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Following a one-day curfew popularly known as the “Janta Curfew” on 22 March 2020, the Government of India ordered a 21-day national lockdown to fight the spread of COVID-19 on 24 March 2020. The lockdown was then extended three times and finally expired on May 31. During this time, most of India’s 1.3 billion residents were required to stop working and shelter indoors, with only a few exceptions. Starting on June 1, and with the exception of containment zones, lockdown restrictions have been relaxed in a phased manner with a focus on easing constraints on economic activity. Some early indicators have pointed towards a V-shape recovery after the lifting of the lockdown.
We document the evolution of unemployment, employment, income and consumption during and after the lockdown. After dramatic setbacks in April and May, all of these time series show rapid improvement immediately after the announcement that lockdown measures would be relaxed. However, they have not all returned to their pre-lockdown levels. There are signs of continued duress for many households, which may foreshadow a slower path to a full recovery.
We analyze data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE)’s Consumer Pyramids Household Survey (CPHS). [1] CPHS is a panel survey that surveys approximately 175,000 households across India every four months. CPHS continued to run through the lockdown with roughly 45 percent of its usual sample, and returned to “normal” survey operations by mid-August. Despite the disruption to surveying imposed by COVID-19 and the lockdown measures, the data collected has remained representative throughout the period. [2]
While India recorded a sharp and large drop in GDP during the lockdown — gross domestic product shrank nearly 24 percent in the second quarter of 2020 compared to the second quarter of 2019 [3] — some early indicators have suggested signs of a V-shape recovery. In particular, several commenters have highlighted the year-on-year increase in GST [4] and gross income tax collections revenues. [5] Indian stock markets indexes such as the Nifty50 are higher than they were a year ago. [6] Others have pointed to a very strong kharif season. [7] Industrial activity has also picked up; port traffic, railway freight traffic, and electricity generation have all improved substantially. [8] Core industrial output has almost completely recovered from a 37.9 percent drop in April 2020. [9] Also, and as seen in Figure 1, the unemployment rate, after skyrocketing to nearly 25 percent in April, had largely returned to its pre-lockdown level by June and was fully back to its February level by July, about 7 percent. [10]
FIGURE 1
Yet other sources point to only a partial and incomplete convalescence. For example, most fast frequency indicators with the exception of electricity generation, railway freight traffic and e-way bills fell year-on-year in the September 2020 quarter. [3] After consistent month-on-month increases in the Index of Industrial Production (IIP) since May, this trend reversed in August. [7] The demand for petroleum products has continued to stay far below its 2019 levels. [11] Despite GST collections having grown, net tax collections are still down 14 percent compared to a year ago and the central government’s non-tax revenues are down 60 percent year-on-year. [5] Furthermore, the indicators suggesting a V-shape recovery cannot provide a perfect picture of the ongoing experiences of Indian households. For example, the GST taxes luxury goods more heavily and basic food consumption items (such as flour, fresh fruits, vegetables, meat, fish and milk) are not generally subject to the consumption tax, making GST revenue data a poor proxy of the well-being of the typical Indian household. Also, the unemployment rate calculates employment as a share of the labor force. As such, this statistic may mask discouragement effects, with workers exiting the labor force if they cannot find work. It may also mask exit of the labor force because of health safety concerns. Furthermore, even if most Indians have been able and willing to return to work post-lockdown, available labor market opportunities may have worsened, translating into lower incomes and negative pressures on consumption.
Unlike the unemployment rate, the employment to population ratio (which isn’t limited to individuals who report being in the labor force) has not yet fully returned to its pre-lockdown level, as seen in Figure 2. [12] After a collapse in April and May, the employment to population ratio among those 15 years of age or older has hovered around 37 to 38 percent between June and October, from a base of closer to 40 percent pre-lockdown. [13] Furthermore, when we exclude from the numerator individuals who report being employed but simultaneously report working zero hours (which we can measure until August), the decline in the employment to population ratio becomes larger, corresponding to about a 4 percentage point drop, or nearly 10 percent drop, relative to the pre-lockdown period, with no sign of improvement between July and August.
FIGURE 2
Even a full return to pre-lockdown employment rate levels (which clearly did not happen) could hide sharp differences in the nature of labor market opportunities and other income generating activities after the lockdown measures have been lifted. Individuals may earn less in the same occupation or may have shifted to less remunerative work. Indeed, others have documented a substantial shift from formal to informal employment as a consequence of the lockdown. [14] Figure 3 presents the monthly time series of household per capita income, including disaggregation by source of income, through June (the latest month of data availability). [15] Total income per capita was about 44 percent lower in April 2020 and 39 percent lower in May 2020 compared to the same months in 2019. Despite an uptick when the lockdown eased, per capita total income in June 2020 remained about 25 percent lower than in June 2019. However, this figure may overstate the decline due to lockdown and associated COVID-related disruptions as both total income and labor income were already trending down in the last quarter of 2019 and early months of 2020. This is consistent with a broad downward trend in the economy in early 2020 even before the pandemic and lockdowns. [16] When benchmarked to February 2020, June total (labor) incomes are only 17 (18) percent down.
FIGURE 3
The drop in total income during the lockdown was primarily driven by a sharp drop in labor income, but was supplemented by a decline in business profits. Interestingly, unlike labor income, business income does not show any sign of recovery by June. Rather, business profits remain 24 percent below their level in February 2020 and 31 percent below their level in June 2019. While government assistance via direct benefit transfers increased during the lockdown, these in-cash transfers represent such a small proportion of total income that they played virtually no role in stabilizing income for the average Indian household during the lockdown. This does not rule out that other forms of government support, such as wage income via the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee (MGNREGA) workfare scheme (which are captured in the wages time series in Figure 3), or in-kind transfers via the Public Distribution System (PDS) (which are not captured in any of the time series in Figure 3), may have helped many households during the lockdown, and continue to stabilize these households post-lockdown.
Drops in wage income appear to be widespread across occupations. [17] Figure 4 presents the percent changes in median wages by occupation both during (May, line in red and scatter in circles) and after (June, line in blue and scatter in triangles) the lockdown period. [18] In particular, we relate median wage income among those employed full-time in an occupation pre-COVID (September to December 2019; x-axis) to percent changes in that median income in that occupation, again among those employed full-time, both during (May 2020) and after the lockdown (June 2020). As can be seen below, the vast majority of occupations experienced very large declines in income for the median individual in that occupation during the lockdown. While some substantial recovery had occurred by June, median incomes remained below baseline in about 80 percent of occupations in that month. Considering the 10 largest occupations in terms of employment numbers in June, the largest losses in median income in that month compared to baseline are recorded among subsistence farmers, smaller businessmen (such as shopkeepers or dhaba owners), agricultural laborers, and industrial and machine workers. Regression analyses show that income losses during the lockdown were both economically and statistically larger among lower income occupations, while no such statistical relationship can be detected post-lockdown.
FIGURE 4
Overall, Figures 2 to 4 highlight that the recovery in the unemployment rate does not fully reflect the ongoing economic situation in India’s labor market. Rather, substantial reductions in employment, and income among the employed, remained post-lockdown.
Figure 5 assesses how the combination of employment losses, drops in wage income among those employed, and changes in non-labor income impacted per-capita household income by income groups both during and after the lockdown. [19] We report the percent change in household income per capita relative to January 2020 across five income groups. The lowest 3 income groups, which account for about 70 percent of the population, follow a similar pattern. If anything, households towards the middle of the income distribution (second and third income groups in Figure 5) experienced somewhat larger losses during the early part of lockdown than the poorest households, but this difference was muted by May. The slowest recovery appears concentrated among higher income households, and especially those in the highest income group. However, it is important to note that per capita income was already trending down prior to the lockdown for that highest income group, suggesting that other economic forces could be at play.
FIGURE 5
Figure 6 reports on the variation among states in the extent of the income decline. For each state, we compute year-on-year percent drop in per capita income for April 2020 as well as for June 2020. [20] Figure 6 shows that Chhattisgarh, Puducherry, Delhi and Tamil Nadu experienced the greatest income losses during the lockdown, with income per capita dropping by 77 percent, 71 percent, 66 percent, and 65 percent percent, respectively, in April 2020 relative to April 2019. After the lifting of the lockdown measures, the greatest income losses were concentrated in Chhattisgarh, Delhi, and Haryana, with income per capita in those states 55 percent, 46 percent, and 46 percent percent below what they were a year before, respectively. A few states however had regained most, and sometimes all, of the lost ground immediately after the lockdown was lifted. In particular, income per capita in Karnataka, Chandigarh, Assam, and Meghalaya were at most 5 percent lower in June 2020 relative to June 2019.
FIGURE 6
While the income data does not currently extend beyond June, we can also assess how well people are faring using weekly expenditure data, which is available for a few high-frequency consumption categories through August (Figure 7). [21] A look at the expenditure data also allows us to demonstrate that the employment and income losses documented above are having real negative welfare consequences for Indian households. Per capita expenditures on milk, eggs, meat and fish, while steady throughout the 2 years preceding the lockdown, dropped by about 45 percent in April 2020 and had only recovered about half of this drop by July and August; in particular, expenditures on milk, eggs, meat and fish were 23 percent percent lower in August 2020 relative to August 2019. Per capita expenditures on other food items (which includes among other things fruits, vegetables, potatoes, and spices) dropped by about 20 percent during the lockdown and had barely recovered from that drop by August.
FIGURE 7
These results mirror those using monthly expenditure data, which covers a wider range of food and non-food expenditures, but is currently only available until June. As seen in Figure 8, these substantial declines in consumption extend to a much broader set of food and non-food expenditures. [22]
FIGURE 8
When the lockdown ended there were rapid improvements in unemployment, employment, income, and consumption. But, the recovery is not complete. Most of these economic indicators have still not reached their pre-lockdown levels, and whether and when they will do so remains unclear. Further, these figures make it clear that the comprehensive view granted by household level data provides important insights beyond those possible from more aggregated indicators. The Indian central government has recently announced a new stimulus package worth 15 percent of India’s GDP. [23] Critically, this includes schemes to incentivize job creation and to increase demand. As new data become available, we will continue to document trends over time and assess whether these stimulus measures are helping accelerate the recovery in household incomes and expenses. We will also try to understand what drives the large geographic variation in the severity of the economic shock and the speed of recovery and investigate why some individuals and households take longer to recover from the lockdown than others.
Check back to Rustandy's Coronavirus Social Impact Research page for the latest results. Read the press announcement .
Marianne Bertrand , Chris P. Dialynas Distinguished Service Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Booth School of Business , and Faculty Director, Chicago Booth's Rustandy Center for Social Sector Innovation and UChicago’s Poverty Lab; Rebecca Dizon-Ross , Associate Professor, University of Chicago Booth School of Business; Kaushik Krishnan , Chief Economist, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE); and Heather Schofield , Assistant Professor, Perelman School of Medicine and The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Emails: [email protected] ; [email protected] ; [email protected]
We thank Adarsh Kumar and Karthik Tadepalli for excellent research assistance.
[1] — CPHS is conducted across the country, except in Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep, Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu. Some parts of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are no longer surveyed due to concerns for CMIE staff safety. Ladakh is also not surveyed as it is not accessible year-round. Data from CPHS is available as a subscription service entitled Consumer Pyramids dx. The data for this piece was downloaded on November 12, 2020 from the CPdx website. CMIE could conduct slight revisions of the data, particularly for monthly income and expenditure data for May and June 2020.
[2] — CPHS execution during the lockdown of 2020, Mahesh Vyas (19 Aug 2020), How We Do It Series , Consumer Pyramids Household Survey, CMIE.
[3] — October 2020 Review of Indian Economy: Macro-economic Performance , Manasi Swamy (14 Oct 2020).
[4] — October GST collection tops Rs 1 lakh crore, 1st time since February , Times of India (Nov 2 2020).
[5] — Government's revenues muted despite green shoots , Manasi Swamy (31 Oct 2020).
[6] — November 2020 Review of Indian Economy: Financial Market Performance , Manasi Swamy (5 Nov 2020).
[7] — October 2020 Review of Indian Economy: Sectoral Performance , Janaki Samant (21 Oct 2020).
[8] — October 2020 Review of Indian Economy: Macro-economic Performance , Manasi Swamy (14 Oct 2020).
[9] — Core industries' output nears year-ago level in September , Manasi Swamy (04 Nov 2020).
[10] — CMIE’s definitions for workforce statistics match those that are used broadly. Details of their methodology and definitions can be found here .
[11] — Petroleum products demand struggles to recover , Manasi Swamy (19 Oct 2020).
[12] — The employment-to-population ratio is computed among those 15 years of age or older. Anyone engaged in any economic activity on either the day of the survey or the preceding day of the survey, or is generally regularly engaged in any such activity, is considered to be employed. “Excluding '0 hours' workers” remove from the count of the employed individuals reporting zero hours of work on a representative day in the week period prior to being surveyed; this measure is only available until August 2020, the latest month of published CPHS data.
[13] — Others have also pointed to a collapse in the employment rate. See Employment falls in October (2 Nov 2020), Mahesh Vyas, CMIE; Labour markets weak in October , Mahesh Vyas (19 Oct 2020), Economic Outlook, CMIE; Labour force shrinks in September , Mahesh Vyas (2 Oct 2020), Economic Outlook, CMIE; Deceptive fall in the unemployment rate , Mahesh Vyas (21 Sep 2020), Economic Outlook, CMIE.
[14] — South Asia Economic Focus, Fall 2020 : Beaten or Broken? Informality and COVID-19 , World Bank ; Job losses in white and blue collar workers , Mahesh Vyas (14 Sep 2020); Salaried job losses , Mahesh Vyas; An unhealthy recovery , Mahesh Vyas (10 Aug 2020).
[15] — Per capita incomes are calculated by dividing the sum of household members' incomes by household size. Values are reported in inflation-adjusted constant 2019 Rupees using CPI data from the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation. Values are weighted using CMIE’s ‘country’ level weights to be nationally representative.
[16] — The R is deep, long and broad , Mahesh Vyas (19 Mar 2020), Economic Outlook, CMIE; It's a deeper recession , Mahesh Vyas (17 Mar 2020); The worst not yet over for Indian economy , Manasi Swamy (2 Mar 2020); Labour metrics flounder in February , Mahesh Vyas (2 Mar 2020); It's recession , Mahesh Vyas (24 Feb 2020); The Misery Index , Mahesh Vyas (17 Feb 2020); Where are the jobs? , Mahesh Vyas (28 Jan 2020); Indian economy in troubled waters , Manasi Swamy (3 Dec 2019).
[17] — CMIE records income earned from self-production and business profits at the household level. More often than not, such income cannot be attributed to an unambiguous person. Therefore, such data is collected at the household level, making it difficult to map these other sources of income into occupations. However, if a businessman or a self-employed individual takes a salary from the business, it is recorded by CMIE as wage income. Wage income also include over-time payments, bribes, monetary value of in-kind goods, and rent reimbursed by the employer.
[18] — For the purposes of this chart, a member's occupation is assumed to be constant throughout a wave. Simple (unweighted) medians of wages for each occupation are taken for the period/months of interest. Size of the bubble corresponds to the unweighted proportion of the total sample employed in that occupation in May and June 2020 respectively. Only those occupations observed in the base period (Sep - Dec 2019) and the month of interest (May or June 2020) are included. Chart values reflect the percentage change in median wages in each occupation between the base period and month of interest. Occupations with Rs. 0 median wages in both waves are recorded to have a 0 percent change. Solid lines for May and June 2020 represent fitted values of the weighted regression run on percentage change in year-on-year income and Sep - Dec 2019 median monthly income; weights for the regression are the counts of the sample in an occupation in the respective month of interest. Values are reported in inflation-adjusted constant 2019 Rupees using CPI data from the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation.
[19] — Sample is restricted to households in CMIE's September - December 2019 wave. Households that shifted residences have also been excluded. These restrictions require us to impose an additional adjustment factor to CMIE’s ‘country’ weights to account for the change in the sample. Our reweighting procedure causes the small town stratum in Udhampur district and the small and large towns strata in Anantnag district, both in Jammu and Kashmir to be dropped. Small towns are defined to be those with fewer than 20,000 households in Census 2011, and large towns are defined to contain 60,000-200,000 households in Census 2011. The five income groups are selected based on monthly income per capita in the September - December 2019 wave and they respectively account for, from lowest income group to highest, 20 percent, 25 percent, 25 percent, 20 percent, and 10 percent of the weighted sample in September 2019. We report changes in mean per capita income in each group relative to the group's mean income in January 2020. Per capita value is calculated by dividing household's total income by household size. Values are adjusted for inflation using CPI data from the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation.
[20] — This figure uses shapefiles for India from Community Created Maps of India by Data{meet} . These shape files depict ISO countries and not sovereign states. We do not claim these to be maps that accurately depict India’s sovereign or internal political borders. Any queries or issues regarding these shape files should be directed to Data{meet} . Values are adjusted for inflation using CPI data from the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation. Values are weighted using CMIE’s provided ‘state’ level weights in order to appropriately represent mean values of each state.
[21] — Per capita value is calculated by dividing household’s weekly expenditures by household size. Values are reported in inflation-adjusted constant 2019 Rupees using CPI data from the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation. In order to reflect month-on-month changes, an unweighted mean is taken for each month of survey execution. “Other Food Items” include vegetables and wet spices, including potatoes and onions, fruits, bread, biscuits, salty snacks, sweets, chocolates, cakes and ice cream.
[22] — Per capita value is calculated by dividing household’s monthly expenditures by household size. Values are reported in inflation-adjusted constant 2019 Rupees using CPI data from the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation. All series, except “Cereals and Pulses,” use CMIE’s 'adjusted' monthly expenditure data. Values are weighted using CMIE’s provided ‘country’ level weights in order to be nationally representative.
[23] — Atmanirbhar Bharat 3.0: Total stimulus package announced is of Rs 29.87 lakh core, 15 percent of GDP, says FM Sitharaman , Moneycontrol News.
How are indian households coping under the covid-19 lockdown eight key findings.
Among the findings: 84 percent of Indian households have lost income due to the lockdown.
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Research output : Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Original language | Undefined/Unknown |
---|---|
Journal | |
Volume | 58 |
Issue number | 18 |
Publication status | Published - 06 May 2023 |
Externally published | Yes |
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
T1 - Gendered impact on unemployment: a case study of India during the COVID-19 pandemic
AU - George, Ammu
AU - Gupta, Sumedha
AU - Huang, Yuting
PY - 2023/5/6
Y1 - 2023/5/6
N2 - India witnessed one of the worst coronavirus crises in the world. The pandemic induced sharp contraction in economic activity that caused unemployment to rise, upheaving the existing gender divides in the country. Using monthly data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy on subnational economies of India from January 2019 to May 2021, we find that a) unemployment gender gap narrowed during the COVID-19 pandemic in comparison to the pre-pandemic era, largely driven by male unemployment dynamics, b) the recovery in the post-lockdown periods had spillover effects on the unemployment gender gap in rural regions, and c) the unemployment gender gap during the national lockdown period was narrower than the second wave.
AB - India witnessed one of the worst coronavirus crises in the world. The pandemic induced sharp contraction in economic activity that caused unemployment to rise, upheaving the existing gender divides in the country. Using monthly data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy on subnational economies of India from January 2019 to May 2021, we find that a) unemployment gender gap narrowed during the COVID-19 pandemic in comparison to the pre-pandemic era, largely driven by male unemployment dynamics, b) the recovery in the post-lockdown periods had spillover effects on the unemployment gender gap in rural regions, and c) the unemployment gender gap during the national lockdown period was narrower than the second wave.
M3 - Article
JO - Economic and Political Weekly
JF - Economic and Political Weekly
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Youth unemployment is a big challenge in developing economies, but there is a limited understanding of the dynamics underlying the rise in unemployment among young workers. This article examines youth unemployment and inactivity in India, where the economic contraction from the pandemic was solely responsible for reversing the trend of decades of declining global inequality. Young workers face higher unemployment, have fewer transitions to work, and are more likely to get stuck in unemployment. The pandemic disproportionately pushed young workers out of work and reinforced the pre-existing trends of being more likely to be out of work and stuck in worklessness. Young workers have a strong desire for public employment programmes, with over 80 percent preferring job guarantees among policy options to tackle unemployment in survey experiments. Workers who lose their jobs and become discouraged from finding work afterward are most supportive of a job guarantee.
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Source: CEP Survey 2021
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See, for example: Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan ( 1993 ), Ruhm ( 1991 ), Sullivan and von Wachter ( 2009 ), Browning and Heinesen ( 2012 ), Eliason and Storrie ( 2009 ), and Bentolila and Jansen ( 2016 ) for long-term unemployment from the pandemic.
In 2017/2018, informal employment amounted to 88.6 percent of total employment in India, with similar rates in the region (81 percent in Nepal, 94.7 percent in Bangladesh, 81.7 percent in Pakistan), but higher rates than Latin American countries (69.4 percent Peru, 62.4 percent Colombia) and much higher rate than for example South Africa 35.3 percent (Ohnsorge and Yu, 2021 ).
The CPHS sample had a rural-urban ratio of 34:66 before the lockdown. However, during the period of 24th of March to 7th of April, the rural sample was overrepresented with a ratio of 43:57. This overrepresentation quickly got restored to 36:64 between April and July. In terms of household income, during the lockdown, the share of households in the middle of the income distribution, earning between Rs 150,000 and Rs 300,000 remained at 45%. Nevertheless, there was a change in the tail-ends of the income distribution. There was an over-representation of low-income households and an under-representation of high-income households. Specifically, households earning Rs 500,000 or more made up 13% of the sample before lockdown and 9% during the lockdown. Whereas those earning Rs. 84,000 to Rs.150,000 made up 19.6% of the sample before the lockdown and 25% during the lockdown. Finally, the share of those earning less than Rs.84,000 increased from 2.4% to 4.1% (“CPHS execution during the lockdown of 2020”, available online at consumerpyramidsdx.cmie.com)
A discussion of the representativeness concerns arising from exclusions at the bottom end of the consumption distribution, especially in rural areas, is provided in Drèze and Somanchi (2021), Dhingra and Kondirolli ( 2022 ).
Eighteen is the age of majority in India and therefore labor laws differ for 15–17 years old who are covered under child labor laws. The compulsory school leaving age in India is 14 years and therefore some official labor statistics are reported for those between 15 and 29 years old. We exclude individuals between 15 and 17 years from our analysis because they are minors who are also more likely to be pursuing high school education which occurs till age 17. However, including them in our analysis reinforces the main findings further.
International Labour Organization. “ILO Modelled Estimates and Projections database (ILOEST).” ILOSTAT.
The recontacted sample was interviewed over the phone and the boost sample was interviewed door-to-door (in person). Individuals in the control and treatment groups did not interact with each other as the interviews were conducted one on one by trained enumerators.
The MGNREGA figure is computed from disbursements made by the government divided by number of individuals actually worked in 2020. These are available from the NREGA public data portal which put the figure at Rs 5642 precisely. The cash transfer figure is computed from the release of the Press Information Bureau (PIB), Government of India, Ministry of Finance, 08/09/2020 at 1:00PM by PIB Delhi. The figure ranges from about Rs 500 to Rs 1640 depending on the type of recipient.
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Financial support from the ERC Starting Grant 760037 is gratefully acknowledged. The primary survey was reviewed and approved by the LSE Research Ethics Committee (REC Ref. 1129) and conducted by Sunai. We are grateful to Stephen Machin and Uday Bhanu Sinha for their comments. There are no conflicts of interest to declare.
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Dhingra, S., Kondirolli, F. Jobless and Stuck: Youth Unemployment and COVID-19 in India. IMF Econ Rev 71 , 580–610 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41308-023-00205-y
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Subscribe to global connection, maurice kugler and maurice kugler professor of public policy, schar school of policy and government - george mason university shakti sinha shakti sinha senior fellow - world resources international (wri india).
July 13, 2020
Much has been written about how COVID-19 is affecting people in rich countries but less has been reported on what is happening in poor countries. Paradoxically, the first images of COVID-19 that India associates with are not ventilators or medical professionals in ICUs but of migrant laborers trudging back to their villages hundreds of miles away, lugging their belongings. With most of the economy shut down, the fragility of India’s labor market was patent. It is estimated that in the first wave, almost 10 million people returned to their villages, half a million of them walking or bicycling. After the economic stoppage, the International Labor Organization has projected that 400 million people in India risk falling into poverty .
Agriculture is the largest employer, at 42 percent of the workforce, but produces just 18 percent of GDP. Over 86 percent of all agricultural holdings have inefficient scale (below 2 hectares). Suppressed incomes due to low agricultural productivity prompt rural-urban migration. Migration is circular, as workers return for some seasons, such as harvesting.
Evidence of Indian labor market segmentation is widely available—with a small percentage of workers being employed formally, while the lion’s share of households relies on income from self-employment or precarious jobs without recourse to rights stipulated by labor regulations. Only about 10 percent of the workforce is formal with safe working conditions and social security. Perversely, modern-sector employment is becoming “informalized,” through outsourcing or hiring without direct contracts. The share of formal employment in the modern sector fell from 52 percent in 2005 to 45 percent in 2012. During this period, formal employment went up from 33.41 million to 38.56 million (about 15 percent), while nonagricultural informal employment increased from 160.83 million to 204.03 million (about 25 percent) .
Most informal workers labor for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) that emerged as intermediate inputs and services suppliers to the modern sector. However, workers struggle to get paid, which the government identifies as great challenge. Payroll and other taxes, as well as limited access to subsidized credit for large firms, are disincentives to MSME growth. Although over half of India has smartphone access, relatively few can telework. Retail and manufacturing jobs require physical presence involving direct client interaction. Indeed, income for families unable to telework has fallen faster.
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The government’s crisis response has mitigated damage, with a fiscal stimulus of 20 trillion rupees , almost 10 percent of GDP. Also, the Reserve Bank of India enacted decisive expansionary monetary policy . Yet, banks accessed only 520 billion rupees out of the emergency guaranteed credit window of 3 trillion rupees. In fact, corporate credit in June is lower than June last year by a wide margin after bank lending’s fall. S&P has estimated the nonperforming loans would increase by 14 percent this fiscal year . Corporations have deleveraged retiring old debts and hoarding cash, as have households. Recovery through investment and consumption has stalled . These trends are exacerbated due to the pandemic. The manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) recovered 50 percent since May but at 47.2 it remains in negative territory. Services contribute over half of GDP but its PMI, even after bouncing back , remains low at 33.7 in June. Consumption of electricity, petrol, and diesel have regained from the lockdown lows but are still 10-18 percent below June 2019 levels . Agriculture has been the bright spot, with 50 percent higher monsoon crop sowing and fertilizer consumption up 100 percent. Unemployment levels had spiked to 23.5 percent but with a mid-June recovery to 8.5 percent—and then crept up again marginally.
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGA) and supply of subsidized food grains have acted as useful buffers keeping unemployment down and ensuring social stability. Thirty-six million people sought work in May 2020 (25 million in May 2019). This went up to 40 million in June 2020 (average of 23.6 million during 2013-2019 period). The government has ramped up allocation to the highest level ever, totaling 1 trillion rupees. Similarly, in addition to a heavily subsidized supply of rice and wheat, a special scheme of free supply of 5 kilograms of wheat/rice per person for three months was started and since extended by another three months, covering 800 million people. There have also been cash transfers of 500 billion rupees to women and farmers .
However, MNREGA has an upper bound of 100 days guaranteed employment and it also does not cover urban areas. Agriculture cannot absorb more labor, with massive underlying disguised unemployment. A post-pandemic survey shows that the MSME sector expects earnings to fall up to 50 percent this year. Critically, the larger firms are perceived healthier. However, small and micro enterprises, who have minimal access to formal credit, constitute 99.2 percent of all MSMEs . These are the largest source of employment outside agriculture. Their inability to bounce back could see India face further economic and also social tensions. The economy is withstanding both supply and demand shocks, with the wholesale prices index declining sharply .
We identified labor market pressures toward increased poverty, both in the extensive margin (headcount) and intensive margin (deprivation depth). India needs to ramp up MNREGA, introduce a guaranteed urban employment scheme, and boost further cash transfers to poor households. Government efforts have been enormous in macroeconomic policy (fiscal stimulus and monetary loosening) to mitigate adversity but fiscal space is narrowing, requiring the World Bank and other international financial institutions to step up and help avert even greater hardship. Also, ongoing advances towards structural economic policy reforms have to continue.
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In April 2020, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that nearly 2.5 crore jobs could be lost worldwide due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Further, it observed that more than 40 crore informal workers in India may get pushed into deeper poverty due to the pandemic. In this blog post, we discuss the effect of COVID-19 on unemployment in urban areas as per the quarterly Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) report released last week, and highlight some of the measures taken by the central government with regard to unemployment.
The National Statistics Office (NSO) released its latest quarterly PLFS report for the October-December 2020 quarter. The PLFS reports give estimates of labour force indicators including Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR), Unemployment Rate, and distribution of workers across industries. The reports are released on a quarterly as well as annual basis. The quarterly reports cover only urban areas whereas the annual report covers both urban and rural areas. The latest annual report is available for the July 2019-June 2020 period. The quarterly PLFS reports provide estimates based on the Current Weekly Activity Status (CWS). The CWS of a person is the activity status obtained during a reference period of seven days preceding the date of the survey. As per CWS status, a person is considered as unemployed in a week if he did not work even for at least one hour on any day during the reference week but sought or was available for work. In contrast, the headline numbers on employment-unemployment in the annual PLFS reports are reported based on the usual activity status. Usual activity status relates to the activity status of a person during the reference period of the last 365 days preceding the date of the survey. |
To contain the spread of COVID-19, a nationwide lockdown was imposed from late March till May 2020. During the lockdown, severe restrictions were placed on the movement of individuals and economic activities were significantly halted barring the activities related to essential goods and services. Unemployment rate in urban areas rose to 20.9% during the April-June quarter of 2020, more than double the unemployment rate in the same quarter the previous year ( 8.9% ). Unemployment rate refers to the percentage of unemployed persons in the labour force. Labour force includes persons who are either employed or unemployed but seeking work. The lockdown restrictions were gradually relaxed during the subsequent months. Unemployment rate also saw a decrease as compared to the levels seen in the April-June quarter of 2020. During the October-December quarter of 2020 (latest data available), unemployment rate had reduced to 10.3% . However, it was notably higher than the unemployment rate in the same quarter last year ( 7.9%) .
Figure 1 : Unemployment rate in urban areas across all age groups as per current weekly activity status (Figures in %)
Note: PLFS includes data for transgenders among males. Sources: Quarterly Periodic Labour Force Survey Reports, Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation; PRS.
Recovery post-national lockdown uneven in case of females
Pre-COVID-19 trends suggest that the female unemployment rate has generally been higher than the male unemployment rate in the country (7.3% vs 9.8% during the October-December quarter of 2019, respectively). Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, this gap seems to have widened. During the October-December quarter of 2020, the unemployment rate for females was 13.1%, as compared to 9.5% for males.
The Standing Committee on Labour (April 2021) also noted that the pandemic led to large-scale unemployment for female workers, in both organised and unorganised sectors. It recommended: (i) increasing government procurement from women-led enterprises, (ii) training women in new technologies, (iii) providing women with access to capital, and (iv) investing in childcare and linked infrastructure.
Labour force participation
Persons dropping in and out of the labour force may also influence the unemployment rate. At a given point of time, there may be persons who are below the legal working age or may drop out of the labour force due to various socio-economic reasons, for instance, to pursue education. At the same time, there may also be discouraged workers who, while willing and able to be employed, have ceased to seek work. Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) is the indicator that denotes the percentage of the population which is part of the labour force. The LFPR saw only marginal changes throughout 2019 and 2020. During the April-June quarter (where COVID-19 restrictions were the most stringent), the LFPR was 35.9%, which was lower than same in the corresponding quarter in 2019 (36.2%). Note that female LFPR in India is significantly lower than male LFPR (16.6% and 56.7%, respectively, in the October-December quarter of 2019).
Figure 2 : LFPR in urban areas across all groups as per current weekly activity status (Figures in %)
Measures taken by the government for workers
The Standing Committee on Labour in its report released in August 2021 noted that 90% of workers in India are from the informal sector. These workers include: (i) migrant workers, (ii) contract labourers, (iii) construction workers, and (iv) street vendors. The Committee observed that these workers were worst impacted by the pandemic due to seasonality of employment and lack of employer-employee relationship in unorganised sectors. The Committee recommended central and state governments to: (i) encourage entrepreneurial opportunities, (ii) attract investment in traditional manufacturing sectors and developing industrial clusters, (iii) strengthen social security measures, (iv) maintain a database of workers in the informal sector, and (v) promote vocational training. It took note of the various steps taken by the central government to support workers and address the challenges and threats posed by the COVID-19 pandemic (applicable to urban areas):
The central and state governments have also taken various other measures , such as increasing spending on infrastructure creation and enabling access to cheaper lending for businesses, to sustain economic activity and boost employment generation.
Mr. Vaghul, our first Chairperson, passed away on Saturday. I write this note to express my deep gratitude to him, and to celebrate his life. And what a life he lived!
Mr. Vaghul and I at his residence |
Our past and present Chairpersons, |
Industry stalwarts have spoken about his contributions to the financial sector, his mentorship of people and institutions across finance, industry and non-profits. I don’t want to repeat that (though I was a beneficiary as a young professional starting my career at ICICI Securities). I want to note here some of the ways he helped shape PRS.
Mr Vaghul was our first chairman, from 2012 to 2018. When he joined the board, we were in deep financial crisis. Our FCRA application had been turned down (I still don’t know the reason), and we were trying to survive on monthly fund raise. Mr Vaghul advised us to raise funds from domestic philanthropists. “PRS works to make Indian democracy more effective. We should not rely on foreigners to do this.”. He was sure that Indian philanthropists would fund us. “We’ll try our best. But if it doesn’t work, we may shut down. Are you okay with that?” Of course, with him calling up people, we survived the crisis.
He also suggested that we should have an independent board without any representation from funders. The output should be completely independent of funders’ interest given that we were working in the policy space. We have stuck to this advice.
Even when he was 80, he could read faster than anyone and remember everything. I once said something in a board meeting which had been written in the note sent earlier. “We have all read the note. Let us discuss the implications.” And he could think three steps ahead of everyone else.
He had a light touch as a chairman. When I asked for management advice, he would ask me to solve the problem on my own. He saw his role as guiding the larger strategy, help raise funds and ensure that the organisation had a strong value system. Indeed, he was the original Karmayogi – I have an email from him which says, “Continue with the good work. We should neither be euphoric with appreciation or distracted by criticism.” And another, "Those who adhere to the truth need not be afraid of the consequences".
The best part about board meetings was the chat afterwards. He would have us in splits with stories from his experience. Some of these are in his memoirs, but we heard a few juicier ones too!
Even after he retired from our Board, he was always available to meet. I just needed to message him whenever I was in Madras, and he would ask me to come home. And Mrs. Vaghul was a welcoming host. Filter coffee, great advice, juicy stories, what more could one ask for?
Goodbye Mr. Vaghul. Your life lives on through the institutions you nurtured. And hope that we live up to your standards.
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India witnessed one of the worst coronavirus crises in the world. The pandemic induced sharp contraction in economic activity that caused unemployment to rise, upheaving the existing gender divides in the country. Using monthly data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy on subnational economies of India from January 2019 to May 2021, we find that a) unemployment gender gap narrowed ...
The fact that labour in India, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, has been trapped in an unprecedented crisis, in living memory, is widely acknowledged. The employment and livelihoods of the overwhelming majority of workers have taken huge hits, and a massive uncertainly continues to loom over their immediate foreseeable future.
COVID-19 cases touched 768.5 million (768,560,727) confirmed COVID-19 cases and 6.9 million (6,952,522) COVID-19 deaths.3 COVID-19 severely affected the low and middle income countries in the regions of South Asia,4 Sub-Saharan Africa, and East Asia.5,6 India experienced 44.99 million (44,995,332) confirmed cases and 0.53 million
2.2 India's Policy Resilience against COVID-19. In India, nearly all services and factories were suspended during lockdown which severely affected the economic activities in the country. Closure of business activities forced millions of migrant workers, primarily working in the informal sector, to return to their villages (Srivastava 2020 ...
UN estimated that COVID-19 pushed global unemployment over 200 million mark in 2022. In case of India, the first case of COVID - 19 infection was reported on January 27, 2020, a 20 yr old female who returned to Kerala from Wuhan city, China. In order to control the COVID - 19 outbreak, the Indian government has announced the lockdown for 21 ...
ILO 5th Monitor on COVID-19 impact released on 30 June 2020 suggests that the labour market recovery during the second half of 2020 will be uncertain and incomplete. The working-hour losses could range between 140 million full-time jobs and 340 million full-time jobs in the last quarter of the year, depending upon the spread of the pandemic. 2.
This study analyses the possible reasons behind decline in monthly earnings and labour market participation of urban people in India during the period of outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, i.e. during the period from April 2020 to June 2020, using the data of fourth quarter from each of the PLFSs of 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20 since they have ...
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Youth unemployment is a big challenge in developing economies, but there is a limited understanding of the dynamics underlying the rise in unemployment among young workers. This article examines youth unemployment and inactivity in India, where the economic contraction from the pandemic was solely responsible for reversing the trend of decades of declining global inequality. Young workers face ...
Using monthly data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy on subnational economies of India from January 2019 to May 2021, we find that a) unemployment gender gap narrowed during the COVID-19 pandemic in comparison to the pre-pandemic era, largely driven by male unemployment dynamics, b) the recovery in the post-lockdown periods had ...
final version received 01 November 2020.ABSTRACTThis paper is an analysis of the. conomic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in India. Even prior to the pandemic, the Indian econ-omy was marked by a slowdown of economic growth. and record increases in unemployment and poverty. Thus, India's capacity to deal with a new cr.
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