essay on franco prussian war

The Franco-Prussian War

Often overlooked by history, the franco-prussian war had a profound impact on france, germany, and europe..

The Franco-Prussian War overturned the balance of power in Europe. That balance, stable since the defeat of Napoleonic France in 1814-15 , had depended on a rough equivalence among five European great powers: Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia.

It helped, too, that all five powers were preoccupied: the British and the French were building overseas empires; the Russian Tsar was expanding into Central Asia; the Austrian Habsburgs were sinking in a cauldron of national tensions; while the Prussians had the opposite problem, that the Germans were fragmented into petty states.

Between 1864 and 1871, this situation was transformed by the enforced ‘solution’ of the national question in Germany – the Prussian-dominated unification of the country by Bismarckian ‘blood and iron’. The Danish-Prussian, Austro-Prussian, and Franco-Prussian Wars had the intended effect of generating a tidal wave of German nationalist sentiment that overwhelmed the petty-potentates of the minor German states and compelled them to unite with Prussia. The Prussian King became the German Emperor in January 1871.

Prussia had absorbed Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Homburg, Hesse-Cassel, and Frankfurt. All the remaining states north of the Main had been forced into a Prussian-dominated North German Confederation. Prussia had acquired the equivalent of three additional army corps. Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt were the only German states to retain full sovereignty.

It was clear that a Franco-Prussian conflict was now only a matter of time: a successful outcome could be expected to cement Germany into a modern nation-state.

Tension increased as Napoleon III’s attempts to follow up Bismarck’s deliberately vague hints about territorial concessions in the Rhineland and Luxembourg in 1867 provoked the south German states into agreeing to put their armies under Prussian command in the event of war with France. Prussia now had the equivalent of a further three army corps on mobilisation, bringing her total manpower to virtually twice that of the French.

Napoleon III took great pride in his professional regular army, especially the 20,000-strong Imperial Guard, but recognised that it was now hopelessly outnumbered. He attempted to introduce a conscription system based on the Prussian model in order to even the numerical odds, but met with fierce resistance from his generals, who limited the scope of the urgent reforms that were forced through.

The new Germany, on the other hand, was a fusion of three forces: the Prussian Army, based on the Junker officer caste of eastern Germany; the rising industrial the power of the Rhineland in the west; and a vast pool of military manpower in an enlarged population of 41 million people.

It was, in short, an amalgam of militarism, industry, and mass. Rhineland capitalism experienced massive expansion after 1871. Within half a century, Germany had become Europe’s foremost industrial power. This expansion drove an ever more imperative search for markets – in the east, in the Balkans, in the Middle East, and in the wider world. That meant tension with the other great powers, both in Europe and overseas, and that in turn became an arms race that eventually exploded into world war.

From 1871 onwards, Imperial Germany was a rising power and a potential pan-European hegemon. Kaiser Wilhelm II took on the aspect of Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, and, of course, Napoleon – a European ruler liable to over-master the continent. Germany found itself unable to prevent the formation of a hostile alliance and the danger of a ‘war on two fronts’.

Given its enormous geopolitical consequences, it is surprising that the Franco-Prussian War receives relatively little attention. Its impact on France was also prodigious: the fall of Napoleon III’s Second Empire; the Paris Commune of 1871; the establishment of the Second Republic; the advent of the burning question of Alsace-Lorraine in French politics.

Its military aspects also deserve close study, for here was a clash of armies of immense size and the most advanced weaponry, made possible by Europe’s industrial revolution. Formations as dense as those at Waterloo were shattered by the concentrated fire of steel guns, breech-loading rifles, and machine-guns.

In terms of weaponry, the two sides were more evenly matched. In fact, the French had one of the best rifles of the period, the Chassepot breech-loader, over a million of which had been produced by 1870. It was an exceptional weapon for its day, with a maximum effective range of 1,200 metres, virtually twice that of the Prussian Dreyse needle-gun.

They also had one of the best manually operated machine-guns of the period, the Reffye mitrailleuse, firing heavy 13mm ammunition at up to 125rpm. However, no more than 200 or so had been completed by 1870, and the weapon rarely had a chance to demonstrate its potential as an infantry support weapon. This was largely due to its misuse as light artillery, in which role it was out-ranged by German guns and frequently silenced before it could effectively return fire.

After its disappointing performance in 1866, the Prussian artillery had been drastically reformed. A School of Artillery had finally been established in 1867, which did much to increase its effectiveness on the battlefield. The rifled, breech-loading Krupp field-guns were modified to improve reliability and consistently outperformed the rifled muzzle-loaders of the French artillery.

But while killing power was impressive, doctrine lagged hopelessly behind. The lessons of the American Civil War had been ignored. And even afterwards, with the experience of slaughter-pen battles like Gravelotte-St-Privat, the generals drew all the wrong conclusions and would repeat the mistakes in 1914 .

This is an extract from a 14-paged special on the Franco-Prussian War, published in the December 2020/January 2021 issue of  Military History Matters . To find out more about the magazine and how to subscribe,  click here .

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“profound impact”. That’s putting it mildly. The Franco-German war of 1870-71 was a warning tremor. The opening skirmish of the 20th century 1914-45 world war that mortally wounded Western Civlization and its core demographic. France post-1871, unwilling to play second fiddle to Germany in Europe (due to its defeat in the Napoleonic War France was already playing second fiddle to Britain on the world stage), immediately began to reform its military, strengthen its national bonding and, above all, instituted a policy of diplomatic and military encirclement of Germany that was essentially complete by 1914. You know the rest.

The First World War is first and foremost linked to the world-stage rivalry between a declining Britain and an agressive and industrially powerful Germany. British elites’ fear of decline, far more than franco-german relations, is the key explanation of the process that led to the collective suicide of 1914-1918. In this case the Charles Doran model works quite well (a paranoïd busted flush – Britain – building ad hoc coalitions to counter a hubristic challenger – Germany. The French strategy is not the key explanation in this case.

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The Franco-Prussian War – Essay Example

The Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) was a conflict between the Second French Empire and the North German Confederation under command of the Kingdom of Prussia. The conflict was based on the Prussian ambition to extend German unification and French fear of Prussian dominance in Europe politics that would result if the Prussians succeeded.

A few historians claim that the Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck purposely incited the French into proclaiming battle on Prussia to draw the free southern German states — Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt — into a coalition with the North German Confederation. On July 19, 1870, the French parliament declared war on Prussia. The German triumph in the conflict brought about the unification of Germany and the possible breakdown of the Second French Domain. The Franco-Prussian Conflict started on July 15, 1870, when the Prussian armed force attacked the French territory of Alsace-Lorraine.

The French army was quickly defeated, and the Germans captured French Emperor Napoleon III at the Battle of Sedan on September 2. The Prussian army then advanced on Paris, and the French government surrendered on September 4. The Prussian army occupied Paris on September 28.

The war ended on January 28, 1871, with the signing of the Treaty of Frankfurt. Under the terms of the treaty, France ceded Alsace-Lorraine to Prussia, and Prussia was recognized as the leading German state.

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What did Prussia’s victory in the Franco-Prussian War mean for Europe

The Franco-Prussian War 1870-71 was one of the most significant wars of the nineteenth century. It changed the balance of power in Europe and resulted in France's relative decline, and confirmed the rise of a United Germany as the major power. This war had enormous implications for international relations not only in Europe but around the Globe. The Franco-Prussian War laid the foundation for the First World War. [1]

In 1870, France was regarded as the most powerful country in mainland Europe, and the authoritarian Emperor Napoleon III ruled it. He had actively sought to expand French influence in Europe and around the world. Napoleon III, inspired by his grandfather Napoleon I, sought to make France the greatest nation in Europe. He had fought wars against the Russian Empire in Crimea and Italy against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Emperor was also acquiring colonies in Asia and Africa . [2]

Germany at this time was still divided among various, often small principalities and dukedoms. Prussia was the most powerful German state, and under the leadership of Chancellor Otto Bismarck, it sought to unify Germany under its leadership. Bismarck had cleverly engineered wars with Denmark and Austro-Hungary, which resulted in Prussian coming to dominate the Northern German States. Bismarck sought to unite the Southern German states under the leadership of Germany. However, Bismarck knew that France would resist this, as Napoleon III did not want a strong and united Germany on its borders. [3]

Origins of the War

The origins of the Franco-Prussian war were a direct consequence of Prussia's rise and its growing influence in Germany. After Prussia had defeated Austria in 1866 at the Battle of Sadowa, ‘it seemed that it was only a matter of time before they brought all the German states under Berlin's control.’ [4] This would have been disastrous for France. [5] Napoleon III ordered a rapid expansion of his armed forces in 1866, which significantly added to tensions with Prussia.

In Berlin, the Prussian capital believed that war with Napoleon III was inevitable and desirable to achieve German unity. Many historians believe that Bismarck created a diplomatic crisis to engineer a war with France. A Prussian prince was one of the candidates for the Throne of Spain. However, France feared encirclement by Prussia and forced the prince to renounce his claims to the Kingdom of Spain. This was a national humiliation for Prussia. Bismarck wanted a war with France and devised a plan to provoke France into declaring war on his country. He changed a telegram sent by the Prussian King to Napoleon III, to make it appear insulting. This became known as the Ems telegram. When Bismarck made public the telegram, the French public was enraged, and the government in Paris declared war on Prussia. [6]

• Franco-Prussian War

The French army advanced into the Rhineland and captured the German city of Saarbrucken. The army of Napoleon III was ill-prepared for war as many of its best troops were fighting in the colonies, such as Algeria and Vietnam. Alarmed at the French invasion, the southern German states eventually put their armies under the Prussian Army's command. [7] Suddenly, France was faced with a united Germany under Prussia's leadership. The German forces, under the command of Field Marshal Helmut Von Moltke, gradually pushed the French army back into eastern France. Gradually, a large section of the French army became encircled in the city of Metz. The French public was alarmed at this and demanded the lifting of the siege. A large French army was assembled and advanced to break the German siege at Metz. As they advanced towards Metz, the French were lured into a trap at Sedan by the Prussian and German forces. The French army suffered a catastrophic defeat at Sedan, and this battle decided the war in Prussia's favor.

France had lost most of its army and was defenseless before the German army. [8] During the battle, Napoleon III was captured by Prussian forces. The war continued, and the French refused to surrender. Napoleon III abdicated, and he was replaced by a government of National Defense, who carried on the war. The Germans advanced to Paris and besieged the city, where the Prussian Kaiser has crowned the monarch of a united Germany in Versailles. The Government of National Defense, after increasingly heavy French losses during the siege of Paris, accepted the inevitable and agreed to a Peace Treaty with the newly created German Empire. [9]

Aftermath of the war

The Franco-Prussian war was a resounding victory for the new German Empire. After the war, Germany was united under Prussia and was the largest and most populous state, apart from Russia. Eventually, Germany withdrew from most of France, although they annexed the French provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. France was also expected to pay reparations to the new German state. Germany’s emergence as the most powerful state in Europe was to change the balance of power in Europe in the decades that followed. Germany had replaced France as the leading nation in continental Europe and, under Bismarck, established good diplomatic relations with Russia and Great Britain, to secure its position. [10]

France and Germany remained enemies, even after the ending of hostilities. French public opinion was very nationalistic and anti-Prussian and was determined to avenge the defeat in 1870-71. The country gradually rebuilt its power by creating a vast Empire in Africa and Asia, which alarmed Berlin. Germany and France began to gather allies in the belief that there would be another Franco-German war one day. By 1900, Europe was divided into two hostile alliances, one led by Germany and the other that was led by France. Europe was divided into two hostile power blocs because of the bitter Franco-German rivalry. The 1870-71 war resulted in two mutually hostile powers in Europe, which led to two rival alliances on the continent. This antagonistic rivalry was perhaps the most significant factor in the outbreak of the First World War. [11]

The Franco-Prussian War decisively changed the balance of power in Europe. The origins of the war lay in the process of the unification of Germany. Bismarck provoked a war with France to complete the unification of Germany. The aftermath of the war was the fall of Napoleon III and left Germany as the most important state in Europe. However, the growing power of Germany eventually led to the formation of two opposing alliances. The Franco-Prussian War ‘led to a united Germany, but a more divided Europe,’ and this ultimately led to the great catastrophe of the First World War. [12]

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• ↑ Wentzel, David (2003) A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War , p. 12.
• ↑ Wetzel, p. 6.
• ↑ Taylor, A.J.P. (1987). The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 , p. 345.
• ↑ Wetzel, p. 123.
• ↑ Taylor, p. 347.
• ↑ Rich, Norman (1991) Great Power Diplomacy: 1814-1914 , p. 156.
• ↑ Clark, C. (2006). Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947 , p. 345.
• ↑ Wawro, G. (2003). The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 167.
• ↑ Wawro, p. 345.
• ↑ Rich, p. 167.
• ↑ MacMillan, Margaret. The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (2013).
• ↑ MacMillan, p.78.
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The Franco-Prussian War 150 years on: A conflict that shaped the modern state

Dr michael rowe.

Reader in European History

17 July 2020

The 19 July marks the 150th anniversary of the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. Whilst the conflict is now largely forgotten in Britain, the 1870 war had a massive impact. Not only did it overturn geo-political norms in Europe, but it also led to the rapid development of the modern state, including in areas seemingly removed from military and foreign affairs like education and public health policy. This linkage between military conflict and wider societal factors also went on to shape subsequent thinking about war generally.

In his seminal work, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870–1871, published in 1961, historian Sir Michael Howard revitalised military history scholarship. He looked beyond campaigns and battles to see instead how the societies of the belligerent states shaped the armies fighting on their behalf, and in many ways determined the outcomes of those conflicts.

Populist disruptors and the path to conflict

Looking back at the pre-war 1870 landscape, there are parallels that can be drawn today, including notably the role of populist disruptors in triggering international conflict. Emperor Napoleon III of France and Prussia's Otto von Bismarck were both products of the 1848 revolutions and master media manipulators who exploited the power of nationalism. Napoleon did so first, sweeping to power in the December 1848 presidential elections on the promise of ‘making France great again’, as it had been under his uncle, the first Napoleon. Four years later, just before his original term should have expired, he made himself emperor, and quickly reasserted French prestige by launching a succession of wars, including against Russia in the Crimea (1853-56).

Napoleon III's wars had unintended outcomes. One of these was that they turned Russia from being a bastion of the international order into a revisionist power. This in turn gave space to Bismarck to wreck what remained of the European system in a way that was definitely not to France's advantage. Austria was the main victim initially in the shake-up that followed, losing its position in Italy following military defeat at the hands of France in 1859, and more spectacularly forfeiting its prime role in Germany to Prussia after defeat in 1866.

This set the scene for the 1870 Franco-Prussian war. France, determined to thwart Prussia’s further rise, sought to block the candidacy of a Prussian prince to the Spanish throne in what looked like a good, old-fashioned, dynastic succession crisis. What made things different from earlier centuries was the weight of public opinion, in an age of universal male suffrage. Policy makers in Berlin and Paris sought to exploit the rising tide of nationalism on both sides of the Rhine, and this increased the risk of an explosion. That explosion came on 19 July.

A rapid French rout

Experts at the time expected the French to win. They overlooked serious weaknesses on the French side, which Sir Michael Howard's analysis shows extended far beyond the narrow military field, to wider political and societal disadvantages. These were reflected above all in the French conscription system, inherited in its essentials from the first Napoleon. This imposed upon the male population an obligation to serve, but in practice, only a small fraction was ever called up, who then served for seven years and often more. In consequence, the French army lacked the ability to 'scale-up' by calling on a mass of reservists.

The Prussian army, in contrast, drew upon the entire male population, producing a substantial body of trained reservists upon mobilisation. Prussian military planning, conducted by the famed General Staff headed by Helmuth von Moltke, made best use of the resulting numerical advantage, not least through the clever exploitation of railways.

Many military observers nonetheless preferred the French system, which produced an essentially professional force that was far better-suited to the near-continuous overseas deployments that Napoleon III's global ambitions demanded. Most damaging of all, despite its elitist pretensions, the French army was socially rather low-status. This was because the rich were allowed to pay for replacements to serve instead of their sons, should they be unlucky enough to be called up. No such facility existed in Prussia, with the result that its army more fairly approximated the nation-in-arms.

The consequence in 1870 was a French rout. General Philip Sheridan, American Civil War veteran, observed the Franco-German conflict at first hand, and his summary of the reasons for the outcome can hardly be bettered:

The earlier advantages gained by the Germans may be ascribed to the strikingly prompt mobilization of their armies, one of the most noticeable features of their perfect military system, devised by almost autocratic power; their later successes were greatly aided by the blunders of the French, whose stupendous errors materially shortened the war, though even if prolonged it could, in my opinion, have had ultimately no other termination. –

The French never recovered from the swift Prussian mobilisation, which included the direction of vast forces by rail towards and then across the frontier before the other side could adequately respond. Political reasons on the French side precluded the option of trading space for time, with the result that successive French armies were pushed forward into a series of encirclements and defeats. The most famous of these, the Battle of Sedan (1-2 September), cost Napoleon III his throne.

Sedan became something of a symbolic, foundational moment in the creation of the new German Empire that soon followed. Indeed, Sedantag (or 'Sedan Day'), became an unofficial holiday for the new nation state. This conveniently overlooked the far lengthier, messier and bloodier post-Sedan phase of the War, that ended only with the ceasefire at the end of January 1871. Features of this second phase included the German siege of Paris, efforts by French irregulars known as Francs-tireurs to disrupt Moltke's supply lines, and a brutal counter-insurgency campaign to stop them. Yet, as Sheridan noted, this form of resistance on the French side could only delay, not prevent, the final outcome.

A war that shaped the modern state

Geo-politically the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War was massive. It led directly to the creation of the German Empire, Continental Europe's most powerful state with Berlin replacing Paris as the focal point of global politics.

In the military domain, several lessons were learned. The first was the advantage of a system of conscription that was genuinely universal, for men, and that produced a large pool of reservists. The second was the importance of fast mobilisation, and planning to insure that the vast forces now available arrived at the right point, at the right time. The stress on swift mobilisation that was baked into war plans not only in Germany, but in other states too, made it far more likely that a future international crisis would trigger a war. This would prove to be the case in July 1914.

A third was the devastating impact of modern weapons, like the French Chassepot breach-loading rifle, and the Prussian steel breach-loading field guns. These weapons made frontal assaults by large densely-packed formations of infantry and heavy cavalry ill-advised. Battlefield tactics needed to adapt accordingly, with much more emphasis on smaller formations, flanking movements, and the use of cover. These tactics in turn required more initiative from junior and non-commissioned officers, and also ordinary soldiers.

The implication of this last point in particular extended well beyond the narrowly military domain. Instead, it had implications for wider policy, notably in areas concerned with education and public health. Policy makers recognised that the efficiency of armies was intimately bound up with the educational ability not only of a small elite, but of the entire population. France in particular drew the lesson from 1870 that Prussia won because of its better school system, and acted accordingly, passing the so-called Jules Ferry Laws in the 1880s instituting free, mandatory and secular education for children. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Rhine, the newly-minted German Empire was putting in place the world’s first government-mandated welfare system.

It is fitting to conclude this short piece by referring again to Sir Michael Howard’s work on the Franco-Prussian War. This conflict in particular lent itself to a comparative study of the societal differences between the two belligerents, France and Germany. These differences not only largely determined the military outcome, but also informed how the two sides learned the lessons of the war subsequently. This process, as already noted, hastened state building in Europe and beyond; and, as a later legacy, it helped shape the modern discipline of military history itself.

In this story

Michael Rowe

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Introduction: the franco-prussian war in french and german history.

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Karine Varley, Introduction: the Franco-Prussian War in French and German History, French History , 2021;, crab047, https://doi.org/10.1093/fh/crab047

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This virtual special issue brings together a selection of articles from French History and German History to mark the 150th anniversary of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. The articles centre upon some of the key themes that have driven historical research in recent years, including violence, the conduct of war, national and border identities, republicanism, liberalism and state-building. Moving beyond traditional military studies and the focus on the war itself, the articles reflect a growing scholarly interest in the wider political, social and cultural repercussions of the Franco-Prussian War.

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Direct impact and profound consequences of the Franco-Prussian War

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Short (lasting only ten months, six of actual fighting), limited to two nations (the French and the Germans) and relatively unbloody (fewer than 200 000 dead) compared to the conflicts that came before and after it – the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War on the one hand, the First World War on the other – the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) had enormous consequences for the states involved and neighbouring Italy, as well as in terms of international relations. It is no exaggeration to say that the First World War was a product of the Franco-Prussian War, or even that it began a cycle of conflict in Europe that would not end until 1945. Yet, in a sense, the Franco-Prussian War was itself the result of the Revolutionary and Imperial Wars and the defeat inflicted on Prussia by Napoleon at the Battle of Jena, in 1806, and the strong nationalist feeling that arose from it.

In France, the capitulation at Sedan, on 2 September 1870, and the departure of Emperor Napoleon III, who personally commanded his army, into captivity resulted in the overthrow of the Second Empire by the Parisians two days later, but the republican Government of National Defence which took over and decided to go on with the war had no more success than the Empire, despite the energy of Léon Gambetta. After the preliminary peace settlement of February 1871, the people of Paris, who had suffered a long and difficult siege since mid-September, refused to hand over the cannons that protected the capital. There ensued the uprising of the Paris Commune, which descended into civil war and ended in a bloodbath (March to May 1871), leaving a lasting impression. The Republic, which had succeeded in securing a peace deal and restoring order, then took a conservative path which alienated the socialists but rallied the rural masses who constituted the majority of the French population at the time. It would take another decade, however, for it to achieve lasting popularity in the polls.

Napoleon III handing his sword to Wilhelm I . Anonymous American engraving, 1871. Library of Congress

The Treaty of Frankfurt of 10 May 1871, which imposed on France the payment of five billion francs in reparations, the occupation of a large part of its territory until that unprecedented sum had been paid in full, in September 1873, and above all the loss of Alsace and Moselle, led to collective low spirits owing to the humiliation of the defeat, and a strong desire for revenge.

The Last Cartridges , Alphonse de Neuville, 1873. Maison de la Dernière Cartouche, Bazeilles

Under a German law of February 1872 and a French law of April 1873, France and German Alsace-Moselle began to be covered with ossuaries and war memorials, a hitherto limited phenomenon. Le Souvenir Français, founded in 1887, played a major role in preserving the memory of the Franco-Prussian War and those who gave their lives for their country. From as early as 1871, many literary works, paintings and sculptures were already beginning to highlight French heroism, the two most famous examples being undoubtedly Alphonse de Neuville’s painting Les Dernières Cartouches ( The Last Cartridges ), from 1873, and Auguste Bartholdi’s monumental statue The Lion of Belfort , made between 1875 and 1880 to commemorate the town’s heroic resistance under the orders of Colonel Denfert-Rochereau. In another register, in July 1873 the majority monarchist and catholic National Assembly voted the construction of the Sacré Coeur Basilica – a “National Vow” – on the hill of Montmartre, for France to expiate its sins, from Napoleon III’s entry into war to the Paris Commune, of which Montmartre itself had been a bastion. The failure of the elites raised questions about their education, giving rise, among other things, to the creation of the École Libre des Sciences Politiques by Émile Boutmy, in February 1872, with a multidisciplinary approach and an international openness hitherto unseen in France. Above all, school and the army became the pillars of the fledgling Third Republic, and encouraged the French people never to take their eyes off the blue line of the Vosges mountains, the border with the contemptible Reich.

The Lion of Belfort , Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi

The repatriation of the French troops protecting the Papal States, as a result of the war, in August 1870, enabled the Italians to pursue unification, by taking the city of Rome, on 20 September 1870, then making it the capital of their kingdom, a few months later. Pope Pious IX considered himself a prisoner within the Vatican. The ensuing crisis with the Kingdom of Italy did not come to an end until 1929, with the Lateran Accords which gave the Pope sovereignty over the Vatican City in exchange for his recognition of the Kingdom of Italy.

But the most important consequences of the Franco-Prussian War were seen in Germany. Just as Bismarck wanted, the conflict, which the Minister President of Prussia and Chancellor of the North German Confederation succeeded in inciting the French Empire into starting, through a cleverly engineered provocation (the Ems Dispatch), galvanised the Germans around Prussia, which was by no means a foregone conclusion, in view of local peculiarities, sectarian divisions and fear of the hegemony of Berlin, particularly acute in Bavaria and Baden.

On 18 January 1871, Bismarck proclaimed the German Empire – the Second Reich – for his king, Wilhelm Hohenzollern, in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles, a kind of revenge against Louis XIV’s sacking of the Palatinate, two centuries earlier. Although the new State was in fact a federation of States which preserved many prerogatives, German unification was nevertheless a major event in European and even world history. Continental domination passed from France to Bismarck’s Germany. The people manifested their pride at the creation of the Reichsland of Alsace-Lorraine, hailed as belonging to all Germans, and on the new national day, the Sedantag. Over subsequent decades, Germany saw spectacular economic and population growth. Above all, the German Chancellor succeeded in completely isolating France on the international stage.

Proclamation of the German Empire in the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles, on 18 January 1871. , Anton von Werner, 1885. Bismarck-Museum

Two contributory factors were the presence of a republican regime in Paris, which frightened a Europe that was still almost exclusively monarchic, and the strong sense that France wanted to exact its revenge, as the military law of 1872 led one to believe.

Bismarck took advantage of this to organise, in September 1872, a meeting between his emperor, Wilhelm I, the Austro-Hungarian emperor, Franz Joseph, and Tsar Alexander II. Despite the rivalry of Austria-Hungary and Russia, both of which believed they could take advantage of the weakening of the Ottoman Empire to expand into the Balkans, a defensive alliance was agreed the following year between the three powers. With the adherence of Italy to the agreement of the three emperors in 1874, and Britain’s abstention, France’s isolation was complete. However, after the Balkan crisis and the Congress of Berlin in the summer of 1878, which put Vienna and St Petersburg on bad terms, Bismarck decided to strengthen ties between Berlin and Vienna, because he deemed Austria-Hungary to be safer and closer to Germany than Russia. He succeeded in overcoming the reticence of Wilhelm I, who was attached to the Russian alliance, to put his new system in place.

The Congress of Berlin, 13 July 1878 , Anton von Werner, 1881. Standing, centre-right: the Hungarian Andrasy, Bismarck and the Russian Chouvalov. Berliner Rathaus, Berlin

On 7 October 1879, the secret treaty of the Dual Alliance was signed. This was a military alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, in the event that one of them should be attacked by Russia or one of its allies. It guaranteed, in addition, the neutrality of the partner in the event of an attack by another country. Meanwhile, Bismarck persuaded the new tsar, Alexander III, to sign a new Three Emperors’ Treaty, on 18 June 1881. The text stipulated that, if one of the three powers entered into war against a fourth, the other two would maintain benevolent neutrality. The following year, Italy, at odds with France over Tunisia, joined the alliance. The treaty instituting the Triple Alliance between Berlin, Vienna and Rome was signed on 20 May 1882. If Italy was attacked by France, Germany and Austria-Hungary would offer assistance. In exchange, Germany would assist Italy if it went to war with France, and Austria-Hungary would do so if Italy was attacked by both Russia and France.

Bismarck achieved the remarkable feat of obtaining an entente between Russia and Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, and Italy and Austria-Hungary, on the other. Berlin and London were on good terms, whereas French and British interests were at loggerheads in Egypt. Meanwhile, Germany signed an alliance with Romania and maintained cordial relations with Spain, Turkey and Serbia. With the renewal of the Three Emperors’ Treaty, in 1884, and the Triple Alliance, in 1887, to which even Britain and Spain partially adhered to contain French ambitions in the Mediterranean, this Bismarckian system reached its apogee. France seemed to be completely surrounded this time..

Otto von Bismarck. Source: German Federal Archives

However, after apparently forgetting about the blue line of the Vosges to turn its attention towards colonial expansion in Africa and Asia, under Jules Ferry, France made continental affairs a priority once again, following the fall of the prime minister, in March 1885. Two years later, the Schnaebelé incident brought France and Germany to the brink of war. A police inspector in a small town near the border, Schnaebelé was also a French intelligence agent. Keen to bolster nationalist opinion in the run-up to the German legislative elections, Bismarck decided to act firmly. Lured into an ambush, the spy was arrested on French territory by German police. This caused outrage in France, and the war minister, General Boulanger, prepared for partial mobilisation. The sang-froid of French president Jules Grévy, and Bismarck’s decision to release Schnaebelé, averted the danger in this instance, but nationalist fever did not abate and Boulangism grew.

Across the Rhine, the threats of a coup from General Revanche and of a war being waged by France to recover Alsace-Moselle were taken more seriously than ever. Yet the new German emperor, Wilhelm II, decided to set his country on a path of global expansion that was more in keeping, in his view, with Germany’s status as a major economic and military power. Born in 1815, at the time of the Congress of Vienna, old chancellor Bismarck, who remained a European above all else and was in some ways obsessed with the possibility of French revenge, was forced to resign in March 1890. Over the next quarter of a century, the Triple Entente was put in place to counter the Triple Alliance. It was this standoff between the two belligerents of the Franco-Prussian War and the rival blocs which each had formed around themselves that led to the First World War.

Section of the panoramic painting representing the Bourbaki Army in Switzerland, Édouard Castres, 1881-85. Musée de Lucerne.

However, the Franco-Prussian War also drove the development of international humanitarian law, which saw its first advances with the Geneva Convention. Signed in August 1864, in the wake of the Crimean War, the Italian War of Independence and the Syrian Expedition, and right in the middle of the American Civil War, the Convention laid down rules for the protection of wounded soldiers. It was on the initiative of Tsar Alexander II that the Brussels Conference was then held, in July-August 1874, the direct origins of which can be traced to the Franco-Prussian War. During the course of that war, the laws and customs of war really began to be codified. Meanwhile, the passage of Bourbaki’s vanquished army into the neutral territory of Switzerland to escape the Germans, in January 1871, created an unprecedented legal problem and led to bilateral agreements between France, Germany and Switzerland. It was all ratified in the two big Hague conventions (July 1899 and October 1907), they, too, a product of the Franco-Prussian War and many of whose articles are still in force today.

Éric Anceau – Sorbonne University, vice-chair of the CHPP, assistant director of HES, head of politics at LabEx-EHNE

Related articles.

• The Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71
• 1870-1871. The Franco-German conflict
• France’s system of defence is put to the test in the Franco-Prussian War

Mark Stoneman

Independent Historian / Freelance Editor and Translator

Atrocities in the Franco-Prussian War, 1870–71

An essay on the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) that I wrote last year appeared in print this fall in a book about war atrocities from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century. 1 The essay focuses on German soldiers and French civilians using the example of the Bavarians. It examines why soldiers sometimes departed from generally accepted standards in Europe about sparing civilians the effects of war as much as possible.

The war began as a “cabinet war” that the German leadership hoped to win quickly through a series of decisive battles of annihilation. In this way the state, led by the king and his cabinet, would maintain control over the war effort and not face any undue influence from civilians, whether its own or those of the enemy. After destroying the Second Empire’s army at Sedan, however, France refused to capitulate. Its people toppled the empire and vowed to fight on. The German leadership had a “people’s war” on its hands that it took five more months to win. While the French and Germans fought most of this war with conventional means between armed forces organized by the state, the war also saw substantial civilian involvement that had the potential to lead to an ever deepening spiral of violence.

The most extensive contact between soldiers and civilians occurred as a result of the German military policy of living off the land, which made German forces more mobile. To maintain discipline, officers were supposed to take small details of soldiers to requisition what animals, fodder, and food their units required. Requisitioning resembled theft in that those whose property the German officers took had no choice in the matter, but it differed insofar as the German officers issued receipts for what they took. These would be paid off by whichever side lost. German forces were also quartered on civilian households. These circumstances enabled soldiers to pursue their own private initiatives. If their “hosts” would not give them what they needed, the soldiers often took it.

More famous, however, were reports of armed French civilians called francs-tireurs. While their number was not great enough to present a strategic threat, the German forces did have to devote some 120,000 soldiers to their lines of communication. Armed incidents led the invading soldiers to shoot suspected partisans summarily, burn down houses and even villages where such incidents occurred, and use hostages, most famously on locomotives. While some reactions had an ad hoc quality to them, the common thread was the notion of “military necessity.” The German forces found the actions regrettable but necessary, in order to prevent the war from lasting longer than necessary. The idea was to counter French “terror” with measures so harsh that the French would see the error of their ways and refrain from any further resistance.

References for these incidents and the historiography of the Franco-Prussian War are available in this new essay as well as the following related one, in which I devote a lot of space to the events in Bazailles, which the Bavarians infamously burned down during the Battle of Sedan: “The Bavarian Army and French Civilians in the War of 1870–1871: A Cultural Interpretation,” War in History 8.3 (2001): 271–93.

My source base for this research was published personal narratives, that is, letters, diaries, and memoirs. Most of them came from Bavarian soldiers and officers, though I drew on other German narratives by way of comparison. It is in some ways surprising how freely the fighting men wrote about these events, but what they were describing was either acceptable in their minds or told in relation to what lines they believed the French had crossed.

One phenomenon I found little mention of was the hostage-taking. This might be because the Bavarian veterans felt they had crossed a line, although it is also worth noting that their units were not as heavily involved in maintaining lines of communication in the rear, which is where the hostage-taking occurred. Recently I learned more about this subject from Heidi Mehrkens’ new book , which includes a section on the German military using hostages on locomotives. Mehrkens’ book is also helpful, because it uses archival sources that confirm the impressions I gained about relations between soldiers and civilians from the published primary sources.

• Mark R. Stoneman, “Die deutschen Greueltaten im Krieg 1870/71 am Beispiel der Bayern”; in Sönke Neitzel and Daniel Hohrath, eds., Kriegsgreuel: Die Entgrenzung der Gewalt in kriegerischen Konflikten vom Mittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2008), 223–39.  ↩

This post originally appeared on Clio and Me ( now closed ) on on this date.

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From the archive, 20 July 1870: The Franco-Prussian War is declared

Since yesterday morning we have received but few telegrams from the continent. This paucity of intelligence in all probability denotes the lull before the storm. Diplomatists made a last effort on Monday to preserve peace, but their good offices were of no avail, and a Paris telegram states that success in that direction is now hopeless.

To-day was fixed for the departure of the Emperor for head-quarters, wherever they may be; but the latest reports state that the time of his departure is kept "strictly secret." The Paris correspondent of the Times says:- "It is certain that His Majesty will take the command, and equally that the Prince Imperial will accompany him." The correspondent adds:- "The Empress is well pleased at the decision, and replies cheerfully to those who condole with her upon the coming separation from her only child."

The announcement that France and Prussia had given assurances that they intend to respect the neutrality of the grand duchy of Luxembourg has induced the Chamber of the duchy to vote an order of the day, in which the Chamber expresses, in the name of the country, the "joy" with which the assurance has been received of the confirmation of the treaty "which consecrates the independence of the country, to which all Luxembourgers are sincerely attached."

Nobody doubts that the duty of England requires her to observe a strict neutrality in the great European struggle which is beginning, and everyone trusts that we may be able to avert the occurrence of any aggression upon the smaller neutral states - a kind calculated, by affecting our honour or our interests, to entangle us in the contest. The proclamation of neutrality which was issued last night is only a formal and official expression of the resolve of our Government and people to refrain from any interference in the war, and to content ourselves with exercising any influence which we may possess for the purpose of preventing its extension and shortening its duration.

It is not, of course, possible, even if it were desirable, to prevent the free discussion of the merits and causes of the struggle. We all of us say freely enough what we think respecting the conduct of our own Government, and we are not likely to show less freedom in commenting upon the policy of the French and Prussian Cabinets.

It is, however, to be hoped that the members of both Houses of Parliament will remember that their position imposes upon them restrictions which are not incumbent upon others. They are not bound to refrain altogether from debating the causes of the calamity which is visiting Europe. It is, indeed, their duty to satisfy themselves, if they have any doubts upon the subject, that the Ministry has not failed to promote the preservation of peace with all its power. But they are bound by their obligations to their constituents and to the country to be chary of saying anything which may tend to compromise our neutrality, or to render it more difficult for the Government to maintain it.

It is their duty to abstain from attempts to force Ministers to make disclosures or express opinions which may render it more difficult for them to maintain amicable relations with both belligerent powers. If, for instance, we assume for a minute that they have reason to believe the French deliberately picked a quarrel with Prussia, they can neither express such a belief nor state its grounds without embarrassing extremely the diplomatic intercourse with the French empire, and giving the French people ground to suspect that our neutrality may easily be changed into hostility.

It is to be hoped that no such endeavours will be made, or that if there should be any they will be at once repressed. They cannot stop the war which has been declared, and they may engender passions which have not yet shown their existence, and which might embarrass our policy and render it more difficult for us at once to maintain our neutrality and secure our interests and dignity.

[The Franco-Prussian war commenced on 19 July 1870]

• From the Guardian archive

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Essay: Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71

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(KEY JUDGMENTS) The strategy adopted by the Prussian leadership prevailed in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71 for a number reason: • Prussian strategy was shaped by the Prussian Grand Strategy with the aim to unify all German states in one powerful state. • Prussian leaderships set themselves achievable national objectives supported by other Germans states. • Military forces were reorganised and modernised using experiences from the previous wars and technical innovation of this time. • Prussian leaderships mobilised all available instruments of national power (means) to support realisation its aim (ends) Prussian diplomacy prevented other countries to participate in conflict against France. • Prussia maintained balance among other members of German Confederation, the government and military. • Strong  characteristics of leaders at the key positions in policy and army  had very important role. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS The France-Prussia war was the result of the rise of German military power and imperialism. This conflict was part of the plan in the process of creation a unified German Empire. Prussia was leading German power. Prussian leaderships recognized France, like a country able to prevent their aim – unification of the German states. There are many different historical approaches in connection with responsibility for this conflict, including the option that Bismarck provoked French aggression. Regarding different interests, the War between France and Prussia was inevitable. France was the strongest military power in Europe, and French leaderships were  against powerful German state, so its leadership expected to solve a problem with war. The Prussian victory against Denmark (1864), success in Austro-Prussian War (1866) and forming the North German Confederation in 1867 encouraged Bismarck to continue toward the defined aim. He was sure that other European countries, the first of all, Russia and Italy will stay neutral. War began on 19 July 1870 after the French declared war on Prussia. The Northern German coalition mobilised troops very fast and rapidly defeated French troops in  northeastern France. The German numerous forces were better trained and used much more effective modern technology, particularly railroads and artillery. After a few victories in eastern France, Prussian forces won in the biggest battle, the Battle of Sedan. Napoleon III had been captured on 2 September, and French Government of national Defence declared the Third Republic in Paris, two days later. War was continued another five months until German troops defeated French armies in the northern part of France. Opposite of many expectations, the war was not long and it finished on 10 May 1871, with heavy French defeat. After the end of War,  German got some parts of Lorrain and the biggest part of Alsace. This victory The German states used to proclaim German Empire.  King, Wilhelm I, become the first German emperor. ANALYSIS OF THE PRUSSIAN STRATEGY GRAND STRATEGY – END Prussian grand strategy was to unite all German lands in German Empire under predominant Prussian influence. Realization of the idea started after the defeat of Napoleon. Prussia was given two-fifths of Saxony, parts of the Duchy of Warsaw, Danzig, and the Westphalia, during The Congress of Vienna held from September 1814 to June 1815. Prussian leaderships had an idea to unify all German states. The first step in this direction was  creating The German Confederation with 39 states. Victory in the War against Denmark, in 1864, German Confederation used to extend territory on the north. Mutual relationships between Prussia and Austria burdened The German Confederation. Their relations culminated with the war in 1866. This conflict, famous like the “Seven Weeks War” was finished by Austrian defeat. Prussia used this win to secure a position of primacy among the German States.  “The annexation of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, as a consequence of the war, not only aggrandized that kingdom but made an important change in the relations of the duchies so annexed”.  Bismarck rejected to join Austria with other German states. However, Prussia annexed four of Austria’s allies in northern and central Germany. The North German Confederation, the basis for German Empire, was created in 1867, with dominant Prussian role. Prussian Army and later Army of the Northern Confederation  had very important  place in the realization of German aim. In connection with that, there was a focus on the enhancing military capabilities. A strategic conflict with France was the inevitable obstacle on Prussian road to the end. France was not ready to accept strong German country in Europe, so the Prussian leadership started with preparing for the War. Thanks to the good preparations The German Confederation won in this war. Nothing any more could prevent establish unify German Empire. GRAND STRATEGY – WAYS Within the overall grand strategic ends. Prussia defined the fallowing ways: • Establish the North German Confederation with Prussian leading position. • Reorganization and modernization of army able to secure military supremacy. • Defeat France, the only country able to prevent the realization of Prussian goals. • Develop good relationships with the other European countries to prevent their supporting to France during the War. • Prussian leaderships hold the key position in The North German Confederation. • Join the other German territory to existing Confederation and declaring German Empire. GRAND STRATEGY – MEANS Prussian leaders planned to unify, create, and to lead the very strong, sustainable German country with the significant role in Europe. Its leader mobilised all instruments of national power. DIPLOMACY Prussia went to war against France like the leader of The North German Confederation. Furthermore, it was very important to overcome many internal problems between members of confederation and to secure stable relation with other countries with the aim to prevent their influence and assistance to France. German Confederation consisted of 39 states, and later The North German Confederation was the alliance of 22 German State northern of the Main River. All states pledged to provide the aid to any member who was attacked by a foreign power. However, they fell short of any economic or national unity. In the aim to solve internal problems, Prussian lieder focused on arrangement these relations. King William of Prussia imposed a constitution by decree in 1850 . Prussia established a parliament with two chambers. The First, officially named the Herrenhaus  was composed of representatives of the great landed proprietors and of the large towns, and of members nominated by the king. The Second, or Lower, which Chamber was elected by all taxpayers. The King was responsible for the appointment of  ministers. Later, under premier Otto von Bismarck, the political system was arranged to secure Prussian domination in Federal Council. Prussia had 17 of 43 votes, and possibility to control the situation through alliances with the other states. Otto von Bismarck, the Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the North German Confederation tried to keep friendly relations with leaders of the biggest countries in Europe. Particularly was important to prepare conditions that Alexander III of Russia and Victor Emanuel of Italy stay neutral in Prussian conflict against France. Italy was Prussian ally during The Austro-Prussian war.  The British government wanted to avoid commitments on the continent. INFORMATION MILITARY One of the most important Prussian tasks was the reorganisation and modernisation of Army. During the wars for unifying Germany, its leadership had enough time to see all weaknesses. Experiences from Schleswig and Austro-Prussian wars were used in the process of reorganization and modernization of military forces. Military services, both conscript and reserve, without substitution were the universal obligation for all Prussian and that area was arranged very well. Corps with a high degree of freedom was established all over the Prussian territory. Each corps was responsible for training and mobilisation in the time of war. The focus in infantry training was on speed, agility, and individual intelligence.  The states in The North German Confederation retained their own governments, but the federal government controlled the military force. Meanwhile, Prussia formed Military General Staff with the aim to improve command  with troops on a wide area. Prussian General Staff consists of eleven officers with Helmuth von Moltke on its head. General Staff had the body whose objectives were: to conduct a continuous intelligent study, to analyze the past, to appreciate the future and to provide commanders in the field with important information and advice. General Staff was also trained and prepared for activity in war. Moltke insisted on offensive activity and he found the way to solve the problem of command on the big distance between units in the battlefield and General Staff. Prussian Army understood on time importance of railways in military purpose. They organised lines for fast deploying troops on the battlefield. Those lines were also used for movement General Staff and supplying. Using of railways were very efficient and all lines operated independently, under local commanders. Artillery played an important role in the strategy of Moltke. The field batteries were reequipped with new steel breech-loading field-pieces, made in German workshops. New weapons were more precisely and longer-range than French.

Finally, German mobilisation was the most rapid in Europe and in 1870 their total strength was 1.183.389 officers and soldiers. A result of serious approach was the fast German victory over French army. ECONOMIC German customs union (Zollverein) was established in 1834 under Prussian leadership position. This union created a free-trade area throughout much of German states. Free-trade zone received significant impetus from many develops economists in The German Confederation. Prussia abolished all internal customs dues and expressed its readiness free trade with neighboring states. Agreements between Prussia with many German states were arranged in the next period. It was very important for the development of the economy. Furthermore, these agreements strengthened relations in Confederation. SOPHISTICATED SYNCHRONISATION OF ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS Prussian leaderships had the clear vision and achievable strategic objectives. Despite numerous problems, they established a stable alliance of states, arranged strong internal relationships and built the powerful army able to defeat all opponents. Prussian political leaders secured stable relation with other countries with the aim to prevent negative influence during the conflict with France. Military leaders used all possibilities to shape, at that time, modern and strong army. Prussian leaders kept leading position and in German Empire, after winning against France. LEADERSHIPS AND ROLES OF BISMARCK AND MOLTKE Prussia had very strong leaderships who were able to recognise the importance of internal relations among members of confederation. Moreover, at the same time, they knew the main goal is impossible without strong military force. In 1862 King Wilhelm I appointed Otto von Bismarck as Prime Minister of Prussia. Bismarck strongly decided to increase Prussian supremacy and influence among the German states. Wilhelm had a lot of confidence in Bismarck. Bismarck solved problems financing of Army and made the condition for its increasing and modernisation. Bismarck conducted progressive economic and political reforms in order to achieve his goals. On the diplomacy plan, he manipulated European rivalries to make Germany a world power. He played an important role to prevent Russian influence during the War against France. Bismarck famous “Iron Chancellor” was very strong, discipline and decisive leadership. He also proposed to advance a strong military program.  Under his policy Prussia took part and won in wars against Denmark, Austria and France. Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke was Chief of Staff of the Prussian General Staff from 1857 to 1871. Moltke was the most responsible for shaping Prussian Army that won in three brilliant Wars for German Unification (1864-71). He established enduring base for Prussian tactical, operational, and strategic thinking during that time. Moltke emphasized significant of the organisation, peacetime training, and mobilization of the army. He “regarded strategy as a practical art of adapting means to ends” . Moltke had worked out the conditions of the march and supply of an army. He understood that only one army corps could be moved along one road in the same day. In the case to put more corps on the same road meant that the rear corps could not be used at the front. This approach was used during army movement in Franco-Prussian War. Moltke particularly attached importance to General Staff in the command. KEY OUTCOMES • German Empire was established and became the most powerful country in Central Europe. Franc lost their power after defeated in this war. • A victorious powerful Prussia (and The North German Confederation). Prussia demonstrated it became the great European power, and German state played a significant role in the history of the World. • The Franco-German War of 1870–71 established Prussia as the leading state in the imperial German Reich. William I of Prussia became German emperor on January 18, 1871. • The other German armed forces joined the Prussian army. The Bavarian army remained still autonomous during the peacetime. Bismarck was imperial chancellor and Prussian minister-president. History of Prussia merged into the German Empire

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