electric vehicles literature review of technology costs and carbon emissions

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• Published: 08 December 2021

Pricing indirect emissions accelerates low—carbon transition of US light vehicle sector

• Paul Wolfram   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-8470-427X 1 ,
• Stephanie Weber 1 ,
• Kenneth Gillingham   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-7329-2660 1 , 2 &
• Edgar G. Hertwich   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-4934-3421 1 , 3  

Nature Communications volume  12 , Article number:  7121 ( 2021 ) Cite this article

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Large–scale electric vehicle adoption can greatly reduce emissions from vehicle tailpipes. However, analysts have cautioned that it can come with increased indirect emissions from electricity and battery production that are not commonly regulated by transport policies. We combine integrated energy modeling and life cycle assessment to compare optimal policy scenarios that price emissions at the tailpipe only, versus both tailpipe and indirect emissions. Surprisingly, scenarios that also price indirect emissions exhibit higher, rather than reduced, sales of electric vehicles, while yielding lower cumulative tailpipe and indirect emissions. Expected technological change ensures that emissions from electricity and battery production are more than offset by reduced emissions of gasoline production. Given continued decarbonization of electricity supply, results show that a large–scale adoption of electric vehicles is able to reduce CO 2 emissions through more channels than previously expected. Further, carbon pricing of stationary sources will also favor electric vehicles.

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Introduction.

Global transportation is the single largest energy user and energy–using emitter of CO 2 emissions, chiefly driven by light duty vehicles (LDVs) 1 . In order to curb emissions, many countries, including the United States (US), are increasingly promoting alternative fuel vehicles, which are typically characterized by lower tailpipe emissions. However, concerns over potentially growing emissions from energy production and vehicle manufacturing have been voiced 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 . These emissions occur off–site, or indirectly, and include generation of electricity to charge electric vehicles, in this work ~66–86 g CO 2 per electric–vehicle km driven in 2020, as well as the production of vehicles, here ~16–38 g CO 2 per vehicle–km driven in 2020 (Supplementary Figs.  1 , 2 and Supplementary Table  1 ). It has only recently been recognized that the emissions for producing gasoline can range significantly, from below 15 to ~320 g CO 2 /kWh in 2015 6 , 7 , compared to direct emissions (synonymous with tailpipe emissions) of about 250 g CO 2 /kWh. Taken together, indirect emissions accounted for ~26% of the 1.5 Gt CO 2 caused by the US LDV fleet in 2020 (Supplementary Table  2 ). The US EPA defines LDVs as passenger vehicles and light trucks with a gross vehicle weight of up to 8500 pounds (about 3855 kg) 8 .

The introduction of the Low Carbon Fuel Standard in California, which regulates all fuel and electricity production and combustion emissions, shows that transport policy in practice can at least partly address indirect vehicle emissions. However, not a single transport policy exists to date that consistently regulates all sources of vehicle emissions along the entire supply chain. Note that we use the terms ‘supply chain emissions’ and ‘life–cycle emissions’ synonymously. Both are defined as the sum of direct, or tailpipe, emissions, and indirect emissions. Fully regulating all emissions, for example through pricing, could significantly change the relative costs of different vehicle propulsion options, such as battery electric vehicles (BEVs) versus hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles (HFCEVs) versus internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs). Changing costs, in turn, could affect production decisions of vehicle manufacturers, and purchase behaviors of consumers 9 . The potential impact of these relationships is unknown to date because neither model calculations, nor real–world policies, have fully accounted for or priced indirect vehicle emissions.

Integrated energy models (IEMs) 10 show that it will be challenging to reduce emissions rapidly and far enough to reach the Paris goal 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 . However, there is concern that IEMs do not fully represent the impact of changes in one sector, such as electricity generation technologies, on emissions in other sectors, such as industry or fuel supply 10 , 15 , 16 , 17 . For electricity generation, this has been investigated 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , but not for vehicles. Although global IEMs are the main tool for identifying optimal climate change mitigation pathways, they generally do not offer the same level of technological detail as national models do 10 , 15 , 16 , 24 which may limit their ability to identify optimal solutions across the range of options available in the real world. Further, while some integrated assessments account for materials used in electric power plants 25 , 26 , others point out the importance of considering efficient use of resources within integrated climate scenarios 27 . Yet, material and resource efficiency have not been thought of as pollution mitigation strategies in large–scale integrated energy scenarios and are therefore not well represented in the assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 28 .

Here, we address these knowledge gaps by applying a conceptual framework by Creutzig et al. 29 , which focuses on energy–demand side (rather than energy–supply side) solutions to climate change mitigation. We apply this framework to develop a comprehensive climate change mitigation analysis of an important demand–side sector, the US LDV sector. We illustrate a set of climate–change mitigation scenarios, primarily for the vehicles sector, but also consider responses in important upstream sectors, such as changes to material production, vehicle manufacturing and electricity generation. Our model of choice is the Energy Information Agency’s National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). NEMS is the federal government’s main tool for evaluating energy and climate policies integrative of all energy demand and supply sectors. The responses described above are normally not fully captured in NEMS. Thus, we soft–link NEMS to a detailed vehicle life cycle assessment (LCA) model (Fig.  1 and Supplementary Fig.  3 ). Among IEMs, NEMS has the advantage of representing the US passenger vehicle sector and its upstream sectors in great detail 10 (also see Methods), which is a prerequisite for accurately accounting for all vehicle emissions across the entire supply chain of the vast portfolio of available technology options. This interdisciplinary approach enables us to fully account for, and price, all life–cycle emissions that are directly (within the vehicle sector) and indirectly (in other sectors) caused by US passenger vehicles. We investigate whether this holistic emissions pricing influences the assessment of the benefit of competitive technologies. We assume that the production cost of electric vehicle batteries and renewable electricity generators fall quickly, in line with recent estimates. We further introduce a carbon price in the transport sector in 2021 which linearly increases up to 150 USD/t CO 2 (constant 2016$) by 2050 (Supplementary Table  3 ). This level is required for an LDV fleet commensurate with the US nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement (see Methods). For simplicity and to provide insight, we run our cases with no carbon pricing on other sectors. The difference between the two main scenarios is that either emissions from (1) the tailpipe, or (2) the entire vehicle supply chain are accounted for and priced. The implications are both surprising and significant. The strongest effect of pricing both tailpipe and indirect emissions is that the system would be pushed to an even faster phase–out of gasoline–powered vehicles, leading to a scenario minimizing both tailpipe and indirect emissions.

See Supplementary Fig.  3 for a more detailed model representation.

Optimal vehicle choice

While pricing only direct tailpipe emissions already leads to a nearly complete phase–out of ICEVs (Fig.  2 a), the transition is accelerated under full emissions pricing (Fig.  2 b). In addition, HFCEVs are avoided entirely under full pricing due to the high emissions penalty of producing hydrogen from natural gas. Lower sales of ICEVs, HFCEVs, and other powertrains (mostly hybrids and flex–fuel vehicles running both on conventional liquid fuels and biofuels) are compensated by higher BEV sales. This substitution pattern peaks around 2040 with about 2.4 million units per year (Fig.  2 c). In absolute terms, sales of ICEV light trucks are reduced the most, and compensated by BEV cars and trucks. The cumulative amount of avoided ICEVs and HFCEVs amounts to nearly 29 and 9 million units. We explore a range of side cases in which (a) only energy–chain emissions (synonymous with well–to–wheel emissions) instead of full life–cycle emissions are priced, (b) hydrogen production becomes carbon–neutral by 2050, (c) HFCEVs become cost–competitive with BEVs, as well as different combinations thereof. We display three of these cases in Supplementary Figs.  4 – 6 . The full list of analyzed scenarios is available in Supplementary Section  5 .

Direct–emissions–only pricing ( a ) and full emissions pricing ( b ). c Differences in vehicle choice between ( b ) and ( a ). PC Passenger car, LT Light truck, ICEV Internal combustion engine vehicle, HEV Hybrid electric vehicle, PHEV Plug–in hybrid electric vehicle, BEV Battery electric vehicle, HFCEV Hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicle; –10 10–mile electric range. The underlying data used to compile this figure can be found in Supplementary Table  4 .

The mentioned substitutions of technologies lead to substantially lower cumulative life–cycle emissions through 2050 (−1.6 Gt CO 2 , Fig.  3 a, f), largely driven by lower fuel combustion (–1.4 Gt CO 2 , Fig.  3 b, g) and lower production of gasoline and hydrogen (−0.5 Gt CO 2 , Fig.  3 c, h). While stronger sales of BEVs lead to higher electricity emissions (Fig.  3 d and i), these are however relatively small compared to lower emissions from fuel production (+0.25 Gt CO 2 vs. −0.5 Gt CO 2 , Fig.  3 k). Finally, since BEVs are material intensive 30 , an additional 30 Mt CO 2 embodied in vehicle production can be observed. However, these could be more than compensated by ambitious recycling and reuse practices (+0.03 vs. −0.5 Gt CO 2 , Supplementary Fig.  7 ). As mentioned earlier, we explore a range of side cases (Supplementary Figs.  4 – 6 ) which show some variation in their potential for emission reductions (also see dotted lines in Fig.  3 a–j) but the overall trend is robust among these cases. Accordingly, additional cumulative life–cycle emission reductions can vary between −1.4 and −1.7 Gt CO 2 across all cases (see dotted lines in Fig.  3 f) on top of emission reductions already achieved under pricing direct emissions only. Only in scenarios of constant renewable electricity costs does full emissions pricing not yield lower emissions than direct–emissions–only pricing (see Uncertainty analysis and Supplementary Figs.  8 , 9 ). In Fig.  3 k, the differences in emissions between ‘full pricing’ and ‘direct–emissions–only pricing’ are once more plotted by life cycle stage, while in Fig.  3 l, all sources of indirect emissions, i.e., production of fuels, electricity, and vehicles, are categorized as such. It becomes apparent that ‘full pricing’ not only leads to reduced tailpipe emissions but also to lower indirect supply chain emissions, at least after about 2035.

Total emissions ( a ) and broken down by life–cycle stage ( b – e ). Differences in emissions between full and direct–emissions–only pricing ( f – l ). Dotted lines ( a – j ) illustrate results from side cases (‘Side cases’, also see Supplementary Figs.  4 – 6 ). The underlying data used to compile this figure can be found in Supplementary Table  2 .

Fleet efficiency

The future of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard is currently highly uncertain and we, therefore, do not model changes to CAFE after 2025. While the Trump administration enacted the Safer Affordable Fuel–Efficient (SAFE) standard in 2018, which weakened CAFE requirements through 2026, the Biden campaign announced a plan to consider a more ambitious CAFE 31 . While further details were unknown at the time of producing the results, a new proposal has been announced on August 5, 2021, which foresees an improvement of the average fleet–wide fuel economy of new 2026 vehicles by 12 miles per gallon relative to 2021 vehicles 32 . Despite the fact that CAFE is not further tightened after 2025 in our model, average real–world fuel economy? 33 of the fleet continues to improve greatly in all scenarios, even after 2025 (Fig.  4 ). This can be explained by the strong market penetration of BEVs. When full life–cycle emissions are priced, average fuel economy is even higher compared to direct–emissions–only pricing due to the accelerated penetration of BEVs. Side cases with higher shares of HFCEVs however exhibit significantly lower average fuel economies (Supplementary Table  5 ). Other fleet characteristics, such as average vehicle weight, deployment of lightweight through material substitution, segment shares, and total travel demand, are less impacted in the different scenarios (Supplementary Fig.  11 ).

The thin green lines show the range of results from the side cases (‘Side cases’). The underlying data used to compile this figure can be found in Supplementary Table  5 .

Resource use implications

Fully pricing life cycle emissions would also have important implications on resource use (Fig.  5 ). For example, gasoline and diesel consumption in 2050 would be 29% and 32% lower than if taxing only direct emissions (26–32% and 30–39% in the side cases). Further, while hydrogen demand would be lower by 99.9% (–98.0 to +327.0%), electricity use would be 18% higher (2–18%). Overall, taxing supply chains would lower energy use by 7% (1–6%). Meanwhile, overall material demand would be slightly higher, by 2.1% (0.8–2.0%), with copper demand higher by 4.7% (with a range of −0.7 to +5.0%). These effects are largely due to higher BEV sales (by 9.1%, with a range of –6.1% to +9.3%, Supplementary Table  6 ).

The hollow bars show the normalized differences of the side cases (‘Side cases’) relative to direct–emissions–only pricing in 2050. BEV Battery electric vehicle; * Onboard energy. The underlying data used to compile this figure can be found in Supplementary Table  7 .

In absolute terms, the difference between the two main scenarios is that under full pricing, cumulative gasoline consumption through 2050 is reduced by 0.15 trillion gallons or 0.6 trillion liters compared to direct–emissions–only pricing. This corresponds to the US gasoline consumption of a whole year (about 0.12 trillion gallons or 0.5 trillion liters in 2020) 34 . Similarly, 0.8 PWh (trillion kWh) of hydrogen is saved, while electricity consumption is higher by 3.2 PWh, roughly corresponding to the current annual amount of electricity end–use in the US in 2019 35 (Supplementary Table  8 ). Cumulative material use for vehicle production is moderately higher, by about 24 Mt, which is chiefly driven by the larger stock of material–intensive BEVs. The higher material demand is partially mitigated by a slightly lower average vehicle weight (Supplementary Fig.  11 ). Material substitutions due to vehicle lightweighting lead to marginally higher use of aluminum and plastics, and a reduction of steel and iron. Overall, the largest absolute difference is due to the higher demand for stainless steel (+13.2 Mt), followed by copper (+3.1 Mt), aluminum (+1.6 Mt), and plastics (+1.2 Mt). Simultaneously, the use of automotive steel and cast iron is lower, by 1.0 Mt. However, more ambitious recycling and reuse practices have the potential to more than offset the stronger demand for virgin materials, by about 740 Mt (Supplementary Fig.  7 ).

Adequacy of analyzed decarbonization measures

Emission reductions required to halt climate change are sometimes framed through the carbon budget — the amount of emissions remaining until the atmosphere reaches an identified temperature threshold. Under the described cases, the US LDV sector would require 3–5% of the global carbon budget identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 14 , which is about as much as its share of current emissions (Supplementary Table  2 ).

There is remarkably little known about the extent to which indirect emissions shape cost–optimal decarbonization pathways 36 and vice versa. Previous work focusing on electricity supply reported a limited role of indirect emissions in optimized climate change mitigation scenarios 18 , 19 , 20 . In this work, we explored the role of indirect emissions in the decarbonization efforts of the US passenger vehicle fleet and find that, in fact, they can significantly alter optimal climate change mitigation pathways. An important difference between the electricity supply sector and the LDV sector is that indirect emissions play a larger role, accounting for about a quarter of total life–cycle emissions already today. In our scenarios, indirect emissions make up almost half of total LDV sector CO 2 emissions in 2050 (44–49%) and about 24–29% of cumulative emissions over the 2010–2050 scenario time frame (Supplementary Table  2 ). For comparison, McDowall et al. report that indirect emissions would account for less than 10% of total life–cycle power plant emissions in 2050 in an optimal decarbonization scenario of the EU 19 .

Although overall life–cycle emissions are significantly lower under full emissions pricing, the share of indirect emissions increases, most prominently due to electricity generation and battery manufacturing for BEVs. However, higher electricity emissions are more than offset by lower gasoline supply–chain emissions stemming from the production of crude oil (Fig.  3 k). Higher emissions from material production and vehicle assembly are relatively small and could be more than offset by increased material efficiency efforts including more ambitious material recycling and reuse of components.

While it is expected that direct emissions of BEVs are lower than those of ICEVs, it is surprising that in fact non–tailpipe emissions are also lower (Fig.  3 l). This sheds new light on the current public debate about ‘dirty’ batteries and electricity 37 . In fact, the simultaneous reduction of both direct and indirect emissions indicates a win–win situation for climate change mitigation, meaning that climate policy with very high shares of BEVs represents a no–regrets strategy in terms of emissions (but only if electricity continues to decarbonize as has been assumed in our main scenarios). Our insights are therefore highly relevant for global climate and transport policies. Current policies, such as performance standards or emission pricing schemes, should be broadened in their scope in order to regulate all sources of vehicle emissions along the entire supply chain or throughout the entire life cycle. Our scenarios further indicate that the US (and likely other nations with suitable low–carbon electricity grids) should target the deployment of BEVs. HFCEVs could offer a viable alternative if costs to produce fuel cells and low–carbon hydrogen would fall considerably in coming years.

Our work represents a step towards a holistic inclusion of dynamic life–cycle relationships in integrated modeling frameworks. Future research could include additional potentially important factors and processes, such as the deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) at fuel refineries, differences in emission intensities of hydrocarbons, synthetic liquid fuels, net–negative emission pathways of energy production, and low–carbon steel production using hydrogen from renewable sources. Future research could also investigate the degree to which our results would differ in various regions of the world, or if additional pollutants, other than direct and indirect CO 2 emissions, were internalized in optimal pollution mitigation pathways.

Demand–side framework

We address calls for stronger research focus on demand–side solutions for mitigating climate change 38 . Specifically, we apply and specify a transdisciplinary demand–side assessment framework focusing on an important emitting sector 29 (Supplementary Figure  3 ). Our framework addresses the following key areas: (1) End–use context: we focus on demand–side solutions, with the US LDV fleet as a case study. (2) Technology: we use industrial ecology methods to model full life cycle CO 2 emissions and costs of all major established and emerging vehicle technologies. This enables us to test the potential of different technological mitigation measures along the entire vehicle supply chain including powertrain switching, changes in material composition, recycling of materials, reuse of vehicle components, and feedstock switching for fuel and electricity production. (3) Policy instruments: Carbon pricing is applied to either tailpipe emissions or the entire vehicle life cycle. (4) Climate change mitigation pathways: We present climate change mitigation scenarios of the US LDV sector and analyze the contribution of several mitigation measures towards the US nationally determined contribution and a 2 °C consistent US LDV sector. (5) Sustainable development: We highlight synergies with other sustainability indicators such as resource use, energy use, and consumer cost.

Integrated energy modelling

Our tool of choice is NEMS which is the model behind the well–known Annual Energy Outlook 39 , 40 . In this study, we use the NEMS code run on a server at Yale University (henceforth we call it ‘Yale–NEMS’ at EIA’s request) and slightly modified to output additional results 41 , 42 . Yale–NEMS sets prices so that an equilibrium is obtained where annual energy supply equals energy demand (in each energy market) through 2050. The main energy demand sectors are residential buildings, commercial buildings, transport, and industry. Projections of economic drivers are provided exogenously while world energy prices, world energy supply and demand, and US energy imports and exports are calculated endogenously. Yale–NEMS provides a full account of CO 2 emissions across all industries and a range of air pollutants from vehicles and power plants. CO 2 accounted for 97% of total GHG emissions of the US electricity and transport sectors in 2019 43 . Other GHGs such as methane emissions from fossil–fuel extraction and hydroelectric power plants are not included.

The transport sector includes several modes of travel, such as LDVs, aviation, trucking, shipping, and rail. The LDV submodule distinguishes twelve vehicle sizes, 86 fuel efficiency technologies, as well as sixteen alternative propulsion technologies including BEV–100 (100 mile electric range), BEV–200, PHEV–10, PHEV–40, HEV, and HFCEV. Various fuel pathways are modeled as well. The LDV submodule uses a discrete choice formulation to simulate both the behavior of vehicle manufacturers and consumers. Consumers base purchase decisions on energy prices, charger and fuel station availability, vehicle purchase prices, and a range of other vehicle attributes. The decision–making process of vehicle manufacturers is usually not considered in large–scale IEMs 2 . Thus a distinguishing feature of Yale–NEMS is that vehicle manufacturers make production decisions based on technology cost, CAFE requirements, and potential regulatory costs. Further details on EIA’s NEMS and a direct comparison with other IEMs can be found elsewhere 10 . Here we make several refinements to Yale–NEMS’ LDV submodule: We update vehicle costs in a bottom–up fashion using detailed cost estimates for all major vehicle components, such as engines, electric motors, transmissions, fuel cells, and hydrogen storage tanks 44 , 45 . Further, costs of lithium–ion batteries start out at about 465 USD/kWh in 2016 and reach floor costs of ~ 83 USD/kWh over the modelled time horizon due to economies of scale and technological development (Supplementary Table  9 ). This cost development is within the range of recent estimates 46 .

The electricity market module considers all major fossil and renewable generators, including conventional, and advanced coal and gas power plants with and without CCS, nuclear, hydro, solar thermal, solar photovoltaics (PV), and on– and offshore wind power. A dispatch model determines electricity supply, demand, and prices at the sub–annual level (three seasons by three times of day). In our scenarios, we assume that overnight capital costs of solar PV and onshore wind power plants fall from around 1245 and 1230 USD/kW in 2019 down to about 370 and 540 USD/kW by 2050 due to economies of scale and technological developments. This cost development is within the range of recent estimates 47 , 48 . As a result, new power plant capacities are mainly provided by renewable electricity generators, while fossil–fueled power plants retire (Supplementary Figs.  12 , 14 ). Thus, renewables provide more than half of all electricity well before 2030 and more than three quarters by 2050, confirming a widely reproduced modelling result 26 , 49 , 50 . The remaining electricity demand in 2050 is mainly met by natural gas (16%) and nuclear power (6%), while coal is almost entirely phased out (1.5%, Supplementary Table  10 ). A small percentage of electricity from coal is generated at CCS–equipped plants. Electricity is not only produced in the power supply sector but also in the residential and commercial end–use sectors — a feature that sets apart Yale–NEMS from other IEMs 24 — with the main technologies being rooftop solar PV and distributed natural gas (for modelling details, see for example section ‘Distributed Generation and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Submodule’ within the ‘Commercial Demand’ section of the NEMS documentation 40 ). While electricity demand grows from almost four to more than six trillion kWh, an increase by more than half, electricity emissions fall from almost 2400 to below 290 Mt CO 2 , a reduction of 88%. As a result, the carbon intensity of the electricity mix falls by a factor of twelve, from 546 down to 45 g CO 2 /kWh (Supplementary Fig.  13 and Supplementary Table  10 ). Since we focus on the accounting of CO 2 emissions, we do not take into account emissions from methane leakage during fossil fuel production.

In all scenarios, we introduce a price on carbon in the transport sector in 2021 which linearly increases up to 150 USD/t CO 2 by 2050 (constant 2016 $ , Supplementary Table  3 ) — a level required to meet the US nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement. The US is committed to reducing CO 2 emissions by 80% by 2050 relative to 2005. We assume that all sectors equally attempt to reduce their emissions by that percentage. According to the US EPA, direct CO 2 emissions from the US LDV fleet amounted to 1180 Mt in 2005 43 . The growing carbon price in the scenarios leads to a significant cost increase of energy carriers, especially gasoline (Supplementary Fig.  13 ). Combined with the cost reductions of electric vehicle batteries and renewable power plants, our assumed carbon price leads to reductions of direct CO 2 emissions on the order of 76–84% in 2050 relative to 2005, depending on the specific scenario (Supplementary Table  3 ).

Soft–linking Yale–NEMS with LCA

We soft–link Yale–NEMS to a detailed passenger vehicle LCA model 51 and iterate between the LCA model and Yale–NEMS until inputs and outputs converge between both models. The LCA model covers CO 2 emissions of all major technologies across the entire vehicle life cycle, including fuel production and combustion, electricity generation, material production and recycling, assembly and reuse of vehicle components, and lightweighting through material substitution. For simplicity purposes, the LCA model assumes that vehicle production takes place in the US. Furthermore, the model includes the most climate–relevant vehicle materials and disregards other minor materials (see Supplementary Section  11 for a discussion of the error invoked from these assumptions).

In a first iteration we calibrate the LCA model to the US case by using the following Yale–NEMS outputs as calibration coefficients: (1) Vehicle baseline weights (without lightweighting, Supplementary Table  11 ), (2) the expected degree of vehicle lightweighting (substitution of conventional materials with lightweight materials, Supplementary Table  12 ), (3) current and future on–road energy consumption (Supplementary Table  11 ), (4) current and future battery sizes (Supplementary Table  11 ), (5) current and future carbon intensity of electricity generation used to manufacture vehicles and charge BEVs (Supplementary Table  10 ), and (6) carbon prices (Supplementary Table  3 ). Taking these variables into account, the LCA model calculates per–vehicle life–cycle carbon emissions (Supplementary Section  2 ) and translates these into life–cycle carbon prices for each technology (Supplementary Section  4 and Supplementary Table  13 ).

The obtained carbon prices are then linked back to Yale–NEMS for consideration in the vehicle choice procedure of the LDV submodule. Specifically, carbon prices on indirect emissions are implemented in Yale–NEMS as a so–called ‘feebate’. Feebates are regarded as an effective policy instrument to reduce vehicle emissions in the new vehicle fleet 52 , 53 , 54 . Feebate systems impose a fee on vehicles with high CO 2 emissions and grant a rebate to low–carbon vehicles. Here we apply that design to both the production of vehicles and energy carriers separately, with two main steps. First, if the production of any alternative vehicle technology a is more carbon–intensive than the production of an ICEV, a fee is added to the purchase price of a , otherwise a rebate is granted. Second, if the production of the energy source that is used in a over a ’s lifetime is expected to create more CO 2 than the production of gasoline used in an ICEV, then an additional fee is added to a ’s purchase price, while a rebate is provided otherwise (Equations ( 1 )–( 3 )). For example, a fee is imposed on the production of BEVs, largely due to the energy– and material–intensive battery. This fee is increasing with the growing carbon price (although partially mitigated by the falling carbon intensity of production), from about 9–15 USD/BEV in 2021 to about 120–210 USD/BEV in 2050, depending on vehicle and battery size. A rebate is however granted due to the production of electricity that the BEV is expected to charge over its lifetime. This rebate is growing stronger each year as electricity quickly decarbonizes — from about 400 USD/BEV in 2021 to ~2600 USD/BEV in 2050 (Supplementary Figs.  4 , 5, and Supplementary Table  13 ). This way, these fees or credits become part of the decision–making process of vehicle manufacturers and consumers, and therefore influence both vehicle production and sales in Yale–NEMS.

F denotes feebate

a denotes alternative vehicle

y denotes year

V denotes vehicle production

E denotes CO 2 emissions

g denotes gasoline–powered ICEV

T denotes carbon tax

C denotes vehicle energy chain

l denotes vehicle age

L denotes vehicle lifetime

P denotes vehicle purchase price

Note that due to the large uncertainties involved we do not attempt to estimate the costs of electric vehicle chargers 45 (especially when allocating a certain fraction of the cost of public chargers to individual BEVs and PHEVs), nor do we attempt to estimate how strongly consumers would discount future costs 54 . We do however acknowledge that these factors could impact consumer choice. Since we wish to present our results in isolation of these factors we leave it for future research to quantify the influence of these effects.

In a second iteration of the LCA model, total vehicle sales by technology and segment, and total energy use by energy carrier are extracted from Yale–NEMS and fed back into the LCA model. In addition, any vehicle characteristics, such as vehicle weights and lightweighting shares, that have been altered by the life–cycle carbon price implemented in Yale–NEMS (Supplementary Fig.  3 ), are updated in the LCA model accordingly. As a result of the second LCA model run, total indirect emissions of vehicle and energy production over time are obtained (Supplementary Table  2 ). Tailpipe emissions and emissions from electricity use are taken directly from Yale–NEMS (Supplementary Table  2 ).

Uncertainty analysis

In addition to the mentioned side cases, we present a set of six scenarios to explore the uncertainty of future costs of electric vehicle batteries and renewable power generators (as well as two additional scenarios exploring uncertainties around battery density, that we discuss in Supplementary Fig.  10 ). Specifically, we investigate the effects of taxing direct as well as full supply chain emissions in scenarios of high costs of renewable power plants and/or EV batteries. We assume that the cost of EV batteries remain constant after 2021. This constant price can be interpreted either as insufficient investments into battery technology or as growing raw material prices. The International Energy Agency notes that “a doubling of lithium or nickel prices would induce a 6% increase in battery costs. If both lithium and nickel prices were to double at the same time, this would offset all the anticipated unit cost reductions associated with a doubling of battery production capacity” 55 . Similarly, the overnight capital costs of wind and solar PV power plants remain at 2021 levels. The share of renewable electricity generation grows from 23% in 2021 to 31% by 2050, a mild increase, which is largely enabled by energy storage installations. If supply chain emissions are fully priced, the higher carbon intensity of electricity implies a substantial two–fold fee on BEVs: (1) A carbon fee on the production of BEVs starts at 10–16 USD in 2021 and grows up to 220–380 USD per vehicle by 2050. (2) Similarly, a carbon fee on charging BEVs increases from 380 to 400 USD in 2021 to 1070–1140 USD per vehicle by 2050. In this case, BEVs are not cost–competitive with ICEVs and therefore do not gain significant market share. If only direct emissions are priced, the transition towards BEVs is only a little perturbed. Assuming constant EV battery prices alone does not strongly affect EV sales, but leads to almost complete substitution of long–range BEVs with short–range BEVs.

In terms of emissions, a carbon tax on supply chain emissions is not able to yield the desired results if the electricity grid does not face substantial decarbonization. In this case, pricing supply chain emissions lead to higher emissions compared to pricing direct emissions only (see Supplementary Fig.  9 for more details and results).

Reporting Summary

Further information on research design is available in the  Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability

Relevant input data and model outputs generated in this study are provided in the Supplementary Information/Source Data file.

Code availability

A version of the LCA model code used in this work is available in an open repository at Zenodo: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3896664 .

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Acknowledgements

We thank Pei Huang at the ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Brian Andrew Reed at Stanford University, Paul Kondis at the US Energy Information Administration for assistance with NEMS. We also thank three anonymous reviewers for their feedback. This publication was developed under Assistance Agreement No. RD835871 was awarded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to Yale University. It has not been formally reviewed by EPA. The views expressed in this document are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Agency. EPA does not endorse any products or commercial services mentioned in this publication.

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Comparison of Carbon Emissions of Gasoline Vehicles and Electric Vehicles

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Electric vehicles are promoted by many countries as alternative products of gasoline vehicles in recent years since they are widely regarded as low-emission green vehicles by the society. However, after a series of investigation and research, it is found that the carbon emissions of electric vehicles in the whole process are not as small as what the public think, carbon emissions of electric vehicles depend on a variety of factors like the manufacturing regions, energy source, etc. By analyzing the sources of carbon emissions during the production and use of various types of vehicles, combined with relevant research data, this paper compares the carbon emission levels of gasoline vehicles and electric vehicles at various stages as well as the emissions in different countries and regions. Through comparative analysis authors draw relevant conclusions on greenhouse gas emissions level of the two types of vehicles. Overall, electric vehicles do have lower emissions than gasoline vehicles in life-cycle process. Electric vehicles that are used in developed regions have lower carbon emissions than those used in developing regions. Another conclusion is that the carbon emissions are lower in places with cleaner electricity sources, this article has compared the carbon emissions of electric vehicles in different states of the United States, the discussion shows that states with a higher proportion of renewable energy have lower carbon emissions in general.

C. Huang, Z. Ou, X. Yu: These authors contributed equally.

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Huang, C., Ou, Z., Yu, X. (2023). Comparison of Carbon Emissions of Gasoline Vehicles and Electric Vehicles. In: Li, X., Yuan, C., Kent, J. (eds) Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Economic Management and Green Development. Applied Economics and Policy Studies. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7826-5_10

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• Factcheck: How electric vehicles help to tackle climate change

Zeke Hausfather

Update 7/2/2020: The lifecycle emissions figures were revised to reflect more recent data on electricity carbon intensity and battery manufacture.

Electric vehicles (EVs) are an important part of meeting global goals on climate change. They feature prominently in mitigation pathways that limit warming to well-below 2C or 1.5C, which would be inline with the Paris Agreement ’s targets.

However, while no greenhouse gas emissions directly come from EVs, they run on electricity that is, in large part, still produced from fossil fuels in many parts of the world. Energy is also used to manufacture the vehicle – and, in particular, the battery.

Here, in response to recent misleading media reports on the topic, Carbon Brief provides a detailed look at the climate impacts of EVs. In this analysis, Carbon Brief finds:

• EVs are responsible for considerably lower emissions over their lifetime than conventional (internal combustion engine) vehicles across Europe as a whole.
• In countries with coal-intensive electricity generation, the benefits of EVs are smaller and they can have similar lifetime emissions to the most efficient conventional vehicles – such as hybrid-electric models.
• However, as countries decarbonise electricity generation to meet their climate targets, driving emissions will fall for existing EVs and manufacturing emissions will fall for new EVs.
•  In the UK in 2019, the lifetime emissions per kilometre of driving a Nissan Leaf EV were about three times lower than for the average conventional car, even before accounting for the falling carbon intensity of electricity generation during the car’s lifetime.
• Comparisons between electric vehicles and conventional vehicles are complex. They depend on the size of the vehicles, the accuracy of the fuel-economy estimates used, how electricity emissions are calculated, what driving patterns are assumed, and even the weather in regions where the vehicles are used. There is no single estimate that applies everywhere.

There are also large uncertainties around the emissions associated with electric vehicle battery production, with different studies producing widely differing numbers. As battery prices fall and vehicle manufacturers start including larger batteries with longer driving ranges, battery production emissions can have a larger impact on the climate benefits of electric vehicles.

Around half of the emissions from battery production come from the electricity used in manufacturing and assembling the batteries. Producing batteries in regions with relatively low-carbon electricity or in factories powered by renewable energy, as will be the case for the batteries used in the best-selling Tesla Model 3 , can substantially reduce battery emissions.

Different studies find different results

A recent working paper from a group of German researchers at the thinktank Institute for Economic Research ( ifo ) found that “electric vehicles will barely help cut CO2 emissions in Germany over the coming years”. It suggests that, in Germany, “the CO2 emissions of battery-electric vehicles are, in the best case, slightly higher than those of a diesel engine”.

This study was picked up in the international media, with the Wall Street Journal running an editorial titled, “ Germany’s dirty green cars ”. It also engendered pushback from electric vehicle advocates, with articles in Jalopnik and Autoblog , as well as individual researchers rebutting the claim.

Other recent studies of electric cars in Germany have reached the opposite conclusion. One study found that emissions from EVs have emissions up to 43% lower than diesel vehicles. Another detailed that “in all cases examined, electric cars have lower lifetime climate impacts than those with internal combustion engines”.

These differences arise from the assumptions used by researchers. As Prof Jeremy Michalek , director of the Vehicle Electrification Group at Carnegie Mellon University , tells Carbon Brief, “which technology comes out on top depends on a lot of things”. These include which specific vehicles are being compared, what electricity grid mix is assumed, if marginal or average electricity emissions are used, what driving patterns are assumed, and even the weather.

The figure below, adapted from an analysis by the International Council for Clean Transportation ( ICCT ), shows an estimate of lifecycle emissions for a typical European conventional (internal combustion engine) car, the hybrid conventional car with the best available fuel economy (a 2019 Toyota Prius Eco ), and a Nissan Leaf electric vehicle for various countries, as well as the EU average. [The Leaf was the top selling EV in Europe in 2018.]

The chart includes tailpipe emissions (grey), emissions from the fuel cycle (orange) – which includes oil production, transport, refining, and electricity generation – emissions from manufacturing the non-battery components of the vehicle (dark blue) and a conservative estimate of emissions from manufacturing the battery (light blue).

In most countries, the majority of emissions over the lifetime of both electric and conventional vehicles come from vehicle operation – tailpipe and fuel cycle – rather than vehicle manufacture. The exception is in countries – Norway or France, for example – where nearly all electricity comes from near-zero carbon sources, such as hydroelectric or nuclear power.

However, while the carbon emitted from burning a gallon of petrol or diesel cannot be reduced, the same is not true for electricity. Lifecycle emissions for electric vehicles are much smaller in countries such as France (which gets most of its electricity from nuclear) or Norway (from renewables).

The chart above bases electric-vehicle emissions on the current grid mix in each country. However, if the climate targets set in the Paris Agreement are to be met, electricity generation will become significantly less carbon-intensive, further increasing the advantage of electric vehicles over conventional ones.

For example, in the UK, emissions from electricity generation have fallen 38% in just the past three years and are expected to fall by more than 70% by the mid-to-late 2020s, which is well within the lifetime of electric vehicles purchased today.

Emissions associated with battery production are taken from the most recent (2019) estimate from the IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute . The Nissan Leaf analysed here has a 40 kilowatt hour (kWh) battery, while the Tesla Model 3 has both 50kWh or 75kWh options (a 62kWh option was previously available, but has been discontinued ).

The figure below shows the estimated lifecycle emissions from a Model 3 if the battery were produced in Asia – which has a large portion of its electricity generated from coal – as is the case for Nissan Leaf batteries. The long-range 75kWh model is used for this analysis, to mimic the approach in the ifo study; battery-manufacturing emissions from the mid-range 50kWh model would be around a third smaller.

Under these assumptions, a Tesla Model 3 would have higher lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than the best-rated conventional car in Germany, but would still be better for the climate than the average vehicle. In other countries even a long-range Tesla Model 3 would be more lower emissions than any petrol vehicle.

However, the fact that the Tesla batteries are, in fact, manufactured in Nevada makes an important difference to this calculation. Lifecycle emissions estimates for batteries produced in the US tend to be notably lower than those produced in Asia, as discussed later in this article.

Around 50% of the battery lifecycle emissions come from the electricity used in battery manufacture and assembly, so producing batteries in a plant powered by renewable energy – as will be the case for the Tesla factory – substantially reduces lifetime emissions. The figure below shows Carbon Brief’s estimate of lifecycle emissions from a Tesla Model 3 with batteries produced in the Tesla “ Gigafactory ”.

Taking manufacturing conditions into account, a Model 3 with a 75kWh battery from the Nevada Gigafactory results in notably smaller emissions – and has a lifecycle climate impact similar to the estimate for the Nissan Leaf.

Emissions from electricity generation will also vary within countries, with some regions having much cleaner generation mixes (and correspondingly larger climate advantages for EVs) than others.

The figures shown above adjust emissions for both conventional and electric vehicles to reflect real-world driving conditions rather than test-cycle numbers. This is important, as official fuel economy estimates can differ widely from real-world performance, with large knock-on impacts for the comparison between conventional and electric vehicles.

Paying back the carbon debt

The analysis in the figures above compares EVs and conventional vehicles over their entire lifetime, based on a total of 150,000km of driving.

However, it’s also possible to compare the vehicles over time, to see how long it would take to repay the initial “carbon debt” incurred by the production of a carbon-intensive battery pack for EVs.

For example, as already noted above, a new Nissan Leaf EV bought in the UK in 2019 would have lifetime emissions some three times lower than the average new conventional car.

Looking at this over time, in the figure below, shows that while the battery causes higher emissions during vehicle manufacture in “year zero”, this excess carbon debt would be paid back after less than two years of driving.

The chart above shows that the difference in use-phase emissions is relatively large, with the EV saving some two to three tonnes of CO2 equivalent each year in the UK. (The figure falls over time as the electricity mix gets cleaner).

This equation would become even clearer were it not for the generous assumption that the existing conventional car has emissions equal to the average new vehicle.

Note that the cumulative lifetime emissions charts above are based on mileage of 150,000km over 12 years, or some 7,800 miles per year, for consistency with the remainder of the article.

This figure is slightly higher than the UK average annual mileage, which fell closer to 7,100 miles in 2017. Even at this lower mileage, however, replacing an existing conventional car with an EV would start cutting emissions within just over four years.

Problematic fuel economy estimates

The ifo study provides an example of the potential pitfalls of using test-cycle fuel economy values instead of real-world performance. The study compared the lifetime emissions from a Mercedes C 220 to the new Tesla Model 3, taking into account emissions associated with vehicle production. It found that the Tesla had emissions between 90% and 125% of the Mercedes over the lifetime of the vehicle.

In other words, despite the headlines it generated, even ifo found that EVs ranged from being slightly better to somewhat worse than a diesel vehicle.

The study assumed a fuel economy of 52 miles per gallon (mpg) for the Mercedes, which is significantly higher than the average car in the US (25mpg for petrol vehicles), but similar to average fuel economy in the UK (52mpg for petrol vehicles and 61mpg for diesel vehicles). However, different fuel-economy testing procedures produce quite different results.

While the US EPA fuel economy numbers tend to reflect actual driving conditions, the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) values used in the EU exaggerate actual vehicle fuel economy by up to 50% – and potentially even more for Mercedes vehicles.

The Tesla Model 3 energy use assumed in the study (241 watt-hours per mile), by contrast, is only 8% smaller than the EPA estimates of real-world use (260 watt-hours/mile). Using more realistic estimates of fuel economy for the conventional vehicle would have a large effect on the results of the ifo analysis, making the EV option preferable to the conventional vehicle.

Large differences in battery emissions

Both the ifo study and the ICCT analysis rely on the same estimate of emissions from battery manufacturing: a 2017 study by the Swedish Environmental Research Institute ( IVL ). IVL examined studies published between 2010 and 2016, and concluded that battery manufacturing emissions are likely between 150 and 200 kg CO2-equivalent per kWh of battery capacity.

The majority of studies examined by IVL looked at battery production in Asia, rather than in the US or Europe. The IVL study also noted that battery technology was evolving rapidly and that there is great potential for reduction in manufacturing emissions.

The IVL study came under considerable criticism , and in late 2019 received a substantial revision . The IVL researchers now estimate that battery manufacturing emissions are actually between 61 and 106 kg CO2-equivalent per kWh, with an upper bound of 146 kg. The low end estimate of 61 kg is for cases when the energy used from battery manufacturing comes from zero-carbon sources. IVL suggests that this revision was driven by new data for cell production, including more realistic measurements of energy use for commercial-scale battery factories that have substantially expanded in scale and output in recent years.

Carbon Brief undertook its own assessment of the literature to find recently published estimates of lifecycle emissions from battery manufacturing. The figure below shows data from 17 different studies, including seven published after the 2017 IVL estimate. It divides studies based on the region in which the batteries were produced: Asia (in red), Europe (light blue), US (dark blue) and reviews that examine multiple regions (grey).

Most of the studies published in recent years show lifecycle emissions smaller than those in the original IVL study, with an average of around 100kg CO2 per kWh for those published after 2017. These new estimates are well in-line with the revised 2019 IVL study numbers. Manufacturing emission estimates are generally higher in Asia than in Europe or the US, reflecting the widespread use of coal for electricity generation in the region. Studies that directly compared batteries manufactured in Asia to those in the US or Europe found lifecycle emissions around 20% lower outside of Asia.

A number of studies break down emissions into mining, refining and other material production that happens off-site, as well as the actual manufacturing process where the battery is assembled. These tend to find that about half the lifecycle emissions are a result of off-site material production and half result from electricity used in the manufacturing process. This is shown in the table below, taken from the 2017 IVL report, which breaks down lifecycle emissions by component and manufacturing stage.

As the IVL study notes:

“Manufacturing stands for a large part of the production impact…This implies that production location and/or electricity mix has great potential to impact the results.”

This is an important factor to consider when estimating battery emissions from Tesla’s Gigafactory in Nevada, which produced all of the batteries currently used in Model 3 vehicles.

Nevada, where Tesla’s Gigafactory is located, has electricity that is, on average, around 30% lower in carbon intensity than the US average. Nevada has phased out nearly all of its coal-based power generation over the past two decades, as shown in the figure below.

Tesla recently began construction of the world’s largest solar roof on top of its Gigafactory, which, when coupled with battery storage, should provide nearly all of the electricity used by the facility.

The image below shows the current status of solar panel installation as of 18 April  2019, though the plan is for nearly the entire roof to be covered by panels when the installation is complete.

The Gigafactory was also built with a focus on energy efficiency, employing material reuse when possible. However, it is unclear what the actual energy use and emissions associated with battery production at the site are as Tesla has not released any figures.

Given the lower lifecycle manufacturing emission estimates of studies in recent years – and the location of the manufacturing facility in a state with a relatively low-carbon electricity generation mix – Carbon Brief provides an estimate of 61kg CO2-equivalent per kWh based on the revised IVL study .

This is quite similar to a recent estimate for battery production in Germany by the Research Center for Energy Economics ( FFE ). FFE found that if batteries were produced using renewable energy, as is the goal for the Nevada Gigafactory, emissions would fall down to 62kg CO2-equivalent per kWh.

How and when electricity is generated matters

The climate benefit of EVs depend not only on the country where an EV is used, but also what region of the country it is used in. In the US, for example , there is a wide variation in how electricity is generated, with much cleaner electricity in places such as California or New York than in the middle parts of the country.

How the emissions from electricity generation are calculated is also important. While many analyses – including the ones earlier in this article – make use of the average emissions from electricity generation, Michalek tells Carbon Brief that using these values can produce somewhat misleading results.

It would be more accurate to use marginal emissions, Michalek says. This reflects emissions from the power plants turned on to meet new demand from EV charging. He explains:

“Some plants, like nuclear, hydro, wind and solar are generally fully utilised and will not change their generation output if you buy an EV. What changes, at least in the short run, is primarily that coal and natural gas plants will increase generation in response to this new load. So, if your question is ‘what will be the emissions consequences if I buy an EV versus a gasoline vehicle,’ which I think is the right question for policy, then the answer should use the consequential grid mix (for small changes this is the marginal generation mix) rather than the average. The marginal grid mix typically has higher emissions intensity than the average.”

However, the marginal emissions are something of a short-term estimate of EV impacts. As the demand from more EVs is added to the grid, gas and coal resources that are currently not being utilised may increase their output, but over the longer term additional generation sources will come online.

Michalek explains that the impact of EV adoption on future power plant construction is an area of active research.

In 2016, Michalek and colleagues published a paper in Environmental Research Letters taking into account a whole host of factors – including the marginal grid mix, ambient temperature, patterns of vehicle miles travelled and driving conditions (city versus highway) – in order to make the most accurate possible comparison between EV and similar conventional vehicles at the time.

The figure below shows their results. In the left column, the most efficient petrol vehicle – a Toyota Prius – is compared to one fully electric vehicle – a Nissan Leaf – and two plug-in electric hybrid vehicles – a Chevrolet Volt and a Toyota Prius Plug-in Hybrid. The right column shows the same analysis, but for a typical conventional vehicle of the same size – a Mazda 3. Each county in the country is colored red if the petrol vehicle has lower emissions and blue if the electric vehicle has lower emissions.

They found that the Nissan Leaf EV is considerably better than a similar typical conventional vehicle outside of parts of the Midwest that rely heavily on coal for marginal emissions. However, when compared to the most efficient conventional vehicle, the climate benefits of the EV were near-zero or negative in large parts of the country.

This study examines the current mix of electricity generation, which will likely become less carbon-intensive over the lifetime of vehicles operating today. However, the authors caution that the relationship between average emission reductions and marginal emission reductions is not always clearcut. Because marginal emissions come primarily from fossil-fuel plants, emission reductions for EV charging will occur mainly when gas displaces coal at the margin, or when widespread EV adoption requires bringing new low-carbon electricity generation facilities online to meet demand.

Electric vehicles ‘not a panacea’ without decarbonisation

In both the US and Europe, EVs represent a substantial reduction in lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions compared to the average conventional vehicle. This has been a consistent finding across the overwhelming majority of studies examined by Carbon Brief.

However, Michalek cautions that:

“EVs are not currently a panacea for climate change…lifecycle GHG emissions from electric vehicles can be similar to or even greater than the most efficient gasoline or diesel vehicles [in the US].”

As electricity generation becomes less carbon intensive – particularly at the margin – electric vehicles will become preferable to all conventional vehicles in virtually all cases. There are fundamental limitations on how efficient petrol and diesel vehicles can become, whereas low-carbon electricity and increased battery manufacturing efficiency can cut much of the manufacturing emissions and nearly all electricity use emissions from EVs.

A transition from conventional petrol and diesel vehicles to EVs plays a large role in mitigation pathways that limit warming to meet Paris Agreement targets. However, it depends on rapid decarbonisation of electricity generation to be effective. If countries do not replace coal and, to a lesser extent, gas, then electric vehicles will still remain far from being “zero emissions”.

Methodology

US values in the first three figures were estimated by Carbon Brief based on US grid emission factors from EPA eGRID 2018 modified with Rhodium Group estimates for 2019 and electricity fuel cycle estimates from Michalek et al 2011 . Error bars reflect lifecycle battery manufacturing estimates ranging from 61 to 146kgCO2e per kWh (kgCO2e/kWh) used in the revised 2019 IVL study , with its central range being 61-100kgCO2e/kWh.

EU average and per-country grid emissions factors for 2019 were taken from Sandbag 2020 . Leaf emissions were based on a 40kWh battery, a fuel economy estimate of 26kWh per 100 miles and a conservative top-end central estimate of 100kgCO2/kWh for battery production.

The Peugeot 208 1.6 BlueHDi used in the original Hall and Lutsey 2018 figure was replaced by a 2019 Toyota Prius Eco hybrid car, which is more comparable in size to both the Leaf and Model 3 and has the highest fuel economy of any commercially available car, with a 56 miles per gallon EPA rating – which is similar to the fuel use in actual driving conditions .

Model 3 emissions were estimated using a fuel economy value of 25kWh per 100 miles for the long-range 75kWh battery model. Non-battery manufacturing emissions were assumed to be the same as those of the Nissan Leaf used in the ICCT analysis . Battery emissions from the Nevada Gigafactory were assumed to be at the bottom end of the central range from the IVL study – 61kgCO2e/kWh – based on the combination of a zero-carbon generation mix, the widespread use of efficiency measures in manufacturing and the use of on-site renewable energy as discussed in the article.

The following studies were used by Carbon Brief in the battery lifecycle emissions literature review:

Philippot, M. et al. (2019) Eco-Efficiency of a Lithium-Ion Battery for Electric Vehicles: Influence of Manufacturing Country and Commodity Prices on GHG Emissions and Costs, Batteries, doi:10.3390/batteries5010023

Regett, A. et al. (2018) Carbon footprint of electric vehicles – a plea for more objectivity, FFE white paper.

GREET model (2018) The Greenhouse gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy use in Transportation Model, Argonne National Laboratory.

Messagie, M. (2017). Life Cycle Analysis of the Climate Impact of Electric Vehicles, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Transport & Environment white paper.

Han, H. et al (2017). GHG Emissions from the Production of Lithium-Ion Batteries for Electric Vehicles in China, Sustainability, doi:10.3390/su9040504

Romare, M. and Dahllöf, L. (2017) The Life Cycle Energy Consumption and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Lithium-Ion Batteries, IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute white paper.

Wolfram, P. and Wiedmann, T. (2017) Electrifying Australian transport: Hybrid life cycle analysis of a transition to electric light-duty vehicles and renewable electricity, Applied Energy, doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.08.219

Wang, Y. et al. (2017) Quantifying the environmental impact of a Li-rich high-capacity cathode material in electric vehicles via life cycle assessment, Environmental Science and Pollution Research, doi:10.1007/s11356-016-7849-9

Ambrose, H. and Kendall, A. (2016) Effects of battery chemistry and performance on the life cycle greenhouse gas intensity of electric mobility. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, doi:10.1016/j.trd.2016.05.009

Dunn, J. et al. (2016) Life Cycle Analysis Summary for Automotive Lithium-Ion Battery Production and Recycling, In: Kirchain R.E. et al. (eds) REWAS 2016. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48768-7_11

Ellingsen, L. et al. (2016) The size and range effect: lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of electric vehicles, Environmental Research Letters, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/5/054010

Kim, H. et al. (2016) Cradle-to-Gate Emissions from a Commercial Electric Vehicle Li-Ion Battery: A Comparative Analysis, Environmental Science & Technology, doi:10.1021/acs.est.6b00830

Peters, J. et al. (2016) The environmental impact of Li-Ion batteries and the role of key parameters – A review, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, doi:10.1016/j.rser.2016.08.039

Nealer, R. et al. (2015) Cleaner Cars from Cradle to Grave, Union of Concerned Scientists white paper.

Hart, K. et al. (2013) Application of LifeCycle Assessment to Nanoscale Technology: Lithium-ion Batteries for Electric Vehicles. US EPA report 744-R-12-001.

Dunn, J. et al. (2012) Impact of recycling on cradle-to-gate energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions of automotive lithium-ion batteries, Environmental Science & Technology. doi:10.1021/es302420z

Majeau-Bettez, G. et al. (2011) Life Cycle Environmental Assessment of Lithium-Ion and

Nickel Metal Hydride Batteries for Plug-In Hybrid and Battery Electric Vehicles, Environmental Science & Technology. doi:10.1021/es103607c

Update 6-2-2020:

This article was updated to include the new battery manufacturing emissions values from the revised 2019 IVL study, replacing the 2017 IVL study values used in the original version of the article.

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Are electric vehicles definitely better for the climate than gas-powered cars, yes: although electric cars' batteries make them more carbon-intensive to manufacture than gas cars, they more than make up for it by driving much cleaner under nearly any conditions..

October 13, 2022

Although many fully electric vehicles (EVs) carry “zero emissions” badges, this claim is not quite true. Battery-electric cars may not emit greenhouse gases from their tailpipes, but some emissions are created in the process of building and charging the vehicles. Nevertheless, says Sergey Paltsev, Deputy Director of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, electric vehicles are clearly a lower-emissions option than cars with internal combustion engines. Over the course of their driving lifetimes, EVs will create fewer carbon emissions than gasoline-burning cars under nearly any conditions.

“We shouldn't claim victory that with this switch to electric cars, problem solved, we are going to have zero emissions,” he says. “No, that's not the case. But electric cars are actually much, much better in terms of the impact on the climate in comparison to internal combustion vehicles. And in time, that comparative advantage of electric cars is going to grow.”

One source of EV emissions is the creation of their large lithium-ion batteries . The use of minerals including lithium, cobalt, and nickel, which are crucial for modern EV batteries, requires using fossil fuels to mine those materials and heat them to high temperatures. As a result, building the 80 kWh lithium-ion battery found in a Tesla Model 3 creates between 2.5 and 16 metric tons of CO 2 (exactly how much depends greatly on what energy source is used to do the heating). 1 This intensive battery manufacturing means that building a new EV can produce around 80% more emissions than building a comparable gas-powered car. 2

But just like with gasoline cars, most emissions from today’s EVs come after they roll off the production floor. 3 The major source of EV emissions is the energy used to charge their batteries. These emissions, says Paltsev, vary enormously based on where the car is driven and what kind of energy is used there. The best case scenario looks like what’s happening today in Norway, Europe’s largest EV market: the nation draws most of its energy from hydropower, giving all those EVs a minuscule carbon footprint. In countries that get most of their energy from burning dirty coal, the emissions numbers for EVs don’t look nearly as good—but they’re still on par with or better than burning gasoline.

To illustrate how EVs create fewer emissions than their counterparts, Paltsev points to MIT’s Insights Into Future Mobility study from 2019. 4 This study looked at comparable vehicles like the Toyota Camry and Honda Clarity across their gasoline, hybrid, plug-in hybrid, battery electric, and hydrogen fuel cell configurations. The researchers found that, on average, gasoline cars emit more than 350 grams of CO 2 per mile driven over their lifetimes. The hybrid and plug-in hybrid versions, meanwhile, scored at around 260 grams per mile of carbon dioxide, while the fully battery-electric vehicle created just 200 grams. Stats from the U.S. Department of Energy tell a similar story: Using the nationwide average of different energy sources, DOE found that EVs create 3,932 lbs. of CO 2 equivalent per year, compared to 5,772 lbs. for plug-in hybrids, 6,258 lbs. for typical hybrids, and 11,435 lbs. for gasoline vehicles. 5

MIT’s report shows how much these stats can swing based on a few key factors. For example, when the researchers used the average carbon intensity of America’s power grid , they found that a fully electric vehicle emits about 25 percent less carbon than a comparable hybrid car. But if they ran the numbers assuming the EV would charge up in hydropower-heavy Washington State, they found it would emit 61 percent less carbon than the hybrid. When they did the math for coal-heavy West Virginia, the EV actually created more carbon emissions than the hybrid, but still less than the gasoline car.

In fact, Paltsev says, it’s difficult to find a comparison in which EVs fare worse than internal combustion. If electric vehicles had a shorter lifespan than gas cars, that would hurt their numbers because they would have fewer low-emissions miles on the road to make up for the carbon-intensive manufacture of their batteries. Yet when the MIT study calculated a comparison in which EVs lasted only 90,000 miles on the road rather than 180,000 miles, they remained 15 percent better than a hybrid and far better than a gas car.

And while internal combustion engines are getting more efficient, EVs are poised to become greener by leaps and bounds as more countries add more clean energy to their mix. MIT’s report sees gasoline cars dropping from more than 350 grams of CO 2 per mile to around 225 grams by the year 2050. In that same span, however, battery EVs could drop to around 125 grams, and perhaps even down to 50 grams if the price of renewable energy were to drop significantly.

“Once we decarbonize the electric grid—once we get more and more clean sources to the grid—the comparison is getting better and better,” Paltsev says.

Thank you to several readers for sending in related questions, including Ross Burlington of Riverside, California, Lloyd Olson of Webberville, Texas, and Thomas Marshall of Lake Charles, Louisiana. You can submit your own question to Ask MIT Climate here .

Read more Ask MIT Climate

1 These figures are derived from comparison of three recent reports that conducted broad literature reviews of studies attempting to quantify battery manufacturing emissions across different countries, energy mixes, and time periods from the early 2010s to the present. We discard one outlier study from 2016 whose model suggested emissions from manufacturing the battery in our example could total as high as almost 40 metric tons. The lowest estimates typically come from studies of U.S. and European battery manufacturing, while the highest come from studies of Chinese and other East Asian battery manufacturing—which is consistent with the different energy mixes in these regions. For more information, see:

Erik Emilsson and Lisbeth Dahllöf. " Lithium-ion vehicle battery production: Status 2019 on energy use, CO 2 emissions, use of metals, products environmental footprint, and recycling ." IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute, in cooperation with the Swedish Energy Agency, Report C444, November 2019.

Hans Eric Melin. " Analysis of the climate impact of lithium-ion batteries and how to measure it ." Circular Energy Storage Research and Consulting, July 2019. Commissioned by the European Federation for Transport and Environment.

Dale Hall and Nic Lutsey. " Effects of battery manufacturing on electric vehicle life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions ." The International Council on Clean Transportation, February 2018.

2 This estimate comes from Argonne National Laboratory's GREET (Greenhouse gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy use in Technologies) Model, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy. It assumes comparable models of EV and gas-powered car, and that the EV has a battery with a range of 300 miles, similar to a Tesla Model 3. Different assumptions about battery manufacture would offer different comparisons; in this model, the battery of the EV entails close to 12 metric tons of CO 2 emissions.

3 Using the same GREET figures as above, manufacturing and end-of-life disposal account for around 9% of a gas car’s emissions, and around 29% of an EV’s (more than half of which comes from the battery alone). A plug-in hybrid EV is in the middle at around 17%. This analysis assumes the EV is charged with the average emissions intensity of the U.S. electric grid; that all cars drive around 173,000 miles in their lifetime; and that the gas car gets 30.7 miles to the gallon.

4 MIT Energy Initiative: Insights Into Future Mobility , November 2019.

5 U.S. Department of Energy Alternative Fuels Data Center: Emissions from Electric Vehicles . Accessed October 13, 2022.

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Electric Vehicles Research Report

Project from 2.832 Solving for Carbon Neutrality at MIT:  To lead and evolve MIT towards fleet and shuttle electrification and EV infrastructure expansion as efficiently and creatively as possible, towards net-zero carbon emissions. 

As part of Fast Forward: MIT’s Climate Action Plan for the Decade, published in May 2021, MIT took on the challenge to join the world in finding equitable ways to bring every sector of the global economy to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, adapt to the effects of climate change that cannot be prevented, “going as far as we can, as fast as we can, with the tools and methods we have now”. The Institute has pledged to reduce direct campus impacts on climate change by achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2026, with a goal of eliminating direct emissions by 2050. This challenge encompassed the following electric vehicle centered goals:

•    All future MIT fleet purchases of light-duty vehicles will be zero emission, subject only to availability. •    MIT will initiate the conversion of campus shuttle bus vehicles to zero-emission buses by 2026. •    MIT will increase campus car-charging stations by a minimum of 200% (from 120 to 360) by 2026.

The Electric Vehicles (EV) Research team, a group of three students who worked with MITOS to aid and further MIT’s progress on the EV front, as a segment of the Carbon Footprint Working Group, addressed this challenge systemically, recognizing the integrated nature of transitioning the fleet and shuttle system with the increased demands on EV infrastructure.

By collaborating with a group of EV Co-Leads, experts in the operational field, the EV Student Researchers analyzed the current state of MIT’s shuttles, Campus fleet, and charging infrastructure. Equipped with the necessary knowledge, the EV Student Researchers derived a series of recommendations for the execution of the three EV-centered goals, which will be explored throughout this report.

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Introduction, section snippets, references (83), cited by (2).

Sustainable Energy Technologies and Assessments

Review article low-carbon development in power systems based on carbon emission analysis models: a comprehensive review.

• • Mitigating the greenhouse effect requires comprehensive strategies to reduce carbon emissions .
• • Power system is a crucial role in reducing carbon emissions as a major energy infrastructure.
• • Basic carbon emission reduction is acquiring precise carbon data within the power system.
• • Carbon emissions across complex compositions and transformations of the power system.
• • Application of carbon flow theory in power system is potential for fair carbon trading markets.

Methodology

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