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The History Behind the Debate Over Paying NCAA Athletes

April 23, 2018  • Jon Solomon

The Aspen Institute Sports & Society Program held a conversation May 1 in Washington, DC titled “Future of College Sports: Reimagining Athlete Pay.” The discussion was livestreamed at as.pn/collegesportsfuture. The Aspen Institute discussion explored the implications if NCAA athletes could be paid by outside entities for use of their names, images, and likenesses, like any college student.

While speaking at the Aspen Institute in 2016, NCAA president Mark Emmert raised concerns that University of Texas swimmer Joseph Schooling had recently received a $740,000 bonus from Singapore for winning a gold medal at the 2016 Olympics. Schooling didn’t just win gold; he was Singapore’s first Olympic gold medalist and beat the great Michael Phelps.

This payment was perfectly permissible under NCAA rules, which since 2001 have allowed US Olympians to compete in college while pocketing tens of thousands of dollars (and sometimes six figures) from the United States Olympic Committee for winning gold, silver, or bronze. The NCAA added an exception in 2015 to also allow international athletes to receive bonuses.

Still, a college swimmer making nearly three-quarters of a million dollars concerned some NCAA members because, Emmert said, “that’s a little different than 15 grand for the silver medal for the US of A. … The members at that time hadn’t anticipated this phenomenon of like the Singaporean kid getting paid a very large amount.”

Never mind that NCAA rules allow two-sport athletes to be paid professionals in one sport while competing in a different college sport, such as Kyle Parker’s $1.4 million baseball signing bonus while serving as Clemson’s quarterback in 2010. Or that tennis players can receive up to $10,000 per year in prize money (and additional cash on a per-event basis) before or during college. Or that college football players can receive bowl gifts up to $550 in value, which can involve players selecting high-tech electronics from a gift suite or receiving a Visa gift card. Or that schools have student-assistance funds to help athletes financially, including paying five-figure insurance policies for elite athletes who want to protect their professional futures.

Emmert’s description of his membership’s concerns about the swimming bonus reflects the never-ending definition of NCAA amateurism. Amateurism is whatever the NCAA says amateurism is at any particular moment.

As US District Judge Claudia Wilken wrote in her 2014 ruling in the Ed O’Bannon v. NCAA antitrust lawsuit case against the NCAA over the commercialized use of players’ names, images and likenesses: “The association’s current rules demonstrate that, even today, the NCAA does not necessarily adhere to a single definition of amateurism.”

The challenges are adding up for the NCAA both in the courtroom and in the court of public opinion. Speaking at a 2017 meeting of the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, Emmert released internal NCAA polling showing that among all Americans, 79 percent say major universities value money ahead of college athletes.

“I can’t think of anything 79 percent of Americans agree to,” Emmert said, “but they agree to that.”

Such is the state of college sports. How America’s college sports system got here – the only country in the world to attach a highly-commercialized, multibillion-dollar industry to higher education, thus resulting in ongoing legal challenges and public criticism – is a long story. Three key events help trace the journey.

1. Why NCAA athletes are called student-athletes

The term “student-athlete” is ingrained in the college sports vernacular. NCAA-organized press conferences involve a moderator seeking questions for any of the “student-athletes,” a term that historically comes to define the NCAA’s perceived moral authority and its justification for existence.

It’s a term rooted in legal calculations. Walter Byers, the NCAA’s first executive director, created “student-athlete” in the 1950s to help the NCAA fight against workmen’s compensation insurance claims for injured football players.

“The student-athlete was a term used to try to offset these tendencies for state agencies or other governmental departments to consider a grant-in-aid holder” to be an employee, Byers said in court testimony during the 1990s. Soon, the term “student-athlete” became embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations.

“Student-athlete” first surfaced when the widow of Ray Dennison, who died from a head injury in 1955 while playing in Colorado for the Fort Lewis A&M Aggies, filed for workmen’s compensation death benefits. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that Dennison’s widow was not eligible for benefits because the college was “not in the football business.”

“The term student-athlete was deliberately ambiguous,” Pulitzer Prize-winning author Taylor Branch wrote in The Atlantic in 2011. “College players were not students at play (which might understate their athletic obligations), nor were they just athletes in college (which might imply they were professionals). That they were high-performance athletes meant they could be forgiven for not meeting the academic standards of their peers; that they were students mean they did not have to be compensated, ever, for anything more than the cost of their studies. Student-athlete became the NCAA’s signature term, repeated constantly in and out of courtrooms.”

Athletes may be receiving degrees, but many examples show that pockets of athletes are not receiving a quality education.

The student-athlete defense helped the NCAA win – and avoid – numerous liability cases through the years. The most notable win was a lawsuit brought by former Texas Christian University (TCU) running back Kent Waldrep, who was paralyzed in a 1974 football game against the University of Alabama. TCU stopped paying his medical bills after nine months and the Waldrep family coped for years on charity.

Shortly after NCAA Division I schools began carrying catastrophic insurance for football players in 1991, Waldrep sued. He claimed he was an employee of TCU at the time of his injury and covered by workers compensation laws. Waldrep initially won $70 a week for life and medical expenses dating to the accident, but TCU’s insurance carrier appealed.

Finally, in 2000, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that Waldrep was not an employee because he and TCU intended for him to participate in sports as a student. As part of its decision, the Texas Supreme Court wrote that a basic purpose of the NCAA was to make the student-athlete an integral part of the student body, and cited the definition of an amateur student-athlete from the NCAA bylaws: “one who engaged in athletics for the education, physical, mental, and social benefits he derives therefrom, and to whom athletics is an avocation.”

The power of the student-athlete label has played out in legal circles and in the public narrative. Today, the NCAA promotes that more than 460,000 student-athletes compete in 24 sports per year, and more than eight in 10 student-athletes will earn a bachelor’s degree. The value of a college degree is viewed very favorably by many Americans, especially as tuition costs continue to skyrocket that causes students to carry college-loan debt well into adulthood.

Yet the money keeps growing in college sports. The combined revenue for the five major conferences (SEC, Big Ten, ACC, Big 12, Pac-12) increased by 266 percent from 2005-15, according to the Knight Commission. In 2015, the 53 public schools from the five major conferences paid their football coaching staffs (530 individuals) a combined $405.5 million, compared to $179.8 million in scholarships to their football players (4,979 individuals).

In recent years, the NCAA changed some rules to allow new benefits for athletes. Schools can expand the value of athletic scholarships to include cash stipends of a couple thousand dollars to cover athletes’ full cost of attendance. The NCAA now lets schools provide unlimited meals to athletes. The Pac-12 in 2014 became the first conference to guarantee athletes who are injured in college competition will have medical expenses covered up to four years by the school; the other four major conferences recently agreed to a minimum two-year standard for medical expenses covered after college.

But the criticism for the NCAA hasn’t subsided. The NCAA’s academic mission has increasingly been called into question. Athletes may be receiving degrees, but many examples show that pockets of athletes are not receiving a quality education. Some of them essentially major in eligibility – that is, they take (and are sometimes directed to) easier majors/courses in order to stay on the field.

The most glaring example occurred when the University of North Carolina was found by outside parties to have organized fake classes that enabled dozens of athletes to gain and maintain their eligibility. In a ruling last year that caused considerable confusion and frustration among NCAA members, the NCAA did not penalize North Carolina. The NCAA said no association rules were broken because the fraudulent classes were not available exclusively to athletes; other students had access to the courses, too. An independent report commissioned by North Carolina found that of the 3,100 students who took the fake classes over 18 years, 47.4 percent were athletes.

The North Carolina scandal also has played out in state and federal court, where the NCAA argued that it “did not voluntarily assume a legal duty to ensure the academic integrity of courses offered by its member institutions.” The NCAA enforcement model “creates no legal duty to prevent NCAA members from violating NCAA rules,” the association wrote.

North Carolina avoided NCAA penalties by essentially arguing that the NCAA should stay out of irregularities in college courses. This caused many critics to say that the NCAA must decide whether it’s going to continue to be involved in other academic matters, such as:

• Approving or withholding initial NCAA eligibility for players based on their high school transcript and curriculum
• Progress toward degree requirements for college athletes to stay eligible
• Penalties against schools, including postseason bans, if individual teams don’t meet Academic Progress Rate benchmarks showing their players are progressing toward a degree

“Maybe we’ve just reached the point where if a university is going to cheat academically, the public needs to look to the university and university leadership and say, ‘Does winning mean that much to you?’” retired North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Bob Orr, co-counsel in a lawsuit against the NCAA involving the North Carolina scandal, told CBSSports.com in 2016. “Instead, they turn to this outside organization with inconsistent standards and limited resources.”

If the NCAA ever removed itself entirely from academics and became solely an organizer of sporting events, that could pose a significant threat to the association’s current nonprofit model. The entire enterprise is designed around the notion that providing access to an education is sufficient compensation to players for their participation in a multibillion-dollar industry.

After all, the NCAA tells us, these players are student-athletes.

2. 1984 Supreme Court decision shifted the power to conferences

Perhaps more than anyone else, the late Supreme Court Justice Byron “Whizzer” White saw the challenges coming for the NCAA. White essentially predicted so much of this – the commercialization, the defections for TV cash, the NCAA’s struggles to protect amateurism – when he wrote the dissenting opinion in the landmark NCAA v. Oklahoma Board of Regents case that ended the NCAA’s monopoly over college football television contracts.

“By mitigating what appears to be a clear failure of the free market to serve the ends and goals of higher education,” White wrote in 1984, “the NCAA ensures the continued availability of a unique and valuable product, the very existence of which might well be threatened by unbridled competition in the economic sphere.”

The NCAA once controlled football television – who got the exposure on TV and how the money was distributed to schools. The University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia sued to change the power structure. An appellate court and the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision that the NCAA’s control over football TV contracts was illegal.

The Supreme Court handed down a 7-2 decision against the NCAA. The only justice joining White in dissension was William Rehnquist. White warned that the court was making a mistake by “subjugating the NCAA’s educational goals … to the purely competitive commercialism of [an] ‘every school for itself’ approach to television contract bargaining.”

After the decision, schools began merging into larger conferences and ended the once-common practice of independent status. Conferences soon held the power in football – and as football’s popularity grew in America, the sport became the financial engine for athletic departments. Conferences began to negotiate lucrative media rights deals, stage championship games and secure their own bowl games, and ultimately produce college football’s first national championship format.

Today, the conferences now stage the College Football Playoff, which is worth about $470 million annually. Many of them have their own television network. During fiscal year 2017, the SEC distributed on average $41 million to each of its 14 universities, according to USA Today. Ten years ago, the SEC average payout per school was $11 million. The Big Ten Conference is projected to exceed $50 million in its average payout.

There’s another legacy of the 1984 ruling: Buried within the NCAA’s landmark loss was a Supreme Court gift that kept on giving for 30 more years. In the middle of the majority opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens dropped in limited language that states “athletes must not be paid”:

“… moreover, the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football – college football. The identification of this ‘product’ with an academic tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”

There were just three sentences in a 19,000-word brief. The topic (player compensation) had nothing to do with the issue at hand (football TV contracts). No one testified about player compensation, and Stevens didn’t appear to give much rigorous thought to what he was writing.

Stevens didn’t define what “paid” means. Does that mean salaries from the school, endorsements from outside entities, or checks written as part of scholarship agreements?

Stevens didn’t explain what “required to attend class” means. Does that mean a part-time student or full-time student, or perhaps attend only one class? How would Stevens interpret “required to attend class” today when compared to how frequently NCAA athletes miss school to travel to play in games? In a 2015 survey, Division I men’s basketball players said they spent an average of 1.7 days a week away from campus and missed 2.2 classes. The Wall Street Journal found that eight top-25 men’s basketball teams in 2018 traveled an average of more than 42 days during the season.

Though NCAA v. Oklahoma Board of Regents wasn’t about compensation for college athletes, Stevens’ five words – “athletes must not be paid” – became a valuable source for many NCAA legal victories in future years. That changed when the O’Bannon case challenged the NCAA’s restrictions preventing football and men’s basketball players from being paid for the licensing use of their names, images, and likenesses (NILs).

Wilken, the judge in O’Bannon v. NCAA , concluded that while NCAA v. Oklahoma Board of Regents “gives the NCAA ‘ample latitude’ to adopt rules preserving ‘the revered tradition of amateurism in college sports’ … it does not stand for the sweeping proposition that student-athletes must be barred, both during their college years and forever thereafter, from receiving any monetary compensation for the commercial use of their names, images and likenesses.”

Andy Coats, the lawyer for Oklahoma and Georgia in the 1984 Supreme Court case, said it was only a matter of time before players sought a slice of the TV pie.

“They’re saying, ‘Look, we’re generating this money either by our play or the fact you take my image and sell it, and it’s not fair,’” Coats told CBSSports.com in 2014.

The money grew too big. The time had come for legal challenges on behalf of the players.

Tom McMillen, who oversees the athletic director association for the NCAA’s largest division, sums up a critical question this way: If schools could pay players, who would athletic directors predominantly pay – the players or the coaches? Surveys show ADs don’t currently support constraining coaches’ salaries, McMillen said.

“The system has allowed coaches’ compensation to explode so it’s a fair question,” McMillen said. “If that hadn’t happened, I think the pressure on paying athletes would be far less today. You can’t have a market place where one side wins and another side doesn’t win. You can’t expect one side to be constrained forever. I said that in my book in 1991. I think it holds even more true today.”

3. Impact of Ed O’Bannon v. NCAA

The next chapter of challenges against the NCAA is still being written. The results will be based in part on the O’Bannon ruling – the legal precedent set, how college athletes are more cognizant of the money around them, and the public’s opinion about amateurism and what it even means.

The O’Bannon case ended up with victories for both sides. The plaintiffs won a decision that certain NCAA amateurism rules violate federal antitrust law. The court determined that those rules constituted an anti-competitive conspiracy by the NCAA schools and conferences to deny men’s basketball and football players monetary value for their NILs. This potentially leaves the NCAA vulnerable for more antitrust challenges.

On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Wilken’s remedy to the violations: Allow schools, if they so desire, to pay players up to $5,000 per year while they are in college with payment coming after they leave school. Rejecting the remedy was a win for the NCAA. Today, the NCAA clings to a new definition of amateurism through the O’Bannon appellate decision, which tied educational expenses to athlete compensation.

“The difference between offering student-athletes education-related compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap,” two Ninth Circuit judges wrote in 2015.

Legal threats continue against the NCAA. Two lawsuits that challenge the NCAA’s current compensation limits for athletes continue – including the Martin Jenkins case led by attorney Jeffrey Kessler, who brought free agency to the NFL – envision an NCAA in which conferences and/or schools would be free to make their own independent determinations about how to fairly compensate athletes.

The ongoing NCAA college basketball scandal showed that under-the-table payments to players by coaches, financial advisors, and shoe companies are common in the sport.

Wilken, the judge in O’Bannon, recently ordered the lawsuits to trial starting Dec. 3. She essentially left the NCAA with only two arguments to use at trial: The notion that fans are drawn to college football and basketball “in part due to their perception of amateurism,” and the idea that “paying student-athletes would detract from the integration of academics and athletics in the campus community.” The results of the trial, and inevitable appeals, could dramatically reshape the NCAA.

According to McMillen, 79 percent of athletic directors in the NCAA’s highest football subdivision support players making money off their name for non-athletic related activities, and 26 percent favor giving players the right for athletic-related pursuits. Emmert, the NCAA president, has said the Olympic model – athletes receiving sponsor money in exchange for use of their name, image and likeness – is deserving of serious consideration inside the context of college sports.

“I hate to say this, I think the plaintiff lawyers are slowing this down,” McMillen said. “If you didn’t have a court case now, I think college sports could have addressed this. Now, the lawyers will say they’ve made progress because of the court cases. It’s what comes first – the chicken or the egg? But when a court case’s fundamental principle is tethered to education, it’s a slippery slope no one will touch right now. I think the ADs are more sympathetic to (players making money off their NIL) provided some of their concerns are addressed. They don’t want it to be an abusive recruiting tool.”

The NCAA’s history has been to legally fight most attempts to increase benefits for athletes. The NCAA fought two court cases over expanding the value of the traditional athletic scholarship to include additional money that covers miscellaneous costs of attending college. Now, thousands of NCAA athletes who received traditional scholarships, rather than the new cost-of-attendance version, will be compensated for the difference. Last year, the NCAA and 11 major conferences settled for $208.7 million in the Shawne Alston lawsuit, which was impacted by the O’Bannon decision.

The ongoing NCAA college basketball scandal brought by federal prosecutors reflected, not surprisingly, that under-the-table payments to players by coaches, financial advisors and shoe companies are common in the sport. Three criminal cases are tied to the FBI investigation, which has resulted in 10 arrests, including charges against assistant basketball coaches at Auburn, Oklahoma State, Arizona and Southern California.

According to a Yahoo! Sports report in February, federal documents show an underground recruiting operation that could create NCAA rules issues for at least 20 Division I basketball programs – including Duke, North Carolina, Texas, Kentucky, Michigan State, Southern California, and Alabama – and more than 25 players. The amounts of impermissible benefits reported by Yahoo! Sports for one sports agency ranged from $70 for a lunch with a player’s parents to tens of thousands of dollars and loans to a former North Carolina State player.

“These allegations, if true, point to systematic failures that must be fixed and fixed now if we want college sports in America,” Emmert said in a statement in February 2018. “Simply put, people who engage in this kind of behavior have no place in college sports. They are an affront to all those who play by the rules.”

Yet the reality is value does exist for some players above their athletic scholarship. That was highlighted in the O’Bannon case. A vice president of videogame maker Electronic Arts Sports testified that his company wants to pay players for the right to use their NILs in popular NCAA videogames that have been discontinued. EA Sports previously used the likeness of players without their permission, resulting in a $60 million settlement with plaintiffs. The average payout was expected to be around $1,600, with some players receiving several thousand dollars depending on how frequently their likeness appeared in the videogame.

A slight majority of American adults (52 percent) still believe a full scholarship is adequate compensation for a college athlete, according to a 2017 nationwide poll by The Washington Post and the University of Massachusetts Lowell. The racial divide was noteworthy: 54 percent of black Americans support paying NCAA athletes based on revenue they generate, whereas only 31 percent of white Americans support the concept.

Gaining public traction is the idea of allowing players to make money if their NIL is sold through merchandise (66 percent of Americans are in favor). A racial gap exists here as well: 89 percent of blacks say athletes should be paid for use of their NIL, while 60 percent of whites are in favor.

Some proponents of paying players argue for a free market that would reallocate the money flowing to coaches, administrators and facility upgrades to the athletes. Others argue for Congress to provide a limited antitrust exemption for college athletic departments so they could impose caps on coach pay and other athletic spending in exchange for athletes to be guaranteed more benefits, including money through use of their NIL.

“My own personal view: There could be ways to do licensing with players and make sure the companies are legit,” McMillen said. “You could set up an independent, voluntary clearinghouse where the licensing staff would negotiate on behalf of all the student-athletes, much like they do in the pros. In taking this step to help elite student-athletes, like Olympic athletes can do today, it might help reduce the ever-growing pressure for universities to pay student-athletes, and that would undermine the whole college sports model.”

In 2014, Notre Dame athletic director Jack Swarbrick made the rare public case by an AD that college sports could manage group licensing for athletes to be paid immediately. He argued that the NCAA’s problems stem from years of rules that differentiate athletes from the general student body, such as not allowing players to make money off their own name.

“You could have a group-licensing approach and say, OK, this group licensee can do a deal with EA Sports for student-athlete image and likeness, and we’ll go to EA Sports and negotiate it for all of the student-athletes,” Swarbrick told CBSSports.com. “Here’s what it’s worth if you wear the jersey in the EA Sports video(game) and here’s what it’s worth if you don’t. You get a market read on it and you distribute it based on the way all group licenses work.”

Nothing in the NCAA’s history suggests it would proactively take such an approach. Allowing players to be paid by outside entities might require a court ruling, federal legislation and/or a player boycott. Big 12 Conference commissioner Bob Bowlsby predicted in 2015 that the day will come when players decide not to play in a major college sporting event.

The Olympics once passionately believed in the evolving definition of amateurism. Paid professional athletes were not allowed. During the 1980s, the move toward professionalism gradually gained full steam sport by sport over several years. The change was aided in part by the suspicion that athletes from some Eastern Bloc nations were already professionals anyway through full-time support and training by their governments.

The public hasn’t stopped watching the Olympics with professionals. Making money through endorsements while being good at a sport doesn’t seem to hurt interest in the Olympics, which once had the most stringent definition of amateurism. In 1960, athletes who simply had decided to turn pro were no longer amateurs under Olympic rules.

College sports is gradually changing amateurism definitions, too. Times change, as reflected by some NCAA members’ concerns in 2016 about allowing an Olympian to get paid $740,000 while still competing in college. Some money is OK, in the view of NCAA members, but where’s the limit?

If swimmers and gymnasts can be paid for winning at the Olympics, why not basketball and football players for other forms of outside compensation? If $740,000 is deemed too much for Schooling to accept from Singapore while swimming for the University of Texas, why would American swimmer Katie Ledecky making $115,000 from the Olympics be OK to swim at Stanford? And for that matter, since Ledecky made $115,000 from Olympic success, why did NCAA rules prevent her from making endorsement money and cause her to turn pro early?

Once a line has been crossed to pay athletes, what makes one amount acceptable and another unacceptable?

That’s NCAA amateurism – a floating definition that’s always evolving, consistently inconsistent, and forever under scrutiny.

Jon Solomon is editorial director of the Aspen Institute Sports & Society Program. He was an award-winning college sports reporter for 18 years, most recently at CBSSports.com.

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NCAA for dummies: a brief history of intercollege athletics

Patrick Bell , Sports Editor | February 10, 2020

newsweek.com

2019 DI men’s basketball national championship game

Editor’s Note: This article is the beginning of a series devoted to the National Collegiate Athletic Association, its evolution, and the issues confronting it today.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a member-led organization that regulates collegiate sports to benefit over half a million student-athletes. They sponsor 24 sports and are partnered with 1,098 universities that stretch across the United States, Canada, and some U.S territories. Through these memberships, the NCAA is giving the participating athletes a platform to compete against other schools.

According to legal scholar Rodney K. Smith’s essay, “A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics,” the NCAA was created due to a need for an impartial governing body to regulate collegiate sports.

It had been an underlying issue ever since 1840, but when 18 people died and 100 others had been seriously injured playing college football in 1905, that got the attention of United States president Theodore Roosevelt, who called for a review on the rules of football. This led to New York University’s Chancellor Henry MacCracken to call for a national meeting with representatives from colleges with major football programs to determine if football could be regulated at the collegiate level; if not, it would be abolished.

These members eventually formed a rules committee that worked with White House officials to regulate football, leading to the formation of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association (IAA) with 62 members. The IAA was eventually renamed the NCAA in 1910.

In the very beginning of the NCAA, they did not play a major role in governing collegiate sports. But in the 1920s and 30s, popularity for college athletics began to grow, not just at each institution, but from the public as well. Radio and the evolution of television helped promote these sports, as it gave fans a chance to follow a game in real time.

Due to the growth of collegiate athletics, a series of gambling infractions, and recruiting excesses, the NCAA was forced to step in and expand its governing authority. In 1948, the NCAA created the “Sanity Code” which was designed to “alleviate the proliferation of exploitative practices in the recruitment of student-athletes.” In order to enforce the Code, the NCAA created the Constitutional Compliance Committee to interpret rules and investigate possible violations.

These efforts weren’t successful because the only consequence for rules that were broken was expulsion, which was so severe that the Committee was powerless. The NCAA then repealed the “Sanity Code” in 1951, replacing the Constitutional Compliance Committee with the Committee on Infractions, which were given broader sanctioning authority.

In the 1950s, the NCAA started working more with television, working out a $1 million contract to broadcast the rights of their sponsored sports. That opened up the door to more lucrative contracts in the future, which in turn made the NCAA more powerful in enforcement of the rules to its member institutions.

Before the 1970s, institutions were separated athletically, based upon if they were a “small college” or “big university.” But in 1973, as its enforcement capacity continued to rise, the NCAA decided to create three separate divisions to help balance out the competition within intercollegiate athletics. These three divisions still stand today.

Division I athletics are most commonly well known nationwide and have the highest emphasis of athletic competition. According to ncaa.org, “they generally have the biggest student bodies, manage the largest athletics budget and offer the most generous number of scholarships.”

In fact, they are the only division in the NCAA that allows institutions to offer full athletic scholarships to its incoming athletes. There are 350 schools that are full members and 170,000 athletes that compete at that level. The only DI program in Vermont is the University of Vermont.

Division II is a more balanced mix between athletics and academics. The universities that compete at the DII level are allowed to give athletics scholarships, but aren’t allowed to cover the full cost just on athletic merit. Enrollment ranges at these institutions from as many as 25,000 to less than 2,500. These numbers aren’t common at many DII institutions, as 87 percent have fewer than 8,000 students, with a high percentage being athletes.

According to ncsasports.org, many of their athletes have the talent to compete at the DI level, but DII athletes and their respective institutions have a higher emphasis on education and will commit less money towards their athletic programs than would a DI university. There is only one DII program in the state, which is Saint Michael’s College.

At the Division III level, NCAA sponsored sports have less of an intense time commitment with a shorter athletic season. This gives more focus on education and life outside the playing surface and classroom. DIII athletes generally feel the closest to their respective communities.

They have the highest number of members with 450 and have more than 190,000 athletes participating at these colleges and universities. These member institutions cannot offer any scholarships to their athletes based upon athletic merit.

At the DI and DII level, the academic standard to play collegiate sports is set by the NCAA, while at the DIII level, the academic standard is set by the university. There are several DIII programs in the state such as NVU-Lyndon and Johnson, Castleton, Norwich, and Middlebury.

At one point, the NCAA considered removing the divisional structure, but in 1997, there was a vote to keep that structure and gave each division more autonomy to govern itself. This has allowed each division to decide policy more tailored to those institutions that participate at that level.

Many schools at all three levels are partnered with a conference. These conferences are made up of multiple schools, many of which are close together in a specific region. Some benefits of being in a conference are a guaranteed number of games and a chance to earn an automatic qualifier to a National Championship Tournament by winning your conference. The only exception is in Division I football, where it doesn’t necessarily matter if you win your conference championship to make it to the college football playoff, as a committee determines who’s in and out.

Some schools some specific programs are labeled as independents. Notre Dame football is notoriously independent, which allows them to have complete control over their schedule and roster but might be harder to compete for a national championship. The rest of Notre Dame’s NCAA sponsored sports compete in the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC). NVU-Johnson currently has one independent sport in women’s triathlon, as there is no other women’s triathlon program in the conference.

Before the 1970s, women’s athletics at the collegiate level either were overlooked or didn’t exist. But in 1972, President Richard Nixon signed into law Title IX, which stated that “no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” It became the calling card for women in sports, specifically at the high school and collegiate level. It had a slow start, with very limited money going towards women’s athletic programs for scholarships and athletic equipment. But over time, it has grown immensely.

Throughout the 70s, 80s, and 90s, the NCAA authority to enforce rules continued to grow. It grew to the point where in 1976, they could start directly punishing schools for breaking rules, and that would have drastic effects on coaches, athletes, and administrators.

Starting in the 1980s, university and college presidents became more involved in the organization of the NCAA as enrollment started to drop and they saw intercollegiate athletics as another source of revenue. Additionally, the success of athletic programs at colleges and universities became more tied to the overall success at that particular college or university.

One such example of NCAA’s growing power was in the case against the Southern Methodist University football team. In the late 70s to the mid 80s, the SMU football team was one of the most powerful football programs in all of collegiate football. They grabbed many of the top recruits, including future NFL Hall of Famer in Eric Dickerson, which led them to win many games. The major problem with their program was that they were caught cheating multiple times by bribing recruits to attend SMU. It all came crashing down in 1987, when the NCAA instituted the “Death Penalty” where their 1987 season was canceled, and they were banned from participating in the 1988 season. This has left a negative impact on the program ever since, as they have only recorded three winning seasons and have lost out on billions of dollars.

Today, the NCAA is a multi-billion dollar organization, the largest collegiate organization in the world. It plays a part and hosts several national tournaments and championships in every sponsored sport. One example of this is their annual DI men’s basketball national tournament, dubbed “March Madness,” where 68 programs across the nation compete for the national championship.

According to investopedia.com, that three-week tournament alone made the NCAA $933 million. That tournament funds a majority of their revenue throughout the year.

As more and more money comes into the commercialization of intercollegiate sports, the more authority the NCAA has over its member institutions. It continues to expand the possibilities for students who wish to be collegiate athletes at any of their three levels. Regardless of all the positives and negatives that come with the NCAA, they are here to stay at many colleges and universities across the nation.

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The NCAA And Its Treatment Of Student Athletes

The NCAA was created in 1906, at the behest of President Theodore Roosevelt, to protect and look out for the best interests of student athletes. In the latest issue of The Atlantic magazine, journalist Taylor Branch tracks how the organization evolved over the years into a body that now, he says, exploits young athletes for the financial gain of its member schools. Melissa Block talks to Branch about his article, which advocates for better treatment — and pay — for student athletes.

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Master's Essays (1922 - )

The history of the ncaa: finding a solution to the problems.

Lawrence A. Frank , Marquette University

Date of Award

Summer 1994

Degree Type

Master's Essay - Restricted

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

The NCAA has continually attempted to implement new rules and regulations which they feel will result in reform. Yet, the actions of the NCAA fail to address the real problem - the structure of the system itself. This paper explores the deficiencies of the NCAA and offers some possible solutions for existing problems.

Recommended Citation

Frank, Lawrence A., "The History of the NCAA: Finding a Solution to the Problems" (1994). Master's Essays (1922 - ) . 718. https://epublications.marquette.edu/essays/718

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The Shame of College Sports

A leading civil-rights historian makes the case for paying college athletes—and reveals how a spate of lawsuits working their way through the courts could destroy the NCAA.

A litany of scandals in recent years have made the corruption of college sports constant front-page news. We profess outrage each time we learn that yet another student-athlete has been taking money under the table. But the real scandal is the very structure of college sports, wherein student-athletes generate billions of dollars for universities and private companies while earning nothing for themselves. Here, a leading civil-rights historian makes the case for paying college athletes—and reveals how a spate of lawsuits working their way through the courts could destroy the NCAA.

“I ’m not hiding,” Sonny Vaccaro told a closed hearing at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C., in 2001. “We want to put our materials on the bodies of your athletes, and the best way to do that is buy your school. Or buy your coach.”

Vaccaro’s audience, the members of the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, bristled. These were eminent reformers—among them the president of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, two former heads of the U.S. Olympic Committee, and several university presidents and chancellors. The Knight Foundation, a nonprofit that takes an interest in college athletics as part of its concern with civic life, had tasked them with saving college sports from runaway commercialism as embodied by the likes of Vaccaro, who, since signing his pioneering shoe contract with Michael Jordan in 1984, had built sponsorship empires successively at Nike, Adidas, and Reebok. Not all the members could hide their scorn for the “sneaker pimp” of schoolyard hustle, who boasted of writing checks for millions to everybody in higher education.

“Why,” asked Bryce Jordan, the president emeritus of Penn State, “should a university be an advertising medium for your industry?”

Vaccaro did not blink. “They shouldn’t, sir,” he replied. “You sold your souls, and you’re going to continue selling them. You can be very moral and righteous in asking me that question, sir,” Vaccaro added with irrepressible good cheer, “but there’s not one of you in this room that’s going to turn down any of our money. You’re going to take it. I can only offer it.”

William Friday, a former president of North Carolina’s university system, still winces at the memory. “Boy, the silence that fell in that room,” he recalled recently. “I never will forget it.” Friday, who founded and co-chaired two of the three Knight Foundation sports initiatives over the past 20 years, called Vaccaro “the worst of all” the witnesses ever to come before the panel.

But what Vaccaro said in 2001 was true then, and it’s true now: corporations offer money so they can profit from the glory of college athletes, and the universities grab it. In 2010, despite the faltering economy, a single college athletic league, the football-crazed Southeastern Conference (SEC), became the first to crack the billion-dollar barrier in athletic receipts. The Big Ten pursued closely at $905 million. That money comes from a combination of ticket sales, concession sales, merchandise, licensing fees, and other sources—but the great bulk of it comes from television contracts.

Educators are in thrall to their athletic departments because of these television riches and because they respect the political furies that can burst from a locker room. “There’s fear,” Friday told me when I visited him on the University of North Carolina campus in Chapel Hill last fall. As we spoke, two giant construction cranes towered nearby over the university’s Kenan Stadium, working on the latest $77 million renovation. (The University of Michigan spent almost four times that much to expand its Big House.) Friday insisted that for the networks, paying huge sums to universities was a bargain. “We do every little thing for them,” he said. “We furnish the theater, the actors, the lights, the music, and the audience for a drama measured neatly in time slots. They bring the camera and turn it on.” Friday, a weathered idealist at 91, laments the control universities have ceded in pursuit of this money. If television wants to broadcast football from here on a Thursday night, he said, “we shut down the university at 3 o’clock to accommodate the crowds.” He longed for a campus identity more centered in an academic mission.

The United States is the only country in the world that hosts big-time sports at institutions of higher learning. This should not, in and of itself, be controversial. College athletics are rooted in the classical ideal of Mens sana in corpore sano —a sound mind in a sound body—and who would argue with that? College sports are deeply inscribed in the culture of our nation. Half a million young men and women play competitive intercollegiate sports each year. Millions of spectators flock into football stadiums each Saturday in the fall, and tens of millions more watch on television. The March Madness basketball tournament each spring has become a major national event, with upwards of 80 million watching it on television and talking about the games around the office water cooler. ESPN has spawned ESPNU, a channel dedicated to college sports, and Fox Sports and other cable outlets are developing channels exclusively to cover sports from specific regions or divisions.

With so many people paying for tickets and watching on television, college sports has become Very Big Business. According to various reports, the football teams at Texas, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and Penn State—to name just a few big-revenue football schools—each earn between $40 million and $80 million in profits a year, even after paying coaches multimillion-dollar salaries. When you combine so much money with such high, almost tribal, stakes—football boosters are famously rabid in their zeal to have their alma mater win—corruption is likely to follow.

Scandal after scandal has rocked college sports. In 2010, the NCAA sanctioned the University of Southern California after determining that star running back Reggie Bush and his family had received “improper benefits” while he played for the Trojans. (Among other charges, Bush and members of his family were alleged to have received free airfare and limousine rides, a car, and a rent-free home in San Diego, from sports agents who wanted Bush as a client.) The Bowl Championship Series stripped USC of its 2004 national title, and Bush returned the Heisman Trophy he had won in 2005. Last fall, as Auburn University football stormed its way to an undefeated season and a national championship, the team’s star quarterback, Cam Newton, was dogged by allegations that his father had used a recruiter to solicit up to $180,000 from Mississippi State in exchange for his son’s matriculation there after junior college in 2010. Jim Tressel, the highly successful head football coach of the Ohio State Buckeyes, resigned last spring after the NCAA alleged he had feigned ignorance of rules violations by players on his team. At least 28 players over the course of the previous nine seasons, according to Sports Illustrated , had traded autographs, jerseys, and other team memorabilia in exchange for tattoos or cash at a tattoo parlor in Columbus, in violation of NCAA rules. Late this summer, Yahoo Sports reported that the NCAA was investigating allegations that a University of Miami booster had given millions of dollars in illicit cash and services to more than 70 Hurricanes football players over eight years.

The list of scandals goes on. With each revelation, there is much wringing of hands. Critics scold schools for breaking faith with their educational mission, and for failing to enforce the sanctity of “amateurism.” Sportswriters denounce the NCAA for both tyranny and impotence in its quest to “clean up” college sports. Observers on all sides express jumbled emotions about youth and innocence, venting against professional mores or greedy amateurs.

For all the outrage, the real scandal is not that students are getting illegally paid or recruited, it’s that two of the noble principles on which the NCAA justifies its existence—“amateurism” and the “student-athlete”—are cynical hoaxes, legalistic confections propagated by the universities so they can exploit the skills and fame of young athletes. The tragedy at the heart of college sports is not that some college athletes are getting paid, but that more of them are not.

Don Curtis, a UNC trustee, told me that impoverished football players cannot afford movie tickets or bus fare home. Curtis is a rarity among those in higher education today, in that he dares to violate the signal taboo: “I think we should pay these guys something.”

Fans and educators alike recoil from this proposal as though from original sin. Amateurism is the whole point, they say. Paid athletes would destroy the integrity and appeal of college sports. Many former college athletes object that money would have spoiled the sanctity of the bond they enjoyed with their teammates. I, too, once shuddered instinctively at the notion of paid college athletes.

But after an inquiry that took me into locker rooms and ivory towers across the country, I have come to believe that sentiment blinds us to what’s before our eyes. Big-time college sports are fully commercialized. Billions of dollars flow through them each year. The NCAA makes money, and enables universities and corporations to make money, from the unpaid labor of young athletes.

Slavery analogies should be used carefully. College athletes are not slaves. Yet to survey the scene—corporations and universities enriching themselves on the backs of uncompensated young men, whose status as “student-athletes” deprives them of the right to due process guaranteed by the Constitution—is to catch an unmistakable whiff of the plantation. Perhaps a more apt metaphor is colonialism: college sports, as overseen by the NCAA, is a system imposed by well-meaning paternalists and rationalized with hoary sentiments about caring for the well-being of the colonized. But it is, nonetheless, unjust. The NCAA, in its zealous defense of bogus principles, sometimes destroys the dreams of innocent young athletes.

The NCAA today is in many ways a classic cartel. Efforts to reform it—most notably by the three Knight Commissions over the course of 20 years—have, while making changes around the edges, been largely fruitless. The time has come for a major overhaul. And whether the powers that be like it or not, big changes are coming. Threats loom on multiple fronts: in Congress, the courts, breakaway athletic conferences, student rebellion, and public disgust. Swaddled in gauzy clichés, the NCAA presides over a vast, teetering glory.

Founding Myths

From the start, amateurism in college sports has been honored more often in principle than in fact; the NCAA was built of a mixture of noble and venal impulses. In the late 19th century, intellectuals believed that the sporting arena simulated an impending age of Darwinian struggle. Because the United States did not hold a global empire like England’s, leaders warned of national softness once railroads conquered the last continental frontier. As though heeding this warning, ingenious students turned variations on rugby into a toughening agent. Today a plaque in New Brunswick, New Jersey, commemorates the first college game, on November 6, 1869, when Rutgers beat Princeton 6–4.

Walter Camp graduated from Yale in 1880 so intoxicated by the sport that he devoted his life to it without pay, becoming “the father of American football.” He persuaded other schools to reduce the chaos on the field by trimming each side from 15 players to 11, and it was his idea to paint measuring lines on the field. He conceived functional designations for players, coining terms such as quarterback. His game remained violent by design. Crawlers could push the ball forward beneath piles of flying elbows without pause until they cried “Down!” in submission.

In an 1892 game against its archrival, Yale, the Harvard football team was the first to deploy a “flying wedge,” based on Napoleon’s surprise concentrations of military force. In an editorial calling for the abolition of the play, The New York Times described it as “half a ton of bone and muscle coming into collision with a man weighing 160 or 170 pounds,” noting that surgeons often had to be called onto the field. Three years later, the continuing mayhem prompted the Harvard faculty to take the first of two votes to abolish football. Charles Eliot, the university’s president, brought up other concerns. “Deaths and injuries are not the strongest argument against football,” declared Eliot. “That cheating and brutality are profitable is the main evil.” Still, Harvard football persisted. In 1903, fervent alumni built Harvard Stadium with zero college funds. The team’s first paid head coach, Bill Reid, started in 1905 at nearly twice the average salary for a full professor.

A newspaper story from that year, illustrated with the Grim Reaper laughing on a goalpost, counted 25 college players killed during football season. A fairy-tale version of the founding of the NCAA holds that President Theodore Roosevelt, upset by a photograph of a bloodied Swarthmore College player, vowed to civilize or destroy football. The real story is that Roosevelt maneuvered shrewdly to preserve the sport—and give a boost to his beloved Harvard. After McClure’s magazine published a story on corrupt teams with phantom students, a muckraker exposed Walter Camp’s $100,000 slush fund at Yale. In response to mounting outrage, Roosevelt summoned leaders from Harvard, Princeton, and Yale to the White House, where Camp parried mounting criticism and conceded nothing irresponsible in the college football rules he’d established. At Roosevelt’s behest, the three schools issued a public statement that college sports must reform to survive, and representatives from 68 colleges founded a new organization that would soon be called the National Collegiate Athletic Association. A Haverford College official was confirmed as secretary but then promptly resigned in favor of Bill Reid, the new Harvard coach, who instituted new rules that benefited Harvard’s playing style at the expense of Yale’s. At a stroke, Roosevelt saved football and dethroned Yale.

For nearly 50 years, the NCAA, with no real authority and no staff to speak of, enshrined amateur ideals that it was helpless to enforce. (Not until 1939 did it gain the power even to mandate helmets.) In 1929, the Carnegie Foundation made headlines with a report, “American College Athletics,” which concluded that the scramble for players had “reached the proportions of nationwide commerce.” Of the 112 schools surveyed, 81 flouted NCAA recommendations with inducements to students ranging from open payrolls and disguised booster funds to no-show jobs at movie studios. Fans ignored the uproar, and two-thirds of the colleges mentioned told The New York Times that they planned no changes. In 1939, freshman players at the University of Pittsburgh went on strike because they were getting paid less than their upperclassman teammates.

Embarrassed, the NCAA in 1948 enacted a “Sanity Code,” which was supposed to prohibit all concealed and indirect benefits for college athletes; any money for athletes was to be limited to transparent scholarships awarded solely on financial need. Schools that violated this code would be expelled from NCAA membership and thus exiled from competitive sports.

This bold effort flopped. Colleges balked at imposing such a drastic penalty on each other, and the Sanity Code was repealed within a few years. The University of Virginia went so far as to call a press conference to say that if its athletes were ever accused of being paid, they should be forgiven, because their studies at Thomas Jefferson’s university were so rigorous.

The Big Bluff

In 1951, the NCAA seized upon a serendipitous set of events to gain control of intercollegiate sports. First, the organization hired a young college dropout named Walter Byers as executive director. A journalist who was not yet 30 years old, he was an appropriately inauspicious choice for the vaguely defined new post. He wore cowboy boots and a toupee. He shunned personal contact, obsessed over details, and proved himself a bureaucratic master of pervasive, anonymous intimidation. Although discharged from the Army during World War II for defective vision, Byers was able to see an opportunity in two contemporaneous scandals. In one, the tiny College of William and Mary, aspiring to challenge football powers Oklahoma and Ohio State, was found to be counterfeiting grades to keep conspicuously pampered players eligible. In the other, a basketball point-shaving conspiracy (in which gamblers paid players to perform poorly) had spread from five New York colleges to the University of Kentucky, the reigning national champion, generating tabloid “perp” photos of gangsters and handcuffed basketball players. The scandals posed a crisis of credibility for collegiate athletics, and nothing in the NCAA’s feeble record would have led anyone to expect real reform.

But Byers managed to impanel a small infractions board to set penalties without waiting for a full convention of NCAA schools, which would have been inclined toward forgiveness. Then he lobbied a University of Kentucky dean—A. D. Kirwan, a former football coach and future university president—not to contest the NCAA’s dubious legal position (the association had no actual authority to penalize the university), pleading that college sports must do something to restore public support. His gambit succeeded when Kirwan reluctantly accepted a landmark precedent: the Kentucky basketball team would be suspended for the entire 1952–53 season. Its legendary coach, Adolph Rupp, fumed for a year in limbo.

The Kentucky case created an aura of centralized command for an NCAA office that barely existed. At the same time, a colossal misperception gave Byers leverage to mine gold. Amazingly in retrospect, most colleges and marketing experts considered the advent of television a dire threat to sports. Studies found that broadcasts reduced live attendance, and therefore gate receipts, because some customers preferred to watch at home for free. Nobody could yet imagine the revenue bonanza that television represented. With clunky new TV sets proliferating, the 1951 NCAA convention voted 161–7 to outlaw televised games except for a specific few licensed by the NCAA staff.

All but two schools quickly complied. The University of Pennsylvania and Notre Dame protested the order to break contracts for home-game television broadcasts, claiming the right to make their own decisions. Byers objected that such exceptions would invite disaster. The conflict escalated. Byers brandished penalties for games televised without approval. Penn contemplated seeking antitrust protection through the courts. Byers issued a contamination notice, informing any opponent scheduled to play Penn that it would be punished for showing up to compete. In effect, Byers mobilized the college world to isolate the two holdouts in what one sportswriter later called “the Big Bluff.”

Byers won. Penn folded in part because its president, the perennial White House contender Harold Stassen, wanted to mend relations with fellow schools in the emerging Ivy League, which would be formalized in 1954. When Notre Dame also surrendered, Byers conducted exclusive negotiations with the new television networks on behalf of every college team. Joe Rauh Jr., a prominent civil-rights attorney, helped him devise a rationing system to permit only 11 broadcasts a year—the fabled Game of the Week. Byers and Rauh selected a few teams for television exposure, excluding the rest. On June 6, 1952, NBC signed a one-year deal to pay the NCAA $1.14 million for a carefully restricted football package. Byers routed all contractual proceeds through his office. He floated the idea that, to fund an NCAA infrastructure, his organization should take a 60 percent cut; he accepted 12 percent that season. (For later contracts, as the size of television revenues grew exponentially, he backed down to 5 percent.) Proceeds from the first NBC contract were enough to rent an NCAA headquarters, in Kansas City.

Only one year into his job, Byers had secured enough power and money to regulate all of college sports. Over the next decade, the NCAA’s power grew along with television revenues. Through the efforts of Byers’s deputy and chief lobbyist, Chuck Neinas, the NCAA won an important concession in the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, in which Congress made its granting of a precious antitrust exemption to the National Football League contingent upon the blackout of professional football on Saturdays. Deftly, without even mentioning the NCAA, a rider on the bill carved each weekend into protected broadcast markets: Saturday for college, Sunday for the NFL. The NFL got its antitrust exemption. Byers, having negotiated the NCAA’s television package up to $3.1 million per football season—which was higher than the NFL’s figure in those early years—had made the NCAA into a spectacularly profitable cartel.

“We Eat What We Kill”

The NCAA’s control of college sports still rested on a fragile base, however: the consent of the colleges and universities it governed. For a time, the vast sums of television money delivered to these institutions through Byers’s deals made them willing to submit. But the big football powers grumbled about the portion of the television revenue diverted to nearly a thousand NCAA member schools that lacked major athletic programs. They chafed against cost-cutting measures—such as restrictions on team size—designed to help smaller schools. “I don’t want Hofstra telling Texas how to play football,” Darrell Royal, the Longhorns coach, griped. By the 1970s and ’80s, as college football games delivered bonanza ratings—and advertising revenue—to the networks, some of the big football schools began to wonder: Why do we need to have our television coverage brokered through the NCAA? Couldn’t we get a bigger cut of that TV money by dealing directly with the networks?

Byers faced a rude internal revolt. The NCAA’s strongest legions, its big football schools, defected en masse. Calling the NCAA a price-fixing cartel that siphoned every television dollar through its coffers, in 1981 a rogue consortium of 61 major football schools threatened to sign an independent contract with NBC for $180 million over four years.

With a huge chunk of the NCAA’s treasury walking out the door, Byers threatened sanctions, as he had against Penn and Notre Dame three decades earlier. But this time the universities of Georgia and Oklahoma responded with an antitrust suit. “It is virtually impossible to overstate the degree of our resentment … of the NCAA,” said William Banowsky, the president of the University of Oklahoma. In the landmark 1984 NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma decision, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s latest football contracts with television—and any future ones—as an illegal restraint of trade that harmed colleges and viewers. Overnight, the NCAA’s control of the television market for football vanished. Upholding Banowsky’s challenge to the NCAA’s authority, the Regents decision freed the football schools to sell any and all games the markets would bear. Coaches and administrators no longer had to share the revenue generated by their athletes with smaller schools outside the football consortium. “We eat what we kill,” one official at the University of Texas bragged.

A few years earlier, this blow might have financially crippled the NCAA—but a rising tide of money from basketball concealed the structural damage of the Regents decision. During the 1980s, income from the March Madness college basketball tournament, paid directly by the television networks to the NCAA, grew tenfold. The windfall covered—and then far exceeded—what the organization had lost from football.

Still, Byers never forgave his former deputy Chuck Neinas for leading the rebel consortium. He knew that Neinas had seen from the inside how tenuous the NCAA’s control really was, and how diligently Byers had worked to prop up its Oz-like façade. During Byers’s tenure, the rule book for Division I athletes grew to 427 pages of scholastic detail. His NCAA personnel manual banned conversations around water coolers, and coffee cups on desks, while specifying exactly when drapes must be drawn at the NCAA’s 27,000-square-foot headquarters near Kansas City (built in 1973 from the proceeds of a 1 percent surtax on football contracts). It was as though, having lost control where it mattered, Byers pedantically exerted more control where it didn’t.

After retiring in 1987, Byers let slip his suppressed fury that the ingrate football conferences, having robbed the NCAA of television revenue, still expected it to enforce amateurism rules and police every leak of funds to college players. A lethal greed was “gnawing at the innards of college athletics,” he wrote in his memoir. When Byers renounced the NCAA’s pretense of amateurism, his former colleagues would stare blankly, as though he had gone senile or, as he wrote, “desecrated my sacred vows.” But Byers was better positioned than anyone else to argue that college football’s claim to amateurism was unfounded. Years later, as we will see, lawyers would seize upon his words to do battle with the NCAA.

Meanwhile, reformers fretted that commercialism was hurting college sports, and that higher education’s historical balance between academics and athletics had been distorted by all the money sloshing around. News stories revealed that schools went to extraordinary measures to keep academically incompetent athletes eligible for competition, and would vie for the most-sought-after high-school players by proffering under-the-table payments. In 1991, the first Knight Commission report, “Keeping Faith With the Student Athlete,” was published; the commission’s “bedrock conviction” was that university presidents must seize control of the NCAA from athletic directors in order to restore the preeminence of academic values over athletic or commercial ones. In response, college presidents did take over the NCAA’s governance. But by 2001, when the second Knight Commission report (“A Call to Action: Reconnecting College Sports and Higher Education”) was issued, a new generation of reformers was admitting that problems of corruption and commercialism had “grown rather than diminished” since the first report. Meanwhile the NCAA itself, revenues rising, had moved into a $50 million, 116,000-square-foot headquarters in Indianapolis. By 2010, as the size of NCAA headquarters increased yet again with a 130,000-square-foot expansion, a third Knight Commission was groping blindly for a hold on independent college-athletic conferences that were behaving more like sovereign pro leagues than confederations of universities. And still more money continued to flow into NCAA coffers. With the basketball tournament’s 2011 television deal, annual March Madness broadcast revenues had skyrocketed 50-fold in less than 30 years.

The Myth of the “Student-Athlete”

Today, much of the NCAA’s moral authority—indeed much of the justification for its existence—is vested in its claim to protect what it calls the “student-athlete.” The term is meant to conjure the nobility of amateurism, and the precedence of scholarship over athletic endeavor. But the origins of the “student-athlete” lie not in a disinterested ideal but in a sophistic formulation designed, as the sports economist Andrew Zimbalist has written, to help the NCAA in its “fight against workmen’s compensation insurance claims for injured football players.”

“We crafted the term student-athlete,” Walter Byers himself wrote, “and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations.” The term came into play in the 1950s, when the widow of Ray Dennison, who had died from a head injury received while playing football in Colorado for the Fort Lewis A&M Aggies, filed for workmen’s-compensation death benefits. Did his football scholarship make the fatal collision a “work-related” accident? Was he a school employee, like his peers who worked part-time as teaching assistants and bookstore cashiers? Or was he a fluke victim of extracurricular pursuits? Given the hundreds of incapacitating injuries to college athletes each year, the answers to these questions had enormous consequences. The Colorado Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the school’s contention that he was not eligible for benefits, since the college was “not in the football business.”

The term student-athlete was deliberately ambiguous. College players were not students at play (which might understate their athletic obligations), nor were they just athletes in college (which might imply they were professionals). That they were high-performance athletes meant they could be forgiven for not meeting the academic standards of their peers; that they were students meant they did not have to be compensated, ever, for anything more than the cost of their studies. Student-athlete became the NCAA’s signature term, repeated constantly in and out of courtrooms.

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Using the “student-athlete” defense, colleges have compiled a string of victories in liability cases. On the afternoon of October 26, 1974, the Texas Christian University Horned Frogs were playing the Alabama Crimson Tide in Birmingham, Alabama. Kent Waldrep, a TCU running back, carried the ball on a “Red Right 28” sweep toward the Crimson Tide’s sideline, where he was met by a swarm of tacklers. When Waldrep regained consciousness, Bear Bryant, the storied Crimson Tide coach, was standing over his hospital bed. “It was like talking to God, if you’re a young football player,” Waldrep recalled.

Waldrep was paralyzed: he had lost all movement and feeling below his neck. After nine months of paying his medical bills, Texas Christian refused to pay any more, so the Waldrep family coped for years on dwindling charity.

Through the 1990s, from his wheelchair, Waldrep pressed a lawsuit for workers’ compensation. (He also, through heroic rehabilitation efforts, recovered feeling in his arms, and eventually learned to drive a specially rigged van. “I can brush my teeth,” he told me last year, “but I still need help to bathe and dress.”) His attorneys haggled with TCU and the state worker-compensation fund over what constituted employment. Clearly, TCU had provided football players with equipment for the job, as a typical employer would—but did the university pay wages, withhold income taxes on his financial aid, or control work conditions and performance? The appeals court finally rejected Waldrep’s claim in June of 2000, ruling that he was not an employee because he had not paid taxes on financial aid that he could have kept even if he quit football. (Waldrep told me school officials “said they recruited me as a student, not an athlete,” which he says was absurd.)

The long saga vindicated the power of the NCAA’s “student-athlete” formulation as a shield, and the organization continues to invoke it as both a legalistic defense and a noble ideal. Indeed, such is the term’s rhetorical power that it is increasingly used as a sort of reflexive mantra against charges of rabid hypocrisy.

Last Thanksgiving weekend, with both the FBI and the NCAA investigating whether Cam Newton had been lured onto his team with illegal payments, Newton’s Auburn Tigers and the Alabama Crimson Tide came together for their annual game, known as the Iron Bowl, before 101,821 fans at Bryant-Denny Stadium. This game is always a highlight of the football season because of the historic rivalry between the two schools, and the 2010 edition had enormous significance, pitting the defending national champion Crimson Tide against the undefeated Tigers, who were aiming for their first championship since 1957. I expected excited fans; what I encountered was the throbbing heart of college sports. As I drove before daybreak toward the stadium, a sleepless caller babbled over WJOX, the local fan radio station, that he “couldn’t stop thinking about the coin toss.” In the parking lot, ticketless fans were puzzled that anyone need ask why they had tailgated for days just to watch their satellite-fed flat screens within earshot of the roar. All that morning, pilgrims packed the Bear Bryant museum, where displays elaborated the misery of Alabama’s 4–24 run before the glorious Bryant era dawned in 1958.

Finally, as Auburn took the field for warm-ups, one of Alabama’s public-address-system operators played “Take the Money and Run” (an act for which he would be fired). A sea of signs reading $CAM taunted Newton. The game, perhaps the most exciting of the season, was unbearably tense, with Auburn coming from way behind to win 28–27, all but assuring that it would go on to play for the national championship. Days later, Auburn suspended Newton after the NCAA found that a rules violation had occurred: his father was alleged to have marketed his son in a pay-for-play scheme; a day after that, the NCAA reinstated Newton’s eligibility because investigators had not found evidence that Newton or Auburn officials had known of his father’s actions. This left Newton conveniently eligible for the Southeastern Conference championship game and for the postseason BCS championship bowl. For the NCAA, prudence meant honoring public demand.

“Our championships,” NCAA President Mark Emmert has declared, “are one of the primary tools we have to enhance the student-athlete experience.”

“Whoremasters”

NCAA v. Regents left the NCAA devoid of television football revenue and almost wholly dependent on March Madness basketball. It is rich but insecure. Last year, CBS Sports and Turner Broadcasting paid $771 million to the NCAA for television rights to the 2011 men’s basketball tournament alone. That’s three-quarters of a billion dollars built on the backs of amateurs—on unpaid labor. The whole edifice depends on the players’ willingness to perform what is effectively volunteer work. The athletes, and the league officials, are acutely aware of this extraordinary arrangement. William Friday, the former North Carolina president, recalls being yanked from one Knight Commission meeting and sworn to secrecy about what might happen if a certain team made the NCAA championship basketball game. “They were going to dress and go out on the floor,” Friday told me, “but refuse to play,” in a wildcat student strike. Skeptics doubted such a diabolical plot. These were college kids—unlikely to second-guess their coaches, let alone forfeit the dream of a championship. Still, it was unnerving to contemplate what hung on the consent of a few young volunteers: several hundred million dollars in television revenue, countless livelihoods, the NCAA budget, and subsidies for sports at more than 1,000 schools. Friday’s informants exhaled when the suspect team lost before the finals.

Cognizant of its precarious financial base, the NCAA has in recent years begun to pursue new sources of revenue. Taking its cue from member schools such as Ohio State (which in 2009 bundled all its promotional rights—souvenirs, stadium ads, shoe deals—and outsourced them to the international sports marketer IMG College for a guaranteed $11 million a year), the NCAA began to exploit its vault of college sports on film. For $29.99 apiece, NCAA On Demand offers DVDs of more than 200 memorable contests in men’s ice hockey alone. Video-game technology also allows nostalgic fans to relive and even participate in classic moments of NCAA Basketball. NCAA Football, licensed by the NCAA through IMG College to Electronic Arts, one of the world’s largest video-game manufacturers, reportedly sold 2.5 million copies in 2008. Brit Kirwan, the chancellor of the Maryland university system and a former president at Ohio State, says there were “terrible fights” between the third Knight Commission and the NCAA over the ethics of generating this revenue.

All of this money ultimately derives from the college athletes whose likenesses are shown in the films or video games. But none of the profits go to them. Last year, Electronic Arts paid more than $35 million in royalties to the NFL players union for the underlying value of names and images in its pro football series—but neither the NCAA nor its affiliated companies paid former college players a nickel. Naturally, as they have become more of a profit center for the NCAA, some of the vaunted “student-athletes” have begun to clamor that they deserve a share of those profits. You “see everybody getting richer and richer,” Desmond Howard, who won the 1991 Heisman Trophy while playing for the Michigan Wolverines, told USA Today recently. “And you walk around and you can’t put gas in your car? You can’t even fly home to see your parents?”

Some athletes have gone beyond talk. A series of lawsuits quietly making their way through the courts cast a harsh light on the absurdity of the system—and threaten to dislodge the foundations on which the NCAA rests. On July 21, 2009, lawyers for Ed O’Bannon filed a class-action antitrust suit against the NCAA at the U.S. District Court in San Francisco. “Once you leave your university,” says O’Bannon, who won the John Wooden Award for player of the year in 1995 on UCLA’s national-championship basketball team, “one would think your likeness belongs to you.” The NCAA and UCLA continue to collect money from the sales of videos of him playing. But by NCAA rules, O’Bannon, who today works at a Toyota dealership near Las Vegas, alleges he is still not allowed to share the revenue the NCAA generates from his own image as a college athlete. His suit quickly gathered co-plaintiffs from basketball and football, ex-players featured in NCAA videos and other products. “The NCAA does not license student-athlete likenesses,” NCAA spokesperson Erik Christianson told The New York Times in response to the suit, “or prevent former student-athletes from attempting to do so. Likewise, to claim the NCAA profits off student-athlete likenesses is also pure fiction.”

The legal contention centers on Part IV of the NCAA’s “Student-Athlete Statement” for Division I, which requires every athlete to authorize use of “your name or picture … to promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs.” Does this clause mean that athletes clearly renounce personal interest forever? If so, does it actually undermine the NCAA by implicitly recognizing that athletes have a property right in their own performance? Jon King, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, expects the NCAA’s core mission of amateurism to be its “last defense standing.”

In theory, the NCAA’s passion to protect the noble amateurism of college athletes should prompt it to focus on head coaches in the high-revenue sports—basketball and football—since holding the top official accountable should most efficiently discourage corruption. The problem is that the coaches’ growing power has rendered them, unlike their players, ever more immune to oversight. According to research by Charles Clotfelter, an economist at Duke, the average compensation for head football coaches at public universities, now more than $2 million, has grown 750 percent (adjusted for inflation) since the Regents decision in 1984; that’s more than 20 times the cumulative 32 percent raise for college professors. For top basketball coaches, annual contracts now exceed $4 million, augmented by assorted bonuses, endorsements, country-club memberships, the occasional private plane, and in some cases a negotiated percentage of ticket receipts. (Oregon’s ticket concessions netted former football coach Mike Bellotti an additional $631,000 in 2005.)

The NCAA rarely tangles with such people, who are apt to fight back and win. When Rick Neuheisel, the head football coach of the Washington Huskies, was punished for petty gambling (in a March Madness pool, as it happened), he sued the NCAA and the university for wrongful termination, collected $4.5 million, and later moved on to UCLA. When the NCAA tried to cap assistant coaches’ entering salary at a mere $16,000, nearly 2,000 of them brought an antitrust suit, Law v. NCAA , and in 1999 settled for $54.5 million. Since then, salaries for assistant coaches have commonly exceeded $200,000, with the top assistants in the SEC averaging $700,000. In 2009, Monte Kiffin, then at the University of Tennessee, became the first assistant coach to reach $1 million, plus benefits.

The late Myles Brand, who led the NCAA from 2003 to 2009, defended the economics of college sports by claiming that they were simply the result of a smoothly functioning free market. He and his colleagues deflected criticism about the money saturating big-time college sports by focusing attention on scapegoats; in 2010, outrage targeted sports agents. Last year Sports Illustrated published “Confessions of an Agent,” a firsthand account of dealing with high-strung future pros whom the agent and his peers courted with flattery, cash, and tawdry favors. Nick Saban, Alabama’s head football coach, mobilized his peers to denounce agents as a public scourge. “I hate to say this,” he said, “but how are they any better than a pimp? I have no respect for people who do that to young people. None.”

Saban’s raw condescension contrasts sharply with the lonely penitence from Dale Brown, the retired longtime basketball coach at LSU. “Look at the money we make off predominantly poor black kids,” Brown once reflected. “We’re the whoremasters.”

“Picayune Rules”

NCAA officials have tried to assert their dominion—and distract attention from the larger issues—by chasing frantically after petty violations. Tom McMillen, a former member of the Knight Commission who was an All-American basketball player at the University of Maryland, likens these officials to traffic cops in a speed trap, who could flag down almost any passing motorist for prosecution in kangaroo court under a “maze of picayune rules.” The publicized cases have become convoluted soap operas. At the start of the 2010 football season, A. J. Green, a wide receiver at Georgia, confessed that he’d sold his own jersey from the Independence Bowl the year before, to raise cash for a spring-break vacation. The NCAA sentenced Green to a four-game suspension for violating his amateur status with the illicit profit generated by selling the shirt off his own back. While he served the suspension, the Georgia Bulldogs store continued legally selling replicas of Green’s No. 8 jersey for $39.95 and up.

A few months later, the NCAA investigated rumors that Ohio State football players had benefited from “hook-ups on tatts”—that is, that they’d gotten free or underpriced tattoos at an Ohio tattoo parlor in exchange for autographs and memorabilia—a violation of the NCAA’s rule against discounts linked to athletic personae. The NCAA Committee on Infractions imposed five-game suspensions on Terrelle Pryor, Ohio State’s tattooed quarterback, and four other players (some of whom had been found to have sold their Big Ten championship rings and other gear), but did permit them to finish the season and play in the Sugar Bowl. (This summer, in an attempt to satisfy NCAA investigators, Ohio State voluntarily vacated its football wins from last season, as well as its Sugar Bowl victory.) A different NCAA committee promulgated a rule banning symbols and messages in players’ eyeblack—reportedly aimed at Pryor’s controversial gesture of support for the pro quarterback Michael Vick, and at Bible verses inscribed in the eyeblack of the former Florida quarterback Tim Tebow.

The moral logic is hard to fathom: the NCAA bans personal messages on the bodies of the players, and penalizes players for trading their celebrity status for discounted tattoos—but it codifies precisely how and where commercial insignia from multinational corporations can be displayed on college players, for the financial benefit of the colleges. Last season, while the NCAA investigated him and his father for the recruiting fees they’d allegedly sought, Cam Newton compliantly wore at least 15 corporate logos—one on his jersey, four on his helmet visor, one on each wristband, one on his pants, six on his shoes, and one on the headband he wears under his helmet—as part of Auburn’s $10.6 million deal with Under Armour.

“Restitution”

Obscure NCAA rules have bedeviled Scott Boras, the preeminent sports agent for Major League Baseball stars, in cases that may ultimately prove more threatening to the NCAA than Ed O’Bannon’s antitrust suit. In 2008, Andrew Oliver, a sophomore pitcher for the Oklahoma State Cowboys, had been listed as the 12th-best professional prospect among sophomore players nationally. He decided to dismiss the two attorneys who had represented him out of high school, Robert and Tim Baratta, and retain Boras instead. Infuriated, the Barattas sent a spiteful letter to the NCAA. Oliver didn’t learn about this until the night before he was scheduled to pitch in the regional final for a place in the College World Series, when an NCAA investigator showed up to question him in the presence of lawyers for Oklahoma State. The investigator also questioned his father, Dave, a truck driver.

Had Tim Baratta been present in their home when the Minnesota Twins offered $390,000 for Oliver to sign out of high school? A yes would mean trouble. While the NCAA did not forbid all professional advice—indeed, Baseball America used to publish the names of agents representing draft-likely underclassmen—NCAA Bylaw 12.3.2.1 prohibited actual negotiation with any professional team by an adviser, on pain of disqualification for the college athlete. The questioning lasted past midnight.

Just hours before the game was to start the next day, Oklahoma State officials summoned Oliver to tell him he would not be pitching. Only later did he learn that the university feared that by letting him play while the NCAA adjudicated his case, the university would open not only the baseball team but all other Oklahoma State teams to broad punishment under the NCAA’s “restitution rule” (Bylaw 19.7), under which the NCAA threatens schools with sanctions if they obey any temporary court order benefiting a college athlete, should that order eventually be modified or removed. The baseball coach did not even let his ace tell his teammates the sad news in person. “He said, ‘It’s probably not a good idea for you to be at the game,’” Oliver recalls.

The Olivers went home to Ohio to find a lawyer. Rick Johnson, a solo practitioner specializing in legal ethics, was aghast that the Baratta brothers had turned in their own client to the NCAA, divulging attorney-client details likely to invite wrath upon Oliver. But for the next 15 months, Johnson directed his litigation against the two NCAA bylaws at issue. Judge Tygh M. Tone, of Erie County, came to share his outrage. On February 12, 2009, Tone struck down the ban on lawyers negotiating for student-athletes as a capricious, exploitative attempt by a private association to “dictate to an attorney where, what, how, or when he should represent his client,” violating accepted legal practice in every state. He also struck down the NCAA’s restitution rule as an intimidation that attempted to supersede the judicial system. Finally, Judge Tone ordered the NCAA to reinstate Oliver’s eligibility at Oklahoma State for his junior season, which started several days later.

The NCAA sought to disqualify Oliver again, with several appellate motions to stay “an unprecedented Order purporting to void a fundamental Bylaw.” Oliver did get to pitch that season, but he dropped into the second round of the June 2009 draft, signing for considerably less than if he’d been picked earlier. Now 23, Oliver says sadly that the whole experience “made me grow up a little quicker.” His lawyer claimed victory. “Andy Oliver is the first college athlete ever to win against the NCAA in court,” said Rick Johnson.

Yet the victory was only temporary. Wounded, the NCAA fought back with a vengeance. Its battery of lawyers prepared for a damages trial, ultimately overwhelming Oliver’s side eight months later with an offer to resolve the dispute for $750,000. When Oliver and Johnson accepted, to extricate themselves ahead of burgeoning legal costs, Judge Tone was compelled to vacate his orders as part of the final settlement. This freed NCAA officials to reassert the two bylaws that Judge Tone had so forcefully overturned, and they moved swiftly to ramp up rather than curtail enforcement. First, the NCAA’s Eligibility Center devised a survey for every drafted undergraduate athlete who sought to stay in college another year. The survey asked whether an agent had conducted negotiations. It also requested a signed release waiving privacy rights and authorizing professional teams to disclose details of any interaction to the NCAA Eligibility Center. Second, NCAA enforcement officials went after another Scott Boras client.

The Toronto Blue Jays had made the left-handed pitcher James Paxton, of the University of Kentucky, the 37th pick in the 2009 draft. Paxton decided to reject a reported $1 million offer and return to school for his senior year, pursuing a dream to pitch for his team in the College World Series. But then he ran into the new NCAA survey. Had Boras negotiated with the Blue Jays? Boras has denied that he did, but it would have made sense that he had—that was his job, to test the market for his client. But saying so would get Paxton banished under the same NCAA bylaw that had derailed Andrew Oliver’s career. Since Paxton was planning to go back to school and not accept their draft offer, the Blue Jays no longer had any incentive to protect him—indeed, they had every incentive to turn him in. The Blue Jays’ president, by telling reporters that Boras had negotiated on Paxton’s behalf, demonstrated to future recruits and other teams that they could use the NCAA’s rules to punish college players who wasted their draft picks by returning to college. The NCAA’s enforcement staff raised the pressure by requesting to interview Paxton.

Though Paxton had no legal obligation to talk to an investigator, NCAA Bylaw 10.1(j) specified that anything short of complete cooperation could be interpreted as unethical conduct, affecting his amateur status. Under its restitution rule, the NCAA had leverage to compel the University of Kentucky to ensure obedience.

As the 2010 season approached, Gary Henderson, the Kentucky coach, sorely wanted Paxton, one of Baseball America’s top-ranked players, to return. Rick Johnson, Andrew Oliver’s lawyer, filed for a declaratory judgment on Paxton’s behalf, arguing that the state constitution—plus the university’s code of student conduct—barred arbitrary discipline at the request of a third party. Kentucky courts deferred to the university, however, and Paxton was suspended from the team. “Due to the possibility of future penalties, including forfeiture of games,” the university stated, it “could not put the other 32 players of the team and the entire UK 22-sport intercollegiate athletics department at risk by having James compete.” The NCAA appraised the result with satisfaction. “When negotiations occur on behalf of student-athletes,” Erik Christianson, the NCAA spokesperson, told The New York Times in reference to the Oliver case, “those negotiations indicate that the student-athlete intends to become a professional athlete and no longer remain an amateur.”

Paxton was stranded. Not only could he not play for Kentucky, but his draft rights with the Blue Jays had lapsed for the year, meaning he could not play for any minor-league affiliate of Major League Baseball. Boras wrangled a holdover job for him in Texas with the independent Grand Prairie AirHogs, pitching against the Pensacola Pelicans and Wichita Wingnuts. Once projected to be a first-round draft pick, Paxton saw his stock plummet into the fourth round. He remained unsigned until late in spring training, when he signed with the Seattle Mariners and reported to their minor-league camp in Peoria, Arizona.

“You Might As Well Shoot Them in the Head”

“When you dream about playing in college,” Joseph Agnew told me not long ago, “you don’t ever think about being in a lawsuit.” Agnew, a student at Rice University in Houston, had been cut from the football team and had his scholarship revoked by Rice before his senior year, meaning that he faced at least $35,000 in tuition and other bills if he wanted to complete his degree in sociology. Bereft of his scholarship, he was flailing about for help when he discovered the National College Players Association, which claims 7,000 active members and seeks modest reforms such as safety guidelines and better death benefits for college athletes. Agnew was struck by the NCPA scholarship data on players from top Division I basketball teams, which showed that 22 percent were not renewed from 2008 to 2009—the same fate he had suffered.

In October 2010, Agnew filed a class-action antitrust suit over the cancellation of his scholarship and to remove the cap on the total number of scholarships that can be awarded by NCAA schools. In his suit, Agnew did not claim the right to free tuition. He merely asked the federal court to strike down an NCAA rule, dating to 1973, that prohibited colleges and universities from offering any athletic scholarship longer than a one-year commitment, to be renewed or not, unilaterally, by the school—which in practice means that coaches get to decide each year whose scholarships to renew or cancel. (After the coach who had recruited Agnew had moved on to Tulsa, the new Rice coach switched Agnew’s scholarship to a recruit of his own.) Agnew argued that without the one-year rule, he would have been free to bargain with all eight colleges that had recruited him, and each college could have decided how long to guarantee his scholarship.

Agnew’s suit rested on a claim of an NCAA antitrust violation combined with a laudable academic goal—making it possible for students to finish their educations. Around the same time, lawyers from President Obama’s Justice Department initiated a series of meetings with NCAA officials and universities in which they asked what possible educational rationale there was for allowing the NCAA—an organization that did not itself pay for scholarships—to impose a blanket restriction on the length of scholarships offered by colleges. Tidbits leaked into the press. In response, the NCAA contended that an athletic scholarship was a “merit award” that should be reviewed annually, presumably because the degree of “merit” could change. Justice Department lawyers reportedly suggested that a free market in scholarships would expand learning opportunities in accord with the stated rationale for the NCAA’s tax-exempt status—that it promotes education through athletics. The one-year rule effectively allows colleges to cut underperforming “student-athletes,” just as pro sports teams cut their players. “Plenty of them don’t stay in school,” said one of Agnew’s lawyers, Stuart Paynter. “They’re just gone. You might as well shoot them in the head.”

Agnew’s lawsuit has made him a pariah to former friends in the athletic department at Rice, where everyone identified so thoroughly with the NCAA that they seemed to feel he was attacking them personally. But if the premise of Agnew’s case is upheld by the courts, it will make a sham of the NCAA’s claim that its highest priority is protecting education.

“They Want to Crush These Kids”

Academic performance has always been difficult for the NCAA to address. Any detailed regulation would intrude upon the free choice of widely varying schools, and any academic standard broad enough to fit both MIT and Ole Miss would have little force. From time to time, a scandal will expose extreme lapses. In 1989, Dexter Manley, by then the famous “Secretary of Defense” for the NFL’s Washington Redskins, teared up before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Education, Arts, and Humanities, when admitting that he had been functionally illiterate in college.

Within big-time college athletic departments, the financial pressure to disregard obvious academic shortcomings and shortcuts is just too strong. In the 1980s, Jan Kemp, an English instructor at the University of Georgia, publicly alleged that university officials had demoted and then fired her because she refused to inflate grades in her remedial English courses. Documents showed that administrators replaced the grades she’d given athletes with higher ones, providing fake passing grades on one notable occasion to nine Bulldog football players who otherwise would have been ineligible to compete in the 1982 Sugar Bowl. (Georgia lost anyway, 24–20, to a University of Pittsburgh team led by the future Hall of Fame quarterback Dan Marino.) When Kemp filed a lawsuit against the university, she was publicly vilified as a troublemaker, but she persisted bravely in her testimony. Once, Kemp said, a supervisor demanding that she fix a grade had bellowed, “Who do you think is more important to this university, you or Dominique Wilkins?” (Wilkins was a star on the basketball team.) Traumatized, Kemp twice attempted suicide.

In trying to defend themselves, Georgia officials portrayed Kemp as naive about sports. “We have to compete on a level playing field,” said Fred Davison, the university president. During the Kemp civil trial, in 1986, Hale Almand, Georgia’s defense lawyer, explained the university’s patronizing aspirations for its typical less-than-scholarly athlete. “We may not make a university student out of him,” Almand told the court, “but if we can teach him to read and write, maybe he can work at the post office rather than as a garbage man when he gets through with his athletic career.” This argument backfired with the jurors: finding in favor of Kemp, they rejected her polite request for $100,000, and awarded her $2.6 million in damages instead. (This was later reduced to $1.08 million.) Jan Kemp embodied what is ostensibly the NCAA’s reason for being—to enforce standards fairly and put studies above sports—but no one from the organization ever spoke up on her behalf.

T he NCAA body charged with identifying violations of any of the Division I league rules, the Committee on Infractions, operates in the shadows. Josephine Potuto, a professor of law at the University of Nebraska and a longtime committee member who was then serving as its vice chair, told Congress in 2004 that one reason her group worked in secret was that it hoped to avoid a “media circus.” The committee preferred to deliberate in private, she said, guiding member schools to punish themselves. “The enforcement process is cooperative, not adversarial,” Potuto testified. The committee consisted of an elite coterie of judges, athletic directors, and authors of legal treatises. “The committee also is savvy about intercollegiate athletics,” she added. “They cannot be conned.”

In 2009, a series of unlikely circumstances peeled back the veil of secrecy to reveal NCAA procedures so contorted that even victims marveled at their comical wonder. The saga began in March of 2007, shortly after the Florida State Seminoles basketball team was knocked out of the NIT basketball tournament, which each spring invites the best teams not selected for the March Madness tournament. At an athletic-department study hall, Al Thornton, a star forward for the team, completed a sports-psychology quiz but then abandoned it without posting his written answers electronically by computer. Brenda Monk, an academic tutor for the Seminoles, says she noticed the error and asked a teammate to finish entering Thornton’s answers onscreen and hit “submit,” as required for credit. The teammate complied, steaming silently, and then complained at the athletic office about getting stuck with clean-up chores for the superstar Thornton (who was soon to be selected by the Los Angeles Clippers in the first round of the NBA draft). Monk promptly resigned when questioned by FSU officials, saying her fatigue at the time could not excuse her asking the teammate to submit the answers to another student’s completed test.

Monk’s act of guileless responsibility set off a chain reaction. First, FSU had to give the NCAA preliminary notice of a confessed academic fraud. Second, because this would be its seventh major infraction case since 1968, FSU mounted a vigorous self-investigation to demonstrate compliance with NCAA academic rules. Third, interviews with 129 Seminoles athletes unleashed a nightmare of matter-of-fact replies about absentee professors who allowed group consultations and unlimited retakes of open-computer assignments and tests. Fourth, FSU suspended 61 of its athletes in 10 sports. Fifth, the infractions committee applied the byzantine NCAA bylaws to FSU’s violations. Sixth, one of the penalties announced in March of 2009 caused a howl of protest across the sports universe.

Twenty-seven news organizations filed a lawsuit in hopes of finding out how and why the NCAA proposed to invalidate 14 prior victories in FSU football. Such a penalty, if upheld, would doom coach Bobby Bowden’s chance of overtaking Joe Paterno of Penn State for the most football wins in Division I history. This was sacrosanct territory. Sports reporters followed the litigation for six months, reporting that 25 of the 61 suspended FSU athletes were football players, some of whom were ruled ineligible retroactively from the time they had heard or yelled out answers to online test questions in, of all things, a music-appreciation course.

When reporters sought access to the transcript of the infractions committee’s hearing in Indianapolis, NCAA lawyers said the 695-page document was private. (The NCAA claimed it was entitled to keep all such records secret because of a landmark Supreme Court ruling that it had won in 1988, in NCAA v. Tarkanian , which exempted the organization from any due-process obligations because it was not a government organization.) Media outlets pressed the judge to let Florida State share its own copy of the hearing transcript, whereupon NCAA lawyers objected that the school had never actually “possessed” the document; it had only seen the transcript via a defendant’s guest access to the carefully restricted NCAA Web site. This claim, in turn, prompted intercession on the side of the media by Florida’s attorney general, arguing that letting the NCAA use a technical loophole like this would undermine the state’s sunshine law mandating open public records. After tumultuous appeals, the Florida courts agreed and ordered the NCAA transcript released in October of 2009.

News interest quickly evaporated when the sports media found nothing in the record about Coach Bowden or the canceled football victories. But the transcript revealed plenty about the NCAA. On page 37, T. K. Wetherell, the bewildered Florida State president, lamented that his university had hurt itself by cooperating with the investigation. “We self-reported this case,” he said during the hearing, and he later complained that the most ingenuous athletes—those who asked “What’s the big deal, this happens all the time?”—received the harshest suspensions, while those who clammed up on the advice of lawyers went free. The music-appreciation professor was apparently never questioned. Brenda Monk, the only instructor who consistently cooperated with the investigation, appeared voluntarily to explain her work with learning-disabled athletes, only to be grilled about her credentials by Potuto in a pettifogging inquisition of remarkable stamina.

In January of last year, the NCAA’s Infractions Appeals Committee sustained all the sanctions imposed on FSU except the number of vacated football victories, which it dropped, ex cathedra, from 14 to 12. The final penalty locked Bobby Bowden’s official win total on retirement at 377 instead of 389, behind Joe Paterno’s 401 (and counting). This carried stinging symbolism for fans, without bringing down on the NCAA the harsh repercussions it would have risked if it had issued a television ban or substantial fine.

Cruelly, but typically, the NCAA concentrated public censure on powerless scapegoats. A dreaded “show cause” order rendered Brenda Monk, the tutor, effectively unhirable at any college in the United States. Cloaking an old-fashioned blackball in the stately language of law, the order gave notice that any school hiring Monk before a specified date in 2013 “shall, pursuant to the provisions of Bylaw 19.5.2.2(l), show cause why it should not be penalized if it does not restrict the former learning specialist [Monk] from having any contact with student-athletes.” Today she works as an education supervisor at a prison in Florida.

T he Florida State verdict hardly surprised Rick Johnson, the lawyer who had represented the college pitchers Andrew Oliver and James Paxton. “All the NCAA’s enforcements are random and selective,” he told me, calling the organization’s appeals process a travesty. (Johnson says the NCAA has never admitted to having wrongly suspended an athlete.) Johnson’s scalding experience prompted him to undertake a law-review article on the subject, which in turn sent him trawling through NCAA archives. From the summary tax forms required of nonprofits, he found out that the NCAA had spent nearly $1 million chartering private jets in 2006. “What kind of nonprofit organization leases private jets?,” Johnson asks. It’s hard to determine from tax returns what money goes where, but it looks as if the NCAA spent less than 1 percent of its budget on enforcement that year. Even after its plump cut for its own overhead, the NCAA dispersed huge sums to its 1,200 member schools, in the manner of a professional sports league. These annual payments are universal—every college gets something—but widely uneven. They keep the disparate shareholders (barely) united and speaking for all of college sports. The payments coerce unity within the structure of a private association that is unincorporated and unregulated, exercising amorphous powers not delegated by any government.

Searching through the archives, Johnson came across a 1973 memo from the NCAA general counsel recommending the adoption of a due-process procedure for athletes in disciplinary cases. Without it, warned the organization’s lawyer, the association risked big liability claims for deprivation of rights. His proposal went nowhere. Instead, apparently to limit costs to the universities, Walter Byers had implemented the year-by-year scholarship rule that Joseph Agnew would challenge in court 37 years later. Moreover, the NCAA’s 1975 convention adopted a second recommendation “to discourage legal actions against the NCAA,” according to the minutes. The members voted to create Bylaw 19.7, Restitution, to intimidate college athletes in disputes with the NCAA. Johnson recognized this provision all too well, having won the temporary court judgment that the rule was illegal if not downright despotic. It made him nearly apoplectic to learn that the NCAA had deliberately drawn up the restitution rule as an obstacle to due process, contrary to the recommendation of its own lawyer. “They want to crush these kids,” he says.

The NCAA, of course, has never expressed such a desire, and its public comments on due process tend to be anodyne. At a congressional hearing in 2004, the infractions-committee vice chair, Josephine Potuto, repeatedly argued that although the NCAA is “not bound by any judicial due process standards,” its enforcement, infractions, and hearing procedures meet and “very likely exceed” those of other public institutions. Yet when pressed, Potuto declared that athletes would have no standing for due process even if the Supreme Court had not exempted the NCAA in the 1988 Tarkanian decision. “In order to reach due-process issues as a legal Constitutional principle, the individual challenging has to have a substantive property or liberty interest,” she testified. “The opportunity to play intercollegiate athletics does not rise to that level.”

To translate this from the legal jargon, Potuto used a circular argument to confine college athletes beneath any right to freedom or property in their own athletic effort. They have no stake to seek their rights, she claimed, because they have no rights at stake.

Potuto’s assertion might be judged preposterous, an heir of the Dred Scott dictum that slaves possessed no rights a white person was bound to respect. But she was merely being honest, articulating assumptions almost everyone shares without question. Whether motivated by hostility for students (as critics like Johnson allege), or by noble and paternalistic tough love (as the NCAA professes), the denial of fundamental due process for college athletes has stood unchallenged in public discourse. Like other NCAA rules, it emanates naturally from the premise that college athletes own no interest in sports beyond exercise, character-building, and good fun. Who represents these young men and women? No one asks.

The debates and commissions about reforming college sports nibble around the edges—trying to reduce corruption, to prevent the “contamination” of athletes by lucre, and to maintain at least a pretense of concern for academic integrity. Everything stands on the implicit presumption that preserving amateurism is necessary for the well-being of college athletes. But while amateurism—and the free labor it provides—may be necessary to the preservation of the NCAA, and perhaps to the profit margins of various interested corporations and educational institutions, what if it doesn’t benefit the athletes? What if it hurts them?

“The Plantation Mentality”

“Ninety percent of the NCAA revenue is produced by 1 percent of the athletes,” Sonny Vaccaro says. “Go to the skill positions”—the stars. “Ninety percent African Americans.” The NCAA made its money off those kids, and so did he. They were not all bad people, the NCAA officials, but they were blind, Vaccaro believes. “Their organization is a fraud.”

Vaccaro retired from Reebok in 2007 to make a clean break for a crusade. “The kids and their parents gave me a good life,” he says in his peppery staccato. “I want to give something back.” Call it redemption, he told me. Call it education or a good cause. “Here’s what I preach,” said Vaccaro. “This goes beyond race, to human rights. The least educated are the most exploited. I’m probably closer to the kids than anyone else, and I’m 71 years old.”

Vaccaro is officially an unpaid consultant to the plaintiffs in O’Bannon v. NCAA. He connected Ed O’Bannon with the attorneys who now represent him, and he talked to some of the additional co-plaintiffs who have joined the suit, among them Oscar Robertson, a basketball Hall of Famer who was incensed that the NCAA was still selling his image on playing cards 50 years after he left the University of Cincinnati.

Jon King, an antitrust lawyer at Hausfeld LLP in San Francisco, told me that Vaccaro “opened our eyes to massive revenue streams hidden in college sports.” King and his colleagues have drawn on Vaccaro’s vast knowledge of athletic-department finances, which include off-budget accounts for shoe contracts. Sonny Vaccaro and his wife, Pam, “had a mountain of documents,” he said. The outcome of the 1984 Regents decision validated an antitrust approach for O’Bannon, King argues, as well as for Joseph Agnew in his continuing case against the one-year scholarship rule. Lawyers for Sam Keller—a former quarterback for the University of Nebraska who is featured in video games—are pursuing a parallel “right of publicity” track based on the First Amendment. Still other lawyers could revive Rick Johnson’s case against NCAA bylaws on a larger scale, and King thinks claims for the rights of college players may be viable also under laws pertaining to contracts, employment, and civil rights.

Vaccaro had sought a law firm for O’Bannon with pockets deep enough to withstand an expensive war of attrition, fearing that NCAA officials would fight discovery to the end. So far, though, they have been forthcoming. “The numbers are off the wall,” Vaccaro says. “The public will see for the first time how all the money is distributed.”

Vaccaro has been traveling the after-dinner circuit, proselytizing against what he sees as the NCAA’s exploitation of young athletes. Late in 2008, someone who heard his stump speech at Howard University mentioned it to Michael Hausfeld, a prominent antitrust and human-rights lawyer, whose firm had won suits against Exxon for Native Alaskans and against Union Bank of Switzerland for Holocaust victims’ families. Someone tracked down Vaccaro on vacation in Athens, Greece, and he flew back directly to meet Hausfeld. The shoe salesman and the white-shoe lawyer made common cause.

Hausfeld LLP has offices in San Francisco, Philadelphia, and London. Its headquarters are on K Street in Washington, D.C., about three blocks from the White House. When I talked with Hausfeld there not long ago, he sat in a cavernous conference room, tidy in pinstripes, hands folded on a spotless table that reflected the skyline. He spoke softly, without pause, condensing the complex fugue of antitrust litigation into simple sentences. “Let’s start with the basic question,” he said, noting that the NCAA claims that student-athletes have no property rights in their own athletic accomplishments. Yet, in order to be eligible to play, college athletes have to waive their rights to proceeds from any sales based on their athletic performance.

“What right is it that they’re waiving?,” Hausfeld asked. “You can’t waive something you don’t have. So they had a right that they gave up in consideration to the principle of amateurism, if there be such.” (At an April hearing in a U.S. District Court in California, Gregory Curtner, a representative for the NCAA, stunned O’Bannon’s lawyers by saying: “There is no document, there is no substance, that the NCAA ever takes from the student-athletes their rights of publicity or their rights of likeness. They are at all times owned by the student-athlete.” Jon King says this is “like telling someone they have the winning lottery ticket, but by the way, it can only be cashed in on Mars.” The court denied for a second time an NCAA motion to dismiss the O’Bannon complaint.)

The waiver clause is nestled among the paragraphs of the “Student-Athlete Statement” that NCAA rules require be collected yearly from every college athlete. In signing the statement, the athletes attest that they have amateur status, that their stated SAT scores are valid, that they are willing to disclose any educational documents requested, and so forth. Already, Hausfeld said, the defendants in the Ed O’Bannon case have said in court filings that college athletes thereby transferred their promotional rights forever. He paused. “That’s ludicrous,” he said. “Nobody assigns rights like that. Nobody can assert rights like that.” He said the pattern demonstrated clear abuse by the collective power of the schools and all their conferences under the NCAA umbrella—“a most effective cartel.”

The faux ideal of amateurism is “the elephant in the room,” Hausfeld said, sending for a book. “You can’t get to the bottom of our case without exposing the hypocrisy of amateurism, and Walter Byers says it eloquently.” An assistant brought in Byers’s memoir. It looked garish on the shiny table because dozens of pink Post-its protruded from the text. Hausfeld read to me from page 390:

The college player cannot sell his own feet (the coach does that) nor can he sell his own name (the college will do that). This is the plantation mentality resurrected and blessed by today’s campus executives.

He looked up. “That wasn’t me,” he said. “That was the NCAA’s architect.” He found a key recommendation on page 388:

Prosecutors and the courts, with the support of the public, should use antitrust laws to break up the collegiate cartel—not just in athletics but possibly in other aspects of collegiate life as well.

Could the book become evidence? Might the aged Byers testify? (He is now 89.) Was that part of the plaintiffs’ strategy for the O’Bannon trial? Hausfeld smiled faintly. “I’d rather the NCAA lawyers not fully understand the strategy,” he said.

He put the spiny book away and previewed what lies ahead. The court soon would qualify his clients as a class. Then the Sherman Antitrust Act would provide for thorough discovery to break down exactly what the NCAA receives on everything from video clips to jerseys, contract by contract. “And we want to know what they’re carrying on their books as the value of their archival footage,” he concluded. “They say it’s a lot of money. We agree. How much?”

The work will be hard, but Hausfeld said he will win in the courts, unless the NCAA folds first. “Why?” Hausfeld asked rhetorically. “We know our clients are foreclosed: neither the NCAA nor its members will permit them to participate in any of that licensing revenue. Under the law, it’s up to them [the defendants] to give a pro-competitive justification. They can’t. End of story.”

I n 2010 the third Knight Commission, complementing a previous commission’s recommendation for published reports on academic progress, called for the finances of college sports to be made transparent and public—television contracts, conference budgets, shoe deals, coaches’ salaries, stadium bonds, everything. The recommendation was based on the worthy truism that sunlight is a proven disinfectant. But in practice, it has not been applied at all. Conferences, coaches, and other stakeholders resisted disclosure; college players still have no way of determining their value to the university.

“Money surrounds college sports,” says Domonique Foxworth, who is a cornerback for the NFL’s Baltimore Ravens and an executive-committee member for the NFL Players Association, and played for the University of Maryland. “And every player knows those millions are floating around only because of the 18-to-22-year-olds.” Yes, he told me, even the second-string punter believes a miracle might lift him into the NFL, and why not? In all the many pages of the three voluminous Knight Commission reports, there is but one paragraph that addresses the real-life choices for college athletes. “Approximately 1 percent of NCAA men’s basketball players and 2 percent of NCAA football players are drafted by NBA or NFL teams,” stated the 2001 report, basing its figures on a review of the previous 10 years, “and just being drafted is no assurance of a successful professional career.” Warning that the odds against professional athletic success are “astronomically high,” the Knight Commission counsels college athletes to avoid a “rude surprise” and to stick to regular studies. This is sound advice as far as it goes, but it’s a bromide that pinches off discussion. Nothing in the typical college curriculum teaches a sweat-stained guard at Clemson or Purdue what his monetary value to the university is. Nothing prods students to think independently about amateurism—because the universities themselves have too much invested in its preservation. Stifling thought, the universities, in league with the NCAA, have failed their own primary mission by providing an empty, cynical education on college sports.

The most basic reform would treat the students as what they are—adults, with rights and reason of their own—and grant them a meaningful voice in NCAA deliberations. A restoration of full citizenship to “student-athletes” would facilitate open governance, making it possible to enforce pledges of transparency in both academic standards and athletic finances. Without that, the NCAA has no effective checks and balances, no way for the students to provide informed consent regarding the way they are governed. A thousand questions lie willfully silenced because the NCAA is naturally afraid of giving “student-athletes” a true voice. Would college players be content with the augmented scholarship or allowance now requested by the National College Players Association? If a player’s worth to the university is greater than the value of his scholarship (as it clearly is in some cases), should he be paid a salary? If so, would teammates in revenue sports want to be paid equally, or in salaries stratified according to talent or value on the field? What would the athletes want in Division III, where athletic budgets keep rising without scholarships or substantial sports revenue? Would athletes seek more or less variance in admissions standards? Should non-athletes also have a voice, especially where involuntary student fees support more and more of college sports? Might some schools choose to specialize, paying players only in elite leagues for football, or lacrosse? In athletic councils, how much would high-revenue athletes value a simple thank you from the tennis or field-hockey players for the newly specified subsidies to their facilities?

University administrators, already besieged from all sides, do not want to even think about such questions. Most cringe at the thought of bargaining with athletes as a general manager does in professional sports, with untold effects on the budgets for coaches and every other sports item. “I would not want to be part of it,” North Carolina Athletic Director Dick Baddour told me flatly. After 44 years at UNC, he could scarcely contemplate a world without amateur rules. “We would have to think long and hard,” Baddour added gravely, “about whether this university would continue those sports at all.”

I, too, once reflexively recoiled at the idea of paying college athletes and treating them like employees or professionals. It feels abhorrent—but for reasons having to do more with sentiment than with practicality or law. Not just fans and university presidents but judges have often found cursory, non-statutory excuses to leave amateur traditions intact. “Even in the increasingly commercial modern world,” said a federal-court judge in Gaines v. NCAA in 1990, “this Court believes there is still validity to the Athenian concept of a complete education derived from fostering the full growth of both mind and body.” The fact that “the NCAA has not distilled amateurism to its purest form,” said the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1988, “does not mean its attempts to maintain a mixture containing some amateur elements are unreasonable.”

But one way or another, the smokescreen of amateurism may soon be swept away. For one thing, a victory by the plaintiffs in O’Bannon’s case would radically transform college sports. Colleges would likely have to either stop profiting from students or start paying them. The NCAA could also be forced to pay tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars in damages. If O’Bannon and Vaccaro and company win, “it will turn college sports on its ear,” said Richard Lapchick, the president of the National Consortium for Academics and Sports, in a recent interview with The New York Times .

Though the O’Bannon case may take several years yet to reach resolution, developments on other fronts are chipping away at amateurism, and at the NCAA. This past summer, Sports Illustrated editorialized in favor of allowing college athletes to be paid by non-university sources without jeopardizing their eligibility. At a press conference last June, Steve Spurrier, the coach of the South Carolina Gamecocks football team (and the winner of the 1966 Heisman Trophy as a Florida Gator), proposed that coaches start paying players $300 a game out of their own pockets. The coaches at six other SEC schools (Alabama, Florida, Ole Miss, Mississippi State, LSU, and Tennessee) all endorsed Spurrier’s proposal. And Mark Emmert, the NCAA president, recently conceded that big changes must come. “The integrity of collegiate athletics is seriously challenged today by rapidly growing pressures coming from many directions,” Emmert said in July. “We have reached a point where incremental change is not sufficient to meet these challenges. I want us to act more aggressively and in a more comprehensive way than we have in the past. A few new tweaks of the rules won’t get the job done.”

Threats to NCAA dominion also percolate in Congress. Aggrieved legislators have sponsored numerous bills. Senator Orrin Hatch, citing mistreatment of his Utah Utes, has called witnesses to discuss possible antitrust remedies for the Bowl Championship Series. Congressional committees have already held hearings critical of the NCAA’s refusal to follow due process in disciplinary matters; other committees have explored a rise in football concussions. Last January, calls went up to investigate “informal” football workouts at the University of Iowa just after the season-ending bowl games—workouts so grueling that 41 of the 56 amateur student-athletes collapsed, and 13 were hospitalized with rhabdomyolysis, a life-threatening kidney condition often caused by excessive exercise.

The greatest threat to the viability of the NCAA may come from its member universities. Many experts believe that the churning instability within college football will drive the next major change. President Obama himself has endorsed the drumbeat cry for a national playoff in college football. This past spring, the Justice Department questioned the BCS about its adherence to antitrust standards. Jim Delany, the commissioner of the Big Ten, has estimated that a national playoff system could produce three or four times as much money as the existing bowl system does. If a significant band of football schools were to demonstrate that they could orchestrate a true national playoff, without the NCAA’s assistance, the association would be terrified—and with good reason. Because if the big sports colleges don’t need the NCAA to administer a national playoff in football, then they don’t need it to do so in basketball. In which case, they could cut out the middleman in March Madness and run the tournament themselves. Which would deprive the NCAA of close to $1 billion a year, more than 95 percent of its revenue. The organization would be reduced to a rule book without money—an organization aspiring to enforce its rules but without the financial authority to enforce anything.

Thus the playoff dreamed of and hankered for by millions of football fans haunts the NCAA. “There will be some kind of playoff in college football, and it will not be run by the NCAA,” says Todd Turner, a former athletic director in four conferences (Big East, ACC, SEC, and Pac-10). “If I’m at the NCAA, I have to worry that the playoff group can get basketball to break away, too.”

This danger helps explain why the NCAA steps gingerly in enforcements against powerful colleges. To alienate member colleges would be to jeopardize its own existence. Long gone are television bans and the “death penalty” sentences (commanding season-long shutdowns of offending teams) once meted out to Kentucky (1952), Southwestern Louisiana (1973), and Southern Methodist University (1987). Institutions receive mostly symbolic slaps nowadays. Real punishments fall heavily on players and on scapegoats like literacy tutors.

A deeper reason explains why, in its predicament, the NCAA has no recourse to any principle or law that can justify amateurism. There is no such thing. Scholars and sportswriters yearn for grand juries to ferret out every forbidden bauble that reaches a college athlete, but the NCAA’s ersatz courts can only masquerade as public authority. How could any statute impose amateur status on college athletes, or on anyone else? No legal definition of amateur exists, and any attempt to create one in enforceable law would expose its repulsive and unconstitutional nature—a bill of attainder, stripping from college athletes the rights of American citizenship.

For all our queasiness about what would happen if some athletes were to get paid, there is a successful precedent for the professionalization of an amateur sports system: the Olympics. For years, Walter Byers waged war with the NCAA’s older and more powerful nemesis, the Amateur Athletic Union, which since 1894 had overseen U.S. Olympic athletes. Run in high-handed fashion, the AAU had infamously banned Jesse Owens for life in 1936—weeks after his four heroic gold medals punctured the Nazi claim of Aryan supremacy—because instead of using his sudden fame to tour and make money for the AAU at track meets across Europe, he came home early. In the early 1960s, the fights between the NCAA and the AAU over who should manage Olympic athletes become so bitter that President Kennedy called in General Douglas MacArthur to try to mediate a truce before the Tokyo Olympic Games.

Ultimately, Byers prevailed and effectively neutered the AAU. In November 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed the bipartisan Amateur Sports Act. Amateurism in the Olympics soon dissolved—and the world did not end. Athletes, granted a 20 percent voting stake on every Olympic sport’s governing body, tipped balances in the United States and then inexorably around the world. First in marathon races, then in tennis tournaments, players soon were allowed to accept prize money and keep their Olympic eligibility. Athletes profited from sponsorships and endorsements. The International Olympic Committee expunged the word amateur from its charter in 1986. Olympic officials, who had once disdained the NCAA for offering scholarships in exchange for athletic performance, came to welcome millionaire athletes from every quarter, while the NCAA still refused to let the pro Olympian Michael Phelps swim for his college team at Michigan.

This sweeping shift left the Olympic reputation intact, and perhaps improved. Only hardened romantics mourned the amateur code. “Hey, come on,” said Anne Audain, a track-and-field star who once held the world record for the 5,000 meters. “It’s like losing your virginity. You’re a little misty for awhile, but then you realize, Wow, there’s a whole new world out there ! ”

Without logic or practicality or fairness to support amateurism, the NCAA’s final retreat is to sentiment. The Knight Commission endorsed its heartfelt cry that to pay college athletes would be “an unacceptable surrender to despair.” Many of the people I spoke with while reporting this article felt the same way. “I don’t want to pay college players,” said Wade Smith, a tough criminal lawyer and former star running back at North Carolina. “I just don’t want to do it. We’d lose something precious.”

“Scholarship athletes are already paid,” declared the Knight Commission members, “in the most meaningful way possible: with a free education.” This evasion by prominent educators severed my last reluctant, emotional tie with imposed amateurism. I found it worse than self-serving. It echoes masters who once claimed that heavenly salvation would outweigh earthly injustice to slaves. In the era when our college sports first arose, colonial powers were turning the whole world upside down to define their own interests as all-inclusive and benevolent. Just so, the NCAA calls it heinous exploitation to pay college athletes a fair portion of what they earn.

• HISTORY & CULTURE

Here's the history of basketball—from peach baskets in Springfield to global phenomenon

The first game used baskets as hoops and turned into a brawl. Soon after, basketball evolved into a pillar of American sports.

The nets used by athletes to dunk the ball and score points in the beloved game of basketball evolved from peaches, or rather the baskets used to collect peaches.

That’s what a young athletic director ultimately used on a cold day back in 1891 for a new game he created to keep his students engaged.  

James Naismith was a 31-year old graduate student teaching physical education at the   International YMCA Training School , now known as Springfield College, in Springfield, Massachusetts when students were forced to stay indoors for days due to a New England storm.   The usual winter athletic activities were marching, calisthenics, and apparatus work but they weren’t nearly as thrilling as football or lacrosse which were played during the warmer seasons.  

Naismith wanted to create a game that would be simple to understand but complex enough to be interesting. The game had to be playable indoors, and it had to accommodate several players at once. The game also needed to provide plenty of exercise for the students, yet without the physicality of football, soccer, or rugby since those would threaten more severe injuries if played in a confined space. ( See 100 years of football in pictures. )

Naismith approached the school janitor, hoping he could find two square boxes to use for goals. When the janitor came back from his search, he had two peach baskets instead. Naismith nailed the peach baskets to the lower rail of the gymnasium balcony, one on each side. The height of that lower balcony rail happened to be 10 feet. The students would play on teams to try to get the ball into their team’s basket.   A person was stationed at each end of the balcony to retrieve the ball from the basket and put it back into play.

The first game ever played between students was a complete brawl.

“The boys began tackling, kicking and punching in the crunches, they ended up in a free for all in the middle of the gym floor before I could pull them apart,” Naismith said during a January 1939 radio program on WOR in New York City called We the People, his only known recording. “One boy was knocked out. Several of them had black eyes and one had a dislocated shoulder.” Naismith said. “After that first match, I was afraid they'd kill each other, but they kept nagging me to let them play again so I made up some more rules.”

For Hungry Minds

The humble beginnings of the only professional sport to originate in the United States laid the foundation for today’s multi-billion-dollar business. The current National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) March Madness college basketball tournament includes the best 68 of more than 1,000 college teams, stadiums that seat tens of thousands of spectators and lucrative television contracts.

Original rules of the game

Naismith didn’t create all of the rules at once, but continued to modify them into what are now known as the original 13 rules . Some are still part of the modern game today.   Naismith’s original rules of the game sold at auction in 2010 for $4.3 million.

In the original rules: The ball could be thrown in any direction with one or both hands, never a fist.   A player could not run with the ball but had to throw it from the spot where it was caught. Players were not allowed to push, trip or strike their opponents. The first infringement was considered a foul. A second foul would disqualify a player until the next goal was made. But if there was evidence that a player intended to injure an opponent, the player would be disqualified for the whole game.

Umpires served as judges for the game, made note of fouls and had the power to disqualify players. They decided when the ball was in bounds, to which side it belonged, and managed the time. Umpires decided when a goal had been made and kept track of the goals.

If a team made three consecutive fouls, the opposing team would be allowed a goal.

A goal was made when the ball was thrown or batted from the grounds into the basket and stayed there. If the ball rested on the edges, and the opponent moved the basket, it would count as a goal. When the ball went out of bounds, it was thrown into the field of play by the person first touching it. The person throwing the ball was allowed five seconds; if he held it longer, the ball would go to the opponent. In case of a dispute, an umpire would throw the ball straight into the field. If any side persisted in delaying the game, the umpire would call a foul on that side.

The length of a game was two 15-minute halves, with five minutes' rest between.   The team making the most goals within the allotted time was declared the winner. If a game was tied, it could be continued until another goal was made.

First public games

The first public game of basketball was played in a YMCA gymnasium and was recorded by the Springfield Republican on March 12th, 1892. The instructors played against the students. Around 200 spectators attended to discover this new sport they had never heard of or seen before. In the story published by the Republican, the teachers were credited with “agility” but the student’s “science” is what led them to defeat the teachers 5-1.

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Within weeks the sport’s popularity grew rapidly. Students attending other schools introduced the game at their own YMCAs. The original rules were printed in a college magazine, which was mailed to YMCAs across the country. With the colleges’ well-represented international student body the sport also was introduced to many foreign nations. High schools began to introduce the new game, and by 1905, basketball was officially recognized as a permanent winter sport.

The first intercollegiate basketball game between two schools is disputed, according to the NCAA. In 1893, two school newspaper articles were published chronicling separate recordings of collegiate basketball games facing an opposing college team.

In 1892, less than a year after Naismith created the sport, Smith College gymnastics instructor Senda Berenson, introduced the game to women’s athletics. The first recorded intercollegiate game between women took place between Stanford University and University of California at Berkeley in 1896.

With the sport’s growth in popularity, it gained notice from the International Olympic Committee and was introduced at the 1904 Olympic Games in St. Louis as a demonstration event. It wasn’t until 1936 that basketball was recognized as a medal event. Women’s basketball wasn’t included as an Olympic medal event until the 1976 Montreal games. ( Wheelchair basketball in Cambodia changed these women's lives. )

As the sport continued its rapid spread, professional leagues began to form across the United States. Basketball fans cheered on their new hometown teams. The first professional league was the National Basketball League (NBL) formed in 1898, comprised of six teams in the northeast. The league only lasted about five years. After it dissolved in 1904, the league would be reintroduced 33 years later in 1937 with an entirely new support system, with Goodyear, Firestone, and General Electric corporations as the league owners, and 13 teams.

While professional sports leagues gained nationwide attention, college basketball was also a major fixture. The first NCAA tournament, which included eight teams, was held in 1939 at Northwestern University.   The first collegiate basketball national champion was the University of Oregon. The team defeated Ohio State University.

Like most of the United States in the early to mid 1900s, basketball was segregated. The sport wouldn’t be integrated until 1950 when Chuck Cooper was drafted by the Boston Celtics. Prior to Cooper being drafted there were groups of black teams across the country, commonly known as “the black fives”, which referred to the five starting players on a basketball team.   All-black teams were often referred to as colored quints or Negro cagers.   The teams flourished in New York City, Washington, D.C., Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Chicago, and in other cities with substantial African American populations. They were amateur, semi-professional, and professional.

Of the more than 1,000 collegiate basketball teams across all divisions of the NCAA, 68 teams play in the annual March Madness tournament. The best college teams from each conference around the country compete for a place in the Sweet 16, Elite Eight, Final Four and, ultimately,   the national championship. Though basketball might not be played the same way as it was when Naismith invented it—peach baskets have been replaced with nets, metal hoops and plexiglass blackboards—its evolution proves that the game has transcended a century.

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Student-Athlete Activism

“The NCAA Board of Governors recognize the important role social engagement has on driving positive societal change. The recent demonstrations following the tragic killing of George Floyd showed the world the power of protest, and student-athletes across the country were at the center of that movement. We commend NCAA student-athletes who recognized the need for change and took action through safe and peaceful protest. We encourage students to continue to make their voices heard on these important issues, engage in community activism and exercise their Constitutional rights.” - NCAA Board of Governors Statement on Social Activism (June 12, 2020)

Activism is the practice of taking intentional action to bring about social, political, economic or environmental change. It can take many forms but often relies on a strategic, organized and action-oriented approach to address persistent systemic issues in society.

Social justice activism works toward the “full and equitable participation of people of all social identity groups in a society that is mutually shaped to meet their needs” (Bell, 2016). It involves “advocating for people without power or voice, while also cognizing a sense of responsibility to combat the problems and injustices of society” (Lee & Cunningham, 2019) .

There are many ways to practice activism. Some examples include:

• Campaigning for (or against) a cause.
• Participating in protests and demonstrations.
• Developing and advocating for (or against) policies and legislation.
• Launching groups or organizations to promote a social cause.
• Participating in community building.
• Developing communication pieces (op-eds, social media, etc.).

“Sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire. It has the power to unite people in a way that little else does. Sport can awaken hope where there was previously only despair. It laughs in the face of all types of discrimination.” - Nelson Mandela, activist, revolutionary and political leader

Sport is a powerful tool for social change. Research shows that there are commonalities between being an athlete and being an activist. Sport develops social consciousness, meritocratic ideals, responsible citizenship and interdependence (Kaufman and Wolff, 2010) . Athletes develop confidence, communication skills, teamwork and other qualities through playing their sport that support their activist efforts.

A recent study conducted by the Ross Initiative in Sports for Equality surveyed more than 2,000 college student-athletes and found that 79% of respondents felt that student-athletes have an obligation to raise awareness about social justice issues. In addition, 83% of student-athletes surveyed were willing to speak up and do more about issues related to student-athlete activism. Women and athletes of color, individuals who hold less privileged identities in American society, are also more likely to engage in activism than their white male counterparts (Mac Intosh, Martin, & Kluch, 2020) .

Student-athletes are uniquely positioned, as campus and community leaders, to use their voice and platform to drive positive social change on topics such as racial justice, gender equity, LGBTQ+ inclusion, environmental activism, sexual violence prevention, immigration and mental health.

NCAA Student-Athlete Activism and Racial Justice Engagement Study

In the fall of 2020, NCAA Research surveyed over 24,000 student-athletes to examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their well-being and explore social and civic engagement topics. Among the key findings:

• More than 80% of student-athletes reported discussing politics and performing volunteer work in the past year, and over a third reported having demonstrated for a cause. Black student-athletes were significantly more likely to have communicated about a cause (77%) or demonstrated for a cause (53%) than their peers across other racial/ethnic groups.
• A majority of student-athletes believed that their coaches, teammates and athletics department would support them for taking a stance publicly.
• Nearly 90% of student-athletes surveyed indicated that they had conversations focused on race or racial justice with family or friends within the prior six months. Approximately 80% indicated that they had made an effort to learn more about race and racial justice on their own. Overall, just over half of all participants indicated having conversations with their coaches about race and racial justice. Among Black student-athletes, that rate was 67%.
• Many student-athletes also publicly participated in the racial justice movement in the summer and fall of 2020. Over half posted content about race or racial justice on social media, and over one-quarter participated in a protest or rally for racial justice. Black student-athletes reported the highest levels of racial justice engagement.

History of Student-Athlete Activism

Historically, student-athletes have been at the forefront of many social movements in the United States.

• During the civil rights movement, Black athletes used their platform to call for an end to racial discrimination and injustices — with UCLA’s Lew Alcindor (now Kareem Abdul-Jabbar) becoming a central figure of the movement. Other notable change agents included the “Syracuse Eight,” a group of Syracuse football players who sacrificed their athletic careers by speaking out against racial injustice.
• In 1976, Yale women’s rowing student-athlete Chris Ernst led her team in staging a protest calling attention to inequities in the treatment of the university’s women’s and men’s teams. Their protest helped define Title IX , one of the landmark laws for gender equity in the U.S.
• In 1990, Texas track student-athlete Shola Lynch worked to organize a rally that saw more than 100 student-athletes marching through campus calling for racial justice following a series of racist incidents on campus.
• In 2003, Manhattanville women’s basketball student-athlete Toni Smith turned her back to the U.S. flag during the national anthem to protest the U.S. involvement in the war in Iraq.
• In 2010, Maryland wrestling student-athlete Hudson Taylor founded Athlete Ally , a nonprofit organization working to end homophobia and transphobia in sports through education and awareness.
• In 2014, Knox women’s basketball player Ariyana Smith lay on the floor for 4 minutes and 30 seconds prior to a game to protest the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Brown’s body had been left in the street for four and a half hours after he was killed.
• In 2015, football players at Missouri announced they would boycott all football-related activities until university officials resigned due to their negligence in addressing racial injustice on campus. The players’ protest was successful and became a defining moment in situating student-athletes’ voices in the Black Lives Matter movement.
• In 2018, Oregon State student-athletes Nathan Braaten and Taylor Ricci launched a mental health awareness initiative, the Dam Worth It campaign. The campaign seeks to utilize the influential platform of sport to open up the conversation around mental health and work to end the stigma.

Now more than ever, in light of recent and pervasive racial injustices, student-athletes across the country have made their voices heard to advocate for their beliefs. The actions below capture some examples of how student-athletes are practicing their activism.

• In October 2020, the three divisional Student-Athlete Advisory Committees and the Board of Governors Student-Athlete Engagement Committee collaborated to create a national Unity Pledge and logo, symbolic gestures to generate stronger unity among the NCAA’s 1,100-plus schools and nearly 500,000 student-athletes.
• In January 2021, the Marquette men’s basketball team wore black uniforms to a home game against UConn in a show of support for Jacob Blake, a Black man who was shot by law enforcement in Kenosha, Wisconsin. It was announced earlier that day that no charges would be filed against the officer who shot Blake.
• In January 2021, most of Tennessee’s women’s basketball players opted to kneel during the national anthem before a home game against Arkansas in the wake of the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

From protests to social media posts, local efforts to conferencewide initiatives, student-athletes have been driving the charge to make this historic moment a social movement.

The Power of the Student-Athlete Voice: Activism for Social Impact

Action strategies for activism.

While we often picture activists as outspoken and persistent, know that all personality types have a place in activist movements. Reflect on your own strengths and unique personality to identify how you can best contribute to activist causes. Roles in activism range from those providing a vision for a cause and those serving as points of connection between different resources to those raising funds and providing emotional support to peers.

Activism starts with education on the cause you are fighting for — but it should not end there. Continue to educate yourself on the topic you are passionate about and use that knowledge to drive your actions.

As a student-athlete, you have visibility on campus. That visibility can be a powerful tool to promote your activism. Show up to events that promote your cause. Organize meetings to connect people who share your passion for your cause. Use social media to call attention to your cause and amplify the voices of those fighting for your cause.

If you are participating in community building and want to mobilize your community to support your activism, establish lines of communication that help you disseminate information quickly and efficiently. For example, if you are launching a group of student-athletes to advance racial justice, identify a strategy and technologies that can be used to communicate with group members. Communicate with your coaches, administrators and peers about your views and discuss how they can best support your activism.

Your athletic department may have resources available to help you promote your causes. For instance, every athletic department has an athletics diversity and inclusion designee who may be able to help support you in your activist efforts. Many athletic departments are launching diversity and inclusion task forces and committees that can also support your activism. Most college campuses have resources available that you can use to amplify the impact of your activism. Resources may include cultural centers on campus, diversity offices, academic departments, faculty with expertise in areas of your activism or staff committed to the cause (e.g., chief diversity officers). There may also be student groups on campus that you can join to support your activism. Community resources that can support activist efforts include community action groups, nonprofit organizations, city governments and human relations commissions.

While your individual voice has immense value in itself, there is power in establishing a collective voice for your cause. Work with your campus and conference Student-Athlete Advisory Committee to align the messaging and initiatives for your activist cause and make sure affiliated campus, conference and athletic groups are aware of your plan prior to launching the initiative.

Your time on campus is limited, so make sure you create the infrastructure for current and future student-athletes to support your cause. This infrastructure can be created by forming an official student organization or launching a SAAC task force/committee dedicated to your cause. As a member of an official student organization, for example, you can often request funding and meeting space from your school. If your activism is relevant to the mission of the athletic department, ask for the cause to be anchored in the department’s strategic plan. In addition, review your school’s strategic plan or mission statement to see where there might be alignment.

Allies are members of the dominant group that advocate for the less privileged group. Mentors provide guidance and support for your activism. Sponsors are individuals who have the power to push your cause when you are not in the room. For your activism to have the most impact, you will need all three. Identify members of your community (e.g., coaches, senior administrators) who buy into your vision. Make sure you address what you may want from each group/individual and how they can assist with the plan.

Every athletic department has:

• An athletics diversity and inclusion designee.
• A senior woman administrator.
• A faculty athletics representative.

Activist work is often met with resistance. Strive to seek common ground with those you may not agree with or who may not have a similar lived experience to you.

This work can be emotionally draining — especially for members of marginalized communities. Make sure to prioritize your mental and physical health when participating in activism. Take frequent mental health days and use your school’s counseling center or office to identify coping strategies for when you face resistance to your activism or feel emotionally drained.

• The Power of the Student-Athlete Voice: Activism for Social Impact – Strategies for Student-Athletes
• Facilitating and Supporting Student-Athlete Activism – Strategies for Coaches and Administrators
• Action Strategies for Supporting Student-Athlete Activism – A Checklist for Coaches and Administrators

Bell, L. A. (2016). Theoretical foundations for social justice education. In M. Adams, L. A. Bell & P. Griffin (Eds.), Teaching for diversity and social justice (pp. 1-14). New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.

Kaufman, P., & Wolff, E. A. (2010). Playing and protesting: Sport as a vehicle for social change. Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 34, 154-175.

Lee, W., & Cunningham, G. B. (2019). Moving toward understanding social justice in sport organizations: A study of engagement in social justice advocacy in sport organizations. Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 43, 1-19.

Mac Intosh, A., Martin, E. M. & Kluch, Y. (2020). To act or not to act? Student-athlete perceptions of social justice activism. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 51, 1-8.

Other Resources

• 2020 NCAA Diversity and Inclusion Social Media Campaign: After the Campaign
• Leadership Development’s Athletes Using Their Power (A4) webinar series
• Ross Initiative in Sports for Equality (RISE): Champions of Change

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Point/Counterpoint: Paying College Athletes

The notion of paying college football players has been an ongoing debate since the early 1900’s. With current television revenue resulting from NCAA football bowl games and March Madness in basketball, there is now a clamoring for compensating both football and basketball players beyond that of an athletic scholarship. This article takes a point/counterpoint approach to the topic of paying athletes and may have potential implications/consequences for college administrators, athletes, and coaches. Dr. John Acquaviva defends the current system in which colleges provide an athletic scholarship that provides a “free college education” in return for playing on the university team. Dr. Dennis Johnson follows with a counterpoint making the case that athletes in these sports should receive compensation beyond that of a college scholarship and forwards five proposals to pay the athletes.

Key words: pay for play, athletic scholarships

Introduction: History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)

The idea of paying college athletes to compete dates back to what is considered to be the first intercollegiate competition. In a regatta between Harvard and Yale Universities, Harvard used a coxswain who was not even a student enrolled at the Ivy League school (5). Much like today’s universities whose appetites for appearances in corporate-sponsored “big money” football bowl events; Harvard may have used the non-student to please regatta sponsor Elkins Railroad (23).

In the late 1800’s, football played by college teams was a brutal sport but enjoyed by many fans. However, from 1900 to 1905, there were 45 players who died playing the sport (22). This prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to summon the presidents of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, and threaten them with a ban unless the sport was modified. As a result of that meeting, a group of 62 university presidents convened to form the Intercollegiate Athletic Association in 1906. This group evolved into the NCAA in 1910, but as a group it only possessed supervisory power (22).

College football became even more popular in the period of 1920-1940. This was a time when commercialism in the educational system was being questioned on a variety of levels. One such fundamental question was posed in 1929 by Howard Savage, a staff member of the Carnegie Foundation. He raised a question in an article entitled Athletics in American College (originally published in 1930 but reprinted in 1999) “whether an institution in the social order whose primary purpose is the development of the intellectual life can at the same time serve an agency to promote business, industry, journalism, and organized athletics on an extensive commercial basis? More importantly, the report asked “can it (the university) concentrate its attention on securing teams that win, without impairing the sincerity and vigor of its intellectual purpose” (9, p.495)? Savage also states that “alumni devices for recruiting winning teams constitutes the most disgraceful phase of recent intercollegiate athletics” (9, p. 495). In sum, the original 1929 report claimed that “big time” college sports were not educational, but were entirely financial and commercial.

Athletes during the early and mid-1900’s were routinely recruited and paid to play; and there were several instances where individuals representing the schools were not enrolled as students. For example, there is one report of a Midwestern university using seven members of its team that included the town blacksmith, a lawyer, a livery man, and four railroad employees (5). Other athletes at colleges were given high paying jobs for which they did little or no work. In 1948, the NCAA adopted a “Sanity Code” that limited financial aid for athletes to tuition and fees, and required that aid otherwise be given based on need (5). In the early 1950’s, with the threat of several southern schools bolting from the NCAA, the code was revised to allow athletic scholarships to cover tuition, fees, and a living stipend.

However, by the mid-1950’s many schools were still struggling with the issue of offering athletic scholarships. Some university presidents ultimately decided to maintain the principles of amateurism and further serve the mission of higher education. Those were presidents of universities that today make up the Ivy League. They concluded that it was not in the best interest of their universities to award athletic scholarships, and have remained steadfast even today.

After passing Title IX in the mid 1970’s, the NCAA absorbed the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) and began to govern women’s sport at the collegiate level. Over the past 50 years, the NCAA has also expanded into three divisions with a multitude of championship events on a yearly basis (20). There are more than 1,300 member institutions that represent an estimated 400,000 student athletes who participate in sport (21). The result of this growth and development are enormous increases in revenue. NCAA President Mark Emmert reports the NCAA revenues for the 2010-11 fiscal year is projected at $757 million, of which $452.2 million will go to Division I members (14).

While seemingly operating in a purely capitalistic/professional atmosphere, the NCAA continues to endorse an amateurism concept in college athletics. These competing, and often contradictory, values lead some college athletes in big time football and basketball programs to question the status quo of the present system through their words and actions. For example, many athletes are still attempting to get their “piece of the pie,” albeit under the table. And so it leads to our point-counterpoint.

Point: College Athletes Should Not Be Paid

The intensity of the argument to pay college athletes has escalated in the past few years. Perhaps it’s because of the current economic climate and everyone, including amateur athletes is looking for ways to make money? Or maybe it’s because many higher learning institutions have given the public access to their annual budget and readers focus on the profit of select athletic programs? Or maybe it is due to the absurd coaches’ salaries and the money that colleges make from football bowl games and basketball tournaments? Regardless, this has magnified the fact that the athletes see none of these profits and thus begs the simple question: “Where’s my share?” Perhaps a fair question, but to understand this argument better, a healthy debate is needed. So, here are some points to consider.

Point #1: Education is Money

Colleges and universities provide an invaluable and vital service to our communities: education. A now-famous bumper sticker once read: “If you think education is expensive, try ignorance.” To address that very slogan, the U.S. census bureau, as reported by Cheesman-Day and Newberger (7), expressed this best when they reported that the lifetime earnings for those with a college degree are over $1 million dollars more than non-graduates. Despite such a statistic, essays and op-ed columns continue to pour in from those who favor paying student-athletes while simultaneously refusing to acknowledge or accept the value of a college education. Is a college education priceless or not?

A sports-journalist in a recent national radio interview proposed that any argument against paying college athletes based on the sole reason that education is the prize is “antiquated”. But what seems antiquated and even shortsighted is the belief that paying a college athlete some (or even a lot of) money will solve all or even some of student’s long-term issues. The fear of the NCAA, as it should be, is that the mere notion of paying college athletes undermines the university’s primary purpose – education, something far more valuable than a modest annual stipend proposed by many. If it currently appears that the universities “don’t really care” about the athlete, paying them would intensify that belief, not dissolve it.

The irony in this dispute is that student-athletes do cost the university a substantial amount of money each year. For example, a full scholarship over four years can range between $30,000 and $200,000 depending if the institution is public or private (29). But let’s address this main point head on: There is an obvious lack of appreciation of a college degree from those in favor of paying athletes, and until a genuine gratitude for this concept develops, this argument will probably continue to linger.

Point #2: There Are Problems with Payment

Despite the well-documented scandals and corruption in college athletics (30), many would probably agree that paying athletes would exponentially increase the need for intense NCAA oversight – an enormous task by all accounts. Plus, there are the practical issues to consider. For example, how much should the athletes get paid and will payments be based on performance? What if the athlete gets hurt? What if the athlete is a bust and despite remaining on the team, doesn’t start or even play at all? – Issues that seem to raise far more questions than answers. But perhaps most important – What will happen to the non-revenue sports at the colleges who lose money from all of their sports programs – including football and basketball? It has been shown that only a fraction of Division I football and men’s basketball programs turn a profit (24, 20). The other Division I football and basketball programs as well as sports such as baseball, softball, golf, hockey, women’s basketball (minus a couple of notable programs), and just about all Division II sports not only fail to make money, but actually drain their athletic budgets. The outcome here would be inevitable: Forcing athletic departments to pay its football and basketball players would result in the eventual elimination of most, if not all, of the non-revenue sports. Is that what we want?

We cannot afford to be myopic on this issue. That is, there are only a limited number of programs that make big money, but yet there are hundreds of schools who absorb big losses at the cost of providing athletes a place to compete and earn a degree. The purpose of the NCAA, along with Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), Little League, and dozens of other organized forms of amateur sport is to provide a venue to play these sports – something we should not take for granted. The problem is that some have shifted in thinking that playing an organized sport is a right, whereas it still stands as a privilege.

Point #3: The University Offers More Than an Education

Concerts, lecture series by prominent people, on-stage productions, movies, intramural sports, fitness facilities, and a variety of clubs are all part of the typical university experience. Most students agree that colleges are self-contained acres of learning and socializing, all which takes place in a safe environment. It’s common for schools to subsidize the above-mentioned on-campus activities by adding fees to the tuition – which means that it’s free to a full-scholarship athlete. Other benefits to the athlete include the regular use of pristine gyms, well-manicured fields, athlete-only (and often team-only) workout facilities, sports medicine care, the opportunity to travel via away games, specialized meal plans and free foot gear and athletic attire. In addition, athletes are improving their trade from the best coaching minds in the sport; not to mention having access to some of the best nutrition and strength/conditioning personnel. And perhaps the most overlooked benefits are that the school provides the player with high-profile name recognition, a dedicated fan base, media exposure, and a competitive atmosphere with proven rivals, all of which took decades, effort and money for each institution to establish.

Point #4: The Athletic Department Has Its Role

Keep in mind that student-athletes are not employees of the university, rather they are students first and athletes second. The university can indeed make money from the sports programs; however, for those that do, the money simply goes back into the athletic program to fund the non-revenue sports (24). In fact, every year the NCAA sponsors over 80 national championships in three divisions, demonstrating the range and depth of their organization (20). While it is true that the champion in football and men’s basketball (and most other sports for that matter) seem to come from a relatively small pool of universities, it might be safe to assume that paying athletes would create an even bigger disparity since so few universities actually make money. Let’s face it, we are an underdog-loving country, and paying athletes would all but ensure that teams like Butler University, who made it to the Final Four in consecutive tournaments (2010 and 2011), will never do it again.

Point #5: Athletes Know the Deal

From the moment the full-scholarship papers are signed, each participant’s role is very clear: Schools accept the responsibility of the student’s tuition, meal plan, and boarding, while the athlete is provided with the opportunity to earn a degree, engage in college life and play their favorite sport in a well-organized, and often high profile fashion. The document signed by each student-athlete describes this agreement in an unmistakable manner. Although wordy and at times complex – a necessity due to the nature of the agreement – there’s no vagueness in the general arrangement or a hidden agenda from either party (10). A failure to honor the basic premise of any such contract would cause all forms of business – big or small – to crumble. If for some reason the university could be held liable for entrapment or some other form of dishonesty, then their athlete’s argument would stand on firmer ground. But frankly, the details of this agreement are well known by all involved, and rather strangely, no one seems to mind when signing them.

In conclusion, it should be noted that any NCAA improprieties or blatant corruption may have a carry-over effect into empathizing with the position given here. While corruption and other related-concerns are legitimate and need investigation, paying college athletes still remains a separate debate. It is vital to this process to view each NCAA issue independently and avoid making judgments on them as a whole. The position here is that, like many organizations, the NCAA should not be dismissed or discredited on one issue due to the mishandling of others. Further, if the contention is that many student athletes enter college unprepared or that athletics takes up too much time to excel (or even earn a degree), those are separate, but much needed arguments, and are not related to the issue of paying athletes.

Now more than ever, we live in an era of entitlement. At one time our country viewed the chance at higher education as a priceless commodity. However, it now seems that a college education is not held in the same esteem and worse yet, some see it as simply an opportunity to earn money. Although it is now evident that there has been a failure to convince much of the public of the true value of an education, keeping college athletes as pure amateurs remains the right thing to do.

Counter Point: Athletes in “Big-Time” Sports Should Be Paid

Introduction.

The argument that a college athletic scholarship is an equal quid pro quo for a college education has been utilized since athletic scholarships were approved by the NCAA in 1950’s. My colleague makes one point that is totally accurate – a college graduate can in fact make a great deal more money over a lifetime when compared to non-graduates. However, the remainder of the author’s points are half-truths and in reality just plain falsehoods. For instance, a “full athletic scholarships” do not provide a “free” education (as it does not cover all costs incurred from matriculation to graduation. In many cases, the university does not live up to its end of the bargain of providing an education; as evidenced by the dismal number in the graduation rates, especially among African Americans. Furthermore, the athletic scholarship is only a one-year (renewable) agreement that can be terminated by the coach or university in any given year for any reason.

In debating the pay-for-play issue in college athletics, the history of the governing body (i.e., currently the NCAA), their mission and view of amateurism, the past history of college athletes benefitting financially, and the degree to which athletes benefit from the university experience must all be examined. The counter point section of this paper addresses each point made by my colleague. Using the Eitzen (12) analogy comparing the NCAA and big-time athletic programs to the old southern plantation system will be the underpinning wellspring for the subject of athlete exploitation and the financial benefits enjoyed by the university derived from that plantation-like exploitation. An economic viewpoint will be presented to demonstrate the cartel-like atmosphere held by the NCAA while maintaining the illusion of amateurism.

Finally, five proposals that outline means to promote pay-for-play in NCAA Division I football and men’s basketball will be presented. The arguments that follow are specifically tailored for those two sports at schools who receive bonus money from the NCAA, as those universities and their coaches enjoy considerable revenue from TV contracts and sponsorships generated by bowl games and “March Madness” appearances.

Point #1: Athletic Scholarships Provide a “Free Education” is not correct

As mentioned, in the 1950’s the NCAA approved adding living stipends to athletic scholarships that previously included only tuition and fees. Today, the “full ride” scholarship can only include tuition, fees, room, board, and books. And as mentioned in the previous section, in some cases, depending on the school attended, that scholarship can be worth anywhere from $30,000 to $200,000, although the figures $20,000 to $100,000 over a four year period might be more accurate. In any case, that still does not cover the full cost of attending college.

The Collegiate Athletes Coalition (CAC) estimates that NCAA scholarships are worth about $2000 less than the cost of attending a university, as it does not account for expenses such as travel and sundries. Former Nebraska head football coach and United States Congressman, Tom Osborne (R-NE), calculates the gap between scholarship funding and the actual cost of attendance to be closer to $3,000. Even former NCAA President, Myles Brand, indicated that he favored increasing scholarship limits: “Ideally, the value of an athletically related scholarship would be increased to cover the full-cost of attendance, calculated at between $2,000 to $3000 more per year than is currently provided, I favor this approach of providing the full cost of attendance” (23, p.232).

So yes, the scholarship can be seen as pay for play, or at the very least, a quid pro quo for services rendered during a four year period. However, even with a full scholarship, an athlete will have to pay somewhere between $8,000 and $12,000 out of pocket to bridge the cost-of-living gap. Therefore, the full athletic scholarship does not provide a “free” education. Thus question remains: is the full scholarship a fair and equitable deal for the athlete?

Athlete Exploitation-The Plantation System

Eitzen (12) among others (27) makes the analogy that the NCAA operates like the “plantation system” of the old south. The coaches are the overseers who get work from the laborers (players) who provide riches for the masters (universities) while receiving little for their efforts. Perhaps slightly over-stated (obviously the athlete is not a slave, but maybe an indentured servant), the student–athlete is dominated, managed, and controlled, and they don’t receive a wage commensurate to their contribution as expressed in dollars earned by the university. Eitzen notes that athletes are sometimes mistreated physically and mentally and are often denied the rights and freedoms of other citizens. Ultimately, they have no real democratic recourse in an unjust system.

There are other similarities to the plantation analogy. Slaves were not free to leave the plantation much like an athlete cannot get out of a letter of intent (without penalty) and/or transfer without the penalty of sitting out a year. Much like the slaves who had no right to privacy, athletes are subject to mandatory drug testing (even though their coaches/masters are not tested), room checks, and limits on where they can and cannot go in the community. The athletes can be prohibited from political protests and the right to assemble. And finally, they can be subjected to mental cruelty and physical abuse (e.g., early morning torture sessions), all in order to create obedient slaves; student athletes.

Furthermore, collegiate athletics is often the only game in town for many of these athletes. For instance, football players must be in their third year of college or over the age of 21 to enter the National Football League (NFL). Basketball players, on the other hand, must attend college for one year or ultimately sit out a year before they can enter the National Basketball Association (NBA). Thus, the college game has become a “feeder system” similar to a minor professional league and it is in reality, “the only game in town.”

Point #2: Athletes Don’t Know the “Real” Deal

My colleague is partially correct in that most student athletes know that they are getting a scholarship that will allow them to go to school and play a sport. However, many don’t know the “real deal” as they generally have very little understanding they are about to enter a “plantation-like” system in which their scholarship in not guaranteed (i.e., renewable yearly) and can be terminated at any time. Student-athletes are also a led to believe that they will play and receive a college degree while possibly picking up a few fringe benefits along the way.

Take, for example, the recent stories regarding players like Reggie Bush, Cam Newton, or the players at Ohio State who received money and/or other benefits as a result of playing football. Even though student athletes know they will not get directly paid for playing, many desire and even expect some form of compensation. Slack (25) surveyed 3,500 current and retired football players in 1989 only to find that 31% had received under the table money during their college careers and 48% knew of others who had received payments. This seems to imply that while many recruits may indeed know “the deal”, they display their discontent by accepting payments or other benefits not currently allowed by the NCAA.

In reality, the statement “athletes know the deal” with regard to academic achievement and degree completion seems to lack substance. Dr. Nathan Tublitz, co-chair of the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletes, an organization of 51 faculty senates whose purpose is to remind college presidents, athletic directors, and coaches that student athletes are students first. He points out that:

“…schools aren’t doing these kids any favors by admitting them when it’s unlikely that they will succeed academically. We bring 17 year-old kids, some of them from the inner city and we wine and dine them. They have female chaperones. We put them up in fancy hotels. They come here and see an incredibly fancy locker room with individual TV screens, air conditioning and videogames. They go in and see the new football stadium and the new $200 million basketball arena. They see a medical training facility that is stunningly beautiful with waterfalls, treadmill pools, and the sate-of-the-art medical and dental equipment. They come here and are treated like royalty. Until they break a leg or get put on the second string and they get set aside. Many don’t earn a degree. They don’t have the training or the skills to be independent after they leave the university. They’re lost (28, p.D10).”

When the scholarship is signed, the athlete and his family have reasonable expectations which include efforts by the coaching staff and university administration to meet all obligations of the contract. Additionally, my colleague notes, “that failure to honor the basic premise of any such contract would cause all forms of business – big or small – to crumble.” If the NCAA and athletic departments in higher education are a business, why are they allowed to act in a cartel-like fashion? And finally, do student athletes really know the “deal” when they penned their name on national signing day? It appears they don’t.

Point #3: The University Offers More than Education-It’s Possible-But Not Probable

Academic Detachment. My colleague also makes the claim that the university offers more than an education (e.g., concerts, lectures, intramurals, and clubs) in settings that enrich the college experience. Due to the plantation effect, however, many athletes are not able to take advantage of those events. For instance, few if any of the scholarship athletes would be allowed to play in an intramural contest for the coach’s fear of injury. Student athletes are also over-scheduled with study halls, practices, weight training sessions, film study, individual workouts, more practice, travel, and competition; all in an attempt to help athletes maintain focus on their sport.

Adler and Adler (1) spent five years recording systematic information regarding the athletes’ lives in a big-time college basketball program. After observing, interviewing, and traveling with them, they concluded that big-time basketball and being seriously engaged in academics were not compatible. They also found that freshmen had a period of optimism regarding academics when they first arrived on campus, but after about two semesters they found that the social isolation combined with the fatigue of training kept them from becoming involved in academic life.

Positive feedback these basketball players earned was always athletic-related and not academic. They soon learned what they had to do to stay eligible. Coaches made sure they scheduled classes that did not interfere with practices. Ultimately, the researchers realized that academic detachment was encouraged by the peer culture, and because of their social status (e.g., big man on campus), it became difficult for them to focus on academics.

Coakley (8) reported that not all of the athletes in the Adler & Adler (1) study experienced academic detachment. Those who entered college well-prepared with appropriate high school courses, strong parental support and an ability to develop relationships outside of sport were able to succeed in the classroom. It’s important to note that too many minority athletes from low socioeconomic environments struggle in academics – an issue that is often perpetuated by the coaches. For instance, Robert Smith, former running back for Minnesota Vikings and pre-med student while at Ohio State, needed two afternoon labs in the same semester. Since the labs conflicted with practice, coaches suggested that he drop them because of the commitment he made to play football. Against the wishes of the coaching staff, Smith took the classes but was forced to sit out the season as red shirt athlete; a further example of the plantation effect.

Benson (3) noted that one perspective was missing from the literature included a full expression from the black athletes point of view. Benson conducted a qualitative interview study of 12 African American students at a DI football program where the graduation rate was 31-40% for black football players compared to 60-70% of white football players. The results in this instance cannot be generalized due to the small sample size (N=12), but it does provide a snapshot of the thoughts regarding education and athletics of this group. Further, they reflect the results obtained by Adler & Adler (1).

Another major finding of the Benson (3) study was that the marginal academic performance was created by a series of interrelated practices engaged in by all significant members of the academic setting, including peers, coaches, advisors, teachers, and the student athletes themselves. It began in the recruitment, and continued through the first year. Black student athletes received the message that school was not important, and that as time passed, they had no real control over their destiny in the classroom. It was simply a matter of survival to keep the grade point average (GPA) to a point to be eligible. They all felt like the coaches did not “walk the talk” in terms of academics. They would just talk the academic game in public but then in reality they would have “fits” if classes ever interfered with the program. Simply put, student athletes learned it was a matter of survival and a basic expectation to maintain a GPA just high enough to remain eligible to compete (3).

“The Black Dumb Jock”. Harry Edwards (13) discussed the creation of the “black dumb jock” image prior to studies completed by Alder and Alder (1), Benson (3), and Coakley (8). He (i.e., Edwards) theorized that they were not born, but rather systematically created. The previous mentioned studies serve as evidence to support his statement (1, 3, 8). The exploitation of athletes is not solely an NCAA issue but a societal one. For example, Fred Butler was passed on through elementary, middle, and high school because he was a good football player. He graduated from high school reading at a second grade level and went to El Camino Junior College. There he took a number of physical activity classes while hoping to be drafted into the NFL. When no offer came, he played at California State University-Los Angeles for a year and a half. When again no offer came and his eligibility expired, he failed out of school within months with no degree, no offers to play pro ball, and no skills to use for employment. And he still could not read! (18). Similarly, Former NFL player Dexter Manley testified before a Senate Committee that he played four years at Oklahoma State University, only to leave the school illiterate. And the sad feature is that academic detachment from the university athletic department perspective doesn’t seem to be an issue because there are always more impoverished (and usually minority) kids waiting to come in and play.

Thus, student athletes in many cases cannot take advantage of the many extras offered by a college education. Why do athletes accept a diluted academic experience or the corruption of doctored transcripts, phantom courses, surrogate test takers, and tutors writing papers? Perhaps it is because they are disenfranchised under the current system, and will lose scholarships, starting roles, and eligibility if they complain. George Will argued that “College football and basketball are, for many players, vocations, not avocations, and academics are unsubstantiated rumors” (12, p.5). So do full scholarship athletes get a chance to take advantage of all the extras of the university experience? More than likely it is not the case especially when they can’t even hope for a meaningful degree.

NCAA as a Cartel. Kahn (16) examined the operation of the college football and basketball systems of the NCAA and offers lessons about the determinants and effects of supply and demand. Specifically he utilizes economic principles to calculate the value of college football player to a university. He notes that total ticket revenues for football and men’s basketball were $757 million in 1999, total value that exceeded the total ticket sales for all of professional baseball, football, and hockey that year. A figure indicating that the NCAA is a very successful business entity engaged in capitalism.

According to the cartel theory, the NCAA has “enforced collusive restrictions on payments for factors of production, including player compensation, recruiting expenses, and assistant coaches salaries; it has restricted output; and it has defeated potential rival groups (16, p. 211).” He notes, along with others (11, 15, 16, 30), that the NCAA can impose sanctions that range from scholarship reductions, elimination from post-season play to program death penalties (e.g., Southern Methodist football); and possibly even threaten a school’s academic accreditation. However, restriction of pay to players is the main way in which the organization acts to restrict competition.

Economists who have studied the NCAA “view it as a cartel that attempts to produce rents, both by limiting payments for inputs such as player compensation and by limiting output” (16, p.210). When looking at the rent values based on college football or men’s basketball players’ performances, they are paid below a competitive level of compensation based on estimates of marginal revenue product produced of these players (6). Their analysis considered the total revenue for a school and the number of players that were eventually drafted by a major professional league. Utilizing this framework they concluded that in 2005 dollars a draft-ready football player returned $495,000 to the university, while a draft-ready basketball player was worth $1.422 million for men’s basketball. And all of this compared to the approximately $40,000 paid in scholarship worth. This indicates that the NCAA does indeed use cartel power to pay top athletes less than the athlete’s market value.

Based on a workload of 1000 hours per year and an average scholarship value, economist Richard Sheehan (16) calculated the basic hourly wage of a college basketball player at $6.82 and a football player at $7.69. Coaches’ hourly wages, on the other hand, ranged from $250-$647 per hour (depending on salary). Again, using the Eitzen metaphor, the masters accumulate wealth at the slave’s expense, even though the athlete/slave’s health is jeopardized by participation (12).

Parent (23) notes the hypocrisy of the amateurism construct when looking at these capitalism issues. He notes that the former president of the University of Washington, William Gerberding, said, “As one contemplates the obvious fact that so many of the most gifted athletes are economically and educationally disadvantaged blacks, this becomes less and less defensible. I have become increasingly uncomfortable about having a largely white establishment maintaining an elaborate system of rules that deprives student-athletes, many of whom are non-white, of adequate financial support in the name of the ideals of amateurism” (p.236).

So, why do athletes tolerate this system? They do mainly because they are disenfranchised and fear losing their scholarships and eligibility if they complain. In essence, this pay-for-play discussion revolves around amateurism, as advertised by the NCAA, and its competing capitalistic drive for income. According to Tulsa Law School professor Ray Yasser, the best option for athletes to change the system for their benefit is to unite and “file an antitrust suit…against the NCAA and their universities, with the claim being that the NCAA and their universities are colluding to create a monopoly over the athlete’s ability to share in the profits generated from college athletics” (23, p.236).

While the points for maintaining the status quo were stated previously, there has been sufficient evidence presented in this section to stimulate discussion of paying players. The “play for a diploma” agreement is not happening in many cases, as the athlete failure rate indicates. Another example is national champion Connecticut men’s basketball program losing two scholarships for the upcoming season as a result of a poor Academic Performance Rating (APR) from the NCAA (11). Thus, the following pay for play proposals are being submitted for consideration.

Pay Proposals

It would appear that NCAA should get out of the commercial business of football and basketball and follow the Ivy League example of providing an environment that is truly amateur where student athletes actually are students first. That move would certainly place the student first in the student athlete term. However, it doesn’t seem pragmatic that either the NCAA or any of the major universities are in any hurry to turn away millions of dollars per year in profits. Therefore, it is time to consider some pay-for-pay proposals. California and Nebraska have already passed state legislation that would enable colleges to compensate athletes; however they are blocked by the NCAA from doing so (23). Therefore, I submit five proposals that could possibly be implemented:

• Big Ten Plan and/or Work Study Proposal: At the very least, the NCAA should follow former NCAA President Miles Brand’s suggestion and allocate athletes include a $2,000-$3,000 cost of living increase to full scholarships. Since athletes are supposedly only allowed to spend 20 hours per week involved with sport-related activities, this might actually be paid as 20 hours of work study or as a monthly living stipend. This would provide the athletes with the needed income for clothes, laundry, sundries, travel, and other small item expenses. Officials from the Big Ten are currently discussing a similar proposal that would help their athletes meet expenses not covered in an athletic scholarship. Big Ten commissioner Jim Delany reports league athletic directors and university officials have seriously discussed using some of their growing TV revenue to pay athletes more. This proposal which would give athletes a $2,000-$5,000 per year living stipend also has the support of current NCAA president Mark Emmert (2).
• SEC Game Pay Proposal: The Southeastern Conference, another of the big time football conferences recently entered into the pay for play discussion. University of South Carolina coach Steve Spurrier put forth a proposal at the recent conference meetings to pay players $300 per game. The proposal was supported by several other coaches. This type of a proposal could pay athletes anywhere from $300-$1000 per game based on time played per game. Since most players do not play more than 30 minutes a game, a player could be paid on a per-minute of competition basis. At a rate of $20 per minute a player could net $600 for a game and approximately $6000-$7,000 per season.
• Professional League Proposal: Ron Woods (27) puts forth a proposal submitted by Peter Plagensa, visiting professor at Middlebury College, regarding the pay-for-play issue. He appears to agree with the likes of Stanley Eitzen that the current practice of colleges and the NCAA do in fact “amount to a little more than a plantation system” (27, p. 67). He suggests that the big time college football and basketball maintain the million-dollar industry by making them an age 23 and under professional league. This proposal would allow universities to hire players as college staff (much like the cafeteria or groundskeepers) at moderate salaries plus room and board. Universities could also grant the athletes free academic classes until they earn a degree (even after playing days are over).

“College basketball players watch the coach roaming the sidelines in his $1,500 custom-make suit. They read about his $500.000 salary and $250,000 perk from a sneaker deal. They watch the schools sell jerseys (and T-shirts) with the player’s numbers on them. They see the athletic director and NCAA officials getting rich and you wonder why they might ask; hey where’s my share? What am I, a pack mule” (17, p.46)

My colleague has argued in point #2 that paying athletes raise a myriad of other issues, such as how much should they receive, what happens if an athlete gets hurt, and so on. That is a discussion for another time. First, we must agree that it is fair to compensate NCAA Division I football and basketball athletes beyond that of an athletic scholarship; then and only then may payout details be chronicled. Note: a reminder that we are only discussing compensation for the NCAA Division I-A football and basketball players; not the athletes in the AAU, Little League or other truly amateur venues of organized sport.

Throughout the history of the NCAA, college athletes have routinely received compensation beyond that of a full college scholarship (e.g., room and board, tuition, books). While such compensation is illegal, athletes like Reggie Bush and others receive under-the-table benefits as evidenced in the Slack survey (25).

Additionally, many athletes in “big time” programs do not receive a degree for their efforts in the athletic arena. Universities routinely admit students based on their athletic skills that are academically ill-prepared for success. As seen in the research (1, 3), many athletes that aspire to be academically successful soon lose hope with the over-scheduling and pressures of sport preparation. As a result, many college athletes, a majority of which are minorities, fail out of school once coaches have utilized their eligibility.

The NCAA functions like a cartel, keeping cost down while increasing profits. Rents for a draft-ready athlete earn the university somewhere between $500,000 for football and $1.422 million for men’s basketball (16), leading to a pseudo-plantation system where the coaches oversee the athletes demanding work and controlling their schedules on and off the field. This unbalanced system allows athletes to earn the equivalent of $6.80-$7.69 an hour (12) while coaches like Nick Saban of Alabama or Mack Brown of Texas earn over five million dollars a year (4).

If the NCAA continues as a corporate entity and acting in a cartel-like fashion making millions of dollars a year, implementing a plan to pay student athletes for playing must be considered. Otherwise, America’s institutions of higher learning should follow the Ivy League schools’ example and eliminate athletic scholarships, get out of the big time sport business, and get on with providing students with a complete educational experience.

Applications in Sport

Few discussions within sport are more common or controversial than the debate to pay college athletes. Some arguments are well thought and articulated, while others lack insight and are simply driven by passion. The purpose of this article is to provide the reader with a new perspective and some historical insight – all supported by the literature – regardless of their stance on this issue. Moreover, readers who may actually be heard by the NCAA may offer a position that has yet to be considered. The concession here is that despite any decision by the NCAA in the near future, we can be assured that college administrators, coaches, and athletes will continue this debate. However, their arguments may now be seen as relevant and more reasoned.

POSTSCRIPT: According to Michelle B. Hosick at the NCAA.org, the NCAA board of directors has moved on two issues discussed in this article since its submission. In April (2012), the board moved to implement a $2,000 allowance to an athlete’s full scholarship. They also voted to grant multi-year scholarships. However, both measures have been put on hold with the threat of an override vote by member institutions. On January 14, 2012 at the NCAA convention the board delayed implementation of the $2,000 supplement and sent it back to committee for revision at its April meeting. The multi-year scholarship issue will continue to be implemented on a conference-by-conference basis. And so the pay-for-play discussion continues.

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College Athletics

History of athletics in u.s. colleges and universities.

Intercollegiate athletics in the United States has come to be regarded as higher education's "peculiar institution." This somewhat critical characterization results from the fact that although intercollegiate athletics is seldom listed as part of the central mission of a college or university, athletics have come to command inordinate visibility, resources, influence, and attention both inside and outside many campuses. Analyzing, explaining, and dealing with this disparity between official philosophy and actual practice presents a complex analytic task. To truly understand the present situation requires a reconstruction of college athletics' unique historical evolution.

Visitors to an American campus cannot help but be struck by the physical presence of the intercollegiate athletics enterprise. In the twenty-first century, it is not unusual for a major university campus to contain both a football stadium that seats 70,000 spectators and a basketball arena that accommodates audiences of 20,000. In the year 2000 many universities had annual operating budgets for athletics ranging between $30 million and $60 million. The success and pervasiveness of college sports described was not inevitable, but is the result of particular innovations and episodes over the past 150 years.

The Violent Birth of Intercollegiate Sports

Prior to 1850 intercollegiate sports played a marginal role in collegiate life. If there was a need for physical activity in the student regimen, college presidents and deans thought manual labor in the form of farming or clearing boulders from college lands fit the bill perfectly. Though admittedly both economical and expedient, students, not surprisingly, remained unconvinced that this was the type of physical release that their souls craved. Instead, collegiate student bodies increasingly devised their own elaborate (and often brutal) intramural contests known as "class rushes." These "rushes" usually involved some variation of football, which actually provided a pretext for a ritualistic and violent hazing of the incoming freshman by the sophomore class.

College officials struggled to curb these violent student traditions, but intramural sports persisted within the campus and eventually took a decisive turn toward sanctioned and refereed events in which a team representing one institution competed against its counterpart from another. Despite the increase in organization, administrators initially were not eager, generally speaking, to embrace such contests that they viewed as inappropriate distractions from serious scholarly work. Indicative of the administrative outrage at such elaborate contests was the telegram that the president of Cornell sent to officials at the University of Michigan in 1873 when he learned that student teams from the two institutions were planning to meet in Cleveland for a football game: "I will not permit thirty men to travel four hundred miles merely to agitate a bag of wind" (Rudolph, p. 374–375).

Whether or not Cornell's president won this particular battle, he and college presidents elsewhere lost the war of curbing intercollegiate athletic contests. With or without administrative blessings, college students formed athletic associations that included mechanisms for raising money, charging fees, sponsoring events, and selling tickets. And, by the 1890s, at many colleges, alumni groups joined with the student organizations to create formidable programs over which the college presidents and faculty exercised relatively little control.

Though college athletics would quickly be dominated by certain sports and by powerful institutions, the outstanding feature of college athletics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was its pervasiveness and diversity across American institutions. Although the oldest and largest institutions–Harvard and Yale–quickly gained the most attention in newspaper coverage and provided the largest athletic budgets, numerous other campuses made significant contributions as well. For instance, Springfield College in western Massachusetts, originally known as the International YMCA Training School, was where James Naismith invented basketball in 1891. Nearby, Amherst College initiated varsity baseball and incorporated calisthenics and physical fitness into the collegiate curriculum. By 1900 the popularity of collegiate sports was reflected by its adoption in even all-girls schools. Wellesley College, for example, acquired renown for having developed a distinctively female approach to such sports as crew, basketball, and physical fitness. Other examples of innovations in American college sports before the turn of the twentieth century include:

• First intercollegiate crew regatta (Harvard vs. Yale): 1852
• First intercollegiate baseball game (Williams vs. Amherst): 1859
• First intercollegiate football association (Harvard-Yale-Princeton): 1872
• First intercollegiate track and field association (Intercollegiate Association of Amateur Athletics of America, or IC4A): 1875
• First intercollegiate tennis match: 1883
• First intercollegiate ice hockey game (Harvard vs. Brown): 1895
• First intercollegiate gymnastics competition: 1899

The Maturing of a Collegiate Way of Life

As American higher education itself was largely nurtured in the Northeast, likewise in sports, this region also led the way in developing the intercollegiate sports that now seem so familiar. Heading into a new century, Yale dominated football and also came to be known as the "cradle of coaches" as it spread the Yale football gospel of strategy and sportsmanship across the nation. By 1910 Harvard obtained the national championship in football and asserted itself in numerous other sports. Harvard would also set the pace in terms of spectator facilities with the construction, in 1904, of Soldiers' Field–considered the finest, largest example of reinforced concrete architecture in the period. This regional predilection for architectural and spectator expansion continued when the Yale Bowl opened in 1914 with a grand design and a seating capacity of more than 70,000.

Although the eastern seaboard colleges initiated college sports, their models and lessons soon were emulated in regions across the country. In the mid-nineteenth century, faculty representatives from Midwestern universities formed the Western Conference –a formal group popularly known then and now as the Big Ten Conference. Within that conference, the universities of Michigan and Chicago set the pace with spectator appeal and winning teams.

The young University of Chicago was especially important as a leader in the structure and control of a high powered varsity sports program. Whereas many presidents had resisted and resented the ascent of intercollegiate athletics, the University of Chicago's administration embraced college sports. Chicago's young, brash president, William Rainey Harper, saw the athletic contests as an opportunity to connect the campus to the greater community and thereby generate goodwill, revenue, and attention for his model institution. The creation of a large stadium combined with a mass marketing effort that succeeded in generating popular appeal and large ticket sales. Harper found the ideal partner to help him carry out his brave new vision of commercialized collegiate athletics in Amos Alonzo Stagg. As coach and athletic director, Stagg, a Yale graduate and storied football hero, oversaw the University of Chicago's athletic department for forty years.

The importance of Stagg's tenure in athletics at Chicago lies in the fact that he (with the president and board's support) created a structure that gave substantial autonomy and influence to the athletic department within the normally complex and Byzantine university administrative structure. Though holding faculty status, Stagg's program budget was exempted from conventional bureaucratic procedures. He reported directly to the president and the board of trustees, with no oversight from academic deans or faculty budget committees. In addition, Stagg generated extra income for himself and his program by being allowed to use the university facilities to sponsor promotional events, host state high school track meets, and hold instructional camps. Such a situation made Stagg and his department the envy of other athletic leaders who in turn pushed their own institutions to adopt similar procedures in order to create the winning programs that alumni and donors demanded.

New England colleges also played a crucial role in the evolution of administration and control of college sports. Harvard's hiring of Bill Reid as a well-paid, full-time football coach in 1901 represented a major escalation of professionalizing college coaches. After Reid's hiring, coaches across the country realized that if they won they too could demand the high salary and substantial benefits enjoyed by Harvard's head coach. During his long tenure at Yale as athletic director, Walter Camp seemingly perfected the financial and political control of an entire athletic program with little accountability to students, faculty, or academic administration. Camp also used his Yale position as the base from which to create an enterprising network of syndicated newspaper columns, annual guides, endorsements, and other lucrative, influential college sports publications.

The turn of the century did not mark simply heady days for the burgeoning athletic programs. Many students and some alumni resented that the emerging organizational scheme tended to give inordinate and enduring support to a few selected spectator (and hence revenue-generating) sports–namely, football–with relatively few resources being dedicated to numerous other varsity squads. Additionally, the power and popularity of intercollegiate athletics led directly to conspicuous abuse. Even at this early juncture, a lack of regulation and fair play both on and off the field left college athletics indelibly marked by corruption and a reputation that has plagued "big-time" college sports to this day. More significantly, as the games "professionalized," brutality often increased. At times, it seemed that the days of Roman crowds chanting for gladiatorial blood were returning.

At the turn of the century, the situation had deteriorated to the point that President Theodore Roosevelt summoned university presidents to the White House with an ultimatum that they eliminate brutality from the playing field or risk federal intervention. The violence did decrease, and the development of better protective equipment also aided in safeguarding the athletes, but the problems were far from solved. No standards were set in areas such as eligibility and scholarships, thereby blurring the line of definition for supposedly amateur contests between students. In an attempt to bring order to these increasingly popular competitions, the National Collegiate Athletic Association was formed in the early 1900s. This could only be considered a Pyrrhic victory, however, for the historic East Coast universities, which had the strongest athletic programs in the country, refused to cooperate and boycotted the organizational meeting with institutions from the Midwest and West. Consequently, intercollegiate athletics lacked any semblance of meaningful nation-wide coordination over the next half century.

Athletics Out West

As Frederick Jackson Turner postulated for the entire nation: Though born and raised in the East, Americans and their institutions are ultimately defined and refined in the West. Collegiate athletics certainly followed Turner's thesis as the rise of spectator and student interest in college sports spread to the Pacific Coast. Between World War I and World War II the geographical balance of power in dominance of college sports shifted. The June 1937 issue of Life magazine devoted to "going to college in America" included a feature article titled, "Sports Records Move West." The emergence of top caliber intercollegiate teams in the Midwest and on the Pacific Coast "left Eastern collegians clinging to a steadily dwindling share of athletic supremacy." This led the editors to observe that: "In the past two decades, athletic reputation has largely moved West and South" ( Life, p. 72–73).

Increasingly, college sports became a symbolic litmus test of regional and/or ethnic esteem and assimilation. For example, in the 1920s in South Bend, Indiana, the University of Notre Dame gained national visibility by becoming a rallying point for American Catholic pride and affiliation. Its victories over established East Coast football teams and national symbols such as West Point provided American Catholics with a sense of accomplishment and belonging. This trend continued well into the 1960s, for example, when African Americans used sports to break color barriers, particularly in southern universities. The national basketball championship won by Texas Western in 1966 with an all-black starting five–over the perennially powerful University of Kentucky and its all-white squad–marked an important shift in recruitment and acceptance of black players.

Various regions of the country have also rallied around school sports programs. Since 1926 the annual intersectional contests between Notre Dame and the University of Southern California regularly attracted crowds of over 100,000, whether played in Los Angeles or Chicago, and provided victorious regions the enjoyment of martial bragging rights without the sacrifice of actual military battle. Starting in 1946 the annual New Year's Day Rose Bowl Game matched the champion of the Midwest's Big Ten Conference against the championship team from the Pacific Coast Conference–and thus provided victorious regions the enjoyment of martial bragging rights without the sacrifice of actual military battle. Tiny schools and forgotten regions could gain instant, if fleeting, national attention by successfully competing with national powers, such as when unheralded Centre College of Kentucky gained national headlines in the 1920s for spirited play–and an eventual victory–over Harvard's football squad in 1921. Finally, as with anything that has mass appeal, politicians endeared themselves to the electorate by associating with and supporting local schools. Perhaps the grandest example of such activities occurred when Huey Long, the indefatigable governor of Louisiana, pronounced in 1928 that Louisiana State University was the "People's University," and called on the people of the state to share in its wealth of championship teams and its magnificent football stadium.

From Chaos to Concern

Colleges and universities paid a dear price for the popularity of intercollegiate athletics. The strong, pervasive, and enduring appeal of varsity teams, combined with the quest by alumni, local boosters, and college officials for championship squads, meant that even by the 1920s the activities associated with recruiting and compensating college student athletes were largely unregulated chaos. This was most dramatically exposed in 1929 when the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching released its comprehensive study American College Athletics, written by Howard Savage. According to this report, meaningful reform in American collegiate sports could take place only if campus presidents replaced the "downtown crowd," comprising a city's businessmen, alumni boosters, and commercial interests, as the source of leadership and responsibility. The initial response of university presidents was outrage and denial, but when the Carnegie Foundation stood by its allegations and released more documentation, academic leaders showed some public signs of interest in reform. Shoring up conferences by adding regulations and a commissioner was one gesture. Ironically, conference reforms were often counterproductive because they merely gave official approval to such practices as training tables that provided college players with free meals daily, along with subsidies for athletes, and alliances with booster clubs that previously had been cited as the problems of unregulated college sports.

Immediately after World War II, the unresolved excesses of intercollegiate athletics gained unprecedented publicity. Returning armed-service veterans swelled the ranks of varsity athletics squads. Many presidents and athletic directors placed no restrictions on the number of athletic scholarships allowed, and some football squads included three hundred players for opening practice, with more than one hundred athletes on scholarship. Excesses were accompanied by illegalities. Between 1948 and 1952 exposés and successful prosecutions of student-athletes, coaches, and alumni boosters involved in point-shaving schemes and gambling cartels led to congressional hearings and a call for nationwide oversight by academic leaders. When organizations led by college presidents, such as the American Council on Education, failed to present a coherent plan, regulatory power was given to the National Collegiate Athletics Association–an organization whose primary charge had previously been to simply promote championship tournaments. Meanwhile, at the conference level, presidents and faculty delegates attempted to introduce standards of student conduct and eligibility into policies and practices. If New England colleges had been pioneers in the creation and expansion of college sports in the first half of the century, after World War II they again assumed a leadership role in the reform and removal of excess. Most noticeable were the codes and restraints demonstrated by the "Little Three"–Amherst, Williams, and Wesleyan. In 1956 the formal creation of the Ivy Group (League) provided a model of presidential and faculty oversight of college sports.

The economics of intercollegiate athletics was slowly but persistently altered in the 1950s due to the simultaneous appearance of two phenomena: (1) professional sports teams in football and basketball, and (2) the availability of radio and television for live broadcasts of sporting events. All college teams, ranging from the established powerful university squads to the small college teams, feared that the popularity of the National Football League and the National Basketball Association would cause declining attendance at college games. Small college squads faced a second threat: national and regional broadcasts of a few selected "big-time" college games prompted many long-time fans to stay at home rather than buy a stadium ticket on Saturday afternoons. The result was a shake-out in college sports programs over two decades in which a substantial number of institutions opted, or were financially forced, to drop football.

College Sports in the Age of Aquarius

In the late 1960s shifting cultural values forced widespread changes in sports policies and emphases. As other athletes demanded equality, granting athletic scholarships ceased to be confined to a handful of traditional revenue sports–namely, football and basketball. By 1970 athletic grants-in-aid were increasingly prevalent for such sports as track, soccer, lacrosse, hockey, wrestling, baseball, and swimming. Expanding the excellence and the number of squads tended to swell athletic department operating expenses, but the small fan base of these sports failed to cover the increased costs. Consequently, institutes of higher learning faced growing philosophical and economic problems within their athletic programs. The financial brinkmanship would be subjected to even greater–and unexpected–stress in the 1970s.

Much more vocally and powerfully than "minor" sports athletes, females increasingly sought equal treatment from institutions in regards to athletics. Their actions would lead to a dramatic change in intercollegiate sports: the inclusion of women as bona fide participants in varsity athletics. The Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), created in the 1950s, led the way in increasing financial support of female athletic programs and scholarships for women. This too placed institutions and athletic departments in dire financial straits, for female sports did not generate enough fan interest to be self-supporting. This largely became a moot point in 1972, however, due to the landmark Title IX legislation that prohibited, with some exceptions, discrimination by gender in provision of educational programs. Consequently, college athletics in many ways moved from the playing fields to the court rooms as individuals challenged institutional compliance with this federal mandate. Between 1972 and 1990 colleges and courts groped for a clear interpretation of precisely what was intended and required in terms of social justice and institutional compliance for women as student-athletes. In 1997 the Supreme Court upheld lower court rulings requiring Brown University to comply with Title IX guidelines on proportionality.

Originally, a school could demonstrate compliance in athletics in one of four ways: have a proportional number of male and female participants; have a proportional relationship between female athletes and female students; demonstrate increasing opportunity for females to participate in athletics; or show that female participation in athletics matched their interest and ability to participate. However, most subsequent court rulings have demanded that the most stringent of the four tests be met, insisting that schools have a proportional number of participants in men's and women's athletics and thereby a proportional number of scholarships for each gender. This rigorous interpretation of directives for compliance with Title IX legislation has proven difficult for institutions due to the disparity of income and male and female sports generate. For instance, many athletic departments rely on football to fund their entire operating budgets, but fielding a football team requires providing scholarships for more than sixty male students. Therefore, under Title IX directives, more than sixty female students must also be given athletic scholarships, which then requires athletic departments to create enough female sports to field sixty participants with the knowledge that these activities will not garner enough fan support to pay for their existence. Consequently, athletic directors nationwide have eliminated many non-revenue male sports, with the claim that athletics programs can no longer afford to fund them. The corollary is that athletic directors have viable alternatives to eliminating men's teams such as wrestling and swimming. The net result of these conflicting interpretations is that many intercollegiate athletics programs are held in suspense on their character and composition. Though difficult, failure to comply with Title IX directives can bring harsh and far-reaching repercussions; therefore academic leaders and athletic directors continue to review their intercollegiate athletic enterprise to ensure that women are equally represented.

Competing in a Brave New Century of Sport

The most conspicuous example of the problems of success and popularity that faced intercollegiate athletics in the late twentieth century can be seen in the 1991 and 2001 reform reports of the Knight Foundation Commission on the Future of Intercollegiate Athletics. The absence of a government agency, combined with the limits of such voluntary associations as the National Collegiate Athletic Association to bring integrity to the governance of college sports, has prompted foundations to take the lead in promoting public discussion of the issues and problems. In 1991 the Knight Foundation panel, dominated by university presidents along with some executives and legislators, proposed that strong presidential involvement was the key to protecting the interests of student-athletes. A decade later, the emphasis was on cost containment as the essential ingredient in curbing the commercialism of intercollegiate sports. Whether or not such reforms have a widespread and enduring influence, intercollegiate athletics persist, for better or worse (or both), as a distinctive part of American higher education.

By the 1990s discussions about student-athletes had shifted from the question, "Are college athletics being paid?" to the proposition, "How much should college athletes be paid?" Such debates followed logically from research by economists who concluded that the National Collegiate Athletic Association had become a highly lucrative cartel, and that athletes participating in big-time programs were, in essence, often being exploited by their institutions and associations as "unpaid professionals." Furthermore, coaches in high profile sports enhanced their stature as celebrities rather than as educators, complete with endorsements and special contracts to supplement their base salaries. To increase the seriousness of these concerns, athletic programs at all institutions, including the most conspicuous ones, faced a paradox of prosperity: despite unprecedented revenues, most teams and programs were not financially self-supporting. Even at the Division IA level of NCAA competition, future funding of intercollegiate athletics faced a situation of dubious fiscal fitness.

The conventional wisdom was that overemphasis on intercollegiate athletics was most prevalent in the relatively small number of big-time programs at large universities. Yet significant, systematic research sponsored by the Mellon Foundation in 2000 suggested otherwise. William G. Bowen and James Shulman's study, The Game of Life: College Sports and Educational Values, complicated the profile with their finding that even at–or, perhaps, especially at–academically selective and relatively small-sized colleges and universities, the demands on student-athletes' time were substantial. Furthermore, at these institutions, usually regarded as apart from athletic excess, commitment to strong varsity sports programs tended to exert inordinate influence on such decisions as admissions and allocation of campus resources. Academic and public concern over the proper place of athletics in American colleges and universities remained problematic at most institutions at the start of the twenty-first century.

See also: C OLLEGE A THLETICS , subentries on A CADEMIC S UPPORT S YSTEMS FOR A THLETES , A THLETIC S CHOLARSHIPS , C OLLEGE S TUDENTS AS A THLETES , NCAA R ULES AND R EGULATIONS , T HE N ATIONAL C OLLEGIATE A THLETIC A SSOCIATION , T HE R OLE AND S COPE OF I NTERCOLLEGIATE A THLETICS IN U.S. C OLLEGES AND U NIVERSITIES .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A TWELL , R OBERT H.; G RIMES , B RUCE ; and L OPIANO , D ONNA A. 1980. The Money Game: Financing Collegiate Athletics. Washington, DC: American Council on Education.

F LEISHER , A RTHUR A., III; G OFF , B RIAN L.; and T OLLISON , R OBERT D. 1991. The National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Study in Cartel Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

L AWRENCE , P AUL R. 1987. Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The National Collegiate Athletic Association and the Business of College Football. New York:Praeger.

L ESTER , R OBIN . 1995. Stagg's University: The Rise, Decline, and Fall of Big-Time Football at Chicago. Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

M ICHENER , J AMES . 1976. Sports in America. New York: Random House.

O RIARD , M ICHAEL . 1993. Reading Football: How the Popular Press Created an American Spectacle . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

R UDOLPH , F REDERICK . 1962. "The Rise of Football." In The American College and University: A History. New York: Knopf.

S HULMAN , J AMES L., and B OWEN , W ILLIAM G. 2000. The Game of Life: College Sports and Educational Values. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

S MITH , R ONALD . 1988. Sports and Freedom: The Rise of Big-Time College Athletics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

S PERBER , M URRAY . 1990. College Sports, Inc.: The Athletic Department vs. The University. New York: Henry Holt.

S PERBER , M URRAY . 1999. Onward to Victory: The Crises That Shaped College Sports. New York: Henry Holt.

"Sports Records Move West." 1937. Life June 7, 72–73.

T HELIN , J OHN R. 1994. Games Colleges Play: Scandal and Reform in Intercollegiate Athletics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Z IMBALIST , A NDREW . 1999. Unpaid Professionals: Commercialism and Conflict in Big-Time College Sports. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

J OHN R. T HELIN

J ASON R. E DWARDS

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How Title IX Transformed Women’s Sports

By: Sarah Pruitt

Updated: August 16, 2023 | Original: June 11, 2021

Title IX, the landmark gender equity law passed as part of the Education Amendments of 1972, banned sex discrimination in federally funded education programs. Its protections would open doors for girls and women in admission, academic majors, teaching positions, vocational programs and individual classes, and help ensure equal access and treatment once they got in.

“This was during a time where there were a lot of barriers for women to progress or succeed in society,” says Karen Hartman, an associate professor at Idaho State University who has studied Title IX extensively. “The Educational Amendments Act, and specifically Title IX, was attempting to address some of those wrongs and provide more opportunities.”

Yet despite its broad aims and applications, Title IX is most famous for its impact on expanding opportunities for women and girls in sports. In 1972, there were just over 300,000 women and girls playing college and high school sports in the United States. Female athletes received 2 percent of college athletic budgets , while athletic scholarships for women were virtually nonexistent.

By 2012, the 40th anniversary of Title IX’s passage, the number of girls participating in high school sports nationwide had risen tenfold, to more than 3 million. More than 190,000 women were competing in intercollegiate sports—six times as many as in 1972. By 2016, one in every five girls in the United States played sports, according to the Women’s Sports Foundation . Before passage of Title IX, that number had been one in 27.

“There used to be a way to view women's sports [as] lesser than,” Hartman says. “But if you watch women's sports today, their competitive level with men is oftentimes on a similar playing field. We're seeing athleticism like we've never seen before.”

The Civil Right Act and Sex Discrimination in Education

The roots of Title IX go back to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , which made it illegal to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin—but made no mention of discrimination based on sex. Women were included in the Civil Rights Act only in Title VII, an amendment that addressed equal employment opportunity but did not apply to educational institutions, among other areas.

By the early 1970s, girls and women continued to face discrimination and unequal treatment in many areas of education. Female students were often barred from certain male-only courses or fields of study, including everything from wood shop and calculus to criminal justice, law and medicine. Some U.S. colleges and universities refused to allow women to attend, or established quotas that limited the number of female students regardless of how qualified they were compared to male applicants. Others denied tenure to female professors, or refused to hire them at all.

Passage of Title IX and Its Impact on Sports

In 1972, President Richard Nixon signed the Education Amendments Act of 1972, which included Title IX, into law. Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, who introduced the amendment in the Senate and helped guide the bill through Congress, called it “an important first step in the effort to provide for the women of America something that is rightfully theirs.”

By the time compliance with Title IX became mandatory in 1978, the law had already made an impact on sports. In a cover story that June, TIME reported that six times as many high school girls were participating in competitive high school sports than in 1970.

“Participation rates for women have exploded every single year since Title IX was passed in 1972,” Hartman says. “We see not only how sport has become more culturally acceptable for women to participate in, but how they also have increased their competitiveness.”

The law’s far-reaching impact could be seen at the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, where American women dominated sports from gymnastics to basketball to swimming. That year saw the largest contingent of U.S. female Olympians in history , with a total of 292 women and 263 men. Back in 1972, only 90 women had joined the U.S. Olympic team of 428 athletes.

“It's kind of like ‘if you build it, they will come,’” Hartman says. “If you give opportunities, then you see how competitive and athletic all bodies can be, no matter if they're men or women.”

Controversy Over the Law

Organizations like the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) have challenged Title IX’s legality, while others have argued that it should apply only to educational programs that directly receive federal funds. 

In 1984, the Supreme Court agreed with this interpretation in Grove City v. Bell , effectively removing Title IX coverage of athletics except for athletic scholarships. Passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (over President Ronald Reagan ’s veto) reversed that decision, and reinstituted Title IX’s broad coverage for any educational institution receiving any federal funds.

The 1990s and beyond have seen continued legal challenges to Title IX , as well as a number of lawsuits alleging the violation of its protections. “Over the decades since it's been passed, legal cases have tried to give more guidance for Title IX, and the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights created compliance elements for it,” Hartman says. “That path over 50 years has been bumpy….[and today] up to 80 percent of higher education institutions are still out of compliance.”

According to Hartman, controversy over Title IX often centers on misunderstandings of the law, such as the mistaken belief that it requires quotas, or the idea that has caused a decline in men’s sports. In fact, she says, participation rates for male athletes have increased consistently since Title IX’s passage. A special report issued for Title IX’s 40th anniversary in 2012 found that NCAA member institutions saw a net gain of nearly 1,000 men’s sports teams from 1988-2011.

In 2021, as part of a wave of lawsuits filed after U.S. colleges cut athletic programs due to financial pressures caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Clemson University men’s track and field and cross-country teams won a historic settlement for their claim of discrimination based on Title IX. As there were nearly an equal number of men and women athletes participating in sports at Clemson in 2019-20, the plaintiffs argued, the cuts meant the university was no longer providing an equitable number of opportunities under the law.

Hartman believes the case provides further evidence that Title IX—while its ultimate promise may remain unfulfilled—continues to make progress. “That’s the heart of a great anti-discrimination law,” Hartman says. “Something that’s going to bring men and women [together] to make sure there is equity.” 

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NCAA signs off on deal that would change landscape of college sports — paying student-athletes

A major change could be coming for college athletes — they may soon start getting paid.

A tentative agreement announced Thursday by the NCAA and the country’s five biggest conferences to a series of antitrust lawsuits could direct millions of dollars directly to athletes as soon as fall 2025.

The nearly $2.8 billion settlement, which would be paid out over the next decade to 14,000 former and current student-athletes, “is an important step in the continuing reform of college sports that will provide benefits to student-athletes and provide clarity in college athletics across all divisions for years to come,” NCAA President Charlie Baker said in a joint statement Thursday night with the commissioners of the ACC, the Big 10, the Big 12, the Pac-12 and the SEC.

The federal judge overseeing the case must still sign off on the agreement, but if it is approved, it would signal a major shift in college sports in which students would play for compensation, not just scholarships, exposure and opportunities.

“This landmark settlement will bring college sports into the 21st century, with college athletes finally able to receive a fair share of the billions of dollars of revenue that they generate for their schools,” said Steve Berman, one of the lead attorneys for the plaintiffs. “Our clients are the bedrock of the NCAA’s multibillion-dollar business and finally can be compensated in an equitable and just manner for their extraordinary athletic talents.”

The NCAA and power conferences called the settlement a “road map” that would allow the uniquely American institution to provide unmatched opportunity for millions of students and write the “next chapter of college sports.”

The case, which was set to go to trial early next year, was brought by a former and a current college athlete who said the NCAA and the five wealthiest conferences improperly barred athletes from earning endorsement money. Former Arizona State swimmer Grant House and Sedona Prince, a former Oregon and current TCU basketball player, also contended in their suit that athletes were entitled to a piece of the billions of dollars the NCAA and those conferences earn from media rights agreements with television networks.

Michael McCann, a legal analyst and sports reporter at Sportico , told NBC News in an interview on Top Story with Tom Llamas the case has two components that “move away from amateurism” — one that deals with how players are paid for the past loss of earnings, including money they could have made for name, image and likeness.

“The going forward part is that colleges can opt in, conferences can opt in, as well, to pay players, to share revenue with them, to have direct pay, and that would be of course a radical from the traditions of college sports,” McCann said, adding many would say that change is warranted. “Now the athletes, at least at some schools, will get a direct stake.”

Terms of the deal were not disclosed, though some details have emerged in the past few weeks. They signal the end of the NCAA’s bedrock amateurism model that dates to its founding in 1906. Indeed, the days of NCAA punishment for athletes driving booster-provided cars started vanishing three years ago when the organization  lifted restrictions on endorsement deals  backed by so-called name, image and likeness, or NIL, money.

Now it is not far-fetched to look ahead to seasons when a star quarterback or a top prospect on a college basketball team not only is cashing in big-money NIL deals but also has a $100,000 school payment in the bank to play.

A host of  details are still to be determined . The agreement calls for the NCAA and the conferences to pay $2.77 billion over 10 years to more than 14,000 former and current college athletes who say now-defunct rules prevented them from earning money from endorsement and sponsorship deals dating to 2016.

Some of the money would come from NCAA reserve funds and insurance, but even though the lawsuit specifically targeted five conferences that comprise 69 schools (including Notre Dame),  dozens of other NCAA member schools  would get smaller distributions from the NCAA to cover the mammoth payout.

Schools in the Big Ten, the Big 12 and the Atlantic Coast and Southeastern conferences would end up bearing the brunt of the settlement at a cost of about $300 million apiece over 10 years, the majority of which would be paid to athletes going forward.

The Pac-12 is also part of the settlement, with all 12 current schools sharing responsibility even though Washington State and Oregon State will be the only league members left by this fall after the 10 other schools leave.

Paying athletes

In the new compensation model, each school would be permitted but not required to set aside up to $21 million in revenue to share with athletes per year, though as revenues rose, so could the cap.

Athletes in all sports would be eligible for payments, and schools would be given the freedom to decide how the money is divvied up among sports programs. Roster restrictions would replace scholarship limits by sport.

McCann said the back pay would disproportionately go to some sports — such as football and basketball.

“The schools that I think that are certainly big football schools will probably opt in because they’re going to want to compete, they’re going to want to get the best players, because college football generates a lot of revenue,” he said. 

Whether the new compensation model is subject to the Title IX gender equity law is unknown, along with whether schools would be able to bring NIL activities in-house as they hope and squeeze out the booster-run collectives that have sprouted up in the last few years to pay athletes. Both topics could lead to more lawsuits.

“There are all sorts of areas of turbulence that could present themselves,” McCann said of roadblocks that could arise.

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Other cases

The settlement is expected to cover two  other antitrust cases  facing the NCAA and major conferences that challenge athlete compensation rules. Hubbard v. the NCAA and Carter v. the NCAA are also in front of judges in the Northern District of California.

A fourth case, Fontenot v. NCAA, creates a potential complication, as it remains in a Colorado court after a judge  denied a request  to combine it with Carter. Whether Fontenot becomes part of the settlement is unknown, and it matters because the NCAA and its conferences don’t want to be on the hook for more damages should they lose in court.

“We’re going to continue to litigate our case in Colorado and look forward to hearing about the terms of a settlement proposal once they’re actually released and put in front of a court,” said George Zelcs, a plaintiffs’ attorney in Fontenot.

Headed in that direction

The solution agreed to in the settlement is a landmark but not surprising. College sports have been trending in this direction for years, with athletes receiving more and more monetary benefits and rights they say were long overdue.

In December, Baker, the former governor of Massachusetts who has been on the job for 14 months,  proposed creating a new tier of Division I athletics  in which the schools with the most resources would be required to pay at least half their athletes $30,000 per year. That suggestion, along with many other possibilities, remains under discussion.

The settlement would not make every issue facing college sports go away. There is still a question of whether athletes should be  deemed employees  of their schools, which Baker and other college sports leaders  are fighting.

Some type of federal legislation or antitrust exemption would most likely still be needed to codify the terms of the settlement, protect the NCAA from future litigation and pre-empt state laws that attempt to neuter the organization’s authority. As it is,  the NCAA still faces lawsuits  that challenge its ability to govern itself, including setting rules limiting multiple-time transfers.

“This settlement is also a road map for college sports leaders and Congress to ensure this uniquely American institution can continue to provide unmatched opportunity for millions of students,” the joint statement said. “All of Division I made today’s progress possible, and we all have work to do to implement the terms of the agreement as the legal process continues. We look forward to working with our various student-athlete leadership groups to write the next chapter of college sports.”

Federal lawmakers have indicated they would like to get something done, but while  several bills have been introduced , none have gone anywhere.

Despite the unanswered questions, one thing is clear: Major college athletics is about to become more like professional sports than ever before.

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What's the best state for you », college athletes score compensation in proposed ncaa settlement.

Under a historic settlement, the NCAA and the five major college sports conferences could pay athletes directly. What comes next?

Takeaways From the NCAA’s Settlement

Jae C. Hong | AP-File

Wisconsin's Traevon Jackson dribbles during practice at the NCAA men's college basketball tournament, March 26, 2014, in Anaheim, Calif.

The ball is finally in student-athletes’ court: The NCAA and the nation’s five major conferences agreed Thursday on a settlement that could see colleges and universities pay athletes directly for the first time in the history of college sports.

Under the settlement, which still needs to be approved by a judge, the NCAA and the five major college sports conferences would pay damages to former and current athletes as well as allow revenue-sharing for athletes in the future. The five conferences – which represent more than 60 schools – include the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big Ten Conference, Big 12 Conference, Pacific-12 Conference and Southeastern Conference (SEC).

In a statement to U.S. News, Steve Berman, co-lead counsel for the plaintiffs, says that ideally the revenue-sharing will be in place by the fall of 2025.

College sports, a billion dollar industry, has been plagued with lawsuits in recent years over its handling of the name, image and likeness rights of student-athletes. NCAA President Charlie Baker and the conference commissioners called the settlement agreement an important step in reforming college athletics and the “next chapter” of college sports.

“This settlement is also a road map for college sports leaders and Congress to ensure this uniquely American institution can continue to provide unmatched opportunity for millions of students,” Baker and the commissioners said in a joint statement . “All of Division I made today's progress possible, and we all have work to do to implement the terms of the agreement as the legal process continues.”

Here’s a look at the settlement agreement details:

Back Pay for Damages

The settlement resolves three pending antitrust lawsuits against the NCAA: House v. NCAA, Hubbard v. NCAA and Carter v. NCAA, in which students sued over use of their name, image and likeness.

It would provide more than $2.75 billion in back pay damages to former and current college athletes, which would be paid out over a 10-year period, according to a law firm representing the athletes. Division I student athletes from 2016 or later would be eligible to receive payments, but must agree not to sue the NCAA for other antitrust violations.

Neither the NCAA nor the conferences disclosed how they will tackle the payments, but CBS Sports reported that the NCAA would pay about 40% of the bill, power conference schools would pay about 24%, and schools that make up the remainder of Division I would pay about 36%.

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Future Revenue-Sharing

The settlement also allows for billions of dollars in future revenue-sharing pay for college athletes. In the first year of the settlement, universities could share 22% of the average of the power conference schools’ revenues, roughly $20 million per school. And as college sports revenues increase, the benefits and payments to college athletes could also increase.

Schools are not required to pay athletes under the settlement, but they could choose to distribute payments and benefits to athletes playing any Division I sport. The settlement eliminates certain rules that prohibit direct payments from schools to athletes, including NCAA scholarship caps.

“This landmark settlement will bring college sports into the 21st century, with college athletes finally able to receive a fair share of the billions of dollars of revenue that they generate for their schools,” Berman said. “Our clients are the bedrock of the NCAA’s multibillion-dollar business and finally can be compensated in an equitable and just manner for their extraordinary athletic talents.”

What’s Next

Berman says the agreement will be submitted to a judge for preliminary approval in the next 30 to 45 days. If the approval is granted, members of the class-action lawsuits will be given a period of time to object to the terms or opt out, after which a final approval hearing takes place. If approved by a judge, the settlement goes into effect. The entire process could take several months.

Congress Reacts

Lawmakers wasted no time in weighing in on the settlement. Republican Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, who has drafted legislation to address legal uncertainties surrounding student-athletes, called on Congress to codify name, image and likeness rights.

In a statement to U.S. News, Cruz says the college athletic system still faces “tremendous legal uncertainty absent Congressional action.”

“This agreement demonstrates the urgent need for Congress to act and give the more than half a million student-athletes across the country a path to continue using athletics to get an education and develop life skills for their future,” Cruz says.

Democratic Rep. Lori Trahan of Massachusetts, a former Division I athlete, said the agreement is a “massive victory for athletes” but didn’t share Cruz’s opinion that it was a matter for Congress.

“Over the past decade, college athletes have sued for violations of their rights in court, and they’ve won significant progress not just for themselves, but athletes everywhere,” Trahan said in a statement. “Rather than asking Congress to turn back the clock, college leaders should take this opportunity to embrace a future where athletes have a seat and a voice at the table when decisions are made about the industry built on their hard work.”

High Court Nixes NCAA Limits on Athletes’ Perks

Lauren Camera June 21, 2021

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N.C.A.A. Athletes’ Pay Deal Raises Questions About Future of College Sports

The landmark settlement made many wonder what the reality — and impact — of revenue-sharing plans with college athletes would look like.

By David W. Chen ,  Jacey Fortin and Anna Betts

Brent Jacquette knows a thing or two about college sports. A former collegiate soccer player and coach in Pennsylvania who is now an executive at a consulting firm for athletic recruiting, he’s well aware of issues surrounding pay for college athletes.

But even for an industry veteran like Mr. Jacquette, the news of the N.C.A.A.’s staggering settlement in a class-action antitrust lawsuit on Thursday came as a surprise, with more than a little anxiety. The first words that came to mind, he said, were “trepidation” and “confusion.”

And he was not alone in feeling unsettled. Interviews, statements and social media posts mere hours after the settlement was announced showed that many were uncertain and concerned about what the future of collegiate sports holds.

“These are unprecedented times, and these decisions will have a seismic effect on the permanent landscape of collegiate athletics,” Phil DiStefano, chancellor of the University of Colorado Boulder, and Rick George, the school’s athletic director, said in a statement .

If the $2.8 billion settlement is approved by a judge, it would allow for a revenue-sharing plan through which Division I athletes can be paid directly by their schools for playing sports — a first in the nearly 120-year history of the N.C.A.A. Division 1 schools would be allowed to use about $20 million a year to pay their athletes as soon as the 2025 football season.

Mr. Jacquette thought of the word “trepidation” because of the impact that the settlement, shaped by the biggest and wealthiest universities with robust football programs, could have on coaches and athletes at smaller institutions and in low-profile sports.

And “confusion," because families of college athletes might soon be overwhelmed by all the possible ways for a student to get paid. In past years, the only form of compensation that students could get was athletic scholarships. But now, with the possibility of a revenue-sharing plan and pay arrangements involving students’ name, image and likeness , they have a lot more to consider when planning their collegiate sports careers.

“As this makes big news, people see this pot of gold at the end of the tunnel,” Mr. Jacquette said.

Many questioned what the financial burdens stemming from a revenue-sharing plan would look like.

Smaller conferences, such as the Big East — which includes Georgetown, Villanova and the University of Connecticut — have voiced “strong objections ” to the settlement, worried about shouldering an unfair burden of costs involved in revenue sharing. They said schools that have higher-profile sports teams and are part of bigger conferences, which often have TV contracts and much higher revenues, should be responsible for covering more of the costs.

Even coaches at powerful athletic programs, such as the University of Florida, which is part of the Southeastern Conference, had qualms. Tim Walton, the school’s softball coach, wondered in an interview with The Associated Press what this would mean for smaller sports programs on campus, and how the university would handle sharing revenues with athletes.

Another concern from critics of the settlement was whether female athletes would be compensated fairly. The settlement did not address how they would be paid compared to men, but Title IX prohibits sex-based discrimination in educational settings.

“Oftentimes, we put all of our eggs in the revenue-generating sports, which is comprised of mostly male sports,” said Jasher Cox, athletic director of Allen University, a historically Black and Division II school in South Carolina.

But many still questioned how the settlement would pan out in practice. Terry Connor, the athletic director at Thomas More University in Kentucky, said in an interview that the reality of revenue sharing felt somewhat distant. Although his school is Division II and would not necessarily be part of a revenue-sharing plan, Mr. Connor said that this still affects college sports as a whole.

The settlement is only the latest in a series of big changes at the N.C.A.A. in recent years, Mr. Connor said, and “how we’ll have to adapt to that is going to be the big question.”

Mr. Jacquette cautioned that it was still “premature” to assess the full impact of the settlement, since the details had not been released. And Sam C. Ehrlich, a professor at Boise State University who has written extensively about college athletes, said that while the settlement was a milestone, it should not be seen as the be-all and end-all of college sports.

Pointing to the Supreme Court’s unanimous ruling in 2021 that the N.C.A.A. could not bar payments to college athletes, Mr. Ehrlich said the college sports landscape has been ever-changing. That decision paved the way for N.I.L. arrangements, or payments based on an athlete’s name, image and likeness. He also cited Johnson v. N.C.A.A. , a pending case over whether college athletes should be classified as employees, which could have profound labor and tax implications.

“This is a big moment, for sure, but it’s not like we have reached the finish line,” Mr. Ehrlich said. “I wouldn’t even necessarily go as far to say, ‘this is the climax here.’ This is still going to be ongoing for several years.”

Billy Witz contributed reporting.

David W. Chen reports on state legislatures, state level policymaking and the political forces behind them. More about David W. Chen

Jacey Fortin covers a wide range of subjects for the National desk of The Times, including extreme weather, court cases and state politics all across the country. More about Jacey Fortin

Anna Betts reports on national events, including politics, education, and natural or man-made disasters, among other things. More about Anna Betts

Inside the World of Sports

Dive deeper into the people, issues and trends shaping professional, collegiate and amateur athletics..

A Minnesota Rallying Cry:  Fans of the Minnesota Timberwolves have picked up on a phrase  uttered by the team’s star, Anthony Edwards, and are hardly put off by its mild vulgarity.

A Beloved Manager:  A coach’s soccer legacy is often reduced to titles and trophies. In Liverpool, Jürgen Klopp will endure in murals, music and shared memories .

The Business of Women’s Basketball:  Caitlin Clark’s arrival has many betting on the W.N.B.A.’s success. But certain structural disadvantages persist , including how much the players earn.

The Premier League’s Problems:  Soccer’s richest competition is a picture of health on the field. Away from it, the Premier League faces lawsuits, infighting and the threat of government regulation .

Competing for Olympic Spots:  Two friends had run side by side for more than 10,000 miles. Both vied for a place in the marathon at the Paris Games .

• SI SWIMSUIT
• SI SPORTSBOOK

NCAA agrees to deal that allows schools to pay players

Cole forsman | may 23, 2024.

• Gonzaga Bulldogs

The NCAA and its power conferences have agreed on a settlement to allow schools to directly pay student-athletes.

According to reports, the NCAA and its leagues are prepared to move forward with a $2.8 billion agreement to settle three antitrust cases. The NCAA will pay that amount to former and current student-athletes over the next 10 years. The antitrust settlement includes the framework of a revenue-sharing plan that allows each school to compensate up to roughly $20 million per year with its student-athletes beginning in the fall of 2025.

The groundbreaking settlement was agreed upon after leaders from the ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, SEC and Pac-12 voted to accept its general terms throughout this week. 

A series of formulas devised by a sports economist will be used to decide how to split the $2.8 billion in damages among the thousands of former and current athletes. An athlete’s market value and metrics like career snap count or star rating as a recruit may play a factor, according to ESPN.

The NCAA is responsible for 40% of that $2.8 billion settlement after the Division-I Board of Directors approved a framework that requires the NCAA to fund $1.1 billion while schools fund $1.65 billion over a 10-year period through a reduction in school distributions. According to CBS Sports, the Power Five conferences – ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-12 and SEC – will pay 24% of the overall damages, followed by the Group of Five at 10%. The FCS will pay 14% and non-football conferences, including the West Coast Conference, will pay 12% of the overall agreement. Those figures were partly determined by the NCAA’s formula that’s based on revenue distribution, which leans heavily on units from the men’s basketball tournament.

Commissioners of the 22 non-FBS conferences pushed back against the financial structure, arguing that Power Five conferences should be responsible for 60% of the withheld distributions because most of the student-athletes receiving the backpay competed in those leagues. Their arguments, while backed by supportive data, were not heard though. 

Non-power conference leaders are also concerned over the revenue-sharing model, according to CBS Sports. Some athletic departments outside the Power 5 leagues already operate on a deficit. They also earn a fraction of the revenue compared to power conferences.

Whatever the ramifications, college sports have taken an even bigger step toward resembling pro sports.

COLE FORSMAN

Cole Forsman is a reporter for Gonzaga Nation, a member of Sports Illustrated’s FanNation network. Cole holds a degree in Journalism and Sports Management from Gonzaga University.

Melinda French Gates to donate $1 billion over next 2 years in support of women’s rights

(AP) - Melinda French Gates says she will be donating $1 billion over the next two years to individuals and organizations working on behalf of women and families globally, including on reproductive rights in the United States.

French Gates earlier this month announced she would step down from the  Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation , and vowed to focus on  women and families .

French Gates, one of the biggest philanthropic supporters of gender equity in the U.S., said Tuesday in a guest essay for The New York Times that she’s been frustrated over the years by people who say it’s not the right time to talk about gender equality.

“Decades of research on economics, well-being and governance make it clear that investing in women and girls benefits everyone,” she wrote.

French Gates touched upon the high maternal mortality rates in the U.S., noting that Black and Native American mothers are at the highest risk.

“Women in 14 states have lost the right to terminate a pregnancy under almost any circumstances. We remain the only advanced economy without any form of national paid family leave. And the number of teenage girls experiencing suicidal thoughts and persistent feelings of sadness and hopelessness is at a decade high,” she said.

French Gates said over the last few weeks she’s started directing new grants through her organization, Pivotal Ventures, to groups working in the U.S. to protect women’s rights and advance their power and influence. The groups include the National Women’s Law Center, the National Domestic Workers Alliance and the Center for Reproductive Rights.

French Gates’ Pivotal Ventures is a limited liability company that also manages investments for profit ventures, so there is little public information about its grantmaking or the assets it manages. Pivotal Ventures has focused on a number of avenues to increase women’s economic and political participation and power, like closing the wage gap, compensating care work often done by women and encouraging women to run for political office.

Looking ahead, French Gates plans to introduce a $250 million initiative in the fall that will concentrate on improving the mental and physical health of women and girls worldwide.

French Gates will be leaving the  Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation  next week. She helped co-found the organization nearly 25 years ago.

The Associated Press receives financial support for news coverage in Africa from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and for news coverage of women in the workforce and state governments from Pivotal Ventures.

The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation will change its name to the Gates Foundation. It is one of the largest philanthropic organizations in the world. As of December 2023, its endowment was $75.2 billion, thanks to donations from Gates and the billionaire investor Warren Buffett. While it works across many issues, global health remains its largest area of work, and most of its funding is meant to address issues internationally rather than in the U.S.

Copyright 2024 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

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Boston college wins 2024 ncaa di women's lacrosse championship.

Boston College won the 2024 NCAA DI women's lacrosse championship after an impressive comeback. Here's more on the championship tournament.

2024 DI women's lacrosse championship bracket

➡️ Click or tap here for the interactive bracket

2024 DI women's lacrosse championship schedule

May 26 — National Championship

• (2) Boston College 14, (1) Northwestern 13

May 10 — First round   (All times Eastern)

• No. 4 Maryland 17 , Robert Morris 1
• No. 6 Yale 17 , Binghamton 4
• No. 7 Notre Dame 24 , Coastal Carolina 6
• No. 8 Penn 16 , Richmond 5
• Stony Brook 19 , Niagara 7
• No. 5 Virginia 21 , LIU 6
• James Madison 14 , Penn State 13
• Denver 13 , Stanford 12
• Loyola Maryland 16 , Duke 11
• Johns Hopkins 11 , Fairfield 5
• Michigan 17 , Mercer 6
• Princeton 14 , Drexel 9
• Florida 17,  North Carolina 8

May 12 — Second round

• No. 2 Boston College 21 , Princeton 16
• Michigan 15 , No. 7 Notre Dame 14
• No. 4 Maryland 17 , James Madison 7
• No. 8 Penn 12 , Loyola Maryland 9
• Florida 13 , No. 5 Virginia 8
• No. 1 Northwestern 17 , Denver 4
• No. 3 Syracuse 15 , Stony Brook 10
• No. 6 Yale 9 , Johns Hopkins 7

May 16 — Quarterfinals

• Florida 15 , No. 4 Maryland 9
• No. 3 Syracuse 19, No. 6 Yale 9
• No. 2 Boston College 14, Michigan 9
• No. 1 Northwestern 20, No. 8 Penn 7

May 24 — Semifinals

• (1) Northwestern 15, Florida 11  | Highlights   | RECAP  
• (2) Boston College 10, (3) Syracuse 7  | Highlights | RECAP  

2024 DI women's lacrosse championship selections

The bracket was revealed on Sunday, May 5 on ESPN2.

👉 See the full selections release

The three top overall seeds earned a first-round bye, with the remaining 26 teams playing first-round games at campus sites. The semifinals and championship game will be played on May 24 and 26 at WakeMed Soccer Park in Cary, North Carolina.

Championship history

Northwestern defeated Boston College, 18-6, in 2023 to win the program's eighth national title. Maryland has the most titles of any school with 14. Here is a full history of NCAA DI women's lacrosse champions ahead of the 2024 championships.

Note: Before 2001, this championship was a national collegiate championship.

Women's college lacrosse teams with the most national championships

Middlebury wins 2024 DIII women's lacrosse championship

Tampa wins first-ever DII women's lacrosse national championship