empirical phenomenology a qualitative research approach

HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY article

A phenomenological paradigm for empirical research in psychiatry and psychology: open questions.

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• 1 Section Phenomenological Psychopathology and Psychotherapy, Psychiatric Department, University Clinic Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany
• 2 Centro de Atención Psicológica, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades Sede Talca, Universidad Autónoma de Chile, Talca, Chile

This article seeks to clarify the way in which phenomenology is conceptualized and applied in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology, emphasizing the suitability of qualitative research. It will address the “What,” “Why,” and “How” of phenomenological interviews, providing not only preliminary answers but also a critical analysis and pointing to future directions for research. The questions it asks are: First, what makes an interview phenomenological? What are phenomenological interviews used for in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology? Second, why do we carry out phenomenological interviews with patients? Is merely contrasting phenomenological hypotheses or concepts enough to do justice to the patients’ involvement? Third, how should we conduct phenomenological interviews with patients? How can we properly perform analysis in empirical phenomenological research in psychiatry and psychology? In its conclusion, the article attempts to go a step beyond these methodological questions, highlighting the “bigger picture”: namely, the phenomenological scientific paradigm and its core philosophical claim of reality as mind-dependent.

Introduction

An initial proposal in favor of “naturalizing phenomenology” was presented in the article “First-person methodologies: What, Why, How?” published by Varela and Shear (1999) in the Journal of Consciousness Studies . The authors were not only concerned with the need for a method in cognitive sciences to obtain empirically-based descriptions of the subject, but also with providing the basis for a “science of consciousness.” “Neurophenomenology” was proposed by Varela (1996) as a means of linking first‐ and third-person perspectives through a systematic examination of subjective experience within experimental settings. An important requirement of neurophenomenology was that both experimenter and experimental subject must learn the Husserlian phenomenological method. The notion “phenomenology” was employed in the etymological sense of the term, that is, “the study of that which appears” (from Greek phainómenon “that which appears” and lógos “study”). Additionally, Varela (1990) coined the term “enactive,” meaning not to act out or to perform as on a stage, but to “enact,” that is, “to bring forth” or to “emerge” ( hervorbringen , in German), as it is used in the phenomenological tradition. Accordingly, the phenomenological method was conceived and applied as a form of training one’s attention to that which “appears” in the subject’s conscious experience, making it similar to a meditation technique. Examples of neurophenomenology are the experiments led by Lutz et al. (2002) , which analyzed subjective reports, reaction times, and brain activity. However, a different approach was proposed by Gallagher (2003) , who claimed that a “phenomenologically enlightened experimental science” means incorporating concepts and distinctions from the phenomenological analysis into the actual design of an experiment. In contrast to neurophenomenology, this approach does not require learning the Husserlian phenomenological method or even making first-person reports in the experiments. Examples of “front-loaded phenomenology” are neuroimaging experiments employing the phenomenological distinction between “sense of agency” and “sense of ownership” in involuntary movement ( Ruby and Decety, 2001 ; Chaminade and Decety, 2002 ; Farrer and Frith, 2002 ).

However, experimental designs are normally not classified as part of qualitative research methodologies ( Fischer, 2006 ; Maxwell, 2011 , 2012 ; Patton, 2015 ; Creswell and Poth, 2018 ). One of the clearest differences between qualitative and quantitative approaches is that qualitative research is carried out in everyday natural conditions, rather than in experimental settings. Concerning the qualitative/quantitative distinction, there is an ongoing debate not only around the differences between the two approaches ( Morgan, 2018 ; Maxwell, 2019 ), but also around whether they are actually distinguishable at all ( Hammersley, 2018 ). Whatever their differences or similarities, qualitative and quantitative approaches are commonly conceived as compatible and their integration – in the form of mixed-methods research designs – valuable ( Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010 ). So, the incorporation of phenomenological interviews in experimental designs is one kind of mixed-method research design: One example is neurophenomenology, where the qualitative component is provided by phenomenology. Broadly speaking, qualitative research is used in many social sciences and humanities disciplines, including psychology, sociology, political sciences, and anthropology. A range of techniques are employed in qualitative research to gather experiential data, such as open-ended interviews, direct observation, focus groups, and document analysis (e.g., clinical records and personal diaries), and different methods are used for the associated qualitative data analysis, including phenomenology, ethnography, narrative analysis (e.g., biographical and life story studies), case studies, and grounded theory. In contrast to the large sample sizes needed in quantitative research to accomplish statistical validation of the results, qualitative research is characterized by an in-depth approach, which means working with few cases, with representativeness not being of such key importance ( Barbour and Barbour, 2003 ). The use of less structured methods allows for the emergence of ideographic descriptions, personal beliefs and meanings, thus addressing the experiential processes of the subjects being studied ( Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979 ; Barbour, 2000 ; Maxwell, 2011 , 2012 , 2019 ).

This article shall not focus on experimental phenomenology. However, this is no way meant to discredit in any sense this form of research design. Indeed, mention has already been made of the precursors of the experimental application of phenomenology to acknowledge the important contribution this research tradition has made – and continues to make – in ensuring that phenomenology acquires a scientific status. For instance, the project “cardiophenomenology” has been recently proposed by Depraz and Desmidt (2019) as a refinement of Varela’s neurophenomenology and performed in experimental studies of surprise in depression ( Depraz et al., 2017 ). In addition, it is worth mentioning Martiny’s (2017) transdisciplinary research on the phenomenological and neurological aspects of living with brain damage, specifically cerebral palsy. Martiny’s work not only has been influenced by, but also seeks to revitalize, Varela’s “radical” proposal, reminding us of the importance of working with openness and a change of mindset in cognitive science. Usually framed as “embodied cognition,” this proposal approaches the mind as embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended (4E cognition), implying an awareness regarding the fact that the “embodied” notion applies not only to the mind of the experimental subject but also to the cognitive scientist carrying out the research ( Depraz et al., 2003 ). Indeed, phenomenology has breached the frontiers of the philosophical discipline to influence the development of interdisciplinary fields of studies bridging the biomedical sciences and the humanities. Besides its application in the cognitive sciences, phenomenology is currently being widely applied in empirical research in healthcare-related disciplines, mostly in psychiatry and psychology. The most influential empirical application of phenomenology has been in the field of psychopathology, with the development of phenomenological interviews for the investigation of schizophrenia spectrum disorders ( Parnas et al., 2005 ; Sass et al., 2017 ). However, the extent of phenomenology’s applicability outside the strict domain of philosophy is currently a topic of intense debate and controversy ( Zahavi and Martiny, 2019 ). The conceptualization of phenomenology in the literature of qualitative research, which has been mostly developed in North America, is not always in line with that of the continental European philosophical tradition. Recent years have seen the start of a dialogue bridging the two traditions, qualitative research and philosophical phenomenology, giving a promise of fruitful collaboration in the future.

This article will address the “What,” “Why,” and “How” of phenomenological interviews, reviewing recent empirical research in the field of phenomenological psychopathology and psychotherapy. Important to note is that qualitative research, as described above, refers to empirical research, not to basic or theoretical investigations. Phenomenological qualitative research in psychology has been developed using Husserlian concepts such as the “epoché” and the “phenomenological reduction,” and precisely on the use of such conceptualizations is where most of the current discussion has been placed. The article, therefore, will not attempt to provide a broad understanding of the phenomenological tradition. Instead, it will focus on a more specific discussion of methodological issues concerning the empirical application of phenomenology in qualitative research in psychiatry and psychology, and Husserl’s methodology in particular. To do so, we first need to agree that the application of phenomenology to empirical research in psychiatry and psychology employing interviews is qualitative, not quantitative. In a strict sense, quantitative methodology based on frequency and scales of severity of the patients’ anomalous experience, although necessary for the statistical validation of the interviews, goes beyond the scope of phenomenology. According to the phenomenological approach, mental disorders cannot be reducible to a cerebral organic basis, nor to numbers, as they are not entities per se but psychopathological configurations that can be identified in the diagnostic process of interaction between a clinician and a patient ( Fuchs, 2010a ; Pallagrosi et al., 2014 ; Pallagrosi and Fonzi, 2018 ; Gozé et al., 2019 ). Consequently, phenomenological interviews are designed to address not objective, but subjective data, namely the what it is like of patients’ anomalous experiences. In this way, the patients’ descriptions of their subjective experiences are not conceived as “static” entities, but, rather, as part of dynamically, open-ended developing processes and interpretations ( Martiny, 2017 ).

What makes an interview “phenomenological”? What are phenomenological interviews used for in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology?

Medical psychiatric diagnosis relies on standardized manuals providing a description of the apparent symptomatology and mostly excludes any assessment of subjective experience ( Mishara, 1994 ; Parnas and Zahavi, 2002 ; Fuchs, 2010a ). Under this approach, research in psychiatry has mainly developed from a third-person perspective, using the methods of the physical and natural sciences. Biomedical psychiatry has prioritized the use of quantitative methods and statistical analysis, whereas the value of qualitative in-depth analysis has been underestimated. The preferred experimental design has been the randomized controlled trial to demonstrate the efficacy of treatments involving psychoactive drugs ( Deacon, 2013 ; Deacon and McKay, 2015 ). An alternative conceptual model to this comes from the phenomenological tradition of psychopathology. In order to understand and conceptualize the anomalous experience of a given mental illness, the phenomenological diagnosis highlights the importance of assessing patients’ subjectivity. Over the last two decades, phenomenological interviews have been developed to complement standardized diagnostic systems such as Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) ( American Psychiatric Association, 2013 ) and International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10) ( World Health Organization, 2012 ). The most important phenomenological interviews are the Examination of Anomalous Self-experience (EASE, Parnas et al., 2005 ) and its supplement, the Examination of Anomalous World Experience (EAWE, Sass et al., 2017 ). These interviews have been inspired by the Husserlian tradition and have incorporated classical descriptions of phenomenological psychopathology (particularly from Blankenburg, Conrad, and Minkowski, among other authors). Their semi-structured design allows for an in-depth examination of the patients’ subjective experiences within formal structures, such as corporeality, temporality, spatiality, and intersubjectivity. In this way, the descriptive task is not carried out on a totally random basis, as the interviews have specific domains and items that have already been established to guide the examination of the patient’s experience. EASE and EAWE were developed with the chief purpose of exploring and better understanding patients’ experiential and behavioral manifestations of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. These interviews offer comprehensive descriptions of disorders of the pre-reflexive self or ipseity ( Sass, 1992 ; Parnas and Handest, 2003 ; Sass and Parnas, 2003 ; Parnas and Sass, 2008 ; Raballo et al., 2009 ; Fuchs, 2010b , 2013a ; Sass et al., 2018 ). Indeed, EASE and EAWE have had great international impact in clinical practice and empirical research in psychiatry and psychology, and EASE has been translated into more than 10 languages, among them German, Danish, Spanish, Italian, and French.

EASE and EAWE describe aspects of the patients’ anomalous experience that are not only relevant for diagnostic but also for psychotherapeutic purposes, as they can be useful as tools in both psychotherapeutic settings and in psychotherapy research. However, phenomenological psychopathology has focused primarily on the issue of psychiatric diagnosis, while the treatment of mental illness has remained less developed. Only in recent years has the treatment of mental illness become the focus of stronger research interest, directly involving the practice of psychotherapy ( Fuchs et al., 2019 ). For its part, although not rooted in phenomenology, body-oriented therapy has been linked to a phenomenological framework, as it provides empirical evidence for embodiment-approach conceptualizations ( Fuchs 2005 ; Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009 ; Koch and Fuchs, 2011 ; Fuchs and Koch 2014 ). The embodiment approach regards schizophrenia as a fundamental disturbance of embodiment, namely a “disembodiment,” that entails a diminishment of the basic sense of self, a disruption of implicit bodily functioning and, as a result, a disconnection from intercorporeality with others. A range of empirical research into body-oriented therapy has been carried out in the field of phenomenological psychopathology. Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of body-oriented therapy for schizophrenia has been obtained from quantitative research carried out with manualized interventions ( Röhricht and Papadopoulos, 2010 ) and using randomized controlled trials to measure outcomes ( Martin et al., 2016 ). Recent research has incorporated phenomenological interviews to describe therapeutic change processes in body-oriented therapy for schizophrenia, thus explaining the relationship between processes and outcomes ( Galbusera et al., 2018 ). Unsurprisingly, the phenomenological interviews revealed an understanding of change as a recovery of a “sense of self” in patients with schizophrenia ( Galbusera et al., 2019 ).

The conceptualization of schizophrenia as a disorder of the self is shared by a number of philosophical and clinical approaches: it is not exclusive to phenomenological psychiatry ( Parnas and Henriksen, 2014 ). So, in much the same way as body therapy has been “converted” to phenomenology, any other psychotherapeutic approach might well incorporate “front-loaded phenomenology,” in the sense of the possibility of being linked to the phenomenological framework. This is especially the case when the effectiveness of psychotherapy has been widely evidenced and recognized independently of its theoretical framework ( Campbell et al., 2013 ). For instance, narrative/dialogical psychotherapy addressing schizophrenia as a disorder of the self might be consistent with the phenomenological conceptualization and could even serve as a complement for body-oriented therapy. In fact, EASE’s and EAWE’s rich descriptions provide evidence that patients with schizophrenia are able to communicate their experience in a comprehensive narrative form, which is quite contrary to Martin et al.’s (2016) claim that verbal dialogue can be difficult in patients with severe mental disorders. A suitable alternative might be the “metacognitive model” ( Lysaker et al., 2018a ). Under this model, deficits in metacognition undermine the availability of a sense of self, others, and the world, making it difficult to provide an adequate response to everyday-life situations. To deal with this, the so-called metacognitive reflection and insight therapy (MERIT) has been designed to target metacognition and recover the availability of a sense of self in the patients’ experience ( Lysaker et al., 2018b ). Precisely because contemporary phenomenological psychiatry places particular emphasis on the bodily and pre-reflective level of experience, the use of phenomenological interviews to explore change process in MERIT might reveal interesting relationships between pre-reflexive and reflective forms of self-experience.

Does psychotherapy needs be rooted in the phenomenological tradition in order to be called “phenomenological?” Here we are talking about enterprises such as Freud’s psychoanalysis or Binswanger’s existential analysis/daseinsanalysis. Such an enterprise requires a well-achieved and comprehensive conceptualization of phenomenological psychopathology as well as a consequent psychotherapeutic intervention rooted in the same phenomenological conceptualization. Certainly, psychotherapy does not need to be rooted in phenomenology, although this enterprise, not a minor one, might be worth undertaking. Yet, the very essence of phenomenological psychotherapy is to remain faithful to the patient’s self-experience and their constitutive vulnerability ( Fuchs, 2013b ; Irarrázaval, 2013 , 2018 ; Irarrázaval and Sharim, 2014 ; Škodlar and Henriksen, 2019 ). Consequently, the development of integrative models of psychotherapy both bodily and narrative/dialogical addressing the patients’ experience of vulnerability is definitely a future challenge.

Why do we carry out phenomenological interviews with patients? Is merely contrasting phenomenological hypotheses or concepts enough to justify the patients’ involvement?

The justification for empirical research employing phenomenological interviews is extremely important, especially when persons with mental illnesses are involved. It is not only a matter of gathering data from the patients’ experience but also one of what to do with this data and, in the end, what for. It is an ethical issue concerning the impact phenomenological interviews might have on patients interviewed. Any interview aimed at exploring the experience of a patient always involves some kind of intervention, so even when applied by accredited experienced clinicians, an ethical justification is required. Arguments before ethics committees that phenomenological interviews are beneficial and do not worsen patients’ instability need to be convincing. Recalling and enacting in patients disturbing experiences we aim to grasp is certainly an intervention that needs justification. Obviously, phenomenological interviews are not psychotherapeutic interventions in themselves – that is, the dialogue in psychotherapy is not an interview – but they can be justified on the grounds similar to those usually employed by psychotherapy: the possibility of sharing anomalous experiences through an accepting and understanding communication helps patients to recover a sense of familiarity with their experience, thus reducing their sense of self-alienation. Furthermore, by means of the descriptive tasks called for in the semi-structured interviews, patients improve their articulation of anomalous experiences, which might have been otherwise overlooked, neglected, or even remain ineffable for them ( Zahavi and Martiny, 2019 ).

Phenomenological interviews have been simply defined as falling within the framework of an interview “which is informed by insights and concepts from the phenomenological tradition and (which) in turn informs a phenomenological investigation” ( Høffding and Martiny, 2016 , p. 540). However, phenomenological interviews involving patients with mental illness should not only be consistent with insights and concepts from the phenomenological tradition of philosophy and psychopathology but, most importantly, they must make explicit their contribution to both diagnosis and psychotherapy. While a biomedical psychiatric diagnosis is ultimately oriented toward finding a suitable pharmacological treatment, a phenomenological diagnosis is ultimately oriented toward providing a treatment based on the experiential dimension of a given mental illness. The interest of a psychotherapist goes beyond the psychiatric diagnostic emphasis by approaching the patient as a whole person, aiming to understand the anomalies of experience within his/her social, cultural, and historical context. This broader, psychological, approach enables an understanding not only of how patients make sense of their anomalous experiences but also of how symptoms manifest themselves within the patients’ immediate life context, as well as how a certain mental illness configures itself along the patients’ history of meaningful interactions with others ( Irarrázaval and Sharim, 2014 ; Irarrázaval, 2018 ). However, in spite of the importance given to the analysis of the patients’ biography by several authors from the phenomenological tradition of psychopathology (Jaspers, Binswanger, and Blankenburg, among other authors), “biographical methods,” originally developed for sociological research in the influential “Chicago School” ( Bornat, 2008 ), have not been sufficiently incorporated in current phenomenological empirical research in psychiatry and psychology.

How should we conduct phenomenological interviews with patients? How can we properly perform analysis in empirical phenomenological research in psychiatry and psychology?

A phenomenological interview involves a second-person situation, in which the dialogical communication with the patient is crucial. No matter how strange or unrealistic the patients’ anomalous experiences might appear to the interviewer, an attitude of professional competence and familiarity is necessary ( Nordgaard et al., 2013 ). For the patient, anomalous experiences are actually lived experiences despite their lack of commonsensical validity. Hallucinations and delusions are, like nonpsychotic experiences, first-personally given, which means that they have a solipsistic validity. This is one of the reasons why it is difficult, especially in psychotic phases, for patients to come to terms with the fact that what they actually experience is not credible or real in the eyes of others, and even abnormal or pathological in the eyes of the clinician. Clearly, the interviewer’s role is not to confront or contradict this lack of commonsensical validity, but simply to grasp the experiences as they appear to the patients. In other words, the interviewer conducts the interview with an attitude of empathetic understanding. Empathy should not be reduced to an attempt to understand the patient in a “representational” manner, in the sense that it does not refer to the interviewer’s own experience of processing (imitating, thinking, or imagining) the patient’s subjectivity ( Irarrázaval, 2019 ). Empathy is the condition of possibility for the “subject-subject” relationship ( Zahavi, 2015 ). That is to say, empathy is a distinct mode of other-directed intentionality that permits the unfolding of the patient’s experience, approached as a unique other person. In this sense, empathic understanding permits the unfolding of the what it is like of the patient’s anomalous experience.

In phenomenological interviews, why-like questions lead patients to respond with causal explanations of the anomalies of their experience or diagnosed mental illness, such as judgments, beliefs, theoretical constructions, etc., For their part, how-like questions guide patients to describe the way in which they live their experience, that is, the way in which the anomalies actually appear to the patients in their experience. To put it another way, both types of questions lead patients to talk about experiential contents, but in different ways: causal attributions in the former, and appearances in the latter. Causal attributions are by no means irrelevant aspects of the patient’s experience not worth addressing in the interview. The way in which patients’ attribute causes to their anomalous experience or mental illness can also provide valuable information for both diagnosis and psychotherapy. Moreover, the relationship between causal attributions and appearances is certainly valuable, as it entails a circular, dynamic process in which both orders of experiencing constantly influence one another. However, the gathering of phenomenological data is generally not aimed at obtaining causal explanations or attributional reports, as in the case of cognitive psychology, but mainly at exploring aspects of experience that how-like questions are designed to unfold.

Turning to data analysis, it has been said that phenomenology is interested in describing the formal structure of the experience rather than its content ( Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008 ), but what does this actually mean? It seems difficult to imagine an experience as a mere structure without any content. Moreover, it is not possible to establish a category of experience that has not been previously built upon any content analysis. In qualitative studies, categories are built upon the basis of prior content analysis; both hypotheses and categories are developed as the study progresses and emerge from the data itself ( Morrow, 2005 ; Maxwell, 2012 ), so-called “iterative process” ( Barbour and Barbour, 2003 ). EASE and EAWE were built collecting first-person descriptions by a significant number of patients (around 100 each), which allowed for their statistical validation. However, only a fairly general description has been provided of how EASE’s domains and items were developed: singular contents of anomalous experience are conceptualized and interconnected within a comprehensive system of meaningful structural wholes or Gestalts , leading to the “core” underlying psychopathological configuration ( Nordgaard et al., 2013 ). A recent qualitative study on the responses to the two scales highlights the specificities of the phenomena described by EASE and EAWE, indicating that disturbances of world experience are fundamentally less unitary, while the experience of the self presents a more coherent and unitary Gestalt ( Englebert et al., 2019 ).

Beyond the statistical validation of the interviews, replication is needed in other clinical samples and cultures to support previous findings and provide added evidence when compared with multiple clinical groups and cross culturally. However, if the focus of the analysis is placed merely on formal structural aspects, then when applying EASE and EAWE to new patients, we will not find domains or categories different from those already defined. To put it differently, quantitative replication of EASE or EAWE in other samples would barely lead to any new knowledge, because already established domains and items tend to constrain the patients’ responses. So, particularly in terms of their potential contribution to psychotherapy, the best contribution that could be made from applying EASE and EAWE to new patients would result from a content analysis of the patients’ reports. However, one key question concerning these interviews’ replication remains unanswered: Which is the most appropriate qualitative method for analyzing the patients’ descriptions?

The empirical application of Husserl’s phenomenological method outside the strict scope of philosophy still is a topic of ongoing debate in both philosophy and the cognitive sciences. According to Zahavi (2019a , b , c) , in philosophy, the main goal of phenomenology is not purely descriptive or attentive to how things appear to the subject; it focuses neither on the subject nor on the object, but on the correlation between them. In this context, the term epoché is used to refer to suspending or putting between parentheses a “naïve” or “natural” attitude toward reality in order to reflect upon fundamental ontological questions, thus adopting a critical stance on the conception of reality as mind-independently given. Epoché , usually described as putting “in brackets” the prejudices and theoretical assumptions of the interviewer ( Fischer, 2009 ), in order to access phenomena as they appear in the subject’s experience, has little to do with the original philosophical method. This does not imply that bracketing our prejudices and theoretical assumptions would not be desirable to avoid bias when conducting phenomenological interviews or analyzing data (we can find several techniques for doing so). It is also not so important to calling such bracketing epoché , as long as we have a basic notion of Husserl’s original sense of the term.

Phenomenology has been applied in empirical research not only in psychiatry and psychology, but also in other healthcare-related disciplines, such as nursing studies ( Zahavi and Martiny, 2019 ). Nevertheless, the different forms in which phenomenology has been applied in these disciplines have been also controversial due to their divergence from the original Husserlian philosophical method ( Zahavi, 2019b , d ). For instance, some have questioned whether the method of analysis proposed by Giorgi (2009 , 2012) , “descriptive phenomenological psychological method,” should be considered “phenomenological” or given another label. This method is aimed at the establishment of inclusive categories resulting from the content analysis of subjects’ descriptions. In fact, Giorgi’s method of content analysis seems closer to an adapted form of “eidetic variation” and quite different to the original Husserlian sense of the epoché , because it basically consists of summarizing the content of the interview transcript by deleting its redundancies, in order to reveal invariables or essences in “meaning” (see Irarrázaval, 2015 ). Eidetic variation is a conceptual analysis that, by imagining a phenomenon as being different from how it currently is, leads to the isolation of its essential features or aspects, in the sense that such features or aspects cannot be varied or deleted without preventing the phenomenon from being the kind of phenomenon that it is ( Parnas and Zahavi, 2002 ). Another example of a so-called applied phenomenological method is “microphenomenology” ( Petitmengin et al., 2018 ; Depraz, 2020 ). This method, like Giorgi’s, also diverges from the original Husserlian philosophical method. In addition to the method of analysis, micro-phenomenology includes some “principles” regarding the interview. Microphenomenological analysis seeks to identify generic pre-reflexive structures from descriptions of “singular” lived experiences. The pre-reflexive aspect of experience is conceived as experientially “unnoticed,” in the sense that it is not immediately accessible to reflective consciousness and verbal description. However, at least in the way Petitmengin et al. (2018) present it, what results from the analysis seems to be more a description of the figurative aspects or features of the object rather than experiential structures of the subject (for example, size, shape, temperature, color, etc.,).

Whether to find evidence supporting already-existing insights and concepts or to make it possible for new insights and concepts to emerge from the data itself, phenomenological empirical research must take on board patients’ accounts of their subjective experience. Phenomenological interviews should present clear guidelines on both how to conduct them and the qualitative methods employed in analyzing patients’ subjective experiences. The research report should follow standards for presenting qualitative research ( O’Brien et al., 2014 ). Still, the most challenging aspect of phenomenological empirical research in psychiatry and psychology is the proper method for analyzing patients’ reports. Neither the original Husserlian question of phenomenological philosophizing nor the phenomenological method of philosophical analysis appears appropriate for empirical application. There seems to be a gap between the phenomenological philosophical method and its empirical versions.

Phenomenological philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology have different aims and practical implications. This implies that the methods used in each of these research fields are necessarily different, since they serve as a means to achieve the different aims pursued by each of the corresponding disciplines. In philosophy, the phenomenological method serves as a means to reflect upon fundamental ontological questions regarding our active subjective involvement in the constitution of the world. However, in phenomenological psychiatry and psychology, the methods serve as a means to achieve more precise, complete, and differential diagnoses, with the aim of improving psychotherapy and, ultimately, patients’ well-being. Nevertheless, regardless of their divergence from the original philosophical method, Georgi’s method of content analysis (to a greater extent), and “microphenomenology” (to a lesser extent), have been quite influential, precisely because of their attempt to bridge this gap, providing a response to the need for a phenomenological method for qualitative research.

An entirely different way of dealing with this problem would not be to seek empirical adaptations of the original phenomenological method inherent in philosophy, nor to limit phenomenology to a mere descriptive task of subjective experience, but to make phenomenology a theoretical framework for empirical research, and even more, a transcendental paradigm. Although its method is certainly fundamental to it, phenomenology should not be reduced to its methodology. Phenomenology is a comprehensive theoretical framework that has been developed on the basis of serious conceptual and empirical research into the subject-world correlation ( Zahavi, 2019a ), including studies of formal structures of experience (spatiality, temporality, corporeality, intersubjectivity, and historicity), research into the modes of intentionality (perception, agency, phantasy, memory, emotions, and empathy), and psychological analyses of meaning-making processes in social interactions. Additionally, despite the different aims and methods involved, just as in phenomenological philosophy, in phenomenological psychiatry and psychology the core philosophical commitment regarding a critical stance on the conception of reality as mind-independently given is fundamental ( Zahavi, 2017 , 2019e ). Does psychiatry and psychology really need the Husserlian method to adopt the phenomenological attitude toward the conception of reality as mind-dependent? No, because this core philosophical commitment already constitutes the basis of a transcendental paradigm in phenomenological psychiatry and psychology.

Mainstream psychiatry has been developed within a natural-scientific paradigm. From the positivist viewpoint of psychiatry, the notion of normality is defined with regard to the degree of correspondence between subjective experience and objective reality. Consequently, abnormality is defined in terms of its degree of deviation from an objective reality that provides the evidence for commonsensical validity. For its part, phenomenological psychopathology approaches mental phenomena in terms of a phenomenological analysis of the patient’s subjectivity, placing the focus on the conditions of possibility of human experience in general, beyond it being diagnosed as abnormal according to common standards of objectivity. For instance, in current diagnostic systems, psychosis is diagnosed by the presence of hallucinations and delusions, as defined by a “natural attitude” that takes for granted the validity of an objective given reality. In DSM-5, hallucination is defined as a perception without object (or an error of perception) and delusion as a false belief of reality ( American Psychiatric Association, 2013 ). In contrast, from a phenomenological approach, a disturbance is not approached in terms of the clinician’s evidence of the inexistence of the object of perception or the lack of external evidence of the patient’s belief, but rather in terms of an analysis of the particular mode of intentionality that constitutes the hallucination or delusion as such. In other words, the clinician is concerned with a phenomenological analysis of the patient’s subjectivity, addressing with empathic understanding the patient’s “self-evidence” or “solipsistic truth,” correlated with the experience of hallucination or delusion, respectively. Indeed, the “external” inexistent object should provide for the clinician with evidence that hallucination is not perception, as it is impossible to have a perception without a directly present object.

Consequently, it would be misleading to conceive of hallucination as something to do with perception at all. Instead, hallucinations would have more to do with the phenomenology of fantasy, whose distinctive character is to “re-present” an object of perception that is not directly present, but absent from the actual field of perception. According to Cavallaro (2017) , it is not the presentation/re-presentation dichotomy, but what Husserl calls “ego-splitting” ( Ichspaltung ) that is crucial to distinguishing when experiencing the “quasi perception” produced by fantasy and not a perception as such. Ego-splitting makes possible the experience of the “as if” fictive character of self-awareness when fantasizing. However, when hallucinating, the patient experiences his/her own thoughts, anticipations, or imaginations just as in original experiences of perception. So, it may be posited that it is precisely this lack of the “as if” self-awareness of the “quasi perception” that lies at the core of psychosis. Such a theory would require further phenomenological research to draw more distinctions between the nature of hallucination in contrast to that of fantasy, as well as regarding other modalities of experiencing which do not have an intentional object directly present, such as anticipations, thoughts, memories, and dreams. Still, introducing the concept of “ego-splitting” as non-pathological might be challenging to traditional psychiatric concepts, especially with regard to schizophrenia.

Finally, the phenomenological attitude should not be conceived of as being like any other attitude; it is obviously not literally an attitude. The phenomenological attitude is a paradigmatic commitment of a non-pregiven reality. This core philosophical commitment is particularly important because it entails a quite unique approach to mental illness, including different conceptualizations of psychopathology, diagnosis, normality, empathy, and psychotherapy, thus leading qualitative empirical research in psychiatry and psychology toward new horizons. Moreover, the notion of suspending the natural attitude to approaching reality (including all kinds of phenomena) lies at the heart of the phenomenological framework for anyone claiming to be a phenomenologist, whether conceptual or empirical, and regardless of other particular methods and topics of study. In this way, the phenomenological attitude might be conceived of the basis of a transcendental scientific paradigm for qualitative research in psychiatry and psychology. This latter claim, which supports the idea that phenomenological psychology – in order to be properly phenomenological – must become transcendental, and the phenomenological conceptualization of hallucination as pathology of fantasy provide challenging directions for future research.

Author Contributions

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.

This article has been financially supported by Chilean National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research CONICYT PFCHA/POSTDOCTORADO EN EL EXTRANJERO BECAS CHILE/2017 – 74180011.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Keywords: applied phenomenology, methodology, qualitative research, psychiatry and psychology, phenomenological interviews

Citation: Irarrázaval L (2020) A Phenomenological Paradigm for Empirical Research in Psychiatry and Psychology: Open Questions. Front. Psychol . 11:1399. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01399

Received: 18 September 2019; Accepted: 25 May 2020; Published: 25 June 2020.

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*Correspondence: Leonor Irarrázaval, [email protected]

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This article presents the tradition of phenomenologically founded psychological research that was originally initiated by Amedeo Giorgi. This data analysis method is inseparable from the broader project of establishing an autonomous phenomenologically based human scientific psychology. After recounting the history of the method from the 1960’s to the present, we explain the rationale for why we view data collection as a process that should be adaptable to the unique mode of appearance of each particular phenomenon being researched. The substance of the article is then devoted to a detailed outline of the method’s whole-part-whole procedure of data analysis. We then offer a sample analysis of a brief description of an ordinary daydream. This is an anxiety daydream in response to the recent Covid-19 pandemic. We present this daydream analysis in full to show the concrete hands-on 5 step process through which the researcher explicated the participants’ expressions from the particular to the general. From this brief sample analysis, the researcher offers a first-person reflection on the data analysis process to offer the reader an introduction to the diacritical nature of phenomenological psychological elucidation.

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Pure phenomenology's tremendous significance for any concrete grounding of psychology is clear from the very beginning. If all consciousness is subject to essential laws in a manner similar to that in which spatial reality is subject to mathematical laws, then these essential laws will be of most fertile significance in investigating facts of the conscious life of human and brute animals.—Husserl 1917 . Footnote 1 The natural sciences were never intended to study man as a person. One need not leave the realm of science to study man adequately. We need only to broaden science itself.—Giorgi, 1970 Footnote 2

1 Introduction

Recently, there has been a healthy and long overdue discussion over how best to appraise the many new qualitative methods and how they contribute to scientific knowledge in psychology. For phenomenological psychologists the crucial challenge is, as expressed by Edmund Husserl (quoted above), to show how phenomenology provides a " concrete grounding " and " fertile significance " to the development of psychology as a science. Historically, it is well known that psychology, by and large, has imitated the methodology of the natural sciences. As expressed by Amedeo Giorgi (quoted above), by emulating physical science, psychology gave up studying human beings "as persons ." In response to this critical flaw at the heart of modern psychology, phenomenological psychologists endeavor to redirect psychology toward a more phenomenologically based direction. The centerpiece of this project has been the development of a qualitative research methodology that would make a phenomenological psychological science possible. What follows is an outline of the original research method, where we also offer an example of data analysis as carried out by the researcher.

2 Historical context: the project of a human science psychology

Before we launch into our main presentation, we believe that it is important to offer a brief historical review to illustrate the unique way in which this method developed in close collaboration with phenomenological philosophy. The following section is a synthesis that draws from historical accounts by Smith ( 2002 ), ( 2010 ), Cloonan ( 1995 ), and Churchill and Wertz’s ( 2015 ), as well as from the past experience of the authors.

In the early 1960’s Giorgi found phenomenology to be practiced in an ambivalent and often methodologically contradictory manner in European academic psychology. Similarly, American humanistic psychologists, sympathetic to phenomenology, were active critics of the deterministic approaches of mainstream psychology. But they, nonetheless, like their European counterparts, also defaulted to non-phenomenological measurement techniques when it came to their own research designs. It was as a response to this situation that the first systematically phenomenological psychology program was founded at Duquesne University in the early 1960’s. In this context Giorgi and his colleagues articulated this distinctly phenomenological way of doing psychological research—a methodology consistent with its phenomenological foundations. While Giorgi took the lead role in the development of this methodology, it needs to be stressed that this a was also an interdisciplinary community endeavor that took place between the philosophy and psychology departments at Duquesne University spanning the 1960’s to the late 1980’s. John Scanlon, the translator of Husserl’s phenomenological psychology lectures, was particularly supportive as a consultant to Giorgi and his colleagues during this period—as was Richard Rojcewicz, Al Lingis, Lester Embree, and several non-Duquesne but sympathetic scholars such as Martin Dillon, William Richardson and many others whom, records show, were often invited as guest speakers and consultants. Also, the psychology curriculum required students to take a minimum of two courses in modern philosophy, whereas the psychology faculty consistently audited philosophy courses.

In 1970 Giorgi launched the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology , which was at the outset a joint venture with European phenomenologically oriented psychologists and psychiatrists, as well as phenomenological philosophers. The journal was initially co-edited by Georges Thines and Carl F. Graumann. Serving on the first editorial board were Europeans such as Blankenburg, Buytendijk, Gurwitsch, van den Berg, van Breda, and Straus. The key point here is that the work being done on the development of the research methodology was part of a radically interdisciplinary and international project from the very beginning. As part of the overall project, Giorgi also founded the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center . This research center also carries a copy of Husserl’s unpublished papers from the archives in Leuven, as well as the archives of Gurwitsch, Straus, Strasser, Bouman, Heidegger’s Marburg lectures, Buytendijk’s Pensée Repensée , and over 20,000 volumes, making it the largest collection of existential-phenomenological literature in the world. At the official inception of the center, Giorgi invited John Salis as his co-director.

Giorgi's seminal work, Psychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenology-Based Approach ( 1970 ) expressed a phenomenological response to the historical situation of psychology as a natural science. This also served as a foundational text for the psychology curriculum at Duquesne. Here, as a psychologist, he first proposed the necessity of a rigorously procedural, qualitative research method for a human scientific psychology. It made the appeal for an overall paradigmatic unity of “approach, method, and content” as the basis for a non-naturalistic psychology—an authentic Geisteswissenschaft or ‘human scientific’ psychology. Giorgi insisted that if psychology is to be true to its own subject matter, the scientific study of humans as persons, then the meaning of term 'empirical' in psychology must by necessity be 'broadened' beyond empiricism’s restriction to the sensory (see also, Giorgi, 1971 , 2009 ). A phenomenologically empirical science would be inclusive of all experience. This would include (in Husserl’s terms) the ir-real, or the more than sensory aspects of experience, not just the real or sense-based measurables of classical empiricism. The vision was to employ the overall phenomenological paradigm to ground a human scientific psychology, a scientific enterprise autonomous from the naturalistic juggernaut of mainstream psychology.

Over this 50-year history this methodological approach has been known by various names: the phenomenological psychological method, the existential-phenomenological psychological method, the qualitative phenomenological method, human science psychology and even “the Duquesne method.” The founding Duquesne faculty mostly preferred the term “ Existential-Phenomenological Psychology ” to highlight the influence of all main continental thinkers: Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty—as well as Husserl and many others. The term “existential” also expressed their emphasis on concrete psychological situatedness in contrast to transcendental phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenological psychologists who received their graduate training from within the Duquesne research tradition, such as, Frederick Wertz (Wertz et al., 2011 ) used the term “Phenomenological Psychological Method,” whereas Scott Churchill ( 2022 ) maintains the original Duquesne term “Existential Phenomenological Research.” As we will see ahead, it was only in 2009 that Giorgi committed to the nomenclature of “the descriptive phenomenological method in psychology.” The emphasis on description was done to offer a counterpoint to the penchant among qualitative researchers, often influenced by cultural postmodernism, to take the extreme position that 'everything is an interpretation'—something rejected by Giorgi as the imposition of a hermeneutic universalism (Giorgi, 1992 ). Footnote 3 However, while generally based on Husserl’s approach, it is very important to highlight how in his 2009 text he never claimed his method to be identical to Husserl's. It was instead it was a modification of Husserlian philosophical methodology to adapt to the human scientific context of the discipline of psychology (Giorgi, 2014 , 2021 ). Footnote 4 In addition, Giorgi ( 2006 , 2010 , 2018 ) has also made several critical comparisons with other qualitative phenomenological methods as well as replies to philosophers (Giorgi, 2017 , 2020 , 2021 ). Several of his psychology colleagues and ex-students have developed variations of the method. Davidson ( 1988 , 2003 , 2021 ), for example, offers such a variation, to which both Giorgi ( 2020 , 2021 ) and Wertz ( 2016 ) are sympathetic. Churchill ( 2022 ) maintains the core Husserlian elements while complimenting them with Heideggerian insights. But all such variations maintain most of the key components of the overall method—as shall be outlined ahead.

Across the development of this research tradition, there have been innumerable studies published in various psychology journals and books based on this overall approach. This research tradition is cited as a significant development within the history of modern psychology (see Brennan & Houde, 2017 ). Important theoretical and original qualitative research findings were published in the four volume, Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology (Giorgi et al., 1971 , 1975 , 1979 , 1983 ), as well as the edited volume Phenomenology and Psychological Research (Giorgi, 1985 ). The latter contains paradigmatic empirical studies on learning (by Giorgi) criminal victimization (by Wertz), thinking while playing chess (by Aanstoos), and self-deception (by Fischer). A brief representative sampling that illustrates the range of recent research outputs is as follows: Living through positive experiences of psychotherapy (Giorgi & Gallegos, 2005 ), Lived persistent meaning of early emotional memories (Englander, 2007 ), Art appreciation (Roald, 2008 ), Pivotal moments in therapy (B. Giorgi, 2011 ), Postpartum depression (Røseth et al., 2011 ), Autism and culture (Desai et al., 2012 ), Leading a police vehicle pursuit (Broomé, 2013 ), Social anxiety (Beck, 2013 ), The suffering of older adults (Morrissey, 2015 ), The beginning of an extra-marital affair (Zapien, 2016 ), Mental health and the workplace (Tangvald-Pedersen and Bongaardt, 2017 ) Disturbances in maternal affection (Røseth and Bongaardt, 2019 ) Cross cultural learning (DeRobertis, 2017 , 2020 ), and Black men’s experience of police harassment (Vogel, 2021 ).

3 Data collection

Since this research tradition is oriented toward data analysis, this section on data collection will be brief and limited to some basic principles. Because psychologists are usually already well trained in interview techniques (Englander, 2020 ; Giorgi, 2020 ), it is natural that interviews will be commonly used to collect descriptive material. However, we stress that the method is not, by itself, an interview method. Footnote 5 Instead, each data collection strategy is developed in an idiosyncratic way by first understanding how each phenomenon best reveals itself in its own unique mode of appearance (Englander, 2020 ). For instance, when studying ‘thinking while playing chess’ Aanstoos ( 1985 ), found interviewing, by itself, to be insufficient for accessing the subtle psychological nuances of playing chess. To accommodate this phenomenon, Aanstoos ( 1983 ), developed a 'think aloud method' where one player freely spoke his thoughts into a recorder during a chess game while the opponent had his ears covered. In other words, the principle here was to design the data collection process by attending closely to the particularity of the phenomenon. Typically, the phenomenon is carefully circumscribed in advance through pilot studies, field work and clinical contexts from which the researcher can uncover the ways to best solicit descriptions and expressions that can most successfully reveal deeper psychological meanings.

Our main point here is that there should be a ‘custom fit’ between the phenomenon and the data collection design to solicit maximally good descriptions of the phenomenon within the context of everyday life. Strategies for collecting such descriptions should not be presumed beforehand and imposed on the phenomenon. The data collection design should fit the phenomenon instead of the phenomenon being forced to fit the design . Concretely, the phenomenon or related phenomena should be carefully studied through the trial-and-error process of pilot studies before any final decisions are made regarding data collection strategies.

Having made these points, some general recommendations have been laid out for data collection procedures. Drawing from existential-phenomenological philosophers such as Sartre ( 1962 , 28–29) and Merleau-Ponty ( 1962 ), phenomenological psychologists acknowledge that a person is always in a situation. At the start of any data collection, the research focus is on a concrete situation in which the participant has directly experienced the phenomenon under investigation. A concrete situation is not an idea, an attitude or anything abstract and conceptual—it is an experience that is directly lived. This acknowledgement of the situated concrete nature of psychological phenomena is another reason why data collection designs, again, need to be unique to the phenomenon and independently ‘custom-designed’ by the researcher. Or put another way, each study seeks the mode of investigation that allows the phenomenon to best express itself in its own distinctive way.

4 Data analysis

For a chronological development of the methodology, see Giorgi ( 1975a , 1975b , 1985 , 1997 , 2009 , 2018 ).

This is a ‘whole-part-whole’ qualitative method that includes steps where the researcher adopts the phenomenological psychological attitude and applies the technique of eidetic variation. Again, in contrast to philosophical analysis, phenomenological psychology begins and ends with meanings as lived and contextualized within the mundane, everyday lifeworld.

4.1 Concrete 5 step method of data analysis

The data analysis has five steps. Over the course of nearly five decades of experience we have learned that success with this method is best achieved by applying each step in a generally sequential relation to the other steps. In this way, all five steps work as an integral whole. The steps that follow where adopted from a recent publication by Giorgi et al. ( 2017 ). Having said this, it is important to also point out that these steps have both a linier and non-linier dimension to them. The linear sequential ‘steps’ offers an initial structure and organization that can also liberate the researcher to move back and forth, reviewing previous steps and revising them in relation to new discoveries and intuitions. In actual concrete practice, the process becomes more like a working draft or scaffold to work from. Ahead, in our discussion of the case analysis, this non-linier dimension will be more fully addressed.

4.2 Step 1. Initial reading for a sense of the whole

As this is a whole-part-whole method, the procedure begins with the ‘sense of the whole,’ proceeds with an analysis of the parts, and concludes with a newly elucidated ‘sense of the whole.’ Thus, the preliminary ‘appreciation’ of the entire description is important because it prepares and assists the researcher for the next steps where one studies its parts. This ‘sense of a whole’ should not be confused with hypothesis, conclusions or theorizations. Instead, it should be seen as a tentative understanding that is only an opening prelude to a relationship with the descriptive material. Importantly, it is this ‘sense of the whole,’ provided by the participant’s full descriptive account, that will act as the background to the diacritical figure-ground analysis carried out during the latter steps. In concrete practical terms, the researcher reviews the transcription (or audio or video) several times before starting Step 2. Again, this first step establishes the figure-ground framework that will drive the part-whole analysis of the entire method as every part, or meaning unit, will usually be explicated in terms of its relationship with the whole of the description.

4.3 Step 2. Adopting the phenomenological psychological attitude

Adopting the overall phenomenological attitude or ‘way of seeing’ is what distinguishes this method from other forms of non-phenomenological qualitative research. Importantly, and this can’t be stressed enough from the onset, in our work as social scientists doing life-world qualitative research, the epoché and the reduction function in a different context then in philosophy. Footnote 7 So, modified to accommodate the psychological sphere of interest, this attitude is essential to the next steps of the data analysis. Most would agree that time needs to be dedicated to the study authoritative primary sources in phenomenology to fully understand the nature of this phenomenological approach to research. This involves, (1) the epoché (or suspension) of the natural attitude, and (2) an assumption of the phenomenological psychological reduction.

With the practice of the epoché we try to just let the experience of something arise in its “givenness.” Footnote 8 In Husserl’s terms this is a ‘putting out of play’ or ‘parenthesizing’ of any positions of belief or doubt toward the world as independent of our consciousness of the world. This ordinary everyday position towards reality is what phenomenologists call the ‘natural attitude.’ A corollary of the natural attitude is the naturalistic attitude which is the commonsense belief that all things are ultimately explained by the physical causes of natural science. So, the psychologist appropriates the epoché for several reasons, (1) it clears the way for us to better understand how the participants are experiencing the world, self and others, and (2) it liberates us to better describe other people’s experiences without falling back on physical explanations, rationalizations, stereotypes or explaining them away with hypothetical models and concepts. (3). It allows researchers to become more aware of how, as Merleau-Ponty ( 1962 , p xiii) put it, one’s own ‘intentional threads’ are themselves influencing the phenomenon. (4). It invites researchers to overcome prejudices and doubts with regard to their own aptitudes for intuitive imagination. Put another way, the epoché opens us to see how the world is profusely intertwined with both the researchers and the research participant's experience of it, characterizing a radically non-dogmatic and open-minded perspective towards psychological research.

We will next go into some detail on the nature of the reduction in phenomenological psychology because it is here that phenomenological psychologists make significant and necessary modifications to the reduction, and in turn the epoché , as originally expressed by Husserl and philosophical phenomenologists. The phenomenological psychological reduction is what one does after first understanding the perspective of the epoché. Here we ‘reduce’ or restrict our frame of reference to a particular region of meaning. The psychological, in this sense, can be viewed as a particular region of science that is a psychological reduction. In the human scientific context of a qualitative psychology, a psychological reduction takes on a different meaning than Husserl’s original incomplete depiction of the psychological reduction. Husserl saw the psychological reduction as both a propaedeutic steppingstone towards the transcendental (or philosophical) reduction, Footnote 9 as much as he also saw it as the basis for new kind of psychological science—as we are applying it here. However, not being a psychologist, Husserl was not able to offer detail on how to apply the psychological reduction in an applied human science context. It is here where Giorgi's modification of the psychological reduction incorporates the doings of science to qualitative psychological research. The psychological region pertains to a particular domain of lived experience—an experience that is neither abstractly conceptual, nor objectively physical; it is concretely and personally lived, by a particular person, always socially engaged, in a particular situation in everyday social life, in space, time and history.

In this sense, the psychological reduction maintains an intimate but distinctively delicate, even tricky, relationship with the natural attitude. While philosophers may be disinterested in the natural attitude in order to pursue other matters, the phenomenological psychologist is studying exactly the natural attitude itself. This mundane world of everyday common-sense beliefs is precisely the subject matter of the phenomenological psychologist—and any other phenomenologically identified social scientists. In this sense, the psychological position transforms the nature of the epoché. Instead of the philosopher’s full suspension of the world of the natural attitude, the psychologist takes strong interest in exactly this world of the natural attitude. This means that the psychologist performs an epoché that is both in and out of the natural attitude. Within the psychological reduction we ‘step back’ from the natural attitude in order to study its structures. Again, the phenomenological psychologist is cognizant of the faith of the assumed world of the natural attitude but still studies this worldview not unlike the empathic manner of an anthropologist, doing field work, who both spontaneously participates in village life, like a fellow villager, while also maintaining his social scientific perspective. So, unlike the faith of the participant, the researcher’s is a faith that regularly, and methodically, steps back and questions itself. These points will be further developed in our reflection on how this attitude, particular to the phenomenological psychologists, was applied to the data analysis process performed on our sample case description.

Another aspect of this circumscribed 'psychological' region is that it pertains to the domain of relevance that is, itself, the ‘discipline’ of psychology Footnote 10 and what Giorgi ( 2009 ) has referred to as the 'disciplinary perspective'. Giorgi suggests that this ‘disciplinary’ reduction to the domain of the psychological (2009) should be most accurately depicted as a human scientific reduction. Footnote 11 In stark contrast to the empirical theory of science that drives mainstream psychology, the approach provided here allows researchers to explicate psychological meanings in their morphological, provisional, phenomenological sense.

4.4 Step 3. Dividing data into meaning units

This next step is motivated by practicality. Attempting to analyze, for example, 30–40 pages of transcribed interview material all at once is a daunting task. This is precisely why a data analysis method is helpful. Nevertheless, to stay consistent with a phenomenological theory of science, Step 3 is carried out from within the phenomenological attitude. For example, while reading through the recorded material, the researcher breaks down the material into smaller manageable parts to allow for a closer and more detailed focus in the upcoming Step 4. By phenomenologically elucidating the parts, the researcher is also able to begin distinguishing the participants’ meanings from how these appear in the natural attitude. This allows the expression by the participants to later (i.e., in Step 4) be explicated into phenomenologically psychologically sensitive description. The material is thus broken into manageable sections referred to as “meaning units.” The length of a meaning unit can vary from one sentence to an entire paragraph or (on rare occasions) a whole page of material. The length of meaning units can also vary from researcher to researcher, and such variation does not necessarily have any bearing on the general findings at the end of the analysis. Often the material can be easily differentiated. The main point is that too large a meaning unit can be unwieldy to analysis. It is also important to point out that not all meaning units are essential to the general structure of the phenomenon. However, all meaning units need to be analyzed (in Step 4). This last point is important, because sometimes when the researcher relaxes the epoché and returns to the natural attitude, some meaning units might mistakenly appear redundant. Nevertheless, when analyzed carefully, there is always the possibility of discovery.

Typically, researchers break this into two side-by-side columns that are written out in text form, referred to as Column 1 and Column 2 . This two-column transcription procedure serves several purposes. It conveniently organizes the process for the researcher and, importantly, it makes the data analysis process transparent and thus open for critique by other phenomenological researchers. As an additional procedure to this step, Giorgi also suggests that one modifies the participants’ expression into third person expressions. However, this is only a suggestion intended for researchers who are having difficulty in seeing the difference between the individual (or the idiographic level) and the phenomenon (the nomothetic level). Another discretionary modification is to extend columns, beyond the usual two, into three or even four columns. This was employed in the daydream analysis ahead where the researcher found a third column to be of value as it allowed him to visually check his more generalized transformations with the original meaning units—right before his eyes.

4.5 Step 4. Transformation of everyday expression to psychological meaning

The relationship between Column 1 (i.e., everyday expression, or naive description, of the participant) and Column 2 (i.e., phenomenological description of psychological meaning) is distinctive to this method. Here one carefully elucidates the participants’ essential meanings into generalizable terms within the domain of psychological relevance—as expressed above. We grasp and draw out the fuller psychological meanings embedded within the everyday description. Now, it is in this particular step that the phenomenological attitude takes center stage and is explicitly put into practice for the purpose of a phenomenological psychological analysis. In addition, in order to seek the general meanings within the lived experience this step also includes the tool of eidetic variation . This means that the researcher needs to maintain a general focus on the phenomenon under investigation while carrying out this detailed analysis. In this context, phenomenological elucidation is not a matter of mere notetaking, summarizing, annotating or just condensing meanings. It is more about how the researcher adjusts one’s mindset so as to allow the psychologically relevant meanings to emerge to one’s consciousness. In a certain sense, one opens oneself, or renders oneself a vehicle to the fuller meanings of the participant’s naive description, but always with a focus on the phenomenon. This is a receptive or ‘discovery’ mode of consciousness—not one of actively applying ideas, theories or concepts. One can understand this position as a contemplative openness to the givens of the other’s experience as it emerges through the participants’ expressions. There is an imaginative participation in the subjects’ descriptions not unlike the engagement one experiences when reading a novel, a poem, or any act of expressive art. There is here an ironically 'focused openness' or put another way: a resolute receptiveness. One converts the participant’s expressions (as conveyed within the natural attitude) into phenomenologically clarified psychological meanings by carefully following the intentionality in the participants' expression. The watchwords here are: elucidation, illumination, and explication. Here, we do not add to what our participants say, instead we bring forth the fuller meanings.

In addition, one does not need to restrict oneself to only one column during the analysis. It is perfectly feasible for the researcher to extend the analysis of the initial meaning unit into several levels of elucidation—such as a column 3 or 4. As noted in the previous section on Step 3, this 4th step is also about the spirit of transparency in science (similar to how one shows one's work when doing mathematics). By extending the analysis into stages or levels of analysis, one is showing colleagues exactly how one has reached these extended levels of generalization.

4.6 Step 5. Returning to the whole and moving toward the general structure

It is at this phase that the researcher moves from a part-whole eidetic analysis to a new focus on the whole again. But now we have a new whole, a whole that is the end result of this entire procedure. Remaining within the phenomenological psychological attitude, as described above, the researcher’s intimate engagement with the meaning unit analysis now becomes an act of synthesis of the parts together into what is usually a temporally sequential narrative. The watchword here is structure. A structure is understood in gestalt terms as a whole, but a whole composed only of essential parts. The idea here is that if one where to hypothetically remove one of the parts, then the rest of the structure would fall apart. Therefore, the researcher wants to be prudent to not overstuff a structure. A good structure should follow the elegance of simplicity—as much as reasonable. Furthermore, the features or constituent parts should be invariant. By invariant we do not mean universal or absolute. We are fully aware that human phenomena are contingent to history and culture. We only mean that an invariant psychological structure should “hold together” within this culture at this point in history. Within these parameters we think it reasonable that generalized psychological claims can be made. Footnote 12

It is important to note that most other qualitative research methods present their conclusions in terms of ‘themes.’ But because this approach emphasizes phenomena as totalities, i.e. as structures, we avoid any overemphasis on themes and prefer to comment on the structure of the phenomenon as a totality as much as possible. When we do discuss parts, we prefer the term ‘constituents’ to stress their relatedness to the whole of the structure. It is conventional for many other methods to present to readers curated direct quotes from their participants. But because we have already performed a very close analysis of the direct expressions of the participants in the earlier steps of the data analysis, we prefer to offer readers the more structural, or general, levels of meaning in any discussion of our results as will be seen ahead when we discuss the results of our analysis of an experience of daydreaming. In short, our inclination is to offer readers prepared or explicated data instead of curated raw data.

4.7 Situated structures

As an optional procedure one can add an extra step between the meaning unit analysis (step 4) and the General Structure (step 5). While Giorgi stressed the general structure, most advanced researchers find it effective to add this intermediary step—as demonstrated in the analysis offered ahead. Footnote 13 This can support the eventual goal of generality and can be an extremely helpful ‘bridge step’ toward the general structural description. But it must be stressed that to remain only on the level of situated individual experience would miss the key purpose of the method—which is to achieve a general (inter-subjective) structural description of the phenomenon. Having said this, a situated structure can be very rich in life world details and remarkably illuminative in its own right. One could depict this as a structure on the idiographic or individual level. This is often popular with clinical psychologists who prefer an individual ‘case-study’ level of understanding. But unlike ‘clinical’ case-studies, this is a research phenomenon which is different from a diagnostic, or therapeutic relationship. Here the research intention is paramount—not the clinical intention. Again, this is the elucidation of an individual participant’s experience performed as a step before moving to the general structure. This would be an essential structure of the invariant aspects of an individual person’s experience of the phenomenon. In more simple language this is a basic summary of the psychologically relevant aspects of this particular person’s experience of the phenomenon. Developing situated structures from three or more research participants can be a very helpful way to eidetically scrutinize the phenomenon as experienced by all of the participants. But when it comes to groups, it is important to emphasize that within the phenomenological approach to science, eidetic comparison (Wertz, 2010 ) should not be confused with statistical comparison. Though more challenging (especially for newcomers), in phenomenological psychology an eidetic analysis could just as well be performed on a single participant as on a group. But having made this qualification, a group of any number of situated structures is always a great support to one’s eidetic analysis towards generalizability. Footnote 14

4.8 The general structure

At this point, these phenomenologically elucidated ‘parts’ of the data analysis (including the situated structures) are brought back together into a new whole . Phenomenological psychology is definitively a search for psychological essences or what we prefer to call general invariant structures. Husserl called this ‘eidetic analysis’ and the primary technique he used for this level of analysis he called eidetic or ‘imaginary variation.’ In this analysis, one imaginatively reviews the phenomenologically clarified parts of the previous analysis as achieved in step 4, with an eye for intuiting a new whole. Again, this is a discovery frame of mind where I render myself open to the continually emerging intuitions and patterns in the elucidated data as they give themselves to my awareness. In other words, it is not an empirical summary or the common denominator of facts across the cases, but another level of the analysis. Specific to this level of the analysis is the technique of imagining the phenomenon in its various profiles, angles or possibilities. For example, as a researcher I can ask myself if the structure of this phenomenon is possible without any of the particular constituent parts that I have discovered during my analysis in Step 4? I may even imagine adding new parts that were not explicitly expressed in the data but ‘apperceptively’ or intuitively suggested by the data. To reiterate, in contrast to most other qualitative approaches, the general structure is an integral whole and is never just a series of separate themes. The key idea here is that a structure is a full gestalt , a whole, or a totality that dissipates when a part is removed. Therefore, it is important to edit a general structure with rigor and integrity and to delete all that is unessential to the systemic pattern that makes the phenomenon what it is. The general structure is typically narrated in the present tense—though not always. Sometimes a phenomenon may split off into types or variants. In such cases one could have two or three general structures, representing different ‘types.’ Therefore, forcing a closure by applying a psychological theory is not an option. The findings, as supported by the analysis, can at a later stage in the discussion section (of the research report) be presented in dialogue with established psychological theories (‘backloading’ in current nomenclature) and other research results (See Fig.  1 ).

Overview—flowchart of data analysis process (from Giorgi et al., 2017 ). R researcher, P participant

5 Case example

What follows is a brief case example of a phenomenological psychological data analysis. Again, unlike philosophy where the research is done in a solitary first person manner, in phenomenological psychology we take a second person position. We see ourselves as participants —not mere observers—as we try to grasp the fuller meaning of other people’s concrete descriptions as expressed within the natural attitude of everyday life (Englander, 2020 ; Giorgi, 2009 ). We make no demands on our participants to take the reflective attitude of the practicing phenomenologist. Instead, only the researcher is responsible for taking the phenomenological stance as he or she reads the expressions of the participant. Here the data analysis is conducted within the tension of two intertwined goals: to be faithful to the intentional meanings as expressed while also deepening their meaning through their re-expression within the phenomenological psychological attitude—as performed in meaning unit analysis (step 4) and the development of structures (step 5). This, again, is what we call elucidation or explication . This is a fidelity that also takes us into a deeper understanding of the expressed intentions our participants. This is exactly the power of the epoché (within the psychological standpoint) as applied to the grasping or bringing-forth of psychological meaning. Like the way certain artists can transform the taken-for-granted experience of an ordinary object, such as an apple in a still-life painting, into an apple seen afresh ‘as if for the first time,’ so does the phenomenological psychologist strive to bring out the psychological meaning of the participant’s experience of the phenomenon.

The sample presented here is taken from the context of an ongoing research project on daydreaming that is currently replicating and updating a previously published study (Morley, 1998 , 1999 , 2003 ) through fresh interview material. As explained above, the data collection process was customized to suit the unique nature of the phenomenon. Here, in this particular research context, the procedure for collecting daydream reports has been to first request a self-written protocol from persons who are not themselves directly involved with psychology. A formal protocol question prompt (see below) was given to the participant to help guide the written description. As mentioned above, the reason for beginning with a written description is that, as an imaginary phenomenon, daydreaming can become unwieldy and difficult to articulate during an interview. Through pilot trials we have learned that written descriptions help the participant to ground or anchor their memory of the daydream. It then serves as an organizing point of reference for the interview—without imposing any leading external influences. Then, the researcher and participant begin the interview itself by re-reading the written protocol together to refresh their memories of the event. The researcher initiates the interview by asking the participant to take the initiative to express what, in the written description, he or she feels is most in need of elaboration or expansion. After the participants have offered further elaborations on what stands out as most important to them, the researcher will then pose questions from an informal semi-structured check-list of points of special phenomenological interest to the researcher. Specifically, the researcher asks for fuller descriptions of existential constants such as space, time, embodiment, social relations, sense of reality, and sense of self as experienced during the various temporal phases of the daydream. The actual interview approach, for this particular phenomenon, will vary across a spectrum from a gentle reiterative style to intensive and challenging inquiries Footnote 15 —depending on circumstances. As described above, this data collection method was developed through the researcher’s intimate relationship with the phenomenon over time.

A full data analysis of an entire interview would surfeit the space of this presentation. So it is for this reason that we chose to offer a concise sample of the analysis process drawn from material that was recently collected in the form of an initial written protocol. While not as detailed and spontaneous as the interview that followed, the written protocol still offers the reader a rich “sense of the whole’ that allows for a faithful sample the data analysis process. So, though brief, this was still a reasonably good description that offers a worthy example of the whole-part-whole dynamic central to the analysis process of this method. Choosing a brief sample also expresses the authors’ confidence that even the smallest fragment of an everyday type of description will explode in meaning when approached from within the phenomenological psychological attitude. Not unlike how the sensory empirical world burst open with the introduction of telescopes and microscopes, so does the human life world open up before us when beheld from within the openness provided by the lens of the overall phenomenological perspective as expressed above.

Having said this, we again caution that as a sample data analysis it does not benefit from the detail offered by the follow-up interview. This small sample is offered for strictly didactic reasons. More importantly, it also stands alone without the fuller dimensionality offered by the intersubjective eidetic analysis at least two other individual case examples to which it’s whole and constituent parts could be eidetically compared. It was for this reason that we restricted the title of the phenomenon from “daydreaming” to “an anxiety daydream” to reflect the particularity of the one sample. But even without the intersubjective corroboration of at least two other daydream descriptions, we hope readers will agree that it can be surprising to see what can emerge when using only one case example.

To reiterate, in brief, we begin with the whole daydream description as depicted in the written protocol. After reading for the whole we then break it into parts—or meaning units. Then, we phenomenologically elucidate each of the parts, or meaning units, though the technique of using columns—in this case we used 3 columns (most researchers only use two). Finally, we return to a renewed sense of the whole in both of the situated and general structures. The situated structure, like a case study, is idiographic to the particular description while the general structure is an attempt to achieve a nomothetic statement on the phenomenon of anxious daydreaming. In this instance, the general structure will be restricted to the meanings elicited from this single, and very brief, case example and will therefore be somewhat limited and tentative. It’s very important to note that in most research instances the general structure will be an eidetic analysis based on the various other individual situated structures. The general structure corresponds to what one could call the results of the research process. While the constituent parts of the whole structure will be discussed in most research reports, unlike most other qualitative methods that discuss themes , typically supported with selected quotes, we prefer to keep the whole structure of the experience as the primary reference point.

Ahead, within the analysis we will refer to the participant as ‘P.’ Later, in the discussion, we will address the participant through the pseudonym of Ashling.

5.1 Written daydream protocol—initial protocol prompt to the participant (P)

Please concretely describe a situation in which you experienced a daydream. Please describe what was happening when the daydream began, what the daydream was about, what it was like while having the daydream, and how the daydream came to an end. Please try to be as concrete and detailed in your description as possible.

5.2 Ashling’s written protocol description—including step 3, marking the meaning units

On March 14, 2020, I was in Tepoztlán, Mexico. Trump had recently announced he would be suspending travel from Europe to the US due to COVID-19. I had just moved to Mexico a few months prior. I feared if the closure was happening with Europe it would most likely be happening with Mexico very soon, a golden moment for Trump to assert his plan for the border with Mexico to be even more impenetrable. As we drove back from Tepoztlán to Mexico City and night was falling, I started to gaze out the window, daydreaming, as we passed the silhouetted Popocatépetl volcano in the distance.

I started thinking about how I would get back to my family in the US if flights were suspended with Mexico. As we continued to drive I thought about if we didn’t stop in Mexico city but just continued all the way to the border (about a 15 h drive). In my daydream I imagined arriving at the border and that there would be mayhem, cars piled up for miles and the border patrol not allowing anyone across. The border agents were armed and aggressive and unreachable. I imagined the reasons I would give, that my family needed me etc., but reasoning with them was not working. And I envisioned somehow managing to get past them as they were distracted by the chaos, and the relief felt by speeding into the US away from the border and onward towards home.

I felt anxious imagining the border patrol and their dominance, their potential to shoot us when we sped past, defying their rules of closure. But I then felt relief at the outcome of getting past, of fighting our way in and across and making it to a place of safety.

When my partner and I later got to the apartment in Mexico City that night I looked into flights to get to Boston where we would be in a familiar place during this most intensive and uncertain time. My good friend called me from Rennes in France and told me how bad it was, that death rates were rising, and how she wasn't leaving the house at all. She advised me to leave quickly and that to have a garden was a saving grace for her, and that at least in Boston I would have a garden. I booked my flight and packed a small case. I daydreamed again as I looked around the apartment, that 10 or so years would pass, and I would finally be able to come back and all my things would be here but between and around old weeds and crumbled walls and cobwebs, a scene left untouched and abandoned.

5.3 Meaning unit analysis

5.4 situated structure of an anxiety daydream.

Daydreaming for this person was an imaginary manifestation of her feelings of anxiety. By manifesting this anxiety as a dramatically staged scenario, she was able to live-out or play-out the enactment of her anxiety and its eventual resolution. This particular daydream occurred as a person’s affective response to the threat of having her freedom of movement, across international borders, curtailed or restricted by political forces beyond her control. In particular she feared being cut-off and separated from her home and family during a time of great uncertainty. These strongly felt emotions around the experience of constraint or restriction had no means of expression within the context of a long road trip in a car. Turning her gaze, away from the car interior, out the window towards the twilight horizon of the landscape, P entered into an imagined scenario where she is in the same car but has arrived at the international border between her foreign country of residence and her desired home country. The daydream manifests the person’s own momentary existential situation as a scene of chaos and mayhem enforced by the imposing, threatening and impersonal agents of power i.e. the border guards who refuse to allow her to cross the border into her home country. P imagines trying to reason or negotiate with the guards but realizes that dialogue is futile in this situation. Again, these are circumstances out of her control. As a staged enactment or ‘metaphorization’ of her actual existential situation, the daydream is both the expression and revelation of her life situation. It allows her to “express” her immersion in the situation which also, in a reversible way, offers her a reflective distance to “see” the feeling of restriction that has occupied her. As both the expression and revelation of her present life situation the daydream is, in this sense, lived ambiguously as both an active and passive experience. These ambiguously dual, yet interwoven, perspectives are implicit to her daydreaming experience. Next, within the imaginary narrative of the daydream, the daydreaming/daydreamed person commits an act of defiant transgression. P shifts the narrative from that of passive casualty of powers beyond her control, to one where she takes charge, or assumes agency, by choosing the extreme risk of speeding past the distracted guards and thus flouting their overbearing authority by driving across the border without their sanctioned permission. By taking matters into her own hands and transgressing the rules, P escapes confinement and experiences the satisfaction that comes with the security of having returned to her home country. The daydream concludes with feelings of relief. The experience of this daydream allowed P to articulate her desire to return home to her native country during this time of uncertainty—a desire that was converted into an actual concrete decision to eventually book an airline flight home to family and friends.

5.5 Tentative general structure of an anxiety daydream

Daydreaming emerges in a situation of unfulfilling circumstances. In the case of anxiety, it appears in the form on an ominous and yet opaque threat to one’s well-being. This feeling presents itself as a demand for action—to seek the source of the threat and to overcome it. However, this demand for action cannot be achieved in the current situation as it is impeded by circumstances where no real behavioral action is possible. This becomes a tension between the feeling’s demand for action, regarding the ominous threat, and its restraining context. The person turns attention away from the immediately restraining situation by seeking out and shifting attention to another horizonal field of focus. It is here that the emotion takes the course of expressing itself through the medium of an imaginary scenario that opens up an opportunity for the fulfillment of the emotion. The emotion transforms into a world scenario where it is expressed in the form of an enacted narrative drama. The person assumes a dual intentional role as both the author/narrator of the dramatic scenario and well as the actor immersed within the dramatic action. The emotion is now lived in a narrative context that allows the possibility of its fulfilment. As a staged enactment the daydream can become a living metaphor of the person’s actual existential situation. The daydream scenario can be both the expression and revelation of one’s emotional situation. Its expression makes it possible to “see” one’s immersion in the emotional dramatic scenario. It can offer the opportunity for a reflective distance from the feeling of restriction that had previously occupied the person. As both expression and revelation of the person’s present life situation daydreaming reveals an ambiguous interplay between both active and passive aspects of experience. These ambiguously interwoven perspectives vary between being implicit or explicit to the daydreamer. Though daydreaming takes place within an imaginary region of experience, this region is always also interfused within one’s life historical horizons—always expressing one’s life projects and goals.

6 Commentary on the analysis

In any phenomenological psychological research report, there is an extensive theoretical discussion of the results (i.e. the constituent parts of general and situated structures) with the phenomenological and natural scientific literature. We have much to say here, especially with regard to such constituents as ‘dual intentionality’ ‘multiple realities, the ‘affective-imaginary dynamic,’ the “linkage of expression with revelation’ and, of course, the comparison of these findings with current studies in cognitive science (such as the default mode network). But alas, as the purpose of this essay is didactic with regard to the method, and due to the limits of space, we must defer this full dialogue to a future publication.

Due to the brevity of the written description, and the very fact of there being only a single participant, the researcher can only modestly offer a highly tentative sample general structure. However, despite its brevity, the participant, whom we will here call ‘Ashling,’ offered a rich and full description and the researcher feels confident that the situated structure was faithful to the participants experience.

6.1 The non-linier dimension of data analysis

While the researcher initially worked with fidelity to the 5 step method, it is also important to note that there was a significantly non-linier dimension to this process. This was especially the case when it came to the composition of the situated and general structures. Once the meaning units were demarcated, the process towards the situated and eventual general structures took on a life of its own. In other words, while the meaning units established a framework for data analysis, once the 3 column framework was established, and the participant’s expressions were laid out before his eyes , the researcher began a back-and-forth process of checking, rechecking, reflecting and intuitively linking the meanings into fuller wholes and patterns. To use an imperfect metaphor, we can compare this explication process to what is called a detective’s “crazy wall” that is used to help interpret and understand a crime case. From detective stories and movies, we are familiar with how the investigator will post pieces of data and information across a wallboard, or sometimes a city map. The detective can then use this to meaningfully link the information and datapoints with connecting strings. Seeing the constituent parts ‘before his eyes’ helps the investigator to make the ‘meaningfully intuitive connections’ that lead to better understanding of the case. Obviously, this helps the investigator to step back and see the dynamic relation between the parts and the whole and it is from this perspective that insights and discoveries can arise. This is exactly the benefit of meaning unit analysis.

6.2 The diacritical aspect of data analysis

To reiterate, the psychological phenomenological attitude is focused on understanding the particular experience of a particular person. Obviously, as evidenced by the general structure, we do not stop a the particular—but this is where we begin. While this attitude undoubtedly suspends the naturalistic attitude of physical science, its disposition towards the more global natural attitude, as discussed above, contains a strategic ambiguity. Very importantly, unlike phenomenological philosophy, phenomenological psychology directly takes up the naively believed world of the natural attitude as a subject of inquiry. Ours is, as Maurice Natanson, citing Alfred Schutz, calls it: “a phenomenology of the natural attitude” ( 1973 , p107). In other words, while we ourselves as researchers are trained to be aware of our own natural attitude, and ‘step back’ from it as best we can, it is also true that we do not entirely put it aside. So, for example, when reading Ashling’s description of her daydream, the researcher imaginatively participated with the description of her daydream and, for that moment, may have been empathically engrossed within the world of her natural attitude. In a recent publication this is well described by Scott Churchill as a ‘disciplined fascination’ (Churchill, 2022 ). Also, as a denizen of the natural attitude oneself, the researcher may well have applied his background stock of knowledge of daydreaming, garnered from personal experiences as well as professional readings on the subject; all of this in order to better understand Ashling’s experience and intentional structures. Hence, as discussed above, this is not a pure epoché or a pure reduction as practiced by the philosopher. On the other hand, unlike Ashling, or any research participant, the researcher continually practices a ‘stepping back’ from that believed world, again, in order to better understand her world. There is, in this way, a weaving process that is unique to the phenomenological psychological attitude.

The figure-ground metaphors used by Merleau-Ponty are very helpful here. Throughout his works he explicitly describes what we are calling the phenomenological psychological attitude, as a ‘ diacritical ’ process (Kearney, 2011 ) that is, like the act of breathing—both inhaling and exhaling as one whole act. This is precisely what we mean by the strategic ambiguity of the phenomenological psychological position. In his well-known discussion on methodology Merleau-Ponty describes the attitude of the researcher as follows: “Reflection does not withdraw us from the world…’ “…it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice…” ( 1962 , p xiii). As psychologists these threads or tethers to the natural attitude are never cut, they are “loosened or slackened” to enable us to see the intentions of others—as well as one’s own. Seeing my own intentional threads can reveal fore-understandings that could either inhibit or enhance my analysis.

In this case, a young woman is learning about the encroaching covid pandemic, wants to return to the security of her home and family, and becomes upset about the closing international borders that could restrict, and become an obstacle, to her desire to return home. This was the big picture to which the researcher returned, in a circular manner, throughout the analysis.

The researcher came to see how Ashling was originally overcome with a desire to go home while simultaneously experiencing a feeling of being impeded from that intention. Though she did not explicitly say this, one could easily imagine how, as more borders closed, Ashling’s desire to return home would only intensify. The beginning part of the daydream narrative reflected this distressing and overwhelming devils circle where she is impeded by powers beyond her control. But in meaning unit 7 we see a turn.

Another diacritical element is the weaving between the whole of the description and its parts. As a reader one could say that I am “zooming-in” on the unique and minute details of the participants expressions as much as I am continually “zooming-out” to use the whole as the context for understanding these details. For example, Ashling’s use of key expressions in Meaning Unit 7 (MU7) such as “envisioned,” “getting past” and “the relief felt” all offered a basis for enhanced eidetic exploration and fuller illumination. They allowed the researcher to come to the insight of Ashling’s shift in position, from that of passive victim of overpowering circumstances to that of an active agent of an imaginary act of courageous transgression—driving past the armed and aggressive border guards to cross the border. Understanding the “whole” of her situation is what brought to light the essential meaning of the daydream.

6.3 Spelling out tacit meanings

By explication, or elucidation, we mean the process of spelling-out latent or tacit meanings. To offer an example, Ashling, of course, never explicitly said that she experienced a ‘dual intentional structure.’ It was the task of the researcher to cull out this structural component that was implicit to the description and likely lived-out in a pre-thematic way by Ashling. The researcher’s recognition of this constituent happened during the researcher’s transition from the meaning unit analysis to the whole of the situated structure. It was in this process of “putting the whole story back together again” that the researcher saw how this double intentionality was experienced by Ashling. Here, there were two distinct but related intentions, (1). the intention to deal with the practical frustrations of booking a flight home during an uncertain period of international crisis (the actual world), and (2). the daydreamed intention of getting past imaginary border guards (the daydreamed world scenario). The researcher came to see Ashling as experiencing both intentions and both corresponding world relations—the actual car scenario and the other being the daydreamed car scenario. Hence, the dual intentional structure. One could call this a “generalizing process” but, in actual practice, it was a much fuzzier and more unclear event than any such nominalizations can portray. Once again, we can understand this as a diacritical process: (1). The insight came ‘as given’ in the discovery manner of a direct phenomenological intuition, and (2). This pattern was ‘recognized’ from the researcher’s background stock of knowledge (or fore-understanding) as a daydream researcher and reader of phenomenological literature. Because this elucidation process is itself somewhat pre-reflective, one can never have absolute certainty over whether it was an intuitive given or a pre-understanding.

Again, Merleau-Ponty’s diacritical approach helps to illuminate this elucidation process. In describing Merleau-Ponty’s ( 1968 ) diacritical approach to grasping meaning, Kearney cites James Joyce’s statement that it is possible to have “two thinks at a time.” ( 2011 , p 1). Directly addressing psychological research, Merleau-Ponty says: “One may say indeed that psychological knowledge is reflection but that it is at the same time an experience. According to the phenomenologist (Husserl) it is a material apriori . Psychological reflection is a “constatation” (a finding). Its task is to discover the meaning of behavior through an effective contact with my own behavior and that of others. Phenomenological psychology is therefore a search for the essence, or meaning, but not apart from the facts.” (Merleau-Ponty,  1964 , p.95).

With the term “constatation’ Merleau-Ponty is suggesting that both observing , (receiving the intuitive givens) and asserting (actively applying one’s stock of knowledge) can be at play in the same act of psychological understanding. Both are one whole movement within the same act—in the chiasmatic, reversable manner of a figure-ground dynamic. While space does not allow us to develop this issue in the detail it deserves, we raise this matter to try to bring some light to the act of elucidation that is so central to this method. The take home point here is that, while the method highlights the significance of description, this does not mean that one needs to choose between stark antinomies such as description and interpretation, or phenomenology and hermeneutics as within this elucidation process of ‘disciplined fascination’ both movements come together.

7 Conclusion

7.1 towards dual disciplinary citizenship.

This method was designed to give psychological researchers an organized and structured framework for doing second person research. The whole-part-whole process, in itself, is not complicated or difficult to understand and learn. What is difficult for those who are beginning this style of research, is the assumption of the phenomenological psychological attitude. This attitude, which distinguishes this method from non-phenomenological qualitative research methods, can’t be taken for granted and requires training, study, and the support of a like-minded research community. Because it is founded in phenomenological epistemology, phenomenological psychology is a hybrid discipline. The practice of phenomenological psychology requires a kind of ‘dual citizenship’ in both psychology and phenomenological philosophy. Those trained solely in philosophy’s orthodox emphasis on textual exegesis may often lack experience in practical professional life-world applications as well as an overall knowledge of the literature and scientific history psychology. On the other hand, those trained solely in psychology, with little to no exposure to philosophy, coupled with the field’s strictly naturalist experimental orientation—which underscores the natural/naturalistic attitude—come to phenomenology with this resilient attitudinal disadvantage that can take effort to overcome. What we have here, in the current academic world, is a set-up for mutual misunderstanding between these disciplines. While the sharp disciplinary divides of the current academic world make such ‘dual citizenship’ training difficult and rare, this is possible, but only with special effort and unique pedagogical interventions. There are institutionalized training programs, usually schools of psychotherapy, that are open to such interdisciplinary training. Yet, these programs are few and far-ranging in their offerings. Most independent researchers entering this field need to supplement their training in naturalistic psychology with an intense period of philosophical study of primary sources and guidance in this study is too often lacking. Then, on the other hand, it is encouraging to see the increasing number of philosophers who are taking an interest in “applied phenomenology.” Yet, we currently see little cognizance, in much of this recent literature, of the 50-year phenomenological psychological research tradition. We mention this, as a friendly invitation to psychologically interested philosophical researchers to acquaint themselves with their predecessors to avoid re-inventing the wheel and duplicating research results and techniques that have already been developed within the phenomenological psychological research tradition. In the same breath, we would just as strongly urge our colleagues in the social sciences to give more serious study to the phenomenological philosophical tradition.

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20 february 2022.

Springer Nature's version of this paper was updated to present the corrected funding note.

From Husserl’s inaugural lecture in Freiburg given 1917 and published in Husserl—Shorter Works ( 1981 , 17).

This quote is from a talk that Giorgi gave at the Symposium on science and scientism: the human sciences Trinity College, May 15–16, 1970 and documented by Maurice Friedman ( 1984 ) Contemporary Psychology: revealing and obscuring the human . Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. (p.30).

To Giorgi, relativism is as much a dogmatism to be avoided in psychology as is reductionism. Giorgi's ( 2009 ) method, hence, became known as the descriptive phenomenological psychological research method. With the emphasis on description Giorgi intended to apply the phenomenological attitude by staying true to discoveries from the everyday lifeworld. So even though discoveries may sometimes be incomplete, he preferred that they were described in their incompleteness rather than forced into unnecessary closure for aesthetic or ideological reasons (ibid.). Hence, both psychologically relevant aspects of Husserl's phenomenology as well as the discovery-oriented spirit of science became essential influences on Giorgi's approach to the project of a qualitative research method in psychology.

Initially influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s psychologically oriented thought, Giorgi turned more to Husserl’s methodological emphasis in his pursuit of a phenomenological theory of science to support a qualitative psychological research method (see Giorgi, 2009 ). As Giorgi ( 2014 , 236) recently stated "…I use Husserl because he confronts the issue directly and he contrasts his position with that of the empiricists." In the late 90’s, several other qualitative methods using a phenomenological approach started to emerge, most had a stronger emphasis on postmodernism or hermeneutics. Giorgi differentiated his method from the newer ones by stressing that his was a more descriptive emphasis as opposed to an interpretative one (Giorgi, 1992 , see also, Giorgi 2006 , 2010 , 2018 ). Of course, the distinction should not be understood too literally, because in certain settings the use of the word ‘interpretation’ could synonymously refer to the act of ‘description.’ However, with the term ‘description’ Giorgi ( 1992 ) simply meant to stay true, or rooted, to what appeared in the data . This is similar to what is called a “close reading of the text” in literary studies. The intention was to avoid the kind of intrusive and overly imposing 'interpretations' where gaps in the qualitative data would be 'filled' with theoretical explanations, abstractions or even speculations.

Developing phenomenological interviewing skills requires practice and training that is often already present in the education of most clinical psychologists and health care workers. However, phenomenological psychologists have been recently applying the insights of philosophical phenomenology to better articulate the role of empathic reflection in participant observation (Englander, 2020 ; Churchill 2010 ) and designing phenomenologically inspired teaching methods (Englander  2014 ; Churchill, 2018 ) for improving quality of psychological interviewing and qualitative phenomenological research generally.

Referring to Schutz, Michal Barber points out how these terms are “analogous to the phenomenological prototype.” In other words, again, as social scientists we apply them with a different purpose than that of the philosopher. See: Barber, Michael, "Alfred Schutz",  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  Summer 2021 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.),

URL =  <  https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/schutz/  > .

The history of phenomenology could be considered one big ongoing deliberation about the meaning and possibility of the epoché. We hope readers will forgive us for sidestepping these discussions for the purposes of this presentation where space only permits us to present the epoché as practically applied to the research process in phenomenological psychology. But we will make this one brief point. All major phenomenological themes such as embodiment, temporality, intersubjectivity and even the hermeneutic circle were developed by philosophers thorough their initial employment of the epoché —or awareness of the natural attitude. It is therefore important, we believe, for one to understand the practice of the epoché to, in turn, fully grasp these phenomenological concepts. We find it inconceivable that one could proficiently comprehend basic phenomenological concepts such as the lived body or intersubjectivity while remaining unreflectively within the influence of the natural attitude. Similarly, we have learned through experience that success with the method we are presenting here is often in direct proportion to one’s awareness of their natural attitude.

The relation between the transcendental and the psychological reduction is another long-deliberated issue in the history of phenomenology which we can’t develop here. In brief, because the transcendental “philosophical” reduction is a non-personal and non-situated level of reflection it is simply not appropriate for performing qualitative psychological research—at the moment that we are doing it. To our knowledge, no phenomenological psychologist would claim to be doing both standpoints at once. But this does not mean that psychologists must, or should, ignore the insights of transcendentally derived philosophical concepts when we design our research or reflect on the results of our psychological analysis. Phenomenological philosophy can be a perfectly compatible basis from which to deepen our understandings of the results of our descriptive analysis. In short, psychologists may visit the transcendental position, but we do not unpack our bags, and we always remember our return ticket.

This is very similar to the relevance structure of a world as suggested by Schutz ( 1962 ).

As Giorgi ( 2009 , 99–100) writes, “The researcher does, of course, assume the human scientific (psychological) reduction. Everything in the raw data is taken to be how the objects were experienced by the describer, and no claim is made that the events described really happened as they were described. The personal past experiences of the researcher and all his or her past knowledge about the phenomenon are also bracketed. This bracketing results in a fresh approach to the raw data and the refusal to posit the existential claim allows the noetic-noematic relation to come to the fore so that the substratum of the psychologist's reality can be focused upon. That is, the particular way in which the describer's personal acts of consciousness were enacted to allow the phenomenal intentional objects to appear from the basis of the sense determination that the psychologist is interested in uncovering.”.

For a more elaborate discussion on general knowledge claims in qualitative research and its relation to a phenomenological theory of science, see for example, Englander ( 2019 ).

Giorgi originally included situated structures but later dropped them to emphasize the nomothetic (or generalized knowledge) aspect of the method. But most Giorgi’s colleagues and ex-students prefer to include situated structures as a transition to the general. As teachers we have learned that this psychologically rich transitional step is of great pedagogical value. For most newcomers to the method, it is intuitively much easier to construct situated structures before moving on to develop general structures. We also find situated structures to be of great psychological value in their own right—as we hope is demonstrated in our case example ahead.

It is important to note that research participants are not considered from the stance of an empirical theory of science. Any qualitative methodology, grounded in a phenomenological theory of science, cannot naively adopt the concept of the population (and sampling methods ) as its ground for making general knowledge claims (see for example, Englander, 2019 ).

At points in the interview when a more active questioning is called for, evocation techniques like those from the explication interview, or the micro phenomenological interview method, can be very effective. (see Petitmengin et al., 2018 ) Here, we invoke the daydream so that both the interviewer and the participant can, in an almost trance-like way, imaginatively re-live the daydream together. These techniques can provoke profoundly rich description. Here is another example of how we approach data collection as always contingent to the manner in which the phenomenon best expresses itself. Again, this is why we endorse an adaptable approach to data collection.

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Englander, M., Morley, J. Phenomenological psychology and qualitative research. Phenom Cogn Sci 22 , 25–53 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09781-8

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I show some problems with recent discussions within qualitative research that centre around the “authenticity” of phenomenological research methods. I argue that attempts to restrict the scope of the term “phenomenology” via reference to the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl are misguided, because the meaning of the term “phenomenology” is only broadly restricted by etymology. My argument has two prongs: first, via a discussion of Husserl, I show that the canonical phenomenological tradition gives rise to many traits of contemporary qualitative phenomenological theory that are purportedly insufficiently genuine (such as characterisations of phenomenology as “what-its-likeness” and presuppositionless description). Second, I argue that it is not adherence to the theories and methods of prior practitioners such as Husserl that justifies the moniker “phenomenology” anyway. Thus, I show that the extent to which qualitative researchers ought to engage with the theory of philosophical phenomenology or adhere to a particular edict of Husserlian methodology ought to be determined by the fit between subject matter and methodology and conclude that qualitative research methods still qualify as phenomenological if they develop their own set of theoretical terms, traditions, and methods instead of importing them from philosophical phenomenology.

Journal of Nursing Education and Practice

Martin Christensen

Background and objective: Descriptive phenomenology when used within the tradition of Husserl offers the qualitative researcher a unique perspective into the lived experience of the phenomena in question. Methods of data analysis are often seen as the theoretical framework for which these studies are then focused. However, what is not realised is that the data analysis tool is merely that a tool for which to delineate the individual narratives. What is often missing is a research framework for which to structure the actual study. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to offer a reflective account of how the empirical-phenomenological framework shaped and informed a descriptive phenomenological study looking at the lived experience of male nursing students as they journey though the under-graduate nursing programme.Methods: A reflective narrative was used to examine and explore how the empirical-phenomenological framework can be used to support method construction within a descriptive...

Shahid Khan

Dr. S. Lourdu nathan

Phenomenology as a Method of Social Science Research The contribution of the two German philosophers namely Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger (Transcendental and Existential Phenomenology) in the beginning of the 20th century is central to the discussion of phenomenology as a methodology of research. These two seminal thinkers spearheaded rather prominent in the philosophical investigation endeavour, known as " phenomenological Movement', which progressively in-sighted towards a significant social science research method. Properly speaking, it was Edmund Husserl, departing from 'factualism/ positivism/verficationsim' as a method of philosophical or social inquiry evolves Phenomenology as a method of 'conceptualising' or cognising the given phenomena and Heidegger evolved phenomenology as a system of philosophy ascribing phenomenology as a world view. The Philosophical realm of Phenomenology both as a method and as a worldview soon influenced social sciences in the 20 th century. Against Positivistic Objectivity To begin with phenomenology does not claim any universal truth-claims. Phenomenology itself as a method of thinking the very thinking and in its existential form is primarily a kind of discontent to the positivistic orientations to the understanding of reality. Both Husserl and Heidegger were in a way antithetical towards the totalising claims of technocratic culture that sway the social life of the 20 th century. Moreover phenomenology, as they conceive is a sort of rejection of the existential situation of wars and a reaction-in-thinking-against-world wars. The difficulty in scientific paradigm as 'scientific' The later part of the 19 th century and beginning of the 20 th century is engulfed with a thought that reality is observable, calculate-able, quantifiable, experiment-able, provable, convertible, explainable, provable, repeatable, discoverable as atomic facts and its molecular combinations which is known as the scientific method of inquiry par excellence. In other words, scientific community holds the 'belief' that the reality of the world (be it the human, or the social or the natural world) is objective and it can be 'given' to scientific-technocratic scrutiny. That is to say, the inquiring mind and inquired object stand in separation, that is to say the subject and object are two separate entities that remain in a dualistic platform by which scientific-subject produces any objective-result or object. Such a position has come to be deemed as 'the scientific and the natural way (attitude) propagated by scientific community (positive Sciences), the principle of which came to be hailed as the verification principle adduced with the principle and practice of pragmatic utility. Husserl contested against this claim of objectivity of the positivist sciences. From this position of phenomenology we could infer that phenomenology both as a methodology and as a world view propels the idea that (a) what is called objectivity by positivism is but doubtable thesis of its objectivity.

Journal of Education and Educational Development

Sadruddin Qutoshi

Pakistan Journal of Health Sciences

Kashif Khan

Phenomenology is the qualitative research inquiry that explores the lived experiences of the individual. This paper discusses phenomenology as a qualitative research methodology and its roots, characteristics, and steps to conduct the study. The relevant literature was searched using the database library, including PubMed, Google Scholar, PakMediNet, Medline, and Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature CINAHL. Literature was searched using keywords including phenomenology, qualitative inquiry, roots of phenomenology, steps of phenomenology, and characters of phenomenology. The essential essence of phenomenology is to understand the lived experiences of individuals. The participants truly share the lived experiences which they witnessed. It is concluded that phenomenology is a qualitative inquiry that addresses the real-life experiences of individuals.

Turkish Online Journal of Qualitative Inquiry

Soner Yildirim

Phenomenology + Pedagogy

Robert Burch

There is no doubt, that the endeavor of grasping how children acquire the world co-interpreting it and participating actively in its constitution is indispensable and central within Educational Sciences. Anyway, it raises some theoretical and methodological questions. Already in marking these out, possible solutions are indicated. Having developed answers to similar theoretical, methodological and methodical questions since a hundred years, phenomenology, resp. body-phenomenology suits as an adequate interpretative backdrop for these solutions.

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CRO Guide   >  Chapter 3.1

Qualitative Research: Definition, Methodology, Limitation & Examples

Qualitative research is a method focused on understanding human behavior and experiences through non-numerical data. Examples of qualitative research include:

• One-on-one interviews,
• Focus groups, Ethnographic research,
• Case studies,
• Record keeping,
• Qualitative observations

In this article, we’ll provide tips and tricks on how to use qualitative research to better understand your audience through real world examples and improve your ROI. We’ll also learn the difference between qualitative and quantitative data.

Table of Contents

Marketers often seek to understand their customers deeply. Qualitative research methods such as face-to-face interviews, focus groups, and qualitative observations can provide valuable insights into your products, your market, and your customers’ opinions and motivations. Understanding these nuances can significantly enhance marketing strategies and overall customer satisfaction.

What is Qualitative Research

Qualitative research is a market research method that focuses on obtaining data through open-ended and conversational communication. This method focuses on the “why” rather than the “what” people think about you. Thus, qualitative research seeks to uncover the underlying motivations, attitudes, and beliefs that drive people’s actions. 

Let’s say you have an online shop catering to a general audience. You do a demographic analysis and you find out that most of your customers are male. Naturally, you will want to find out why women are not buying from you. And that’s what qualitative research will help you find out.

In the case of your online shop, qualitative research would involve reaching out to female non-customers through methods such as in-depth interviews or focus groups. These interactions provide a platform for women to express their thoughts, feelings, and concerns regarding your products or brand. Through qualitative analysis, you can uncover valuable insights into factors such as product preferences, user experience, brand perception, and barriers to purchase.

Types of Qualitative Research Methods

Qualitative research methods are designed in a manner that helps reveal the behavior and perception of a target audience regarding a particular topic.

The most frequently used qualitative analysis methods are one-on-one interviews, focus groups, ethnographic research, case study research, record keeping, and qualitative observation.

1. One-on-one interviews

Conducting one-on-one interviews is one of the most common qualitative research methods. One of the advantages of this method is that it provides a great opportunity to gather precise data about what people think and their motivations.

Spending time talking to customers not only helps marketers understand who their clients are, but also helps with customer care: clients love hearing from brands. This strengthens the relationship between a brand and its clients and paves the way for customer testimonials.

• A company might conduct interviews to understand why a product failed to meet sales expectations.
• A researcher might use interviews to gather personal stories about experiences with healthcare.

These interviews can be performed face-to-face or on the phone and usually last between half an hour to over two hours. 

When a one-on-one interview is conducted face-to-face, it also gives the marketer the opportunity to read the body language of the respondent and match the responses.

2. Focus groups

Focus groups gather a small number of people to discuss and provide feedback on a particular subject. The ideal size of a focus group is usually between five and eight participants. The size of focus groups should reflect the participants’ familiarity with the topic. For less important topics or when participants have little experience, a group of 10 can be effective. For more critical topics or when participants are more knowledgeable, a smaller group of five to six is preferable for deeper discussions.

The main goal of a focus group is to find answers to the “why”, “what”, and “how” questions. This method is highly effective in exploring people’s feelings and ideas in a social setting, where group dynamics can bring out insights that might not emerge in one-on-one situations.

• A focus group could be used to test reactions to a new product concept.
• Marketers might use focus groups to see how different demographic groups react to an advertising campaign.

One advantage that focus groups have is that the marketer doesn’t necessarily have to interact with the group in person. Nowadays focus groups can be sent as online qualitative surveys on various devices.

Focus groups are an expensive option compared to the other qualitative research methods, which is why they are typically used to explain complex processes.

3. Ethnographic research

Ethnographic research is the most in-depth observational method that studies individuals in their naturally occurring environment.

This method aims at understanding the cultures, challenges, motivations, and settings that occur.

• A study of workplace culture within a tech startup.
• Observational research in a remote village to understand local traditions.

Ethnographic research requires the marketer to adapt to the target audiences’ environments (a different organization, a different city, or even a remote location), which is why geographical constraints can be an issue while collecting data.

This type of research can last from a few days to a few years. It’s challenging and time-consuming and solely depends on the expertise of the marketer to be able to analyze, observe, and infer the data.

4. Case study research

The case study method has grown into a valuable qualitative research method. This type of research method is usually used in education or social sciences. It involves a comprehensive examination of a single instance or event, providing detailed insights into complex issues in real-life contexts.  

• Analyzing a single school’s innovative teaching method.
• A detailed study of a patient’s medical treatment over several years.

Case study research may seem difficult to operate, but it’s actually one of the simplest ways of conducting research as it involves a deep dive and thorough understanding of the data collection methods and inferring the data.

5. Record keeping

Record keeping is similar to going to the library: you go over books or any other reference material to collect relevant data. This method uses already existing reliable documents and similar sources of information as a data source.

• Historical research using old newspapers and letters.
• A study on policy changes over the years by examining government records.

This method is useful for constructing a historical context around a research topic or verifying other findings with documented evidence.

6. Qualitative observation

Qualitative observation is a method that uses subjective methodologies to gather systematic information or data. This method deals with the five major sensory organs and their functioning, sight, smell, touch, taste, and hearing.

• Sight : Observing the way customers visually interact with product displays in a store to understand their browsing behaviors and preferences.
• Smell : Noting reactions of consumers to different scents in a fragrance shop to study the impact of olfactory elements on product preference.
• Touch : Watching how individuals interact with different materials in a clothing store to assess the importance of texture in fabric selection.
• Taste : Evaluating reactions of participants in a taste test to identify flavor profiles that appeal to different demographic groups.
• Hearing : Documenting responses to changes in background music within a retail environment to determine its effect on shopping behavior and mood.

Below we are also providing real-life examples of qualitative research that demonstrate practical applications across various contexts:

Qualitative Research Real World Examples

Let’s explore some examples of how qualitative research can be applied in different contexts.

1. Online grocery shop with a predominantly male audience

Method used: one-on-one interviews.

Let’s go back to one of the previous examples. You have an online grocery shop. By nature, it addresses a general audience, but after you do a demographic analysis you find out that most of your customers are male.

One good method to determine why women are not buying from you is to hold one-on-one interviews with potential customers in the category.

Interviewing a sample of potential female customers should reveal why they don’t find your store appealing. The reasons could range from not stocking enough products for women to perhaps the store’s emphasis on heavy-duty tools and automotive products, for example. These insights can guide adjustments in inventory and marketing strategies.

2. Software company launching a new product

Method used: focus groups.

Focus groups are great for establishing product-market fit.

Let’s assume you are a software company that wants to launch a new product and you hold a focus group with 12 people. Although getting their feedback regarding users’ experience with the product is a good thing, this sample is too small to define how the entire market will react to your product.

So what you can do instead is holding multiple focus groups in 20 different geographic regions. Each region should be hosting a group of 12 for each market segment; you can even segment your audience based on age. This would be a better way to establish credibility in the feedback you receive.

3. Alan Pushkin’s “God’s Choice: The Total World of a Fundamentalist Christian School”

Method used: ethnographic research.

Moving from a fictional example to a real-life one, let’s analyze Alan Peshkin’s 1986 book “God’s Choice: The Total World of a Fundamentalist Christian School”.

Peshkin studied the culture of Bethany Baptist Academy by interviewing the students, parents, teachers, and members of the community alike, and spending eighteen months observing them to provide a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of Christian schooling as an alternative to public education.

The study highlights the school’s unified purpose, rigorous academic environment, and strong community support while also pointing out its lack of cultural diversity and openness to differing viewpoints. These insights are crucial for understanding how such educational settings operate and what they offer to students.

Even after discovering all this, Peshkin still presented the school in a positive light and stated that public schools have much to learn from such schools.

Peshkin’s in-depth research represents a qualitative study that uses observations and unstructured interviews, without any assumptions or hypotheses. He utilizes descriptive or non-quantifiable data on Bethany Baptist Academy specifically, without attempting to generalize the findings to other Christian schools.

4. Understanding buyers’ trends

Method used: record keeping.

Another way marketers can use quality research is to understand buyers’ trends. To do this, marketers need to look at historical data for both their company and their industry and identify where buyers are purchasing items in higher volumes.

For example, electronics distributors know that the holiday season is a peak market for sales while life insurance agents find that spring and summer wedding months are good seasons for targeting new clients.

5. Determining products/services missing from the market

Conducting your own research isn’t always necessary. If there are significant breakthroughs in your industry, you can use industry data and adapt it to your marketing needs.

The influx of hacking and hijacking of cloud-based information has made Internet security a topic of many industry reports lately. A software company could use these reports to better understand the problems its clients are facing.

As a result, the company can provide solutions prospects already know they need.

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Qualitative Research Approaches

Once the marketer has decided that their research questions will provide data that is qualitative in nature, the next step is to choose the appropriate qualitative approach.

The approach chosen will take into account the purpose of the research, the role of the researcher, the data collected, the method of data analysis , and how the results will be presented. The most common approaches include:

• Narrative : This method focuses on individual life stories to understand personal experiences and journeys. It examines how people structure their stories and the themes within them to explore human existence. For example, a narrative study might look at cancer survivors to understand their resilience and coping strategies.
• Phenomenology : attempts to understand or explain life experiences or phenomena; It aims to reveal the depth of human consciousness and perception, such as by studying the daily lives of those with chronic illnesses.
• Grounded theory : investigates the process, action, or interaction with the goal of developing a theory “grounded” in observations and empirical data. 
• Ethnography : describes and interprets an ethnic, cultural, or social group;
• Case study : examines episodic events in a definable framework, develops in-depth analyses of single or multiple cases, and generally explains “how”. An example might be studying a community health program to evaluate its success and impact.

How to Analyze Qualitative Data

Analyzing qualitative data involves interpreting non-numerical data to uncover patterns, themes, and deeper insights. This process is typically more subjective and requires a systematic approach to ensure reliability and validity. 

1. Data Collection

Ensure that your data collection methods (e.g., interviews, focus groups, observations) are well-documented and comprehensive. This step is crucial because the quality and depth of the data collected will significantly influence the analysis.

2. Data Preparation

Once collected, the data needs to be organized. Transcribe audio and video recordings, and gather all notes and documents. Ensure that all data is anonymized to protect participant confidentiality where necessary.

3. Familiarization

Immerse yourself in the data by reading through the materials multiple times. This helps you get a general sense of the information and begin identifying patterns or recurring themes.

Develop a coding system to tag data with labels that summarize and account for each piece of information. Codes can be words, phrases, or acronyms that represent how these segments relate to your research questions.

• Descriptive Coding : Summarize the primary topic of the data.
• In Vivo Coding : Use language and terms used by the participants themselves.
• Process Coding : Use gerunds (“-ing” words) to label the processes at play.
• Emotion Coding : Identify and record the emotions conveyed or experienced.

5. Thematic Development

Group codes into themes that represent larger patterns in the data. These themes should relate directly to the research questions and form a coherent narrative about the findings.

6. Interpreting the Data

Interpret the data by constructing a logical narrative. This involves piecing together the themes to explain larger insights about the data. Link the results back to your research objectives and existing literature to bolster your interpretations.

7. Validation

Check the reliability and validity of your findings by reviewing if the interpretations are supported by the data. This may involve revisiting the data multiple times or discussing the findings with colleagues or participants for validation.

8. Reporting

Finally, present the findings in a clear and organized manner. Use direct quotes and detailed descriptions to illustrate the themes and insights. The report should communicate the narrative you’ve built from your data, clearly linking your findings to your research questions.

Limitations of qualitative research

The disadvantages of qualitative research are quite unique. The techniques of the data collector and their own unique observations can alter the information in subtle ways. That being said, these are the qualitative research’s limitations:

1. It’s a time-consuming process

The main drawback of qualitative study is that the process is time-consuming. Another problem is that the interpretations are limited. Personal experience and knowledge influence observations and conclusions.

Thus, qualitative research might take several weeks or months. Also, since this process delves into personal interaction for data collection, discussions often tend to deviate from the main issue to be studied.

2. You can’t verify the results of qualitative research

Because qualitative research is open-ended, participants have more control over the content of the data collected. So the marketer is not able to verify the results objectively against the scenarios stated by the respondents. For example, in a focus group discussing a new product, participants might express their feelings about the design and functionality. However, these opinions are influenced by individual tastes and experiences, making it difficult to ascertain a universally applicable conclusion from these discussions.

3. It’s a labor-intensive approach

Qualitative research requires a labor-intensive analysis process such as categorization, recording, etc. Similarly, qualitative research requires well-experienced marketers to obtain the needed data from a group of respondents.

4. It’s difficult to investigate causality

Qualitative research requires thoughtful planning to ensure the obtained results are accurate. There is no way to analyze qualitative data mathematically. This type of research is based more on opinion and judgment rather than results. Because all qualitative studies are unique they are difficult to replicate.

5. Qualitative research is not statistically representative

Because qualitative research is a perspective-based method of research, the responses given are not measured.

Comparisons can be made and this can lead toward duplication, but for the most part, quantitative data is required for circumstances that need statistical representation and that is not part of the qualitative research process.

While doing a qualitative study, it’s important to cross-reference the data obtained with the quantitative data. By continuously surveying prospects and customers marketers can build a stronger database of useful information.

Quantitative vs. Qualitative Research

Image source

Quantitative and qualitative research are two distinct methodologies used in the field of market research, each offering unique insights and approaches to understanding consumer behavior and preferences.

As we already defined, qualitative analysis seeks to explore the deeper meanings, perceptions, and motivations behind human behavior through non-numerical data. On the other hand, quantitative research focuses on collecting and analyzing numerical data to identify patterns, trends, and statistical relationships.  

Let’s explore their key differences: 

Nature of Data:

• Quantitative research : Involves numerical data that can be measured and analyzed statistically.
• Qualitative research : Focuses on non-numerical data, such as words, images, and observations, to capture subjective experiences and meanings.

Research Questions:

• Quantitative research : Typically addresses questions related to “how many,” “how much,” or “to what extent,” aiming to quantify relationships and patterns.
• Qualitative research: Explores questions related to “why” and “how,” aiming to understand the underlying motivations, beliefs, and perceptions of individuals.

Data Collection Methods:

• Quantitative research : Relies on structured surveys, experiments, or observations with predefined variables and measures.
• Qualitative research : Utilizes open-ended interviews, focus groups, participant observations, and textual analysis to gather rich, contextually nuanced data.

Analysis Techniques:

• Quantitative research: Involves statistical analysis to identify correlations, associations, or differences between variables.
• Qualitative research: Employs thematic analysis, coding, and interpretation to uncover patterns, themes, and insights within qualitative data.

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• Last modified: January 3, 2023
• Conversion Rate Optimization , User Research

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A Phenomenological Paradigm for Empirical Research in Psychiatry and Psychology: Open Questions

Leonor irarrázaval.

1 Section Phenomenological Psychopathology and Psychotherapy, Psychiatric Department, University Clinic Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany

2 Centro de Atención Psicológica, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades Sede Talca, Universidad Autónoma de Chile, Talca, Chile

This article seeks to clarify the way in which phenomenology is conceptualized and applied in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology, emphasizing the suitability of qualitative research. It will address the “What,” “Why,” and “How” of phenomenological interviews, providing not only preliminary answers but also a critical analysis and pointing to future directions for research. The questions it asks are: First, what makes an interview phenomenological? What are phenomenological interviews used for in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology? Second, why do we carry out phenomenological interviews with patients? Is merely contrasting phenomenological hypotheses or concepts enough to do justice to the patients’ involvement? Third, how should we conduct phenomenological interviews with patients? How can we properly perform analysis in empirical phenomenological research in psychiatry and psychology? In its conclusion, the article attempts to go a step beyond these methodological questions, highlighting the “bigger picture”: namely, the phenomenological scientific paradigm and its core philosophical claim of reality as mind-dependent.

Introduction

An initial proposal in favor of “naturalizing phenomenology” was presented in the article “First-person methodologies: What, Why, How?” published by Varela and Shear (1999) in the Journal of Consciousness Studies . The authors were not only concerned with the need for a method in cognitive sciences to obtain empirically-based descriptions of the subject, but also with providing the basis for a “science of consciousness.” “Neurophenomenology” was proposed by Varela (1996) as a means of linking first‐ and third-person perspectives through a systematic examination of subjective experience within experimental settings. An important requirement of neurophenomenology was that both experimenter and experimental subject must learn the Husserlian phenomenological method. The notion “phenomenology” was employed in the etymological sense of the term, that is, “the study of that which appears” (from Greek phainómenon “that which appears” and lógos “study”). Additionally, Varela (1990) coined the term “enactive,” meaning not to act out or to perform as on a stage, but to “enact,” that is, “to bring forth” or to “emerge” ( hervorbringen , in German), as it is used in the phenomenological tradition. Accordingly, the phenomenological method was conceived and applied as a form of training one’s attention to that which “appears” in the subject’s conscious experience, making it similar to a meditation technique. Examples of neurophenomenology are the experiments led by Lutz et al. (2002) , which analyzed subjective reports, reaction times, and brain activity. However, a different approach was proposed by Gallagher (2003) , who claimed that a “phenomenologically enlightened experimental science” means incorporating concepts and distinctions from the phenomenological analysis into the actual design of an experiment. In contrast to neurophenomenology, this approach does not require learning the Husserlian phenomenological method or even making first-person reports in the experiments. Examples of “front-loaded phenomenology” are neuroimaging experiments employing the phenomenological distinction between “sense of agency” and “sense of ownership” in involuntary movement ( Ruby and Decety, 2001 ; Chaminade and Decety, 2002 ; Farrer and Frith, 2002 ).

However, experimental designs are normally not classified as part of qualitative research methodologies ( Fischer, 2006 ; Maxwell, 2011 , 2012 ; Patton, 2015 ; Creswell and Poth, 2018 ). One of the clearest differences between qualitative and quantitative approaches is that qualitative research is carried out in everyday natural conditions, rather than in experimental settings. Concerning the qualitative/quantitative distinction, there is an ongoing debate not only around the differences between the two approaches ( Morgan, 2018 ; Maxwell, 2019 ), but also around whether they are actually distinguishable at all ( Hammersley, 2018 ). Whatever their differences or similarities, qualitative and quantitative approaches are commonly conceived as compatible and their integration – in the form of mixed-methods research designs – valuable ( Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010 ). So, the incorporation of phenomenological interviews in experimental designs is one kind of mixed-method research design: One example is neurophenomenology, where the qualitative component is provided by phenomenology. Broadly speaking, qualitative research is used in many social sciences and humanities disciplines, including psychology, sociology, political sciences, and anthropology. A range of techniques are employed in qualitative research to gather experiential data, such as open-ended interviews, direct observation, focus groups, and document analysis (e.g., clinical records and personal diaries), and different methods are used for the associated qualitative data analysis, including phenomenology, ethnography, narrative analysis (e.g., biographical and life story studies), case studies, and grounded theory. In contrast to the large sample sizes needed in quantitative research to accomplish statistical validation of the results, qualitative research is characterized by an in-depth approach, which means working with few cases, with representativeness not being of such key importance ( Barbour and Barbour, 2003 ). The use of less structured methods allows for the emergence of ideographic descriptions, personal beliefs and meanings, thus addressing the experiential processes of the subjects being studied ( Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979 ; Barbour, 2000 ; Maxwell, 2011 , 2012 , 2019 ).

This article shall not focus on experimental phenomenology. However, this is no way meant to discredit in any sense this form of research design. Indeed, mention has already been made of the precursors of the experimental application of phenomenology to acknowledge the important contribution this research tradition has made – and continues to make – in ensuring that phenomenology acquires a scientific status. For instance, the project “cardiophenomenology” has been recently proposed by Depraz and Desmidt (2019) as a refinement of Varela’s neurophenomenology and performed in experimental studies of surprise in depression ( Depraz et al., 2017 ). In addition, it is worth mentioning Martiny’s (2017) transdisciplinary research on the phenomenological and neurological aspects of living with brain damage, specifically cerebral palsy. Martiny’s work not only has been influenced by, but also seeks to revitalize, Varela’s “radical” proposal, reminding us of the importance of working with openness and a change of mindset in cognitive science. Usually framed as “embodied cognition,” this proposal approaches the mind as embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended (4E cognition), implying an awareness regarding the fact that the “embodied” notion applies not only to the mind of the experimental subject but also to the cognitive scientist carrying out the research ( Depraz et al., 2003 ). Indeed, phenomenology has breached the frontiers of the philosophical discipline to influence the development of interdisciplinary fields of studies bridging the biomedical sciences and the humanities. Besides its application in the cognitive sciences, phenomenology is currently being widely applied in empirical research in healthcare-related disciplines, mostly in psychiatry and psychology. The most influential empirical application of phenomenology has been in the field of psychopathology, with the development of phenomenological interviews for the investigation of schizophrenia spectrum disorders ( Parnas et al., 2005 ; Sass et al., 2017 ). However, the extent of phenomenology’s applicability outside the strict domain of philosophy is currently a topic of intense debate and controversy ( Zahavi and Martiny, 2019 ). The conceptualization of phenomenology in the literature of qualitative research, which has been mostly developed in North America, is not always in line with that of the continental European philosophical tradition. Recent years have seen the start of a dialogue bridging the two traditions, qualitative research and philosophical phenomenology, giving a promise of fruitful collaboration in the future.

This article will address the “What,” “Why,” and “How” of phenomenological interviews, reviewing recent empirical research in the field of phenomenological psychopathology and psychotherapy. Important to note is that qualitative research, as described above, refers to empirical research, not to basic or theoretical investigations. Phenomenological qualitative research in psychology has been developed using Husserlian concepts such as the “epoché” and the “phenomenological reduction,” and precisely on the use of such conceptualizations is where most of the current discussion has been placed. The article, therefore, will not attempt to provide a broad understanding of the phenomenological tradition. Instead, it will focus on a more specific discussion of methodological issues concerning the empirical application of phenomenology in qualitative research in psychiatry and psychology, and Husserl’s methodology in particular. To do so, we first need to agree that the application of phenomenology to empirical research in psychiatry and psychology employing interviews is qualitative, not quantitative. In a strict sense, quantitative methodology based on frequency and scales of severity of the patients’ anomalous experience, although necessary for the statistical validation of the interviews, goes beyond the scope of phenomenology. According to the phenomenological approach, mental disorders cannot be reducible to a cerebral organic basis, nor to numbers, as they are not entities per se but psychopathological configurations that can be identified in the diagnostic process of interaction between a clinician and a patient ( Fuchs, 2010a ; Pallagrosi et al., 2014 ; Pallagrosi and Fonzi, 2018 ; Gozé et al., 2019 ). Consequently, phenomenological interviews are designed to address not objective, but subjective data, namely the what it is like of patients’ anomalous experiences. In this way, the patients’ descriptions of their subjective experiences are not conceived as “static” entities, but, rather, as part of dynamically, open-ended developing processes and interpretations ( Martiny, 2017 ).

What makes an interview “phenomenological”? What are phenomenological interviews used for in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology?

Medical psychiatric diagnosis relies on standardized manuals providing a description of the apparent symptomatology and mostly excludes any assessment of subjective experience ( Mishara, 1994 ; Parnas and Zahavi, 2002 ; Fuchs, 2010a ). Under this approach, research in psychiatry has mainly developed from a third-person perspective, using the methods of the physical and natural sciences. Biomedical psychiatry has prioritized the use of quantitative methods and statistical analysis, whereas the value of qualitative in-depth analysis has been underestimated. The preferred experimental design has been the randomized controlled trial to demonstrate the efficacy of treatments involving psychoactive drugs ( Deacon, 2013 ; Deacon and McKay, 2015 ). An alternative conceptual model to this comes from the phenomenological tradition of psychopathology. In order to understand and conceptualize the anomalous experience of a given mental illness, the phenomenological diagnosis highlights the importance of assessing patients’ subjectivity. Over the last two decades, phenomenological interviews have been developed to complement standardized diagnostic systems such as Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) ( American Psychiatric Association, 2013 ) and International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10) ( World Health Organization, 2012 ). The most important phenomenological interviews are the Examination of Anomalous Self-experience (EASE, Parnas et al., 2005 ) and its supplement, the Examination of Anomalous World Experience (EAWE, Sass et al., 2017 ). These interviews have been inspired by the Husserlian tradition and have incorporated classical descriptions of phenomenological psychopathology (particularly from Blankenburg, Conrad, and Minkowski, among other authors). Their semi-structured design allows for an in-depth examination of the patients’ subjective experiences within formal structures, such as corporeality, temporality, spatiality, and intersubjectivity. In this way, the descriptive task is not carried out on a totally random basis, as the interviews have specific domains and items that have already been established to guide the examination of the patient’s experience. EASE and EAWE were developed with the chief purpose of exploring and better understanding patients’ experiential and behavioral manifestations of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. These interviews offer comprehensive descriptions of disorders of the pre-reflexive self or ipseity ( Sass, 1992 ; Parnas and Handest, 2003 ; Sass and Parnas, 2003 ; Parnas and Sass, 2008 ; Raballo et al., 2009 ; Fuchs, 2010b , 2013a ; Sass et al., 2018 ). Indeed, EASE and EAWE have had great international impact in clinical practice and empirical research in psychiatry and psychology, and EASE has been translated into more than 10 languages, among them German, Danish, Spanish, Italian, and French.

EASE and EAWE describe aspects of the patients’ anomalous experience that are not only relevant for diagnostic but also for psychotherapeutic purposes, as they can be useful as tools in both psychotherapeutic settings and in psychotherapy research. However, phenomenological psychopathology has focused primarily on the issue of psychiatric diagnosis, while the treatment of mental illness has remained less developed. Only in recent years has the treatment of mental illness become the focus of stronger research interest, directly involving the practice of psychotherapy ( Fuchs et al., 2019 ). For its part, although not rooted in phenomenology, body-oriented therapy has been linked to a phenomenological framework, as it provides empirical evidence for embodiment-approach conceptualizations ( Fuchs 2005 ; Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009 ; Koch and Fuchs, 2011 ; Fuchs and Koch 2014 ). The embodiment approach regards schizophrenia as a fundamental disturbance of embodiment, namely a “disembodiment,” that entails a diminishment of the basic sense of self, a disruption of implicit bodily functioning and, as a result, a disconnection from intercorporeality with others. A range of empirical research into body-oriented therapy has been carried out in the field of phenomenological psychopathology. Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of body-oriented therapy for schizophrenia has been obtained from quantitative research carried out with manualized interventions ( Röhricht and Papadopoulos, 2010 ) and using randomized controlled trials to measure outcomes ( Martin et al., 2016 ). Recent research has incorporated phenomenological interviews to describe therapeutic change processes in body-oriented therapy for schizophrenia, thus explaining the relationship between processes and outcomes ( Galbusera et al., 2018 ). Unsurprisingly, the phenomenological interviews revealed an understanding of change as a recovery of a “sense of self” in patients with schizophrenia ( Galbusera et al., 2019 ).

The conceptualization of schizophrenia as a disorder of the self is shared by a number of philosophical and clinical approaches: it is not exclusive to phenomenological psychiatry ( Parnas and Henriksen, 2014 ). So, in much the same way as body therapy has been “converted” to phenomenology, any other psychotherapeutic approach might well incorporate “front-loaded phenomenology,” in the sense of the possibility of being linked to the phenomenological framework. This is especially the case when the effectiveness of psychotherapy has been widely evidenced and recognized independently of its theoretical framework ( Campbell et al., 2013 ). For instance, narrative/dialogical psychotherapy addressing schizophrenia as a disorder of the self might be consistent with the phenomenological conceptualization and could even serve as a complement for body-oriented therapy. In fact, EASE’s and EAWE’s rich descriptions provide evidence that patients with schizophrenia are able to communicate their experience in a comprehensive narrative form, which is quite contrary to Martin et al.’s (2016) claim that verbal dialogue can be difficult in patients with severe mental disorders. A suitable alternative might be the “metacognitive model” ( Lysaker et al., 2018a ). Under this model, deficits in metacognition undermine the availability of a sense of self, others, and the world, making it difficult to provide an adequate response to everyday-life situations. To deal with this, the so-called metacognitive reflection and insight therapy (MERIT) has been designed to target metacognition and recover the availability of a sense of self in the patients’ experience ( Lysaker et al., 2018b ). Precisely because contemporary phenomenological psychiatry places particular emphasis on the bodily and pre-reflective level of experience, the use of phenomenological interviews to explore change process in MERIT might reveal interesting relationships between pre-reflexive and reflective forms of self-experience.

Does psychotherapy needs be rooted in the phenomenological tradition in order to be called “phenomenological?” Here we are talking about enterprises such as Freud’s psychoanalysis or Binswanger’s existential analysis/daseinsanalysis. Such an enterprise requires a well-achieved and comprehensive conceptualization of phenomenological psychopathology as well as a consequent psychotherapeutic intervention rooted in the same phenomenological conceptualization. Certainly, psychotherapy does not need to be rooted in phenomenology, although this enterprise, not a minor one, might be worth undertaking. Yet, the very essence of phenomenological psychotherapy is to remain faithful to the patient’s self-experience and their constitutive vulnerability ( Fuchs, 2013b ; Irarrázaval, 2013 , 2018 ; Irarrázaval and Sharim, 2014 ; Škodlar and Henriksen, 2019 ). Consequently, the development of integrative models of psychotherapy both bodily and narrative/dialogical addressing the patients’ experience of vulnerability is definitely a future challenge.

Why do we carry out phenomenological interviews with patients? Is merely contrasting phenomenological hypotheses or concepts enough to justify the patients’ involvement?

The justification for empirical research employing phenomenological interviews is extremely important, especially when persons with mental illnesses are involved. It is not only a matter of gathering data from the patients’ experience but also one of what to do with this data and, in the end, what for. It is an ethical issue concerning the impact phenomenological interviews might have on patients interviewed. Any interview aimed at exploring the experience of a patient always involves some kind of intervention, so even when applied by accredited experienced clinicians, an ethical justification is required. Arguments before ethics committees that phenomenological interviews are beneficial and do not worsen patients’ instability need to be convincing. Recalling and enacting in patients disturbing experiences we aim to grasp is certainly an intervention that needs justification. Obviously, phenomenological interviews are not psychotherapeutic interventions in themselves – that is, the dialogue in psychotherapy is not an interview – but they can be justified on the grounds similar to those usually employed by psychotherapy: the possibility of sharing anomalous experiences through an accepting and understanding communication helps patients to recover a sense of familiarity with their experience, thus reducing their sense of self-alienation. Furthermore, by means of the descriptive tasks called for in the semi-structured interviews, patients improve their articulation of anomalous experiences, which might have been otherwise overlooked, neglected, or even remain ineffable for them ( Zahavi and Martiny, 2019 ).

Phenomenological interviews have been simply defined as falling within the framework of an interview “which is informed by insights and concepts from the phenomenological tradition and (which) in turn informs a phenomenological investigation” ( Høffding and Martiny, 2016 , p. 540). However, phenomenological interviews involving patients with mental illness should not only be consistent with insights and concepts from the phenomenological tradition of philosophy and psychopathology but, most importantly, they must make explicit their contribution to both diagnosis and psychotherapy. While a biomedical psychiatric diagnosis is ultimately oriented toward finding a suitable pharmacological treatment, a phenomenological diagnosis is ultimately oriented toward providing a treatment based on the experiential dimension of a given mental illness. The interest of a psychotherapist goes beyond the psychiatric diagnostic emphasis by approaching the patient as a whole person, aiming to understand the anomalies of experience within his/her social, cultural, and historical context. This broader, psychological, approach enables an understanding not only of how patients make sense of their anomalous experiences but also of how symptoms manifest themselves within the patients’ immediate life context, as well as how a certain mental illness configures itself along the patients’ history of meaningful interactions with others ( Irarrázaval and Sharim, 2014 ; Irarrázaval, 2018 ). However, in spite of the importance given to the analysis of the patients’ biography by several authors from the phenomenological tradition of psychopathology (Jaspers, Binswanger, and Blankenburg, among other authors), “biographical methods,” originally developed for sociological research in the influential “Chicago School” ( Bornat, 2008 ), have not been sufficiently incorporated in current phenomenological empirical research in psychiatry and psychology.

How should we conduct phenomenological interviews with patients? How can we properly perform analysis in empirical phenomenological research in psychiatry and psychology?

A phenomenological interview involves a second-person situation, in which the dialogical communication with the patient is crucial. No matter how strange or unrealistic the patients’ anomalous experiences might appear to the interviewer, an attitude of professional competence and familiarity is necessary ( Nordgaard et al., 2013 ). For the patient, anomalous experiences are actually lived experiences despite their lack of commonsensical validity. Hallucinations and delusions are, like nonpsychotic experiences, first-personally given, which means that they have a solipsistic validity. This is one of the reasons why it is difficult, especially in psychotic phases, for patients to come to terms with the fact that what they actually experience is not credible or real in the eyes of others, and even abnormal or pathological in the eyes of the clinician. Clearly, the interviewer’s role is not to confront or contradict this lack of commonsensical validity, but simply to grasp the experiences as they appear to the patients. In other words, the interviewer conducts the interview with an attitude of empathetic understanding. Empathy should not be reduced to an attempt to understand the patient in a “representational” manner, in the sense that it does not refer to the interviewer’s own experience of processing (imitating, thinking, or imagining) the patient’s subjectivity ( Irarrázaval, 2019 ). Empathy is the condition of possibility for the “subject-subject” relationship ( Zahavi, 2015 ). That is to say, empathy is a distinct mode of other-directed intentionality that permits the unfolding of the patient’s experience, approached as a unique other person. In this sense, empathic understanding permits the unfolding of the what it is like of the patient’s anomalous experience.

In phenomenological interviews, why-like questions lead patients to respond with causal explanations of the anomalies of their experience or diagnosed mental illness, such as judgments, beliefs, theoretical constructions, etc., For their part, how-like questions guide patients to describe the way in which they live their experience, that is, the way in which the anomalies actually appear to the patients in their experience. To put it another way, both types of questions lead patients to talk about experiential contents, but in different ways: causal attributions in the former, and appearances in the latter. Causal attributions are by no means irrelevant aspects of the patient’s experience not worth addressing in the interview. The way in which patients’ attribute causes to their anomalous experience or mental illness can also provide valuable information for both diagnosis and psychotherapy. Moreover, the relationship between causal attributions and appearances is certainly valuable, as it entails a circular, dynamic process in which both orders of experiencing constantly influence one another. However, the gathering of phenomenological data is generally not aimed at obtaining causal explanations or attributional reports, as in the case of cognitive psychology, but mainly at exploring aspects of experience that how-like questions are designed to unfold.

Turning to data analysis, it has been said that phenomenology is interested in describing the formal structure of the experience rather than its content ( Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008 ), but what does this actually mean? It seems difficult to imagine an experience as a mere structure without any content. Moreover, it is not possible to establish a category of experience that has not been previously built upon any content analysis. In qualitative studies, categories are built upon the basis of prior content analysis; both hypotheses and categories are developed as the study progresses and emerge from the data itself ( Morrow, 2005 ; Maxwell, 2012 ), so-called “iterative process” ( Barbour and Barbour, 2003 ). EASE and EAWE were built collecting first-person descriptions by a significant number of patients (around 100 each), which allowed for their statistical validation. However, only a fairly general description has been provided of how EASE’s domains and items were developed: singular contents of anomalous experience are conceptualized and interconnected within a comprehensive system of meaningful structural wholes or Gestalts , leading to the “core” underlying psychopathological configuration ( Nordgaard et al., 2013 ). A recent qualitative study on the responses to the two scales highlights the specificities of the phenomena described by EASE and EAWE, indicating that disturbances of world experience are fundamentally less unitary, while the experience of the self presents a more coherent and unitary Gestalt ( Englebert et al., 2019 ).

Beyond the statistical validation of the interviews, replication is needed in other clinical samples and cultures to support previous findings and provide added evidence when compared with multiple clinical groups and cross culturally. However, if the focus of the analysis is placed merely on formal structural aspects, then when applying EASE and EAWE to new patients, we will not find domains or categories different from those already defined. To put it differently, quantitative replication of EASE or EAWE in other samples would barely lead to any new knowledge, because already established domains and items tend to constrain the patients’ responses. So, particularly in terms of their potential contribution to psychotherapy, the best contribution that could be made from applying EASE and EAWE to new patients would result from a content analysis of the patients’ reports. However, one key question concerning these interviews’ replication remains unanswered: Which is the most appropriate qualitative method for analyzing the patients’ descriptions?

The empirical application of Husserl’s phenomenological method outside the strict scope of philosophy still is a topic of ongoing debate in both philosophy and the cognitive sciences. According to Zahavi (2019a , b , c) , in philosophy, the main goal of phenomenology is not purely descriptive or attentive to how things appear to the subject; it focuses neither on the subject nor on the object, but on the correlation between them. In this context, the term epoché is used to refer to suspending or putting between parentheses a “naïve” or “natural” attitude toward reality in order to reflect upon fundamental ontological questions, thus adopting a critical stance on the conception of reality as mind-independently given. Epoché , usually described as putting “in brackets” the prejudices and theoretical assumptions of the interviewer ( Fischer, 2009 ), in order to access phenomena as they appear in the subject’s experience, has little to do with the original philosophical method. This does not imply that bracketing our prejudices and theoretical assumptions would not be desirable to avoid bias when conducting phenomenological interviews or analyzing data (we can find several techniques for doing so). It is also not so important to calling such bracketing epoché , as long as we have a basic notion of Husserl’s original sense of the term.

Phenomenology has been applied in empirical research not only in psychiatry and psychology, but also in other healthcare-related disciplines, such as nursing studies ( Zahavi and Martiny, 2019 ). Nevertheless, the different forms in which phenomenology has been applied in these disciplines have been also controversial due to their divergence from the original Husserlian philosophical method ( Zahavi, 2019b , d ). For instance, some have questioned whether the method of analysis proposed by Giorgi (2009 , 2012) , “descriptive phenomenological psychological method,” should be considered “phenomenological” or given another label. This method is aimed at the establishment of inclusive categories resulting from the content analysis of subjects’ descriptions. In fact, Giorgi’s method of content analysis seems closer to an adapted form of “eidetic variation” and quite different to the original Husserlian sense of the epoché , because it basically consists of summarizing the content of the interview transcript by deleting its redundancies, in order to reveal invariables or essences in “meaning” (see Irarrázaval, 2015 ). Eidetic variation is a conceptual analysis that, by imagining a phenomenon as being different from how it currently is, leads to the isolation of its essential features or aspects, in the sense that such features or aspects cannot be varied or deleted without preventing the phenomenon from being the kind of phenomenon that it is ( Parnas and Zahavi, 2002 ). Another example of a so-called applied phenomenological method is “microphenomenology” ( Petitmengin et al., 2018 ; Depraz, 2020 ). This method, like Giorgi’s, also diverges from the original Husserlian philosophical method. In addition to the method of analysis, micro-phenomenology includes some “principles” regarding the interview. Microphenomenological analysis seeks to identify generic pre-reflexive structures from descriptions of “singular” lived experiences. The pre-reflexive aspect of experience is conceived as experientially “unnoticed,” in the sense that it is not immediately accessible to reflective consciousness and verbal description. However, at least in the way Petitmengin et al. (2018) present it, what results from the analysis seems to be more a description of the figurative aspects or features of the object rather than experiential structures of the subject (for example, size, shape, temperature, color, etc.,).

Whether to find evidence supporting already-existing insights and concepts or to make it possible for new insights and concepts to emerge from the data itself, phenomenological empirical research must take on board patients’ accounts of their subjective experience. Phenomenological interviews should present clear guidelines on both how to conduct them and the qualitative methods employed in analyzing patients’ subjective experiences. The research report should follow standards for presenting qualitative research ( O’Brien et al., 2014 ). Still, the most challenging aspect of phenomenological empirical research in psychiatry and psychology is the proper method for analyzing patients’ reports. Neither the original Husserlian question of phenomenological philosophizing nor the phenomenological method of philosophical analysis appears appropriate for empirical application. There seems to be a gap between the phenomenological philosophical method and its empirical versions.

Phenomenological philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology have different aims and practical implications. This implies that the methods used in each of these research fields are necessarily different, since they serve as a means to achieve the different aims pursued by each of the corresponding disciplines. In philosophy, the phenomenological method serves as a means to reflect upon fundamental ontological questions regarding our active subjective involvement in the constitution of the world. However, in phenomenological psychiatry and psychology, the methods serve as a means to achieve more precise, complete, and differential diagnoses, with the aim of improving psychotherapy and, ultimately, patients’ well-being. Nevertheless, regardless of their divergence from the original philosophical method, Georgi’s method of content analysis (to a greater extent), and “microphenomenology” (to a lesser extent), have been quite influential, precisely because of their attempt to bridge this gap, providing a response to the need for a phenomenological method for qualitative research.

An entirely different way of dealing with this problem would not be to seek empirical adaptations of the original phenomenological method inherent in philosophy, nor to limit phenomenology to a mere descriptive task of subjective experience, but to make phenomenology a theoretical framework for empirical research, and even more, a transcendental paradigm. Although its method is certainly fundamental to it, phenomenology should not be reduced to its methodology. Phenomenology is a comprehensive theoretical framework that has been developed on the basis of serious conceptual and empirical research into the subject-world correlation ( Zahavi, 2019a ), including studies of formal structures of experience (spatiality, temporality, corporeality, intersubjectivity, and historicity), research into the modes of intentionality (perception, agency, phantasy, memory, emotions, and empathy), and psychological analyses of meaning-making processes in social interactions. Additionally, despite the different aims and methods involved, just as in phenomenological philosophy, in phenomenological psychiatry and psychology the core philosophical commitment regarding a critical stance on the conception of reality as mind-independently given is fundamental ( Zahavi, 2017 , 2019e ). Does psychiatry and psychology really need the Husserlian method to adopt the phenomenological attitude toward the conception of reality as mind-dependent? No, because this core philosophical commitment already constitutes the basis of a transcendental paradigm in phenomenological psychiatry and psychology.

Mainstream psychiatry has been developed within a natural-scientific paradigm. From the positivist viewpoint of psychiatry, the notion of normality is defined with regard to the degree of correspondence between subjective experience and objective reality. Consequently, abnormality is defined in terms of its degree of deviation from an objective reality that provides the evidence for commonsensical validity. For its part, phenomenological psychopathology approaches mental phenomena in terms of a phenomenological analysis of the patient’s subjectivity, placing the focus on the conditions of possibility of human experience in general, beyond it being diagnosed as abnormal according to common standards of objectivity. For instance, in current diagnostic systems, psychosis is diagnosed by the presence of hallucinations and delusions, as defined by a “natural attitude” that takes for granted the validity of an objective given reality. In DSM-5, hallucination is defined as a perception without object (or an error of perception) and delusion as a false belief of reality ( American Psychiatric Association, 2013 ). In contrast, from a phenomenological approach, a disturbance is not approached in terms of the clinician’s evidence of the inexistence of the object of perception or the lack of external evidence of the patient’s belief, but rather in terms of an analysis of the particular mode of intentionality that constitutes the hallucination or delusion as such. In other words, the clinician is concerned with a phenomenological analysis of the patient’s subjectivity, addressing with empathic understanding the patient’s “self-evidence” or “solipsistic truth,” correlated with the experience of hallucination or delusion, respectively. Indeed, the “external” inexistent object should provide for the clinician with evidence that hallucination is not perception, as it is impossible to have a perception without a directly present object.

Consequently, it would be misleading to conceive of hallucination as something to do with perception at all. Instead, hallucinations would have more to do with the phenomenology of fantasy, whose distinctive character is to “re-present” an object of perception that is not directly present, but absent from the actual field of perception. According to Cavallaro (2017) , it is not the presentation/re-presentation dichotomy, but what Husserl calls “ego-splitting” ( Ichspaltung ) that is crucial to distinguishing when experiencing the “quasi perception” produced by fantasy and not a perception as such. Ego-splitting makes possible the experience of the “as if” fictive character of self-awareness when fantasizing. However, when hallucinating, the patient experiences his/her own thoughts, anticipations, or imaginations just as in original experiences of perception. So, it may be posited that it is precisely this lack of the “as if” self-awareness of the “quasi perception” that lies at the core of psychosis. Such a theory would require further phenomenological research to draw more distinctions between the nature of hallucination in contrast to that of fantasy, as well as regarding other modalities of experiencing which do not have an intentional object directly present, such as anticipations, thoughts, memories, and dreams. Still, introducing the concept of “ego-splitting” as non-pathological might be challenging to traditional psychiatric concepts, especially with regard to schizophrenia.

Finally, the phenomenological attitude should not be conceived of as being like any other attitude; it is obviously not literally an attitude. The phenomenological attitude is a paradigmatic commitment of a non-pregiven reality. This core philosophical commitment is particularly important because it entails a quite unique approach to mental illness, including different conceptualizations of psychopathology, diagnosis, normality, empathy, and psychotherapy, thus leading qualitative empirical research in psychiatry and psychology toward new horizons. Moreover, the notion of suspending the natural attitude to approaching reality (including all kinds of phenomena) lies at the heart of the phenomenological framework for anyone claiming to be a phenomenologist, whether conceptual or empirical, and regardless of other particular methods and topics of study. In this way, the phenomenological attitude might be conceived of the basis of a transcendental scientific paradigm for qualitative research in psychiatry and psychology. This latter claim, which supports the idea that phenomenological psychology – in order to be properly phenomenological – must become transcendental, and the phenomenological conceptualization of hallucination as pathology of fantasy provide challenging directions for future research.

Author Contributions

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Funding. This article has been financially supported by Chilean National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research CONICYT PFCHA/POSTDOCTORADO EN EL EXTRANJERO BECAS CHILE/2017 – 74180011.

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