrayed in such movies would be considered sexual violence, but rather normal sexual encounters that should be used as a guide. One university lecturer stated, “…young people think that if they do the same thing [as pornography], they will be professional, and this mindset causes young people to commit acts of sexual violence that they themselves do not know,” (University Lecturer, Woman). Several participants emphasized that the risk of imitating sexually explicit material, and at times violent sexually explicit material, was heightened because official information about healthy sexual relationships was lacking and so could not counter adolescents’ interpretations of SEM as normal forms of sexual interaction.

Concurrently, some participants, and particularly high school teachers, perceived a rise in portrayals of transactional sex in online media that capitalize on gender-stereotypical roles and economic power imbalances, particularly manifesting in “sugar-daddy” relationships among young people. One CSO affiliate shared, “… the most current trend [on dating apps] is sugar-daddy and sugar-mommy, which is why people nowadays joke that formerly, you could only purchase a single ticket for one-night stands, but now you can purchase a multiple-round ticket.” (CSO Affiliate, Woman). According to one high school teacher’s experience, sugar-daddy and sugar-mommy relationships were normalized in online media: “Last year, for example, there were so many cases of sugar babies—sugar daddies. They even made short clips to gain views and likes and created videos to post on YouTube to make money.” (High School Teacher, Woman). Another participant from a CSO contrasted her own personal experiences with those of youth only a few years younger: “My age is pretty close to them [but] when I was their age, those types of [transactional] relationships weren’t that common around me and not on the media either. Now it’s much more popular in the media…. These things are normalized because it’s common among young people” (CSO Affiliate, Woman).

Mixed Consequences and Opportunities from Young People’s Engagement with Media

To many focus group and interview participants, including many of high school teachers and university lecturers, increased access to and interaction with media, the lack of reliable information on sexual relationships and sexual violence, and media portrayals and normalization of non-consensual and violent relationships led to increased risk of sexual violence victimization among youth. The accessibility of communication with unknown persons provided by internet access was viewed as facilitating these cases of violence by providing opportunities for youth to be taken advantage of. A CSO affiliate spoke to this point, saying, “They [youth] often use communication apps to date or have sex (slang). Even those children of 15, 16 age… showed their bodies online as requested by older men” (CSO Affiliate, Man).

Several participants elaborated that youth they were familiar with also were at risk of non-consensual recording and distribution of content. Over one-third of high school teachers discussed these risks, and a participant who worked with a youth-centered CSO detailed them, saying, “…some people lure students into the toilet to secretly film them. … [some are] paying students to go to their living space to perform sex, then record clips…. On paid sex viewing websites, many videos with private sex scenes are posted to get money" (CSO Affiliate, Man). This non-consensual sharing of explicit sexual material was not limited to circumstances of non-consensual recording but could also originate in the consensual sharing of videos or images among youth, or between youth and adults. This content was described as potential material for blackmail and manipulation: “Four cases that I handled last year had to do with online erotic messaging via Zalo or text messages: boys and girls, they exchanged erotic images, but the boy saved those images and used them to blackmail the girl." (University Lecturer, Man) According to some participants, they didn’t believe youth understood the risks of content sharing, even to a single person: “The images uploaded on the Internet can be viewed by millions of people. People do not think of it as a danger to themselves. There are cases where private pictures/videos are spread out right in the school. Students did not think that it could be able to be exposed.” (CSO Affiliate, Man).

Conversely, some participants acknowledged benefits to increased access and exposure to media. The internet provides forums where youth who had experienced sexual violence could connect with other survivors, fostering social support: “Nowadays, the young can share their story with some groups or forums on the Internet. …though talking about their situations on the Internet didn’t get them the professional support they needed, they did receive a certain level of empathy and emotional support” (CSO Affiliate, Woman). Another participant noted that the internet provided a layer of privacy that could not be achieved through in-person contact, easing feelings of embarrassment or discomfort in seeking support: “I think they would talk to their friends… [but] talking [in person] could be embarrassing, and they would be afraid that someone might overhear them, so I think they would send messages over Zalo, Facebook.” (University Lecturer, Woman)

Furthermore, social forums on the internet were seen by some participants as providing space for young people to ask questions, to be exposed to different opinions, and to gather a variety of perspectives to inform themselves better: “In this era, information is very accessible. However, what really helps is a space where they feel safe to share their views on this topic. And after sharing, they can also listen to other people's opinions to conclude what is right, what is reasonable, what is not reasonable, and what is needed to be changed?” (University Lecturer, Woman).

Media as a Tool for Sexual Education and Sexual Violence Prevention

Despite participants’ perceptions of the mixed outcomes related to high accessibility of heterogeneous information about sex and sexual relationships and the high use by young people of media for this information, many participants noted that media was a powerful and important tool for disseminating information about sex and sexual violence and for engaging youth. One high school teacher shared, “…with the advance of technology in today's society, we can create websites, Facebook pages, or TikTok channels…to share information about sexual violence and ways to prevent it. I think this is a way for the young to access reliable sources of information more easily” (High School Teacher, Woman). How information is presented in media also was discussed, with some participants highlighting that media can be a tailored medium of information to youth. The flexibility of media as a medium, and particularly online media was noted as a major facilitator or tailoring information. An CSO-based participant shared: “We can run several media projects that propagate sex education content such as talk shows, minigames, etc.… There are certain levels of flexibility for communicating with students of this age, especially in a time when sex education is still something we are aiming at" (CSO Affiliate, Woman). Finally, some participants, particularly those affiliated with CSOs, noted a key feature of media as a potentially effective tool was the ability to reach large populations:

The biggest advantage of youth groups like us, or young NGOs working in the social field, we know about social media, and we use it quite proficiently… Hence, I feel that is our huge advantage, especially if we want to spread the knowledge about sexual violence on the media and social networks. That's quite true because, among our 150,000 followers, 78 - 80% of them are young people aged from 18-20 years old. (CSO Affiliate, Woman)

Other participants echoed these sentiments, with one university lecturer suggesting that existing institutional resources could be leveraged, saying, “I think the best method would be using websites, the ones that are familiar to students, or pages of the student community " (University Lecturer, Woman). This strategy was cited as providing the sense of an “official” channel of information, and more clearly delineating between “official” and “unofficial.” Other partnerships also were discussed, including working with media channels: “I think we can also use the help of media news channels and authorities to spread more awareness and attract attention to the topic of sexual violence.… By doing this, the young do not have to actively learn about it … their mindset about sexual violence can be formed unconsciously" (High School Teacher, Woman). By these means, participants recognized media as potentially facilitating norms change through the efforts of activists and educators, underscoring the perceived power of media as a tool, “…not just to inform people, but also advocate for public opinions.” (University Lecturer).

Despite the numerous positive features of media as an educational tool, a few participants noted limitations. One participant shared, “I can't force them to visit only this page, go to that page, or tell them that they can only read materials related to learning and mustn’t watch movies. That is very difficult" (High School Teacher, Woman). Another participant pointed out that, despite the accessibility of information on the internet, neither access to nor use of the internet to seek out information were universal, potentially leaving vulnerable populations out of media-based programming:

Not everyone can have access to social media, or to the internet. Not everyone has time…. For me, the people who don't … have the conditions to do it are the people we need to approach most. Because those people are people who don't have much access to the mass media, to both information and knowledge sources on gender and sexual violence. (CSO Affiliate, Woman)

Even with these limitations, several of participants acknowledged that media already has shifted norms in Vietnam. One participant said of the youth with whom they work, “With the influence of social media such as YouTube, Tiktok, or Facebook, young people view sexual intercourse at this age as something normal. They think it is no longer a shame as in older times; they even openly share about it instead of keeping it a secret as before" (CSO Affiliate, Woman). Another key informant shared the impact of media on independent decision-making among youth, stating that media has given youth freedom through access to information. Finally, one participant commented on the increasing globalization allowed by media, and the profound impacts of exposure to different ideas:

I believe that the power of media and other means of connecting people, such as social networks, is quite large… There is also the openness of social media, where Vietnamese adolescents are more exposed to Western culture through concepts like freedom of expression and self-expression. Furthermore, girls are no longer constrained by the old concept of virginity. Boys, on the other hand, have more opportunities to study abroad and interact with people from different cultures, resulting in more cultural exchange. There are also an increasing number of reality shows on television about love and romance. As a result, they have a wealth of resources at their disposal to learn more about sex. (CSO Affiliate, Woman)

Leveraging of these resources, participants agreed, could be used to promote sexual health and decrease sexual violence among Vietnamese youth, empowering adolescents to shift social norms and promote increased gender equity.

Summary and Interpretation of Findings

In interviews and focus groups regarding sexual violence prevention among adolescents in Vietnam, high school teachers, university lectures, and affiliates of youth-focused CSOs expansively discussed the role of media and technology in the context of sexual violence and sexual education for Vietnamese youth. Primarily, interview and focus group participants expounded upon the high availability of access to media through technology, and particularly media relating to sex. However, the information presented in this media varies widely, according to participants, with some media that is incorrect or inappropriate for youth, and few available sources of information that were classified as “official.” Respondents shared that the available media—including news media, informational websites, social networking platforms, video streaming platforms, and mobile applications—depict sexual activity that is coercive or violent, normalize transactional sex, reinforce normative beliefs about inequitable gender roles, and prompt mimicry of sexual violence.

Given the high prevalence of youth information-seeking about sex through media (Buhi et al., 2009 ; Santor et al., 2007 ), including in Southeast Asia (Gesselman et al., 2020 ; Ngo et al., 2008 ; Nguyen, 2007 ) and Vietnam, specifically, the availability of accurate and appropriate information on sex and sexual violence is imperative to the education of youth globally. In line with behavioral health theories that integrate mimicry and observational or social learning, such as sexual script theory (Wiederman, 2015 ) and social cognitive/social learning theory (Bandura, 2001 ; Bandura & Walters, 1977 ), participants stated that youth they were familiar with imitated the sexual situations and actions they viewed in media, including violent sexual acts without the consent of their partner. This echoes previous findings of the role of observational learning in the contexts of media, violence, and sexual activity, previously identified associations between exposure to SEM, sexual attitudes, and gender-stereotypical sexual beliefs in the global West and Asia (Gesselman et al., 2020 ; Peter & Valkenburg, 2016 ), and recent findings on a dose–response relationship between SEM and sexually violent behavior among young men in Vietnam (Bergenfeld et al., 2022a ). Participants stated that non-consent was normalized in movies and television, passively reinforcing the violent and coercive sexual behaviors, while news media both sensationalized and neglected to portray the nuances of sexual violence and consent. According to cultivation theory, repeated exposure to portrayals and normalization of sexual violence may promote greater acceptance of and desensitization to violence (Morgan et al., 2014 ), which may provide insight into why some participants reported that youth did not know that nonconsensual sexual acts were in fact sexual violence.

Participants also discussed the implications of this increased access to media relating to sex, with both negative and positive outcomes delineated. Media was cited as increasing opportunities for sexual violence in two main ways. First, youth were put at risk through connecting with unknown people via messaging or networking sites, leading to vulnerable in-person meetings. Indeed, almost 30% of individuals in Southeast Asia are thought to have used sex-tech for finding sexual partners (Gesselman et al., 2020 ), indicating willingness to put oneself in situations that may be conducive to sexual violence. Second, youth were put at risk through the sharing of their own sexually explicit media with others, either privately or publicly. An estimated 60.1% of individuals in Southeast Asia report sending sexually explicit messages, including images and videos (Gesselman et al., 2020 ), which have the potential to then be shared beyond the original recipient without consent. Non-sexually explicit photos posted on social media were also described as a pathway for sexual harassment or TFSV.

By contrast, media also provided forums for learning, exploration, and social support, which participants noted is promising for sexual education and prevention of sexual violence. Social media and blogs were cited as potential sources of diverse opinions and experiences, corroborating previous findings of young women in Southeast Asia using the internet to explore and develop sexual identities and gain accurate information about sex (Boonmongkon et al., 2013 ; Fongkaew & Fongkaew, 2016 ; Ngo et al., 2008 ), and seek advice and social support about sex and sexual violence (Alaggia & Wang, 2020 ; Yeo & Chu, 2017 ). The significant portion of Vietnamese young adults on social media (Silver et al., 2019 ) also marks this as an ideal pathway for education and prevention of sexual violence, as identified by interview and focus group participants.

Interestingly, while participants recognized the diversity of the sources of information on the internet and the impossibility of "forcing" students to view "official” channels, they did not discuss the importance of media literacy education, which may help students to identify the useful/good vs. harmful information. It may be important to emphasize students as agents for change—once they are equipped with the knowledge and skills to analyze media sources with discernment and more accurate knowledge of sexual violence and consent. Media literacy education in high school and university contexts may offer a normatively acceptable pathway to increased critical analysis of sexual and sexually violent content in media, and may not face the same barriers that have been outlined to implementing sexual violence prevention education in Vietnam (Yount et al., 2023a ). This strategy may complement ongoing violence prevention efforts, particularly in high schools given that average educational attainment is projected to exceed 12 years in Vietnam among children of school-entry age (United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2022 ). Such programs that have been successfully implemented in the United States may be appropriate for adaptation to the context of Vietnam (Scull et al., 2018 , 2022 ).

Limitations and Strengths of Analysis

Some limitations and several strengths of this analysis are notable. First, qualitative research is not generalizable but generates salient themes that may be explored more systematically in future surveys involving representative samples of young people. Second, the data are perceptions of the behavior of young people from high-school teachers, university lecturers, and CSO affiliates and should not be interpreted as the actual behavior of young people. Relatedly, there is a possibility of polysemy in interpretation of media, wherein messaging may be interpreted semantically differently by different individuals (Ewoldsen et al., 2022 ), with implications for processing and actions taken following viewing. Educators may not only interpret media they see differently from their students, but students in one cultural group, class, or educational environment may view or interpret media differently from others, limiting the interpretations educators may be privy to. Only comprehensive inclusion of diverse educators—for the circumstances of this analysis—or youth can capture these multiple interpretations. While significant efforts were made to engage educators from across geographic regions and genders, these efforts may not be sufficient to capture all educator interpretations, let alone those of youth. Despite these caveats, the sample of participants is highly diverse, representing men and women living in urban and rural areas and key informants from diverse youth-serving institutions across all regions of Vietnam. Moreover, the participants in the study, because of their profession and high degree of interaction with young people, are important key informants to query, as knowledgeable adults from their own vantage point. Finally, the team used theory on media and violence to inform a nuanced interpretation of the data and its alignment with results from prior empirical research. The findings provide important insights about possible next steps to understand and to address young people’s use of the media and the diverse and sometimes countervailing ways in which it may help or harm young people’s encounters with sexual violence.

Implications for Research and Sexual Violence Prevention Programming

The findings from this analysis are a strong call for more research among youth in Vietnam, especially surrounding the needs for comprehensive sex education and TFSV. The increased prevalence of TFSV also warrants including this outcome in measures of sexual violence, such as those used in population-based surveys. Thus, large-scale surveys among high-school studies and university studies to document in representative school-based samples the various ways in which media and violence intersect, and at what developmental ages, would provide critical groundwork for developing educational programming that meets the most salient needs at each developmental stage. Expanded research is needed on youth media literacy and the needs of educational systems to facilitate implementation of sexual violence programming (Yount et al., 2023a ). Finally, given increasing access among youth globally to media-related technology and the internet, more work is needed to understand the implications of this access for sexual violence and sexual health, particularly among youth in low- and middle-income countries.

From the perspective of sexual health and sexual violence programming, the findings from this analysis are suggestive of some common and some age-specific needs of young people in Vietnam. First, there is a clear call for official, science-based curricula on sex and sexual violence that is developmentally tailored to high school and university students. A stronger need may exist for comprehensive sexuality education at the high-school level, including education on healthy relationships and media literacy. It may be beneficial to incorporate international standards, such as those suggested in the UNESCO Comprehensive Sexuality Education Implementation Toolkit (UNESCO, 2023 ), into newly developed curricula. Existing effective programs delivered through technology to university students (Yount et al., 2022 ) may be adaptable for the context of high school students, facilitating continuous sexual health and sexual violence education through high school and university. At the university level, there may be a more salient need for sexual violence prevention programming that educates adult students about the nature and scope of sexual violence, the importance of obtaining active consent for sex, the role of (media disseminated) gender norms in perpetuating myths about rape, masculine privilege, and ideas that are harmful to healthy sexual relationships (Bergenfeld et al., 2022b , 2022c ). Notably, peers themselves are an important source of norms about sexual violence alongside media; as such, comprehensive sexual violence prevention programming must address both media- and peer-related risk factors for sexually violent behavior (Yount et al., 2022 ). Furthermore, there is a need for education at both the high-school and university levels about the safety of online dating and social networking so that students are better informed about the risks at the outset of their engagement with online social-network and dating aps. Finally, there is a need for comprehensive education about the types of sexually explicit material that may heighten risks of sexually violent behavior for both groups, given the high prevalence of exposure at a young age in Vietnam (Bergenfeld et al., 2022a ).

Conclusions

The rise in availability and exposure to media among youth globally and in Vietnam has raised new educational needs on sexual violence prevention and sexual health information. New and adapted curricula, with age-specific programmatic elements, may help to mediate the impacts of media on perpetration of violence.

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We would like to thank the participants who generously contributed their time and thoughts to this research, as well as Dr. Minh Tran Hung, the site principal investigator for this research.

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Investigating the Role of Social Media In the Rise of Violent Rhetoric and Actual Political Violence

May 20, 2024

Violent political rhetoric and personal threats against public officials are on the rise. In a feature story posted on May 19, The New York Times reported :

Last year, more than 450 federal judges were targeted with threats, a roughly 150 percent increase from 2019, according to the United States Marshals Service. The U.S. Capitol Police investigated more than 8,000 threats to members of Congress last year, up more than 50 percent from 2018.

Threats rarely evolve into violent action, but it happens. The mass shootings at a synagogue in Pittsburgh in 2018 and a supermarket in Buffalo in 2022 were carried out by gunmen who expressed extreme right-wing views online. On January 6, 2021, supporters of then-President Donald Trump rioted at the U.S. Capitol and threatened to hang then-Vice President Mike Pence in an historic act of political violence incited and organized on social media platforms like Twitter (now X) and Facebook.

Trump’s penchant for menacing rhetoric doubtless has contributed to a coarsening of American political communication. In a recent interview with Time, he refused to rule out political violence if he were to fail in his attempt to regain the White House in November. “If we don’t win, you know, it depends,” he told TIME. “It always depends on the fairness of the election.”

But what other factors contribute to the trend? The Times reported that “experts describe this moment as particularly volatile, thanks in great part to social media platforms that can amplify anonymous outrage, spread misinformation and conspiracy theories and turn a little-known public employee into a target” (emphasis added). But the newspaper did not offer a specific citation for this claim, leaving some ambiguity surrounding the role of social media.

Our Center for Business and Human Rights has decided to investigate what social science tells us about that role. We’ll supplement our survey of the academic literature with interviews of scholars who have researched the question and a review of journalistic reports connecting social media to violent threats and actual violence. We aim to publish our white paper soon after Labor Day, as the presidential election campaign enters its intense final phase.

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Social media’s role in the rise of youth violence

Stephanie Sy Stephanie Sy

Madison Staten Madison Staten

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Violent crime has been on a downward trend across the country since the pandemic-era spike. But today, several cities are reporting a new rise in violent crimes involving youth. In many of these cases, police say social media played a central role. Stephanie Sy reports on the challenges of addressing teen violence.

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Notice: Transcripts are machine and human generated and lightly edited for accuracy. They may contain errors.

Geoff Bennett:

Violent crime is on a downward trend across the country since a pandemic era spike.

But, today, a number of cities are reporting a new rise in violent crime among youth. In many cases, law enforcement says social media played a central role.

Stephanie Sy reports from Maricopa County, Arizona, about the challenges of addressing teen violence.

Stephanie Sy:

A little over a year ago, Connor Jarnagan's typical suburban teen life took a dark turn.

Connor Jarnagan, Teenager:

Until that moment, I did not think people had such an evil in their heart to do something like that to somebody.

While waiting in the parking lot of an In-N-Out, Connor said he was confronted by about a dozen teen boys. The leader demanded $20 and Connor resisted.

Connor Jarnagan:

I worked for this money. You are not going to just take it from me. So, I said no until he punched me with brass knuckles.

The whole time, there was blood just gushing down my head. I was shaking and crying, because I did not know what was going to happen to me. I did not know if I was going to live. It was really scary for me.

The suburb where it happened, outside Phoenix, is what his mom, Stephanie, described as a bubble, billing itself in recent years as one of the safest cities in America.

Stephanie Jarnagan, Mother or Connor Jarnagan: We live in Gilbert, Arizona. It is a bedroom community. I never thought that that would happen to my son. Letting him go have a burger with friends at dinnertime, like, I did not think that that would be unsafe.

It turns out the teen who assaulted Connor was part of a group who called itself The Gilbert Goons.

There's videos of him fighting people all over the Internet.

The group members were known for posting videos of each other flashing guns, ganging up on teens, and street racing.

Examples of teen violence span social media and the country, from Missouri where a 15-year-old girl attacked another teen, landing her in the ICU, to Stockton, California, where a group of teens filmed the beating and robbing of an 8-year-old.

The violence by The Gilbert Goons, which, although recorded, went unchecked by law enforcement for the better part of a year, culminated in the death of 16-year-old Preston Lord last October. While a group of attackers pummeled him, some teens called 911, while others stood by, recording on their phones.

Chuck Bongiovanni, Gilbert, Arizona, Councilman:

Why do you have 40 kids with a camera recording violence? I saw a five-second video of Preston before they did CPR. And I don't ever want to see a video like that again in Gilbert.

As community grief turned to outrage over the death of Lord, Gilbert town Councilmember Chuck Bongiovanni helped set up a subcommittee to address teen violence. At a recent meeting, half the attendants were area high school students.

Christine Njuguna, Gilbert Mayor’s Youth Advisory Committee:

Just one thing I would say would be a big deal while going to these schools is just also teaching children accountability. You will be accountable, not only with police and everything, but just like general morals.

While moral accountability is called for by some, many others are calling for stronger law enforcement and curfews.

Chuck Bongiovanni:

Now, with social media, it is creating personas these kids usually really wouldn't be if they did not have social media.

A 30-minute drive from Gilbert, Commander Gabe Lopez says the number of teens murdered in his city last year rose significantly from the year before, as did the number of teens charged with homicides.

Lopez is head of the Phoenix Police Department's Violent Crimes Bureau. He points out the scene of a shooting late last year during a particularly violent stretch.

Cmdr. Gabe Lopez, Phoenix Police Department:

I think a total of nine victims are what these two individuals were charged with. So, of the four people in the car, two were charged with the homicide.

And they were juveniles?

Cmdr. Gabe Lopez:

They were juveniles. And, again, the victim was 15, the suspects were 17, and then you had a 10-year-old shot.

Federal statistics show, in 2020, homicides committed by juveniles were the highest they'd been in two decades.

The fear that I have, and I think it's shared by others in law enforcement, is people are doing or committing crimes so that they can capture it, so they can post it on their social media feed, so they can get street cred, or so that they can get likes.

James Garbarino, Psychologist:

Youth culture has moved in the direction of celebrity is the number one value.

Psychologist James Garbarino has spent decades researching adolescent violent behavior.

James Garbarino:

The cultural immersion in violent imagery is so powerful in the United States and, of course, social media, the rise of social media as a context in which those expressions can be offered, it's certainly it's not just limited to 2020 and onward, but it has escalated as well.

Commander Lopez says social media has also changed the landscape of gang violence.

Traditionally, it had always been really focused on the neighborhood that you were from, a group of friends that you typically grew up with. Nowadays, they meet online, they communicate via social media. It's a hybrid mix of different races, different areas of the city. It's complicated as far as trying to police that.

Before Olga Lopez moved to the Phoenix suburbs from California two years ago, she made sure it was a safe town where her son Jeremiah could play on a competitive high school football team.

But, last may, Jeremiah was shot and killed at a fellow student's home in Mesa. He was 18, weeks away from graduating high school.

Olga Lopez, Mother of Shooting Victim: The teammate who lives in the house along with the young man that lives across the street, were pointing guns at Jeremiah multiple times and recording it and posting it to Snapchat.

In the video described to her, Lopez says the laser from the guns pointed at Jeremiah shone red dots on his face.

Olga Lopez:

One time, Jeremiah says: "Hey, chill." Another time, Jeremiah is trying to make light of the situation. A little under 30 minutes later, my son is fatally shot in the back of the head.

I vowed that I would show up with the same grit and determination that he did.

Olga got the devastating news on May 7.

It isn't something that you get over. It definitely isn't something that time heals. And every day is like the first week.

She pours herself into running a nonprofit foundation she set up with her oldest son in Jeremiah's name.

While social media may have played a role in both Jeremiah's death and the attack on Connor Jarnagan in Gilbert, it was also what helped pin down the suspects in their cases. Jarnagan helped lead police to his attacker.

They got into his phone, and they looked at his chats and there it was: "I hit this guy and he gave me $20."

Connor says a lot of teens have been afraid to report on their peers, for fear of retaliation.

Teens need to come forward and stop being in the shadows, stop recording these fights. Instead, do something about it and make our communities a safer place.

He's doing his part by calling for Arizona state lawmakers to ban brass knuckles for minors. That action is tabled for now.

I'm hoping both sides of the aisle, Republicans and Democrats alike, can come together on this issue.

Connor continues to heal. And part of that, he says, has meant forgiving the teen who attacked him.

For the "PBS NewsHour," I'm Stephanie Sy in Maricopa County, Arizona.

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Stephanie Sy is a PBS NewsHour correspondent and serves as anchor of PBS NewsHour West. Throughout her career, she served in anchor and correspondent capacities for ABC News, Al Jazeera America, CBSN, CNN International, and PBS NewsHour Weekend. Prior to joining NewsHour, she was with Yahoo News where she anchored coverage of the 2018 Midterm Elections and reported from Donald Trump’s victory party on Election Day 2016.

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Essay on Media and Violence

Introduction

Research studies indicate that media causes violence and plays a role in desensitization, aggressive behavior, fear of harm, and nightmares. Examples of media platforms include movies, video games, television, and music. Violence in media has also been associated with health concerns. The youth have been the most common victims of media exposure and thus stand higher chances of exposure to violence (Anderson, 2016). In the contemporary world, violence in media platforms has been growing, reaching heightened levels, which is dangerous for society. When you turn on the television, there is violence, social media platforms; there is violence when you go to the movies; there is violence. Studies indicate that an average person in the United States watches videos for nearly five hours in a day. In addition, three-quarters of television content contain some form of violence, and the games being played today have elements of violence. This paper intends to evaluate the concept of media messages and their influence on violent and deviant behaviors. Television networks and video games will be considered.

The Netflix effect involves the behavior of staying home all day, ordering food, and relaxing the couch to watch Netflix programs (McDonald & Smith-Rowsey, 2016). Netflix and binge-watching have become popular among the younger generation and thus are exposed to different kinds of content being aired. Studies indicate that continuous exposure to violent materials has a negative effect on the aggressive behavior of individuals. Netflix is a global platform in the entertainment industry (Lobato, 2019). Although, the company does not have the rights to air in major countries such as China, India, and Japan, it has wide audience. One of the reasons for sanctions is the issues of content being aired by the platform, which may influence the behaviors of the young generation. The primary goal of Netflix is entertainment; it’s only the viewers who have developed specific effects that affect their violent behaviors through imitation of the content.

Television Networks

Television networks focus on feeding viewers with the latest updates on different happenings across the globe. In other instances, they focus on bringing up advertisements and entertainment programs. There is little room for violent messages and content in the networks unless they are airing movie programs, which also are intended for entertainment. However, there has been evidence in the violence effect witnessed in television networks. Studies called the “Marilyn Monroe effect” established that following the airing of many suicidal cases, there has been a growth in suicides among the population (Anderson, Bushman, Donnerstein, Hummer, & Warburton, 2015). Actual suicide cases increased by 2.5%, which is linked to news coverage regarding suicide. Additionally, some coverages are filled with violence descriptions, and their aftermath with may necessitate violent behaviors in the society. For instance, if televisions are covering mass demonstrations where several people have been killed, the news may trigger other protests in other parts of the country.

Communications scholars, however, dispute these effects and link the violent behaviors to the individuals’ perception. They argue that the proportion of witnessing violent content in television networks is minimal. Some acts of violence are associated with what the individual perceives and other psychological factors that are classified into social and non-social instigators (Anderson et al., 2015). Social instigators consist of social rejection, provocation, and unjust treatment. Nonsocial instigators are physical objects present, which include weapons or guns. Also, there are environmental factors that include loud noises, overcrowding, and heat. Therefore, there is more explanation of the causes of aggressive behaviors that are not initiated by television networks but rather a combination of biological and environmental factors.

Video games

Researchers have paid more attention to television networks and less on video games. Children spend more time playing video games. According to research, more than 52% of children play video games and spend about 49 minutes per day playing. Some of the games contain violent behaviors. Playing violent games among youth can cause aggressive behaviors. The acts of kicking, hitting, and pinching in the games have influenced physical aggression. However, communication scholars argue that there is no association between aggression and video games (Krahé & Busching, 2015). Researchers have used tools such as “Competition Reaction Time Test,” and “Hot Sauce Paradigm” to assess the aggression level. The “Hot Sauce Paradigm” participants were required to make hot sauce tor tasting. They were required to taste tester must finish the cup of the hot sauce in which the tester detests spicy products. It was concluded that the more the hot sauce testers added in the cup, the more aggressive they were deemed to be.

The “Competition Reaction Time Test” required individuals to compete with another in the next room. It was required to press a button fast as soon as the flashlight appeared. Whoever won was to discipline the opponent with loud noises. They could turn up the volume as high as they wanted. However, in reality, there was no person in the room; the game was to let individuals win half of the test. Researchers intended to test how far individuals would hold the dial. In theory, individuals who punish their opponents in cruel ways are perceived to be more aggressive. Another way to test violent behaviors for gamer was done by letting participants finish some words. For instance, “M_ _ _ ER,” if an individual completes the word as “Murder” rather than “Mother,” the character was considered to possess violent behavior (Allen & Anderson, 2017). In this regard, video games have been termed as entertainment ideologies, and the determination of the players is to win, no matter how brutal the game might be.

In this paper, fixed assumptions were used to correlate violent behaviors and media objects. But that was not the case with regards to the findings. A fixed model may not be appropriate in the examination of time-sensitive causes of dependent variables. Although the model is applicable for assessing specific entities in a given industry, the results may not be precise.

Conclusion .

Based on the findings of the paper, there is no relationship between violent behaviors and media. Netflix effect does not influence the behavior of individuals. The perceptions of the viewers and players is what matters, and how they understand the message being conveyed. Individuals usually play video games and watch televisions for entertainment purposes. The same case applies to the use of social media platforms and sports competitions. Even though there is violent content, individuals focus on the primary objective of their needs.

Analysis of sources

The sources have been thoroughly researched, and they provide essential information regarding the relationship between violent behaviors and media messages. Studies conducted by various authors like Krahé & Busching did not establish any relationship between the two variables. Allen & Anderson (2017) argue that the models for testing the two variables are unreliable and invalid. The fixed assumptions effect model was utilized, and its limitations have been discussed above. Therefore, the authors of these references have not been able to conclude whether there is a connection between violence and media messages.

Allen, J. J., & Anderson, C. A. (2017). General aggression model.  The International Encyclopedia of Media Effects , 1-15.

Anderson, C. A. (2016). Media violence effects on children, adolescents and young adults.  Health Progress ,  97 (4), 59-62.

Anderson, C. A., Bushman, B. J., Donnerstein, E., Hummer, T. A., & Warburton, W. (2015). SPSSI research summary on media violence.  Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy ,  15 (1), 4-19.

Krahé, B., & Busching, R. (2015). Breaking the vicious cycle of media violence use and aggression: A test of intervention effects over 30 months.  Psychology of Violence ,  5 (2), 217.

Lobato, R. (2019).  Netflix nations: the geography of digital distribution . NYU Press.

McDonald, K., & Smith-Rowsey, D. (Eds.). (2016).  The Netflix effect: Technology and entertainment in the 21st century . Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

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Understanding Violence: New Data and Theory

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This Research Topic on violence foregrounds new ideas, concepts, and frameworks that might advance our understanding of violence. It also provides a space for new datasets and new forms of critique that address the realities of violence in all its forms. While many suggest that civil society continues to move forward towards some hazy civilizational ideal, it seems to us perfectly obvious that violence of various kinds continues to be a crucial feature of contemporary societies. In this Research Topic, we explore how violence occurs, what violence means to participants, the effect of violence upon victims, and the role of systemic violence in driving antagonism, enmity, and social competition. The scope of the Research Topic is understandably broad. We are open to innovative submissions from academics researching and writing about violence in all its forms. We have no intention of simply rehearsing out-of-date ideas from the twentieth century. We are interested in the causes of violence; the contexts in which violence occurs; victims and perpetrators of violence, and the deeper forms of violence that play a central role in the constitution of everyday life. We welcome ideology critique, theoretical work, and papers that describe recent empirical research projects.

Keywords : systemic violence, subjective violence, symbolic violence, masculinities, familial violence, cultures of violence, violent subcultures, violent spaces, outcomes of violence, victims of violence, perpetrators of violence

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The Unpunished: How Extremists Took Over Israel

After 50 years of failure to stop violence and terrorism against Palestinians by Jewish ultranationalists, lawlessness has become the law.

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By Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti

• May 16, 2024

This story is told in three parts. The first documents the unequal system of justice that grew around Jewish settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. The second shows how extremists targeted not only Palestinians but also Israeli officials trying to make peace. The third explores how this movement gained control of the state itself. Taken together, they tell the story of how a radical ideology moved from the fringes to the heart of Israeli political power.

By the end of October, it was clear that no one was going to help the villagers of Khirbet Zanuta. A tiny Palestinian community, some 150 people perched on a windswept hill in the West Bank near Hebron, it had long faced threats from the Jewish settlers who had steadily encircled it. But occasional harassment and vandalism, in the days after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, escalated into beatings and murder threats. The villagers made appeal after appeal to the Israeli police and to the ever-present Israeli military, but their calls for protection went largely unheeded, and the attacks continued with no consequences. So one day the villagers packed what they could, loaded their families into trucks and disappeared.

Listen to this article, read by Jonathan Davis

Who bulldozed the village after that is a matter of dispute. The Israeli Army says it was the settlers; a senior Israeli police officer says it was the army. Either way, soon after the villagers left, little remained of Khirbet Zanuta besides the ruins of a clinic and an elementary school. One wall of the clinic, leaning sideways, bore a sign saying that it had been funded by an agency of the European Union providing “humanitarian support for Palestinians at risk of forcible transfer in the West Bank.” Near the school, someone had planted the flag of Israel as another kind of announcement: This is Jewish land now.

Such violence over the decades in places like Khirbet Zanuta is well documented. But protecting the people who carry out that violence is the dark secret of Israeli justice. The long arc of harassment, assault and murder of Palestinians by Jewish settlers is twinned with a shadow history, one of silence, avoidance and abetment by Israeli officials. For many of those officials, it is Palestinian terrorism that most threatens Israel. But in interviews with more than 100 people — current and former officers of the Israeli military, the National Israeli Police and the Shin Bet domestic security service; high-ranking Israeli political officials, including four former prime ministers; Palestinian leaders and activists; Israeli human rights lawyers; American officials charged with supporting the Israeli-Palestinian partnership — we found a different and perhaps even more destabilizing threat. A long history of crime without punishment, many of those officials now say, threatens not only Palestinians living in the occupied territories but also the State of Israel itself.

Many of the people we interviewed, some speaking anonymously, some speaking publicly for the first time, offered an account not only of Jewish violence against Palestinians dating back decades but also of an Israeli state that has systematically and increasingly ignored that violence. It is an account of a sometimes criminal nationalistic movement that has been allowed to operate with impunity and gradually move from the fringes to the mainstream of Israeli society. It is an account of how voices within the government that objected to the condoning of settler violence were silenced and discredited. And it is a blunt account, told for the first time by Israeli officials themselves, of how the occupation came to threaten the integrity of their country’s democracy.

The interviews, along with classified documents written in recent months, reveal a government at war with itself. One document describes a meeting in March, when Maj. Gen. Yehuda Fox, the head of Israel’s Central Command, responsible for the West Bank, gave a withering account of the efforts by Bezalel Smotrich — an ultraright leader and the official in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government with oversight over the West Bank — to undermine law enforcement in the occupied territory. Since Smotrich took office, Fox wrote, the effort to clamp down on illegal settlement construction has dwindled “to the point where it has disappeared.” Moreover, Fox said, Smotrich and his allies were thwarting the very measures to enforce the law that the government had promised Israeli courts it would take.

This is a story, pieced together and told in full for the first time, that leads to the heart of Israel. But it begins in the West Bank, in places like Khirbet Zanuta. From within the village’s empty ruins, there is a clear view across the valley to a tiny Jewish outpost called Meitarim Farm. Built in 2021, the farm has become a base of operations for settler attacks led by Yinon Levi, the farm’s owner. Like so many of the Israeli outposts that have been set up throughout the West Bank in recent years, Meitarim Farm is illegal. It is illegal under international law, which most experts say doesn’t recognize Israeli settlements in occupied land. It is illegal under Israeli law, like most settlements built since the 1990s.

Few efforts are made to stop the building of these outposts or the violence emanating from them. Indeed, one of Levi’s day jobs was running an earthworks company, and he has worked with the Israel Defense Forces to bulldoze at least one Palestinian village in the West Bank. As for the victims of that violence, they face a confounding and defeating system when trying to get relief. Villagers seeking help from the police typically have to file a report in person at an Israeli police station, which in the West Bank are almost exclusively located inside the settlements themselves. After getting through security and to the station, they sometimes wait for hours for an Arabic translator, only to be told they don’t have the right paperwork or sufficient evidence to submit a report. As one senior Israeli military official told us, the police “exhaust Palestinians so they won’t file complaints.”

And yet in November, with no protection from the police or the military, the former residents of Khirbet Zanuta and five nearby villages chose to test whether justice was still possible by appealing directly to Israel’s Supreme Court. In a petition, lawyers for the villagers, from Haqel, an Israeli human rights organization, argued that days after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, a raiding party that included settlers and Israeli soldiers assaulted village residents, threatened murder and destroyed property throughout the village. They stated that the raid was part of “a mass transfer of ancient Palestinian communities,” one in which settlers working hand in hand with soldiers are taking advantage of the current war in Gaza to achieve the longer-standing goal of “cleansing” parts of the West Bank, aided by the “sweeping and unprecedented disregard” of the state and its “de facto consent to the massive acts of deportation.”

The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and the relief the villagers are seeking — that the law be enforced — might seem modest. But our reporting reveals the degree to which decades of history are stacked against them: After 50 years of crime without punishment, in many ways the violent settlers and the state have become one.

Separate and Unequal

The devastating Hamas attacks in Israel on Oct. 7, the ongoing crisis of Israeli hostages and the grinding Israeli invasion and bombardment of the Gaza Strip that followed may have refocused the world’s attention on Israel’s ongoing inability to address the question of Palestinian autonomy. But it is in the West Bank where the corrosive long-term effects of the occupation on Israeli law and democracy are most apparent.

A sample of three dozen cases in the months since Oct. 7 shows the startling degree to which the legal system has decayed. In all the cases, involving misdeeds as diverse as stealing livestock and assault and arson, not a single suspect was charged with a crime; in one case, a settler shot a Palestinian in the stomach while an Israel Defense Forces soldier looked on, yet the police questioned the shooter for only 20 minutes, and never as a criminal suspect, according to an internal Israeli military memo. During our review of the cases, we listened to recordings of Israeli human rights activists calling the police to report various crimes against Palestinians. In some of the recordings, the police refused to come to the scene, claiming they didn’t know where the villages were; in one case, they mocked the activists as “anarchists.” A spokesman for the Israeli National Police declined to respond to repeated queries about our findings.

The violence and impunity that these cases demonstrate existed long before Oct. 7. In nearly every month before October, the rate of violent incidents was higher than during the same month in the previous year. And Yesh Din, an Israeli human rights group, looking at more than 1,600 cases of settler violence in the West Bank between 2005 and 2023, found that just 3 percent ended in a conviction. Ami Ayalon, the head of Shin Bet from 1996 to 2000 — speaking out now because of his concern about Israel’s systemic failure to enforce the law — says this singular lack of consequences reflects the indifference of the Israeli leadership going back years. “The cabinet, the prime minister,” he says, “they signal to the Shin Bet that if a Jew is killed, that’s terrible. If an Arab is killed, that’s not good, but it’s not the end of the world.”

Ayalon’s assessment was echoed by many other officials we interviewed. Mark Schwartz, a retired American three-star general, was the top military official working at the United States Embassy in Jerusalem from 2019 to 2021, overseeing international support efforts for the partnership between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. “There’s no accountability,” he says now of the long history of settler crimes and heavy-handed Israeli operations in the West Bank. “These things eat away at trust and ultimately the stability and security of Israel and the Palestinian territories. It’s undeniable.”

How did a young nation turn so quickly on its own democratic ideals, and at what price? Any meaningful answer to these questions has to take into account how a half-century of lawless behavior that went largely unpunished propelled a radical form of ultranationalism to the center of Israeli politics. This is the history that is told here in three parts. In Part I, we describe the origins of a religious movement that established Jewish settlements in the newly won territories of Gaza and the West Bank during the 1970s. In Part II, we recount how the most extreme elements of the settler movement began targeting not only Palestinians but also Israeli leaders who tried to make peace with them. And in Part III, we show how the most established members of Israel’s ultraright, unpunished for their crimes, gained political power in Israel, even as a more radical generation of settlers vowed to eliminate the Israeli state altogether.

Many Israelis who moved to the West Bank did so for reasons other than ideology, and among the settlers, there is a large majority who aren’t involved in violence or other illegal acts against Palestinians. And many within the Israeli government fought to expand the rule of law into the territories, with some success. But they also faced harsh pushback, with sometimes grave personal consequences. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s efforts in the 1990s, on the heels of the First Intifada, to make peace with Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, gave rise to a new generation of Jewish terrorists, and they ultimately cost him his life.

The disagreement over how to handle the occupied territories and their residents has bred a complex and sometimes opaque system of law enforcement. At its heart are two separate and unequal systems of justice: one for Jews and another for Palestinians.

The West Bank is under the command of the I.D.F., which means that Palestinians are subject to a military law that gives the I.D.F. and the Shin Bet considerable authority. They can hold suspects for extended periods without trial or access to either a lawyer or the evidence against them. They can wiretap, conduct secret surveillance, hack into databases and gather intelligence on any Arab living in the occupied territory with few restrictions. Palestinians are subject to military — not civilian — courts, which are far more punitive when it comes to accusations of terrorism and less transparent to outside scrutiny. (In a statement, the I.D.F. said, “The use of administrative detention measures is only carried out in situations where the security authorities have reliable and credible information indicating a real danger posed by the detainee to the region’s security, and in the absence of other alternatives to remove the risk.” It declined to respond to multiple specific queries, in some cases saying “the events are too old to address.”)

According to a senior Israeli defense official, since Oct. 7, some 7,000 settler reservists were called back by the I.D.F., put in uniform, armed and ordered to protect the settlements. They were given specific orders: Do not leave the settlements, do not cover your faces, do not initiate unauthorized roadblocks. But in reality many of them have left the settlements in uniform, wearing masks, setting up roadblocks and harassing Palestinians.

All West Bank settlers are in theory subject to the same military law that applies to Palestinian residents. But in practice, they are treated according to the civil law of the State of Israel, which formally applies only to territory within the state’s borders. This means that Shin Bet might probe two similar acts of terrorism in the West Bank — one committed by Jewish settlers and one committed by Palestinians — and use wholly different investigative tools.

In this system, even the question of what behavior is being investigated as an act of terror is different for Jews and Arabs. For a Palestinian, the simple admission of identifying with Hamas counts as an act of terrorism that permits Israeli authorities to use severe interrogation methods and long detention. Moreover, most acts of violence by Arabs against Jews are categorized as a “terror” attack — giving Shin Bet and other services license to use the harshest methods at their disposal.

The job of investigating Jewish terrorism falls to a division of Shin Bet called the Department for Counterintelligence and Prevention of Subversion in the Jewish Sector, known more commonly as the Jewish Department. It is dwarfed both in size and prestige by Shin Bet’s Arab Department, the division charged mostly with combating Palestinian terrorism. And in the event, most incidents of settler violence — torching vehicles, cutting down olive groves — fall under the jurisdiction of the police, who tend to ignore them. When the Jewish Department investigates more serious terrorist threats, it is often stymied from the outset, and even its successes have sometimes been undermined by judges and politicians sympathetic to the settler cause. This system, with its gaps and obstructions, allowed the founders of groups advocating extreme violence during the 1970s and 1980s to act without consequences, and today it has built a protective cocoon around their ideological descendants.

Some of these people now run Israel. In 2022, just 18 months after losing the prime ministership, Benjamin Netanyahu regained power by forming an alliance with ultraright leaders of both the Religious Zionism Party and the Jewish Power party. It was an act of political desperation on Netanyahu’s part, and it ushered into power some truly radical figures, people — like Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir — who had spent decades pledging to wrest the West Bank and Gaza from Arab hands . Just two months earlier, according to news reports at the time, Netanyahu refused to share a stage with Ben-Gvir, who had been convicted multiple times for supporting terrorist organizations and, in front of television cameras in 1995, vaguely threatened the life of Rabin, who was murdered weeks later by an Israeli student named Yigal Amir.

Now Ben-Gvir was Israel’s national security minister and Smotrich was Israel’s finance minister, charged additionally with overseeing much of the Israeli government’s activities in the West Bank. In December 2022, a day before the new government was sworn in, Netanyahu issued a list of goals and priorities for his new cabinet, including a clear statement that the nationalistic ideology of his new allies was now the government’s guiding star. “The Jewish people,” it said, “have an exclusive and inalienable right to all parts of the land of Israel.”

Two months after that, two Israeli settlers were murdered in an attack by Hamas gunmen near Huwara, a village in the West Bank. The widespread calls for revenge, common after Palestinian terror attacks, were now coming from within Netanyahu’s new government. Smotrich declared that “the village of Huwara needs to be wiped out.”

And, he added, “I think the State of Israel needs to do it.”

Birth of a Movement

With its overwhelming victory in the Arab-​Israeli War of 1967, Israel more than doubled the amount of land it controlled, seizing new territory in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. Now it faced a choice: Would the new land become part of Israel or be bargained away as part of a future Palestinian state? To a cadre of young Israelis imbued with messianic zeal, the answer was obvious. The acquisition of the territories animated a religious political movement — Gush Emunim, or “Bloc of the Faithful” — that was determined to settle the newly conquered lands.

Gush Emunim followers believed that the coming of the messiah would be hastened if, rather than studying holy books from morning to night, Jews settled the newly occupied territories. This was the land of “Greater Israel,” they believed, and there was a pioneer spirit among the early settlers. They saw themselves as direct descendants of the earliest Zionists, who built farms and kibbutzim near Palestinian villages during the first part of the 20th century, when the land was under British control. But while the Zionism of the earlier period was largely secular and socialist, the new settlers believed they were advancing God’s agenda.

The legality of that agenda was an open question. The Geneva Conventions, to which Israel was a signatory, forbade occupying powers to deport or transfer “parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” But the status of the territory was, in the view of many within and outside the Israeli government, more complex. The settlers sought to create what some of them called “facts on the ground.” This put them into conflict with both the Palestinians and, at least putatively, the Israeli authorities responsible for preventing the spread of illegal settlements.

Whether or not the government would prove flexible on these matters became clear in April 1975 at Ein Yabrud, an abandoned Jordanian military base near Ofra, in the West Bank. A group of workers had been making the short commute from Israel most days for months to work on rebuilding the base, and one evening they decided to stay. They were aiming to establish a Jewish foothold in Judea and Samaria, the Israeli designation for the territories that make up the West Bank, and they had found a back door that required only the slightest push. Their leader met that same night with Shimon Peres, then Israel’s defense minister, who told the I.D.F. to stand down. Peres would treat the nascent settlement not as a community but as a “work camp” — and the I.D.F. would do nothing to hinder their work.

Peres’s maneuver was partly a sign of the weakness of Israel’s ruling Labor party, which had dominated Israeli politics since the country’s founding. The residual trauma of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 — when Israel was caught completely by surprise by Egyptian and Syrian forces before eventually beating back the invading armies — had shaken citizens’ belief in their leaders, and movements like Gush Emunim, directly challenging the authority of the Israeli state, had gained momentum amid Labor’s decline. This, in turn, energized Israel’s political right.

By the late 1970s, the settlers, bolstered in part by growing political support, were expanding in number. Carmi Gillon, who joined Shin Bet in 1972 and rose by the mid-1990s to become its director, recalls the evolving internal debates. Whose responsibility was it to deal with settlers? Should Israel’s vaunted domestic security service enforce the law in the face of clearly illegal acts of settlement? “When we realized that Gush Emunim had the backing of so many politicians, we knew we shouldn’t touch them,” he said in his first interview for this article in 2016.

One leader of the ultraright movement would prove hard to ignore, however. Meir Kahane, an ultraright rabbi from Flatbush, Brooklyn, had founded the militant Jewish Defense League in 1968 in New York. He made no secret of his belief that violence was sometimes necessary to fulfill his dream of Greater Israel, and he even spoke of plans to buy .22 caliber rifles for Jews to defend themselves. “Our campaign motto will be, ‘Every Jew a .22,’” he declared. In 1971, he received a suspended sentence on bomb-making charges, and at the age of 39 he moved to Israel to start a new life. From a hotel on Zion Square in Jerusalem, he started a school and a political party, what would become Kach, and drew followers with his fiery rhetoric.

Kahane said he wanted to rewrite the stereotype of Jews as victims, and he argued, in often vivid terms, that Zionism and democracy are in fundamental tension. “Zionism came into being to create a Jewish state,” Kahane said in an interview with The Times in 1985, five years before he was assassinated by a gunman in New York. “Zionism declares that there is going to be a Jewish state with a majority of Jews, come what may. Democracy says, ‘No, if the Arabs are the majority then they have the right to decide their own fate.’ So Zionism and democracy are at odds. I say clearly that I stand with Zionism.”

A Buried Report

In 1977, the Likud party led a coalition that, for the first time in Israeli history, secured a right-wing majority in the country’s Parliament, the Knesset. The party was headed by Menachem Begin, a veteran of the Irgun, a paramilitary organization that carried out attacks against Arabs and British authorities in Mandatory Palestine, the British colonial entity that preceded the creation of Israel. Likud — Hebrew for “the alliance” — was itself an amalgam of several political parties. Kach itself was still on the outside and would always remain so. But its radical ideas and ambitions were moving closer to the mainstream.

Likud’s victory came 10 years after the war that brought Israel vast amounts of new land, but the issue of what to do with the occupied territories had yet to be resolved. As the new prime minister, Begin knew that addressing that question would mean addressing the settlements. Could there be a legal basis for taking the land? Something that would allow the settlements to expand with the full support of the state?

It was Plia Albeck, then a largely unknown bureaucrat in the Israeli Justice Ministry, who found Begin’s answer. Searching through the regulations of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Palestine in the years preceding the British Mandate, she lit upon the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, a major effort at land reform. Among other provisions, the law enabled the sultan to seize any land that had not been cultivated by its owners for a number of years and that was not “within shouting distance” of the last house in the village. It did little to address the provisions of the Geneva Convention, but it was, for her department, precedent enough. Soon Albeck was riding in an army helicopter, mapping the West Bank and identifying plots of land that might meet the criteria of the Ottoman law. The Israeli state had replaced the sultan, but the effect was the same. Albeck’s creative legal interpretation led to the creation of more than 100 new Jewish settlements, which she referred to as “my children.”

At the same time, Begin was quietly brokering a peace deal with President Anwar Sadat of Egypt in the United States at Camp David. The pact they eventually negotiated gave the Sinai Peninsula back to Egypt and promised greater autonomy to Palestinians in the occupied territories in return for normalized relations with Israel. It would eventually win the two leaders a joint Nobel Peace Prize. But Gush Emunim and other right-wing groups saw the accords as a shocking reversal. From this well of anger sprang a new campaign of intimidation. Rabbi Moshe Levinger, one of the leaders of Gush Emunim and the founder of the settlement in the heart of Hebron, declared the movement’s purposes on Israeli television. The Arabs, he said, “must not be allowed to raise their heads.”

Leading this effort would be a militarized offshoot of Gush Emunim called the Jewish Underground. The first taste of what was to come arrived on June 2, 1980. Car bombs exploded as part of a complex assassination plot against prominent Palestinian political figures in the West Bank. The attack blew the legs off Bassam Shaka, the mayor of Nablus; Karim Khalaf, the mayor of Ramallah, was forced to have his foot amputated. Kahane, who in the days before the attack said at a news conference that the Israeli government should form a “Jewish terrorist group” that would “throw bombs and grenades to kill Arabs,” applauded the attacks, as did Rabbi Haim Druckman, a leader of Gush Emunim then serving in the Knesset, and many others within and outside the movement. Brig. Gen. Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, then the top I.D.F. commander in the West Bank, noting the injuries suffered by the Palestinian mayors under his watch, said simply, “It’s a shame they didn’t hit them a bit higher.” An investigation began, but it would be years before it achieved any results. Ben-Eliezer went on to become a leader of the Labor party and defense minister.

The threat that the unchecked attacks posed to the institutions and guardrails of Jewish democracy wasn’t lost on some members of the Israeli elite. As the violence spread, a group of professors at Tel Aviv University and Hebrew University in Jerusalem sent a letter to Yitzhak Zamir, Israel’s attorney general. They were concerned, they wrote, that illegal “private policing activity” against the Palestinians living in the occupied territories presented a “threat to the rule of law in the country.” The professors saw possible collusion between the settlers and the authorities. “There is a suspicion that similar crimes are not being handled in the same manner and some criminals are receiving preferential treatment over others,” the signatories to the letter said. “This suspicion requires fundamental examination.”

The letter shook Zamir, who knew some of the professors well. He was also well aware that evidence of selective law enforcement — one law for the Palestinians and another for the settlers — would rebut the Israeli government’s claim that the law was enforced equally and could become both a domestic scandal and an international one. Zamir asked Judith Karp, then Israel’s deputy attorney general for special duties, to lead a committee looking into the issue. Karp was responsible for handling the most delicate issues facing the Justice Ministry, but this would require even greater discretion than usual.

As her team investigated, Karp says, “it very quickly became clear to me that what was described in the letter was nothing compared to the actual reality on the ground.” She and her investigative committee found case after case of trespassing, extortion, assault and murder, even as the military authorities and the police did nothing or performed notional investigations that went nowhere. “The police and the I.D.F. in both action and inaction were really cooperating with the settler vandals,” Karp says. “They operated as if they had no interest in investigating when there were complaints, and generally did everything they could to deter the Palestinians from even submitting them.”

In May 1982, Karp and her committee submitted a 33-page report, determining that dozens of offenses were investigated insufficiently. The committee also noted that, in their research, the police had provided them with information that was incomplete, contradictory and in part false. They concluded that nearly half the investigations opened against settlers were closed without the police conducting even a rudimentary investigation. In the few cases in which they did investigate, the committee found “profound flaws.” In some cases, the police witnessed the crimes and did nothing. In others, soldiers were willing to testify against the settlers, but their testimonies and other evidence were buried.

It soon became clear to Karp that the government was going to bury the report. “We were very naïve,” she now recalls. Zamir had been assured, she says, that the cabinet would discuss the grave findings and had in fact demanded total confidentiality. The minister of the interior at the time, Yosef Burg, invited Karp to his home for what she recalls him describing as “a personal conversation.” Burg, a leader of the pro-settler National Religious Party, had by then served as a government minister in one office or another for more than 30 years. Karp assumed he wanted to learn more about her work, which could in theory have important repercussions for the religious right. “But, to my astonishment,” she says, “he simply began to scold me in harsh language about what we were doing. I understood that he wanted us to drop it.”

Karp announced she was quitting the investigative committee. “The situation we discovered was one of complete helplessness,” she says. When the existence of the report (but not its contents) leaked to the public, Burg denied having ever seen such an investigation. When the full contents of the report were finally made public in 1984, a spokesman for the Justice Ministry said only that the committee had been dissolved and that the ministry was no longer monitoring the problem.

A Wave of Violence

On April 11, 1982, a uniformed I.D.F. soldier named Alan Harry Goodman shot his way into the Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem, one of the most sacred sites for Muslims around the world. Carrying an M16 rifle, standard issue in the Israeli Army, he killed two Arabs and wounded many more. When investigators searched Goodman’s apartment, they found fliers for Kach, but a spokesman for the group said that it did not condone the attack. Prime Minister Begin condemned the attack, but he also chastised Islamic leaders calling for a general strike in response, which he saw as an attempt to “exploit the tragedy.”

The next year, masked Jewish Underground terrorists opened fire on students at the Islamic College in Hebron, killing three people and injuring 33 more. Israeli authorities condemned the massacre but were less clear about who would be held to account. Gen. Ori Orr, commander of Israeli forces in the region, said on the radio that all avenues would be pursued. But, he added, “we don’t have any description, and we don’t know who we are looking for.”

The Jewish Department found itself continually behind in its efforts to address the onslaught. In April 1984, it had a major breakthrough: Its agents foiled a Jewish Underground plan to blow up five buses full of Palestinians, and they arrested around two dozen Jewish Underground members who had also played roles in the Islamic College attack and the bombings of the Palestinian mayors in 1980. But only after weeks of interrogating the suspects did Shin Bet learn that the Jewish Underground had been developing a scheme to blow up the Dome of the Rock mosque. The planning involved dozens of intelligence-gathering trips to the Temple Mount and an assessment of the exact amount of explosives that would be needed and where to place them. The goal was nothing less than to drag the entire Middle East into a war, which the Jewish Underground saw as a precondition for the coming of the messiah.

Carmi Gillon, who was head of Shin Bet’s Jewish Department at the time, says the fact that Shin Bet hadn’t learned about a plot involving so many people and such ambitious planning earlier was an “egregious intelligence failure.” And it was not the Shin Bet, he notes, who prevented the plot from coming to fruition. It was the Jewish Underground itself. “Fortunately for all of us, they decided to forgo the plan because they felt the Jewish people were not yet ready.”

“You have to understand why all this is important now,” Ami Ayalon said, leaning in for emphasis. The sun shining into the backyard of the former Shin Bet director was gleaming off his bald scalp, illuminating a face that looked as if it were sculpted by a dull kitchen knife. “We are not discussing Jewish terrorism. We are discussing the failure of Israel.”

Ayalon was protective of his former service, insisting that Shin Bet, despite some failures, usually has the intelligence and resources to deter and prosecute right-wing terrorism in Israel. And, he said, they usually have the will. “The question is why they are not doing anything about it,” he said. “And the answer is very simple. They cannot confront our courts. And the legal community finds it almost impossible to face the political community, which is supported by the street. So everything starts with the street.”

By the early 1980s, the settler movement had begun to gain some traction within the Knesset, but it remained far from the mainstream. When Kahane himself was elected to the Knesset in 1984, the members of the other parties, including Likud, would turn and leave the room when he stood up to deliver speeches. One issue was that the continual expansion of the settlements was becoming an irritant in U.S.-Israel relations. During a 1982 trip by Begin to Washington, the prime minister had a closed-door meeting with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to discuss Israel’s invasion of Lebanon that year, an effort to force out the P.L.O. that had been heavy with civilian casualties. According to The Times’s coverage of the session, Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, then in his second term, had an angry exchange with Begin about the West Bank, telling him that Israel was losing support in this country because of the settlements policy.

But Israeli officials came to understand that the Americans were generally content to vent their anger about the issue without taking more forceful action — like restricting military aid to Israel, which was then, as now, central to the country’s security arrangements. After the Jewish Underground plotters of the bombings targeting the West Bank mayors and other attacks were finally brought to trial in 1984, they were found guilty and given sentences ranging from a few months to life in prison. The plotters showed little remorse, though, and a public campaign swelled to have them pardoned. Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir also made the case for pardoning them, saying they were “excellent, good people who have erred in their path and actions.” Clemency, Shamir suggested, would prevent a recurrence of Jewish terrorism.

In the end, President Chaim Herzog, against the recommendations of Shin Bet and the Justice Ministry, signed an extraordinary series of pardons and commutations for the plotters. They were released and greeted as heroes by the settler community, and some rose to prominent positions in government and the Israeli media. One of them, Uzi Sharbav, now a leader in the settlement movement, was a speaker at a recent conference promoting the return of settlers to Gaza.

In fact, nearly all the Jews involved in terror attacks against Arabs over the past decades have received substantial reductions in prison time. Gillon, the head of the Jewish Department when some of these people were arrested, recalls the “profound sense of injustice” that he felt when they were released. But even more important, he says, was “the question of what message the pardons convey to the public and to anyone who ever thinks about carrying out acts of terror against Arabs.”

Operational Failures

In 1987, a series of conflicts in Gaza led to a sustained Palestinian uprising throughout the occupied territories and Israel. The First Intifada, as it became known, was driven by anger over the occupation, which was then entering its third decade. It would simmer for the next six years, as Palestinians attacked Israelis with stones and Molotov cocktails and launched a series of strikes and boycotts. Israel deployed thousands of soldiers to quell the uprising.

In the occupied territories, reprisal attacks between settlers and Palestinians were an increasing problem. The Gush Emunim movement had spread and fractured into different groups, making it difficult for Shin Bet to embed enough informants with the settlers. But the service had one key informant — a man given the code name Shaul. He was a trusted figure among the settlers and rose to become a close assistant to Rabbi Moshe Levinger, the Gush Emunim leader who founded the settlement in Hebron.

Levinger had been questioned many times under suspicion of having a role in multiple violent attacks, but Shaul told Shin Bet operatives that they were seeing only a fraction of the whole picture. He told them about raids past and planned; about the settlers tearing through Arab villages, vandalizing homes, burning dozens of cars. The operatives ordered him to participate in these raids to strengthen his cover. One newspaper photographer in Hebron in 1985 captured Shaul smashing the wall of an Arab marketplace with a sledgehammer. As was standard policy, Shin Bet had ordered him to participate in any activity that didn’t involve harm to human life, but figuring out which of the activities wouldn’t cross that line became increasingly difficult. “The majority of the activists were lunatics, riffraff, and it was very difficult to be sure they wouldn’t hurt people and would harm only property,” Shaul said. (Shaul, whose true identity remains secret, provided these quotes in a 2015 interview with Bergman for the Israeli Hebrew-language paper Yedioth Ahronoth. Some of his account is published here for the first time.)

In September 1988, Rabbi Levinger, Shaul’s patron, was driving through Hebron when, he later said in court, Palestinians began throwing stones at his car and surrounding him. Levinger flashed a pistol and began firing wildly at nearby shops. Investigators said he killed a 42-year-old shopkeeper, Khayed Salah, who had been closing the steel shutter of his shoe store, and injured a second man. Levinger claimed self-defense, but he was hardly remorseful. “I know that I am innocent,” he said at the trial, “and that I didn’t have the honor of killing the Arab.”

Prosecutors cut a deal with Levinger. He was convicted of criminally negligent homicide, sentenced to five months in prison and released after only three.

Shin Bet faced the classic intelligence agency’s dilemma: how and when to let its informants participate in the very violent acts the service was supposed to be stopping. There was some logic in Shin Bet’s approach with Shaul, but it certainly didn’t help deter acts of terror in the West Bank, especially with little police presence in the occupied territories and a powerful interest group ensuring that whoever was charged for the violence was released with a light sentence.

Over his many years as a Shin Bet mole, Shaul said, he saw numerous intelligence and operational failures by the agency. One of the worst, he said, was the December 1993 murder of three Palestinians in an act of vengeance after the murder of a settler leader and his son. Driving home from a day of work in Israel, the three Palestinians, who had no connection to the deaths of the settlers, were pulled from their car and killed near the West Bank town Tarqumiyah.

Shaul recalled how one settler activist proudly told him that he and two friends committed the murders. He contacted his Shin Bet handlers to tell them what he had heard. “And suddenly I saw they were losing interest,” Shaul said. It was only later that he learned why: Two of the shooters were Shin Bet informants. The service didn’t want to blow their cover, or worse, to suffer the scandal that two of its operatives were involved in a murder and a cover-up.

In a statement, Shin Bet said that Shaul’s version of events is “rife with incorrect details” but refused to specify which details were incorrect. Neither the state prosecutor nor the attorney general responded to requests for comment, which included Shaul’s full version of events and additional evidence gathered over the years.

Shaul said he also gave numerous reports to his handlers about the activities of yet another Brooklyn-born follower of Meir Kahane and the Jewish Defense League: Dr. Baruch Goldstein. He earned his medical degree at Albert Einstein College of Medicine in the Bronx and in 1983 immigrated to Israel, where he worked first as a physician in the I.D.F., then as an emergency doctor at Kiryat Arba, a settlement near Hebron.

In the years that passed, he gained the attention of Shin Bet with his eliminationist views, calling Arabs “latter-day Nazis” and making a point to visit the Jewish terrorist Ami Popper in prison, where he was serving a sentence for the 1990 murder of seven Palestinians in the Tel Aviv suburb Rishon LeZion. Shaul said he regarded Goldstein at the time as a “charismatic and highly dangerous figure” and repeatedly urged the Shin Bet to monitor him. “They told me it was none of my business,” he said.

‘Clean Hands’

On Feb. 24, 1994, Goldstein abruptly fired his personal driver. According to Shaul, Goldstein told the driver that he knew he was a Shin Bet informer. Terrified at having been found out, the driver fled the West Bank immediately. Now Goldstein was moving unobserved.

That evening marked the beginning of Purim, the festive commemoration of the victory of the Jews over Haman the Agagite, a court official in the Persian Empire and the nemesis of the Jews in the Old Testament’s Book of Esther. Right-wing Israelis have often drawn parallels between Haman and Arabs — enemies who seek the annihilation of Jews. Goldstein woke early the next day and put on his I.D.F. uniform, and at 5:20 a.m. he entered the Cave of the Patriarchs, an ancient complex in Hebron that serves as a place of worship for both Jews and Muslims. Goldstein carried with him his I.D.F.-issued Galil rifle. It was also the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, and on that morning hundreds of Muslims crowded the hall in prayer. Goldstein faced the worshipers and began shooting , firing 108 rounds before he was dragged down and beaten to death. The massacre killed 29 Muslim worshipers and injured more than 100.

The killings shocked Israel, and the government responded with a crackdown on extremism. Kach and Kahane Chai, the two political organizations most closely affiliated with the Kahanist movement, were outlawed and labeled terrorist groups, as was any other party that called for “the establishment of a theocracy in the biblical Land of Israel and the violent expulsion of Arabs from that land.” Rabin, in an address to the Knesset, spoke directly to the followers of Goldstein and Kahane, who he said were the product of a malicious foreign influence on Israel. “You are not part of the community of Israel,” he said. “You are not partners in the Zionist enterprise. You are a foreign implant. You are an errant weed. Sensible Judaism spits you out. You placed yourself outside the wall of Jewish law.”

Following the massacre, a state commission of inquiry was appointed, headed by Judge Meir Shamgar, the president of the Supreme Court. The commission’s report, made public in June 1994, strongly criticized the security arrangements at the Cave of the Patriarchs and examined law-enforcement practices regarding settlers and the extreme right in general. A secret appendix to the report, containing material deemed too sensitive for public consumption, included a December 1992 letter from the Israeli commissioner of police, essentially admitting that the police could not enforce the law. “The situation in the districts is extremely bleak,” he wrote, using the administrative nomenclature for the occupied territories. “The ability of the police to function is far from the required minimum. This is as a result of the lack of essential resources.”

In its conclusions, the commission, tracing the lines of the previous decade’s Karp report, confirmed claims that human rights organizations had made for years but that had been ignored by the Israeli establishment. The commission found that Israeli law enforcement was “ineffective in handling complaints,” that it delayed the filing of indictments and that restraining orders against “chronic” criminals among the “hard core” of the settlers were rarely issued.

The I.D.F. refused to allow Goldstein to be buried in the Jewish cemetery in Hebron. He was buried instead in the Kiryat Arba settlement, in a park named for Meir Kahane, and his gravesite has become an enduring place of pilgrimage for Jews who wanted to celebrate, as his epitaph reads, the “saint” who died for Israel with “clean hands and a pure heart.”

A Curse of Death

One ultranationalist settler who went regularly to Goldstein’s grave was a teenage radical named Itamar Ben-Gvir, who would sometimes gather other followers there on Purim to celebrate the slain killer. Purim revelers often dress in costume, and on one such occasion, caught on video, Ben-Gvir even wore a Goldstein costume, complete with a fake beard and a stethoscope. By then, Ben-Gvir had already come to the attention of the Jewish Department, and investigators interrogated him several times. The military declined to enlist him into the service expected of most Israeli citizens.

After the massacre at the Cave of the Patriarchs, a new generation of Kahanists directed their anger squarely at Rabin for his signing of the Oslo agreement and for depriving them, in their view, of their birthright. “From my standpoint, Goldstein’s action was a wake-up call,” says Hezi Kalo, a longtime senior Shin Bet official who oversaw the division that included the Jewish Department at that time. “I realized that this was going to be a very big story, that the diplomatic moves by the Rabin government would simply not pass by without the shedding of blood.”

The government of Israel was finally paying attention to the threat, and parts of the government acted to deal with it. Shin Bet increased the size of the Jewish Department, and it began to issue a new kind of warning: Jewish terrorists no longer threatened only Arabs. They threatened Jews.

The warnings noted that rabbis in West Bank settlements, along with some politicians on the right, were now openly advocating violence against Israeli public officials, especially Rabin. Extremist rabbis issued rulings of Jewish law against Rabin — imposing a curse of death, a Pulsa Dinura , and providing justification for killing him, a din rodef .

Carmi Gillon by then had moved on from running the Jewish Department and now had the top job at Shin Bet. “Discussing and acknowledging such halakhic laws was tantamount to a license to kill,” he says now, looking back. He was particularly concerned about Benjamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon, who were stoking the fury of the right-wing rabbis and settler leaders in their battles with Rabin.

Shin Bet wanted to prosecute rabbis who approved the religiously motivated death sentences against Rabin, but the state attorney’s office refused. “They didn’t give enough importance back then to the link between incitement and legitimacy for terrorism,” says one former prosecutor who worked in the state attorney’s office in the mid-1990s.

Shin Bet issued warning after warning in 1995. “This was no longer a matter of mere incitement, but rather concrete information on the intention to kill top political figures, including Rabin,” Kalo now recalls. In October of that year, Ben-Gvir spoke to Israeli television cameras holding up a Cadillac hood ornament, which he boasted he had broken off the prime minister’s official car during chaotic anti-Oslo demonstrations in front of the Knesset. “We got to his car,” he said, “and we’ll get to him, too.” The following month, Rabin was dead.

Conspiracies

Yigal Amir, the man who shot and killed Rabin in Tel Aviv after a rally in support of the Oslo Accords on Nov. 4, 1995, was not unknown to the Jewish Department. A 25-year-old studying law, computer science and the Torah at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv, he had been radicalized by Rabin’s efforts to make peace with Palestinian leaders and had connections to Avishai Raviv, the leader of Eyal, a new far-right group loosely affiliated with the Kach movement. In fact, Raviv was a Shin Bet informant, code-named Champagne. He had heard Amir talking about the justice of the din rodef judgments, but he did not identify him to his handlers as an immediate danger. “No one took Yigal seriously,” he said later in a court proceeding. “It’s common in our circles to talk about attacking public figures.”

Lior Akerman was the first Shin Bet investigator to interrogate Amir at the detention center where he was being held after the assassination. There was of course no question about his guilt. But there was the broader question of conspiracy. Did Amir have accomplices? Did they have further plans? Akerman now recalls asking Amir how he could reconcile his belief in God with his decision to murder the prime minister of Israel. Amir, he says, told him that rabbis had justified harming the prime minister in order to protect Israel.

Amir was smug, Akerman recalls, and he did not respond directly to the question of accomplices. “‘Listen,” he said, according to Akerman, “I succeeded . I was able to do something that many people wanted but no one dared to do. I fired a gun that many Jews held, but I squeezed the trigger because no one else had the courage to do it.”

The Shin Bet investigators demanded to know the identities of the rabbis. Amir was coy at first, but eventually the interrogators drew enough out of him to identify at least two of them. Kalo, the head of the division that oversaw the Jewish Department, went to the attorney general to argue that the rabbis should be detained immediately and prosecuted for incitement to murder. But the attorney general disagreed, saying the rabbis’ encouragement was protected speech and couldn’t be directly linked to the murder. No rabbis were arrested.

Days later, however, the police brought Raviv — the Shin Bet operative known as Champagne — into custody in a Tel Aviv Magistrate Court, on charges that he had conspired to kill Rabin, but he was released shortly after. Raviv’s role as an informant later came to light, and in 1999, he was arrested for his failure to act on previous knowledge of the assassination. He was acquitted on all charges, but he has since become a fixture of extremist conspiracy theories that pose his failure to ring the alarm as evidence that the murder of the prime minister was due not to the violent rhetoric of the settler right, or the death sentences from the rabbis, or the incitement by the leaders of the opposition, but to the all-too-successful efforts of a Shin Bet agent provocateur. A more complicated and insidious conspiracy theory, but no less false, was that it was Shin Bet itself that assassinated Rabin or allowed the assassination to happen.

Gillon, the head of the service at the time, resigned, and ongoing inquiries, charges and countercharges would continue for years. Until Oct. 7, 2023, the killing of the prime minister was considered the greatest failure in the history of Shin Bet. Kalo tried to sum up what went wrong with Israeli security. “The only answer my friends and I could give for the failure was complacency,” he wrote in his 2021 memoir. “They simply couldn’t believe that such a thing could happen, definitely not at the hands of another Jew.”

The Sasson Report

In 2001, as the Second Intifada unleashed a wave of Palestinian suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, Ariel Sharon took office as prime minister. The struggling peace process had come to a complete halt amid the violence, and Sharon’s rise at first appeared to mark another victory for the settlers. But in 2003, in one of the more surprising reversals in Israeli political history, Sharon announced what he called Israel’s “disengagement” from Gaza, with a plan to remove settlers — forcibly if necessary — over the next two years.

The motivations were complex and the subject of considerable debate. For Sharon, at least, it appeared to be a tactical move. “The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process,” his senior adviser Dov Weisglass told Haaretz at the time. “And when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.” But Sharon was also facing considerable pressure from President George W. Bush to do something about the ever-expanding illegal settlements in the West Bank, which were a growing impediment to any regional security deals. In July 2004, he asked Talia Sasson, who had recently retired as the head of the special tasks division in the state attorney’s office, to draw up a legal opinion on the subject of “unauthorized outposts” in the West Bank. His instructions were clear: Investigate which Israeli government agencies and authorities were secretly involved in building the outposts. “Sharon never interfered in my work, and neither was he surprised by the conclusions,” Sasson said in an interview two decades later. “After all, he knew better than anyone what the situation was on the ground, and he was expecting only grave conclusions.”

It was a simple enough question: Just how had it happened that hundreds of outposts had been built in the decade since Yitzhak Rabin ordered a halt in most new settlements? But Sasson’s effort to find an answer was met with delays, avoidance and outright lies. Her final report used careful but pointed language: “Not everyone I turned to agreed to talk with me. One claimed he was too busy to meet, while another came to the meeting but refused to meaningfully engage with most of my questions.”

Sasson found that between January 2000 and June 2003, a division of Israel’s Construction and Housing Ministry issued 77 contracts for the establishment of 33 sites in the West Bank, all of which were illegal. In some cases, the ministry even paid for the paving of roads and the construction of buildings at settlements for which the Defense Ministry had issued demolition orders.

Several government ministries concealed the fact that funds were being diverted to the West Bank, reporting them under budgetary clauses such as “miscellaneous general development.” Just as in the case of the Karp Report two decades earlier, Sasson and her Justice Ministry colleagues discovered that the West Bank was being administered under completely separate laws, and those laws, she says, “appeared to me utterly insane.”

Sasson’s report took special note of Avi Maoz, who ran the Construction and Housing Ministry during most of this period. A political activist who early in his career spoke openly of pushing all Arabs out of the West Bank, Maoz helped found a settlement south of Jerusalem during the 1990s and began building a professional alliance with Benjamin Netanyahu, who was then the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations and would soon go on to his first term as prime minister. Years later, Maoz would be instrumental in ensuring Netanyahu’s political survival.

“The picture that emerges in the eye of the beholder is severe,” Sasson wrote in her report. “Instead of the government of Israel deciding on the establishment of settlements in the territories of Judea and Samaria, its place has been taken, from the mid-1990s and onward, by others.” The settlers, she wrote, were “the moving force,” but they could not have succeeded without the assistance of “various ministers of construction and housing in the relevant periods, some of them with a blind eye, and some of them with support and encouragement.”

This clandestine network was operating, Sasson wrote, “with massive funding from the State of Israel, without appropriate public transparency, without obligatory criteria. The erection of the unauthorized outposts is being done with violation of the proper procedures and general administrative rules, and in particular, flagrant and ongoing violation of the law.” These violations, Sasson warned, were coming from the government: “It was state and public agencies that broke the law, the rules, the procedures that the state itself had determined.” It was a conflict, she argued, that effectively neutered Israel’s internal checks and balances and posed a grave threat to the nation’s integrity. “The law-enforcement agencies are unable to act against government departments that are themselves breaking the law.”

But, in an echo of Judith Karp’s secret report decades earlier, the Sasson Report, made publicly available in March 2005, had almost no impact. Because she had a mandate directly from the prime minister, Sasson could have believed that her investigation might lead to the dismantling of the illegal outposts that had metastasized throughout the Palestinian territories. But even Sharon, with his high office, found himself powerless against the machine now in place to protect and expand the settlements in the West Bank — the very machine he had helped to build.

All of this was against the backdrop of the Gaza pullout. Sharon, who began overseeing the removal of settlements from Gaza in August 2005, was the third Israeli prime minister to threaten the settler dream of a Greater Israel, and the effort drew bitter opposition not only from the settlers but also from a growing part of the political establishment. Netanyahu, who had served his first term as prime minister from 1996 to 1999, and who previously voted in favor of a pullout, resigned his position as finance minister in Sharon’s cabinet in protest — and in anticipation of another run for the top job.

The settlers themselves took more active measures. In 2005, the Jewish Department of Shin Bet received intelligence about a plot to slow the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza by using 700 liters of gasoline to blow up vehicles on a major highway. Acting on the tip, officers arrested six men in central Israel. One of them was Bezalel Smotrich, the future minister overseeing civilian affairs in the West Bank.

Smotrich, then 25, was detained and questioned for weeks. Yitzhak Ilan, one of the Shin Bet officers present at the interrogation, says he remained “silent as a fish” throughout — “like an experienced criminal.” He was released without charges, Ilan says, in part because Shin Bet knew putting him on trial might expose the service’s agents inside Jewish extremist groups, and in part because they believed Smotrich was likely to receive little punishment in any case. Shin Bet was very comfortable with the courts when we fought Palestinian terrorism and we got the heavy punishments we wanted, he says. With the Jewish terrorists it was exactly the opposite.

When Netanyahu made his triumphant return as prime minister in 2009, he set out to undermine Talia Sasson’s report, which he and his allies saw as an obstacle to accelerating the settlement campaign. He appointed his own investigative committee, led by Judge Edmond Levy of the Supreme Court, who was known to support the settler cause. But the Levy report, completed in 2012, did not undermine the findings in the Sasson Report — in some ways, it reinforced them. Senior Israeli officials, the committee found, were fully aware of what was happening in the territories, and they were simply denying it for the sake of political expediency. The behavior, they wrote, was not befitting of “a country that has proclaimed the rule of law as a goal.” Netanyahu moved on.

A NEW GENERATION

The ascent of a far-right prime minister did little to prevent the virulent, anti-government strain inside the settler movement from spreading. A new generation of Kahanists was taking an even more radical turn, not only against Israeli politicians who might oppose or insufficiently abet them but against the very notion of a democratic Israeli state. A group calling itself Hilltop Youth advocated for the total destruction of the Zionist state. Meir Ettinger, named for his grandfather Meir Kahane, was one of the Hilltop Youth leaders, and he made his grandfather’s views seem moderate.

Their objective was to tear down Israel’s institutions and to establish “Jewish rule”: anointing a king, building a temple in place of the Jerusalem mosques sacred to Muslims worldwide, imposing a religious regime on all Jews. Ehud Olmert, who served as Israeli prime minister from 2006 to 2009, said in an interview that Hilltop Youth “genuinely, deeply, emotionally believe that this is the right thing to do for Israel. This is a salvation. This is the guarantee for Israel’s future.”

A former member of Hilltop Youth, who has asked to remain anonymous because she fears speaking out could endanger her, recalls how she and her friends used an illegal outpost on a hilltop in the West Bank as a base to lob stones at Palestinian cars. “The Palestinians would call the police, and we would know that we have at least 30 minutes before they arrive, if they arrive. And if they do arrive, they won’t arrest anyone. We did this tens of times.” The West Bank police, she says, couldn’t have been less interested in investigating the violence. “When I was young, I thought that I was outsmarting the police because I was clever. Later, I found out that they are either not trying or very stupid.”

The former Hilltop Youth member says she began pulling away from the group as their tactics became more extreme and once Ettinger began speaking openly about murdering Palestinians. She offered to become a police informant, and during a meeting with police intelligence officers in 2015, she described the group’s plans to commit murder — and to harm any Jews that stood in their way. By her account, she told the police about efforts to scout the homes of Palestinians before settling on a target. The police could have begun an investigation, she says, but they weren’t even curious enough to ask her the names of the people plotting the attack.

In 2013, Ettinger and other members of Hilltop Youth formed a secret cell calling itself the Revolt, designed to instigate an insurrection against a government that “prevents us from building the temple, which blocks our way to true and complete redemption.”

During a search of one of the group’s safe houses, Shin Bet investigators discovered the Revolt’s founding documents. “The State of Israel has no right to exist, and therefore we are not bound by the rules of the game,” one declared. The documents called for an end to the State of Israel and made it clear that in the new state that would rise in its place, there would be absolutely no room for non-Jews and for Arabs in particular: “If those non-Jews don’t leave, it will be permissible to kill them, without distinguishing between women, men and children.”

This wasn’t just idle talk. Ettinger and his comrades organized a plan that included timetables and steps to be taken at each stage. One member even composed a training manual with instructions on how to form terror cells and burn down houses. “In order to prevent the residents from escaping,” the manual advised, “you can leave burning tires in the entrance to the house.”

The Revolt carried out an early attack in February 2014, firebombing an uninhabited home in a small Arab village in the West Bank called Silwad, and followed with more arson attacks, the uprooting of olive groves and the destruction of Palestinian granaries. Members of the group torched mosques, monasteries and churches, including the Church of the Multiplication of the Loaves and Fishes on the banks of the Sea of Galilee. A police officer spotted Ettinger himself attacking a herd of sheep belonging to an Arab shepherd. He stoned a sheep and then slaughtered it in front of the shepherd, the officer later testified. “It was shocking,” he said. “There was a sort of insanity in it.”

Shin Bet defined the Revolt as an organization that aimed “to undermine the stability of the State of Israel through terror and violence, including bodily harm and bloodshed,” according to an internal Shin Bet memo, and sought to place several of its members, including Ettinger, under administrative detention — a measure applied frequently against Arabs.

The state attorney, however, did not approve the request. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) documented 323 incidents of violence by settlers against Palestinians in 2014; Palestinians were injured in 107 of these incidents. By the following year, the Revolt escalated the violence by openly advocating the murder of Arabs.

The Shin Bet and the police identified one of the prominent members of the Revolt, Amiram Ben-Uliel, making him a target of surveillance. But the service failed to prevent the wave of violence that he unleashed. On the night of July 31, 2015, Ben-Uliel set out on a killing spree in a central West Bank village called Duma. Ben-Uliel prepared a bag with two bottles of incendiary liquid, rags, a lighter, a box of matches, gloves and black spray paint. According to the indictment against him, Ben-Uliel sought a home with clear signs of life to ensure that the house he torched was not abandoned. He eventually found the home of Reham and Sa’ad Dawabsheh, a young mother and father. He opened a window and threw a Molotov cocktail into the home. He fled, and in the blaze that followed, the parents suffered injuries that eventually killed them. Their older son, Ahmad, survived the attack, but their 18-month-old toddler, Ali, was burned to death.

It was always clear, says Akerman, the former Shin Bet official, “that those wild groups would move from bullying Arabs to damaging property and trees and eventually would murder people.” He is still furious about how the service has handled Jewish terrorism. “Shin Bet knows how to deal with such groups, using emergency orders, administrative detention and special methods in interrogation until they break,” he says. But although it was perfectly willing to apply those methods to investigating Arab terrorism, the service was more restrained when it came to Jews. “It allowed them to incite, and then they moved on to the next stage and began to torch mosques and churches. Still undeterred, they entered Duma and burned a family.”

Shin Bet at first claimed to have difficulty locating the killers, even though they were all supposed to be under constant surveillance. When Ben-Uliel and other perpetrators were finally arrested, right-wing politicians gave fiery speeches against Shin Bet and met with the families of the perpetrators to show their support. Ben-Uliel was sentenced to life in prison, and Ettinger was finally put in administrative detention, but a fracture was spreading. In December 2015, Hilltop Youth members circulated a video clip showing members of the Revolt ecstatically dancing with rifles and pistols, belting out songs of hatred for Arabs, with one of them stabbing and burning a photograph of the murdered toddler, Ali Dawabsheh. Netanyahu, for his part, denounced the video, which, he said, exposed “the real face of a group that poses danger to Israeli society and security.”

American Friends

The expansion of the settlements had long been an irritant in Israel’s relationship with the United States, with American officials spending years dutifully warning Netanyahu both in public and in private meetings about his support for the enterprise. But the election of Donald Trump in 2016 ended all that. His new administration’s Israel policy was led mostly by his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who had a long personal relationship with Netanyahu, a friend of his father’s who had stayed at their family home in New Jersey. Trump, in a broader regional agenda that lined up perfectly with Netanyahu’s own plans, also hoped to scuttle the nuclear deal with Iran that Barack Obama had negotiated and broker diplomatic pacts between Israel and Arab nations that left the matter of a Palestinian state unresolved and off the table.

If there were any questions about the new administration’s position on settlements, they were answered once Trump picked his ambassador to Israel. His choice, David Friedman, was a bankruptcy lawyer who for years had helped run an American nonprofit that raised millions of dollars for Beit El, one of the early Gush Emunim settlements in the West Bank and the place where Bezalel Smotrich was raised and educated. The organization, which was also supported by the Trump family, had helped fund schools and other institutions inside Beit El. On the heels of the Trump transition, Friedman referred to Israel’s “alleged occupation” of Palestinian territories and broke with longstanding U.S. policy by saying “the settlements are part of Israel.”

This didn’t make Friedman a particularly friendly recipient of the warnings regularly delivered by Lt. Gen. Mark Schwartz, the three-star general who in 2019 arrived at the embassy in Jerusalem to coordinate security between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. A career Green Beret who had combat deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq and served as deputy commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, the military task force with authority over U.S. counterterrorism special missions units, Schwartz wasn’t short on Middle East experience.

But he was immediately shocked by the landscape of the West Bank: settlers acting with impunity, a police force that was essentially nonexistent outside the settlements and the Israeli Army fanning the tensions with its own operations. Schwartz recalls how angry he was about what he called the army’s “collective punishment” tactics, including the razing of Palestinian homes, which he viewed as gratuitous and counterproductive. “I said, ‘Guys, this isn’t how professional militaries act.’” As Schwartz saw it, the West Bank was in some ways the American South of the 1960s. But at any moment the situation could become even more volatile, resulting in the next intifada.

Schwartz is diplomatic when recalling his interactions with Friedman, his former boss. He was a “good listener,” Schwartz says, but when he raised concerns about the settlements, Friedman would often deflect by noting “the lack of appreciation by the Palestinian people about what the Americans are doing for them.” Schwartz also discussed his concerns about settler violence directly with Shin Bet and I.D.F. officials, he says, but as far as he could tell, Friedman didn’t follow up with the political leadership. “I never got the sense he went to Netanyahu to discuss it.”

Friedman sees things differently. “I think I had a far broader perspective on acts of violence in Judea and Samaria” than Schwartz, he says now. “And it was clear that the violence coming from Palestinians against Israelis overwhelmingly was more prevalent.” He says he “wasn’t concerned about ‘appreciation’ from the Palestinians; I was concerned by their leadership’s embrace of terror and unwillingness to control violence.” He declined to discuss any conversations he had with Israeli officials.

Weeks after Trump lost the 2020 election, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo traveled to Israel for a trip that delivered a number of gifts to Netanyahu and the settler cause. He announced new guidelines requiring that goods imported to the United States from parts of the West Bank be labeled “Made in Israel.” And he flew by helicopter to Psagot, a winery in the West Bank, making him the first American secretary of state to visit a settlement. One of the winery’s large shareholders, the Florida-based Falic family, have donated millions to various projects in the settlements.

During his lunchtime visit, Pompeo paused to write a note in the winery’s guest book. “May I not be the last secretary of state to visit this beautiful land,” he wrote.

A Settler Coalition

Benjamin Netanyahu’s determination to become prime minister for an unprecedented sixth term came with a price: an alliance with a movement that he once shunned, but that had been brought into the political mainstream by Israel’s steady drift to the right. Netanyahu, who is now on trial for bribery and other corruption charges, repeatedly failed in his attempts to form a coalition after most of the parties announced that they were no longer willing to join him. He personally involved himself in negotiations to ally Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Jewish Power party and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism Party, making them kingmakers for anyone trying to form a coalition government. In November 2022, the bet paid off: With the now-critical support of the extreme right, Netanyahu returned to office.

The two men ushered into power by this arrangement were some of the most extreme figures ever to hold such high positions in an Israeli cabinet. Shin Bet had monitored Ben-Gvir in the years after Yitzhak Rabin’s murder, and he was arrested on multiple charges including inciting racism and supporting a terrorist organization. He won acquittals or dismissals in some of the cases, but he was also convicted several times and served time in prison. During the Second Intifada, he led protests calling for extreme measures against Arabs and harassed Israeli politicians he believed were insufficiently hawkish.

Then Ben-Gvir made a radical change: He went to law school. He also took a job as an aide to Michael Ben-Ari, a Knesset member from the National Union party, which had picked up many followers of the Kach movement. In 2011, after considerable legal wrangling around his criminal record, he was admitted to the bar. He changed his hairstyle and clothing to appear more mainstream and began working from the inside, once saying he represented the “soldiers and civilians who find themselves in legal entanglements due to the security situation in Israel.” Netanyahu made him minister of national security, with authority over the police.

Smotrich also moved into public life after his 2005 arrest by Shin Bet for plotting road blockages to halt the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. He made Shin Bet’s Jewish Department a frequent target of criticism, complaining that it was wasting time and money investigating crimes carried out by Jews, when the real terrorists were Palestinians. His ultraright allies sometimes referred to the Jewish Department as Hamakhlaka Hayehudit — the Hebrew phrase for the Gestapo unit that executed Hitler’s Final Solution.

In 2015, while campaigning for a seat in the Knesset, Smotrich said that “every shekel invested in this department is one less shekel invested in real terrorism and saving lives.” Seven years later, Netanyahu made him both minister of finance and a minister in the Ministry of Defense, in charge of overseeing civilian affairs in the West Bank, and he has steadily pushed to seize authority over the territory from the military. As part of the coalition deal with Netanyahu, Smotrich now has the authority to appoint one of the senior administrative figures in the West Bank, who helps oversee the building of roads and the enforcement of construction laws. The 2022 election also brought Avi Maoz to the Knesset — the former housing-ministry official whom Talia Sasson once marked as a hidden hand of Israeli government support for illegal settlements. Since then, Maoz had joined the far-right Noam party, using it as a platform to advance racist and homophobic policies. And he never forgot, or forgave, Sasson. On “International Anti-Corruption Day” in 2022, Maoz took to the lectern of the Knesset and denounced Sasson’s report of nearly two decades earlier, saying it was written “with a hatred of the settlements and a desire to harm them.” This, he said, was “public corruption of the highest order, for which people like Talia Sasson should be prosecuted.”

Days after assuming his own new position, Ben-Gvir ordered the police to remove Palestinian flags from public spaces in Israel, saying they “incite and encourage terrorism.” Smotrich, for his part, ordered drastic cuts in payments to the Palestinian Authority — a move that led the Shin Bet and the I.D.F. intelligence division to raise concerns that the cuts would interfere with the Palestinian Authority’s own efforts to police and prevent Palestinian terrorism.

Weeks after the new cabinet was sworn in, the Judea and Samaria division of the I.D.F. distributed an instructional video to the soldiers of a ground unit about to be deployed in the West Bank. Titled “Operational Challenge: The Farms,” the video depicts settlers as peaceful farmers living pastoral lives, feeding goats and herding sheep and cows, in dangerous circumstances. The illegal outposts multiplying around the West Bank are “small and isolated places of settlement, each with a handful of residents, a few of them — or none at all — bearing arms, the means of defense meager or nonexistent.”

It is the settlers, according to the video, who are under constant threat of attack, whether it be “penetration of the farm by a terrorist, an attack against a shepherd in the pastures, arson” or “destruction of property” — threats from which the soldiers of the I.D.F. must protect them. The commander of each army company guarding each farm must, the video says, “link up with the person in charge of security and to maintain communications”; soldiers and officers are encouraged to cultivate a close and intimate relationship with the settlers. “The informal,” viewers are told, “is much more important than the formal.”

The video addresses many matters of security, but it never addresses the question of law. When we asked the commander of the division that produced the video, Brig. Gen. Avi Bluth, why the I.D.F. was promoting the military support of settlements that are illegal under Israeli law, he directly asserted that the farms were indeed legal and offered to arrange for us to tour some of them. Later, a spokesman for the army apologized for the general’s remarks, acknowledged that the farms were illegal and announced that the I.D.F. would no longer be promoting the video. This May, Bluth was nonetheless subsequently promoted to head Israel’s Central Command, responsible for all Israeli troops in central Israel and the West Bank.

In August, Bluth will replace Maj. Gen. Yehuda Fox, who during his final months in charge of the West Bank has seen a near-total breakdown of law enforcement in his area of command. In late October, Fox wrote a letter to his boss, the chief of Israel’s military staff, saying that the surge of Jewish terrorism carried out in revenge for the Oct. 7 attacks “could set the West Bank on fire.” The I.D.F. is the highest security authority in the West Bank, but the military’s top commander put the blame squarely on the police — who ultimately answer to Ben-Gvir. Fox said he had established a special task force to deal with Jewish terrorism, but investigating and arresting the perpetrators is “entirely in the hands of the Israeli police.”

And, he wrote, they aren’t doing their jobs.

‘Only One Way Forward’

When the day came early this January for the Supreme Court to hear the case brought by the people of Khirbet Zanuta, the displaced villagers arrived an hour late. They had received entry permits from the District Coordination Office to attend the hearing but were delayed by security forces before reaching the checkpoint separating Israel from the West Bank. Their lawyer, Quamar Mishirqi-Assad, noting that their struggle to attend their own hearing spoke to the essence of their petition, insisted that the hearing couldn’t proceed without them. The judges agreed to wait.

The villagers finally were led into the courtroom, and Mishirqi-Assad began presenting the case. The proceedings were in Hebrew, so most of the villagers were unable to follow the arguments that described the daily terrors inflicted by settlers and the glaring absence of any law-enforcement efforts to stop them.

The lawyers representing the military and the police denied the claims of abuse and failure to enforce the law. When a judge asked what operational steps would be in place if villagers wanted to return, one of the lawyers for the state said they could already — there was no order preventing them from doing so.

The next to speak was Col. Roi Zweig-Lavi, the Central Command’s Operations Directorate officer. He said that many of these incidents involved false claims. In fact, he said, some of the villagers had probably destroyed their own homes, because of an “internal issue.” Now they were blaming the settlers to escape the consequences of their own actions.

Colonel Zweig-Lavi’s own views about the settlements, and his role in protecting them, were well known. In a 2022 speech, he told a group of yeshiva students in the West Bank that “the army and the settlements are one and the same.”

In early May, the court ordered the state to explain why the police failed to stop the attacks and declared that the villagers have a right to return to their homes. The court also ordered the state to provide details for how they would ensure the safe return of the villagers. It is now the state’s turn to decide how it will comply. Or if it will comply.

By the time the Supreme Court issued its rulings, the United States had finally taken action to directly pressure the Netanyahu government about the violent settlers. On Feb. 1, the White House issued an executive order imposing sanctions on four settlers for “engaging in terrorist activity,” among other things, in the West Bank. One of the four was Yinon Levi, the owner of Meitarim Farm near Hebron and the man American and Israeli officials believe orchestrated the campaign of violence and intimidation against the villagers of Khirbet Zanuta. The British government issued its own sanctions shortly after, saying in a statement that Israel’s government had created “an environment of near-total impunity for settler extremists in the West Bank.”

The White House’s move against individual settlers, a first by an American administration, was met with a combination of anger and ridicule by ministers in Netanyahu’s government. Smotrich called the Biden administration’s allegations against Levi and others “utterly specious” and said he would work with Israeli banks to resist complying with the sanctions. One message that circulated in an open Hilltop Youth WhatsApp channel said that Levi and his family would not be abandoned. “The people of Israel are mobilizing for them,” it said.

American officials bristle when confronted with the question of whether the government’s actions are just token measures taken by an embattled American president hemorrhaging support at home for his Israel policy. They won’t end the violence, they say, but they are a signal to the Netanyahu government about the position of the United States: that the West Bank could boil over, and it could soon be the latest front of an expanding regional Middle East war since Oct. 7.

But war might just be the goal. Ehud Olmert, the former Israeli prime minister, said he believes that many members of the ultraright in Israel “want war.” They “want intifada,” he says, “because it is the ultimate proof that there is no way of making peace with the Palestinians and there is only one way forward — to destroy them.”

Additional reporting by Natan Odenheimer.

Top photograph: A member of a group known as Hilltop Youth, which seeks to tear down Israel’s institutions and establish ‘‘Jewish rule.’’ Photograph by Peter van Agtmael/Magnum, for The New York Times.

Read by Jonathan Davis

Narration produced by Anna Diamond

Engineered by David Mason

Peter van Agtmael is a Magnum photographer who has been covering Israel and Palestinian territories since 2012. He is a mentor in the Arab Documentary Photography Program.

Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House. More about Ronen Bergman

Mark Mazzetti is an investigative reporter based in Washington, D.C., focusing on national security, intelligence, and foreign affairs. He has written a book about the C.I.A. More about Mark Mazzetti

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