german foreign policy essay

Hitler’s Foreign Policy and the Third Reich: 1936-1939

‘From 1936 to 1939 the Third Reich consistently yet flexibly pursued Hitler’s systematic foreign policy.’ Discuss.

The statement that from 1936 to 1939 the Third Reich consistently yet flexibly pursued Hitler’s systematic foreign policy points out the relationship between the Fuehrer and the Third Reich and suggests how Hitler’s plans in the making of foreign policy were translated into action. Given that during the period 1936-39 Nazi Germany experienced diplomatic gains and that Hitler was perceived as ‘the bearer of the people’s will’ [1] it is plausible to assert that Germany’s successes on the road to war were driven by Hitler’s aims and motives in the sphere of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the statement in question in fact concerns more than one aspect of the history of the Third Reich and an evaluation of Hitler’s power as the maker of German foreign policy from 1936 to 1939 portrays some of the most controversial debates on the Nazi history. To assess the validity of the statement in question Hitler’s power over the Third Reich, the existence of his so-called blueprints for the Reich and the consistency and flexibility of Nazi Germany’s foreign policy must be contemplated. In this vein, a synthesis across the issues can be made [2] and hence the proposed claim may be true in one sense but not in another.

Firstly, Hitler’s power over the Third Reich can be evaluated via the investigation into the political structure of Nazi Germany during the period concerned. Power in this sense is defined as the ability to exert influence over the making of policy and to translate ideas into practice. Power is, thus, by no means a static term. At one extreme end, the diary by Lord Mayor of Hamburg after a conversation with Lammers the head of the Reich Chancellery in 1937 about the nomination of personnel [3] is a piece of personal, direct evidence for Master in the Reich or weak dictator discussion. A ‘large cabinet’ implies the Nazi regime was polycratic and Hitler’s hoping ‘the question of the personnel would solve itself’ shows fragmentation of the authority beneath Hitler. This highlights Hitler’s reduced power to dictate agenda because such disintegration arguably allowed some to influence the agenda setting. As such it is perhaps inaccurate to suggest that the Third Reich pursued Hitler’s foreign policy when it is possible that foreign policy might have been conducted by the Nazis in the upper echelon rather than Hitler alone. Consistent with this view is that evidence on Hitler’s ‘artistic temperament’ [4] is suggestive of Hitler’s being a lazy ruler and hence master only in theory. In practice policy might have emerged out of chaos and confusion in the system as ‘ad hoc responses’ [5] to circumstances rather than directly from Hitler. Even if not so, it is still hard to see how an individual was able to control decisions in every aspect concerning foreign policy. Hitler’s personification of the nation was perhaps used by his subordinates as propaganda to further their own initiatives. Hitler’s emphasis on the racial struggle was exploited by Himmler to justify his organisation of the Death’s Head Units in 1937 [6] . The Fuehrer, therefore, was probably largely dependent on his subordinates on making foreign policy.

On the other hand, the arguments ignore the relationship between Hitler and the people, Hitler and the Party and the link between the two relationships which had come into play before the period in question. Ever since 1933 Hitler’s myth as standing aloof of self-interest but on behalf of the whole Germany was reinforced by Goebbels’ propaganda machinery and intimidation by the secret police and the use of terror and force. Although it is problematic to assess public opinion during the Nazi regime because people were not allowed to express their views freely, Hitler’s success of combining the Presidency and the Chancellery within a year of his becoming Chancellor reflected a level of nationwide consent. Hitler was able to and did abolish the framework created by the conservative elites to ensure that he would pursue their foreign policy direction [7] . In fact he began to override the conservatives by assuming authority in taking major decisions in the sphere of foreign policy since 1933 and increasingly became the ‘latter-day Bismarck’ [8] . This created power dynamism for Hitler to extend the conventional expansionist demands [9] to acquire Lebensraum to remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936. The event was arguably the decisive turning point in European international relations in the period 1933-39 because not only was Hitler able to override the army and enhance his personal standing within Germany but it reflected Germany’s willingness and capacity to retaliate against Versailles and Locarno. This in turn enabled Hitler to order the purges of Conservatives in 1937-38 so as to introduce the new phase of foreign policy dimension via establishing enhanced patronage over new positions replacing the old ones. Most important of this was Schacht’s resignation in 1937 after his clashes with Goering over economic issues. The link between Hitler’s authority over his Party as the autocrat of the NSDAP [10] and that over the people was developed since individuals attempted to outdo each other to gain Hitler’s favour by translating his will into actions under the Fuehrerprinzip and Social Darwinism . The ‘witches’ cauldron’ [11] became the divide and rule strategy which furthered Hitler’s supremacy as the final decision maker.

Nevertheless, the extent to which Hitler was in a strong position to formulate foreign policy may be undermined by the view that his power was constrained by domestic matters. The Four-Year Plan of 1936 and the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937 were perhaps shaped by domestic economic and military issues. In this regard, the Third Reich in its broadest sense pre-dominated Hitler’s decision making and not vice versa. Hitler’s underlining that the degree of the military rearmament could not be too large [12] showed that he had no complete control over the pace of rearmament. His concern over living space and the subsequent need to overthrow Czecholovakia and Austria for iron and grain highlighted how his foreign policy was shaped by Germany’s internal factors. It is conceivable to point out the rearmament programme and autarky as responses to the Depression of 1930s and as preconditions for Hitler’s expansionist goals [13] . Yet there is little doubt that Marxist historians would argue for the supremacy of economic factors over foreign policy because to them history is shaped by economic superstructure. It is, however, arguable that the German economy was not in such a crisis that Hitler had to gear it to war. The Hossbach Memorandum refers to 1942-43 as the years when Germany would be ready for war. Had economic issues been significantly dominant, the decision for a European war would have been taken in mid 1940s. International context, hence, was far more decisive in the decision for war in 1939. Overall, Hitler’s directives were implemented on the grounds of internal dynamism within Germany and in turn foreign policy goals shaped the nature and objectives of domestic policy [14] .

This relates back to the statement in question. It is open to discussion whether Hitler had systematic foreign policy. His aims and motives were initially reflected in his Mein Kampf and Hitlers Zweite Buch, some of which represented a diversion from the past and the elites’ goals. The problem here is to define Hitler’s ‘systematic foreign policy’. In its strictest sense, it can refer to Hitler’s blueprint for German expansionism, be it continental or global but in its broader term it refers to Hitler’s taking decision stage-by-stage to materialise his foreign policy objectives. To some extent, the proposal is valid. As the personification of the nation’s will, Hitler took the Third Reich beyond traditional revisionism of the Treaty of Versailles into the racial-power politics whereby anti-Semitism was radicalised to make Germany greater not in terms of power politics but also in terms of racial superiority. In this aspect, the Fuehrerprinzip brought Hitler’s subordinates to attempt to establish the regime of racial purity with the strength of arms and national rebirth in the continent [15] . This was concretised in the event of the Anschluss of 1938 before Hitler moved on to focus on Czechoslovakia.

However, it is much more plausible to see the chain of events between 1936 and 1939 as more arbitrary and ad hoc rather than systematic. It is undeniable that Hitler had fixed bearing towards achieving his goals in making foreign policy but this does not mean he had a clear outline or timed schedule for it. In fact the proposed claim in the question that the Third Reich ‘consistently yet flexibly’ pursued Hitler’s foreign policy exposes the fact that Hitler had no clear measures of how to achieve his objectives. Rather, Hitler was able to conduct the direction, or framework, of Nazi Germany’s foreign policy but at the same time exploited opportunities granted by international circumstances to precipitate what he had in mind. In the case of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the event was made possible partly because Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia diverted international attention away from Germany’s rearmament. Paul Schmidt’s writing in 1949 [16] that Hitler was nervous after the remilitarisation of the Rhineland due to Germany’s inadequate resources should a war break out. This means Hitler took a ‘wild gamble’ or, in other words, exercised brinkmanship by escalating the possibility of war with the West via his diplomatic coup.

The Czech crisis of 1938 and the Munich Agreement in that September resulted from his triumph over the Anschluss which led to the encirclement of western Czechoslovakia and economic advantages for the Reich. Hitler’s diplomatic successes during these years considerably served to enhance his authority within Nazi Germany. This can be shown by contemplating resistance and opposition against the Nazis. The year 1938 was marked by the emergence of conservative resistance against Hitler which followed the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis whereby Hitler was able to retain his supremacy over Blomberg and Fritsch. Such conservative resistance culminated into General Beck’s bomb plot in the same year but as it turned out Hitler’s diplomatic gains over the period deterred the planned assassination of the Fuehrer.

Perhaps the flexibility of Hitler’s methods in achieving his objectives was most clearly shown by the making of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939. Before the Czech crisis the alliance between Soviet Union and Nazi Germany was rather unforeseen and regarded as improbable. Yet when Soviet Union was excluded from the decision-making process in Munich, Stalin’s regime was also alienated against Britain and France. This opened up opportunities for Hitler to exploit in order to acquire Poland via the additional secret clause. Consequently the confidence of his position in Europe amid Britain and France’s policy of appeasement during the 1930s prompted Hitler to order Germany to attack Poland in September 1939. As such, if Hitler had any plan in the making of foreign policy it would rather be shaped by international context than ruthlessly designed beforehand according to his will. Rauschning’s explanation of Hitler’s tactics in foreign affairs, further, leads to another interpretation that Hitler was indeed ‘a master tactician with a daemon’ [17] . It can, thus, be argued that Hitler’s re-active approach might have been done to create the consequences he desired and the flexibility of his short-term approach suggests that the Fuehrer kept his options open ‘to the very last moment’ [18] .

In the final analysis, at one end of spectrum Hitler possessed unrestricted power in Germany which was the spring board for his exercising of excessive power in the formulation of German foreign policy. Nonetheless, it is over-simplistic to deduce that the Third Reich from 1936 to 1939 consistently yet flexibly pursued Hitler’s foreign policy simply because Hitler was the personification of the nation. The consistency of the foreign policy of the Third Reich undeniably was derived from Hitler having fixed bearing and broad aims in foreign affairs. On the other hand the flexibility of the methods of achieving foreign policy aims were considerably attributed to international context rather than Hitler alone. Further, the validity of the statement in question can be undermined since Hitler’s foreign policy was more opportunistic than systematic. The Fuehrer had the framework of and direction for foreign policy but it was his strategy of exploiting the opportunities placed before him that led to the Third Reich’s diplomatic successes during the period 1936-39.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

John Hite and Chris Hinton , Weimar & Nazi Germany , (John Murray, 2000).

John Laver , Nazi Germany 1933-1945 , (Hodder & Stoughton, 2004).

J. Noakes and G. Pridham , Nazism 1919-1945 , A Documentary Reader Volume 2: State, Economy and Society 1933-1939, (University of Exeter Press, 1997).

J. Noakes and G. Pridham , Nazism 1919-1945 , A Documentary Reader Volume 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination, (University of Exeter Press, 1991).

Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle , The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: an Anthology of Texts , (Routledge, 2002).

Albert Speer , Inside the Third Reich , (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970).

Secondary Sources

P. M. H. Bell , The Origins of the Second World War in Europe , (Longman, 1986).

Klaus Hildebrand , The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich , (Batsfold Ltd, 1973).

Ian Kershaw , Hitler 1936-45: Nemesis , (Penguin Books, 2000).

Ian Kershaw , The Nazi Dictatorship , (Arnold, 1993).

G. Martel , Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered , (Routledge, 1992).

Robertson ,  The Origins of the Second World War , (Macmillan, 1971).

[1] Ernst Huber’s theory in 1935, cited in John Hite and Chris Hinton, Weimar & Nazi Germany , (John Murray, 2000), p.184.

[2] Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship , (Arnold, 1993), p.115.

[3] Cited in J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945 , A Documentary Reader, (University of Exeter Press, 1997), Volume 2, p.206.

[4] Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich , (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p.131.

[5] J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945 , A Documentary Reader, (University of Exeter Press, 1997), Volume 2, p.206.

[6] Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle, The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: an Anthology of Texts , (Routledge, 2002), p.205.

[7] Letter from Bernhard von Bulow to Herbert von Dirksen, the German ambassador to the Soviet Union, on 6 February 1933 cited in J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, A Documentary Reader , (University of Exeter Press, 1991), Volume 3, p.652.

[8] Wolfgang Michalka’s quotes, cited in Richard Overy, ‘Misjudging Hitler’, published in G. Martel, Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered , (Routledge, 1992),  p.93.

[9] Foreign Ministry’s Memorandum, 7 April 1933, cited in John Laver, Nazi Germany 1933-1945 , (Hodder & Stoughton, 2004), p.83.

[10] Hans Frank’s Memoirs, cited in J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945 , A Documentary Reader, (University of Exeter Press, 1997), Volume 2, p.201.

[11] Otto Dietrich, Twelve Years with Hitler , 1955, cited in John Hite and Chris Hinton, Weimar & Nazi Germany , (John Murray, 2000), p.187.

[12] Extract from the Four-Year Plan Memorandum, August 1936, cited in John Hite and Chris Hinton, Weimar & Nazi Germany , (John Murray, 2000), p.218.

[13] Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich , (Batsfold Ltd, 1973), p.27.

[14] Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship , (Arnold, 1993), p.123.

[15] Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936-45: Nemesis , (Penguin Books, 2000), p.64.

[16] Cited in John Hite and Chris Hinton, Weimar & Nazi Germany , (John Murray, 2000), p.384.

[17] Rauschning, ‘Revolution of Destruction’, cited in P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe , (Longman, 1986), p.85.

[18] Alan Bullock, Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War , cited in Robertson,  The Origins of the Second World War , (Macmillan, 1971), p.208.

Written by: Piangtawan Phanpras Written at: London School of Economics Written for: Dr Heather Jones Date written: 2008

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• Günther Maihold

Stefan Mair

• Melanie Müller
• Judith Vorrath
• Christian Wagner (Hg.)

German Foreign Policy in Transition

Volatile Conditions, New Momentum

doi:10.18449/2021RP10

The weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

The EU’s central weakness remains the lack of focus­ed detection, joint threat assessments, and proactive, forward-looking foreign policy responses to hybrid threats. Attempts have been made – and are still being made, largely unsuccessfully – to achieve more effective decision-making in the Common For­eign and Security Policy (CFSP) by extending qualified majority voting in the Council. Perhaps the most im­por­tant reason for failure is that the member states’ threat analyses and security policy scenarios diverge greatly; often they do not allow for a common inter­pretation of the situation, and therefore also no uni­form formulation of security policy. Understandably, there are major differences in threat perceptions between Italy and Sweden or between Portugal and Estonia. If each member state understands the threat landscape only against its respective national back­ground, collectively they can only agree on a mini­malist CFSP and cannot develop a coordinated ap­proach to major power conflicts. This fundamental problem is not new, but it is exacerbated by hybrid threats.

The German Council Presidency made a renewed attempt in 2020 with the “Strategic Compass” to miti­gate the existing differences between EU member states. 10 Yet, the Strategic Compass has two major short­comings. First, it seeks to develop a common European threat assessment only in selected fields and is not systematically connected to policymaking. It represents an ad hoc measure that does not trans­late the observed structural changes into an institutional reform which would go beyond another White Paper on defence. Its second shortcoming may be even more serious: The entire process is shaped by the defence ministries of EU countries, and thus it tends to be too narrow and technical when applied to diverse hybrid threats.

In order to do justice to the complexity of hybrid threats, European security policy must also protect the integrity of the democratic process (e.g. elections), further train the population in digital skills, consider and implement strategic connectivity or decoupling, analyse the vulnerabilities of supply chains (e.g. for important medicines and raw materials), and much more. It is a policy that needs to be thought through comprehensively, and it needs to be located in a place that is appropriately equipped for this purpose.

The necessary reorganisation of the EEAS as a strategic intelligence unit

The two shortcomings of the Strategic Compass can be corrected. This would require a systematic process of institutionalisation with the aim of attaining regu­lar and comprehensive threat assessments. 11 The EEAS, in particular, should be empowered to orches­trate such a continuous and EU-wide process. It should be given the competence to request intelligence from the member states and EU delegations as well as from the Commission services, and to organise Europe’s secu­rity expertise to handle the new world of hybrid threats. It is by no means sufficient for the competent authorities of the member states to provide selective information to a Council working group set up to counter hybrid threats. 12 In particular, the EU Intel­ligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) and its military counterpart in the EU Military Staff (EUMS INT) need to be upgraded as key suppliers to the EEAS – and to Council decision-making, in turn. Although EU INTCEN and EUMS INT are formally separate struc­tures from the EEAS, they have been cooperating for a long time through the civil-military network of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) of the EEAS. 13

In 2016, the Hybrid Fusion Cell (HFC) was launched within EU INTCEN. This unit represents the model for an institutionally and methodologically broad analysis of hybrid threats. 14 However, the HFC has not yet been developed into a strategic analysis unit that com­bines sensitive intelligence of the member states (finished intelligence), the thematic expertise of the Commission and various international centres of excel­lence, as well as the growing volume of open source intelligence. National authorities need to pro­actively forward analyses to the SIAC (push principle), rather than respond to EU INTCEN on demand (pull principle). An upgraded HFC should result in the regu­lar submission of an agreed number of intelligence analyses that can serve as a valid basis for deci­sion-making in the CFSP or Common Security and Defence Policy matters. The competence of the EEAS should not be limited to the military dimension of security policy – as currently provided for in the Stra­tegic Compass – but should address all relevant policy fields in line with the aspirations of the Secu­rity Union.

Germany’s contribution to the restructuring of the EEAS

Germany should launch a political initiative to strength­en the EEAS with the aim of producing regu­lar joint intelligence-led threat assessments. This is neither about creating a European intelligence service nor about undermining national constitutional prin­ciples. It is simply about the basis on which any com­mon position in the Council must be based: a com­mon understanding of the most pressing risks and threats. Only then will it be possible to decide on appropriate countermeasures. Today, it is not only Europe’s (physi­cal) borders that are being challenged, but also its internal constitution. Even countries such as France that are sceptical about the challenges posed by hybrid threats on the EU’s eastern flank are likely to recognise the European added value. Communitarising the process of threat analysis may also pro­vide new insights to large states such as Germany and France about when patterns and risks emerge simul­taneously in several EU states. The thematic priorities for reporting should be decided on an ongoing basis, using the matrix outlined above (see p.  66 ). More generally, a shared intelligence matrix would allow all states to allocate their respective resources across regions and topics in a more complementary way.

The recipients of regular joint intelligence assessments on hybrid threats are not only the leaders of the EU institutions, the Political and Security Com­mittee, and the European Union Military Committee, but also selected committees of the European Parlia­ment as well as the decision-makers at the government and ministry levels in the major capitals. Last but not least, a firmly institutionalised, EU-wide coordination of threat analyses could promote sub­stantial reforms in Germany and improve the respec­tive role of the Federal Security Council.

Towards an International Policy of Democratic Resilience

Authoritarian regimes have become the norm in many parts of the world. Following the third wave of transition to democracy 1 (1974–1990), we have been talking about the third wave of authoritarianism since 1995. 2 Many countries that were on the road to democracy have become stuck in a “grey zone” between incomplete democratisation and autocratic tendencies, where the road often leads back to the past. The signs of a democratic awakening have been deceiving, not only with regard to the states of the post-socialist sphere; established democracies have also been caught up in the maelstrom of an increas­ing authoritarian imposition of political styles and methods.

Much of this is taking place behind a legal façade that is mostly controlled by “elected autocrats” who undermine and subvert democratic institutions and procedures as well as the rule of law in the name of a “new democracy”. 3 Their actions against liberal democracy follow a pattern: They stir up resentment and deepen social divisions; they gain legitimacy for these policies through elections won by “popular” measures such as resistance to immigration or by touting economic success. Political polarisation and the collapse of party systems are seen as crucial fac­tors in the decline of democracies. Autonomous insti­tutions, free media, and an independent judiciary are becoming the targets of illiberal practices, in Europe as well as in other regions of the world.

In the meantime, it has become clear that this trend cannot be countered with ad hoc policies. Nor can this decline in democratic governance be stopped by purely reactive measures in the form of warnings, complaints, or sanctions. In its foreign policy, Ger­many, as a democracy-oriented polity, must always consider anew when deciding about these cases as to whether engagement is, or could be, necessary – or even if it is worthwhile. If Germany wants to play a more prominent role in efforts to prevent further “back­sliding” on democracy and human rights, it must first address the question of how a correspond­ing foreign policy can become more effective beyond symbolic actions and in view of the limited effectiveness of traditional travel diplomacy in its attempt to issue warnings to politicians around the world who are inclined to authoritarian rule. In concrete terms, it is necessary to clarify whether our country has a genuine opportunity to exert influence or is prepared to permanently assume the costs of resolving a crisis or overcoming the problems that triggered it.

Is Germany a democracy that is willing to defend itself and its principles also to the outside world?

It is part of the DNA of the Federal Republic of Ger­many to see itself as a contentious, defensible democ­racy at home. Articles 1 and 20 of the constitution (Grundgesetz) enshrine this status, in conjunction with Article 79.3. The defence of democracy and human rights has thus become the basis for the actions of all constitutional bodies and part of Germany’s foreign policy identity. Should this democratic policy man­date in foreign policy refer only to international rela­tions or also to the domestic politics of other states? A distinction must be made here: First, the validity of our understanding of democracy extends into foreign policy in cases where the legal order in Germany is endangered or called into question in an international environment, for example due to terrorist attacks or cyberattacks on essential institutions of the demo­cratic infrastructure, such as those for conducting elections. Second, respect for democracy is a good that cannot be limited by the oft-cited precept of inadmissible “interference in internal affairs”.

Looking at variants of authoritarianism and autocracies

The world of authoritarian states is not homo­geneous. It will therefore hardly be possible to apply a uniform standard for foreign policy action against them. In addition, for many autocratic leaders, their international presence and the recognition it often brings are convenient instruments for consolidating power, which also gives them domestic political legiti­macy. Those shaping German foreign policy are thus faced with a difficult problem: judgement cannot solely be based on an assessment of the “qualities” of the respective regime and its internal dynamics; it must also take the regional and global environment into account.

The spectrum of possible manifestations of author­itarian rule practices is very broad, 4 ranging from repressive autocracies (as in North Korea and Syria) to liberal autocracies that still allow the media and civil societies to operate (as in Jordan and Morocco) to modernising autocracies that combine repressive ele­ments with the granting of certain civil liberties (as is evident in the case of Saudi Arabia). A special position is occupied by “authoritarian gravity centres” such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, which not only exemplify and propagate an autocratic role model within a narrower regional framework, but even hone corresponding governing techniques through collec­tive learning processes and disseminate them world­wide via common means of transmission. 5 Ger­many’s close partners, such as Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, deserve spe­cial atten­tion because they are expected to enforce democratic rules to a greater extent than can be demanded of regimes that are less close to it. In addi­tion, it must be assessed as to whether the respec­tive authoritarian regimes exhibit revisionist or even expansionist ten­den­cies, that is, whether they are pur­suing strategies that could change the inter­national status quo. Ger­man foreign policy decision-makers must react in a correspondingly scaled man­ner to these states’ viola­tions of the fundamental norms and rules of democ­racy. Democracy promotion – whether in the context of state cooperation or through civil society actors such as German political foundations – is also in­creasingly encountering resistance in the host coun­tries, which limits, com­plicates, and even inhibits engagement in the promotion of human rights and political participation.

From external democracy promotion to an international policy of democratic resilience

Democracy promotion has been based on two approaches – one antagonistic and one facilitative: Specific punitive measures, such as those directed at particular individuals (as currently the case with the leaders of Belarus, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) or more comprehensive sanctions regimes (as in the example of Cuba) have sought to promote regime change, not least by supporting opposition members or subsidising their diaspora organisations. This is in contrast to the promotional approach, which focuses on democ­racy-building measures with the aim of expanding existing spaces for participation and helping a variety of voices to find expression in a pluralistic society. The aim is to provide an impetus in the hopes of encouraging parliaments, parties, the media, and civil society groups in the target countries to develop and expand democratic norms by means of imitation and persuasion, but also by setting conditionalities (such as in the EU accession process). 6 The central point here is to create confidence in the institutions and procedures of democracy to prevent democratic com­petition from creating lines of conflict within society that cannot normally be dealt with by (still) weak insti­tutions. This goal is primarily served by the classic instruments of promoting political parties and expanding spaces for participation by civil society actors. So far, the focus of such engagement has most­ly been focused on the political elites, whose interests in maintaining power and social positions are often at odds with this concept of democracy promotion because it fails to engage them in democratic pro­cedures.

Today, a new understanding of democracy pro­motion must be found, one that focuses not only on initiating and galvanising but also on defending demo­cratic standards. This shifts the focus to the ques­tion of which instruments, procedures, and organisations are suitable for strengthening the resili­ence of democracies. The aim is to formulate a policy of democratic resilience 7 that focuses on those insti­tutional relationships which are essential for the functioning of democratic rule and can ward off anti-democratic behaviour, that is, robust institutions such as transparent and fair electoral procedures, the effective separation of powers, and free media. In this context, the transnational dimension of challenges to democracy must also be taken into account, for example the targeted external attacks on democratic procedures (such as elections) by means of hybrid inter­ventions by other states. 8

However, even such an ambitious programme to strengthen democratic resilience needs to identify its priorities, not only in terms of the selection of coun­tries, but also in terms of its own possibilities. Given the limited resources for action, a policy of demo­cratic resilience must focus on the early stages of autocratisation processes, 9 on when existing freedoms can still be used, and on where resilience – especially of the judiciary – can still be strengthened. Once institutional relations have been massively weakened, such a policy can only react, and merely with a greatly reduced arsenal of options. A policy of democratic resilience is a policy “without red lines” that must act agilely and closely to the ground, even if the partners and institutions concerned are not democratically “flawless”. In doing so, one will still have to live with the criticism of applying “double standards”.

It is therefore advisable to adopt a preventive ap­proach that does not follow static formats but allows for strategic adjustments in order to enhance and expand the performance of democratic procedures. It follows from this that countries such as El Salvador, Indonesia, and the Philippines should be considered with respect to the question about which measures of active de-polarisation or transformative re-polari­sation can still be successful. 10 This does not mean completely dispensing with the reciprocal strategies of opposition forces vis-à-vis state measures, but working with other themes and formats that neither reinforce nor strengthen existing patterns of polarisa­tion. Such a strategy demands comprehensive local knowledge and the rapid availability of resources from the actors involved. The latter could be provided by a “resilience fund” from the German Federal For­eign Office that may be accessed without too much bureaucracy.

Setting priorities: A policy of democratic resilience must focus primarily on those institutions in states where threats are becoming visible or where a weak­ening of authoritarian rule practices (as is currently the case in Sudan, despite all the recent turbulent events) can be discerned. Robust institutions must be supported flexibly and promptly in the relevant states with “light” tools, that is, with little bureaucratic effort. Authoritarian gravity centres, for example, thus fall outside such a grid, as they are difficult to influence with proactive measures.

Politicisation of cooperation formats: Pursuing a policy of democratic resilience means showing “clear edges” and publicly addressing undesirable developments as such, in other countries as well. Those who want to combat the dismantling of democracy must formulate clear positions. Possible negative consequences should be mitigated through formats of risk and responsi­bility-sharing – in the national context through the development of network structures, digital formats, and multi-actor alliances; internationally through joint action by various donors and their implement­ing organisations. “Foreign agents” laws in countries such as Russia and El Salvador try to single out non-governmental organisations, journalists, and bloggers receiving grants from abroad to control or even inhibit their activities.

Counteracting the formation of international blocs: It is important to avoid driving governments with authori­tarian tendencies into a common front in the mis­taken assumption that democratic values and prin­ciples can be better enforced through the formation of a democratic bloc. With such an approach, the opposite effect could manifest: If the world is once again divided into blocs and new rifts are created, joint action is likely to become more difficult, or even impossible. Economic interdependence and social interaction remain important preconditions for in­fluencing the authoritarian character of a regime.

Thinking Build Back Better on a Global Level: Strengthening Strategies from the Global South

“Build Back Better” (BBB) is a strategy for socio-economic recovery after the Corona pandemic. The aim is to compensate for weaknesses in the global economic system. In its Recovery and Resilience Plan and the European Recovery Plan, the German gov­ern­ment has committed itself to aligning post-health crisis recovery with the premises of social justice and sustainability. While the focus so far has been on combating the pandemic and its consequences in Germany and Europe, the upcoming coalition gov­ernment must think BBB in more global terms. Due to the high level of international interconnectedness in investment, trade, and the production of goods along global supply chains, the recovery and future resilience of the German and European economies also depend on the successful management of eco­nomic crises and political stability in countries of the Global South. The German government therefore needs to take the potential negative impacts of the German and European BBB strategies on other (sub-)continents or regions into account. Otherwise, these impacts may run the risk of thwarting Germany’s and Europe’s economic and development policy goals. To avoid this, the newly elected German gov­ern­ment should initiate a “Global Dialogue on Recovery Strategies”.

Understanding regional recovery strategies

The economic recovery strategies of regions in the Global South and the Global North differ according to the socio-economic challenges that they consider to be particularly pressing. Where strategies overlap, for example the aim to strengthen regional value chains, the implementation of these strategies varies widely due to the different geographical contexts. For exam­ple, when comparing Latin American and African countries to most Asian countries, which have com­petitive manufacturing industries and high production capacities, consolidating regional value chains is a major challenge due to (with some exceptions) low levels of industrialisation. Both regions often function as suppliers of critical raw materials to the Global North in global supply chains and are therefore the focus of this article. Since the production and trade of goods is organised along global value chains, inter­ventions at one point of the chain automatically affect the entire supply chain. In order to support crisis recovery in Latin America and Africa and to assess the potential impacts of the German and Euro­pean BBB strategies on both continents, it is impor­tant to better understand regional BBB strategies.

European priorities

The European Union’s (EU) recovery plan “NextGener­ationEU” and the seven-year budget adopted in 2021 put a strong emphasis on climate protection and digitalisation. The German Recovery and Resilience Plan largely coincides with the EU’s priorities because Germany played a key role in drafting the budget. A third of the investments at the EU level will finance the European “Green Deal”, which aims to make the EU climate-neutral by 2050. The “Just Transition Fund” is intended to mitigate the socio-economic costs of the green transition. Central elements in the Euro­pean debate on BBB are the concepts of reshoring and nearshoring. In order to increase the EU’s stra­tegic autonomy and security of supply – particularly with raw materials for the green transition – Brus­sels aims to relocate selected production facilities to EU member states or neighbouring countries. In June 2021, Germany also joined the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative in the wake of the G7 sum­mit. 1 B3W aims to promote large-scale investments in low- and middle-income countries in the areas of climate, health, digitalisation, and gender equality.

Build Back Better in Africa

In order to combat the pandemic, African states have centred on regional cooperation within the framework of the African Union (AU) and the African regional organisations, as well as on support from inter­national actors such as the World Health Orga­nization, the World Bank, and the International Finance Corporation, but also from China. The regional strategy developed by the AU prioritises the building of resources to combat the coronavirus, inter alia by supporting the Africa Centres for Disease Con­trol and Prevention. In February 2021, the AU called for the TRIPS agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), which also protects intellectual property rights of products and technologies used to combat the virus, to be suspended for the duration of the pandemic. The claim has so far been unsuccessful due to opposition from the EU, among others.

The mobilisation of financial resources is another important component of the African BBB strategy. How­ever, there were limited effects of stimulus packages from the African Development Bank and international organisations as well as of the suspension of interest payments on public debt and sov­ereign bonds for low-income countries decided by the G20 finance ministers on the regional liquidity crisis. Finally, the AU is pushing for the rapid and effective implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), launched in January 2021, to boost economic reconstruction. By removing barriers to intra-regional trade, AfCFTA aims to strengthen intra-African value chains and attract foreign direct invest­ment. 2 It has the potential to increase the economic resilience of African states in the long term and can promote economic recovery in the medium term. However, the successful implementation of the free trade area requires extensive economic reforms in the AU member states, investments, and supportive meas­ures to strengthen the private sector – in addition to political will.

Latin American strategies

Latin American countries have shown very different reactions to the pandemic. However, many are now pooling their efforts and formulating common goals for recovery. Regional organisations such as the Eco­nomic Commission for Latin America and the Carib­bean (ECLAC) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) have identified the chal­lenges the region is facing and have developed strategies for reconstruction. In doing so, they are focusing in particular on the problem of social in­equal­ity, which in most Latin American states coincides with a high level of mistrust in state insti­tutions by the citizens. In some cases, non-trans­par­ent or even contradictory measures that were adopted to deal with the pandemic have reinforced the dis­tance between citizens and their respective states. The recovery strategies of Latin American governments are therefore being directed at strengthening effective governance with a focus on social justice and sustain­ability. Digitalisation is among the most important instruments to reach this goal.

The extraction and export of raw materials is the main economic pillar of many Latin American coun­tries. However, this sector has suffered massively from the crisis. The Latin American BBB strategy there­fore aims to promote resource exports and restructure the entire extractive sector in a fairer and more sustain­able way, for example through increased investments in new technologies and the expansion of renewable energies. Some countries have already introduced con­ditional cash transfer programmes that include incentives for environmental and health protection and sustainable production methods, and they have also adopted fiscal pacts with a focus on sustainable investment. 3

The need for compatible regional strategies

The European economy is closely linked to produc­tion and processing sites in Latin America and Africa. Economic recovery and resilience in Europe and Germany depend on success against the pandemic as well as economic recovery in the two continents. Regional BBB strategies must therefore be compatible with each other. The future German government should make use of three central fields of action to strengthen the BBB strategies in Latin America and Africa. It should supplement these efforts by initiat­ing a “Global Dialogue on Recovery Strategies”.

Establishing B3W as an attractive cooperation offer: Taking advantage of the German G7 presidency

The G7 countries present their B3W infrastructure project as a value-based and transparent alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). B3W seeks to establish partnerships of equals between G7 countries and countries of the Global South. However, distribu­tion of the Corona vaccines and the decision not to suspend patent protection on vaccines have re-mani­fested existing global power imbalances and cast doubt on the credibility of the B3W initiative. In con­trast, many countries in the Global South have viewed China’s mask and vaccine diplomacy positive­ly. At the same time, some governments in the target regions are critical of Beijing’s actions in the context of the BRI.

B3W offers an opportunity for Germany to position itself, together with the G7, as an attractive partner for middle- and low-income countries. Against the backdrop of the smouldering rivalry between China and the United States, however, the initiative should not be designed as a rival to the BRI but instead create attractive offers for cooperation for its target coun­tries. An important step in this direction would be to align investments with the recovery strategies of the partner regions. The newly elected German government should seize the opportunity of the upcoming G7 presidency to play a key role in shaping the cri­teria for implementing B3W. Looking at Germany’s Due Diligence Act and the one being planned by Europe, priority should be given to compliance with high sustainability and transparency standards. These standards and the mechanisms for monitoring them should be defined jointly with the partner countries.

Designing nearshoring fairly: Strengthening local supply chains through EU trade policy

Supply shortages during the pandemic have revealed weaknesses in the hitherto organisation of supply chains. The EU as well as countries in the Global South therefore seek to promote regional supply chains by nearshoring or reshoring specific economic sectors. In resource-rich countries in Latin America and Africa with weak processing industries, this cannot be achieved without an additional push towards indus­trialisation. If the EU was to transfer some industrial processing (closer to) to Europe, this would thwart cur­rent efforts to promote the creation and consolidation of robust local value chains in both regions. The future German government should therefore use its strong voice in the EU to advocate for the promotion of economically, socially, and ecologically sustainable and transparent processing industries in countries of the Global South within the framework of European trade policy. It should aim to strengthen the resili­ence to crises in international supply chains and to increase its own security of supply.

With regard to Africa, the new German govern­ment should advocate broadening the support for AfCFTA at the next EU-AU summit. The EU could supplement existing measures by promoting the build­ing of production capacities and the creation of a mechanism that mitigates economic and social inequalities within AfCFTA. At the same time, the EU should not push for economic partnership agree­ments (EPAs) with individual African regional organi­sations. EPAs could negatively impact the implementation of AfCFTA and the development of manufac­turing industries in the free trade area. In addition, European and international investment programmes, such as the EU External Investment Plan for Africa, the G20’s Compact with Africa, and B3W, should be more closely aligned with AfCFTA. With regard to Latin America, Germany should advocate for taking into account not only trade policy considerations but also the expansion of sustainable, local processing industries during negotiations on bilateral free trade agreements, for example between Chile and the EU.

Thinking globally about the energy transition: Implementing measures for a just transition

The German and European BBB strategies focus on the green transition. Potential negative effects of the EU’s decarbonisation strategy in other regions have been given little consideration so far. However, the current focus on securing the supply of critical minerals, which are indispensable for the development of green technologies, should not neglect the social and ecological impacts in countries where minerals are extracted and processed, nor the goal of promoting local value creation. Planned policy instruments for the implementation of the “Green Deal”, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mecha­nism for imports, pose economic challenges for coal-dependent countries in the Global South. These coun­tries lack access to the technologies and financial leeway needed to drive the energy transition and mitigate its social costs. Reducing the negative social and environmental impacts of the extraction and processing of raw materials in the Global South is an important prerequisite for increasing the sustainability of end products produced in Germany. To achieve this, the new German government should focus on technology and knowledge transfers within the frame­work of bilateral partnerships. Furthermore, in the course of its upcoming G7 presidency, it should advocate for the creation of a global fund to mitigate the socio-economic costs of the energy transition in countries of the Global South.

The three fields of action highlight that a lack of compatibility between regional BBB strategies can thwart efforts to achieve an equitable and sustainable global recovery. The creation of a “Global Dialogue on Recovery Strategies” would be an appropriate tool to discuss and coordinate regional priorities for building back better and their impacts.

Integrating Climate Ambition and Energy Diplomacy in Foreign Policy

In the past, Germany’s climate and energy diplomacy had many overlaps and interlinkages. However, they followed separate path dependencies and were largely dealt with individually. 1 The energy sector accounts for two-thirds of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions and is thus central to the climate agenda. In order to rapidly increase the low-carbon supply of elec­tricity and hydrogen, renewable energy production has to be expanded considerably and energy efficiency must be improved. This should be accompanied by a modernisation and repurposing of long-standing infrastructures in industry as well as existing buildings, and transport networks. With the Green Deal, the European Union (EU) is adding new climate initiatives for industry, transport, and agriculture to its agenda. Climate protection, energy, technology, and industrial policy are thus becoming increasingly integrated. Internationally, however, they are subject to geo-economic rivalries. Accordingly, Germany’s energy and climate foreign policy conduct needs both a step change and a strategic set-up for the next couple of years.

Climate ambitions and a changing energy sector

Following the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 24 March 2021, 2 the Federal Government has committed itself to achieving climate neutrality by 2045 and a 65 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. This reinforces once more the primacy of climate protection. Yet, the German energy consumption mix is still dominated by fossil fuels: Oil has a share of 33.7 per cent, natural gas 26.6 per cent, coal 15.8 per cent , nuclear 6 per cent, and renewable energies only 16.6 per cent. 3

Moreover, the EU has decided to become climate neutral by 2050, too; EU-wide, emissions are to be reduced by 55 per cent by 2030 compared to 1990. As part of the “Fit for 55” package, the European Com­mission proposed a first set of measures in July 2021, and the European post-pandemic recovery plan, “NextGenerationEU”, includes the promotion of cli­mate-friendly investments. 4

There is no alternative but to initiate far-reaching and rapid decarbonisation through closer internation­al cooperation, as it is technically difficult and expensive for Europe to undertake the energy transition on its own, not to mention the potential disruptions at its external borders and in its relations with the neigh­bourhood. German and European climate diplo­macy therefore has to maintain and deepen the cli­mate policy consensus of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Energy diplomacy needs to be intensified for both the “phase-out” of fossil energy sources and the “phase-in” of green and clean electrons and molecules. 5

A coal phase-out as the prevailing global climate solution

The global phase-out of coal combustion is a climate policy goal of many members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Global coal consumption is consistently high – despite the pandemic – and is being driven by China, which burns around 56 per cent of the global coal supply. 6 Germany had announced a phase-out of its coal-fired power generation by 2038 that was to be accompanied by a socially acceptable transformation (“just transition”), and the new government coalition wants to speed up the end of coal by the target date of 2030. In the long term, however, it will also be neces­sary to phase out natural gas in order to meet climate targets.

How much and how quickly oil consumption in Germany and the EU will decline depends on how extensively climate-neutral energies are used for trans­port and mobility. A rapid reduction in oil con­sumption will have far-reaching geopolitical conse­quences, as the EU accounts for 12 per cent of global consumption. 7 The EU’s shift away from oil will severely affect countries in its wider neighbourhood such as Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, and Azerbaijan. As far as oil production is concerned, the shares of the Arab Gulf states and Russia could continue to rise. The turnaround in the climate policy of the United States (US) under President Joe Biden implies that the US will set a regulatory limit on extended and expanded oil (and gas) production. 8

Expansion of renewable energies and the importance of Europe

The use of renewable energies is on the rise globally. However, neither the pace nor the capacity is suffi­cient to meet the demand, let alone permanently slow global warming. Even if Europe still has the potential for more renewables investment, Germany and the EU will have to import green electricity as well as carbon-neutral hydrogen to meet their needs. For this, pipelines and grids will have to be expanded on a pan-European basis. Moreover, the European energy transition depends on new technological solutions such as offshore wind farms, more efficient batteries, and electrolysers. Metals and rare earths, as well as the complex supply chains for raw materials and tech­nological components, add to the list of new for­eign policy challenges. Climate-neutral raw ma­terials and energy sources must be available promptly, reliably, and cost-effectively if European industries are to avoid competitive disadvantages.

External relations in climate and energy: Interfaces, divergences, and partners

Climate and external energy relations need guardrails if they aim at supporting the reduction in fossil fuel imports and the expansion of climate-friendly alter­natives. Germany and the EU should, in a first step, develop the necessary norms, standards, and rules within the EU and the European Economic Area, the Energy Community, and the United Kingdom. 9 Hydro­gen in particular has to be integrated into the EU’s Energy Union. In a second step, these guardrails must also be negotiated and implemented globally. Trade policy rules, coordinated carbon pricing, and climate- and energy-related standards for key sectors and goods must be negotiated and agreed with the US, China, and Japan as well as other G20 members.

In view of limited diplomatic resources, it is nec­essary to focus on key partner countries in the Afro-Euro-Asian ellipse . 10 This refers to countries in the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Caspian regions with which climate policy cooperation as well as old and new energy policy issues need to be addressed. They provide the production sites as well as important grids for green electrons and molecules.

Dealings with Russia remain arguably the greatest geopolitical and economic task due to its pre-eminent position as a supplier of oil, gas, and raw materials. The potential for escalation is high; the most pro­minent example being the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Furthermore, the planned de-coupling of the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Moldova from the post-Soviet electricity grid constitutes another critical issue. The integration of Ukraine into the European energy mar­ket is already a political priority. Cooperation with Russia on hydrogen could help to shape a positive agenda and strike a balance between cooperation, confrontation, and competition.

Finally, the Maghreb, Egypt, and Turkey are key energy countries and also bridgeheads to Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, where interconnectivity dynamics are unfolding. The economic and logistical corridors that are emerging in these regions have to be developed, as part of both the EU-Africa partner­ship and the Green Deal.

Whether the partner countries will commit themselves more strongly to low-carbon energy sources and production will not least depend on their politi­cal approaches to dealing with an increasing number of climate change-driven extreme weather events.

Options for a proactive German diplomacy

German climate and energy diplomacy needs a step change with the aim of transforming the patchwork of German climate and energy partnerships into a more coherent landscape. Such a change should be based on priorities that reflect geographical and substantive policy goals. The new German government should take stock of its energy and climate policy interests with a view to its respective foreign partners and draw up a strategy that reflects these interests.

One of the priorities is dealing with fossil fuel suppliers. So far, Germany’s interests in security of supply on the one hand, and climate action on the other, are not aligned, which is creating tensions. Such tensions can be reduced, yet it is important that government departments prioritise issues based on environmental, development, and foreign trade policy considera­tions. These priorities should become part of a co­ordi­nation process between the ministries that minimises contradictory signals in foreign relations much more than in the past. The decarbonisation of the gas value chain will pose a particular challenge in this respect.

From a geographic angle, energy policy has to be developed along concentric circles. Climate policy inter­ests have to be added in order to complement and specify the approach. For a rapid and far-reaching trans­formation towards climate neutrality, existing as well as new infrastructures matter as much as a common legal and normative framework. These prior­ities demand a refocusing on the EU and other European partners, including the neighbouring regions of the North, the Baltic, the Black Sea, as well as the Mediterranean. Policymakers have to develop forums for the EU’s “electricity neighbours” and the “hydrogen neighbours” along industrial centres, routes, and networks. Moreover, Germany has to carry forward these new dimensions of foreign policy to the European level of trade policymaking. Existing and future trade agreements help to set standards and lower transaction costs – at best this will also have an impact on progress at the World Trade Organization.

The trade policy debate on climate action has come alive in view of the Commission’s proposal to intro­duce a border carbon adjustment levy on certain energy-intensive goods entering the EU market from 2026. The carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) will be based on the CO 2 content of the pro­duction processes abroad. 11 Some EU neighbours have already reacted by signalling an interest in national CO 2 pricing, and OECD partners would also like to cooperate with the EU on this issue. However, China and Russia, among others, are highly sceptical and have thought aloud about retaliation should the CBAM be put into force. The German government should not give in to such rhetoric and instead use the window of opportunity in 2022 to put climate pro­tection on a common footing – namely CO 2 price and emissions standards – with the G7 partners, the G20, and other groups.

The energy and climate policy tools and their nation­al implementation will remain important topics also in negotiations at the United Nations (UN) level, the G‑formats, and in existing multilateral insti­tutions. However, for effective regional and global cooperation, multilateral institutions are still lacking. New technologies, energy sources, interconnectivity, standards, and norms need to be addressed in detail. In order to facilitate this, the growing number of parallel forums should be consolidated around these issues as quickly as possible. This would be a task for the German G7 presidency in 2022, with which the new German government could raise its profile.

The prominence that the impacts of climate change and the pressure for more climate protection have gained in politics and the public sphere has made decarbonisation part of the contest for global leadership in Europe and the US. This contest is reflected in UN climate negotiations but also in eco­nomic competition over future technologies. Only together with its European partners can Germany achieve the critical mass and develop the foreign policy levers to prevail in this contest. To be more assertive, technological leadership, standard-setting, regulatory space, and market size should be the guid­ing principles of a new energy and climate foreign policy strategy, and they must be added to the diplo­matic toolbox if it is to carry more weight.

German and European Asylum and Migration Policy: Why a More Forward‑looking Approach Is Needed

In recent years, German and European asylum and migration policy has been strongly crisis-driven, espe­cially during and after the large-scale migratory move­ments of 2015/2016, with governments mainly trying to limit the number of incoming refugees and irregular migrants through short-term national measures.

However, the costs of a merely reactive mode of action are high, especially in this policy area. The ad hoc approaches of the past have had problematic consequences – among these legitimising the Libyan coast guard and its practices that violate human rights, strengthening Turkey’s increasingly autocratic government, and perpetuating the degrading con­ditions for refugees on the Greek islands. In reaction to this, the German government and the European Commission have been criticised by the European Par­liament as well as the United Nations (UN) and human rights organisations for violating European and international law, in particular the 1951 Refugee Convention. 1 In addition, this mode of policy-making fuels doubts about the ability of those in power to deal with complex challenges related to migration and displacement. The main beneficiaries of this are populist parties and movements that offer supposedly simple solutions. A predominantly reactive policy ultimately misses opportunities to address migration challenges and to strengthen the contribution of migrants and migration to sustainable development – the main objectives of the Global Compact on Migra­tion, adopted by the majority of UN member states on 10 December 2018 in Marrakesh. Against this back­ground, the European Union (EU) and its member states should adopt a more forward-looking asylum and migration policy. There is a favourable opportunity for this, at least in Germany. First, in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, public attention to issues of displacement and migration has waned, allowing for a more factual approach to these polarising issues in domestic politics. Second, internationally, Germa­ny’s reputation with regard to its asylum and migra­tion policy has risen due to it being one of the main refugee-hosting countries. This goes hand in hand with growing expectations about German engagement in this policy area, and with demands being placed on the Federal Government to address longer-term issues concerning asylum and migration policy. Third, the recent federal election and the formation of a new government offer an opportunity to break out of previous path dependencies based on a reactive policy mode. A more strategic, sustainable, and effec­tive asylum and migration policy is based on (1) iden­tifying problems, challenges, and opportunities to be expected in the medium and long term, (2) identifying conflicting goals, determining objectives, and prioritising them, and (3) expanding Germany’s com­petence to shape policy in a targeted manner.

Problems, challenges, and opportunities

Both forced displacement and irregular migration have increased in recent years. A reversal of this trend is not in sight. At the same time, Germany and Europe are dependent on immigration. This is the only way to cushion the impact of demographic changes and to counter the labour shortages that exist and continue to grow in many sectors of the economy. Dealing with these challenges and opportunities is made more dif­fi­cult due to the unwillingness of EU member states to pursue policies that address asylum and migration objectives in equal measure. This continues to be a problem because EU member states are affected to different degrees by refugee movements, and each has specific migration policy interests. Over time, how­ever, these differences will diminish.

This applies to migration, for one thing. Most Euro­pean countries are now in a phase of demographic transition, in which their populations are ageing and shrinking, 2 resulting in political, economic, and social consequences that are hard to predict and difficult to manage. The ongoing convergence of interests in favour of labour immigration is accelerated by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. It has shown, on the one hand, that the shortage of seasonal workers in agriculture and of skilled workers in the health sector is structural in nature. On the other hand, it has made it obvious that the previously abundant labour pools in the countries on the periphery of the EU are also limited. As international competition for labour increases, a rules-based and rights-based approach to international labour mobility is becoming an important asset.

There are also growing common interests in refugee and asylum policy that should be highlighted. In general, there are concerns with regard to reducing the root causes of forced displacement and stabilising countries of origin and host countries so that humani­tarian emergencies are avoided and the pressure on asylum systems is reduced. Europe’s capacity to act in this area should be strengthened through selective cooperation on key issues, for example in the context of a joint resettlement initiative or in relation to migra­tion in the context of training partnerships.

Conflicting objectives and target-setting

In order to transform German and European asylum and migration policy into a proactive mode, it is not only necessary to identify current and future chal­lenges and opportunities. There is also a need for a corresponding definition of policy goals. In this con­text, an open and evidence-based debate on conflict­ing goals and areas of tension is essential.

Conflicting goals exist, among other instances, with regard to reducing the root causes of displacement and irregular migration. This applies, for exam­ple, to cooperation with authoritarian regimes, which may seem necessary from a security policy perspective in order to reduce irregular migration in the short term. However, it is fundamentally at odds with the overarching goal of foreign and development policy to strengthen good governance in partner coun­tries. 3

Similar trade-offs exist in the recruitment of labour, which is becoming increasingly important for the economic development of many industrialised countries. This applies not only to skilled workers, but also to lower-skilled jobs in home care and domes­tic services. Such recruitment can conflict with development policy efforts to prevent brain drain. Fundamental conflicts of this kind cannot usually be resolved. Instead, they require a balancing of inter­ests. To this end, it is necessary to set thematic and geographical priorities and to assess long-term and short-term interests. The basis must be the existing obligations under human, international, and Euro­pean refugee and migration law, in particular the 1951 Refugee Convention. More recent international agreements, such as the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Migration, are helpful.

Against this backdrop, there is an urgent need for priority action with regard to refugees, especially in the following key areas: responsibility-sharing within the EU as well as globally, the creation of more legal migration pathways to Germany and the EU, an im­provement of the reception facilities at the EU’s exter­nal borders, and increased support for major refugee-hosting countries outside of the EU. In this, the Ger­man government should lead the way with like-minded (EU) states instead of waiting for a com­mon European solution.

Elements of a strategically oriented asylum and migration policy

In order to pursue the strategic goals and expand Germany’s competence in shaping asylum and migra­tion policy, the new Federal Government should become particularly active in the following areas.

For one, a number of institutional and organisational reforms are needed. In addition to strengthening inter­ministerial coherence, thematic analysis and fore­casting capacities in particular should be expanded. The concerns and opportunities for action by the pri­vate sector, civil society, and municipal actors should be taken into account more systematically than has been the case. In addition, the external dimensions of Germany’s asylum and migration policy should be better coordinated, along the lines of the Swiss whole-of-government approach in migration policy, for exam­ple. Such an approach would give sufficient weight to foreign, security, economic, and development policy objectives and enable better cooperation between the relevant ministries and subordinate authorities. Part of this process could be annual asylum and migration summits at which all stakeholders discuss the direction of policy. 4 In order for the Federal Government to effectively represent its interests and goals in international processes, two things are required. First, migration-related knowl­edge must be anchored in the German administration in a sustainable and interministerial manner, which presupposes appropriate staffing. Second, there is a need for the continued and expanded secondment of German personnel to the relevant UN agencies and international organisations (such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organi­zation for Migration, and the International Labour Organization). Finally, flexible, multi-year, and reli­able funding is a central element of any strategically oriented policy.

Additionally, long-term sustainable partnerships with countries of origin and transit are an essential com­ponent of an effective, legitimate, and sustainable asylum and migration policy. This requires flexible approaches that are tailored to the actors involved and allow for solutions that go beyond the respective legislative period. Moreover, partnerships must be based on mutual trust and include the interests of both sides. Since this has been insufficiently taken into account, especially in the EU’s approaches, the Federal Government should also advocate effective and sustainable migration partnerships that are backed by concrete targets at the European level. The Commission’s proposal for a new migration and asylum package already provides an important basis for this. However, the partnership idea contained in it has not yet been given concrete form. The implementation proposals are one-sidedly oriented towards migration management and cooperation on return and reintegration without adequately taking into account the interests of potential partner countries, for example in legal migration channels and greater inter­national mobility. 5

The beginning of the new legislative period offers a favourable opportunity to give German asylum and migration policy a more strategic orientation. This opportunity should be seized. Migration pressure is expected to remain high, not least because of the eco­nomic disruption resulting from the Covid-19 pan­demic, but also because of existing or newly escalated violent conflicts worldwide, for example in Afghanistan. Once pandemic-related restrictions on mobility are eased, the number of refugees and migrants arriv­ing in the EU is also likely to rise again. In dealing with these challenges, the mistake of poor communi­cation – as was committed in the past, for example in the context of the Global Compact for Migration – should be avoided. Instead, the new Federal Government should proactively justify and promote poten­tially controversial decisions in asylum and migration policy.

At the same time, every opportunity must be seized at the European and international levels to ensure that asylum and migration policy is developed in line with human rights and Germany’s long-term inter­ests. For example, the new Federal Government should advocate for an expansion of legal immigra­tion chan­nels beyond the ongoing negotiations in the context of the EU’s asylum and migration package. At the inter­national level, it should support the im­ple­men­tation of the Global Compact on Refugees, the Global Compact for Migration, and the Sustainable Development Goals. On the one hand, this offers start­ing points for improving global refugee protec­tion and adapting it to the challenges of climate change. On the other hand, migration that promotes develop­ment must be strengthened through better mobility regulations and the fair recruitment of workers.

Between War and Peace: How to Raise Germany’s Profile in Crisis Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa

The primacy of crisis prevention is an integral part of foreign policy rhetoric in Germany. The election manifestos of almost all political parties represented in the Bundestag refer to the goal of preventing crises and violent conflicts. The importance of crisis preven­tion is also emphasised in the Federal Government’s 2017 Foreign Policy Guidelines (Preventing Crises, Manag­ing Conflicts, Promoting Peace) and in the 2021 report on their implementation. Moreover, the approach has repeatedly been a programmatic focus, for example during Germany’s recent membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The German government now provides far-reaching resources and is expanding its capacities in early warning. But a gap between aspirations and reality remains because decisions on initiatives and measures during immi­nent crisis situations are often still taken too late or half-heartedly. The new coalition government should therefore fundamentally raise Germany’s profile in this area, place crisis prevention higher on the politi­cal agenda, and create the institutional conditions for taking a position and acting in a coordinated manner before critical junctures are reached.

Despite visible improvements in recent years – from early warning to inter-ministerial coordination and the design of concrete instruments – the chal­lenge to act earlier, more flexibly, and in a more targeted manner persists. Preventive measures are still rarely prioritised, despite discernible warning signals. However, those who wait for the breaking headlines will hardly be able to make a significant contribution towards preventing crises. If this primacy is to be filled with substance, crisis preven­tion must be given a higher political priority and be firmly embedded in all the relevant ministries. In order to translate increasing pressure for action into tangible initiatives, however, capacities in the ad­min­istration must also be strengthened. Here the links between strategic foresight and the units in the minis­tries responsible for policies in specific regions and countries are particularly important. The new Ger­man government could focus particularly on contexts in sub-Saharan African states, where decisive turning points between war and peace are looming. This would be in Germany’s interest for various reasons. Moreover, the room for manoeuvre in this part of the African continent is sometimes greater and the inter­national environment less entrenched than in parts of the Southern neighbourhood. 1

Early prevention instead of wait and see

It is not surprising news that, in many geopolitical contexts, the line between war and peace is increas­ingly blurred, conflicts are becoming entrenched, and violence is repeatedly breaking out. Thus, they rarely follow the ideal-type conflict cycles and instead fluc­tuate between different stages. Under these conditions, it is difficult to find starting points for effective prevention that not only seeks to avoid the outbreak of violent conflict, but also works against its esca­lation or recurrence after a phase of relative calm. Inter­national actors frequently shy away from the com­plexities of such situations and the possible material – and political – follow-up costs. As a result, effective crisis prevention is often least likely to take place where it is most urgently needed. The German government’s White Paper on Multilateralism of May 2021, for example, primarily emphasises early and structural prevention – alongside efforts by the UN and the European Union (EU). It is gener­ally correct to start with the framework conditions in fragile states. However, longer-term projects, such as the reform of state institutions and multilateral formats, quickly reach their limits when political (and security) developments take a problematic turn. Moreover, the EU does not always have the necessary influence as an actor in these contexts.

The patterns of conflict in several contexts in recent years – including in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon – have shown that, when signs of desta­bilisation increase, it is not too late to act, but options are significantly narrowed. For example, it becomes more difficult to access areas with an eroding security situation, and thus to reach local actors (for dialogue processes, for example) and gather information. The respective government sometimes tries to play down violence and insecurity so as to conceal or dismiss the underlying causes. Moreover, extremist threats, as in the Sahel and the Lake Chad region, tend to be trans­national. But cooperation with neighbouring coun­tries is not always possible or desirable, especially when violence is already occurring. Under such con­ditions, development cooperation projects usually have to be scaled back or switched to “remote control”.

The example of Mozambique has recently highlighted the main problems arising in such a scenario. The lack of clarity in the situation leads some inter­national actors to react with a wait-and-see attitude, which is linked to the hope that the conflict could still develop differently. In the meantime, regional powers or other influential states may enter the scene and push for an “iron-fist” policy. State actors such as Russia or (more or less) private security companies are then on the spot and ready to intervene militarily at an early stage. But it is precisely this kind of repressive approach against violent extremist actors that often proves to be insufficient or even counterproductive. Security measures are certainly needed, at the latest when violence breaks out. However, these must be applied in a targeted and coordinated manner and complemented by other approaches. In addition, political channels should be used and offers of sup­port made before (African) states officially request military assistance.

In the past, the wait-and-see attitude also repeatedly put Germany in situations it actually wanted to avoid: ultimately having to decide on the deployment of its own military forces or being called upon to provide support for armed operations. The debate about the recent EU training mission in Mozambique is another example. Of course, the German government can hardly stop a crisis by itself. But it can provide more targeted support than in the past to influence devel­opments at critical junctures in such a way that they may develop in a more positive direction. Establishing and expanding channels of communication as well as linking structural and operational prevention measures are fundamentally important. To this end, Germany should position itself more firmly at an early stage when there are signs of a critical escalation and address “tricky” cases more decisively. Coun­tries such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Mozambique may not be very high on the foreign policy agenda. However, this was also true for Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan before the outbreaks of violence there – all countries where Germany has since spent considerable resources for stabilisation. Moreover, German interests in the sub-Saharan crisis zones are affected in many ways – whether regarding the causes of flight, terrorism, regional stability, and/or responsibilities towards partners and actors in the countries themselves.

Acting at critical junctures

A key to effective preventive action is a stronger focus on potential critical junctures , where pivotal decisions are made in an uncertain environment that set the course for a longer period. In retrospect, these junc­tures preceding the outbreak or escalation of armed conflict are relatively easy to identify. They are often associated with incisive events – such as coups, as in Mali in 2012; initial outbreaks of violence, such as the attack on a police station in northern Mozambique in October 2017; or harsh responses by the central state to protests, as in the Anglophone areas of Cameroon in 2016/2017 – each of which was then followed by further violence. Of course, critical junctures can also generate positive momentum, for example when new windows of opportunity open, as in the case of the transition in Sudan.

Such events with long reverberations are difficult to predict, but there are a number of signals along the way. In order not to miss possible entry points for (increased) engagement, discussions about potential critical junctures in the foreseeable future should be systematically included in conflict analysis and sce­nario planning. In this way, instances of increasing pressure and options for preventive action can be identified more concretely and earlier. This requires breaking away even further from the idea of a com­mon conflict cycle and analysing more specifically – on the basis of the case and the political environ­ment, both nationally and internationally – where there is scope for intervention.

Considering “atypical” courses of conflict

The precondition is a continuous examination of the situation as well as a consistent questioning of tradi­tional assumptions. External actors tend to continue to interpret crisis developments in one direction once they have been clearly perceived. In countries such as Burkina Faso and Mozambique, for example, extrem­ist threats had been taking shape for some time. When they became virulent, support was focused primarily on the military level. This reaction cor­responded to the preferences of the governments concerned but was also promoted by some European partners. Instead, it is important to explore starting points for prevention more thoroughly before secu­rity erodes and – in the event of actual destabilisa­tion – to continue to identify countervailing tenden­cies or divergent paths that do not necessarily lead directly to a military solution. It is debatable to what extent, for example, the support of the government of Burkina Faso for (local) negotiations with extremists in different parts of the country really was meant to be a way out of the mired “iron-fist” policy. But such processes could at least open a window of opportunity for other approaches. To assess such situations with regard to possible entry points for action, it is also necessary to sharpen one’s eye for potentially atypical courses of conflict. This, in turn, presupposes the further expansion of capacities for analysis and fore­sight in the ministries involved.

If the new Federal Government wants to make crisis prevention more effective, it must determine its own positions and the relationship of this goal to other objectives of German foreign policy. Only if there is support for this at a higher political level can prevention efforts be intensified before or during potential critical junctures. There is already awareness within the administration that it is essential to translate the results of early warning into early and substantive action. However, despite improved analysis, the meaning of “early” often remains a matter of discretion for the individual bureaucrats who decide about prioritising preventive measures in response to warning signs – or not.

Formative change needs leadership

Crisis prevention would have to be more firmly embedded in all the relevant ministries in order to be an integral part of the guiding principles of German foreign policy. In certain cases – for example, when Germany has vested interests and coordinated action with corresponding international visibility is called for – a stronger role of the chancellery might be nec­essary. In addition, crisis prevention needs to be per­manently embedded in day-to-day business in the form of a permanent focal point that integrates all the relevant ministries and provides them with the capacities to support those responsible for preventive measures in implementing their mandates. Finally, the Bundestag has an important role to play in criti­cally observing an approach for active crisis prevention.

A more proactive positioning of Germany in crisis prevention could meaningfully complement the work of the UN and the EU in this field. Experience shows that coordination processes can take a long time in these institutional contexts, resulting in critical win­dows of opportunity being missed. In this way, Ger­many could also meet the demand for a greater con­tribution to peace and security without having to resort to military intervention – which is highly controversial within the population – although secu­rity policy measures will continue to be part of the toolbox. For initiating political processes, the EU frame­work can be used in a more targeted manner. Where this path is blocked, Germany could lead the way with like-minded states (also outside Europe). This is particularly appropriate in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, where the German government has invested heavily in recent years to improve coopera­tion in the field of peace and security. Cooperation with the African Union and its sub-regional organi­sations could be further expanded here to broaden the scope for action.

For this conceptual change to take place, several preconditions must be met: In addition to data-based early warning, the country units in the respective ministries and the aforementioned institutional interfaces – and certainly also the embassies – need to be adequately equipped. In addition, the German government must bring political weight to bear – not only in concrete bilateral and regional cooperation, but also at the international level wherever necessary. Moreover, it is important to explore the broad spectrum of political and financial options – aimed at supporting not only the state level but also civil society actors – for managing critical junctures. In this sense, structural and operational prevention should be closely coordinated. 2

The course for such an active shaping of crisis pre­vention would have to be set at the beginning of the legislative period. Above all, Germany’s foreign policy profile needs to be clearly embedded in the agenda of the new Federal Government and in the inter-minis­terial cooperation as well as supported with the appropriate resources.

Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Nuclear Sharing. Germany’s European and Global Responsibility

Germany is committed to the transatlantic alliance and advocates for disarmament and the non-prolif­eration of nuclear weapons. Both political principles can be combined by declaration, but in practice they are in latent tension with each other. For this reason, Berlin’s arms control policy appears ambiguous and untrustworthy. In order to live up to its global and European responsibilities, a future German government must make its alliance and disarmament policy more coherent. This can succeed if it encourages the Biden administration in its deliberations on a change of strategy, makes more credible contributions to con­ventional alliance defence, and promotes a new beginning for conventional arms control in Europe more decidedly than before.

Balancing act between normative non-proliferation policy and nuclear sharing

On the one hand, Germany has committed itself to the status of a non-nuclear weapons state in both the Two Plus Four Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is obliged to renounce the production, acqui­sition, and control of nuclear weapons. According to the NPT, it must contribute towards their elimination.

On the other hand, Berlin supports the strategic con­cept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which defines itself as a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. Its policy of “extended deterrence” does not exclude the first use of nuclear weapons. To this end, the United States (US) has “stra­tegic” delivery systems with intercontinental range. Within the framework of nuclear sharing, it has also stationed “sub-strategic” (formerly: “tactical”) nuclear free-fall bombs in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany. In order to be able to use them in the event of war, these states keep their own nuclear-capable combat aircraft (dual-capable aircraft”, DCA) ready. Conventional air operations by seven other Allies are to support the DCA in penetrating protected airspace.

The prerequisite for allied deployments of nuclear weapons would be their release by the President of the United States. Prior to this, the NATO Council is to take a position. The Nuclear Planning Group discusses po­liti­cal principles of nuclear deterrence and pro­cedures in the event of the release of nuclear weap­ons. It in­cludes all Allies except France, which has an autono­mous nuclear strategy. Release procedures are planned by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, who is also the commander-in-chief of US forces in Europe.

In January 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force. It pro­hibits the support of nuclear weapons postures of other states. Therefore, Germany cannot join the TPNW as long as it supports NATO’s deterrence con­cept and adheres to nuclear sharing.

In addition, Berlin is of the opinion that the TPNW presents a normative goal, which it shares, but it is not proposing any concrete steps on how nuclear dis­armament can be advanced. Rather, it has deepened the political divisions among the NPT parties. To­gether with nuclear and non-nuclear states, Berlin wants to develop realistic prerequisites for effective disarmament. This would include comprehensive international verification of the life cycles of nuclear weapons, from the start of enrichment to the dis­mantl­ing of weapons-grade fissile material. This would be the only way to prevent individual actors from secretly retaining nuclear weapons in the final phase of disarmament.

This essentially useful approach, however, does not get to the heart of the problem, for in the view of the nuclear powers and their Allies, nuclear weapons are also intended to deter a conventional attack. This is particularly appealing to Allies of the US, who rely on the latter’s “positive nuclear security guarantees”. They consider the “negative security guarantees” that are given in the NPT context to be insufficient. These are commitments by nuclear powers to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, provided they belong to nuclear-weapon-free zones, abide by NPT obligations in a certifiable manner, do not attack the troops of the guarantor powers, and do not ally with other nuclear powers. Instead, strong military powers would have to credibly guarantee that they would also refrain from conventional attacks. The prerequisite for this, however, would be effective conventional arms control in the conflict regions of Europe, East and South Asia, and the Middle East – or a political settlement of the con­flicts.

Since neither of these is likely to occur in the fore­seeable future, the nuclear powers claim that the political situation does not allow them to fully com­ply with the disarmament obligation under Article VI of the NPT. But this obligation applies in principle and unconditionally. Therefore, they and their Allies are coming under increasing pressure to justify their position. Why should nuclear weapons – in con­tra­diction to NPT norms – be indispensable to preserve their national security, while all other states are obliged to renounce them? One can, of course, coun­ter this with arguments based on realpolitik. But these challenge the acceptance of the NPT, since it is obviously about preserving the global supremacy of the five official nuclear powers (P5). In the long run, this is likely to damage the normative approach of the NPT and jeopardise the goal of non-proliferation. The entry into force of the TPNW is a sign of growing impatience.

Thus, the German dual approach of advocating for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons and at the same time actively supporting nuclear security guarantees threatens to fail because of the inherent contradiction between postulated goals and real action.

The credibility dilemma of nuclear first‑use

Doubts about the credibility of the nuclear escalation threat have also gained new relevance since NATO’s return to extended deterrence. For 50 years, the US and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) have accepted parity in “strategic” delivery systems and regularly ensured the continuation of “second-strike capability” through arms control treaties. Since that time, both sides have had the ability to launch devastating coun­ter-attacks if attacked with nuclear weapons on their own territory (“first strike”). The “mutually assured destruction capability” realistically excludes a “stra­tegic” nuclear escalation against the core territories (“sanctuaries”) of both states.

Therefore, there is a danger that escalation could occur at the expense of Allies with “tactical” nuclear weapons (TNWs). For Bonn, the idea that divided Germany could become a “nuclear battlefield” was unacceptable. Therefore, NATO’s “flexible response” strategy left it open as to when, how, and where the alliance would respond with nuclear weapons in the event of war, and it provided for a graduated, initially selective escalation. Although this strategy is no longer used, its purpose remains to threaten the aggres­sor with incalculable risks that would be out of all rea­son­able proportion to conceivable gains.

Nuclear sharing is a legacy of the Cold War that has remained untouched to this day. At the time, Bonn permitted the stationing of some 5,000 US TNWs and provided hundreds of German Army and Air Force delivery systems. Alongside the US and the United Kingdom, West Germany thus secured a special say in the formulation of the NATO nuclear con­cept. But then, as now, only the US President decides on nuclear escalation and the “release” of US nuclear weapons to German units. Priority is given to the national security interests of the US.

However, the political and military situations have changed fundamentally. Germany is united; the War­saw Pact and the Soviet Union have disintegrated; the enlarged NATO extends 1,000 km east of the Elbe River. It is conventionally superior to Russia. None­theless, NATO “frontline states” fear an attack by Rus­sian forces that could concentrate sub-regionally more rapidly than those of its Allies. The alliance has been responding to this since 2014 with military reinforcement measures.

The US and Russia have significantly reduced the number of their strategic nuclear weapons since 1990 and withdrawn and reduced the mass of TNWs from Europe. But neither the nuclear powers (except China) nor NATO have renounced the option of nuclear first-use. Currently, 100 to 150 US B61 nuclear free-fall bombs are stationed in Europe, including about 20 at Büchel for use by German Tornado DCA. In addition, there are about 500 French and British nuclear weap­ons, mainly on submarines, which are classified as “strategic” but are not subject to arms control rules.

Russia still has about 1,800 TNWs. However, they are not operationally collocated with the delivery systems, but are stored securely on both sides of the Urals, from Europe to the Far East. They are earmarked not only for land systems, but also for mari­time missions or air and missile defence. Moscow’s risk calculus must include seven neighbouring nuclear powers. According to its nuclear doctrine, nuclear weapons will be used only in the event of an “existential threat” to Russia.

However, the strategic dilemma of NATO’s extended deterrence persists. If nuclear strikes with TNWs were carried out in the “sanctuary” of a nuclear power, a strategic counterattack against the territory of the attacking nuclear power would have to be expected, regardless of the nationality of the pilot who drops the bomb. This still raises the question of whether a regionally limited nuclear war can be realistically conducted and controlled. The Trump administration took that up in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and reintroduced low-yield warheads. However, the Cen­tral European “glacis” of non-Soviet allies of Moscow disappeared after 1990. If the US wants to avoid a strategic counterstrike, it would have to conduct nuclear strikes with TNWs on the territory of Allies or over the sea. Extended deterrence, which must be narrowed down to the use of nuclear weapons at the expense of Allies, however, is as irrational and unacceptable as strategic escalation.

Political stability considerations and conclusions

Germany’s nuclear participation today is more politi­cally than militarily motivated: NATO “frontline states” in particular believe that US nuclear weapons in Germany – as the most important non-nuclear ally and strategic hub of the alliance – are indispen­sable to bind the US to Europe and deter Russia.

In the traditional calculation of the Western powers, nuclear sharing had yet another significance: Dependence on US “nuclear protection” defined Ger­many’s security status after 1945. It helped to prevent Germany from going it alone. West Germany was not to acquire nuclear weapons. Mainly for this reason, the US, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union jointly pushed the NPT in the 1960s: The number of nuclear powers was to be permanently limited to themselves plus France and the People’s Republic of China. Thus, the Federal Republic re­mained dependent on the extended deterrence of the US if it and the Allies wanted to prevent an attack or, if this failed, to stop it through nuclear escalation. With the stationing of US nuclear weapons and nuclear sharing, Germany demonstrated its willingness to “outsource” its security needs, link them closely to the US, and share the burdens and risks of deterrence to a greater extent than other Allies.

The decision on the future of nuclear sharing is thus first and foremost a question of the political emancipation of sovereign Germany after 1990. But the consequences for European stability must be considered, as well as those for the credibility of its disarmament and non-proliferation policy. The latter would be strengthened if Berlin were to withdraw from nuclear sharing and communicate this as being a contribution to global disarmament. As a political signal, such a step would give positive momentum to the NPT process. However, its effect on the nuclear powers’ willingness to disarm should not be over­estimated.

On the other hand, a move away from nuclear involve­ment would change Germany’s position in the post-war structure of Europe and arouse mistrust among some Allies. It would force NATO to change its military deterrence structure. Above all, a uni­lateral withdrawal would raise doubts about Germa­ny’s loyalty to the alliance – especially in Europe’s current security crisis – and divide it. Deploying nuclear weapons in NATO “frontline” states, as has already been considered there, would mean a breach of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and would trigger Russian countermeasures. While this would not be in the interest of the US, Berlin must consider the con­sequences for European stability when deciding on the continued deployment of US nuclear weapons and the procurement of a new nuclear-capable com­bat aircraft.

In order to live up to its European and global respon­sibilities, Berlin should consider new options for action. These could develop from the strategic stability talks and a New Start follow-up agreement between the US and Russia. Both powers have an inter­est in expanding the treaty framework to include sub-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. If overall ceilings for all nuclear weap­ons were agreed and geostrategic asymmetries were taken into account, a withdrawal of deployed US TNWs from Europe would be an option, provided that Russia also reduces its TNWs and subjects them to a transparency regime. There is room for negotiation for this in Moscow as well.

If a new German government wants to change the nuclear sharing status without exposing itself to the risk of isolation, it must refrain from going it alone nationally. Instead, it should encourage Washington to seek a New Start follow-up agreement with an expanded regulatory framework that allows for the withdrawal of TNWs from Europe. At the same time, it should encourage the US administration to consider moving to a sole-purpose strategy. Its purpose would be to deter potential adversaries from nuclear first-use, rather than threatening first-use itself in con­ven­tional scenarios. To this end, Berlin must coordinate with like-minded states and clearly position itself within the alliance, which intends to adopt a new strategic concept in 2022.

In order to consolidate its credibility as a reliable alliance partner, Berlin should provide rapidly avail­able, fully equipped, and robust large-scale forma­tions for the defence of the alliance. It must also work more vigorously to renew conventional arms control in Europe in order to contain threat perceptions.

A Club of Democratic Market Economies in Response to China’s Mercantilism?

The shaping of future political and economic rela­tions with the People’s Republic of China preoccupies governments around the world. However, many observers assume that the decision for or against the expansion of economic relations with China is one that the industrialised countries – jointly or uni­laterally – could make. In fact, the die has already been cast: China’s state and party leaders want to reduce the country’s dependence on imports and are focusing on self-sufficiency in key production sectors. Beijing is partially turning its back on the previous form of globalisation and abandoning the longstand­ing consensus on the benefits of the international division of labour.

Certainly, at first glance it appears that China’s leadership is striving for a dominant position in inter­national politics, for example through the measures of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In fact, however, the BRI only serves to export temporary overcapacity. In the long term, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is aiming to reduce the country’s interdependencies with the rest of the world. Wherever possible, China’s strategists plan to replace foreign products with domestically produced ones. The People’s Republic is decoupling itself. 1 Beijing is thus at least relying on classical mercantilism, possibly even on autarky.

The strategy of the state and party leadership is not limited to trade policy. Cultural exchanges are also to be reduced. At the country’s universities, the works of foreign scholars are no longer to be part of the teach­ing programme to the same extent as before. A high-ranking CCP official called in March 2021 for the abo­lition of English classes in schools and universities: This knowledge would no longer be needed. 2

Market economies are being forced by China’s new economic policy to take a stand. Therefore, the estab­lishment of a club of democratic market economies could be a possible reaction to Beijing’s politically motivated autarky and its adherence to state capitalist structures.

Preference for economic autonomy

China’s retreat into the domestic economy appears surprising at first glance. After opening up its econo­my at the end of the 1970s, the country developed into a centre of industrial production. Since then, the Chi­nese economy has benefited from the deepening of the international division of labour.

Against this backdrop, it would be reasonable to assume that the Chinese leadership would see the coun­try’s integration into the global economy as ben­eficial and would open up the country’s economy further. Today, however, the Communist Party and its General Secretary, Xi Jinping, are focusing on the coun­try’s far-reaching self-sufficiency. This new strat­egy finds its programmatic expression in the current Five-Year Plan, which was adopted at the end of 2020.

Back in November 2018, General Secretary Xi felt the time had come for a renaissance of Mao’s trade policy. Xi lamented that it was increasingly difficult to source high technology from abroad. The growing protectionism of other economies is forcing China to take the path of self-sufficiency, he said. 3

In October 2020, Xi concretised his foreign economic policy reform plans. The strategy, called “double circulation”, has two central elements: China is to become less dependent on foreign countries by strength­ening domestic production and demand. At the same time, Xi wants to ensure that the People’s Republic remains indispensable for international production networks. 4

For many centuries, Chinese economic policy favoured self-sufficiency and remained sceptical of the international division of labour. The opening of the country to European imports enforced by Great Britain in the mid-19th century fed these reservations.

Today’s form of globalisation, however, is based on diametrically opposed assumptions: The vast majority of economists and the governments of countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel­opment (OECD) are convinced of the economic benefits of the international division of labour. Free trade allows companies to specialise and has con­tributed significantly to the increases in prosperity of recent decades.

But why is China pursuing this economically im­plausible policy? It would be a misconception to suggest that Xi Jinping’s strategy is primarily about maximising economic benefits. The general secretary is working primarily to consolidate the CCP’s power. No other political goal is nearly as important. Xi fears that continuing on the current economic policy course could lead to an undermining of the party’s hitherto unchallenged position. For the CCP, ex­changes with foreign countries entail the risk that China could become vulnerable, for example through bans on high-tech exports.

Consequences for Germany and the global economy

In Germany, it is repeatedly emphasised how impor­tant trade with China and the investments made there are for the country’s own economy. This atti­tude is increasingly being viewed with scepticism abroad. 5 At the same time, China is not irreplaceable. Germany trades significantly more with the three Eastern European economies of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary than with China. At €185.4 billion, the exchange of goods with Poland and Hungary was already more extensive than that with the People’s Republic in 2019.

However, a complete picture also includes the Ger­man economy’s investments in China. For the Ger­man automotive industry in particular, economies of scale – the fall in construction costs per unit as the num­ber of units grows – are an important factor in the devel­opment of vehicles. However, these economies of scale mainly benefit the companies’ shareholders, while those employed domestically only benefit to a limited extent.

In mid-July 2021, Friedrich Merz warned German companies against continuing to rely so heavily on business with China. At the same time, he called for a new China strategy from the German government. Germany should not only cooperate with the US in its policy towards Beijing, but also with the United King­dom (UK), Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, he said. Merz described the dependence of the Ger­man economy on China as “too great”. He advised companies to forgo business once in a while and not to become too tied to trade with the People’s Repub­lic. 6

Change through trade?

Today, the European Union (EU) is debating future external economic relations with China. What an­swers does the EU have with regard to Beijing’s depar­ture from the international division of labour? Would it not be appropriate to break new ground in inter­national economic relations without the People’s Repub­lic of China?

There is little evidence at present to support the expectation that China will change. Against this back­ground, it seems entirely appropriate and necessary to develop concepts for the reorganisation of multi­lateral trade relations that will help to break the dead­lock in the World Trade Organization (WTO) that has persisted for almost 20 years. Moreover, so far there are no plausible proposals on how to overcome the special treatment in the WTO of economies that classify themselves as developing countries.

If one were to follow the idea of waiting for a change in Chinese economic policy and a move to­wards acceptance of market economy rules, this would mean continuing with the status quo. This would result in foregoing further development of the WTO, because neither China will change to a market econo­my, nor will the US stand by Beijing’s continued dis­regard for the principles of the WTO and still agree to strengthen the organisation. The WTO would not disappear in such a course of action, but it would slide into irrelevance.

New directions in trade policy?

There is no doubt that the People’s Republic of China is not the only country that has only half-heartedly supported or even ignored the letter and spirit of the multilateral trade regime. India, South Africa, and, of course, the US have recently blocked further devel­op­ment of the WTO. The US partially crippled the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism by preventing the backfilling of judges’ posts. 7 The significant increase in free trade agreements – the number of which has more than quintupled from 99 to 568 in the 2000 to 2021 period – reflects scepticism about the WTO. 8 But according to former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, for example, China remains the most important problem in reforming the WTO. In 2018, he already saw the incompatibility of the glob­alised market economy with the Chinese state econo­my as being the main obstacle on the path to a reorgani­sation of the institution. 9

Should the Europeans decide to break new ground in trade policy, there are three options. The first is to rebuild the WTO and eliminate some of its current structural flaws. This would include the exclusion of states whose economies are very much shaped by the state. However, this would split the world into a free-market part and the China-led bloc of non-market economies.

The second option is the creation of a trade policy club of like-minded states in a large free trade area. The 38 member countries of the OECD could establish an OECD free trade area.

Even if the OECD was not founded to organise trade policy cooperation, the circle of member coun­tries of this organisation is very well-suited to be a new platform for international economic cooperation in the geopolitical conflict between the US and China. The OECD free trade area could be open to all states that are willing to observe market economy principles and act in a rules-based manner.

The third and most compelling alternative would be to expand an existing free trade area into a new global group. This could be, for example, the already existing agreement of Pacific Rim countries, the Com­prehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This treaty, originally known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, would offer the possi­bility of concluding a comparatively ambitious agree­ment and organising the trade relations of the most important industrialised countries within this frame­work.

At first glance, the suggestion that the EU could join an agreement in the Indo-Pacific region seems very far-fetched and almost audacious. In fact, how­ever, the EU already has a strong presence as a trad­ing partner in the region and is also negotiating, or has already concluded, a free trade agreement with all CPTPP member countries – except Brunei – for example with Mexico and Canada.

The CPTPP, which may be renamed and in the future be referred to more generally as the Compre­hensive Agreement for International Partnership, could become the future club of market economies. The UK already applied to join this free trade area in early 2021 after leaving the EU. Both the EU and the US could follow suit. Certainly, even a large club would only be the second-best solution. The silver bullet in trade policy remains multilateral regulation. But in view of the WTO’s design flaws, which were also diagnosed by the new Director General, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, in July 2021, the search for alternative regimes is the order of the day. 10

A free trade area involving the EU, the US, Japan, and the UK would be a powerful trade bloc. It would have to be open to all applicant economies, provided they are willing to meet the conditions of membership. At the same time, the EU would have bundled its trade relations in the Indo-Pacific region into a single agreement and concluded a trade agreement with the US. The market-based economies, which are currently waiting tensely for the latest decisions in Beijing, would, with the creation of this club, estab­lish the basis for the future organisation of inter­national economic relations.

Readjusting and Refocusing Germany’s European Policy

High expectations are being placed on Germany’s European policy. This was clearly visible before the German government took over the presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) from 1 July to 31 December 2020. The hopes that were placed on Berlin proved to be extremely varied: While the Netherlands expected Germany to support them in maintaining budgetary discipline, Italy had hoped for more soli­darity and understanding for its financial situation. The situation was similar with regard to asylum and migration. Which position should Germany have supported? Denmark’s proposal to process asylum applications before entry in the future, Greece’s deci­sion to make Turkey a safe third country, or Italy’s plan to allow asylum seekers to move on within the Schengen Area? Finally, there was the European Com­mission’s plan to hand over asylum applications to an EU agency. 1

Courage to change shape in European policy despite pressure to adapt

The primary task of German European policy is to coordinate efforts to reconcile the differing positions of the member states, or even to provide unilateral inputs in order to facilitate consensus-building. Thus, the motto of the German presidency of the Council of the EU was “Together for Europe’s recovery”. 2 In its review of the six-month presidency, the Federal Gov­ernment noted that it had succeeded in strengthening solidarity among the member states and improving the EU’s ability to act externally. Nevertheless, it admitted that this was only a “foundation” and that only important “cornerstones” had been set for “the way out of the crisis”. 3 The EU is thus still in a criti­cal situation that affects nearly all policy areas. Ger­many can therefore no longer limit itself to the role of mediator of national interests and should see the current crisis as an opportunity to open up new areas for shaping policy.

This is because Brexit has decisively changed the balance of power within the EU. Following the depar­ture of the United Kingdom (UK), a political force has now gone that was sceptical about projects of differ­entiated integration, 4 such as the Eurozone and the Schengen Area. London’s credo has always been the “Europe of homelands”, that is, close cooperation between states that act as sovereignly as possible. Although France prefers a communitarisation of the tasks of nation-states, it is currently not utilising Brexit to pursue this strategy. On the contrary, a few days after the Brexit withdrawal agreement came into force, the French president announced that France “wants to remain sovereign or determine for itself […] which transfers of sovereignty it agrees to and which binding cooperation projects it enters into”. 5 If Ger­many does not want to become a pawn of other EU member states, it must think more about its own inter­ests in the future and include them in the dis­course.

The EU is not Europe – EU enlargement does not happen on its own

A rethinking seems appropriate, first of all with the use of the term “Europe”. Increasingly, it is being used synonymously with the EU, which leads to mis­conceptions. This gives the impression that the EU is the only integration project and that there is no alternative to its deepening and enlargement strategy. However, some European states, such as the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – Ice­land, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Norway – are not seeking EU membership. The UK also now belongs to this group of economically powerful coun­tries. In addition, some EU members reject additional integration steps, with the result that a continuation of the deepening agenda could lead to further with­drawals, such as that of Poland. Moreover, there have been violations of the EU treaties, which has led to discussions on expulsion from the Union, as in the case of Hungary. After all, only those countries hop­ing to solve their economic crises or simply gain more security, such as the Western Balkans, are still seek­ing to join the EU.

On the other hand, it would be more effective to give more responsibility to European organisations – which, like the EU, contribute to peacekeeping and cooperation in Europe – and to demand that they take their own initiatives. This applies to EFTA, the Nordic Council, the Central European Free Trade Agreement in south-eastern Europe, and even to the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This would be entirely in line with a multilateral approach – something that the EU’s High Represen­tative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, seeks to strengthen in the 21st century. 6 As a consequence, the European Commission would have to forego the leadership role it is now striving for in many policy fields worldwide. Indeed, multilateralism is based on the “principle of the sovereign equality” of states enshrined in international law. 7 Influential countries, such as the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, are suspected of securing leading positions in multilateral forums in order to cover up violations of international laws or more effectively assert their own interests. 8 This criticism applies not only to China and Russia, but equally to the United States and EU member states.

Strengthening intergovernmental cooperation within the EU‑27

The multilateral approach is already evident in the intergovernmental cooperation of the EU‑27, for example in foreign policy, because the competences in this policy field lie with the nation-states. The Union’s foreign and security policy is based on con­sultations and requires unanimous decisions in the European Council. In addition, beyond the supra­national level, there are examples of multilateral cooperations within the EU, some of which even have institutionalised formats: the Franco-German Parlia­mentary Assembly, the Visegrád Group, and the Nordic Council. These forms of cooperation should be appre­ciated as a contribution towards European integration, even if they do not entail communitarisation. Finally, the concept of “differentiated integration” also follows the multilateral or intergovernmental approach. According to it, EU member states can con­tractually agree to cooperate, even outside of EU law. Examples of when this has occurred are the negotiations on the Schengen Treaty, the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal Com­pact, and the Euro Plus Pact. 9

When the European Commission initiates infringe­ment proceedings against member states, as it is cur­rently doing, and tensions build between the supra­national and national levels, these multilateral formats are particularly useful. They can open com­munication channels in situations where confronta­tion would otherwise prevail. Thus, for Germany, good neighbourly relations with Poland are more important than the Commission’s complaints against Warsaw with regard to gender education. 10 At the end of 2020, German-Polish relations actually served as a bridge in the adoption of the EU budget, which Hungary and Poland had opposed. Another example of how bilateral or multilateral relations within the Union can help to solve problems are the so-called Dublin cases, that is, asylum seekers who submit their applications in an EU country other than the one stipulated by the Dublin Regulation. Since insti­tutions in Brussels do not (or cannot) offer a solution here, the member states have taken initiatives. 11 One result is the German-Spanish repatriation agreement.

Reshaping EU relations with EFTA and the United Kingdom

Despite approval of the withdrawal agreement with the UK at the end of 2020, relations between the EU and its member states and the UK remain tense. This is due to disagreements over the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol annexed to the treaty. These differences are rooted in the conflicting national interests of the UK and the Republic of Ireland, and thus a centuries-old conflict that has so far been mitigated due to EU membership. However, Germany should not take sides – at most, it should intervene as a mediator. It has no interest in pursuing a con­fron­tational course, as it did during the Brexit nego­tiations; after all, the UK is a very important trading partner. The British-German summit at the beginning of July 2021 was therefore a good start for establish­ing a new contractual basis for the relationship.

In this context, German European policy should take account of the relations that the UK establishes with other European organisations. After all, follow­ing Brexit, the UK left the European Economic Area and instead concluded an EU free trade agreement (2021). It is now in a special position similar to that of the EFTA states, which have also entered into their own free trade agreements with the EU. Since the beginning of 2020, these countries have been offering the UK accession to EFTA. But the government in London has so far only signed a new trade agreement with EFTA (20 July 2021). This is because, in the long term, it is seeking more comprehensive agreements with a wide range of states. Switzerland is also seen as a strategic ally on the financial policy level.

Dealing with the EU neighbourhood (Western Balkans, Eastern Europe)

The EU enlargement policy has raised great expecta­tions among the candidate countries, so much so that the states concerned, such as Albania, Serbia, Monte­negro, and North Macedonia, are now demanding membership. The degree to which this is happening is distracting from the fact that they do not fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, despite an accession process that has lasted around 20 years: They have neither stable democratic institutions nor functioning market econo­mies. 12 Another factor is also working against early accession to the EU: their unwillingness to establish good neighbourly relations in their region. The “Ber­lin Process”, initiated by the German government in 2014, could not change this either. German European policy should change course here and make it clearer that these states have no place in the EU without mak­ing efforts towards peaceful coexistence.

The states associated with the EU without accession prospects (Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of Mol­dova) are still closely intertwined with the post-Soviet area, the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), and the Commonwealth of In­dependent States (CIS). Tensions between the EU and Russia therefore affect the stability of these countries. This is evident in the territorial conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. Concepts that allow for overlapping areas of integration between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU, Russia, Belarus, and Arme­nia) would be helpful here. While this was ruled out in the case of Ukraine, it was already feasible in the case of the EU partnership agreement with Armenia. 13 Germany’s European policy could motivate Brussels to follow Armenia’s example and make such coopera­tion possible for other countries as well.

Rethinking and Redirecting: Germany’s Security Policy Needs Mental and Material Empowerment

For years, there has been a gap in Germany between the importance of security policy and the esteem with which it is held by German policymakers, the media, and the public at large. This discrepancy is reflected in the criticism of the Bundeswehr mission in Af­ghani­stan as being part of an utter failure by the West. However, it was not the Bundeswehr that failed, but rather a political strategy that was marred by a calami­tous mismatch between goals and means.

The Afghanistan experience makes it an even more urgent matter to rethink and redirect German secu­rity policy. The formidable task before Germany’s next government and parliament is twofold. Firstly, politi­cal leaders should vigorously raise the public’s aware­ness about the continued need for protection pro­vid­ed by military forces and German membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Secondly, they must act accord­ingly, namely by better equipping the Bundes­wehr, pursuing greater European autonomy, and being prepared to take on robust and risky assignments in collective operations. Such a mental and material enhancement should consist of an 11-point agenda.

Within a time span of 15 years, two German presi­dents have observed that their fellow countrymen have shown “friendly disinterest” in the Bundeswehr: Horst Köhler in 2005 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Bundeswehr’s establishment, and Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2020 on the 65th anni­versary. 1 Their diagnoses are a testament to a severe failure: German governments as well as Members of Parliament have neglected to convey to the popu­lation that the Bundeswehr is pivotal to Germany’s security, the protection provided through its NATO and EU membership, as well as an effective foreign policy. Tellingly, the assistance provided by the Bun­deswehr during the Corona pandemic and in the after­math of disastrous floods was highly appreciated and received with universal applause. This recognition was well-deserved, but “armed forces” are not created for such civilian missions. The raison d’être of the military is the preventive and reactive manage­ment of violence: the prevention of war and aggression through deterrence, that is, the threat of coun­tervailing force, or, if deterrence fails, the use of the military to contain and end violence.

Why German security policy needs to be enhanced

Security policy is more than conflict management by military force. It must be embedded into an overarching strategy that focuses on conflict prevention and resolution with non-violent, that is, political and diplo­matic, economic and financial means. In this sense, the widely applied mantra in Germany that “there are no military solutions” is true. Since con­flicts have causes other than purely military ones, they cannot be resolved militarily. But this truism should not be misused as a justification for avoiding difficult decisions on the deployment and use of military means.

The same applies to the often-employed “culture of military restraint”. There are several explanations why such an approach is ennobled with the term “culture” in Germany. First, there is history. Germany’s economic resurgence, its democratisation, and its regaining of political sovereignty by embedding the country in NATO under United States (US) leadership and through the process of European unification – these post-war developments would have been im­possible without a credible renunciation of Nazi-type militarisation and aggression.

Second, the Bundeswehr was founded for and inte­grated into NATO from the outset; military operations other than in defence of the country and NATO mem­bers were not envisaged. Since the end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr has been deployed for purposes other than national and alliance defence. However, two things have not changed: Germany remains depend­ent on the support of its allies for its defence. Secondly, Germany never acts alone – it deploys its armed forces only in joint operations with partners. Consequently, in contrast to states of comparable size, Germany has not (yet) had to develop a strategic culture that is based on strictly national interests and informed by independent military operations.

Finally, there is a third reason for military restraint that is not rooted in specific German characteristics. It has a structural and pragmatic aspect. Inevitably, the mere existence of armed forces signals mistrust, for there would be no need for them if – as in the EU – a non-violent settlement of conflicts were the uni­versally respected norm. Hence, even a military pos­ture that is meant to be defensive – but is not per­ceived as such by others – can lead to an arms race and war-prone tensions.

The pragmatic aspect relates to the experiences with failed interventions, such as in Iraq and Libya. After nearly 20 years, the Afghanistan mission ended in a botched withdrawal and a return to power of the Taliban. Still, it would be fallacious to see the Afghanistan debacle as evidence that there can be no military solutions. The Taliban defeated NATO troops and the Afghan army. Although their victory does not solve Afghanistan’s problems, the Taliban wore down the US and regained power through force.

Afghanistan offers no reason to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Among the lessons of the inter­vention is the trivial but crucial insight that, although armed forces can only be successful as part of a multi-dimensional strategy guiding their application, they are indispensable to such a strategy. 2

Thus, Germany will continue to require a military anchor to safeguard its core foreign policy interests of peace, security, welfare, and cooperation. Since it can only realise these interests as a member of the EU and NATO, the anchor must be a collective backstop to which Germany must make a proper military con­tri­bution. For years, Germany has not fulfilled this require­ment. It has consistently underperformed with respect to NATO’s goal of spending 2 per cent of a coun­try’s gross domestic product on defence by 2024 at the latest. The Bundeswehr suffers from massive equipment deficiencies, and the public’s awareness of security risks is lacking.

At the same time, Germany’s security situation has deteriorated: Russia’s domestic weaknesses are fuell­ing outward aggressiveness under Putin’s leadership; an autocratic China sees itself in the global ascendancy and is behaving as such; the American-Chinese rivalry is heating up; and Germany’s most important non-Euro­pean partner remains domestically polarised even after the change from Trump to Biden, raising doubts about its reliability and demanding more mili­tary self-reliance from its European allies. In addition, there are persistent regional conflicts in the Middle East, bilateral tensions between nuclear powers, as well as terrorist and cyber threats.

For Germany to successfully meet these challenges, the mental gap between the importance of security policy and the esteem with which it is held by policy­makers, the media, and the public at large must be closed. Military-backed risk prevention and management must be seen for what they are: vital to Ger­many’s democratic stability, sustainable prosperity, and political self-determination. This requires that the government and parliamentarians be ready to confront the public’s “friendly disinterest” in matters of the military, equip the armed forces with appro­priate matériel, and contribute to NATO, the EU, and other formats to a level commensurate with Germa­ny’s size and interests.

An 11-point agenda to enhance German security policy

1. The key is a change in mindset among policy­makers and their willingness to speak plainly to the public: The military and armaments are irreplaceable security policy instruments. As such, they are not an unwelcome necessity but in line with Germany’s values and serve its interest in peace, security, wel­fare, and cooperation.

2. The raison d’être of the military is managing violence and the threat thereof. Its dual nature should be emphatically stated publicly: the indispen­sable protection provided by armed forces and the concomitant requirement of threatening or using force when necessary.

3. This also applies to the most horrendous military means of all. Germany has renounced the devel­op­ment and deployment of nuclear weapons under international law. Yet, it remains dependent on others to protect it from blackmail and aggression by nuclear-armed opponents. Preventing and defusing war-prone conflicts is primarily a political task, to be achieved through détente and cooperation, including arms control and disarmament agreements. But there will be a need for nuclear deterrence as long as cur­rent or potential hostilities are not replaced by a com­munity of trust in which, as in today’s EU, war has become inconceivable. Therefore, Germany cannot and should not accede to the Treaty on the Prohibi­tion of Nuclear Weapons.

4. Germany needs nuclear-armed protectors, first and foremost the US. Yet, this nuclear dependency points to an even more fundamental truth: Germany can only safeguard its security collectively, that is, in an alliance with partners – the most important of which is NATO, with the US as its nuclear backbone.

5. NATO’s modus operandi is reciprocity through each member contributing to the collective good for mutual protection. Germany is shirking its obligation to spend 2 per cent of its gross domestic product on defence by 2024 at the latest. If the government does not consider such a benchmark meaningful, it should argue for a revision that takes into account criteria other than financial input.

6. Reciprocity of risk- and burden-sharing includes nuclear-sharing in the form of US nuclear weapons, which are stored in European countries (besides Ger­many, also in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy) and, in the event of war, would be delivered to their targets by aircraft from these countries. A unilateral German withdrawal from this arrangement would be unwise and demonstrate a lack of solidarity with its American and European allies. Therefore, the next German government must develop a new fighter jet to replace the obsolete Tornados. 3

7. The Afghanistan debacle does not demonstrate the ineffectuality of military means. Rather, the key lesson is that goals and means must go hand in hand. The goal of stabilising Afghanistan and setting in motion a sustainable transition was missed. Unless the goal was inherently illusory, the means and methods used might have been unsuitable, or Washington and its allies lacked the patience for them to bear fruit. There is no doubt, however, that whatever chance to succeed there might have been, it required over­throw­ing the Taliban regime, defeating al-Qaeda, and providing military provision for civil reconstruction assistance.

8. The Bundeswehr is afflicted by crippling equip­ment shortfalls. Providing it with the weapons and matériel that it needs and its members deserve should be a priority of the next government and Bundestag. This should include the procurement of armed drones for soldiers’ protection.

9. Notwithstanding that NATO and the US remain Germany’s security backstop for the foreseeable future, Berlin should vigorously advocate for greater European autonomy. Washington will increasingly leave the handling of conflicts in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood (e.g. the Balkans, North Africa) to its European partners. More fundamentally, unilateral dependencies exact a price, even among friends. The Biden administration’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan without properly consulting its European allies has shown this once again. 4

10. Berlin can only achieve greater autonomy to­gether with Paris. After Brexit, France is a fortiori the only partner that can offer Germany nuclear reas­sur­ance in the event that the American commitment erodes. Hence, after the French presidential election in spring 2022, and as envisaged in the “Aachen” Franco-German Treaty of 22 January 2019, Berlin should seek a substantial deepening of bilateral cooperation, provided this is possible with the next leadership in Paris. To this end, the long-standing offer of Emmanuel Macron to discuss a prospective European dimension of Force de frappe should finally be taken up.

11. More autonomy, including through a closer alliance with France, will demand a great deal of Germany. For joint armaments projects to succeed, German export guidelines cannot be the sole yard­stick. Furthermore, Germany would have to make concessions to partners with different strategic cul­tures and interests when it comes to deciding where, when, and how to deploy joint forces, and its partners would expect Berlin to incur greater risks in combat operations. However, shirking such engagement is not an option for a country that cannot defend itself alone but has considerable resources to create an en­vironment – in Europe and beyond – that is con­ducive to promoting peace, security, welfare, and co­operation.

The European Security Order in a Geopolitical World

Germany’s security and defence policy will remain oriented towards multilateralism after the Bundestag elections. In order to meet Germany’s obligations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Berlin has steadily increased its defence budget in recent years. Within the framework of the European Union (EU), the Federal Republic has been making particular efforts in this area since 2016 to close existing capa­bility gaps. Both are essential because, under Presi­dent Joseph Biden, the United States (US) expects more autonomous engagement from its partners in security and defence policy, while supporting the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in principle. 1 Since early summer 2020, the EU member states have also been working on a “Strategic Com­pass”. In the document, the 27 capitals want to define which goals they wish to accomplish jointly in secu­rity and defence policy and which capabilities they need for this. A similar strategy process is taking place in NATO. Here, as there, Germany must focus the attention of its allies above all on the question of how the growing influence of third countries is currently changing the European security order and how it can be contained. Closely linked to this is the challenge of sustaining and improving the political capacities of the EU and NATO for action.

Dwindling influence in a changed geopolitical environment

The European security order is under pressure to adapt to the changed conditions of the international system. Rivalries between major powers have in­creased and led to a “geopoliticisation” of foreign policy, which runs counter to the kind of security order that the Charter of Paris was intended to estab­lish in 1990. In this Charter, the signatory states pledged to guarantee democracy and the rule of law, settle disputes peacefully, uphold human rights, respect the borders of other states, and not interfere in their internal affairs. Today, this claim is being challenged by foreign policies that are aimed at domi­nating or influencing specific geographical areas. A number of European states, most notably Russia and Turkey, have abandoned the normative consensus and are moving – at different speeds – towards authori­tarianism. Their foreign policies are losing predictability but are generally aimed at undermining the principles of the Euro-Atlantic security order, reck­lessly pursuing national interests, and influenc­ing Europe’s periphery. In addition, China is also trying to influence the Euro-Atlantic region, for exam­ple through large-scale infrastructure projects and direct influence on the policies of Western institutions.

The number of countries that view themselves, at least to some extent, as “European powers” has thus increased significantly. They challenge political insti­tutions whose ability to ensure peace and security in Europe remains limited. This is particularly evident in the case of the EU. For 20 years following the end of the East-West conflict, it was almost the sole for­mative power for the Euro-Atlantic area and its eastern and south-eastern periphery – the countless cooperation agreements and programmes offered to the countries of this region are impressive proof of this. In the meantime, however, this area has become subject to fierce regional competition. In the case of Russia, this is not surprising given its geographic loca­tion. What is new, however, is that countries such as China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates are seeking to shape the European neigh­bourhood in their own interests and to present themselves as providers of alternative models of order. This limits the EU’s influence, confronts it with new kinds of security challenges, and calls for a new “geopolitical foreign policy”.

What power politics, with what partners?

In view of an emerging “concert of powers”, that is, a multipolar system as the organising principle in inter­national relations, the German government will soon have to answer two questions in the EU, and pro­spectively also in NATO:

Do the member states specifically want to develop the EU or NATO into one of those power centres to which other actors orient themselves and gear their foreign policy? And if so, what steps would have to be taken to meet the demands of a geopolitical foreign policy? Such an orientation, which would give the EU and NATO the necessary influence, would also have a normative dimension: “Space” and “power” instead of “values” and “law” would then be the guiding categories for action. Shaping the European neighbourhood would then primarily mean exerting influence on it in order to contain the policies of other actors.

With which partners and in which institutional arrangements can the normative remnants of the “Paris Consensus” be preserved under fundamen­tally changed conditions?

In terms of its internal structure and foreign policy self-perception, the EU is not well-equipped for an era of great power rivalries. It was created precisely as a counter-design to the disastrous European great power politics of the first half of the 20th century; it is a union of states, still decides on its foreign policy with unanimity, and defines itself largely as a civilian power that deliberately dispenses with instruments of “hard power”. There is no shortage of proposals on how the EU could achieve greater effectiveness in its external relations by reforming itself institutionally and changing its treaties. But so far, the forces of iner­tia and path dependencies in this area have proven to be very strong.

The search for partners with whom the normative remnants of the European security order could be preserved collides with an essential characteristic of an international order distinguished by great power rivalries: Other states appear in it simultaneously as partners, competitors, and rivals. The simple em­pha­sis on important bilateral relations encompassing many issues is therefore of no help. Rather, German and European policymakers are faced with the task of developing reasonably stable relations with the major powers of the international system in the face of con­flicting interests and differing levels of willingness to cooperate. Since neither the EU nor NATO can orga­nise the necessary consensus, individual states have a special role to play here. This trend can be illustrated by the recent Franco-German initiative for an EU-Rus­sia summit or the current differences between Berlin and Washington on how to deal with China. How­ever, the tendency to take special account of the policies of major powers makes it all the more difficult for Ger­many to implement its own claim of a “rules-based international order” encompassing all states – the preservation of which the “Alliance for Multilateralism” or the “White Paper on Multilateralism” formu­late as a goal.

Flexibilisation internally, readjustment externally

Nevertheless, Germany has the means to adapt itself and its most important security partnerships to the changes that have been outlined. To do so, however, the new German government must be prepared to in­vest considerable resources – both financial and politi­cal.

At times, Berlin seems rather helpless in the face of changes in the international order. Together with its partners in the EU and the US, Germany is trying to im­pose limits on authoritarian regimes primarily through sanctions. In recent years, however, it has become clear that the states concerned have learnt to deal with such measures. Russia, for example, was able to consolidate its position in the occupied terri­tories of Ukraine after annexing Crimea in violation of international law and intervening militarily in the east of the country. Domestically, President Vladimir Putin has also intensified the pressure on political opponents. The EU member states also imposed sanc­tions on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. However, Brussels continues to lack consensual sup­port for the Belarusian opposition. With regard to NATO ally Turkey, there is no majority among the EU states in favour of fundamentally changing the state of mutual relations and their framework. Berlin, too, is dependent on Ankara – above all in migration policy.

However, because the states that are moving in the direction of authoritarianism in particular are in­creas­ingly trying to exert influence on domestic issues in Germany as well as in other EU countries, the future German government should consider expand­ing the EU’s conditionality policy to include the issues of disinformation, cyberattacks, and influencing diaspora groups. At the very least, Berlin should consider dovetailing internal and external affairs in such a way that interventions in the internal affairs of EU member states are sanctioned.

The efforts of China and the Middle Eastern states to exert influence – efforts that differ considerably in terms of goals, instruments, and political significance – can only be contained by means of a more active enlargement policy as well as foreign policy on the part of the EU. The EU must counter China’s and Saudi Arabia’s investments in the (analogue and digi­tal) infrastructures of countries in the Western Bal­kans with projects of its own. This will require a high commitment of financial resources, which seems unavoidable if Germany and the EU want to resist the geopoliticisation of their neighbourhood. On the ini­tiative of President Biden, the G7 countries have already agreed on a multi-billion infrastructure ini­tiative for the emerging countries. It is intended to become an alternative to China’s “New Silk Road”. 2

In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult for EU member states to reach consensus on foreign and security policy issues. This also applies to over­arching questions of the European security order. The well-known differences in the strategic cultures of the member states have an impact here. More serious, however, is the fact that some of them block decisions on individual issues in order to force action even on issues that are closer to their interests.

Two processes should serve to harmonise the stra­tegic cultures of the member states more closely: the European Intervention Initiative, launched by France in 2017 outside of the EU framework, and the draft­ing of the EU Strategic Compass, which was largely driven by Germany. More important, however, would be to redesign the EU’s institutional framework so that a majority of states can make decisions on behalf of all members without compromising legitimacy and political cohesion. In the past legislative period of the Bundestag, a number of ideas have already been de­vel­oped to this end that are aimed at speeding up decision-making procedures. The call to introduce qualified majority voting is one of them, as is the proposal to set up a European Security Council. 3 Neither of these approaches has yet gained majority support among the EU 27.

The debate therefore needs new momentum. In the EU, it could be generated by making greater use of Article 44 of the Treaty on European Union. According to this article, the European Council may, within the framework of the CSDP, “entrust the execution of a mission to a group of Member States which so desire and have the capabilities required for such a mis­sion”. It would entail comparatively little cost to breathe life into this treaty-immanent flexibilisation of the CSDP. If Article 44 is successfully applied, it could provide important medium-term impetus for force integration, defence-industrial cooperation among EU mem­ber states, and decision-making procedures in the CSDP. The fact that the article allows member states to find majorities for their own interests within the EU frame­work – even without questionable ma­noeu­vring – should reduce blocking behaviour during voting.

It may be uncertain whether this can open up a way for the EU to assume an autonomous foreign, security, and defence policy role between the super­powers of the US and China. But it would at least put the EU and its member states in a position to act more quickly and more effectively on crises and con­flicts in their neighbourhood.

For Germany’s NATO policy, this means that the alliance’s new strategic concept, to be presented in 2022, will have to recalibrate transatlantic security relations in light of the changed geopolitical environ­ment in the sense of a “New Transatlantic Security Deal”. Based on the assumption that it is in Germany’s interest for the US to remain a European power, it would be necessary to redefine what the European pillar of NATO is capable of achieving politically and militarily. This strategic realignment could basically take two forms, namely a stronger geographic focus (Europe vs. the Indo-Pacific) or a functional division of labour (collective defence vs crisis management) between America and Europe.

German Policy Towards the United States: More Self-Confidence and More Independence Needed

Under President Joe Biden, the United States (US) and Germany are seeking to reboot their relationship. After President Donald Trump shook the foundations of the transatlantic alliance and called into question many of the certainties of German foreign policy, the desire to return to normality is strong. As recently as 2017, after a G7 summit with Trump, Chancellor Merkel noted: “The times when we could completely rely on others are somewhat over. [...] We Europeans must really take our fate into our own hands.” 1 Biden’s announcement that “America is back” and ready to resume its traditional leadership role in international politics was met with relief in Germany. However, Germany should not end its efforts to deter­mine its own destiny. Biden’s presidency should not be taken as a chance to lean back, but rather as an opportunity to prepare for more difficult times.

No return to the status quo ante

Many of Biden’s global policy goals are in line with German interests. It is therefore tempting to dismiss Trump as a historical anomaly and to resume the status quo ante. Instead, the Trump shock should pro­vide an incentive to question problematic patterns of interaction that have emerged in US-Germany rela­tions since the Second World War and establish a new foundation for the relationship. The current US leadership, which shares many of Berlin’s priorities, offers an opportunity for cooperation without losing sight of the goal of reducing Germany’s and Europe’s dependence on the US.

One source of frustration for both sides is the asymmetry in their relationship. In the US, there has long been a bipartisan consensus that Germany is freeriding on US security guarantees and needs to share more of the burden in defence policy; in Ger­many, on the other hand, there are complaints about the unequal nature of the partnership and a lack of consultation by the US. Both states have resigned themselves to a state of affairs that Jeremy Shapiro calls a “toxic interplay of American arrogance and European incompetence”. 2 A case in point was the withdrawal from Afghanistan, which the US adminis­tration announced at short notice and hastily exe­cuted, leading to enormous challenges for US allies and tragic consequences for the Afghans left behind. As was the case at the outset of the intervention, the US set the course while their European allies were confronted with a fait accompli. The same dynamic shapes the relationship in a number of policy areas. Whether it is a global minimum tax on corporations or the lifting of patent protections for vaccines in the Covid-19 pandemic, the US usually launches new initiatives while Germany merely reacts. A little more courage to shake things up could help the new Ger­man government to counter the criticism that Germany lacks initiative.

More initiative and self-confidence in cooperation

It is in Germany’s interest to rethink the current division of labour. Currently, both the relative power of the US and the willingness of its public to bear the costs of an international leadership role and the pro­vision of global public goods are declining. A rising China is challenging US supremacy, competing for global influence, and offering its version of authori­tarianism as an alternative model to liberal-market democracy. 3 One result of this development is that the US will focus more attention on Asia and seek to reduce its involvement in Europe’s neighbourhood, including the Middle East.

Under the heading of “A foreign policy for the middle class”, the Biden administration is rebalanc­ing its international engagement with the needs of Ameri­can society. So far, it is more a slogan than a concrete framework for action, and it is not without controversy: It is simultaneously criticised for merely being “old wine in new bottles” – meaning rebranding the traditional foreign policy without much sub­stantial change – and for continuing the protectionist nationalism à la Trump under an innocuous motto. At the very least, the new emphasis is based on the recognition that Trump’s call for “America First!” struck a chord with many voters. For the American public to be willing to support an active global policy, they must be convinced that they benefit from it. That will only be the case if Biden delivers at home. Germany should be supportive of Biden’s efforts to reduce inequality by reforming the welfare state. If, on the other hand, protectionist impulses prevail, new conflicts with the EU are inevitable.

An ongoing concern is the state of US democracy. The political polarisation, and in particular the radicalisation of the Republican Party, continues to reach new extremes. Two-thirds of Republican voters (about one-third of the total electorate) believe the “big lie” that the 2020 election was rigged and that Joe Biden is not the legitimate president. 4 There is little open dissent from Republican leadership; those who stand up for the truth lose offices, are forced out of the party, or are challenged by Trump loyalists in the primaries. In states that Republicans control, they have introduced legislation that is challenging the in­dependence of election authorities and aims to sup­press the vote. In some places, legislatures are even being enabled to ignore the vote in presidential elec­tions altogether and appoint electors themselves. Sub­stantial parts of the Republican Party appear to have abandoned the most basic democratic norms, vastly increasing the potential for constitutional crises. 5

Cooperation where possible, independence where necessary

So what can be done? First, we should acknowledge that Trump was no accident but rather the culmination of trends long present in American politics, and that the election of a similarly disruptive president remains a possibility. Therefore, we should do two things at the same time. First, we should not squan­der the opportunity to cooperate with the Biden ad­ministration and the Democratic majority in Con­gress. The priority should be policies that make the democracies on both sides of the Atlantic more resist­ant to illiberal tendencies from within and abroad. On the other hand, the next German government would do well to reduce its dependencies in the event that there is a constitutional crisis in the US or some­one hostile to Europe once again enters the White House.

Notwithstanding the fact that the possibility to influence US domestic policy is very limited, German policymakers and civil society should express their concerns about US democracy. When dealing with Republicans, it is important to call out and criticise the anti-democratic tendencies within the party. Possible forums include the Bundestag’s Parliamentary Group on the United States; the European Parlia­ment’s Delegation for Relations with the United States; and the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue of the US Congress. The topic should also be brought up on visits by the usually bipartisan congressional dele­gations to Europe. A combination of moral appeals and “shaming” would at least signal that these devel­opments do not go unnoticed abroad and are damag­ing America’s reputation.

A common challenge is the rise of disinformation: Groups denying the danger of Covid-19 – such as the “Querdenker” in Germany – or followers of con­spiracies about the power of the “Deep State”, such as the “QAnon network”, undermine trust in the media and public institutions. Their increasing collaboration with far-right forces strengthens violent groups with nationalist and racist attitudes, as illustrated by the images of rioting mobs in the Capitol in Washington and on the steps of the Reichstag in Berlin. All these actors weaken social cohesion and hinder effective government action, especially in response to crises such as the Covid-19 pandemic. It is essential that Ger­many and the US coordinate their policies in this regard and learn from each other’s experiences.

Changes in the media landscape, especially the ad-based platforms misleadingly referred to as “social media”, also require policy responses. Different regu­latory cultures make it difficult to cooperate to curb their influence, but the conditions are currently better than ever. In the US, awareness of the internet companies’ power and corrosive effects on democratic society has grown since elections and political dis­course have been massively affected by disinforma­tion. The new transatlantic Trade & Technology Coun­cil offers an opportunity to work together to find solutions to the difficult trade-offs between freedom and regulation as well as consumer and business interests. The EU is already a pioneer in the regulation of internet platforms; standing up to Big Tech, whose business model relies on exploiting user data to manipulate their emotions and consumption habits, remains important. Germany should point to the lessons of its own historical experience to stress the need for a resilient democracy and to counter accusations that its insistence to reign in the power of tech monopolies is anti-American in nature.

Reduce political, military, and economic dependencies

The need for constructive cooperation notwithstand­ing, Germany would be well advised to reduce the extent of its political, military, and economic depend­ence on the US. Politically, much depends on whether we succeed in creating more unity in Europe. One prerequisite is Germany’s willingness to set aside its idiosyncrasies in favour of a pan-European position from time to time. In order to be able to maintain a more united position vis-à-vis the US, it is crucial to involve those EU members for which American secu­rity guarantees are not only of theoretical significance. Nord Stream 2 is an example of how not to do it: Regardless of the substantial pros and cons, it should be obvious by now how high the price is for the project in relations between allies of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). US sanctions against the companies involved in the pipe­line met with approval even among some EU mem­bers. When smaller EU states are forced to pick sides between Germany and the US, the weakness of the EU becomes apparent. We should try to avoid such situa­tions, at least as long as someone broadly sympathetic to the EU occupies the Oval Office. Conflicts between the EU and NATO can also be avoided when building up the EU’s military capacities.

Germany’s credibility in security and defence depends on whether it manages to resolve the serious problems in its military procurement and capabilities. Countless reports about deficient helicopters, missing spare parts, and poor equipment damage its reputation as a reliable alliance partner. In this respect, it is more important to bring the Bundeswehr’s capabilities into line with political requirements than to meet NATO’s 2 per cent target. Differences between the expec­tations of EU and NATO allies and specific Ger­man reservations on defence issues, such as on arms ex­ports, armed drones, or the presence of nuclear weapons in Germany [ nukleare Teilhabe ], 6 should be openly articulated, debated, and resolved through the political process, keeping in mind that on these issues Germany is the outlier, and insisting on its particular positions affects alliance relations. In contrast, when it comes to deploying German troops to military mis­sions, alliance solidarity or reputational considerations are not sufficient; we should not participate in missions when there are serious doubts about their rationale or prospects of success. In such situations, taking a clear position and being willing to defend it against criticism is preferable to trying to pretend it is possible to please everyone.

On sanctions, Germany should actively and critically engage with the US. Extraterritorial and secondary sanctions against companies in the EU undermine European sovereignty. When faced with the choice between trade with Iran and access to the US market, the decision for European companies was easy – a similar scenario with regard to China would hardly be acceptable. Here, too, the EU gains credibility if it attempts to address its own shortcomings and does not wait for US action, as it did when the US sanc­tioned Bulgarian officials for corruption. Not­with­standing this, further work should be done to strength­en the euro as an international trading currency and to further develop instruments such as the INSTEX payment mechanism in order to reduce the level of its own vulnerability.

Let us hope that the close German-American rela­tions that were reaffirmed during the Chancellor’s visit to Washington in July 2021 will outlast not only the Bundestag election, but also the US presidential election in 2024. However, in line with the motto “hope for the best, prepare for the worst”, we should not let up our efforts to – in Angela Merkel’s words – “take control of our own destiny” until the next exter­nal shock hits us.

Partners or Rivals? Dealing with Authoritarian Powers

One mantra of German foreign policy is: “Never alone again!” In view of Germany’s historical experiences in the 20th century, its central position in Europe, and its limited resources compared to the superpowers, it is hardly surprising that this commitment is a core element of the Federal Republic’s foreign policy iden­tity. A central task of German diplomacy is therefore to find partners and to establish reliable and resilient political partnerships with them. After the end of the East-West conflict, the search for partners initially seemed easy. In view of the expectation that the liberal model of order would become universally accepted, almost any country seemed to qualify for such a role. Strategic partnerships were also entered into with states that, from today’s perspective, would be hardly suitable. Germany did so in the case of China, and the European Union (EU) elevated both China and Russia to the status of strategic partners.

In recent years, however, there has been a grow­ing awareness that the global convergence towards democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy could not only fail to materialise, but that, on the contrary, divergent tendencies might dominate – that in the future we might be dealing more with rivals than with partners. A prominent expression of this trend reversal was the European External Action Service’s China Strategy Paper of March 2019, in which the People’s Republic is still referred to as a partner, but at the same time as a sys­temic rival. 1 German foreign policy is still far from naming antago­nistic forces so clearly. The most that can be said is “difficult partner” – a term that tends to obscure rather than illuminate the quality of bilateral rela­tions. 2

What makes states partners, what makes them rivals?

It is therefore necessary to establish clarity about what qualifies another country as a partner and what makes it a rival. Bilateral partners should (1) have a certain normative consensus, that is, a common set of values; they should (2) pursue congruent interests in at least a relevant number of policy areas; 3 and they should (3) complement and strengthen each other’s capabilities. Vice versa, rivals can be defined as those (1) whose set of values is largely incompatible, (2) who not only pursue conflicting interests but also attempt to assert them against their counterparts, and (3) who are in a position to weaken or challenge them – that is, from the perspective of Western liberal democra­­cies: powerful authoritarian states with an adversarial international agenda. The assignment to one or the other category is not binary, but approximate. This becomes clear when one takes a closer look at two states that, at first glance, seem to fall more and more clearly into the rival category and consequently can hardly be considered as partners: China and Russia.

The normative similarities between Germany and China are conceivably small: on the one hand, a democracy and market economy built on individual human rights and freedoms that accepts the primacy of law and strives internationally to create a liberal, rules-based order; on the other, an authoritarian, if not totalitarian, political system that emphasises the primacy of collective obligations and uses law as an instrument to preserve the Communist Party’s mo­nopo­ly on power. 4 Beijing accepts the existing world order only to the extent that it serves China’s per­severance of power and economic development, but it increasingly reveals revisionist intentions where it works against these goals. Although the findings still appear unambiguous when it comes to normative foun­dations, they become more difficult when it comes to interests. Open conflicts of interest between the two countries are hardly apparent. So far, they have been most readily discernible on two points: whether German and Chinese companies operate on a level playing field in their respective domestic mar­kets and in third countries, and how far-reaching and binding China’s commitments in the fight against climate change should be. On the other hand, it is precisely climate policy – and, more recently, global health policy 5 – that suggests an interest in partnerships with Beijing. So far, China has tended to weaken German positions only indirectly – by creating eco­nomic dependencies in the course of the Belt and Road Initiative, initiating public campaigns against German companies, building up diplomatic coercion behind the scenes, or mobilising counter-coalitions in international organisations and bodies.

The picture that emerges of Russia in terms of its quality as a partner or rival is in some respects contrary to that of China. Here, it is the criterion of a common normative basis that is least clearly tilted in one direction or the other. The Russian leadership’s effort to establish an authoritarian system that draws on traditional Christian conservative values and contrasts them with the “libertarian” way of life of Western societies finds only limited resonance among its own population. This course seems to be accepted only as long as it can guarantee security and order as well as great power status internationally. On the other hand, the divergence of interests vis-à-vis Russia is much more evident: in climate policy as well as in the shaping of the security order for Eastern Europe and the European neighbourhood. Moscow’s attempts to weaken Germany’s influence and power are clearly visible: through disinformation campaigns and threats of a hybrid and military nature; through actions against reform-oriented states and forces in Eastern Europe or the Caucasus; through open antagonism towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. Whereas in the case of China the systemic, normative conflict stands in the way of a genuine partnership, in the case of Russia it is above all divergences of interests and strategic calculations.

The grey area between partner and rival is large. This can also be illustrated by a country that clearly falls into the partnership category but showed ob­vious signs of rivalry between 2017 and 2020. Outside of Europe, the United States is Germany’s most im­por­tant bilateral partner and an indispensable guar­antor of its security. And yet, the four years of the Trump administration raised serious doubts about the solidity of the common foundation of values and revealed considerable differences of interest in trade and climate policy. The fact that the American presi­dent openly referred to the EU as a “foe” gave rise to concerns that he was pursuing a strategy of weakening Germany and the EU. 6 Populist governments in India, Brazil, and Mexico pose similar challenges for German policies. The normative and interest-driven divergences with NATO partner Turkey are also growing.

Nevertheless, the criticism of the excessive use of the term “partner” should not lead to the reverse con­clusion that it is now primarily a matter of identifying rivals and developing counter-strategies. Rather, it is important to keep this category small and to limit it to those for whom normative and interest-related dif­ferences predominate and who are both willing and able to weaken or even question liberal models of order at the national or international level. At the global level, only China can be considered such a rival, and in Germany’s wider neighbourhood (North Africa, the Middle East, Eurasia) Russia and, with greater reservations, Iran.

Dealing with rivals

However selectively it must be used, the rival category is nevertheless useful for defining the basic orientation in bilateral relations with certain countries. It is not primarily a matter of trying to strike a balance with a partner, to involve them, to accommodate their interests, and to always strive to work together as partners, but rather of realising that relations are primarily characterised by antagonism. In this con­text, it must be acknowledged that rivals are also needed in order to tackle global challenges effectively and contain the escalation of conflicts of interest.

Thus, the right strategy vis-à-vis rivals seems to be the compartmentalisation of bilateral relations. 7 This unwieldy term can be elegantly broken down into the so-called three C’s: cooperation , competition , confron­tation . With regard to China, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken paraphrased this approach in his first pro­grammatic speech at the beginning of March 2021 as follows: “Our relationship with China will be com­petitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.” 8 With this, the Biden administration departed from the “decoupling” approach of the previous administration and swung to the line that had already been formulated by the EU in 2019. 9

There seems to be a broad consensus on the general approach to China. The real challenge lies in its concrete implementation – in two respects. First, it must be defined in which policy areas which “C” dimension is to be applied; second, negative spill-over effects between the areas must be avoided. The first task seems easier than the second. Cooperation is cer­tainly needed in the case of global challenges such as climate change, comprehensive health risks, the fight against international terrorism, the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, and sustainable devel­op­ment. Competition is possible in the case of eco­nomic relations, technological innovation, and inter­national standard-setting. Confrontation, on the other hand, is necessary in the case of human rights, Indo-Pacific security, the independence of Taiwan, diplo­matic coercion emanating from China, and hybrid threats. Beijing itself, however, rejects such compartmentalisation and has, among other things, created an instrument for itself in the form of the Anti-Sanc­tions Law to punish foreign companies if they comply with sanctions imposed by their governments against China. It is to be feared, then, that confrontation on security and human rights issues will at least affect the competitive dimension. However, China’s interest in addressing global challenges is likely to be so great that the negative effects resulting from confrontational issues on cooperation, especially in climate policy, should remain limited. 10

One example of semi-successful compartmentalisa­tion is Western policy towards Russia. Sanctions have been imposed to penalise Moscow for human rights violations, the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and military intervention in eastern Ukraine. These punitive measures have indeed affected mutual eco­nomic relations and Russia’s willingness to cooperate in international disarmament policy. But they have not led to a complete breakdown of exchanges in either area, let alone to Russia’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. 11

Such a compartmentalisation approach towards powerful authoritarian states offers promise if four preconditions are met. First, it is important to act from a position of strength. Western democracies therefore also have the task of remedying their own deficits that undermine their input and output legiti­macy. 12 At the same time, they must develop the necessary capabilities to withstand confrontation, to survive in competition, and to be attractive as co­opera­tion partners. In doing so, the position of the counterpart must be correctly assessed when evalu­ating their relative strength. There is a tendency to either significantly underestimate or overestimate China’s penetrating power in particular. Second, compartmentalisation must be embedded in a com­prehensive country strategy so that interactions between the three dimensions mentioned above can be adequately taken into account. The German gov­ern­ment has such a cross-policy area strategy for Africa, Central Asia, and the Indo-Pacific, for exam­ple, but not for China and Russia. Third, correspond­ing strategies vis-à-vis individual states must be set in relation to each other. 13 Finally, these strategies and the actions based on them must be closely coordinated with European partners, transatlantic allies, and other like-minded states. 14

Don’t Drop the Ball: German Indo‑Pacific Policy

The Indo-Pacific is an economically dynamic region that is of fundamental significance for the future of the international order. For German and European policy, it has thus become an important geo-eco­nomic and geo-strategic point of reference. The Federal Gov­ernment published policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in September 2020, while the European Union (EU) released its corresponding strategy a year later. One of the main aims of these approaches is to diver­sify, deepen, and thematically broaden relations with partners in the region beyond China. Thereby, Ger­many and the EU intend to play a key role in shaping developments in this dynamic region.

In geo-economic terms, the Indo-Pacific includes important non-European trading partners such as China, Japan, India, South Korea, and South-East Asian states. Several of these countries have some of the fastest-growing economies in the world, and thus are attractive targets for German investment. As a trading nation, Germany is dependent on open trade routes. The geopolitical importance of the Indo-Pacific lies in the fact that the region is centre stage for the systemic rivalry between the United States (US) and China. Developments there will determine the future shape of the international order. It is therefore also in Germany’s and Europe’s interest to strengthen the existing rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific – for example by advocating the rule of international law, open and fair trade practices, and peaceful conflict resolution.

To ensure Germany’s credibility as an international actor in the region, the next Federal Government must develop a strategy for implementing the guide­lines as well as the principles and goals formulated therein. The political will to pursue this Indo-Pacific policy should be demonstrated through a long-term commitment. This includes, firstly, the provision of adequate resources in terms of finance, materials, and personnel on a sustained basis. Secondly, political con­tacts must be expanded, for example through diplomatic visits and new formats, so that Germany also gains greater visibility in the region.

As Berlin sets out to chart an appropriate course, it faces four central challenges. These relate firstly to European cooperation, secondly to the choice of part­ners in the Indo-Pacific, thirdly to the issue focus, and fourthly to dealing with conflicting goals and crises.

European coordination and cooperation

Having played a key role in the process of formulat­ing the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, Germany should now follow through by contributing to concrete meas­ures. However, given the limitations in EU for­eign policymaking resulting from the consensus principle, Berlin must simultaneously pursue the implementation of its own guidelines. With France and the Nether­lands also having presented their own concepts for the region, a juxtaposition of European and national strategies is emerging. Against this background, it is advisable to establish a regular exchange between the main actors responsible for Indo-Pacific policy with the objective of harmonising and coordinating ini­tiatives at the EU level and in the member states.

The United Kingdom also emphasises the Indo-Pacific in its new foreign and security policy strategy of March 2021. Therefore, London should be included in European coordination processes as much as pos­sible. That would allow for devising joint initiatives or positions while increasing the coherence and comple­mentarity of European policies towards the region.

If no consensus can be reached at the EU level, Ger­many should move ahead with initiatives by relying on flexible coordination with European partners. Examples of such joint moves include the note verbale to the United Nations regarding the South China Sea, issued by Berlin, Paris, and London in September 2020, as well as the reference to Taiwan in the final declaration of the G7 summit in June 2021.

Partners in the Indo-Pacific

So far, Germany’s focus vis-à-vis the region has been on bilateral relations with important countries such as Japan, India, and Indonesia on the one hand, and regional institutions, in particular the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the other. With­in the G7, Germany is also involved in the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, which was announced in June 2021. It aims to support developing countries in the Indo-Pacific and other regions with improving their infrastructure.

In addition, however, new minilateral forums and ad hoc coalitions have emerged in the Indo-Pacific in recent years with the objective of achieving efficient cooperation on specific issues. These include the Sup­ply Chain Resilience Initiative between Japan, Aus­tralia, and India, and the Blue Dot Network between Japan, Australia, and the US, which develops stand­ards for infrastructure projects. The Quad Group, con­sisting of the US, India, Japan, and Australia, has also intensified cooperation. Minilaterals of this kind allow the partners to pursue common goals and respond to regional needs in a flexible way.

Germany has no experience to date with minilat­eral formats in the Indo-Pacific, but it should be open to them. To this end, the Federal Government should seek like-minded partners on the basis of shared values or converging interests on certain issues. Ger­many should initially engage those regional states that are identified as value partners in the guidelines, such as Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, Singa­pore, and South Korea. Going forward, Germany must consider how domestic and foreign policy constellations influence the respective willingness of these coun­tries to cooperate. The conflict over North Korea, for example, limits South Korea’s foreign policy options.

At the same time, however, cooperation with selected regional organisations must not be neglected. In view of its political and economic importance, ASEAN should remain the focus of attention for Ger­many and Europe. Depending on the geographic and issue focus – and such a focus is important – Germany could also place greater emphasis on other regional formats, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Coopera­tion (BIMSTEC) or the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Minilateral formats and regional cooperation can also be combined; for example, regional organisations can be supported through joint programmes with India and Japan.

In terms of values such as democratic rights and freedoms, Taiwan is an important regional partner, yet it is not mentioned in the German guidelines. The challenge here is to find creative ways to intensify cooperation at the political level or in economic and social spheres without abandoning Germany’s official “one-China” policy.

Issue priorities

Germany’s and Europe’s cooperation with the Indo-Pacific already spanned a wide range of topics before the related policy documents were published, and the agenda has now broadened further. In addition to economic cooperation, Germany and Europe have been particularly active in “soft” areas (including non-traditional security), such as development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the environment and climate, or fighting organised crime and piracy.

This focus also opens up opportunities for cooperation with the Quad states. In Beijing, the Quad is seen as part of the American effort to build a bloc against China, although its members are also pursuing partly inclusive concepts for the Indo-Pacific and for dealing with the People’s Republic. At its first summit in March 2021, the Quad emphasised cooperation on climate change, health, and technology. Even if Berlin and Brussels do not seek direct cooperation with the Quad in order to show their independence and avoid being seen as supporting a confrontational stance vis-à-vis China, the group’s agenda offers common ground for cooperation within the framework of a Quad-plus format. The same applies to the minilateral initiatives mentioned above.

Germany also needs to consider a stronger security profile in the Indo-Pacific, given that the military bal­ance of power in the region has been rapidly shifting in favour of China and inter-state tensions are on the rise. In view of the limited capabilities of the German navy and existing alliance obligations, the deploy­ment of warships will for the foreseeable future re­main merely a symbolic act calling for compliance with international law – especially the law of the sea. In such cases, coordination and cooperation must be sought with European states such as France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, which have their own naval units in the region or are deploying them. Joint exercises, also with the littoral states, would make Europe more visible in the Indo-Pacific. This would also be in line with the EU Council Con­clusions on the Indo-Pacific of April 2021, which state the goal of ensuring an EU maritime presence in the region on the basis of voluntary contributions by member states. Germany’s security policy profile can also be raised by establishing high-level political formats with selected value partners, such as govern­ment consultations or “two plus two” dialogues be­tween foreign and defence ministers. Such a dialogue already took place with Japan in spring 2021.

In security cooperation with the region, Germany and the EU could place a more prominent focus on capacity-building. Germany should actively support the EU’s CRIMARIO II (Critical Maritime Routes Indian Ocean II) initiative, which aims to improve partners’ maritime awareness capabilities, and thus the secu­rity of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and in South and South-East Asia. Through the European Peace Facility, Germany can also work within the EU framework to help partner countries improve their capabilities in areas such as border control and border defence. Fur­thermore, the German Enable and Enhance Initiative is suitable for helping to build security-related capac­ities through selected projects in the Indo-Pacific.

Priority-setting, conflicting goals, tough decisions

There is a need for inter-ministerial coordination and a consistent implementation of the German guide­lines on the Indo-Pacific, which were formulated as a “whole of government approach”. However, the multitude of intended cooperation areas across many policy areas expressed in the document do not indi­cate any clear prioritisation. With limited financial, human, and military resources, it will become nec­essary to focus on specific issues, partners, and for­mats. One of the challenges will be to find a balance between cultivating bilateral relations, supporting minilateral formats, and strengthening regional organisations.

Against the backdrop of a growing rivalry between the US and China, Germany’s and the EU’s inclusive Indo-Pacific concept aims to counteract both bipolar­ity and unipolarity in the region. Germany and Europe must make it clear to China that inclusiveness does not mean that Beijing’s violations of international rules and norms, such as human rights or internation­al maritime law, will be accepted without objection. Nor does China have a veto right when it comes to shaping German or European Indo-Pacific policy.

Germany’s and Europe’s growing engagement in the Indo-Pacific region is likely to elicit counter-reactions from China. The price involved may include negative effects on German and European economic interests, but unless this is accepted, political cred­ibility cannot be maintained. China’s (over)reaction to the sanctions imposed by the EU on Beijing in March 2021 due to human rights violations in Xinjiang was a case in point. It can be assumed that China’s actions will affect European states to varying degrees and in different ways. In order to prevent divisions between them, dialogue must be sought with the most impor­tant partners at an early stage. Any punitive measures taken by the People’s Republic should be countered with joint responses. 1

Finally, with a stronger engagement in the region, including on security issues, it will be necessary to undertake more contingency planning at the Euro­pean and national levels to discuss crises and conflict scenarios in the Indo-Pacific and possible reactions. Such contingency planning is the only way to ensure a timely and coordinated response.

Abbreviations

The Authors

Dr Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Deputy Head of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS)

Dr Steffen Angenendt

Senior Fellow in the Global Issues Research Division

Dr Muriel Asseburg

Senior Fellow in the Africa and Middle East Research Division

Dr Peter Becker

Senior Associate in the EU   /   Europe Research Division

Dr Marianne Beisheim

Senior Associate in the Global Issues Research Division

Dr Annegret Bendiek

Deputy Head of the EU   /   Europe Research Division

Susan Bergner

Associate in the Global Issues Research Division until August 2021

Nadine Biehler

Associate in the Global Issues Research Division

Dr Raphael Bossong

Associate in the EU   /   Europe Research Division

Prof. Dr Heribert Dieter

Dr Susanne Dröge

Dr Sabine Fischer

Senior Fellow in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division

Felicitas Fritzsche

Research Assistant in the Global Issues Research Division

Dr Hanns Günther Hilpert

Head of the Asia Research Division

Dr habil. Markus Kaim

Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division

Dr Ronja Kempin

Senior Fellow in the EU   /   Europe Research Division

Nadine Knapp

Dr Anne Koch

Dr Wolfram Lacher

Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division

Dr Barbara Lippert

Director of Research, Executive Board

Ambassador (ret.) Dr Eckhard Lübkemeier

Visiting Fellow in the EU   /   Europe Research Division

Prof. Dr Günther Maihold

Deputy Director of SWP

Dr Stefan Mair

Director of SWP

Prof. Dr Hanns Maull

Senior Distinguished Fellow, Visiting Fellow of the Executive Board

Amrei Meier

Dr Melanie Müller

Dr Michael Paul

neColonel (ret.) Wolfgang Richter

Senior Associate in the International Security Research Division

Prof. Dr habil. Sabine Riedel

Dr Alexandra Sakaki

Deputy Head of the Asia Research Division

Dr Christina Saulich

Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division

Visiting Fellow in the International Security Research Division

Svenja Schöneich

Dr Angela Stanzel

Associate in the Asia Research Division

Ambassador (ret.) Dr Volker Stanzel

Göran Swistek

Dr Johannes Thimm

Deputy Head of The Americas Research Division

Dr Oliver Thränert

Head of the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at SWP

Dr Denis M. Tull

Dr Judith Vorrath

Associate in the Global Issues Research Division until September 2021

Dr Gudrun Wacker

Senior Fellow in the Asia Research Division

Dr habil. Christian Wagner

Dr Kirsten Westphal

Dr Claudia Zilla

Senior Fellow in The Americas Research Division

 German foreign policy is understood here as a collective term that covers the entire breadth of the field of foreign policy action, and thus also includes security policy, devel­op­ment policy, etc.

 Barbara Lippert and Volker Perthes, eds., Strategic Rivalry between United States and China. Causes, Trajectories, and Implications for Europe , SWP Research Paper 4/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/strategic-rivalry-between-united-states-and-china (accessed 7 September 2021).

 New dependencies and vulnerabilities as well as chal­lenges posed by rising powers and the shaking of the post-war international order were already addressed in 2013 in the paper New Power, New Responsibility. Elements of a German Foreign and Security Policy for a Changing World (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and Washington, D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2013), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/projekt_papiere/German ForeignSecurityPolicy_SWP_GMF_2013.pdf . The transforma­tion of the “liberal international order” was the subject of a project a few years later: Hanns W. Maull, ed., The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, November 2018). How to respond to the new situation was examined in the study edited by Barbara Lippert , Nicolai von Ondarza, and Volker Perthes , European Strategic Autonomy. Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests , SWP Research Paper 4/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2019), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/ european-strategic-autonomy (all accessed 7 September 2021).

 See Bernhard Stahl and Sebastian Harnisch, “Nationale Identitäten und Außenpolitiken: Erkenntnisse, Desiderate und neue Wege in der Diskursforschung”, in Vergleichende Außenpolitikforschung und nationale Identitäten , ed. Bernhard Stahl and Sebastian Harnisch (Baden-Baden, 2009), 31–58 (37).

 Federal Foreign Office, “‘China Is a Partner, Competitor and Rival’. Interview by Foreign Minister Heiko Maas with Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland”, 12 July 2020, https:// www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-rnd/ 2367552 (accessed 7 September 2021).

 This volume is not intended to succumb to the temptation to discuss possibilities for a reorientation across virtually all policy fields and regional references. This is therefore not a treatise on German foreign policy in all its facets, which would certainly have overloaded an assessment of the current situation.

 Richard N. Haass and Charles A. Kupchan, “The New Con­cert of Powers”, in Anchoring the World. International Order in the Twenty-first Century , ed. Charles A. Kupchan and Leslie Vinjamuri (Foreign Affairs, 2021), 89–103.

 Richard N. Haass and Charles A. Kupchan, “A Concert of Powers for a Global Era”, Project Syndicate (online), 25 March 2021, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/concert-of-powers-for-global-era-by-richard-haass-and-charles-a-kupchan-2021-03 (accessed 5 July 2021).

 See Haass and Kupchan, “The New Concert of Powers” (see note 1 ), 91, 99.

 The analogy to the Congress of Vienna and the time of Metternich is inaccurate in many ways, not least because it did not bring about an era of peace – see the Crimean War, Germany’s wars with Austria and France. Also, the Holy Alliance within the Pentarchy suppressed national and demo­cratic movements, and thus held the five powers together. The realist reading of Haass and Kupchan can be found, for example, in Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 83: “The so-called Concert of Europe implied that nations which were competitive on one level would settle matters affecting overall stability by con­sensus.” It should also be taken into account that England (from the outside) watched over the precarious balance of power on the continent. There is currently no equivalent to this either.

 Joseph R. Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again,” Foreign Affairs (online), (March/April 2020), https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again (accessed 5 July 2021).

 Erik Brattberg and Ben Judah, “Forget the G-7, Build the D10”, Foreign Policy (online), 10 June 2020, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/10/g7-d10-democracy-trump-europe/ (accessed 5 July 2021).

 Joseph R. Biden and Boris Johnson, The New Atlantic Char­ter  (St. Ives, Cornwall, 10 June 2021), https://assets.pub lishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/992569/The_New_Atlantic_Charter_ 2021.pdf (accessed 5 July 2021).

 Ursula von der Leyen, “Europe address”, European Com­mission, Speech at Allianz Forum, Berlin, 8 November 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ SPEECH _ 19_ 6248 (accessed 5 July 2021).

 Emmanuel Macron, Speech by the President of the Re­public, Emmanuel Macron, on the occasion of the German Remembrance Day ceremony, Berlin, German Bundestag, 18 November 2018, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ IMG / pdf/181118_rede_pr_volkstrauertag_cle8c3c49.pdf (accessed 5 July 2021).

 Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza, and Volker Per­thes, eds., European Strategic Autonomy , SWP Research Paper 04/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2019), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/european-strategic-autonomy (accessed 18 August 2021).

 “Eine sanfte Utopie ist mir lieber”, interview with Nora Bossong, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , 29 June 2021.

 This definition draws on Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1990), 25.

 A notable exception was Willy Brandt, who as Foreign Minister in 1968 published a book in which he asserted: “The Federal Republic cannot, of course, make what is called a ‘dead beetle’. To put it less popularly: It shouldn’t pretend that it has no interests and no will of its own”, Willy Brandt, Friedenspolitik in Europa (Frankfurt: Fischer 1968), 49.

 See Eckhard Lübkemeier, Europas Banalität des Guten. Ursachen der europäischen Dauerkrise und Auswege – ein Weg­weiser , SWP-Studie 6/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2019), 64–70.

 On the concept of co-leadership and Germany’s relevant role, see Eckhard Lübkemeier, Führung ist wie Liebe. Warum Mitführung in Europa notwendig ist und wer sie leisten kann , SWP-Studie 30/2007 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2007).

 The German government has neglected this imperative in the case of the Nord Stream 2 project. For years it had insisted that the gas pipeline was a purely commercial project, only to have to admit at last that it also has a political dimension, as neighbours like Poland and Ukraine had always claimed.

 Quoted in Süddeutsche Zeitung , 20 November 2020, 6.

 Helmut Schmidt, “‘Politik der Friedenssicherung aus Ver­antwortung und Überzeugung’. Rede auf dem Jahresempfang der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, 26 Januar 1982”, Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung 18 (3 March 1982), 138–39.

 Ibid., 139.

 Geneva Global Health Hub, Non-Paper on Strengthening WHO’s Leading and Coordinating Role in Global Health (Geneva, August 2020), http://g2h2.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/ 08/Non-paper-1.pdf (accessed 29 November 2021).

 Graduate Institute Geneva, “A Global Pandemic Treaty Should Aim for Deep Prevention”, (Geneva, 27 April 2021), https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/ global-pandemic-treaty-should-aim-deep-prevention (accessed 29 November 2021).

 Zukunftsforum Public Health, Eckpunkte einer Public-Health-Strategie für Deutschland (March 2021), https://zukunftsforum-public-health.de/public-health-strategie/ .

 Federal Ministry of Health, ed., Strategy of the Federal Gov­ern­ment on Global Health (Berlin, October 2020), https://www. bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/fileadmin/Dateien/ 5_Publikationen/Gesundheit/Broschueren/GlobaleGesund heitsstrategie_Web.pdf (accessed 29 November 2021).

 Federal Government, “Coronavirus: WHO Centre Comes to Berlin ”, Press Release, 5 May 2021, https://www.bundes regierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/who-bueo-in-berlin-1910932 (accessed 29 November 2021).

 Wissenschaftsplattform Nachhaltigkeit 2030/SDSN Ger­many, eds., Impulse für die Überarbeitung der Deutschen Nach­haltigkeitsstrategie vor dem Hintergrund der COVID-19 Pandemie (Potsdam, 2020), https://www.die-gdi.de/fileadmin/user_ upload/pdfs/veranstaltungen/2020/20200826_Beiraete_im_ Gespraech_Ergebnis.pdf (accessed 29 November 2021).

 Bundesgesundheitsministerium, ed., Strategie der Bundes­regierung zur globalen Gesundheit (see note 4 ).

 See website: https: //globalhealth.de/.

 “ Coronavirus Pandemic : Five Heads of State Call for Glo­bal Alliance”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (online), 1 April 2020, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/gesundheit/ coronavirus/coronavirus-pandemie-fuenf-praesidenten-fordern-globale-allianz-16706321.html (accessed 29 Novem­ber 2021).

 This extreme negative scenario would only be conceivable if the EU were to break apart – and in this catastrophic case, the Europeans and Germany would have quite different problems than taking over and repaying the debts of a defunct Union.

 “Regulation (EU) 2021/784 of 29 April 2021 on Addressing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online”, Official Jour­nal of the European Union , L 172/79 (Brussels, 17 May 2021), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX: 32021R0784&from=EN .

 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Euro­pean Production and Preservation Orders for Electronic Evidence in Criminal Matters , COM(2018) 225 final (Strasbourg, 17 April 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN / TXT/HTML /? uri= CELEX :52018PC0225 .

 For example, the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), or the Europol Information System (EIS).

 For example, on Passenger Name Record (PNR) data or on cross-border searches of DNA or motor vehicle data.

 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of Preparations for the Full Implementation of the Interoperability Regulations , COM(2020) 428 final (Brussels, 21 August 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= COM :2020:0428: FIN:EN:PDF .

 See Article 222 TFEU.

 Council of the European Union, “The EU Integrated Political Crisis Response – IPCR – Arrangements in Brief”, 17 April 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ documents-publications/publications/the-eu-integrated-political-crisis-response-ipcr-arrangements/ .

 Tiago Almeida, “EU Parliament Approves Reform of Civil Protection Mechanism”, euractiv , 29 April 2021, https://www. euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/eu-parlia ment-approves-reform-of-civil-protection-mechanism/ .

 Raphael Bossong, The Expansion of Frontex. Symbolic Measures and Long-term Changes in EU Border Protection , SWP Comment 47/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2019), http://dx.doi.org/10.18449/2019C47 .

 7,000 of the 10,000 EU border guards targeted by 2027 would be seconded from member states.

 European Parliament, Report on the Fact-finding Investiga­tion on Frontex Concerning Alleged Fundamental Rights Violations , Working Document, 14 July 2021, https://www.statewatch. org/media/2590/ep-frontex-scrutiny-group-final-report-14-7-21.pdf .

 Cameron F. Kerry, “The Oracle at Luxembourg: The EU Court of Justice Judges the World on Surveillance and Privacy” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 11 January 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-oracle-at-luxembourg-the-eu-court-of-justice-judges-the-world-on-surveillance-and-privacy/ ; Sofie Royer and Sem Careel, “Access Denied – CJEU [European Court of Justice] Reaffirms la Quadrature du Net and Clarifies Requirements for Access to Retained Data”, 23 March 2021, https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/blog/access-denied-cjeu-reaffirms-la-quadrature-du-net-and-clarifies-requirements-for-access-to-retained-data/ .

 Marion MacGregor, “EU Border Agency to Face Court over Alleged Migrant Rights Violations”, InfoMigrants , 26 May 2021, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/32529/eu-border-agency-to-face-court-over-alleged-migrant-rights-violations .

 Fenella M. W. Billing, “Limiting Mutual Trust on Funda­mental Rights Grounds under the European Arrest Warrant and Lessons Learned from Transfers under Dublin III”, New Journal of European Criminal Law 11, no. 2 (2020): 184–203.

 Nikolaj Nielsen, “EU Condemns ‘Pegasus’ Spyware Use on Journalists”, EUobserver , 20 July 2021, https://euobserver. com/democracy/152487 .

 See the contribution of Steffen Angenendt et al., p.  33 ff.

 Bodo Weber, “Die Flüchtlingskrise als Spiegelbild euro­päischer Außenpolitik – Russische Sabotagepolitik, die Abwesenheit der USA und die Grenzen reaktiver Führung”, in Europa und die neue Weltunordnung. Analysen und Positionen zur europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik , ed. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (Berlin, 2016), 135–43.

 Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), Key Elements of the Bundeswehr of the Future (Berlin, 18 May 2021), https://www. bmvg.de/resource/blob/5092636/f30cf5dd345488be5c5a090c58367fae/eckpunkte-final-en-data.pdf .

 Ulf von Krause, Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Außen­politik (Wiesbaden, 2013), doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-00185-8 .

 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (6 December 2018), https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/ pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf (accessed 3 August 2021).

 Congressional Research Service, Defense Primer: Army MultiDomain Operations (MDO) (Washington, D.C., 22 April 2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11409.pdf (accessed 3 August 2021).

 BMVg, Key Elements (see note 2 ).

 Ibid.

 Federal Ministry of Defense, Position Paper: Reflections on the Bundeswehr of the Future (Bonn, 9 February 2021), https://www. bmvg.de/resource/blob/5029396/a83129815c00e3638302ba3630478987/20210211-dl-positionspapier-en-data.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).

 The authors owe the inspiration for this apt metaphor to Philip Stephens, “The Right Answer to Xi Jinping Is a One-China Policy”, Financial Times , 21 January 2021.

 See Hanns W. Maull, “Eine China-Strategie braucht auch Abschreckungspotenzial ”, Die Zeit (online), 22 May 2021.

 See in particular Feration of German Industries (BDI), Part­ner and Systemic Competitor – How Do We Deal with China’s State-Controlled Economy? , Policy Paper China (Berlin, January 2019).

 See the contribution of Alexandra Sakaki, Gudrun Wacker, and Christian Wagner, p.  123 ff.

 European Commission, EU Trade Statistics , https://ec. europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/statistics/ (accessed 14 July 2021).

 Carlos de León, “Transporte terrestre chino en América Latina” [Chinese land transport in Latin America], Observa­torio Económico Latinoamericano , 31 May 2021, http://www. obela.org/analisis/transporte-terrestre-chino-en-america-latina (accessed 14 July 2021).

 Wilson Center, Aid from China and the U.S. to Latin America amid the COVID-19 Crisis (Washington, D.C., 8 February 2021), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/aid-china-and-us-latin-america-amid-covid-19-crisis (accessed 14 July 2021).

 African Union Commission/OECD Development Centre, Africa’s Development Dynamics 2021. Digital Transformation for Quality Jobs (Paris, 2021), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ development/external-financial-inflows_e1670c9e-en (accessed 14 July 2021).

 Federal Foreign Office, Eine vertiefte Partnerschaft mit Afrika. Fortschreibung und Weiterentwicklung der Afrikapolitischen Leit­linien der Bundesregierung (Berlin, 27 March 2019), 18.

 Idrissa Rahmane, Dialogue in Divergence. The Impact of EU Migration Policy on West African Integration: The Cases of Nigeria, Mali, and Niger (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, 2019).

 European Council, European Council Meeting – Conclusions (28 June 2016) –, EUCO 26/16 (Brussels, 28 June 2016), para. 2.

 “‘Spanien wirft Marokko ‘Erpressung’ vor”, Deutsche Welle , 20 May 2021, https://www.dw.com/de/spanien-wirft-marokko-erpressung-vor/a-57600252 (accessed 19 July 2021).

 Data on Covid-19 infections and deaths as well as vacci­nation coverage in this section are based on analyses from WHO, WHO Cornonavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard , https:// covid19.who.int/ (accessed 13 July 2021).

 Rashmee Roshan Lall, “Por qué Haití no ha vacunado aún a ni una sola persona” [Why Haiti has not vaccinated a single person yet], openDemocracy , 5 July 2021, https://www. opendemocracy.net/es/haiti-no-ha-vacunado-a-nadie/ (accessed 13 July 2021).

 Vaccines from Russia (Sputnik V) and China (VeroCell) are in the EU approval process after application in March and May 2021, respectively.

 The Federal Foreign Office, ed., A Multilateralism for the People . Federal Government White Paper (Berlin, May 2021), 23.

 In the German government’s current White Paper on multi­lateralism, there is remarkably no reference to either the – obviously obsolete – modernisation partnership with Russia or the – formally continuing – bilateral “com­prehensive strategic partnership” with China.

 The expenditures for external relations include the departmental appropriations of the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Defence, and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

 Federal Government, German Sustainable Development Strategy – Update 2021 (Berlin, 2021).

 Independent Group of Scientists, Global Sustainable Develop­ment Report 2019: The Future Is Now – Science for Achieving Sus­tainable Development (New York, NY: United Nations, 2019).

 This article is based, among other things, on a series of talks on “Hebel ‘Internationale Verantwortung und Zusammenarbeit’ als Instrument deutscher und europäischer Nachhaltigkeitspolitik” (Lever ‘International Responsibility and Cooperation’ As an Instrument of German and Euro­pean Sustainability Policy), held in cooperation with the German Development Institute and the SDSN Germany net­work on 4 and 5 May 2021. See also note 17 .

 Auswärtiges Amt, Diplomatie für Nachhaltigkeit. Bericht des Auswärtigen Amtes zur Umsetzung der Deutschen Nachhaltigkeits­strategie und der Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDGs) (Berlin, November 2020).

 Federal Government, German Sustainable Development Strategy (see note 1 ), 128 (emphasis added).

 Auswärtiges Amt, Diplomatie für Nachhaltigkeit (see note 4 , own translation), 5.

 Citizen Assembly, Germany’s Role in the World . The Recom­mendations of the Digital Citizens’ Assembly (Berlin, March 2021).

  Ibid., 56.

 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Leitsätze zum Beschluss des Ersten Senats (Klimaschutz) (Karlsruhe, 24 March 2021), 97.

 Bundesregierung, Transformation erreichen – Perspektiven für die Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitspolitik (Berlin, 14 June 2021), 3 ( own translation ).

 UN Secretary General, Our Common Agenda (New York, NY: United Nations, 2021). https://www.un.org/en/un75/ common-agenda (accessed 7 October 2021).

 Sara Batmanglich et al., Driving Transformative Change: Foreign Affairs and the 2030 Agenda (Berlin: Adelphi, 2019), https://www.adelphi.de/de/publikation/driving-transformative-change-foreign-affairs-and-2030-agenda (accessed 12 July 2021).

 Federal Government, A Multilateralism for the People. Federal Government White Paper (Berlin, 2021), 16.

 Maike Voss, Globale Impfstoffverteilung: Zu kleiner Kuchen, ungleiche Stücke , SWP Kurz gesagt (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 8 December 2020).

 Federal Government, A Multilateralism for the People (see note 14 ), 88.

 Sustainable Development Solutions Network Germany, Zu Hebeln gewendet? Auswärtige Politiken für die Ziele nachhaltiger Entwicklung (Bonn and Berlin, 5 May 2021), https://www.die-gdi.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/veranstaltungen/2021/ 20210504_KurzberichtGespraechsreiheAuswaertigePolitiken_ SDSNGermany.pdf (accessed 12 July 2021).

 United Nations, Voluntary Common Reporting Guidelines for Voluntary National Reviews at the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) (New York, NY, 2021).

 G7 Climate and Environment: Ministers’ Communiqué (London, 21 May 2021).

 International Institute for Sustainable Development, “Germany and Chile Share Concrete Examples of Just Tran­sition” (Winnipeg, 25 July 2019), https://sdg.iisd.org/news/ germany-and-chile-share-concrete-examples-of-just-transition/ (accessed 19 July 2021).

 The term “hybrid threat” is often used in a fuzzy way or is highly contested despite years of use; see Murat Caliskan and Michel Liégeois, “The Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Undermines NATO’s Strategic Thinking: Insights from Inter­views with NATO Officials”, Small Wars and Insurgencies 32, no. 2 (2021): 295–319.

 Samuel Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid War”, Survival 57, no. 6 (2015): 51–58.

 P. Cullen, C. Juola, G. Karagiannis, K. Kivisoo, M. Nor­mark, A. Rácz, J. Schmid, and J. Schroefl, The Landscape of Hybrid Threats. A Conceptual Model , JRC123305 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021), doi: 10.2760/44985 .

 See European Commission, Fifth Progress Report on the Implementation of the 2016 Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats and the 2018 Joint Communication on Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats , SWD(2021) 729 final (Brussels, 23 June 2021); Lutz Güllner, “Im digitalen Fadenkreuz” , International Politics 76, no. 4 (2021): 78–81.

 Mikael Wigell, “Democratic Deterrence: How to Dissuade Hybrid Interference ”, The Washington Quarterly 44, no. 1 (2021): 49–67.

 Eitvydas Bajarūnas, “ Addressing Hybrid Threats: Priorities for the EU in 2020 and Beyond”, European View 19, no. 1 (2020): 62–70.

 With the so-called Stratcom departments (Strategic Communications), see European External Action Service, “Stra­tegic Communications”, https://eeas.europa.eu/head quarters/headquarters-homepage_en/100/Strategic%20 Communications .

 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Secu­rity and Defence in the Context of the EU Global Strategy , 10048/19 (Luxembourg, 17 June 2019), https://data.consilium.europa. eu/doc/document/ST-10048-2019-INIT/en/pdf ; European Com­mission, EU Security Union Strategy, COM(2020) 605 final (Brus­sels, 24 July 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0605&from=EN .

 Other initiatives of the European Commission focus on related soft factors, such as the quality of democracy and the integration of immigrants.

 German Presidency of the Council of the European Union, “Strategic Compass: Developing Strategic Principles”, 25 August 2020, https://www.eu2020.de/eu2020-en/news/ article/eu-defense-strategic-compass-foreign-policy/2377030 ; Federal Ministry of Defence, “The Strategic Compass: Devel­oping Strategic Principles”, 3 May 2020, https://www.bmvg. de/en/news/the-strategic-compass-5058518 .

 See From Self-Doubt to Self-Assurance. The European Exter­nal Action Service as the Indispensable Support for a Geopolitical EU,  report by the task force “EEAS 2.0”, Chairman: Pierre Vimont, Rapporteurs: Christophe Hillion and Steven Blockmans (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, January 2021).

 Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats (HWP ERCHT).

 See Raphael Bossong, Intelligence Support for EU Security Policy. Options for Enhancing the Flow of Information and Political Oversight , SWP Comment 51/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen­schaft und Politik, December 2018), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/intelligence-support-for-eu-security-policy ; Golo M. Bartsch, “Das Wissen vor dem Handeln. Die Nachrichtendienste in der europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik”, Europäische Sicherheit und Technik , no. 5 (2019): 20–22.

 Already in 2016, the EU INTCEN built a generic “Hybrid Tool Box”, see Gerhard Conrad, “Situational Awareness for EU Decision-Making: The Next Decade”, European Foreign Affairs Revue 26, no. 1 (2021): 55–70.

 See Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Para­digm”, Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 5–21 (9).

 Thus Anna Lührmann and Staffan I. Lindberg, “A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New about It?” Democratization 26, no. 7 (2019): 1095–113.

 See Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York, NY: Penguin, 2018), 7.

 See Svante E. Cornell, “How Should America Deal with Authoritarian States?” The American Interest 15, no. 5 (2020).

 See Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber, “Con­ceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers. Sources and Addressees, Mechanisms and Motives of Authoritarian Pres­sure and Attraction”, in Authoritarian Gravity Centers. A Cross-Regional Study of Authoritarian Promotion and Diffusion , ed. Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber (New York, NY: Routledge, 2021), 26–52.

 For an overview of the extensive literature, see Timm Beichelt, “Externe Domokratieförderung”, Neue Politische Literatur 55, no. 3 (2010): 447–67.

 See, e.g., Wolfgang Merkel and Anna Lührmann, “Resilience of Democracies: Responses to Illiberal and Authoritarian Challenges”, Democratization 28, no. 5 (2021): 869–84.

 See the contribution of Annegret Bendiek and Raphael Bossong, p.  33 ff.

 Boese et al. speak here of “onset resilience”; see Vanessa A. Boese et al., “How Democracies Prevail: Democratic Resilience as a Two-stage Process”, Democratization 28, no. 5 (2021): 885–907.

 For more on this, see Jennifer McCoy and Murat Somer, “Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies”, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (2019): 234–71.

 The White House, Fact Sheet: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership (Washington, D.C., 12 June 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/ (accessed 24 August 2021).

 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop­ment, Covid-19 in Africa: Regional Socio-economic Implications and Policy Priorities (Paris, 7 May 2020).

 United Nations Environment Programme, Opportunities to Respond and Build Back Better while Leaving No One Behind in Latin America and the Caribbean (Nairobi, 2020).

 See also the contribution by Marianne Beisheim and Felicitas Fritzsche, p.  60 ff.

 See Federal Constitutional Court, “Constitutional Com­plaints against the Federal Climate Change Act Partially Suc­cessful”, Press Release 31/2021, 29 April 2021, https://www. bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2021/bvg21-031.html (accessed 16 August 2021).

 Source: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen, Struktur des Primärenergieverbrauchs in Deutschland 2020 , September 2021, https://ag-energiebilanzen.de/21-0-Infografik.html (accessed 27 August 2021).

 See European Commission, “European Green Deal. Striving to Be the First Climate-neutral Continent”, https:// ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en ; “Recovery Plan for Europe”, https://ec.europa. eu/info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe_en (each accessed 23 August 2021).

 Net Zero by 2050. A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector (Paris: International Energy Agency [IEA], July 2021), 24f., https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/beceb956-0dcf-4d73-89fe-1310e3046d68/NetZeroby2050-ARoadmapfortheGlobal EnergySector_CORR.pdf .

 See Carlos Fernández Alvarez, “Global Coal Demand Surpassed pre-Covid Levels in Late 2020, Underlining the World’s Emissions Challenge” (Paris: IEA, 23 March 2021), https://www.iea.org/commentaries/global-coal-demand-surpassed-pre-covid-levels-in-late-2020-underlining-the-world-s-emissions-challenge (accessed 12 August 2021).

 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, 70th edition (London, July 2021), 23, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/ bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/ statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf .

 See The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leader­ship on Clean Energy Technologies”, 22 April 2021, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/ 2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-sets-2030-greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-and-securing-u-s-leadership-on-clean-energy-technologies/ (accessed 12 August 2021).

 Maria Pastukhova, Jacopo Maria Pepe, and Kirsten West­phal, Beyond the Green Deal: Upgrading the EU’s Energy Diplomacy for a New Era, SWP Comment 31/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis­senschaft und Politik, June 2020).

 Susanne Dröge, Ein CO2-Grenzausgleich für den Green Deal der EU. Funktionen, Fakten und Fallstricke , SWP-Studie 9/2021 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2021).

 See, e.g., Kim Son Hoang, “Klage und scharfe UN-Kritik wegen EU-Migrationspolitik im Mittelmeer”, Der Standard , 26 May 2021, https://www.derstandard.de/story/20001269 27457/klage-und-scharfe-un-kritik-wegen-eu-migrations politik-im-mittelmeer (accessed 11 August 2021) ; “ Moria: Empörung und Abgrenzung im EU-Parlament”, Deutsche Welle , 17 September 2020, https://www.dw.com/de/moria-emp%C3%B6rung-und-abgrenzung-im-eu-parlament/a-54 960264 (accessed 11 August 2021).

 See Wido Geis-Thöne, In Deutschland und der EU leben immer weniger Kinder. Eine Betrachtung der Entwicklungen der letzten 25 Jahre , IW-Report 62/2020 (Cologne: Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft/German Economic Institute [IW], December 2020), https://www.iwkoeln.de/ studien/wido-geis-thoene-in-deutschland-und-der-eu-leben-immer-weniger-kinder.html (accessed 11 August 2021).

 See Anne Koch, Annette Weber, and Isabelle Werenfels, eds., Profiteers of Migration? Authoritarian States in Africa and European Migration Management , SWP Research Paper 4/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2018), https:// www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/profiteers-of-migration (accessed 11 August 2021); Nadine Biehler, Anne Koch, and Amrei Meier, Risiken und Nebenwirkungen deutscher und euro­päischer Rückkehrpolitik. Ein außen-, sicherheits- und entwicklungs­politischer Beipackzettel , SWP-Studie 12/2021 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2021), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/risiken-und-nebenwirkungen-deutscher-und-europaeischer-rueckkehrpolitik (accessed 8 September 2021).

 See Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement, Preventing Crises, Creating Prospects, Protecting People , Report (April 2021), 146, https://www.fachkommission-flucht ursachen.de/en (accessed 4 October 2021).

 See Steffen Angenendt, Nadine Biehler, Raphael Bossong, David Kipp, and Anne Koch, The New EU Migration and Asylum Package: Breakthrough or Admission of Defeat? SWP Comment 46/2020 ( Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/the-new-eu-migration-and-asylum-package-breakthrough-or-admission-of-defeat (accessed 4 October 2021).

 See the contribution of Hürcan Aslı Aksoy, Muriel Asse­burg and Wolfram Lacher, p.  33 ff.

 Systemic prevention is equally relevant. However, it is primarily directed at the global risk factors of conflicts and can therefore rarely be applied to individual cases.

 Moritz Koch, “Chinas Selbstentkoppelung”, Handelsblatt , 12 July 2021, 16.

 Liu Caiyu, “Chinese Lawmaker Proposes Removing Eng­lish as Core Subject”, Global Times , 5 March 2021, https:// www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1217396.shtml (accessed 5 August 2021).

 Gabriel Wildau, “Xi Invokes Mao with Call for ‘Self-reliance’”, Financial Times , 13 November 2018, 4.

 Tetsushi Takahashi, “A Future in Which China No Longer Needs the World, but the World Cannot Spin without It”, Financial Times , 16 December 2020.

 “Germany’s China Policy: Out of Date”, The Economist , 18 July 2020, 24.

 Daniel Goffart, “Notfalls aufs Geschäft verzichten”, Wirt­schaftswoche , 16 July 2021, 30.

 “Welthandelsorganisation WTO droht die Blockade”, Die Zeit (online), 10 December 2019, https://www.zeit.de/news/ 2019-12/10/welthandelsorganisation-wto-droht-die-blockade (accessed 5 August 2021).

 WTO, “RTAs Currently in Force (by Year of Entry into Force), 1948–2021”, Regional Trade Agreements Database, https://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (accessed 5 August 2021). It should be noted that the actual number of free trade agreements is even higher, as not all agreements have to be reported to the WTO.

 Thomas Hanke, “‘Wir müssen Druck auf China aus­üben”, Handelsblatt , 9 August 2018, 9.

 Okonjo-Iweala acknowledged in early July that the WTO suffers from a “design problem” because WTO rules allow economies such as China to classify themselves as developing countries; see Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, “Development Status at WTO a ‘Design Problem’”, Inside U.S. Trade (online), 13 July 2021.

 For more detail, see Sabine Riedel, Grenzschutz, Migration und Asyl. Wege der Europäischen Union aus der Politikverflechtungs­falle , SWP-Studie 23/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ publications/products/studien/2020S23_asyl_migration.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).

 Auswärtiges Amt, ed., Together for Europe’s Recovery. Review of Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 1 July to 31 December 2020 (Berlin, 2021), https://www.eu2020.de/ blob/2430740/82492e5a38fd3d8312991a7ee8e930c1/bilanz-en-pdf-data.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).

 Ibid., 5f.

 Ursula Lehmkuhl, “Großbritannien in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften”, in Dossier. Der Brexit und die britische Sonder­rolle in der EU , ed. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Bonn, 10 June 2016), https://www.bpb.de/internationales/ europa/brexit/229084/von-efta-bis-eu?p=all (accessed 1 Octo­ber 2021).

 Élysée, “Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy”, Paris, 7 February 2020, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/ speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy (accessed 1 October 2021).

 European Commission, A Renewed Multilateralism Fit for the 21st Century: The EU’s Agenda , Press corner (Brussels, 17 Feb­ruary 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/ detail/en/ip_21_622 (accessed 1 October 2021).

 See Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, CA, 26 June 1945), article 2, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/ uncharter.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).

 Laura Philipps and Daniela Braun, The Future of Multi­lateralism. The Liberal Order under Pressure , International Reports 3/2020 (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 5 October 2020), https://www.kas.de/documents/259121/10240919/The+Future+of+Multilateralism.pdf/6ad20720-e21f-7986-b784-ec6729 adc53f?version=1.0&t=1601545054776 (accessed 1 October 2021).

 Deutscher Bundestag, Unterabteilung Europa, Fach­bereich Europa, Differenzierte Integration in Europa , Berlin, 27 October 2020 (Ausarbeitung PE 6-3000-090/20), p. 12 https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/810866/e2015ec67fe07f73390cba33eb2fa229/PE-6-090-20-pdf-data.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).

 See “Polen-Quartett. Vier Personen, ein Thema. Über Polen” (online) (Darmstadt: Deutsches Polen-Institut , 2021), https://www.deutsches-polen-institut.de/politik/polen-quartett/ (accessed 1 October 2021).

 For background, see Axel Kreienbrink et al., Rückkehr aus Deutschland. Forschungsstudie 2006 im Rahmen des Europäischen Migrationsnetzwerks , Forschungsbericht 4 (Nürnberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2007), https://www. bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Forschungsberichte/fb04-rueckkehr-emn.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=11 (accessed 1 October 2021).

 See European Parliament, The Western Balkans , Fact Sheets on the European Union (Brussels and Strasbourg, June 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_ 5.5.2.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).

 European Union, The Comprehensive & Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union & Armenia (CEPA) (Brus­sels, 26 February 2021), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ headquarters-homepage/36140/comprehensive-enhanced-partnership-agreement-between-european-union-armenia-cepa_en (accessed 1 October 2021).

 Horst Köhler, speech on 10 October 2005, https://www. bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Horst-Koehler/ Reden/2005/10/20051010_Rede.html ; Frank-Walter Stein­meier, speech on 12 November 2020, https://www. bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Frank-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2020/11/201112-Geloebnis-Bundeswehr. html (accessed 18 August 2021). While Köhler’s statement was merely indicative, Steinmeier conceded that there was a problem of “friendly disinterest”.

 For lessons and fallacies of the Afghanistan intervention, see Eckhard Lübkemeier, “Nicht alles ist schlecht”, Die Welt , 17 June 2020, 2.

 See Oliver Thränert, “Sicherheit im Atomzeitalter: Atempause oder Zeitenwende?” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , 7 June 2021, 7.

 See Eckhard Lübkemeier, Europa schaffen mit eigenen Waffen? SWP-Studie 17/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2020). For the English version, see Eckhard Lübkemeier, Standing on Our Own Feet? Opportunities and Risks of European Self-Defence , SWP Research Paper 1/2021 (Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2021).

 See Max Bergmann, James Lamond and Siena Cicarelli, The Case for EU Defense. A New Way Forward for Trans-Atlantic Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, June 2021), https://www.americanprogress.org/ issues/security/reports/2021/06/01/500099/case-eu-defense/ (accessed 13 August 2021).

 Matthew P. Goodman and Jonathan E. Hillman, The G7’s New Global Infrastructure Initiative , CSIS Critical Questions (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], June 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/g7s-new-global-infrastructure-initiative (accessed 13 August 2021).

 See Markus Kaim and Ronja Kempin, A European Security Council. Added Value for EU Foreign and Security Policy? SWP Comment 2/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2019), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/ a-european-security-council (accessed 8 October 2021).

 Adam Soboczynski, “Die Zeiten, in denen wir uns auf andere völlig verlassen konnten, die sind ein Stück vorbei”, Die Zeit (online), 3 June 2017, https://www.zeit.de/2017/23/ angela-merkel-rhetorik-deutschland-usa (accessed 20 July 2021).

 “The essential problem is neither American arrogance nor European fecklessness. Rather, it is the toxic interaction between the two”, Jeremy Shapiro, “Biden Talks a Big Game on Europe. But His Actions Tell a Different Story”, Politico (online), 4 June 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/ magazine/2021/06/04/biden-administration-europe-focus-491857 (accessed 8 June 2021).

 See the contribution of Hanns Günther Hilpert and Angela Stanzel, p.  46 ff.

 Public Religion Research Institute, “The ‘Big Lie’: Most Republicans Believe the 2020 Election Was Stolen” (Washing­ton, D.C., 12 May 2021), https://www.prri.org/ spotlight/the-big-lie-most-republicans-believe-the-2020-election-was-stolen/ (accessed 15 July 2021).

 Brennan Center for Justice, “Voting Laws Roundup: May 2021” (Washington, D.C., 28 May 2021), https://www. brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-may-2021 (accessed 16 July 2021); States United Democracy Center et al., “Democracy Crisis Report Update: New Data and Trends Show the Warning Signs Have Inten­sified in the Last Two Months”, 10 June 2021, https:// statesuniteddemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ Democracy-Crisis-Part-II_June-10_Final_v7.pdf (accessed 16 July 2021).

 See the contribution of Wolfgang Richter, p.  91 ff.

 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: EU-China – A Strategic Out­look (Strasbourg, 12 March 2019), 1, https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019JC0005&from=EN (accessed 19 October 2021).

 Jörg Lau, “‘Schwieriger Partner’”, Internationale Politik , no. 2 (2021): 13.

 See also Library of the European Parliament, EU Strategic Partnerships with Third Countries , Library Briefing (26 September 2012), 2, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/biblio theque/briefing/2012/120354/LDM_BRI%282012%29120354_REV1_EN.pdf (accessed 10 August 2021).

 See Moritz Rudolf, Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law. New Substance in the Conflict of Systems with China , SWP Comment 28/2021 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2021), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/xi-jinping-thought-on-the-rule-of-law (accessed 19 October 2021).

 “‘I think the European Union is a foe,’ Trump says ahead of Putin meeting in Helsinki”, CBS News , 15 July 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-interview-cbs-news-european-union-is-a-foe-ahead-of-putin-meeting-in-helsinki-jeff-glor/ (accessed 10 August 2021).

 For another view, see the contribution of Hanns Günther Hilpert and Angela Stanzel, p.  46 ff.

 US Department of State, “A Foreign Policy for the Ameri­can People”, Speech by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, 3 March 2021, https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/ (accessed 10 August 2021).

 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council (see note 1 ), 1.

 See the contribution of Sabine Fischer, p.  43 ff.

 See the contribution of Günther Maihold, p.  69 ff.

 See also Wolfgang Ischinger and Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Mind the Gap: Priorities for Transatlantic China Policy – Report of the Distinguished Reflection Group on Transatlantic China Policy (Munich, Berlin, Washington, D.C.: Munich Security Con­ference, Mercator Institute for China Studies, Aspen Strategy Group, July 2021), https://doi.org/10.47342/GXWK1490 (accessed 6 August 2021); Hans Binnendijk and Sarah Kirch­berger, The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic Competition (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, March 2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/ 03/The-China-Plan-A-Transatlantic-Blueprint.pdf (accessed 10 August 2021).

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SWP Research Papers reflect the views of the author(s).

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doi: 10.18449/2021RP10

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Understanding German Foreign Policy in the (Post-)Merkel Era— Review Essay

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Jakub Eberle, Understanding German Foreign Policy in the (Post-)Merkel Era— Review Essay , International Studies Review , Volume 25, Issue 2, June 2023, viad007, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viad007

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This essay reviews four recent books on Germany's foreign policy with emphasis on the era of Angela Merkel. The evaluation is based on their (a) added value to scholarship on German foreign policy, (b) theoretical sophistication and contribution to IR, and (c) relevance also for the post-Merkel era. I argue that the books bring in valuable insights regarding the enduring, yet also changeable role of anti-militarism and provide knowledgeable analyses of the failure of Germany's policies toward Russia. Importantly, they enrich also broader literatures, especially in their focus on discursive change and state power in the European Union context. I demonstrate that these ideas help us understand Germany's struggle to redefine its role after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and offer more nuanced analyses of Germany's policies and their specifics, staying clear of treating the country as a priori exceptional.

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• > Journals
• > Central European History
• > Volume 12 Issue 1
• > From Second to Third Reich: The Problem of Continuity...

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From second to third reich: the problem of continuity in german foreign policy.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Ever since Heraklites' dictum “panta rhei,” historians have debated the relative priority of continuity and change. Although Nazi and Allied propagandists saw the Third Reich as the fulfillment of earlier traditions, postwar scholars stressed the unprecedented nature of its genocide, political repression, and external aggression. Sensitive to charges of “collective guilt,” many German historians preferred to see the Nazi era as something sui generis , an aberration from and not the culmination of German history. Handicapped by language, culture, and access to sources, American scholars often tended to concentrate on problems and themes within one of several airtight compartments such as the Wilhelmian Empire, Weimar Republic, or Third Reich. Because of efforts to restore the “historical consciousness of [the German] people,” the critical implications of Ludwig Dehio's and Hajo Holborn's revisionism were largely ignored. Hence the scholarly community reacted with anger and disbelief when Fritz Fischer drew attention first to the continuity of German expansionism and then to the continuity of historical apologetics in his provocative book on German Aims in the First World War .

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1 Immanuel , Geiss et al., Ansichten einer künftigen Geschichtswissenschaft ( Munich , 1974 ), pp. 15 ff Google Scholar ., and Conze , Werner , “ Die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft seit 1945: Bedingungen und Ergebnisse ,” Historische Zeitschrift 225 ( 1977 ): 1 – 28 . CrossRef Google Scholar

2 Krieger , Leonard , “European History in America,” in Higham , John , History ( Princeton , 1965 ). Google Scholar Cf. also Landes , David S. and Tilly , Charles , History as Social Science ( Englewood Cliffs, N.J. , 1971 ). Google Scholar

3 Ritter , Gerhard , Das deutsche Problem , rev. ed. ( Munich , 1962 ), p. 8 Google Scholar ; Dehio , Ludwig , Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie? ( Krefeld , 1948 ) Google Scholar , and Holborn , Hajo , The Political Collapse of Europe ( New York , 1951 ). Google Scholar

4 Fischer , Fritz , Griff nach der Weltmacht ( Düsseldorf , 1961 ) Google Scholar trans. as Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967), and Der Krieg der Illusionen (Düsseldorf, 1969) trans. as War of Illusions (New York, 1974). For summaries of the voluminous literature cf. Jarausch , Konrad H. , “ World Power or Tragic Fate? The Kriegsschuldfrage as Historical Neurosis ,” Central European History 5 ( 1972 ): 72 ff. CrossRef Google Scholar , and Moses , John , The Politics of Illusion ( New York , 1975 ). Google Scholar

5 See the discussion in Kocka , Jürgen , “ Theorien in der Sozial- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte ,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 1 ( 1975 ): 9 – 42 . Google Scholar Cf. the controversy between Hillgruber , Andreas , “ Politische Geschichte in moderner Sicht ,” Historische Zeitschrift 216 ( 1973 ): 529 –52 CrossRef Google Scholar , and Wehler , Hans-Ulrich , “ Moderne Politikgeschichte oder ‘Grosse Politik der Kabinette’? ” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 1 ( 1975 ): 344 –69 Google Scholar , refereed by Schmidt , Gustav , “ Wozu noch ‘politische Geschichte’ ?” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte , 1975 , no. 17, pp. 21 – 45 . Google Scholar

6 Heinrich , August Winkler , ed., Organisierter Kapitalismus ( Göttingen , 1973 ). Google Scholar Cf. also Barkin's , Kenneth critique, “ Organized Capitalism ,” Journal of Modern History 47 ( 1975 ): 125 ff. CrossRef Google Scholar

7 Wehler , H.-U. , Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918 ( Göttingen , 1973 ) Google Scholar , based on his earlier Bismarck und der Imperialismus , 3rd ed. (Cologne, 1972). See also Zmarzlik , Hans-Günter , “ Das Kaiserreich in Neuer Sicht? ” Historische Zeitschrift 222 ( 1976 ): 105 –26. CrossRef Google Scholar

8 Mayer , Arno J. , Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe 1870–1956 ( New York , 1971 ) Google Scholar , and the ensuing controversy with Peter Loewenberg, Joachim Remak, and Paul Schroeder in the pages of the Journal of Modern History .

9 Hillgruber , Andreas , Kontinität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler ( Düsseldorf , 1969 ) Google Scholar , and Hildebrand , Klaus , The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich ( Berkeley , 1973 ) Google Scholar , as well as “Innenpolitische Antriebskräfte der nationalsozialistischen Aussenpolitik,” in Wehler , H.-U. , ed., Sozialgeschichte Heute ( Göttingen , 1974 ), pp. 635 ff. CrossRef Google Scholar

10 Stegmann , Dirk , Die Erben Bismarcks: Parteien und Verbände in der Spātphase des Wilhelminischen Deutschlands: Sammlungspolitik 1897–1918 ( Cologne , 1970 ) Google Scholar , and, building on earlier suggestions of Roth , G. and Sauer , W. , Groh , Dieter , Negative Integration und revolutionārer Attentismus: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges ( Frankfurt , 1973 ). Google Scholar Cf. the criticism of Buse , Dieter K. in the Journal of Modern History 46 ( 1974 ): 732 ff. CrossRef Google Scholar

11 Nipperdey , Thomas , “ Wehler's ‘Kaiserreich’: Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung ,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 1 ( 1975 ): 539 –60. Google Scholar One of the ironies of the current debate is the reversal of the normal fronts with the traditionalists stressing change and the critics asserting continuity!

12 Röhl , John C. G. , From Bismarck to Hitler: The Problem of Continuity in German History ( New York , 1970 ), p. xiii . Google Scholar

13 Namier , Lewis , Diplomatic Prelude 1938–1939 ( London , 1948 ) Google Scholar , and Hofer , Walther , Die Entfesselung des zweiten Weltkrieges ( Stuttgart , 1954 ). Google Scholar For Hitler's consistency cf. also Trevor-Roper , Hugh Redwald , “ Hitlers Kriegsziele ,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 8 ( 1960 ): 121 –33. Google Scholar

14 Taylor , A. J. P. , The Origins of the Second World War , 2nd rev. ed. ( London , 1963 ). Google Scholar For the controversy see Carr , William , “National Socialism: Foreign Policy and Wehrmacht,” in Walter , Laqueur , ed., Fascism: A Readers Guide ( Berkeley , 1976 ), pp. 151 –78. Google Scholar

15 For apologias see Hoggan , David , Der Erzwungene Krieg ( Tübingen , 1961 ) Google Scholar ; Irving , David , Hitler's War ( New York , 1977 ). Google Scholar Hitler's planning is stressed by Hillgruber and Hildebrand (see n. 9).

16 Hans Mommsen, “National Socialism: Continuity and Change,” in W. Laqueur, ed., Fascism, pp. 179–210, in contrast to Mosse , George L. , The Nationalization of the Masses ( New York , 1975 ) Google Scholar , and Jäckel , Eberhard , Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power ( Middletown , 1972 ). Google Scholar

17 Kielmannsegg , P. Graf , “ Von den Schwierigkeiten deutsche Geschichte zu schreiben ,” Merkur 25 ( 1971 ): 366 –69 Google Scholar versus H.-U. Wehler, Kaiserreich , pp. 238ff.

18 Cecil , Lamar , The German Diplomatic Service, 1871–1914 ( Princeton , 1976 ) Google Scholar ; Lauren , P. G. , Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth Century Diplomacy in France and Germany ( Stanford , 1976 ) Google Scholar ; and Kenneth Mernitz, “Characteristics of German Diplomats, 1933–1945” (m.a. thesis, University of Missouri, Columbia, 1978).

19 Eyck , Erich , Das Persönliche Regiment Wilhelms II ( Erlenbach-Zurich , 1948 ) Google Scholar ; Röhl , J. G. C. , Germany Without Bismarck: The Crisis of Government in the Second Reich, 1890–1900 ( Berkeley , 1967 ) Google Scholar ; and Mommsen , Wolfgang J. , “ Die latente Krise des Wilhelminischen Reiches: Staat und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1890–1914 ,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 15 ( 1974 ): 7 – 28 . Google Scholar

20 Rich , Norman , Hitler's War Aims ( New York , 1973 ), 1 : 11ff. Google Scholar , as well as his paper “Nazi Imperialism: Retrospect and Perspective” at the 1975 Georgetown Forum. Cf. Jacobsen , Hans-Adolf , Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik 1933–1938 ( Frankfurt , 1968 ) Google Scholar as well as his paper, “Organisation, Entwicklung und Bedeutung des aussenpolitischen Instrumentariums im Dritten Reich, 1933–1945,” at the same conference, now also in his essay collection cited in n. 36.

21 For the term cf. Goodspeed , D. J. , The German Wars, 1914–1945 ( Boston , 1977 ). Google Scholar For the conceptualization of the following discussion see Gantzel , K.-J. et al., eds., Konflikt—Eskalation—Krise: Sozialwissenschaftliche Studien zum Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges ( Düsseldorf , 1972 ). Google Scholar

22 For the documentary background consult Geiss , Immanuel , July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War ( New York , 1974 ) Google Scholar , Eubank , Keith , The Road to World War Two ( New York , 1973 ) Google Scholar , and Adamthwaite , Anthony P. , The Making of the Second World War ( London , 1977 ). Google Scholar For introductions into the voluminous literature see Berghahn , Volker R. , Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 ( London , 1973 ) Google Scholar , and Carr, “Foreign Policy and Wehrmacht,” pp. 151ff.

23 Jarausch , K. H. , “ Die Alldeutschen und Bethmann Hollweg: Eine Denkschrift Kurt Riezlers aus dem Jahre 1916 ,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 21 ( 1973 ): 435 –68. Google Scholar Hitler , Adolf , Mein Kampf , trans. Mannheim , R. ( Boston , 1943 ), pp. 131 ff. Google Scholar

24 F. Fischer, Germany's Aims , passim; Immanuel , Geiss and Wendt , Bernd J. , eds., Deutschland in der Weltpolitik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts ( Düsseldorf , 1973 ) Google Scholar ; Geiss , I. , German Foreign Policy, 1871–1914 ( London , 1976 ), pp. 173 ff. Google Scholar ; and Fischer , , “Zum Problem der Kontinuität in der deutschen Geschichte von Bismarck zu Hitler,” in his Der Weltkrieg und das deutsche Geschichtsbild ( Düsseldorf , 1977 ), pp. 350 –63 Google Scholar , which shows continuity in socioeconomic structures as well as power-political aims, but admits “a qualitative leap … in the extermination policy towards Jews and Poles.”

25 For my own interest in these questions cf. Jarausch , K.H. , The Four Power Pact, 1933 ( Madison , 1966 ) Google Scholar , and The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany, 1856–1921 (New Haven, 1973).

26 Hildebrand , K. , “ Hitler's Ort in der Geschichte des preussisch-deutschen Nationalstaates ,” Historische Zeitschrift 217 ( 1973 ): 584 – 632 CrossRef Google Scholar ; and Karl D. Bracher, “The Role of Hitler: Perspectives of Interpretation,” in W. Laqueur, ed., Fascism, pp. 211–25. See also Mason , Timothy , Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich: Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft ( Wiesbaden , 1977 ) CrossRef Google Scholar , for Hitler's relations with the workers.

27 Lack of restraint is also Craig's , Gordon A. chief criticism in his introduction to From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft , rev. ed. ( New York , 1965 ), pp. ixff . Google Scholar and his exposition in Germany, 1866–1945 (New York, 1978).

28 For a critique of the concepts and the literature cf. Hans Mommsen, “Continuity and Change,” pp. 179ff., 205ff.

29 For the concept cf. Stürmer , Michael , Regierung und Reichstag im Bismarckreich, 1871–1880: Cāsarismus oder Parlamentarismus ( Düsseldorf , 1974 ). Google Scholar For critiques see Gall , Lothar , “ Bismarck und der Bonapartismus ,” Historische Zeitschrift 223 ( 1976 ): 618 –37 CrossRef Google Scholar , and Mitchell , Alan , “ Bonapartism as a Model for Bismarckian Politics ,” Journal of Modern History 49 ( 1977 ): 181 – 207 . CrossRef Google Scholar

30 Hillgruber , A. , “ Grundzüge der nationalsozialistischen Aussenpolitik 1933–1945 ,” Saeculum , 1973 , no. 4, pp. 329 ff. Google Scholar Cf. the special issue on “International Fascism” of the Journal of Contemporary History 11 (1976), and Francis L. Carsten, “Interpretations of Fascism,” in W. Laqueur, ed., Fascism, pp. 415–34.

31 Turner , Henry A. , “ Hitlers Einstellung zu Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft vor 1933 ,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 2 ( 1976 ): 89 – 117 Google Scholar , and Alan S. Milward, “Fascism and the Economy,” in W. Laqueur, Fascism , pp. 379–412. See also Mason , T. W. , “ Labour in the Third Reich, 1933–1939 ,” Past and Present 33 ( 1966 ): 112 –41 CrossRef Google Scholar , for a related point.

32 Eley , Geoff , “ Sammlungspolitik, Social Imperialism and the Navy Law of 1898 ,” Militārgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 15 ( 1974 ): 29 – 63 Google Scholar , and Mommsen , W. J. , “ Europäischer Finanzimperialismus vor 1914: Ein Beitrag zu einer pluralistischen Theorie des Imperialismus ,” Historische Zeitschrift 224 ( 1977 ): 17 – 81 . CrossRef Google Scholar

33 Eugen Weber, “Revolution? Counterrevolution? What Revolution?” in W. Laqueur, Fascism , pp. 435–67. Cf. also his “Introduction” to The European Right: A Historical Profile (Berkeley, 1966), pp. 1ff.

34 Otto Pflanze, “Bismarck's Quest for Social Consensus,” paper delivered at the 1976 American Historical Association meeting in Washington, D.C. See also the comment by K. H. Jarausch, “Contemporary and Historical Perceptions of Social Order in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” at the same session.

35 Berghahn , V. , “ Fritz Fischer und seine Schüler ,” Neue Polititsche Literatur 19 ( 1974 ): 243 ff. Google Scholar and Mann's , R. forthcoming volume on “Quantitative Analysen zum Nationalsozialismus,” previewed in his report in the Jahrbuch der historischen Forschung 1976/7 ( Stuttgart , 1978 ), 79 – 84 . Google Scholar

36 Jacobsen , Hans-Adolf , “Zur Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert,” in his collection, Von der Strategie der Gewalt zur Politik der Friedenssicherung ( Düsseldorf , 1977 ) Google Scholar , unfortunately discusses the problem of continuity more in relation to 1945 than to 1933.

37 Wehler , H.-U. , Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte ( Göttingen , 1973 ). Google Scholar For a spirited defense of the hermeneutic usefulness of the paradigms cf. also his “Kritik und kritische Antikritik,” Historische Zeitschrift 225 (1977): 347–84.

38 Weinberg , Gerhard L. , The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–1936 ( Chicago , 1970 ). Google Scholar Cf. also the essays in Funke , M. , ed., Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte: Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches ( Düsseldorf , 1976 ). Google Scholar

39 Hildebrand , K. in his introduction and conclusion to “ Imperialismus, Wettrüsten und Kriegsausbruch 1914: Zum Problem der Legitimität und Revolution im internationalen System ,” Neue Politische Literatur 20 ( 1975 ): 160 –94, 339–64. Google Scholar Perhaps one should add the alternative of evolutionary change to the dichotomy between status quo and revolutionary upheaval which Hildebrand takes from Kissinger.

40 Rosecrance , Richard N. , Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective ( Boston , 1963 ) Google Scholar , and Northedge , F. S. and Grieve , M. J. , A Hundred Years of International Relations ( London , 1971 ) Google Scholar are recent examples of explanations on the level of the international system. Cf. Dehio , Ludwig , Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century ( New York , 1959 ). Google Scholar

41 Gerschenkron , Alexander , “On the Concept of Continuity in History,” in his collection, Continuity in History and Other Essays ( Cambridge, Mass ., 1968 ), pp. 11 – 39 . Google Scholar See also Alff's , W. critical “Bemerkungen zu A. Hillgrubers Auffassung des Kontinuitätsproblems der deutschen Geschichte,” in his essay collection, Materialien zum Kontinuitätsproblem der deutschen Geschichte ( Frankfurt , 1976 ), pp. 142 –50. Google Scholar Most intriguing is his notion of a “change in the German national character” due to a “process of education after 1871,” ibid ., pp. 16ff.

42 Cf. above, n. 24. For the general issue of illiberalism see also Dahrendorf , R. , Society and Democracy in Germany ( Garden City , 1967 ) Google Scholar , and Stern , F. , The Failure of Illiberalism ( Chicago , 1975 ). Google Scholar

43 Joll , James , 1914: The Unspoken Assumptions ( London , 1969 ) Google Scholar ; Cord-Meyer , Henry , The Long Generation ( New York , 1973 ) Google Scholar recognizes that the problem ought to be approached from this perspective, but fails to solve it. Cf. Jarausch , K. H. , “ Liberal Education as Illiberal Socialization: The Case of Students in Imperial Germany ,” Journal of Modern History 50 ( 1978 ): 609 –30. CrossRef Google Scholar See also P. W. Schroeder, “The Autonomy of Diplomatic History,” luncheon address at the 1978 meeting of the Southern Historical Association in St. Louis.

44 Nipperdey , Thomas , “ 1933 und die Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte ,” Historische Zeitschrift 227 ( 1978 ): 86 – 111 . CrossRef Google Scholar Although understandable as a reaction to the simplistic monocausality of much of the holocaust literature, his trivialization of antisemitism (it “does not belong to the dominant continuities of German history”) needs to be challenged. Cf. also Gay's , Peter “Introduction: German Questions,” in his Freud, Jews and Other Germans: Masters and Victims of Modernist Culture ( New York , 1978 ), pp. 3 – 28 . Google Scholar

45 Gerschenkron, “Continuity,” pp. 38ff. For the broader perspective cf. also Feuchtwanger , E. J. , “Introduction” to his collection, Upheaval and Continuity: A Century of German History ( London , 1973 ), pp. 11 – 27 Google Scholar , Krieger , L. , “ Nazism: Highway or Byway ?” Central European History 11 ( 1978 ): 3 – 22 CrossRef Google Scholar , and the provocative essay by Calleo , David , The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present ( Cambridge , 1978 ). CrossRef Google Scholar

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The End of Self-bondage

German Foreign Policy in a World Without Leadership

• © 2021
• Stefan Fröhlich 0

Institute for Political Science, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

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• Germany's foreign policy is better than its reputation
• A plea for a reassessment of the German role in Europe and the world
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Europe is in a permanent state of crisis: nationalisms, brexit and seemingly insurmountable differences on issues of migration, reforming the euro zone and improving its global competitiveness are threatening the cohesion of the Union. At the same time, external pressure from Russia and China, developments on the southern periphery, and not least in the United States, is growing. Trump's election not only disintegrates Germany's foreign policy coordinate system, but also turns the liberal international order upside down. Against this background, Stefan Fröhlich argues for a reassessment of Germany's role in Europe and the world in this political essay: Germany's foreign policy is better than its reputation. In recent years, the country has long since broken with numerous taboos and assumed leadership in Europe. This is one of the reasons why the accusations of those who continue to lament German complacency but at the same time evade global leadership and responsibility themselves sound downright cynical.

This book is a translation of the original German 1 st  edition  Das Ende der Selbstfesselung  by Stefan Fröhlich, published by Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature in 2019. The translation was done with the help of artificial intelligence (machine translation by the service DeepL.com). A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content, so that the book will read stylistically differently from a conventional translation. Springer Nature works continuously to further the development of tools for the production of books and on the related technologies to support the authors .

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Front matter, the tiresome debate about germany’s role in the world: from overcoming division to the new german question.

Stefan Fröhlich

The Future of the Global Economy and the Euro Area

Between the fronts: conflict and crisis management on the eastern and southern flanks of the eu, transatlantic and other strategic partnerships: germany in the concert of global system change, germany’s new foreign policy pragmatism, back matter, authors and affiliations, about the author.

Dr. Stefan Fröhlich is Professor of International Politics and Political Economy at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg and teaches at various renowned universities in Germany and abroad. He is equally well known in academia, the public and the media as a proven expert on German foreign policy.

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Book Title : The End of Self-bondage

Book Subtitle : German Foreign Policy in a World Without Leadership

Authors : Stefan Fröhlich

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32764-4

Publisher : Springer Wiesbaden

eBook Packages : Political Science and International Studies , Political Science and International Studies (R0)

Copyright Information : Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021

Hardcover ISBN : 978-3-658-32763-7 Published: 01 April 2021

Softcover ISBN : 978-3-658-32766-8 Published: 02 April 2022

eBook ISBN : 978-3-658-32764-4 Published: 31 March 2021

Edition Number : 1

Number of Pages : XII, 131

Topics : Popular Science in Political Science and International Relations , Foreign Policy , German Politics , European Politics , International Political Economy

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Germany's foreign policy: What lessons can be learned from the Schröder years?

The German general election on September 18th 2005 is of massive interest to people all over the world. Because Germany is a large and influential EU member, its foreign policy matters not only to other European countries, but also those further afield, such as the Americans, the Russians and the Chinese. If the opinion polls are correct, and the German people elect a new government, the country's foreign policy will change. The international record of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's SPD-Green coalition has been very mixed.

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The Quest for Peace: Henry A. Kissinger on Germany

By mirco reimer, introduction: the phenomenon kissinger.

“If you don’t know where you are going, every road will get you nowhere.”- Henry A. Kissinger

Henry A. Kissinger is a unique figure in United States foreign relations history. Kissinger’s career is unusual in at least three aspects: He is an intellectual, who spent most of his adulthood at a university; he became the first foreign-born Secretary of State; and he is a Jewish war refugee, a German, but also an American. 1 Also, Jeremy Suri has noted that Kissinger’s career is about “the rise of fascism, the Holocaust, and democratic responses… ethnic identity, education, and social networking”, but most importantly, about his thinking that “exemplifies the role of ideas, memories, and prejudices in daily life.” 2 To others, Kissinger is “the quintessential American icon, a great American success story” since he, after all, is a Jewish-German immigrant who narrowly escaped the Holocaust and ended up serving at the highest level of U.S. government, as Hanhimäki has noted. 3

Indeed, Kissinger is a phenomenon, which is also due to his extreme popularity while serving in office. In 1972, Kissinger ranked fourth in Gallup’s “Most Admired Man Index”, and in 1973 he ranked first—never before had a Secretary of State or any presidential advisor been placed on Gallup’s list. From this day and onwards, Kissinger has been a larger than life figure. Another poll illustrates this: In May 1973, 78 percent of Americans were able to identify Kissinger 4 while in comparison, in 2007 only 65 percent could recall the name of Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State at that point, despite of the technologically facilities citizens now could utilize. 5

The rationale behind writing about Kissinger is, partly, that personalities matter in the conduct of policy. 6 In the 1960s, a study of the Institute for Defense Analysis concluded that “the force of personality tends to over-ride procedures.” 7 Kissinger’s own writing also subscribes to this notion. However, this rationale does not mean that personality is the only determinant of policy outcomes. Kissinger certainly did not formulate and implement American foreign policy completely by himself during his time in office. Still, this essay assumes that Kissinger’s policy decisions cannot be understood without considering Kissinger’s own ideas and personal influences before he entered the Nixon administration.

The literature on Kissinger is packed, literally shelves of books have been written about Kissinger, but surprisingly few works have combined two important aspects when examining his life: The time before he went to Washington and became a member of the Nixon administration, and his relationship to his native country, Germany. One reason might be that Kissinger never was much identified with Germany and German politics in the U.S.—despite his origin and accent. 8 During his time in academia, Kissinger was primarily viewed as a nuclear strategist, not an expert on the German question—even though he did consultative work for the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations on that particular question. Another reason might be that most research focuses on Kissinger’s time in the Nixon and Ford administrations where Germany was not at the center of attention. Rather, the issues of the day centered around Kissinger’s involvement in détente with the Soviet Union, the ‘opening of China’, the Vietnam War, Kissinger’s controversial involvement in the American intervention in Chile, and his ‘shuttle diplomacy’ in the Middle East. These works are numerous and range from admiring Kissinger to almost despising him. 9

While these works are important, of course, it is one’s belief that in any serious effort to understand how Kissinger has handled American foreign policy, it is necessary to understand how his ideas formed during his writings and personal experiences in the decades prior to his entry in governmental positions. 10 Some academic and journalistic works have tried to shed light on these features. Dickson, Weber, and Cleva have provided detailed accounts on the European and German intellectual tradition and the influence these traditions had on Kissinger’s Weltanschauung, with particularly focus on Kissinger’s Harvard honors thesis and his subsequent dissertation at Harvard. 11 But few have blended Kissinger’s early intellectual development and tied it to his ideas about his native country Germany before he entered the Nixon administration.

Consequently, what this essay will try to achieve is to address Kissinger’s main conceptual ideas, in particular his views on Germany before he entered the Nixon administration. An essay of this length will have to compromise, as does any piece of scholarship. Therefore, it is also important to emphasize what this essay will not try to emphasize. This essay will not deal with `private` Kissinger, and his extensive writing on nuclear weapons and other foreign policy issues, unless these things can be connected to the essay’s overarching theme which is Kissinger’s views and relationship with Germany prior to his entrance in the Nixon administration. Also, while the essay tries to highlight what influenced Kissinger’s thinking on Germany, it will not compare his views to those of other professionals. This essay is, quite frankly, about one man only: Henry A. Kissinger.

As the essay will try to tease out, Kissinger’s outlook prior to 1969—when he became National Security Advisor—has changed little in the last fifty plus years. 12 Stephen Walker has emphasized: “Kissinger’s academic works reflect his personal philosophy of history and his political philosophy which strongly influenced the policies that Kissinger advocated while on office.” 13 John Stoessinger, a graduate student at Harvard with Kissinger in the 1950s, has also highlighted that Kissinger’s diplomacy as Secretary of State was deeply rooted in the insights of the young doctoral student Kissinger at Harvard a quarter century ago: ”We are witness here to a unique experiment in the application of scholarship to statesmanship, of history to statecraft.” 14 Since Kissinger’s writing and decision making reflects an element of continuity it is even more interesting to examine his early thoughts on Germany. 15 In order to do so, we need to go seventy-five years back in time. Our destination is New York City where the main protagonist of this essay was about to arrive on a ship from Europe with his family.

Coming to America

In 1938, the Kissingers had been forced to flee their native country Germany due to their Jewish belief and the horrors of Nazi Germany and arrived in New York City on a ship. The new life in America proved to be a thrilling experience for the young Henry Kissinger, fifteen years old at that point. Kissinger later recalled:

“I always remembered the thrill when I first walked the streets of New York City. Seeing a group of boys, I began to cross to the other side to avoid being beaten up. And then I remembered where I was.” 16

Kissinger’s first encounters with America proved fruitful. The young Kissinger was ambitious, focused, and serious in his attempt to assimilate himself into his new American society. 17 While many German-Jewish immigrants were content with their new-won social and cultural environment—which, obviously, was way more comforting than the tyranny of Nazi Germany—the young Jewish refugee tried to assimilate himself and succeeded, partly, because he became independent earlier than many of his peers. Kissinger noted later: “If I assimilated quicker, perhaps it was because I had to go work when I was sixteen.” 18 For a sixteen year old today this might sound noteworthy, but in 1939, and with a father who was struggling to earn the income necessary to feed his family, it was not unusual that a boy like Kissinger had to work. Indeed, Kissinger’s experiences were not unique but what seemed to be unique was what Kissinger “made of them, and the way in which once formed, he entered so forcefully into his adopted country’s history”, as Mazlish has observed. 19 While working in a brush factory, Kissinger also attended the tuition-free City College of New York after having graduated with excellent marks from high school. The financial situation was tense for his parents, but for the young Kissinger it seemed an obvious step to go to college if he wanted to climb up the social ladder. Ultimately, though, it was not the time at City College—home to such pivotal figures in American history like Daniel Bell, Sidney Hook, and Irving Kristol—that proved to be pivotal. Rather, it was Kissinger’s experiences in a non-educational branch that turned to be decisive.

Germany Revisited: Kissinger’s time in the Army

History was about to take a different, decisive, step for the young Kissinger. In 1943, Kissinger was drafted for the U.S. army. Not only was this a radical departure from anything that previously had been familiar to Kissinger, twenty years old at that point, but it also marked the first step away from his familiar German-Jewish environment. Kissinger’s time in the army `Americanized` him 20 and Kissinger himself later remarked: “I was never made to feel like a foreigner…I actually thought I had lost my accent when I was in the army.” 21 Although this seems to be a willful exaggeration, Kissinger’s army experience surely created a foundation for Kissinger and gave him the feeling to belong to American society. 22

The army did not only leave Kissinger with the chance of fighting for his new country—which was of particular significance for young emigrants who wanted to assimilate themselves in the United States—but gave him also the chance to enhance his step up the social ladder. The G.I. bill of 1947 made higher education possible for a larger segment of the American population, in particularly for promising students like Kissinger. It was also during his time in the army that Kissinger’s confidence in his intellectual ability grew. But most importantly, Kissinger got the chance to go back to his native country.

Already during his time at Camp Claiborne, LA, Kissinger had lectured his fellow comrades on Nazi Germany, but whenever the talk came to center around his own thoughts and German background, Kissinger remained quiet. As one comrade recalled, Kissinger “never talked about his childhood in Germany, but it was clear that he knew everything about the Nazis.” 23 It seems as if the young Kissinger, understandably, still had to come to terms with his childhood experiences, both emotionally and especially rationally. 24 Even though Kissinger was thriving in his new country at that point, the Jewish refugee still had a feeling that he would “always be German.” 25 Coming back to Germany, as a member of a powerful army, was important for the development of Kissinger’s mindset. It also gave him the chance to come clear with the past, at least partly. Scholars like Ward have maintained that Kissinger felt “a sense of regret of having had to flee from Hitler,” 26 while Landau has noted that Kissinger was not among those refugees from Hitler Germany who looked back “with discomfort and bitterness; he was instead one of those refugees who regretted having to leave their country behind.” 27

One of the reasons that Kissinger regretted that he had to leave Germany was that he felt “an overwhelming affinity for the greater historical and cultural tradition into which he had been born” in Germany. 28 This tradition had been taken away from him when Adolf Hitler transformed the culturally rich country into a warmongering and racist Kriegsmaschine .  Consequently, Kissinger’s time in the army and his prolonged stay in Germany after the end of the war proved pivotal towards giving him the chance of coming to terms with the past. Kissinger himself noted in an interview with the German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel in 1998:

“The Germany that I remember best, the Germany that shaped me and finally formed my affection to the country and its population is not the Germany where I was brought up but the one that I experienced after the end of the war.” 29

Furthermore, while in the army, Kissinger developed a personal relationship that became crucial for his ideas on Germany. During his time at Camp Claiborne, Kissinger became close friends with Fritz Kraemer, a German émigré, who also had fled Nazi Germany and, like Kissinger, was drafted in the American army in 1943. Kraemer was significantly older than Kissinger, eighteen years, and was about to have a profound impact on Kissinger’s subsequent career and thinking, as several Kissinger biographers have noted. 30 Kraemer himself has noted that his first impression of Kissinger was that Kissinger “as yet knew nothing but he understood everything. He had the urgent desire not to understand the superficial thing but the underlying causes.” 31 Kraemer turned out to be the ideal mentor for the young Kissinger who later recalled that “out of this encounter grew a relationship that changed my life.” 32

Their relationship became like professor and student and it was, unsurprisingly, also Kraemer who convinced Kissinger to pursue an academic career at Harvard University instead of becoming an accountant. During their time in the military the two had lengthy conversations—in German—which introduced Kissinger to the works of Kant, Spengler, and other German intellectuals. These talks did not fundamentally alter Kissinger’s worldview, however. They refined Kissinger’s outlook rather than “instilling it”, as Klitzing has highlighted. 33 Among the notions that Kissinger had encountered through Kraemer and would elaborate during his studies at Harvard were the primacy of foreign policy over domestic policy, the primacy of power in politics (at the neglect of economic factors), and the significance of great statesman within the historical process. Kraemer was, however, not the last person to have a important influence on Kissinger’s thinking.

The making of an intellectual: Kissinger at Harvard

In the summer of 1947, Kissinger left Germany and began his undergraduate studies at Harvard University. Due to his good grades he was assigned a tutor who proved to be a second great benefactor for Kissinger’s intellectual development. 34 The tutor was William Y. Elliott, who previously had been a member of Roosevelt’s Brain Trust and Vice President of the War Production Board in Charge of Civilian Requirements during World War II.

While Kraemer had helped Kissinger to discover European and particularly German thinkers like Homer, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, Elliott built upon these foundations. 35 What Elliott liked in particular about Kissinger was that he was “not like the stupid behaviorists… he was not blind to the epic nature of history.” 36 Like Kraemer, Elliott saw history as a “panacea against nihilism and mass conformism”, an attitude Kraemer and Elliott fused with a notion of elitism and a Hegelian notion about the role of the individual in history. 37 Kissinger came to embrace this world view as well and Elliott proved to be another inspiring force, leading Kissinger to write in the acknowledgements of his dissertation that he owed more to Elliott “both intellectually and humanly, than I can ever repay.” 38 Still, it is important to note that Kissinger did not completely assume Elliott’s mindset. Rather, he blended it with his own experience and developed his own conceptual framework.

Kissinger had a conservative skepticism when it came to attempts of social engineering, but he also embraced the importance of ideas for the historical process. This conceptual development is exemplified in Kissinger’s 380 plus page honor’s thesis The Meaning of History where Kissinger put forward his own philosophy of history, which was both shaped by his personal experiences, of course, and the German intellectual tradition. 39 In his thesis, Kissinger seemed to look for a spiritual answer to the meaning of history, a question that had puzzled Kissinger since he fled Germany in 1938. Given his own personal experiences, Kissinger put forward a worldview, which made confidence in human progress impossible:

“The generation of Buchenwald and the Siberian labor-camps cannot walk with the same optimism as its fathers. The bliss of Dante has been lost in our civilization. But this merely describes a fact of decline and not its necessity… The experience of freedom enables us to rise beyond the sufferings of the past and the frustrations of history. In this spirituality resides humanity’s essence, the unique which each man imparts to the necessity of life, the self-transcendence which gives peace.” 40

In particular the pessimistic ideas expressed by Spengler, emphasizing that men would be unable to sustain creativity and the motif of the “irreversibility of life and the momentariness of the individual in history, as well as civilizations” left lasting impressions on Kissinger. 41 His intellectual sense for tragedy, at least partly developed due to his own personal experience that saw the collapse of his secure and stable world, became central features in Kissinger’s outlook and distinguished him from most of his American countrymen. While most Americans had a pragmatic and optimistic take on history and saw history characterized by a notion of progress and the thorough overcoming of injustice and evil, Kissinger saw history as “a tale of efforts that failed.” 42 These divergent views were at the core of the controversy that was about to follow Kissinger during his time as an intellectual and subsequent politician. 43 Kissinger was concerned with what he perceived as American naivety in foreign affairs, also towards Germany. Accordingly, in 1961, he noted: “Nothing is more difficult for Americans to understand than the possibility of tragedy.” 44 For Kissinger, this tragedy had characterized most of his early childhood.

It was Immanuel Kant who got the main focus of Kissinger’s attention in his undergraduate thesis. Especially Kant’s supposition that events moved in an inescapable course which ultimately denied human freedom puzzled Kissinger. The undergraduate student denounced Kant’s notion because he distinguished between history and the realm of freedom. 45 While Kant, arguably an idealist, posited the rule of law in international relations, Kissinger, in a more ‘realist’ notion, perceived relations between states above all determined by power and a state’s national interest. 46 That Kissinger rejected the notion of moral progress, which Kant championed, is understandable when considering his personal experiences. As one biographer has noted: “Auschwitz made it impossible for Kissinger to believe in universal moral principles and eternal values that formed the basis for Kant’s faith in human progress.” 47

Rather, Kissinger championed Max Weber’s idea of Verantwortungsethik . To Kissinger, some evil was acceptable if it helped to minimize an even more destructive development in the long run. Later, Kissinger put this idea in more blunt terms, writing in his memoirs White House Years : “Leaders are responsible not for running public opinion polls but for the consequence of their actions.” 48 Consequently, the most important thing to Kissinger became the preservation of the existing international order. 49 In general, Kissinger suggested that if he had to choose between justice and disorder or injustice and order, he would always advocate for the latter. 50 His early views on Germany reflect this sort of thinking and outlook.

Hitler’s Calamity: Kissinger on Nazi Germany

The particular ‘European feature’ in Kissinger’s thinking was, according to Mazlish, that he could “accept the tragic necessity of having to act , and to act in a seemingly amoral or immoral way to achieve a higher historical morality: the preservation of stability and order through the use of power” (emphasis in original). 51 Ralph Blumenfeld has also highlighted Kissinger’s unique thinking, arguing that Kissinger has a view of the world that “a born American could not have.” 52

Kissinger’s excellent standing on the German question also had a cultural dimension. Even though Kissinger’s religious belief did not figure prominently in his thinking, it is important to remember that Kissinger was a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany and had lost numerous family members during the Holocaust. But Kissinger held no grudges and approached the sensible subject of Germany before and after Hitler with an astonishing rational attitude and pragmatism that made him extremely popular in academic circles. As Klitzing has noted: “Kissinger had not only survived, he now thrived and, even more so, seemed to hold no grudges about what had happened.” 53

How the intellectual Kissinger interpreted the Nazi era is particularly interesting. 54 His interpretation highlighted the need to differentiate between Hitler and the German people as a whole. With this approach Kissinger tried to ease the burden of the German population and save their pride as a people and country. This approach was also in accordance with Kissinger’s own view of history that focused on ‘great men’. 55

Both Kissinger’s undergraduate thesis on German intellectuals and the meaning of history and his dissertation on Metternich, Castlereagh and the problems of peace after the Napoleonic Wars in 1814 focused on the special role that powerful leaders had had in world history and Kissinger applied this interpretation to the horrors of Hitler’s rule as well. He saw Hitler not only as the central driving force in Germany’s force to war and the abyss of modernity but also described him as the incarnation of evil. For example, Kissinger later wrote in his book Diplomacy :

“The orgy of killing and devastation that it unleashed was the work of one demonic personality…It is no small irony that the twentieth-century—the age of popular will and of impersonal forces— should have been forged by so few individuals, and that its greatest calamity might have been avoided by the elimination of one single individual…the largest land war in history of mankind was unleashed, in effect, by the will of one man.” 56

Even though one has to be careful with these kind of assessments, Kissinger’s public utterances seem to suggest that he was trying to resign as little blame as possible against the Germans as a whole for Nazi Germany’s transgressions. Furthermore, Kissinger warned against dismissing the brutalities of Nazi Germany as a national peculiarity. Rather, Kissinger maintained, the horror had come about due to a complex interaction of specific German conditions, such as the lost war, and the cultural phenomena of modern society.

Although Kissinger clearly distanced himself from “the collective German amnesia”, he did not abstain from criticism towards the (self-serving) German attitude and behavior. 57 This did not mean that Kissinger engaged in any lengthy discussions on the legal and moral legitimacy of German grievances. Instead, Kissinger viewed them as a reality that had to be dealt with from an American point of view. Consequently, according to Kissinger, the official American `propaganda line` should state that the U.S. was “well aware” of Germany’s difficulties. Kissinger, due to his transatlantic understanding while simultaneously understanding American interests, was therefore in his dealing with Germany ready to accept that Germans had to “gain some voice in their destiny” as he noted in a letter to his parents in 1952. 58

Kissinger was, however, not interested in discussions of the German past, apart from a superficial concern with the psychological, social and moral effects the war had had on the German psyche. He harbored a fundamental pessimism about the German capacity to move beyond narrow nationalism and a shortsighted perception of the country’s interests. But as with so much else, time proved to be a healing factor. Looking back, Kissinger noted in 1995:

“Particularly remarkable with the German economic miracle were the courage and the power of the Germans who did not resign after the catastrophe. I still feel close to this post-war Germany today, not to the Germany of the thirties.” 59

Kissinger appeared to be sincere in his understanding for Germany’s difficult dealing with the past, underlining consequently that Hitler, not the whole population, was to blame for the evils of Nazi Germany. But even though Kissinger continued to have a staunch pro-German attitude, this notion was second in line to Kissinger’s overarching rationale, a stable balance of power, fostering stability.

Preserving the balance: Kissinger on post-war Germany

Kissinger always saw the German question within its larger European and geopolitical context. 60 During his Harvard studies, he had not only developed his own meaning of history but also arrived at some more fundamental views about Germany. First, keeping the Federal Republic in the Western alliance constituted an essential American interest. Second, in order to achieve the first, the U.S. needed to shift the blame for German division towards the Soviet Union. Third, any American endorsement of the status quo — German division — might generate a new wave of German nationalism, which Kissinger feared more than anything else. 61 Therefore, Kissinger always argued forcefully, that any discussion of Western defense policy remained incomplete without taking the political context and the German questions into account: “Whenever Europe is considered, one comes up inevitably against the problem of the future of Germany.” 62 Germany was the centerpiece in Kissinger’s European Cold War chessboard because Germany, ultimately, was the defining actor that could tip the balance of power on the continent. 63 Pointing out the historical dimension of Germany’s importance for regional and geopolitical stability, Kissinger observed that “arrangements in Germany have been the key to the stability of Europe for the last three centuries.” 64 The ideal situation, Kissinger wrote, “would be a Germany strong enough to defend itself but not strong enough to attack.” 65

Furthermore, Kissinger was concerned about the subject of German division, noting that “it is against all probability that a large and dynamic country can be kept divided indefinitely in the center of the continent that gave the concept of nationalism to the world.” 66 European defense was for Kissinger, “inconceivable without full participation of Germany, politically and military.” 67 To achieve a stable balance of power, Germany needed to be a willing partner of the Atlantic community. This, Kissinger claimed, was not only important to Germany’s future but “even more vital to the peace of the world.” 68 Atlantic unity was ultimately seen as the key to resistance and resolution to the German question 69 and Kissinger noted:

“Only a united Atlantic Alliance facing jointly the issue of Germany’s future can minimize the danger of sharp conflict between Germany’s national goals and its Atlantic ties. The effort to devise a common German policy is essential not only in order to retain Germany as a willing member of the Alliance, but also for the peace of Europe as well.” 70

In the end, Kissinger knew, the issue of German unification had to stay on the political table if the good relationship with the Federal Republic was to be maintained. 71 Therefore, Kissinger vehemently argued that German unification, or at least the rhetorical promotion of such, was an American interest and needed to be pursued: “If the West understands its interest, it must advocate German unification despite the experience of two world wars and despite the understandable fear of a revival of German truculence”. 72

At the same time, Kissinger never left the American interest and his obsession with a stable balance of power out of sight. The United States had to keep German ambitions in check because any failure to do so could have hazardous implications, Kissinger noted: “A national policy for Germany has historically been a disaster for Europe, partly because if its geographical position, and partly because of the special traditions of German foreign policy.” 73 For Kissinger, the German question always had two dimensions. First, the question was how to bring about unification. Second, how could the United States curb the force of German nationalism? To Kissinger, ideas rather than material conditions were the essential guidance for human aspirations and dealing with these questions. His first and foremost thought when it came to the Germany question was always whether the Federal Republic might cause international instability. As Hans Wilhelm Gatzke has noted, Kissinger had become “thoroughly and loyally American. The fact that he was never accused of being either pro- or anti-German speaks well for him.” 74

Conclusion: Kissinger’s Legacy

“It is an illusion to believe that leaders gain in profundity while they gain experience. As I have said, the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as they continue in office. There is little time for leaders to reflect.” – Henry A. Kissinger 75

Kissinger always emphasized Germany’s central role in the international system and how Germany’s past constituted a problem for erecting a stable world order. However, ever the Realpolitiker, Kissinger tirelessly argued for a German role in the world that was in accordance with its economic, military, and political might. This is as true today as it was more than half century ago, when Kissinger began to establish and develop his own ideas on the meaning of history and his outlook. In other words, Kissinger always adhered to the same approach when it came to the issue of Germany: The United States should accept and accommodate Germany’s reasonable and legitimate pursuit of its national interests as long as this was in requirement with European stability. This would ultimately be consummate with stability. If the United States tried to deny these interests to Germany, the country might be driven into short-sighted nationalism and challenge the international order. As a consequence, the costs for the United States might prove disastrous. 76

Kissinger always sought to influence transatlantic relations on a conceptual level rather than giving policy recommendations. He focused on ideas and tried with his first-hand knowledge and background to explore the fundamentals in the German-American relationship. Through his writings, Kissinger tried to enlighten his American audience and highlight to them that the world looked fundamentally different from the European continent than it did from the United States. If the United States wanted to have fruitful relationships with their Western European allies, they needed to account for the Europeans’ attitudes and perceptions and consider them in their analyses and decision making, Kissinger preached. On the other side of the Atlantic, Kissinger intended to enlighten European decision-makers, in particular the Germans, with the American point of view. Hence, Kissinger tried to make a personal contribution and serve as a medium between the Atlantic, ultimately working towards the development of a prosperous German-American relationship. 77

Like few others, Henry Kissinger symbolizes the infusion of European ideas into American politics, as Klitzing has highlighted. 78 Kissinger was fascinated with European statesman like Metternich and Bismarck, and the European conception of Realpolitik, while at the same time admiring “the courage and moral strength it took to start again in Germany after the debacle of the war.” 79 Kissinger’s early and subsequent thinking on Germany and international relations was heavily influenced by other German immigrants like Fritz Kraemer, but Kissinger was not merely taking their thoughts and making them his own. On the contrary, he developed his own Weltanschauung and tried to serve as an American-European intellectual bridge across the Atlantic Ocean.

Bibliography

Books Andrianopoulos, Gerry Argyris: “ Western Europe in Kissinger’s Global Strategy ”, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s, 1988). Caldwell, Dan (editor ): “Henry Kissinger, His Personality and Policies”, (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1983). Dallek, Robert: “Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power”, (New York: HarperCollins Pub., 2007). Dickson, Peter W.: “ Kissinger and the Meaning of History ”, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1978). Gatzke, Hans Wilhelm: “ Germany and the United States, a “special Relationship?”, ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980). Graubard, Stephen Richards: “ Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind ”, (New York: W. W. Norton &, 1973). Hanhimäki, Jussi M: “ The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy ”, (New York: Oxford UP, 2004). Hersh, Seymour M.: “ The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House ”, (New York: Summit, 1983). Isaacson, Walter: “ Kissinger: A Biography ”, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). Kalb, Marvin L., and Bernard Kalb: „ Kissinger “, (Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein, 1974). Kissinger, Henry: “ A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22”,  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957). Kissinger, Henry: “ Diplomacy ”, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). Kissinger, Henry: “ The Necessity for Choice; Prospects of American Foreign Policy”, ( New York: Harper, 1961). Kissinger, Henry: “ The Troubled Partnership; a Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance”, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966). Kissinger, Henry: “ White House Years ”, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979). Klitzing, Holger: “ The Nemesis of Stability: Henry A. Kissinger’s Ambivalent Relationship with Germany ”, (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2007). Landau, David: “Kissinger: The Uses of Power”,  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). Mazlish, Bruce: “ Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy ”, (New York: Basic, 1976). Nutter, Warren G.: ” Kissinger’s Grand Design ”, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975). Schulzinger, Robert D.: “ Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy ”, (New York: Columbia UP, 1989). Smith, Michael Joseph: “ Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger ”, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1986). Stoessinger, John George: “ Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power ”, (New York: Norton, 1976). Suri, Jeremi: “ Henry Kissinger and the American Century ”, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2007). Articles Kissinger, Henry: ”The search for stability”, ( Foreign Affairs 37 (1959)). Online Sources “Public Knowledge of Current Affairs Little Changed by News and Information Revolutions”, ( Pew Research Center for the People and the Press ): http://www.people-press.org/2007/04/15/public-knowledge-of-current-affairs-little-changed-by-news-and-information-revolutions/ (accessed 11/11/13)

1. See for example Graubard, Stephen Richards: “ Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind ”, (New York: W. W. Norton &, 1973), page ix; page 4; Hanhimäki, Jussi M: “ The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy ”, (New York: Oxford UP, 2004), pp. xv-xix; and Suri, Jeremi: “ Henry Kissinger and the American Century”, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP), 2007, pp. 4-6.

2. Suri, “ Henry Kissinger and the American Century”, p. 4.

3. Hanhimäki, “The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy”, p. xv.

4. Caldwell, Dan (editor ): “Henry Kissinger, His Personality and Policies”, (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1983), p. 4.

5. “Public Knowledge of Current Affairs Little Changed by News and Information Revolutions”, ( Pew Research Center for the People and the Press ): http://www.people-press.org/2007/04/15/public-knowledge-of-current-affairs-little-changed-by-news-and-information-revolutions/ (accessed 11/11/13).

6. See for example Ward, Dana in Caldwell, Dan (editor ): “Henry Kissinger, His Personality and Policies”, p. 25.

7. Ward in Caldwell (editor ): “Henry Kissinger”, p. 25.

8. Dallek, Robert: “Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power”, (New York: HarperCollins Pub., 2007), p. 40.

9. Klitzing, Holger: “ The Nemesis of Stability: Henry A. Kissinger’s Ambivalent Relationship with Germany ”, (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2007), p. 5.

Critical accounts are, for example, Hersh, Mazlish, Landau, while Kalb/Kalb, Graubard, and Stoessinger are more positive accounts of Kissinger. The most balanced accounts are arguably Schulzinger and in particular Isaacson’s biography of Kissinger. For more information, please consult the bibliography.

10. Graubard, “ Kissinger ”, p. ix.

11. See Dickson, Weber, and Cleva in bibliography. Graubard’s book is an example of the former, while Klitzing’s study stands apart as the most comprehensive overview so far.

12. Caldwell (editor ): “Henry Kissinger”, xii and Nutter, Warren G.: ” Kissinger’s Grand Design ”, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 2. See also Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability ”, pp 5-10 and especially the footnotes.

13. Caldwell (editor ): “Henry Kissinger” , p. xiii.

14. Ibid,p. 10.

15. Interestingly, Kissinger virtually quoted from his Ph.D. thesis when he explained the Indochina peace agreement at a news conference on January 24, 1973. See Caldwell (editor): “Henry Kissinger ”, p. 10.

16. Kissinger, Henry: “ White House Years ”, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 229.

17. See Ward in Caldwell (editor), “Henry Kissinger”, pp. 33-36; Dallek, “Nixon and Kissinger”, pp. 34-37; and Hanhimäki, “ The Flawed Architect ”, pp. 3-4.

18. Kissinger quoted in Isaacson, Walter: “ Kissinger: A Biography ”, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 37.

19. Mazlish, Bruce: “ Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy ”, (New York: Basic, 1976), p. 39.

20. Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability ”, pp. 38-41.

21. Suri, “ Henry Kissinger ”, p. 59.

22. See Ward in Caldwell, Dan (editor): “Henry Kissinger”, pp. 37-41; Hanhimäki, “The Flawed Architect”, pp. 4-5; Mazlish, “Kissinger”, pp. 41-47; and Suri, “ Henry Kissinger, “ pp. 57-59.

23. Isaacson, “ Kissinger: A Biography ”, p. 43.

24. Klitzing, “The Nemesis of Stability,” p. 42.

25. Ward in Caldwell (editor ), “Henry Kissinger” , p. 36.

26. Ward in Caldwell (editor ), “Henry Kissinger” , p. 36.

27. Landau, David: “Kissinger: The Uses of Power”,  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 16.

28. Ibid, p. 16.

29. Quoted in Klitzing , “The Nemesis of Stability,” p. 60.

30. See, for example, Dallek, “Nixon and Kissinger”, pp. 36-38; Isaacson, “ Kissinger: A Biography ”, pp. 43-47; Kalb and Kalb: „Kissinger“, pp. 38-39; and Suri, “Henry Kissinger”, pp. 77-80.

31. Quoted in Kalb and Kalb: „Kissinger“, pp. 39.

32. Suri, “Henry Kissinger”, p. 78.

33. Klitzing , “The Nemesis of Stability,” p. 44.

34. See Ward in Caldwell (editor ), “Henry Kissinger”, p. 44; Dallek, “Nixon and Kissinger”, pp. 40-42 and Mazlish, “ Kissinger ”, p. 60-66.

35. Kalb and Kalb: „Kissinger“, p. 44.

36. Ibid , p. 44.

37. Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability, ” p 64.

38. Kissinger, Henry: “ A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22”,  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).

39. See Ward, in Caldwell (editor ),“Henry Kissinger”, p. 43; Hanhimäki, “ The Flawed Architect ”, pp. 6-7; and Suri, “ Henry Kissinger”, pp. 29-33.

40. Quoted in Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability, ” p. 66.

41. Ibid, p. 67.

42. Quoted in Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability,” p. 67.

43. See also Dickson, “ Kissinger ”, pp.153-156.

44. Kissinger, Henry: “ The Necessity for Choice; Prospects of American Foreign Policy”, ( New York: Harper, 1961), p. 2.

45. Dickson, “ Kissinger ”, pp. 68-75.

46. Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability, ” p. 68.

47. Dickson, “ Kissinger ”, p. 75.

48. Kissinger, “ White House Years ”, p. 292.

49. See for example Andrianopoulos, Gerry Argyris: “ Western Europe in Kissinger’s Global Strategy ”, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s, 1988), p. 6; Caldwell (editor ), “Henry Kissinger”, p. xiii; Hanhimäki, “ The Flawed Architect ”, p. 2; and Nutter, ” Kissinger’s Grand Design ”, p.2.

50. Stoessinger, “ Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power ”, p. 14.

51. Mazlish, “ Kissinger ”, p. 275.

52. Quoted in Dallek, Robert: “Nixon and Kissinger,” p. 33.

53. Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability, ” p. 80.

54. Suri’s observations are particular interesting here. See Suri, “ Henry Kissinger ”, pp. 48-50.

55. On Kissinger and his theory of `great men`, see Andrianopoulos, “ Western Europe ”, p. 7; Hanhimäki, “ The Flawed Architect ”, pp. 7-9; Nutter, Warren G.: ” Kissinger’s Grand Design ”, p. 8; and Suri, “ Henry Kissinger ”, p. 112.

56. Kissinger, Henry: “ Diplomacy ”, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 288.

57. Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability,” p. 88.

58. Quoted in Isaacson, “Kissinger: A Biography”, pp. 80-81.

59. Quoted in Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability, ” p. 93.

60. For a manifestation of this, see Kissinger, “ The Necessity for Choice”, pp. 128-169.

61. Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability, ” p. 95.

62. Kissinger, “ The Necessity for Choice”, pp. 128.

63. See also Nutter, “ Kissinger’s Grand Design ”, p. 4.

64. Kissinger, “ The Necessity for Choice”, pp. 129.

66. Kissinger, “ The Troubled Partnership; a Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance”, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 215-216.

67. Nutter, “ Kissinger’s Grand Design ”, p. 5.

68. Kissinger, Henry: ”The search for stability”, ( Foreign Affairs 37 (1959)), p. 540.

69. Nutter, ” Kissinger’s Grand Design ”, p. 4.

70. Kissinger, “ The Troubled Partnership”, pp. 215-216.

71. See also Nutter, ” Kissinger’s Grand Design ”, pp. 5 and 57.

72. Kissinger, ”The search for stability”, ( Foreign Affairs 37 (1959)), p. 542.

73. Quoted in Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability, ” p. 204.

74. Gatzke, Hans Wilhelm: “ Germany and the United States, a “special Relationship?”, ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980), p. 220.

75. Quoted in Andrianopoulos, “Western Europe”, p. 31.

76. Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability, ” p. 423.

77. Ibid, p. 218.

78. Ibid, p. 4.

79. Quoted in Klitzing, “ The Nemesis of Stability, ” p. 452.

80. Kissinger, “ White House Years ”, p. 27.

81. Graubard, “ Kissinger ”, p. xi.

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German Foreign Policy Essay

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Resource Description

Assess the significance of German foreign policy as a cause of conflict in Europe in 1939.

(Word Count: 1205)

Adolf Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy was highly significant as a cause of conflict in Europe in 1939. Hitler never planned a global war, however conflict began in Europe due to his foreign policy, which can be understood as advancing through three key stages from 1933-39. The ultimate goal of German foreign policy was eastwards expansion into Russia to secure Lebensraum (living space) for the racial state and this triggered conflict in Europe . If each stage of foreign policy had not been completed, Lebensraum could not have been pursued and conflict would not have been caused. Revising the Versailles Treaty and rapid rearmament from 1933-35 primed Germany for war and created the necessary instrument to pursue Hitler’s ultimate goal. The second stage of foreign policy, securing the Grossdeutschland (Greater Germany) from 1936-38, created an alliance with Italy and secured Germany’s borders, which began to increase international tension and enabled Hitler to embark on his final goal. Aggressive expansion in the sake of Lebensraum in 1939, was the central cause of conflict as the invasion of Poland exacerbated European tensions and tipped the Western powers’ policy of appeasement to a declaration of war. German foreign policy was majorly benefitted by Britain and France’s policy of appeasement and the collapse of collective security, which allowed Hitler to pursue his aims without initial retaliation. Although these two factors influenced German foreign policy, it was inherently the aims and strategies of Hitler’s foreign policy that provoked conflict in Europe in 1939.

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Ai for healthy cities, her power @ unga79, fp tech forum @ unga79, from risk to resilience, in international politics, be careful what you wish for, german reunification is the latest western triumph that's starting to pose major political problems..

• Stephen M. Walt

In the recent German state elections, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party received the largest share of the vote in Thuringia and ran a close second in Saxony. The newly formed Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance finished third in both states and is poised to play a central role in the resulting governments. There are many lessons one could draw from these results, but here’s one: Be careful what you wish for. The far right’s popularity is a vivid reminder that what seems like a stunning triumph at one point in time can sow the seeds of big trouble down the road.

In the case of Germany, for example, the peaceful reunification that took place after the Cold War was a vindication of the West German social democratic model and a noteworthy achievement of Bonn’s diplomacy. It was also a powerful victory for German nationalism—symbolized in the return of the federal government to the traditional capital of Berlin—and a sign of its successful recovery from the Nazi past.

With hindsight, however, reunification has proved to be even more difficult than Germans might have expected when it occurred. More than three decades have passed, and the political differences between the country’s eastern and western halves remain considerable. This is hardly surprising, insofar as Germany’s two halves were governed by wholly different political institutions for more than 40 years. Economic conditions in the east continue to lag behind the west, and citizens there exhibit far more autocratic impulses than the rest of the country. It is no accident that neo-Nazi movements have found more fertile soil in the east, but the rise of these parties is now affecting the politics of the entire country in ways that few observers would have imagined during the heady months after reunification.

(Side note: If you think unifying Germany has proved tougher than expected, imagine what might happen if the two Koreas tried to recombine.)

Now consider Hungary’s political trajectory. Back in the 1990s, bringing the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into NATO, and eventually the European Union, was seen as a victory for liberal ideals and as a way to ensure these fledgling democracies didn’t backslide. Russia wasn’t happy about it, but even enlargement skeptics like me believe Moscow would have accepted the first wave of enlargement had the process ended there. Instead of being a permanent liberal triumph, however, Hungary (and to a lesser extent, Poland) became a poster child for so-called illiberal democracy: a governing model that preserves the forms of democracy (e.g., elections) but not the substance (e.g., rule of law, tolerance, free and fair political competition). Instead of making NATO and the EU stronger, Hungary has been a persistent thorn in the side of both institutions and an inspiration for would-be autocrats such as Donald Trump. How many U.S. senators expected this outcome when they voted to expand NATO back in 1998?

Or take Israel. As I argued a few weeks ago, Israel’s stunning victory in the 1967 Six-Day War was an undeniable military triumph that seemed miraculous to many Israelis. But that victory also sowed the seeds of a danger that now threatens the country’s long-term future. Once Israel’s leaders decided to occupy and colonize the lands conquered during that war, it could no longer be both a Jewish state and a genuine democracy. Either it had to create an apartheid system over the millions of Palestinians it now controlled—with all the brutality that such systems require—or it had to allow them political rights, which would have meant abandoning the Zionist vision of a Jewish state. As the past year has shown, this dilemma has only gotten worse with time, another telling example of how success now can lead to failure later.

This phenomenon is a recurring theme after great wars, of course. Germany’s defeat in World War I was a wonderful moment for the victorious Allies, but the peace settlement fashioned at Versailles made a return match very likely if not inevitable. Stopping the Axis and overthrowing German and Italian fascism and Japanese militarism were undeniable achievements in World War II, but these victories also allowed the Soviet Union to impose communism over Eastern Europe and helped Mao Zedong gain power in China—events that contributed to 40 years of cold war.

When the Cold War ended, Westerners and especially Americans greeted the collapse of communism with undisguised elation, assumed that victory demonstrated the universal appeal of the West’s core values, and quickly succumbed to the hubristic belief that Washington possessed the magic formula for success in the modern world. The result was a misguided effort to remake the world in America’s image, one that persisted long after its shortcomings were apparent. And some earlier successes came back to bite: How many Americans foresaw that helping the Afghan mujahideen bleed the Soviets white in Afghanistan would also nurture the emergence of al Qaeda or that the subsequent 9/11 attacks would eventually ensnare the United States in the same quagmire that had helped bring down the Soviet Union? One might say the same thing for that “Mission Accomplished” moment in Iraq or the ouster of Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, in each case a short-term success that deteriorated almost immediately.

If victory is sometimes the prelude to disappointment, defeats or setbacks can herald a brighter future if future leaders learn the right lessons from them. German and Japanese elites learned many of the right lessons from the disasters of World War II and benefited greatly from a wholly different approach to politics and foreign policy over the next 50 years. Defeat in Vietnam taught a generation of U.S. leaders to avoid the siren song of “nation-building”; sadly, that lesson was forgotten by the time George W. Bush and his neoconservative advisors gained power. These and other cases remind us that states (and people) sometimes learn more useful lessons from failure than they do from success. But not always.

Why do great victories turn to ashes? The ancient Greeks warned of hubris: the fatal flaw of excessive pride that offended the gods and lured heroes to a tragic end. That is surely part of the problem: Those who preside over a great victory are prone to give themselves too much credit and ignore the role that good fortune (or an opponent’s errors) played in their success. Great victories are also highly disruptive: They set many different social forces in motion, and unintended consequences will be rife, confounding the victor’s ability to predict how the future will unfold or to manipulate it to their advantage.

The lesson is not that states should abandon ambitious foreign-policy objectives, dream no large dreams, or refrain from celebrating those rare and wonderful moments where events take a favorable turn. To expect the latter is to deny much of what we know about human nature. Nor am I suggesting that failure is preferable to success because one sometimes learns more from setbacks. The real lesson is not to interpret even singular achievements and strokes of good fortune as proof that history is on our side and that a happy future is assured.

As any good investment firm will tell you, performance is no guarantee of future returns. In international affairs, success is often the harbinger of future troubles. Victories should be savored briefly, therefore, and then attention must turn to dealing with the inevitably messy consequences.

Stephen M. Walt is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. X:  @stephenwalt

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The Many Paths to Power for Germany’s Far Right

Next month’s regional elections could spell big trouble for the country.

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Germany’s expansion of border controls is testing European unity

FILE - A border pole in German national colours marking the German border with Poland at the river Oder near the city Lebus, Germany, Oct. 28, 2021. (AP Photo/Markus Schreiber, File)

FILE - A Federal Police officer escorts a group of migrants who illegally crossed the border from Poland into Germany during a patrol in a forest near Forst, southeast of Berlin, Germany, Oct. 11, 2023. (AP Photo/Markus Schreiber, File)

FILE - Federal Police officer Frank Malack looks at the belongings of migrants who illegally crossed the border from Poland into Germany during a patrol in a forest near Forst, southeast of Berlin, Germany, Oct. 11, 2023. (AP Photo/Markus Schreiber, File)

FILE - German federal police officers check a van at the Austrian-German border crossing point in Kiefersfelden, Germany, Oct. 9, 2023. (AP Photo/Matthias Schrader, File)

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WARSAW, Poland (AP) — The German government says it is cracking down on irregular migration and crime following recent extremist attacks, and plans to extend temporary border controls to all nine of its frontiers next week.

Last month, a deadly knife attack by a Syrian asylum-seeker in Soligen killed three people. The perpetrator claimed to be inspired by the Islamic State group. In June, a knife attack by an Afghan immigrant left a police officer dead and four other people wounded.

The border closures are set to last six months and are threatening to test European unity. Most of Germany’s neighbors are fellow members of the European Union, a 27-country bloc based on the principles of free trade and travel. And Germany — the EU’s economic motor in the heart of Europe — shares more borders with other countries than any other member state.

The Polish prime minister on Tuesday denounced the closures as “unacceptable” and Austria said it won’t accept migrants rejected by Germany.

Here’s a look at some of the issues:

How do Europeans travel currently?

The EU bloc has a visa-free travel area known as Schengen that allows citizens of most EU countries to travel easily across borders for work and pleasure. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland also belong to Schengen even though they are not EU members.

According to the EU, member states are allowed to temporarily reintroduce controls at the EU’s so-called internal borders in case of a serious threat, such as one to internal security. But it also says border controls should be applied as a last resort in exceptional situations, and must be time-limited.

Such limitations are often put in place during major sporting events, including the recent Olympic Games in Paris and the European soccer championship this summer.

What’s Germany doing now?

Nine countries border Germany and all are part of Schengen. Germany already imposed restrictions last year at its borders with Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria and Switzerland.

Germany’s Interior Ministry on Monday ordered the extension of checks at those borders, as well as controls at borders with France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark.

Interior Minister Nancy Faeser said the aim was to limit irregular migration and protect the nation from “the acute dangers posed by Islamist terrorism and serious crime.”

Growing backlash against migration

The government and many Germans welcomed refugees fleeing conflicts in Syria and elsewhere from 2015-16, when more than 1 million asylum-seekers entered the country.

But as large-scale migration to Europe continues nearly a decade later, a backlash is fueling the growth of far-right parties.

Some people say social services are overwhelmed, and extremist attacks by asylum-seekers have led to security fears. It has added up to growing support for firmer immigration policies — and in some cases, backing for the far-right parties that champion such limits.

The unpopular coalition government of Chancellor Olaf Scholz is trying to crack down on irregular immigration after the far right did well in two recent state elections in eastern Germany. Another comes Sept. 22 in Brandenburg, the state surrounding Berlin.

Economic worries

As the EU’s largest economy, Germany is a key trading partner for neighbors. The interior ministry’s announcement has prompted economic worries for the main Dutch transportation lobby group, the Dutch Association for Transport and Logistics. It said the decision was undermining the Schengen principle of free trade and it fears major economic damage.

At home, Germany’s DSLV logistics and freight association urged a selective approach that would spare trucks moving goods across borders — which would mirror what occurred during the European soccer championships. Those checks avoided economic disruptions because officials focused on individuals and not trucks, the association said.

Dirk Jandura, the president of the Federation of German Wholesale, Foreign Trade and Services, said in an statement to The Associated Press that restrictions on the free movement of people “always mean delays and thus cost increases for the economy and especially for wholesale and foreign trade.”

He added: “However, if migration policy findings require restrictive measures, then this is understandable. For us, it is important to implement the measures with a sense of proportion.”

Political repercussions

The ruling conservative government in Austria — which is facing a tight race against the far-right party in an election this month — says it will not accept refugees who are turned back from Germany.

Interior Minister Gerhard Karner told reporters that Germany has the right to send people back if another EU country is responsible for their asylum application. But that would require a formal procedure and the consent of the member state concerned.

Meanwhile, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called Germany’s plan “unacceptable” and called for urgent consultations by all countries affected. Poland has struggled with a migration crisis on its border with Belarus since 2021. Warsaw accuses Belarus and Russia of luring migrants from the Middle East and Africa there to destabilize the West.

Agnieszka Łada-Konefał, deputy director of the German Institute of Polish Affairs, said random checks at the German-Polish border create traffic jams that make it more difficult for people to cross for work and discourage Germans from shopping in Poland. Poles also argue that Germany first introduced a policy of openness to refugees but is now pushing them back to Poland.

“Due to the negative perception of the influx of migrants in Poland, any report of migrants being returned by Germany also negatively affects Polish-German relations and Germany’s image in Poland,” Łada-Konefał told the AP.

But in the Netherlands, where the anti-immigration Party for Freedom won last year’s election, the minister for asylum and migration pledged to step up Dutch border controls as well.

Slovenia, Austria and Italy also have extended temporary border controls in some areas or all along their frontiers.

Associated Press writers Mike Corder in Amsterdam, David McHugh in Frankfurt and Philipp Jenne in Vienna contributed to this report.

Follow AP migration coverage at: https://apnews.com/hub/migration

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Guest Essay

This Is Germany, the Last Country Anyone Wants to Make Great Again

By Peter Kuras

Mr. Kuras is a writer and translator who covers German culture and politics. He wrote from Berlin.

Since it became clear that the far-right Alternative for Germany, or AfD, will emerge as a dominant force in eastern Germany’s politics after regional elections this September, I’ve been unable to get a photograph out of my mind.

The picture was taken in 1992, during a four-day pogrom in eastern Germany’s port city of Rostock . An estimated 400 right-wing extremists attacked the local immigration center and a housing complex that was home to much of the city’s small Vietnamese community, while a large crowd kept police officers and firefighters at bay. The picture shows a man named Harald Ewert . He’s wearing a German football jersey and a pair of jogging pants. His eyes are glassy and wild. His right arm is stretched out in the Nazi salute.

It’s one of the most iconic photos in contemporary German history, one that captures a period of intense social division and violence. It calls out with special resonance now. Bjorn Höcke, the AfD’s leader in Thuringia, where elections will be held this Sunday, has been convicted twice for his use of Nazi slogans. Between Mr. Ewert, who died in 2006 at the age of 52, and Mr. Höcke, there’s a clear line — proof that the specter of Nazism continues to haunt Germany.

Yet in many ways, the photo is misleading. The rioters who committed acts of violence that day, as the cultural critic Diedrich Diedrichsen wrote, didn’t look like neo-Nazis. Neither did the politicians who used attacks against minorities as a pretext to tighten asylum restrictions. As the far right comes ever closer to power, it’s plain that the focus on its traditional symbols — its slogans and salutes — has proved unsuccessful. By obsessing over images and signs, Germany has missed more dangerous developments beneath the surface.

In truth, there isn’t much difference between the AfD and the other right-wing populist parties that have spread across Europe in recent years. Like Law and Justice in Poland, Fidesz in Hungary and Golden Dawn in Greece, the AfD relies on a toxic combination of xenophobia, militarism and nostalgia to win votes. But this is Germany, the last country anyone wants to make great again.

Germany’s other political parties, unable to agree on much over the past few years, have accepted that you can’t let a party that flirts with fascism come to power and ensured the AfD’s isolation. In a country less attuned to the possibility of a fascist takeover, the party — with its disciplined organization and skilled use of the media — would almost certainly have amassed substantial political power over the past decade. Even now, the amount of concrete political power the AfD stands to gain next month is unclear. A shift of a few percentage points in the results could well make the difference between another coalition of established centrist parties and a state government led by far-right extremists.

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