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Philippine National Elections 2022: Voter Preferences and Topics of Discussion on Twitter

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Understanding election violence in the Philippines: Beware the unknown assassins of may

• University of Portsmouth
• Centre for European & International Studies Research
• Lund University

Research output : Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Despite election violence being a commonly agreed upon phenomena in the Philippines, there has been a dearth in academic research on the topic in recent years, largely due to a lack of reliable information. To address this, our article adapts recognized methods from studies such as Lindsay Shorr Newman’s 2013 paper, together with Stephen McGrath and Paul Gill’s 2014 research on terrorism and elections. To expose the timing of election violence, we tracked incidents relative to election dates for the period from 2004 to 2017, with the results indicating that violence increased closer to an election date, and frequency substantially increased during the 14-year period. This is the first academic journal article since John Linantud in 1998 to focus on the issue of election violence in the Philippines but through adaptive methodologies goes further, enabling national analysis. Furthermore, our findings reveal statistically significant differences regarding the types of terrorist attacks and targets when comparing election and non-election periods. We highlight complicating factors such as the majority of attacks being attributed to “unknown” actors and the complex situation during elections. The results also demonstrate that election violence in the Philippines is dominated by the New People’s Army and the use of assassination. The paper makes the case for further research and the creation of a dedicated database of election violence in the Philippines and elsewhere, and evaluates the measures implemented by the government that have failed to stem election violence.

• Assassination
• Election violence
• New People’s Army
• Philippines

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Access to Document

• 10.5509/2021943491
• Election_Violence_AAM Accepted author manuscript (Post-print), 590 KB
• https://pacificaffairs.ubc.ca/articles/understanding-election-violence-in-the-philippines-beware-the-unknown-assassins-of-may/

Fingerprint

• Violence Social Sciences 100%
• Election Earth and Planetary Sciences 81%
• Philippines Social Sciences 31%
• philippines INIS 31%
• Research Social Sciences 12%
• Paper Social Sciences 12%
• Information Social Sciences 12%
• Methodology Psychology 12%

Research output

• 1 Citations

Research outputs per year

The False Dawns over Marawi: Examining the post-Marawi counterterrorism strategy in the Philippines

Philippines: the challenges ahead for the new president marcos.

Research output : Contribution to specialist publication › Article

• Philippines 100%
• philippines 100%
• Country 33%
• Reflection 33%

Philippines election: how the Marcos clan might be heading back to power

• 1 Invited talk
• 1 Oral presentation

Activities per year

The Hated and the Dead Podcast - Rodrigo Duterte

Tom Smith (Speaker)

Activity : Talk or presentation types › Invited talk

Election violence in the Philippines - University of Portsmouth Podcast

Activity : Talk or presentation types › Oral presentation

Press/Media

La presse (canada): power war at the top in the philippines.

1 Media contribution

Press/Media : Expert comment

T1 - Understanding election violence in the Philippines

T2 - Beware the unknown assassins of may

AU - Smith, Tom

AU - Reyes, Joseph Anthony L.

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © Pacific Affairs.

PY - 2021/9/2

Y1 - 2021/9/2

N2 - Despite election violence being a commonly agreed upon phenomena in the Philippines, there has been a dearth in academic research on the topic in recent years, largely due to a lack of reliable information. To address this, our article adapts recognized methods from studies such as Lindsay Shorr Newman’s 2013 paper, together with Stephen McGrath and Paul Gill’s 2014 research on terrorism and elections. To expose the timing of election violence, we tracked incidents relative to election dates for the period from 2004 to 2017, with the results indicating that violence increased closer to an election date, and frequency substantially increased during the 14-year period. This is the first academic journal article since John Linantud in 1998 to focus on the issue of election violence in the Philippines but through adaptive methodologies goes further, enabling national analysis. Furthermore, our findings reveal statistically significant differences regarding the types of terrorist attacks and targets when comparing election and non-election periods. We highlight complicating factors such as the majority of attacks being attributed to “unknown” actors and the complex situation during elections. The results also demonstrate that election violence in the Philippines is dominated by the New People’s Army and the use of assassination. The paper makes the case for further research and the creation of a dedicated database of election violence in the Philippines and elsewhere, and evaluates the measures implemented by the government that have failed to stem election violence.

AB - Despite election violence being a commonly agreed upon phenomena in the Philippines, there has been a dearth in academic research on the topic in recent years, largely due to a lack of reliable information. To address this, our article adapts recognized methods from studies such as Lindsay Shorr Newman’s 2013 paper, together with Stephen McGrath and Paul Gill’s 2014 research on terrorism and elections. To expose the timing of election violence, we tracked incidents relative to election dates for the period from 2004 to 2017, with the results indicating that violence increased closer to an election date, and frequency substantially increased during the 14-year period. This is the first academic journal article since John Linantud in 1998 to focus on the issue of election violence in the Philippines but through adaptive methodologies goes further, enabling national analysis. Furthermore, our findings reveal statistically significant differences regarding the types of terrorist attacks and targets when comparing election and non-election periods. We highlight complicating factors such as the majority of attacks being attributed to “unknown” actors and the complex situation during elections. The results also demonstrate that election violence in the Philippines is dominated by the New People’s Army and the use of assassination. The paper makes the case for further research and the creation of a dedicated database of election violence in the Philippines and elsewhere, and evaluates the measures implemented by the government that have failed to stem election violence.

KW - Assassination

KW - Election violence

KW - New People’s Army

KW - Philippines

KW - Terrorism

UR - https://pacificaffairs.ubc.ca/submissions/open-access-policy/

U2 - 10.5509/2021943491

DO - 10.5509/2021943491

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85114504556

SN - 0030-851X

JO - Pacific Affairs

JF - Pacific Affairs

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VOTERS PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINE ELECTION

2020, Journal of Critical Reviews

Electing public officers is the most exciting event in Philippines. It is when friends turn to enemies and relatives into insignificant all in the name of the candidate they supported. The research unveils the rationale behind this exciting event. This research resolves the common practices before election. What are the problems and challenges encountered? How do voters behave before election? And what Policy Recommendation on Electoral Reforms can be proposed based on the findings of the study? This study made use purposive sampling. Interview is conducted in one of the poorest province in the Philippines which is Southern Leyte and Fifty (50) selected respondents from the five municipalities of Cebu Province must be of legal age (18) and above, and a registered voter. The researchers identified the following respondents based on characteristics that they deem to be the basic qualification significant to make this study possible. The result of the research strongly recommended that Commission on Election should provide an avenue so that the voters will know well the candidates they are about to choose. Debate is advisable prior to the election proper. In this way, the voters will be educated on the capabilities of the future officials. Government should do its best to stop vote buying.

Related Papers

Reginald Matt Santiago

Elections in the Philippines are always filled with issues, and it is important to look on how the voters operate in exercising their suffrage to vote. The study looks in to the voting behavior and preference of the voters in Purok 5, Brgy.31-D, Davao City. This study attempted to examine the basis for voting, preferred campaign methods and the preferred characteristics of electoral choices that will highly influence their voting choices.

Patricia Leane Saguiped

There exists a notion that Filipino voters should be blamed for the problems of their country because they tend to vote irresponsibly. Filipino voters usually base their votes upon who seemed to have them entertained the most, and the surname that they're familiar with, or the surname that is written at the top of the ballots. Majority of Filipino voters value the candidates themselves, and not their capacity to give justice to their desired position. The Filipino voters' voting preference relies heavily on the influence of mass media. Voters are too consumed on how the different platforms of media showcase, exaggerate, or even romanticize the status of individuals and society. Thus, Filipinos, especially voters, tend to forget how we really perceive society with our own vision and understanding. This paper seeks to analyze the factors that affect the Filipino way of voting in the 2000s, the incompetency and loopholes in the qualifications required for running for a specific government position, and a search for a healthy preference that Filipinos should follow when voting. On a more important note, this paper also tackles the efficiency and validity of voting and elections in the Philippines. The concept of the title is obtained from one of Aesop's tales entitled " The Lion and the Mouse " which emphasizes the idea of mutualism among vastly different beings. The concept of the fable showcases mutualism between the candidate and the voters in the Philippine electoral system, one could not exist or survive without the other. The lion, especially during elections, is the voter for he/she will need to vote a candidate (the mouse). If the mouse or the candidate will win a seat, then he/she must also repay the lion or the voter through proving that the voter's vote was indeed worth it. A political system is considered democratic to the extent that its most powerful decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies

Steven Rood

This paper attempts to trace, using survey evidence, the electoral behaviour of Baguio City voters during two years beginning with the 1986 Presidential election contest between Ferdinand Marcos and Corazon Aquino. The revolutionary aftermath to this election issued in a new political regime, which held a series of elections. By January 1988 there had been a plebiscite to ratify a new Constitution, Congressional and Senatorial elections, and finally local elections for the Mayor and City Council. For all of these elections, local surveys were conducted in the City of Baguio.

Belen Figueras

Emmanuel J Bacud

This introduces essential concepts on elections and its relevance inthe Philippine Political culture.

Nikko Danao

This is a descriptive study on the voting preferences of selected voters in the City of Calapan for 2016 National and Local Elections. The researchers utilized a survey-questionnaire instituted to 1,050 randomly-selected registered voters from seven (7) barangays in the City of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Philippines. The research was conducted from 1-6 March 2016, months before the conduct of national and local automated elections on 09 May 2016. The study found out various factors and sociological conditions that contribute to the preferences of the voters for various national and local positions. Keywords: Politics, Elections, Voting Preferences

The purpose of this research is to find out how is the interpretation of first-time voters towards political socialization, campaign, and media which is performed by political party and legislative candidate which caused the first-time voters in Kota Pasuruan, Kecamatan Bugul Kidul, Gadingrejo, Purworejo, and Panggungrejo deciced to participate in Pemilu Legislatif 2014. On top of that, the purpose of this research is also to find out the relationship between first-time voters’ interpretation towards legislative candidate, political party, and issues during the campaign period and decision to participate for first-time voters who become the informant with snowball sampling technique and through in-depth interviews. This research shows that based on the majority of key informants, popularity, reputation, track record, and position in a political party are important decision making factors in deciding which political party is the best. This research also shows that majority of key informants have negative view towards political party in Indonesia. In voting, they prioritize to select from legislative candidate’s character rather than his political party. Corruption such as money politic and political dynasty become some factors which caused the decrease in trust of first-time voters towards political party and its candidate. The lack of campaign time for legislative candidate and political party also cause the political communication and messages to voters to be less effective. With all these challenges in Pemilu Legislatif 2014, the first-time voters decided to still vote based on information that they already had to decide which legislative candidate that they have to choose.

Jules Asedillo

Ferdinand Abocejo

ABSTRACT Vote buying during election is a phenomenon in Philippine politics clandestinely practiced as underground activities by political candidates who utilize it as a political strategy. This study examined the vote buying phenomenon of the Philippines during periodic elections in the national and local levels. It utilized secondary data from various source agencies and published refereed journals on practices of fraud and vote buying which have crucially shape out election results and the electoral system of the country. The findings suggest that Filipino traditional voters attribute vote buying to “patron-client relations” during elections where parity and justice are momentarily accomplished when political candidates carry out their obligations and lend supports to their constituents with vested interests. Operationally for many Filipino voters, vote buying is a tangible “gift” from aspiring candidates which influences their choice and produce instrumental compliance. This phenomenon underlying the patron-client ties manifests a two-fold bond of reciprocity and mutual obligation linking individuals of disproportionate social status and authority based on the exchange of money and votes. Those less educated and rural residents are among the more vulnerable electoral groups to vote buying. The study concludes that vote buying as practiced in the Philippines has penetrated all levels of the bureaucracy. The veracity of vote buying has become culturally intricate with fraud, intimidation and violent means to win the electoral race. Keywords - Vote buying, electoral system, political culture, voters’ education, election exercise, rural residents, Philippines ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Note: If you cite this work, please cite the author, article tile, volume, issue, URL address or DOI, ISSN and journal where it is published, thank you very much! The “International Journal on Graft and Corruption Research”, Print ISSN 2362-7476, Online ISSN 2362-7492, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 36-45, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7719/ijgc.v2i1.301

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Why the 2022 Philippines election is so significant

There are 10 candidates vying to replace Rodrigo Duterte as president, but only two really matter.

The Philippines goes to the polls on May 9 to choose a new president, in what analysts say will be the most significant election in the Southeast Asian nation’s recent history.

Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte leaves office with a reputation for brutality – his signature “drug war”  has left thousands dead and is being investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) – economic incompetence, and cracking down on the media and his critics.

Keep reading

‘our generation’s fight’: robredo’s campaign to stop marcos jr, leila de lima release urged after witnesses retract testimony, us, philippines kick off their largest-ever military drills, duterte ally wrests control of tv signals used by abs-cbn.

Duterte has also been criticised for his handling of the coronavirus pandemic, which has killed at least 60,439 people in the archipelago.

There are 10 people battling to replace him, but only two stand a chance of winning.

The first is frontrunner Ferdinand Marcos Jr, popularly known as “Bongbong” and the namesake of his father, who ruled the Philippines as a dictator until he was forced from office and into exile in a popular uprising in 1986.

The second is Leni Robredo, the current vice president and head of the opposition, who has promised more accountable and transparent government and to reinvigorate the country’s democracy.

“This election is really a good versus evil campaign,” University of the Philippines Diliman political scientist Aries Arugay told Al Jazeera. “It’s quite clear. Duterte represents dynasty, autocracy and impunity. Robredo stands for the opposite of that: integrity, accountability and democracy.”

What happens on election day?

Some 67.5 million Filipinos aged 18 and over are eligible to cast their vote, along with about 1.7 million from the vast Filipino diaspora who have registered overseas.

Polling stations will open at 6am (22:00 GMT) and close at 7pm (11:00 GMT). The hours have been extended because of the coronavirus pandemic and the need to avoid queues and crowds.

Once the polls close, counting gets under way immediately, and the candidate with the most votes wins. There is no second round so the name of the new president could be known within a few hours. The inauguration takes place in June.

As well as the presidential race, Filipinos are choosing a new vice president – the position is elected separately to the president – members of congress, governors and thousands of local politicians including mayors and councillors.

Politics can be a dangerous business in the Philippines and there is the risk of violence during both campaigning and the election itself.

In one of the most horrific incidents, dozens of people were killed and buried by the roadside in 2009 by a rival political clan in what became known as the Maguindanao massacre .

Who is in the running for president?

Opinion polls suggest Marcos Jr remains in the lead although Robredo appears to be closing the gap.

The 64-year-old dictator’s son attended the private Worth School in England and studied at Oxford University – Marcos Jr’s official biography says he “graduated” but the university says he emerged with a “special diploma” in social studies.

He entered politics in the family stronghold of Ilocos Norte in 1980, and was governor of the province when his father was forced out of power and democracy restored.

In 1992, he was elected to congress – again for Ilocos Norte. Three years later, he was found guilty of tax evasion, a conviction that has dogged him ever since but does not seem to have hindered his political career.

Marcos Jr was elected a senator in 2010, and ran unsuccessfully for the vice presidency six years later when he was pipped to the post by a resurgent Robredo.

On the campaign trail, Marcos Jr has talked of “unity” but has provided little detail on his policies and has avoided media interviews and debates.

His running mate is Sara Duterte-Carpio , Duterte’s daughter, who took over as mayor of Davao City from her father and is leading the field for vice president.

Robredo is the current vice president and a human rights lawyer who got into politics in 2013 after her husband – a government minister – was killed in a plane crash.

She threw her hat into the ring at a relatively late stage, and has relied on a network of pink-clad volunteers to win over voters across the archipelago.

Thousands have turned out for her rallies, some of then standing for hours in their hot sun waiting to hear the presidential hopeful speak. Robredo, whose running mate is Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan, is running on a platform of good governance, democracy and an end to corruption.

Other candidates include champion boxer Manny Pacquiao , Manila mayor Francisco “Isko Moreno” Domagoso, and a former police chief Panfilo Lacson.

Why would a Marcos victory be controversial?

Ferdinand Marcos became president of the Philippines in 1965, winning over Filipinos with his charisma and rhetoric, and taking control of a country that appeared at the time to be one of Southeast Asia’s emerging powerhouses.

Backed by the United States, Marcos won a second term in office in 1969, but three years later he declared martial law claiming the move was necessary to “save” the nation from communists.

For the next 14 years, he ruled the country as a dictator.

More than 3,200 people were killed – their bodies often dumped by the road side as a warning to others – and even more tortured or arbitrarily jailed, according to the US academic and historian, Alfred McCoy.

Marcos’s biggest rival, Benigno Aquino, was assassinated as he got off a plane at Manila airport.

The killing shocked Filipinos at a time when they were increasingly angry at the corruption and extravagance of the Marcos regime. Even as many lived in poverty, the Marcos family bought properties in New York and California, paintings by artists including impressionist master Monet, luxury jewellery and designer clothes.

Transparency International estimated in 2004 that the couple embezzled as much as $10bn during their years in power, and Imelda , Marcos’s wife, has become a byword for excess.

But since the former dictator’s death in Hawaii in 1989, the Marcos family have sought to rehabilitate themselves, trying to portray the dictatorship as some kind of golden age.

In 2016, Duterte allowed Ferdinand Marcos to be buried in Manila’s heroes cemetery, complete with a 21-gun salute .

Now the Duterte family is allied with the Marcos one, and their bid also has the support of other politically influential dynasties in a country where blood ties are more important than any political party.

“The meteoric resurgence of the Marcoses is itself a stinging judgement on the profound failures of the country’s democratic institutions,” academic Richard Javad Heydarian wrote in a column for Al Jazeera in December. “Decades of judicial impunity, historical whitewashing, corruption-infested politics and exclusionary economic growth has driven a growing number of Filipinos into the Marcoses’ embrace.”

Many worry the election of Marcos Jr, particularly if Duterte becomes vice president as widely expected, could herald a new era of repression.

“The two are the offspring of two strongman rulers,” Arugay said. “Can we expect restraint and inclusive government? You don’t need to be a political scientist to answer that question.”

Earlier this week, some 1,200 members of the clergy of the Catholic Church endorsed Robredo and Pangilinan describing them as “good shepherds”. At least 86 percent of Filipinos are Catholic.

“We cannot simply shrug, and let the fate of our country be dictated by false and misleading claims that aim to change our history,” they said.

Will the result be accepted?

When Marcos Jr lost the vice presidential race by 263,000 votes in 2016, he challenged the result in court.

With the stakes much higher this time around, some analysts worry he could do so again if Robredo manages to pull off a victory.

The role of social media

Filipinos are avid users of social media and the platforms have played a key – and divisive – role in the election, intensifying the more toxic elements of political campaigning.

Marcos Jr and his team have been accused of using – and abusing – online platforms.

In January, Twitter suspended more than 300 accounts promoting his campaign, which it said breached rules on spam and manipulation.

Joshua Kurtantzick of the Council on Foreign Relations says Marcos Jr has also benefited from “the legacy of Duterte, who fostered the spread of disinformation and made it easier for another strongman to win”.

Senatorial race

While all eyes are on the presidential race, it is worth keeping an eye on the senate, too.

Leila de Lima, who has spent the past five years imprisoned in the national police headquarters in Manila after questioning Duterte’s drug war, is campaigning for office again.

The opposition senator is hopeful she may soon be released after two key witnesses withdrew their testimony .

De Lima was the target of vicious, misogynistic attacks by Duterte and his supporters before she was charged in 2017 with taking money from drug lords while she was justice secretary in the government of the late Benigno Aquino III .

De Lima has denied the charges and Human Rights Watch has said the case is politically motivated.

• Subscribe Now

One year before 2025 Philippine elections: Proxy wars, and where alliances stand

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This is AI generated summarization, which may have errors. For context, always refer to the full article.

CIVIL. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Vice President Sara Duterte during the distribution of land e-titles to qualified beneficiaries in Davao City on February 7, 2024.

MANILA, Philippines – One year before the 2025 elections, apparent divisions within President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s super majority coalition raise the possibility of a head-to-head battle between the factions in the upcoming midterm polls.

Marcos has insisted that the UniTeam electoral alliance he built with his number two – Vice President Sara Duterte – remains intact, but critics believe their supposed marriage of convenience for the 2022 polls has reached its bitter end.

How is the line drawn a year before election day?

Infighting slipping through the cracks

The President and Vice President have kept it friendly and professional in public, as they remain allies on paper.

However, major signs of discord among their closest allies have created an impression of a proxy war between the country’s two highest leaders.

Even prior to the start of the Marcos presidency, political onlookers have witnessed a number of key moments that fueled observations that there is a falling out within the UniTeam:

• Sara missed out on the defense portfolio, which she had expressed interest in, when Marcos appointed her to lead the Department of Education (DepEd).
• In 2023, Pampanga 2nd District Representative Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, a crucial broker of the UniTeam alliance, got demoted twice in the House. In March of that year, she was stripped of her senior deputy speakership post which Romualdez hinted was in response to an ouster plot against him . This did not sit well with Sara, who resigned from their party Lakas-CMD . Months later, Arroyo lost her deputy speakership altogether, after she failed to sign a House resolution expressing confidence in Romualdez’s leadership.
• The Romualdez-led House denied Sara’s request for confidential funds for her offices in 2024.
• Marcos once said that his administration was studying the possibility of rejoining the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is investigating Rodrigo Duterte’s bloody drug war.
• Sara’s brother, Davao City Mayor Sebastian Duterte, called for Marcos’ resignation .
• Rodrigo Duterte accused Marcos of drug addiction , but the latter dismissed his predecessor’s foul-mouthed attack as the side effect of his “ fentanyl” use .
• First Lady Liza Araneta Marcos admitted that she was not on good terms with the Vice President because the latter supposedly laughed when her father, during a rally they both attended, claimed that the President was under the influence of drugs.
• Sara opposed the administration’s position on some key issues, particularly charter change and the revival of peace talks with communist rebels .
• The President’s own sister, Senator Imee Marcos, criticized the administration on numerous issues as well, including charter change and economic policies affecting tariffs on rice . Imee, a staunch supporter of the Dutertes , also acknowledged an unresolved rift with her cousin Speaker Romualdez .

Marcos gearing up for 2025

On May 1, Marcos told new members of the Partido Federal ng Pilipinas, which he chairs, that party leaders were preparing for the midterm polls , a vote that would test his popularity as president.

PFP, Marcos’ home party that rose from obscurity after he used it as vehicle for his 2022 campaign, has beefed up its membership after the 2022 elections by recruiting local officials across the country, including governors and mayors.

PFP has partnered with Romualdez’s party Lakas-CMD , which is the most dominant bloc in the House, in building a stage for the administration’s senatorial slate in 2025.

It is expected that other key blocs in the Marcos administration’s super majority coalition, such as the National Unity Party, Nationalist People’s Coalition, and Nacionalista Party, will also forge an alliance with PFP and Lakas-CMD heading to the midterms.

Kilusan ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino , which in 2023 tried to launch itself as the next party of Marcos for 2025, failed to take off after its accreditation languished at the Comelec, and after most of its inaugural members jumped ship to more established political formations.

Waiting for Sara and the Dutertes

The question that hangs in the air is how the Vice President will position herself for the midterm elections.

There have been calls for the President to remove the country’s second-in-command from the Cabinet, but the so-far risk-averse Marcos has insisted on keeping her , saying he has no reason to fire her because she was not incapable nor corrupt.

It is important to note that reputable surveys have constantly named Sara as the most trusted government official . She has a commanding grip on Mindanao, where the President has seen his approval scores tumble in recent months.

Sara herself has faced calls to just voluntarily step down from the DepEd, but doing so would be an outright declaration of war against the Marcos administration.

Key figures of the alliance between PFP and Lakas-CMD are coy about the possibility of including Hugpong ng Pagbabago – Sara’s regional party – in the administration coalition. Romualdez and PFP president South Cotabato Governor Jun Tamayo said they are not closing their doors on HNP, but admitted there have been no formal talks to invite them to the alliance.

Former president Duterte, for his part, has sent mixed signals , saying he was done with politics, but also that he would run in the future should he find a compelling reason to do so. Whispering in his ear are his most loyal political operators , in addition to former Marcos supporters who have jumped ship after losing favor with the incumbent chief executive.

The threat of arrest in connection with the ICC probe against his bloody drug war may be keeping the former president awake at night, leaving a 2025 senatorial run in the list of options he could explore.

Davao City’s political kingpin and his children have mastered the art of keeping their enemies and the public on their toes , so it would be unwise to count them out.

Genuine opposition

And then, there is the decimated opposition.

The Liberal Party – the political vehicle of the late former president Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III – has struggled to regain its numbers after Duterte’s rise to power.

The “hostile political climate,” as former senator and party chairman Francis Pangilinan once said , relegated the party to the sidelines. In 2022, Albay lawmaker and party president Edcel Lagman promised a comeback for the 2025 midterms, but the party’s diminishing size in Congress indicates that it has yet to regain momentum.

The LP, however, has been among the first to partially unveil its 2025 lineup , saying that Pangilinan and former senator Bam Aquino will try to reenter the Senate, along with lawyer Chel Diokno, who is giving the upper chamber a third shot.

What about former vice president Leni Robredo?

The charismatic opposition figure who came in distant second in the 2022 presidential race is being convinced by LP stalwarts to give the Senate a chance in 2025, but her move to transfer her voter registration records to Naga City has fueled speculations that she’s gunning for a mayoral seat.

A bid to lead city hall in her bailiwick is the much safer route, compared to a senatorial campaign that already promises to be expensive and exhausting before she can commit to it, with recent surveys putting her outside the Magic 12 a year before the polls. She can, however, reignite the passion of the millions of voters who chose her to be president in 2022, and who would want to see her brand of politics in a national setting.

Twelve months before Filipinos go out and vote, the stage is set for a showdown between the Marcos and Duterte families, emblems of traditional politics in the Philippines. Will the viable alternative please stand up? – Rappler.com

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Peer Reviewed

US-skepticism and transnational conspiracy in the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election

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Taiwan has one of the highest freedom of speech indexes while it also encounters the largest amount of foreign interference due to its contentious history with China. Because of the large influx of misinformation, Taiwan has taken a public crowdsourcing approach to combatting misinformation, using both fact-checking ChatBots and public dataset called CoFacts. Combining CoFacts with large-language models (LLM), we investigated misinformation across three platforms (Line, PTT, and Facebook) during the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election. We found that most misinformation appears within China-friendly political groups and attacks US-Taiwan relations through visual media like images and videos. A considerable proportion of misinformation does not question U.S. foreign policy directly. Rather, it exaggerates domestic issues in the United States to create a sense of declining U.S. state capacity. Curiously, we found misinformation rhetoric that references conspiracy groups in the West.

Program in Quantitative Social Science, Dartmouth College, USA

Department of Political Science, University of Nevada Las Vegas, USA

Department of Computer Science, Barnard College, USA

Research Questions

• What are the misinformation narratives surrounding the election in Taiwan and how do they target international relations with the United States?
• What geographical or temporal patterns emerge from misinformation data?
• Who are the targets of these misinformation narratives and through what modalities?

Essay Summary

• We leveraged a dataset of 41,291 labeled articles from Line, 911,510 posts from Facebook, and 2,005,972 posts and comments from PTT to understand misinformation dynamics through topic modeling and network analysis.
• The primary form of misinformation is narratives that attack international relations with the United States (henceforth referred to as US-skepticism), specifically referencing the economy, health policy, the threat of war through Ukraine, and other U.S. domestic issues.
• Temporal and spatial evidence suggests VPN-based coordination, focused on U.S. issues and addresses.
• Misinformation is most common among pan-Blue and ROC identity groups on social media and is spread through visual media. These groups share many themes with conspiracy groups in Western countries.
• Our study shows the prevalence of misinformation strategies using visual media and fake news websites. It also highlights how crowdsourcing and advances in large-language models can be used to identify misinformation in cross-platform workflows.

Implications

According to Freedom House, Taiwan has one of the highest indices for free speech in Asia (Freedom House, 2022). Additionally, due to its contentious history with China, it receives significant foreign interference and misinformation, especially during its presidential elections. Due to the large influx of dis- and misinformation, Taiwan has developed many strategies to counter misleading narratives, including fact-checking ChatBots on its most popular chatroom app (Chang et al., 2020). Under this information environment, the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election emerged as one of the most divisive elections in Taiwan’s history, featuring at one point a doubling of presidential candidates in a typically two-party race, from two to four. As such, Taiwan is regarded as a “canary for disinformation” against elections in 2024, as a first indicator to how foreign interference may take place in other democracies (Welch, 2024).

In this paper, we study the misinformation ecosystem in Taiwan starting a year prior to the election. First, our findings highlight the interaction between misinformation and international relations. As was reported in The Economist and The New York Times , a considerable portion of the misinformation spread in Taiwan before the 2024 election is about US-skepticism, which aims at undermining the reputation of the United States among Taiwanese people (“China is flooding Taiwan with disinformation,” 2023; Hsu, Chien, and Myers, 2023). This phenomenon is significant because it does not target specific candidates or parties in the election but may indirectly influence the vote choice between pro- and anti-U.S. parties. Given the US-China global competition and the Russia-Ukraine ongoing conflict, the reputation of the United States is crucial for the strength and reliability of democratic allies (Cohen, 2003). Hence, it is not surprising that misinformation about the United States may propagate globally and influence elections across democracies. However, our findings surprisingly show that US-skepticism also includes a considerable number of attacks on U.S. domestic politics. Such content does not question the U.S. foreign policy but undermines the perceived reliability and state capacity of the United States. Here, s tate capacity is defined as whether a state is capable of mobilizing its resources to realize its goal, which is conceptually different from motivation and trust.

US-skepticism is commonly characterized as mistrusting the motivations of the United States, as illustrated in the Latin American context due to long histories of political influence (see dependency theory; Galeano, 1997), but our findings suggest that perceived U.S. state capacity is also an important narrative. As most foreign disinformation arises from China, this indicates a greater trend where authoritarian countries turn to sharp power tactics to distort information and defame global competitors rather than winning hearts and minds through soft power. Sharp power refers to the ways in which authoritarian regimes project their influence abroad to pierce, penetrate, or perforate the informational environments in targeted countries (Walker, 2018). In Taiwan’s case, China may not be able to tell China’s story well, but can still influence Taiwanese voters by making them believe that the United States is declining. Our findings suggest that future work analyzing the topics and keywords of misinformation in elections outside the United States should also consider the US-skepticism as one latent category, not just the politicians and countries as is common with electoral misinformation (Tenove et al., 2018). These findings are corroborated by narratives identified by a recent report including drug issues, race relations, and urban decay (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2024).

Additionally, our research investigates both misinformation and conspiracy theories, which are closely related. Whereas misinformation is broadly described as “false or inaccurate information” (Jerit & Zhao, 2020), a conspiracy theory is the belief that harmful events are caused by a powerful, often secretive, group. In particular, conspiracy communities often coalesce around activities of “truth-seeking,” embodying a contrarian view toward commonly held beliefs (Enders et al., 2022; Harambam, 2020; Konkes & Lester, 2017). Our findings also provide evidence of transnational similarities between conspiracy groups in Taiwan and the United States. Whereas the domestic context has been explored (Chen et al., 2023; Jerit & Zhao, 2020), the intersection of partisanship and conspiracy groups as conduits for cross-national misinformation flow deserves further investigation.

Second, our findings reemphasize that an IP address is not a reliable criterion for attributing foreign intervention.  Previous studies on Chinese cyber armies show that they use a VPN for their activities on Twitter (now X) (Wang et al., 2020) and Facebook (Frenkel, 2023). Commonly known as the Reddit of Taiwan, PTT is a public forum in Taiwan that by default contains the IP address of the poster. Our analysis of PTT located a group of accounts with US IP addresses that have the same activity pattern as other Taiwan-based accounts. Therefore, it is likely that these accounts use VPN to hide their geolocation. Our results provide additional evidence that this VPN strategy also appears on secondary and localized social media platforms. Our results suggest that the analysis of the originating location of misinformation should not be based entirely on IP addresses.

Third, our findings show that text is far from the only format used in the spread of misinformation. A considerable amount of misinformation identified on Facebook is spread through links (47%), videos (21%), and photos (15%). These items may echo each other’s content or even feature cross-platform flow. Proper tools are needed to extract and juxtapose content from different types of media so that researchers can have a holistic analysis of the spread and development of misinformation (Tucker et al., 2018). Such tools are urgent since mainstream social media has adopted and highly encouraged short videos—a crucial area for researchers to assess how misinformation spreads across platforms in the upcoming year of elections. This understanding is also important for fact-check agencies because they must prepare for collecting and reviewing information on various topics found in multiple media types across platforms. Crowdsourcing, data science, expert inputs, and international collaboration are all needed to deal with multi-format misinformation environments.

With prior studies showing that the aggregated fact checks (known as wisdom of the crowds) perform on par with expert ratings (see Arechar et al., 2023; Martel et al., 2023), our case study also evidences how crowdsourcing and LLM approaches can not only quickly fact-check but also summarize larger narrative trends. In Taiwan, this takes form of the CoFacts open dataset, which we use to identify misinformation narratives. CoFacts is a project initiated by g0v (pronounced “gov zero”), a civic hacktivism community in Taiwan that started in 2012. CoFacts started as a fact-checking ChatBot that circumvents the closed nature of chatroom apps, where users can forward suspicious messages or integrate the ChatBot into private rooms. These narratives are then sent to a database. Individual narratives are subsequently reviewed by more than 2,000 volunteers, including teachers, doctors, students, engineers, and retirees (Haime, 2022). As a citizen-initiated project, it is not affiliated with any government entity or party.

Crucially, these reviews provide valuable labels that are used to train AI models and fine-tune LLMs. The dataset is available open source on the popular deep-learning platform HuggingFace. Just as AI and automation can be used to spread misinformation (Chang, 2023; Chang & Ferrara, 2022; Ferrara et al., 2020; Monaco & Woolley, 2022), it can also help combat “fake news” through human-AI collaboration.

Finding 1: The primary form of misinformation  is narratives that attack international relations with the United States (henceforth referred to as US-skepticism), specifically referencing the economy, health policy, the threat of war through Ukraine, and other U.S. domestic issues.

The status quo between China and Taiwan is marked by Taiwan’s self-identification as a sovereign state, which is in contrast to China’s view of Taiwan as part of its territory under the “One China” policy. As brief context, China has claimed Taiwan as its territory since 1949, but the United States has helped maintain the status quo and peace after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. After democratization in 1987, Taiwan’s politics have been dominated by a clear blue-green division. The blue camp is led by Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, KMT hereafter), the founding party of the Republic of China (ROC, the formal name of Taiwan’s government based on its constitution) who was defeated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. The green camp is led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which pursues revising the ROC Constitution and changing the country’s name to Taiwan. The political cleavage between the blue and green camps is dictated by Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC and the United States. The blue camp’s position is that the PRC and ROC are under civil war but belong to the same Chinese nation, and thus the blue camp appreciates military support from the United States while enhancing economic and cultural cooperation with the PRC. The green camp believes that the necessary conditions for Taiwan to be free and independent are to stand firmly with the United States and maintain distance from the PRC. After 2020, the two major camps’ insufficient attention to domestic and social issues caused the rise of nonpartisans and a third party, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP or the white camp), which strategically avoids discussing foreign policies. In the 2024 election, the ruling DPP party (green) was reelected with 40% of votes for the third consecutive presidency (from 2016 to 2028), while KMT (blue) and TPP (white) received 33% and 26% of votes, respectively.

The U.S. “One China” policy since 1979 indicates that the United States opposes any change to the status quo unless it is solved peacefully. This has motivated the PRC to persuade Taiwanese citizens to support unification using misinformation targeted at China-friendly political groups, as the cost of unification would be greatly reduced if sufficient Taiwanese citizens opposed U.S. military intervention. This history between the United States and Taiwan serves as the foundation of US-skepticism. In the literature, US-skepticism in Taiwan is composed of two key psychological elements: trust and motivation (Wu & Lin, 2019; Wu, 2023). First, many Taiwanese no longer trust the United States after the United States switched diplomatic ties from Taiwan (ROC) to the PRC in 1979. Many blue-camp supporters doubt the commitment of the United States to send troops should China invade, per the Taiwan Relations Act (Wu & Lin, 2019). Second, Taiwanese citizens question Taiwan’s role as a proxy in a potential war with China instead of sincerely protecting democracy and human rights in Taiwan (Wu, 2023).

The CoFacts dataset contains 140,314 articles submitted by Line users, which are then fact-checked by volunteers as rumor (47%), not a rumor (21%), not an article (19%), and opinion (13%). Here, rumor is synonymous with misinformation. Using the CoFacts dataset, we trained a BERTopic model to identify 34 forms of misinformation and then ranked them by their overlap with the word “elections” in Mandarin Chinese (George & Sumathy, 2023; Nguyen et al., 2020). Table 1 shows the top nine narratives.

Many of these narratives are directly related to political parties or the democratic process. For instance, the highest-ranked topic is attacking the incumbent party (the DPP) at 18.1%, which contains 2,371 total posts. The subsequent misinformation topics focus on policy issues and specific narratives—international relations, issues of marriage and birth rate, vaccines, nuclear energy, biometrics, egg imports, and the war in Ukraine. These are known cleavage issues and overlap with the eight central concerns during the election cycle—economic prosperity, cross-strait affairs, wealth distribution, political corruption, national security, social reform/stability, and environmental protection (Achen & Wang, 2017; Achen & Wang, 2019; Chang & Fang, 2023).

We focus on the third type of misinformation, which is the relationship between Taiwan, the United States, and China. US-skepticism is not only the largest at 10,826 individual posts, but one flagged by journalists, policymakers, and politicians as one of the most crucial themes. This is a relatively new phenomenon in terms of proportion, which aims to sow distrust toward the United States (“China is flooding Taiwan with disinformation,” 2023). In contrast, questioning the fairness of process (i.e. ballot numbers) and policy positions (i.e. gay marriage) are common during elections. However, US-skeptical misinformation diverges in that there is no explicit political candidate or party targeted. By sampling the topic articles within this category and validating using an LLM-summarizer through the ChatGPT API, we identified three specific narratives:

(a) The United States and the threat of war: Ukraine intersects frequently in this topic, with videos of direct military actions. Example: “Did you hear former USA military strategist Jack Keane say the Ukrainian war is an investment. The USA spends just $66,000,000,000 and can make Ukraine and Russia fight…  Keane then mentions Taiwan is the same, where Taiwanese citizens are an ‘investment’ for Americans to fight a cheap war. The USA is cold and calculating, without any actual intent to help Taiwan!”

(b) Economic atrophy due to fiscal actions by the United States: These narratives focus on domestic policy issues in Taiwan such as minimum wage and housing costs. Example: “The USA printed 4 trillion dollars and bought stocks everywhere in the world, including Taiwan, and caused inflation and depressed wages. Be prepared!”

(c) Vaccine supply and the United States: While some narratives focus on the efficacy of vaccines, several describe the United States intentionally limiting supply during the pandemic. Example: “Taiwanese Dr. Lin is a leading scientist at Moderna, yet sells domestically at $39 per two doses, $50 to Israel. Taiwan must bid at least $60! The United States clearly does not value Taiwan.”

These narratives reveal a new element to US-skepticism: state capacity. As previously mentioned, state capacity is defined as whether a state is capable of mobilizing its resources to realize its goal. The Ukraine war and vaccine supply narratives both question the United States’ motivations in foreign policies and perceived trustworthiness. Meanwhile, the economic atrophy narrative is based on the United States’ domestic budgetary deficit and downstream impact on Taiwanese economy. These narratives frame U.S. state capacity as declining and imply that the United States could no longer realize any other commitment due to its lack of resources and capacity. The goal of such a narrative is to lower the Taiwanese audience’s belief that the United States will help. But such a narrative does not include keywords of its target group (e.g., Taiwan) nor the PCR’s goal (e.g., unification) and only works through framing and priming as an example of sharp power. 

The specific focus of misinformation narratives related to the United States is composed of Ukraine (28.8%), the economy and fiscal policies (33.1%), technology (25.2%), and vaccine supply (9.9%). Misinformation related to state capacity takes up approximately 52.4%, more than half of all narratives (see Figure A1, part a in the Appendix). In all narratives, political parties are only referenced 27.8% of the time with the DPP the primary target (26.2%), which is almost half of the proportion for state capacity. China is only mentioned in tandem with the United States in 38.4% of the posts (see Figure A1, part b in the Appendix).

Finding 2: Temporal and spatial evidence suggests VPN-based coordination, focused on U.S. issues and addresses.

Once we identified the top misinformation narratives using Line, we investigated information operations or coordination. Line is one of Taiwan’s most popular communication apps featuring chatrooms (similar to WhatsApp), with 83% usage. One limitation of Line is that although we can analyze message content, Line chatrooms can be seen as conversations behind “closed doors”—platforms cannot impose content moderation and researchers have no access to the users themselves nor to the private chatroom in which users engage with misinformation (Chang et al., 2020). PTT, on the other hand, provides a public forum-like environment in which users can interact. Figure 1 shows the co-occurrence network of users who post comments under the same forum. Each circle (node) represents a user who posts on PTT. If two users make mutual comments on more than 200 posts, then they are connected (form a tie). Intuitively, this means if two users are connected or “close” to each other by mutual connections, then they are likely coordinating or have extremely similar behaviors. The placement of the users reflects this and is determined by their connections.

Using the Louvain algorithm (Traag, 2015), a common method to identify communities on social networks, five communities emerged from our dataset. Each community is colored separately, with clear clusters, except for teal which is more integrated. In particular, the yellow cluster is significantly separate from the others. This means they share significant activity amongst their own community, but less so with other communities. This suggests premeditated coordination rather than organic discussion, as the users would have to target the same post with high frequency. Prior studies have shown analyzing temporal patterns can provide insight into information operations. Specifically, overseas content farms often follow a regular cadence, posting content before peak hours in Taiwan on Twitter (Wang et al., 2020) and YouTube (Hsu & Lin, 2023).

To better understand the temporal dynamics on PTT, we plotted the distribution of posts and comments over a 24-hour period. Specifically, we focused on the top two countries by volume—Taiwan and the United States. Figure 2, part a shows the time of posting. Taiwan’s activity increases from 6 in the morning until it peaks at noon (when people are on lunch break), then steadily declines into the night. In contrast, posts from the United States peak at midnight and 8 a.m. Taipei time, which corresponds to around noon and 8 p.m. in New York, respectively. This provides an organic baseline as to when we might expect people to post.

However, in Figure 2, part b, while the distribution for Taiwan (blue) remains unchanged, the peak for the United States (orange) occurs at the same time as Taiwan. One explanation is that users are responding to posts in Taiwan. The second is that users in Asia—potentially China—are using a VPN to appear as if they are in the United States. This coincides with a report by Meta Platforms that found large numbers of CCP-operated Facebook accounts and subsequently removed them (Frenkel, 2023).

The more curious issue is when considering the activity of the yellow group from Figure 1, the temporal pattern (green) shows a sharp increase in activity at 10 a.m., which then coincides with both the peaks for Taiwan (12) and the United States (22). The sudden burst of activity is consistent with prior findings on content farms from China, where posting behavior occurs when content farm workers clock in regularly for work (Wang et al., 2020). While it is difficult to prove the authenticity of these accounts, the structural and temporal aspects suggest coordination. Figure A2 in the appendix shows further evidence of coordination through the frequency distribution of counts for co-occurring posts. For the US-based group, a distribution akin to a power law appears, commonly found within social systems (Adamic & Huberman, 2000; Chang et al., 2023; Clauset et al., 2009). In contrast, the coordinated group features a significantly heavier tail, with a secondary, “unnatural,” peak at around 15 co-occurrences.

To better understand the content of these groups, Table A1 shows the summary of comments of each group and the originating post, using a large-language model for abstractive summarization (see Methods). We report the top points for comments and posts in Table A1. The coordinated community focuses on businessman Terry Gou, who considered running as a blue-leaning independent. The comments attack the incumbent DPP and their stance toward foreign policy. One popular post features President Tsai’s controversial meeting with Kevin McCarthy, then the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. When a journalist asked McCarthy if he would “invite President Tsai to Congress… or… Washington,” McCarthy replied, “I don’t have any invitation out there right now. Today we were able to meet her as she transits through America, I thought that was very productive.” While this was positively framed, the title of the post itself was translated as “McCarthy will not invite Tsai to the United States” (Doomdied, 2023). This takes on a common tactic in misinformation where statements are intentionally distorted to produce negative framings of a particular candidate.

Comments from U.S. IP addresses between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m. focus on the potential alliance between the KMT and TPP. These posts are KMT-leaning with criticism toward both Lai and Ko, who are two oppositional candidates to the KMT. Some users argue that while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a negative force, the United States is not automatically a positive force, as the United States does not explicitly support Taiwan’s international recognition or economic integration. In general, both posts and comments express that Taiwan should not rely too heavily on either China or the United States. This echoes the element of trust in the US-skepticism from the historical experience between ROC and the United States.

Both the U.S.-based and coordinated groups appear as blue-leaning audiences. What differentiates the first and second case is clear evidence of misinformation in the former through inaccurate framing. While US-skepticism may be a valid political stance, if the ambient information environment contains inaccurate information, then the democratic deliberative process is at risk. The case of US-skepticism is also one where stance and truth-value are often conflated, which may influence the process of voter deliberation.

Finding 3: Misinformation is most common among pan-Blue and ROC identity groups on social media and is spread through visual media. These groups share themes with conspiracy groups in Western countries.

Lastly, we considered the groups in which misinformation is common and the way misinformation is delivered. To do so, we queried CrowdTangle using the titles and links from the CoFacts dataset specific to US-Taiwan relations. This yielded 4,632 posts from public groups. Table 2 shows the groups ranked by the total number of misinformation articles identified.

There are two themes to these groups. First, they are often pan-Blue media outlets ( CTI News ), politician support groups ( Wang Yo-Zeng Support Group ), and ROC national identity groups ( I’m an ROC Fan ). The second type is somewhat unexpected but extremely interesting; it consists of groups that espouse freedom of speech ( Support CTI News and Free Speech ) and truth-seeking ( Truth Engineering Taiwan Graduate School ), topics often regarded as conspiracies. These topics are reminiscent of those in the West, such as the rhetoric around “fake news” and “truthers,” and paint a transnational picture of how misinformation coalesces. The second largest group is Trump for the World , which supports a politician known to court conspiracy theory groups such as QAnon. These groups also serve as the “capacity” element of US-skepticism, implying that the United States is in trouble for its domestic issues and is not a reliable partner to Taiwan. Furthermore, these groups have sizable followings—ranging from 8,279 to 43,481. We show the mean, as the total number of members fluctuated over our one-year period.

Lastly, we found that the majority of misinformation contains some form of multimedia, such as video (36%) or photos (15%), as shown in Figure 3, part a. Only 1% is a direct status. This may be due to CrowdTangle not surfacing results from normal users, but the ratio of multimedia to text is quite high. This aligns with extant studies showing the growth of multimodal misinformation (Micallef et al., 2022) and also user behavior in algorithm optimization (Chang et al., 2022; Dhanesh et al., 2022; Pulley, 2020)—posts with multimedia tend to do better than posts with only text.

Moreover, 47% contain a URL. Figure 3, part b shows one of the top domains containing misinformation (beyondnews852.com) after filtering out common domains such as YouTube. The site is named “Beyond News Net” and is visually formatted like a legitimate news site to increase the perceived credibility of information (Flanagin & Metzger, 2007; Wölker & Powell, 2021). The ability to rapidly generate legitimate-looking news sites as a tactic for misinformation may become a challenge for both media literacy and technical approaches to fight misinformation.

We utilized three unique misinformation datasets—Line, Facebook, and PTT—with dates between 01/12/2023 and 11/10/2023. The CoFacts dataset includes 140,193 received messages, 96,432 that have been labeled as misinformation, facts, opinion, or not relevant. Of this, 41,564 entries are misinformation. The CoFacts dataset is not only methodologically useful but exemplifies a crowd-sourced approach to fact-checking misinformation as an actual platform intervention. Moreover, it is public and transparent, allowing for replicability. Using a subset of articles and posts containing misinformation, we trained a topic model using BERTopic (Grootendorst, 2022). On a high level, using BERTopic involves five steps: 1) extract embeddings using a sentence transformer, 2) reduce dimensionality, 3) cluster reduced embeddings, 4) tokenize topics, and 5) create topic representation.

We conducted several trials, experimenting with parameters such as different sentence transformer models and minimum cluster sizes for the HDBSCAN clustering algorithm. The model used to extract topics for this paper utilized paraphrase-multilingual-MiniLM-L12-v2 for our sentence embedding model (Reimers & Gurevych, 2019), had a minimum cluster size of 80 for the clustering algorithm, and used tokenize_zh for our tokenizer. Our model yielded 34 topics. We also trained a model based on latent-Dirichlet allocation (LDA) (Blei et al., 2003), but found the BERTopic results to be more interpretable. We then labeled all messages to indicate whether they included reference to the election or not, and ranked the topics by their election-related percentage to measure electoral salience. For our subsequent analysis, we focused on topic 3 (see Table 1), which captures general discourse about the relations between the United States, China, and Taiwan.

The Facebook dataset was extracted using CrowdTangle. We queried posts containing links and headlines from topic 3. We also cross-sectioned these links and headlines with a general election-based dataset with 911,510 posts. This yielded a total of 4,632 of posts shared on public Facebook groups and 227,125 engagements. Due to privacy concerns, it is not possible to obtain private posts from users on their own Facebook timelines, private groups, or messages. However, public groups are a good proxy for general discourse, in addition to providing ethnic or partisan affiliations via their group name (Chang & Fang, 2023). In other words, while CoFacts provides the misinformation narratives, Facebook public groups give insight into the targets of misinformation.

Lastly, we scraped PTT using Selenium. Commonly known as the Reddit of Taiwan, PTT is unique in that it contains the IP address of the poster, though this could be shrouded by proxy farms or VPNs. First, we scraped all posts that contained reference to the United States and the election, which yielded 22,576 posts and 1,983,396 comments, all with IP addresses, addresses provided by PTT, and the time of posting. We expanded the scope of this analysis as we were interested in the general discourse directly related to the United States, and the geospatial and temporal patterns that arose. 

Due to the large amount of data, there are three general approaches we could have taken—local extractive summarization with LLMs, local abstractive summarization with LLMs, and server-based abstractive summarization (such as ChatGPT). Local extractive summarization is a method that embeds each of the input sentences and then outputs five of the most representative sentences. However, this approach is often too coarse, as it returns sentences with the highest centrality but does not summarize general themes across all the different comments or posts. On the other hand, abstractive summarization works by considering the entire context by ingesting many documents and then summarizing across them. This provides a more generalized characterization of key themes. However, the input size is the primary bottleneck as large-language models can only ingest so many tokens (or words), which also need to be held in memory—the case for our project, as we are summarizing more than 10,000 posts.

To circumvent these issues, we sampled the maximum number of posts or comments that could fit within 16,000 tokens and then made a query call using the ChatGPT API. This provided a summary based on a probabilistic sample of the posts and comments.

• / Elections

Cite this Essay

Chang, H. C. H., Wang, A. H. E., & Fang Y. S. (2024). US-skepticism and transnational conspiracy in the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election. Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review . https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-144

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No funding has been received to conduct this research.

Competing Interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

No human subjects were included in this study.

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that the original author and source are properly credited.

Data Availability

All materials needed to replicate this study are available via the Harvard Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/5SPGDY . The Cofacts database is available on HuggingFace and Facebook via CrowdTangle per regulation of Meta Platforms.

Acknowledgements

H. C. would like to thank Brendan Nyhan, Sharanya Majumder, John Carey, and Adrian Rauschfleish for their comments. H.C. would like to thank the Dartmouth Burke Research Initiation Award.

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Senators urge $32 billion in emergency spending on AI after finishing yearlong review

Alphabet CEO Sundar Pichai speaks at a Google I/O event in Mountain View, Calif., Tuesday, May 14, 2024. (AP Photo/Jeff Chiu)

FILE - OpenAI’s ChatGPT app is displayed on an iPhone in New York, May 18, 2023. The rate of businesses in the U.S. using AI is still relatively small but growing rapidly, with firms in information technology and professional services, and in locations like Colorado and the District of Columbia, leading the way, according to a new paper from U.S. Census Bureau researchers. (AP Photo/Richard Drew, File)

Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella speaks during a conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Thursday, May 2, 2024. Microsoft will invest $2.2 billion over the next four years in Malaysia’s new cloud and artificial intelligence infrastructure as well as partnering with the government to establish a national AI center, Nadella said Thursday. (AP Photo/Vincent Thian)

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WASHINGTON (AP) — A bipartisan group of four senators led by Majority Leader Chuck Schumer is recommending that Congress spend at least $32 billion over the next three years to develop artificial intelligence and place safeguards around it, writing in a report released Wednesday that the U.S. needs to “harness the opportunities and address the risks” of the quickly developing technology.

The group of two Democrats and two Republicans said in an interview Tuesday that while they sometimes disagreed on the best paths forward, they felt it was imperative to find consensus with the technology taking off and other countries like China investing heavily in its development. They settled on a raft of broad policy recommendations that were included in their 33-page report.

While any legislation related to AI will be difficult to pass, especially in an election year and in a divided Congress, the senators said that regulation and incentives for innovation are urgently needed.

“It’s complicated, it’s difficult, but we can’t afford to put our head in the sand,” said Schumer, D-N.Y., who convened the group last year after AI chatbot ChatGPT entered the marketplace and showed that it could in many ways mimic human behavior.

The group recommends in the report that Congress draft emergency spending legislation to boost U.S. investments in artificial intelligence, including new research and development and new testing standards to try to understand the potential harms of the technology. The group also recommended new requirements for transparency as artificial intelligence products are rolled out and that studies be conducted into the potential impact of AI on jobs and the U.S. workforce .

Republican Sen. Mike Rounds, a member of the group, said the money would be well spent not only to compete with other countries who are racing into the AI space but also to improve Americans’ quality of life — supporting technology that could help cure some cancers or chronic illnesses, he said, or improvements in weapons systems could help the country avoid a war.

“This is a time in which the dollars we put into this particular investment will pay dividends for the taxpayers of this country long term,” he said.

The group came together a year ago after Schumer made the issue a priority — an unusual posture for a majority leader — and brought in Democratic Sen. Martin Heinrich of New Mexico, Republican Sen. Todd Young of Indiana and Rounds of South Dakota.

As the four senators began meeting with tech executives and experts, Schumer said in a speech over the summer that the rapid growth of artificial intelligence tools was a “moment of revolution” and that the government must act quickly to regulate companies that are developing it.

Young said the development of ChatGPT, along with other similar models, made them realize that “we’re going to have to figure out collectively as an institution” how to deal with the technology.

“In the same breath that people marveled at the possibilities of just that one generative AI platform, they began to hypothesize about future risks that might be associated with future developments of artificial intelligence,” Young said.

While passing legislation will be tough, the group’s recommendations lay out the first comprehensive road map on an issue that is complex and has little precedent for consideration in Congress. The group spent almost a year compiling the list of policy suggestions after talking privately and publicly to a range of technology companies and other stakeholders, including in eight forums to which the entire Senate was invited.

The first forum in September included X owner and Tesla CEO Elon Musk, Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg, former Microsoft CEO Bill Gates and Google CEO Sundar Pichai.

Schumer said after the private meeting that he had asked everyone in the room — including almost two dozen tech executives, advocates and skeptics — whether government should have a role in the oversight of artificial intelligence, and “every single person raised their hand.”

Still, there are diverse views in the tech industry about the future of AI. Musk has voiced dire concerns evoking popular science fiction about the possibility of humanity losing control to advanced AI systems if the right safeguards are not in place. Others are more concerned about the details of how proposed regulations could affect their business, from possible government oversight over the most capable AI systems to tracking of highly sought-after AI computer chips for national security.

The four senators are pitching their recommendations to Senate committees, which are then tasked with reviewing them and trying to figure out what is possible. The Senate Rules Committee is already moving forward with legislation, on Wednesday approving three bills that would ban deceptive AI content used to influence federal elections, require AI disclaimers on political ads and create voluntary guidelines for state election offices that oversee candidates.

Schumer, who controls the Senate’s schedule, said those election bills were among the chamber’s “highest priorities” this year. He also said he planned to sit down with House Speaker Mike Johnson, who has expressed interest in looking at AI policy but has not said how he would do that.

Still, winning enough votes on the legislation may be not be easy. The bills that would ban deceptive AI election content and require AI disclaimers on political ads were approved by the Rules panel on party line votes, with no GOP support. Republicans argued that the legislation would usurp states that are already acting on the issue and potentially violate political candidates’ rights to free speech.

Senate Rules Committee Chairwoman Amy Klobuchar, a Democrat from Minnesota, said that the rapid development of AI is a “hair on fire” moment for elections. And while states may be passing similar bills, she said the country is “unguarded on the federal level.”

Some experts warn that the U.S. is behind many other countries on the issue, including the EU which took the lead in March when they gave final approval to a sweeping new law governing artificial intelligence in the 27-nation bloc. Europe’s AI Act sets tighter rules for the AI products and services deemed to pose the highest risks, such as in medicine, critical infrastructure or policing. But it also includes provisions regulating the new class of generative AI systems like ChatGPT that have rapidly advanced in recent years.

“It’s time for Congress to act,” said Alexandra Reeve Givens, CEO of the Center for Democracy & Technology. “It’s not enough to focus on investment and innovation. We need guardrails to ensure the responsible development of AI.”

Others said the senators’ road map wasn’t tough enough on tech companies. Some groups calling for tighter AI safeguards and civil rights protections said it showed too much deference to industry priorities.

Alix Dunn is a senior adviser at AI Now, a policy research center that pushes for more accountability around AI technology. She criticized the closed door sessions with tech CEOs. “I don’t see how it got us even an inch closer to meaningful government action on AI,” she said.

The senators emphasized balance between innovation and safeguards, and also the urgency of action.

“We have the lead at this moment in time on this issue, and it will define the relationship between the United States and our allies and other competing powers in the world for a long time to come,” Heinrich said.

O’Brien reported from Providence, R.I. Associated Press writer Dan Merica in Washington contributed to this report.