bismarck foreign policy essay

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Bismarck’s Foreign Policy 1871-1890

• Key personality: Bismarck
• Germany under Bismarck 1870 - 1890
• The Unification of Germany 1864-1871
• Bismarck's domestic policy 1870-1890

This document was written by Stephen Tonge . I am most grateful to have his kind permission to include it on the web site.

Main Events

1873 Formation of the Dreikaiserbund 1878 The Congress of Berlin 1879 The Dual Alliance 1881 The renewal of the Dreikaiserbund 1887 The Reinsurance Treaty.

Diplomatic genius guided by the principles of keeping France isolated and remaining on good terms with both Austria and Russia.

Introduction:

Bismarck had defeated each of his enemies - Denmark, Austria, and France - in isolation. He realised that a powerful united Germany could not expect to fight another carefully insulated war. After 1871 Bismarck was committed to preserving the peace of Europe.

There were five powers in Europe: Germany, Britain, France, Austria and Russia .

France was bitter at her loss in the recent war and Britain did not wish to get involved in European affairs.

A resurgent France, powerful and allied to another European power haunted Bismarck. The main aims of Bismarck’s foreign policy were based around the need to keep France isolated and prevent this from happening.

To achieve this aim he needed to keep on good terms with both Austria and Russia. This would prevent a two-front war in the future.

The key in Bismarck’s view to German interests lay in good relations with Russia and Austria . As he said “you forget the importance of being a party of three on the European chessboard.” This would deprive France of a potential ally.

This was a difficult task as Austria and Russia were rivals in the Balkans. The friendship with both, Bismarck hoped, would reduce tensions between both over the Balkans.

The Dreikaiserbund

In 1873 the formation of the Dreikaiserbund (the League of the Three Emperors) between Germany, Austria and Russia was an example of Bismarck’s policy of isolating France. This was an alliance of three conservative monarchies designed to stop the spread of revolution in Europe and preserve the status quo in Europe.

However the alliance had little substance. There were no military features to it as Austria refused to agree to any. It did however ensure co-operation among the three Eastern powers rather than rivalry which was Bismarck’s primary objective.

The War in Sight Crisis

France had recovered quickly after the Franco-Prussian war . In 1875 the “ War-in-sight ” crisis resulted from an attempt to bully France into abandoning her rearmament programme. The export of horses to France was forbidden (usually a sign of preparation for war). Then an article appeared in the influential Berliner Post entitled “ Is war in sight ?” It was almost certainly inspired by Bismarck.

There was talk from leading German officials about the possibility of a preventative war . The episode resulted in a German diplomatic defeat as Russia backed a British protest to Berlin. The Dreikaiserbund had been weakened. The affair brought home the dangers of a two front war to Bismarck. After this episode he proceeded with the utmost caution.

Crisis in the Balkans

The Dreikaiserbund was destroyed as a result of events in the Balkans. The Balkans was of no interest to Bismarck. (He remarked that the area was not “ the healthy bones of single Pomeranian musketeer .”) However he was worried about Austrian-Russian rivalry in the region.

In the Balkans there was a series of revolts against the Ottoman Empire among the Sultan’s Christian subjects between 1875 and 1876. In 1877 after attempts to impose reforms on the Turkish Empire failed, the Russo-Turkish war broke out. Russia was acting in her role as the traditional protector of the Sultan’s Orthodox and Slav subjects.

Before the war, Russia had promised Austria that she would not create a big Bulgaria if she won. After fierce resistance the Turks surrendered and signed the Treaty of San Stefano in March. The treaty proposed the creation of a big Bulgaria. This would be dominated by Russia.

This development was totally unacceptable to Britain who always opposed Russian ambitions in the Mediterranean as it threatened the Suez Canal. The British sent warships to the region. The Austrians were also enraged as the Russians had broken their promise not to create a big Bulgaria. War seemed imminent.

The Congress of Berlin

The results of the “ Congress of Berlin ” left Russia very disappointed especially at Bismarck’s role (Bulgaria was divided into three small states), Russia withdrew from the Dreikaiserbund . Tension grew between the two as Russia strengthened her frontier garrisons and Germany introduced tariffs against Russian grain imports.

The Dual Alliance

It was against this background that the Dual Alliance was signed with Austria in 1879. This secret defensive alliance became as Carr pointed out “ the very corner stone of German foreign policy ”.

Bismarck saw two benefits of this alliance:

• It would secure Germany’s southern frontier in the event of a war with Russia
• It would frighten Russia into seeking a closer relationship with Germany.

Kaiser William strongly opposed this alliance as he saw it as anti-Russian. Bismarck threatened to resign before he reluctantly signed.

This alliance was enlarged into the Triple Alliance when Italy joined in 1882. Although Bismarck did not think much of Italy’s military or political power, it deprived France of a potential ally.

The Renewal of the Dreikaiserbund

Russia was worried by her diplomatic isolation and sought to reach an understanding with Germany and Austria. In 1881 a new Dreikaiserbund was formed between Russia, Germany and Austria. Bismarck hoped that this agreement would help to reduce tensions between Austria and Russia in the Balkans. It was agreed that the Western Balkans would be dominated by the Austrians and the Eastern half by the Russians.

The Reinsurance Treaty

Again events in the Balkans were to disrupt Bismarck’s aims. Between 1885 and 1887 the Bulgarian crisis saw relations between Austria and Russia deteriorate. Alarmingly there was growing pro-French feeling in Russia. In 1887 the Dreikaiserbund ended as Russia made it clear she would sign no further agreement with Austria.

Bismarck then negotiated “ his final diplomatic masterpiece .” (Massie)

• A “Reinsurance Treaty” was signed between Russia and Germany. It was a defensive alliance: Germany promised to stay neutral if Russia was attacked by Austria Russia would stay neutral if France attacked Germany.

This secret treaty reduced the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance. In 1888 in order to prevent was between Austria and Russia he published the terms of the Dual Alliance. Austria would fight on her own if she attacked Russia while Russia would have to face Germany if she attacked Austria.

Events were beginning to move against Bismarck as it was very difficult to keep on good terms with Russia. The new emperor, William II, was more anti-Russian while French loans were funding Russian industrialisation.

In 1890 when Bismarck resigned as Chancellor one of Kaiser William’s first acts was to refuse to renew the Reinsurance Treaty. Only four months later a French naval flotilla called at the Russian naval base at Kronstadt . Bismarck’s policies were in ruins. The nightmare of a two front war was now a distinct possibility.

Bismarck and Colonies

Bismarck was at first very wary of any involvement in the “ Scramble for Africa ”. He did not want to disturb the balance of power in Europe. Colonial expansion could involve Germany in disputes with Britain a power with which he wished to remain on good terms (although he disliked Gladstone intensely.)

In 1882 the German Colonial League was formed and pressure from the press and the public mounted. This pressure was driven by hopes of vast wealth, prestige and a channel for German emigration. Reluctantly Bismarck agreed, possibly to embarrass the pro-British Crown Prince, Frederick .

Between 1884 and 1885 Germany acquired Togo, the Cameroons, German East Africa (Tanzania) and South West Africa (Namibia). The colonies in total were about five times the size of Germany. However most of them were of little value as the rich pickings were already gone.

The Berlin Conference of 1884 hosted by Bismarck settled many colonial disputes especially over the Congo that was awarded to Belgium. It also prohibited the slave trade .

During the same period Bismarck encouraged French colonial expansion. He hoped that this would weaken French desire for revenge over Alsace and Lorraine and get them involved in disputes with other countries.

By 1886 the process of colonialism was ended as Bismarck, the reluctant Imperialist, turned his attention back to Europe. Famously he said to an African explorer “my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia and here is France with Germany in the middle; that is my map of Africa.”

• Bismarck has long enjoyed a formidable reputation in the field of foreign affairs. He prevented the formation of any hostile coalition against Germany and obtained for his country recognition of her great power status.
• His foreign was based around the principles of keeping France isolated and Russia and Austria on good terms. The first of his principles he largely achieved although this were beginning to unravel by the time of his resignation in 1890 as Russia and France moved closer together.
• His handling of the Congress of Berlin and the Bulgarian crisis helped to prevent war in Europe. The Congress of Berlin in 1884 helped to solve many colonial disputes between the great powers.
• He restrained Austrian ambitions in the Balkans while his successors did not and this contributed to the outbreak of World War I.
• He failed however to neither keep both Austria and Russia on good terms nor could he reconcile France to the loss of Alsace Lorraine.
• The biggest criticism of Bismarck (and of his contemporaries) was his disregard for the interests and wishes of the peoples of small nations who were seen as pawns in a great game of chess between the great powers. At the Congress of Berlin the actual wishes of the people living in the Ottoman Empire were ignored.

D.G . Williamson “In the immediate post war years Bismarck was primarily concerned to prolong French isolation”

J. Joll “In the years between 1870 and 1890 it was German foreign policy that dominated the international scene.”

W. Carr “Germany faced the real danger of war on two fronts if she was on bad terms with France and Russia simultaneously.”

W. Carr “Bismarck was a past master in the diplomatic arts.”

W. Carr "As long as William I lived, German foreign policy was conducted by Bismarck alone."

M. Sturmer “Bismarck cultivated alliances with both Russia and Austria, but due to the stirrings of the Balkan Slavs against their Turkish overlords, this became increasingly difficult.”

Exam Questions: Very popular topic in Section C

Germany 1870-1890

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You are not expected to deal with domestic and foreign policy equally but you must deal with both or you will lose marks.

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Bismarck Foreign Policy

In terms of domestic policy, Bismarck spent much of his time seeking out enemies of the Reich and neutralising their impact either by coercion, paternalism or brute force. Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) ruled over Germany’s foreign policy from 1871 until 1890.

This article will discuss Bismarck’s Foreign Policy in the context of the IAS Exam .

The candidates can go through the relevant topics useful for their upcoming exams from the links provided below:

Employing placing ahead conflict, the French fell properly into an enticing proposition that the Prussian king’s chief minister, Otto von Bismarck, had cautiously laid for them. Struggle in opposition to France, the ‘conventional enemy,’ modified into Bismarck’s brilliant threat of inflaming German countrywide feeling and persuading the unbiased south German states to unite with the Prussian-ruled states of the north, thereby unifying Germany. Bismarck had three foremost goals as Germany’s chancellor: To isolate France, to maintain peace between Russia and Austria-Hungary, and to keep away from being encircled diplomatically, which means to keep away from conflict. Otto von Bismarck desired to isolate France for several motives. He wanted to try this because Germany became sandwiched between two great powers, France and Russia.

Features of Bismarck’s Foreign Policy

All of Bismarck’s mind to isolate France laboured very efficiently, and without sturdy France within the EU photo, Germany might be one of the strong EU powers, which, till 1890, they had been. Every other essential objective of Otto von Bismarck has become to stay friendly with Austria-Hungary and Russia. Now that the three nations had been at peace, Germany no longer had the concern of being encircled by the manner of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Balkans. This became very important, and Germany had to create Balkan peace because if they did no longer, Russia could possibly be the best friend with France (causing the isolation of France to collapse). They would keep away from any revolts or wars to break out. Because Otto von Bismarck did all of this, being pleasant with Austria-Hungary and Russia modified into a brilliant success. Using the phrases of the dual Alliance of October 1879, Germany and Austria promised to offer complete resources if Russia attacked both.

With the aid of the phrases of the Triple Alliance of may additionally 1882, each Germany and Italy had been entitled to aid each different against an unprovoked assault using France. If Austria-Hungary has been at war with Russia, Italy might be unbiased-consequently, giving the Austrians protection on their southern frontier. In case, Otto von Bismarck’s overseas policy changed into an achievement. Because isolation of France and retaining peace with Austria-Hungary and Russia worked, it is clear that his overseas coverage became a success. But, Otto von Bismarck’s foreign coverage was modified into the most effective fulfilment in the quick run. It made Germany again fear a conflict coming from two fronts and made Germany end up not so excellent as the super EU Powers, which they had been not a part of.

The essential component of Bismarckian treaties was that he had to unite the global places indeed unique successfully and against every other, which incorporates Austria and Russia, Italy and Austria, and Russia and England on considered one of a kind issues.

Difficulties in Bismarck Foreign Policy UPSC

In 1886-87 on Bulgarian difficulty, Bismarck confronted disagreement; however, he declared very accurately, in Bulgaria, he was Russian and did not allow Russia to sign up for each camp. He stored Russia in his camp, but his friendship became not trustworthy. Russia could not accept him as accurate after the treaty of Berlin.

The relations between Russia and Austria were under strain on the issue of the eastern question, and it became tough to keep them in a single fold. Italy and Austria have been the deadliest enemies of every different on the problem of unredeemed Italy. Even though Bismarck seemed England to be his lovely friend, he did not conclude any treaty together with her.

Note: UPSC 2022 is approaching closer, supplement your preparation with the free UPSC Study Materials by BYJU’S.

Start your IAS Exam preparation by understanding the UPSC Syllabus in-depth and planning your approach accordingly.

Frequently Asked Questions on the Bismarck Foreign Policy

What was the most important diplomatic objective of bismarck.

The most important diplomatic objective of the Bismarck policy was preventing France from forming an alliance with either Austria-Hungary or Russia to form an alliance of enemies in both the east and the west.

What were Bismarck’s policies that led to the unification of Germany?

Bismarck believed that the unification of Germany was possible only by Prussia. Hence, he began working on two fronts:

• Driving out of Austria from the German states’ association
• Spreading German nationalism by appropriating culture and traditions.

When was the revived Three Emperors’ League negotiated by Bismarck?

Bismarck negotiated the Three Emperors’ League in 1881. By that time, he already had a solid ally, and by negotiating this league, he demonstrated his prowess and diplomatic adroitness. He now had a solid impact on Vienna and St. Petersburg that could play a key role in preventing the Balkans related conflict.

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Assess the success of Bismarck's foreign policy with reference to: a) Keeping France isolated b) Keeping Russia and Austria - Hungary happy c) Maintaining European peace

Charlotte McKenna

Bismarck’s Foreign Policy

Assess the success of Bismarck’s foreign policy with reference to:

a) Keeping France isolated

b) Keeping Russia and Austria – Hungary happy

c) Maintaining European peace

  During the majority of his time in German government, Bismarck found himself initiating and implementing schemes in order to keep France isolated, keep Russia and Austria – Hungary happy and to maintain European peace. He used his boundless intelligence and diplomatic skills in order to achieve these aims.

 Bismarck came to “power” in 1862 and by 1870 his first challenge had begun. Relations between Prussia and France had been weak and due to the potential unification of Germany, relations declined throughout the 1860’s. France was keen to fight Prussia to prevent the unification of Germany and Prussia was equally keen to fight France, so as to complete the unification by taking control of the south Germanic states, e.g. Alsace Lorraine. Relations finally reached a low when war finally came in 1870, here the Prussians easily defeated France and Napoleon III was overthrown. Prussia then was able to take control of Alsace Lorraine.

  Then, it seemed, relations between the two countries were irreconcilable.  Due to the loss of their emperor France was relatively weak and disorganized as a country, now having to adjust to a republican government system.

  It was at this point that Bismarck began his policy of French isolation.

  After the unification of Germany was complete, Bismarck realized that his newly created system could come under threat if the French decided to seek revenge. So he decided to do everything he could in order to prevent this.

   The first thing that Bismarck did was to form the Dreikaiserbund. The three countries involved in this were Germany, Russia and Austria – Hungary. Russia and Austria - Hungary were at loggerheads at this time, as they held differing views over the Balkans situation, and as a result there was increasing mistrust and antagonism between them. The Balkans situation threatened to disrupt the peace and power balance of Europe.

  War seemed likely between two. In this situation one of these two countries would possibly look towards Germany as a potential ally, so, therefore, Bismarck would have the job of choosing between them. Whichever of the two was rejected by Bismarck would then look for an ally elsewhere. Chances were this would end up being France. This was exactly what Bismarck didn’t want, as then he would be fighting a war on both sides, so he would have to split his army, and therefore the country would weaken. Bismarck used his excellent diplomatic skills in order to avoid such a decision; he initiated a gentleman’s agreement between the leaders of the other two countries – the Dreikaiserbund . This would kill two birds with one stone; Bismarck could help maintain friendly relations between Russia and Austria – Hungary and therefore avoid a war and a difficult decision, and also keep France isolated by preventing it from forming potential alliances.

This is a preview of the whole essay

  Bismarck went even further to isolate France: under the terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt France had to pay Germany 5 000 million French francs, and while they still owed this money, German troops were allowed to occupy France. But, Bismarck underestimated France, who due to the introduction of the National Lottery, managed to raise enough money to pay off the reparations in just two years. This was a shock for Bismarck as he had anticipated that it would take much longer for these reparations to be paid off. After the failure of this scheme to isolate France he now had to come up with another.

  In 1875 Bismarck became alarmed at the rapid revitalization of the French army, which resulted in an increase in its strength. Bismarck saw his opportunity to isolate the French further when they ordered several horses to be exported from Berlin. In Bismarck’s eyes this was a threat of war (as normally countries bought horses in preparation for war) and so he tried to intimidate the French by publishing an article in the German newspaper “Die Post”, headed “Is War in Sight?”  This insinuated that Germany would wage war on France if they didn’t abandon their rearmament scheme. Bismarck thought that by doing this would scare France and turn other European nations against them.

   Again, this did not go to plan. Other European countries accused Germany of “bullying” France, seeing that France’s buying of horses was not an act of aggression but an essential procedure so that they would be prepared in the event of a war. Britain, Italy and Russia expressed their concerns and they rallied on the side of the French. This infuriated Bismarck, as again he had been defeated and instead of decreasing support for France, he ended up creating support for them, and he realized France was not so isolated after all.

  There was, in 1875, another threat to the stability of the new unified Germany. An outbreak of conflict threatened to overthrow everything that Bismarck had been working for, for the last five or so years. A series of revolts in the Balkans against the Turkish rule of the Ottoman Empire nearly resulted in the end of the Dreikaiserbund . Austria -   Hungary and Russia both held differing points of view over what should happen there. Russia wanted independence for all countries under the Ottoman Empire, as after being given independence, these countries would, no doubt, turn to Russia for support, and then Russia would gain access to a warm water port. This would help trade in the country, as Russia had been a somewhat backward country partly due to this. Whereas Austria -Hungary did not want independence for those countries, as she thought that this would give inspiration to all the countries that formed the Austro – Hungarian Empire, to break away and seek independence.

Due to the Pan-slavist movement in Russia, and their strong desire for countries like Serbia to be independent, Russia declared war on Turkey, a war that they easily won. The war led to the signing of the treaty of San Stefano in March 1878. Under the terms of the treaty Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Romania gained full independence and Russia was allowed access to a warm water port. So as a result Bulgaria became the biggest power of the Balkans, which allowed Russia to dominate the area.

   This development caused outrage in Europe, as none of the countries were happy with the new situation apart from Russia. So Bismarck decided that he should take charge and change the situation to please every country in Europe a bit. So he organized the Congress of Berlin, over which he would officiate as an “honest broker” figure as he had found himself in a situation he had been hoping to avoid; Austria-Hungary and Russia on opposite sides. The congress led to a revision of the treaty of San Stefano - the Treaty of Berlin –whose terms included that Bulgaria had to split into three, in order to retain the power balance in the Balkans., Serbia, Montenegro and Romania remained independent of Turkey, Austria – Hungary was allowed to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia was allowed to take over Bessarabia , Karz and Batum  and Britain was allowed to take over Cyprus for use as a naval base.

    Most countries were happy with this treaty as its main aims had been achieved; the power balance had been restored, there was peace in Europe and France again was isolated (this made Bismarck happy anyway.)

Only one thing did not go quite to plan; Russia was very angry as they saw everything they had earned from the treaty of San Stefano slip away. They may have gained land, but so what? This land was insignificant, and they no longer had access to a warm water port. They felt that the congress had been a “European coalition against Russia under the Leadership of Prince Bismarck.” The Dreikaiserbund  had now fallen apart.

  After this turn of events Bismarck decided to focus on strengthening relations with Austria –Hungary. They formed a secret Dual Alliance; it was kept secret so as not to upset the Russian Tsar, who already thought that Bismarck’s Foreign policies were Anti-Russian, and in the case of being found out, Russia may have taken offence and allied with France. Germany and Austria – Hungary agreed that in the event of an attack from Russia the other country would provide full military support. But if one of the countries was attacked by another country that wasn’t Russia, they would sustain a state of benevolent neutrality, which basically meant that they would provide food, arms and money, but not soldiers.

  One of the reasons for signing the treaty was to make Russia jealous and put pressure on them to seek a revival of the Dreikaiserbund  but with very different terms. Bismarck assumed correctly, and Russia soon signed the Dreikaiserbundnis  or the Three Emperors Alliance. This was a piece of diplomatic brilliance, showing Bismarck in his element, as again he had managed to isolate France. The treaty stated that if a fourth country attacked one of the countries involved in the treaty, the others would adopt a state of benevolent neutrality. This settled the problems for the moment but did not remove the causes of rivalry between Russia and Austria Hungary.

 In 1882 Bismarck then took the chance to enlarge his field of alliances with the aim to isolate France further, by taking on another anti – French nation. Italy had recently been unified and was angry because the French had recently occupied Tunis. Austria –Hungary was also keen to enter this treaty as the Italians had claim to some land in the southern Tyrol and Croatia, so as result of signing, Italy would not be able to attach this territory. This treaty excluded Russia.

  This new treaty and a new development in the Balkans put the Dreikaiserbundnis under strain. So Bismarck signed another secret treaty, this time with Russia, in which he agreed to support their claims in Bulgaria, whereby, in the event of war against a third power, they would take on a benevolent state of neutrality. But if Russia went to war with Austria-Hungary then this would not apply as then the Dual Alliance would be contradicted, this shows again Bismarck favouring Austria-Hungary over Russia.

  But, unfortunately for Bismarck the Dreikaiserbundnis  collapsed after a Russian attempt to kidnap the King of Bulgaria and replaced him with a Russian general. This caused uproar and the alliance dissolved as tension between Russia and Austria Hungary was renewed.

Then there was a second war scare with France in 1886. The rise of General Boulanger to French Minister of War was seen as a great threat to Germany. He won support through radical vocal attacks on Germany. Under him, France seemed to be heading towards a coup d’etat. He was keen to get revenge on Germany, which earned him the name General Revanche . Again Bismarck went to the papers, but in the end nothing came of it and Boulanger’s power fizzled out after three years.

  The policy of French exclusion continued in 1887 with the signing of the Mediterranean Agreements involving Germany, Austria – Hungary, Spain, Italy and Great Britain. These agreements allowed for the maintenance of a status quo in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Note that this treaty excluded Russia as well as France which was bound to contribute to the deterioration of relations between them later.

  Then to conclude this saga in 1888 the Russians openly accused Bismarck of double dealing as they thought he was favouring Austria-Hungary over them while pretending to be impartial. In response to this Bismarck published the terms of the Dual Alliance. As a result of this relations began to deteriorate as the Russians felt humiliated. This pushed Russia further towards France, especially when Bismarck refused to lend the Russians a loan, which they ended up having to borrow from the French, then political and diplomatic links between the two countries began to grow; the French were now not alone.

Germany had experienced nineteen years of peace up until 1890 when Bismarck was forced to resign. Having exploited and encouraged rivalries between the European countries Bismarck had managed to prevent any hostile alliances against Germany, so that was one aspect of the policy that was completely successful. But in most areas he was not so successful:

Though he did not succeed in the first to attempts that he made this intricate and complex set of agreements and alliances had the effect of denying the French of any potential allies and allowed Bismarck to retain diplomatic initiative. In the years of 1879 – 1882, when many of these agreements were being concluded Bismarck moved with assurance and aplomb, taking advantage of the apprehensions of the other governments, making the most of the unforeseen opportunities, always retaining the initiative and by 1882 he had enhanced Germany’s position so much that Berlin was regarded as the diplomatic capital of Europe.   Bismarck succeeded in keeping France isolated until 1888, when Russia fell out with Germany for good and struck up good relations with France. Now, in the event of a war, Bismarck would face a battle on two fronts. In considering this, Bismarck was successful in isolating them for almost twenty years, but towards the end he failed by pushing Russia towards them.

   Through the mountains of treaties from Dreikaiserbund s to Dual Alliance Bismarck managed to keep Austria –Hungary happy and on his side the whole time. But Russia was a different story. Although they were contented at first to sign the initial Dreikaiserbund , after the exposure of Austro – Hungarian favouritism by Bismarck, Russia began to get more and more anti –German. The second Dreikaiserbund  temporarily settled them, but before long the tension between them and Austria –Hungary became unbearable, and it dissolved, pushing them further and further into the arms of France. So much so, that this would lead to an alliance between the two countries later on. But although this did not work out we must consider what an achievement it was that Bismarck managed to contain such tensions during the terms when the treaties did last, between two countries that were so culturally different. For any other diplomat, this is an impossible feat.

  In respect to peace in Europe Bismarck was very successful. He managed to resolve issues at the Congress of Berlin, which suited the majority of Europe, and so he managed to stabilize its situation and avoid even the concept of war until he resigned and even after that. Due to him there was no conflict in Europe from 1885 (Bulgaria against Serbia) until 1914. So although his treaty was successful it did leave unresolved issues that would ultimately result in the First World War.  

  But how far these agreements go to be useful in the long term is questionable. Particularly as, when, not long after this Bismarck was forced to leave office and his delicate system was left in the clumsy hands of a pompous and clueless Kaiser where it all started to unravel…

  Bismarck is, to this day, considered to be the most significant German in history, which only partly credits him for his outstanding actions towards a potentially disastrous turn of events. If handled by anyone else German history may have been quite   different.

Document Details

• Word Count 2569
• Level AS and A Level
• Subject History

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SAN FRANCISCO—The United States has spent two years supporting Ukraine in one ground war and seven months backing Israel in another, and it continues to prepare for the possibility of a third in Taiwan. But arguably its most persistent focus has been on a far longer-running, more perennial, borderless battle over cyberspace and the future of technology.

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The strategy document, unveiled on Monday, sits at the intersection of three hallmarks of the Biden administration’s first term: an escalating conflict with adversaries such as Russia and China that frequently plays out in the cyber realm; an emphasis on “ minilateralism ” by building international coalitions and partnerships among smaller, targeted groupings; and a determination to maintain the United States’ global technological primacy.

“Today’s revolutions in technology are at the heart of our competition with geopolitical rivals,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said while announcing the strategy at the RSA Conference in San Francisco, which is Silicon Valley’s biggest annual gathering of cybersecurity professionals.

“Our ability to design, to develop, to deploy technologies will determine our capacity to shape the tech future, and naturally, operating from a position of strength better positions us to set standards and advance norms around the world,” Blinken added. “But our advantage comes not just from our domestic strength. It comes from our solidarity with the majority of the world that shares our vision for a vibrant, open, and secure technological future, and from an unmatched network of allies and partners with whom we can work in common cause.”

Speaking to reporters just minutes after that speech, Nathaniel Fick, the U.S. ambassador at large for cyberspace and digital policy, outlined the importance of those global partnerships in setting broader norms and collectively calling out contraventions by the likes of Russia and China. “It’s easy to pick on one kid at the playground. It’s harder to pick on 30 kids,” he said. “So building durable coalitions in these attributions matters.”

The strategy puts into a neater framework much of what the Biden administration has already been doing in practice. In 2021, the administration established the Counter Ransomware Initiative, which has now grown to involve more than 60 countries. Just under one-third of that number have signed a U.S.-led pledge to curb the misuse of commercial spyware. And the United States has played a key role in corralling artificial intelligence safety efforts with the Group of Seven countries, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations.

The State Department has even occasionally put its money where its mouth is, giving $25 million each to Albania and Costa Rica following cyberattacks on those countries that were linked to Iran and Russia respectively. It is also disbursing $500 million to seven countries across Asia and Latin America to help shore up their semiconductor manufacturing capabilities . Blinken also called out a recent investment in the literal piping of the internet—a partnership with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan on an undersea cable that can bring online around 100,000 people in the Pacific Islands.

Fick pointed to his own appointment in 2022 as a prime example of the administration’s tech-centric foreign policy. “For two years, we’ve had a bureau at the State Department focused on these issues. We’ve had somebody with an ambassadorial title representing us on these issues, and broadly, it’s an attempt to integrate and elevate our diplomatic approach on these things,” he said.

Cybersecurity and cyberdefense remain the most urgent facets of U.S. tech policy. The United States has faced numerous and increasing cyberattacks from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea in recent years that have compromised critical infrastructure such as gas pipelines, water suppliers, and even health care systems. The intelligence community has also repeatedly warned of potential Russian and Chinese efforts to influence the upcoming U.S. presidential election in November.

The State Department’s strategy places significant emphasis on the threat of adversarial cyberattacks, but it is far from the first Biden administration document to do so. The White House released its National Cybersecurity Strategy in March 2023—followed by an implementation plan in June—and the Defense Department released its own cyber strategy document in September.

Even Blinken’s announcement earlier this week wasn’t the administration’s most recent cyber document. On Tuesday, the White House Office of the National Cyber Director released an update to last year’s implementation plan, along with a first-ever report on the U.S. cybersecurity posture , which outlines the country’s readiness to fend off adversaries.

“We’ve made good progress, and we have to do more—we have a ways to go,” said Harry Coker Jr., the White House’s national cyber director, during another panel at the RSA Conference. “Cybersecurity is a space where there’s no downtime.”

For U.S. diplomats, however, the effort to build coalitions goes hand-in-hand with continuing attempts to engage adversaries—particularly on thorny issues such as cyberattacks and AI guardrails.

Fick, who accompanied Blinken on a trip to China in late April that included meetings with Blinken’s Chinese counterpart Wang Yi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, said that the two countries have agreed to meet in a “third country” in the coming weeks to hold a bilateral dialogue on AI safety and trust in order “to ensure that we maintain a communication channel on the most important and transformative of the various emerging technologies that are in front of us.”

Blinken also conveyed that “holding American critical infrastructure at risk, especially civilian critical infrastructure, is dangerous, it’s escalatory, it’s unacceptable,” Fick added.

But one prominent source of recent bilateral friction was notably not mentioned: “I will say, the Chinese did not raise TikTok,” Fick said.

The vision laid out in the State Department’s digital strategy means that Washington may need to have tough conversations with allies and partners whose use of technologies may not align with that vision. Israel’s use of AI systems to pick targets for bombing in Gaza has raised alarm bells, for instance, while another key strategic partner, India, frequently tops the global list of internet shutdowns by number and has cracked down on online dissent more broadly.

“When allies and partners step over the line in that regard, we don’t hesitate to call them out,” Fick said in response to a question from Foreign Policy . “Someone once told me: ‘Looking the other way as your friends do bad things is thuggery,’ so it’s important to hold allies and partners to the same standard as we are advocating elsewhere.”

In the meantime, Fick added, Washington will remain focused on leading by example.

“In a world where you’ve got maybe a few dozen countries that are more or less always aligned on these things and a handful that more or less always are not, that leaves a huge number in the middle that, for their own national interests, don’t want to be forced to make a choice and shouldn’t be forced to make a choice,” he said.

“I’ve joked before that I’ve got two teenage daughters,” Fick added. “Pounding the table and saying ‘my way or the highway’ doesn’t work with them, and it generally doesn’t work in diplomacy.”

Rishi Iyengar is a reporter at  Foreign Policy . Twitter:  @Iyengarish

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Guest Essay

What Trump Could Do in Foreign Policy Might Surprise the World

By Curt Mills

Mr. Mills is the executive director of The American Conservative.

Love it or hate it, the United States has an imperial presidency, and in his first term, Donald Trump demonstrated a record of using such powers with noted relish on the world stage. As in many areas, he does not have a conventional approach to global relations. But it may turn out that, like Richard Nixon and George H.W. Bush before him, Mr. Trump enjoys engagement with foreign policy.

His particular style of politics can be provocative, of course, but also effective. Mr. Trump’s approach to America’s place in the world is pragmatic or unpredictable or both, and it could offer surprising opportunities for peace.

If Mr. Trump re-enters the Oval Office, he may seek to surprise in his final act, perhaps inspiring parallels, in its unpredictability and volatility, with Nixon and his “madman” foreign policy.

In Mr. Trump’s first term, his results in foreign affairs have generally been underrated. For a “madman,” there were real accomplishments: no new foreign wars, the Abraham Accords between Israel and a handful of Sunni states that many experts on the subject thought were impossible, a focus on China that is now bipartisan, putting allies on notice that they had to more than vaguely contribute to their own defense.

Unless the global landscape suddenly shifts, Mr. Trump would return to the Oval Office facing the sorts of foreign crises — particularly the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East — that he largely avoided in his first term.

But the circumstances would surely not change the way he managed foreign affairs. In his first term Mr. Trump could be the bête noire of the establishment and Republican neoconservatives on Monday (as in his interactions with Kim Jong-un and the NATO leaders). And he could be the vicious spear tip of American power on Tuesday (as in the 2020 airstrike in Baghdad that killed Qassim Suleimani).

In a second term Mr. Trump would likely not assemble a right-wing establishment cabinet of oil executives and generals. He would instead be guided by a new group of establishment figures or pragmatists as well as a cut of advisers associated with the new right who want a broader convulsion in foreign policy and who wonder, with increasing despondence at the state of American culture, if a new Cold War-type enemy, perhaps China, would unify the population.

Members of this new right group increasingly disagree among themselves, particularly on just how far to take it to China and just how interchangeable conservative foreign policy should be with Israel’s.

Among the new pragmatists, the man who succeeded John Bolton as national security adviser, Robert O’Brien, would almost certainly play a key role in a second term, perhaps as defense secretary or secretary of state.

Mr. O’Brien is an understated but powerful lawyer from the West Coast. (Another point in the Trump-Nixon echoes: In 2022, Mr. O’Brien was named chairman of the board of the Richard Nixon Foundation.) He calls himself a Reagan Republican and would be an easy Senate confirmation.

The team might also include the former acting director of national intelligence Richard Grenell, who was Mr. Trump’s ambassador to Germany from 2018 to 2020. An ally of Mr. O’Brien’s, Mr. Grenell engages in smashmouth interpersonal politics that marked his tumultuous tenure in Berlin. But his style aligns well with Mr. Trump’s approach to diplomacy-as-negotiation.

In addition to the wonkish ideologues and pragmatists, there is an unpredictable milieu of true believers, among them Steve Bannon and the retired colonel Douglas Macgregor, a cult hero on the new right who in the chaos of the 2020-21 transition was installed by Pentagon loyalists to Mr. Trump with the intent of a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan.

This team would suggest a vision — relative aversion to ideology but a tolerance for radicalism — that could fulfill Mr. Trump’s foreign policy approach, which favors a mixture of staying out of trouble and engaging in conflicts decisively and briefly. Washington veterans often react with puzzlement to the idea that Mr. Trump has a foreign policy vision at all. His approach confused people like Mr. Bolton, who criticized Mr. Trump for looking at “things on a transactional basis.”

But Mr. Trump likes to occupy two identities at once: threat and negotiator. And as he showed in a recent interview with Time magazine, he has a shrewd understanding of how to manage his team in negotiations. For example, he said in the interview that Mr. Bolton “served a good purpose” because “every time he walked into a room, people thought you were going to war.”

This again suggests a parallel with Mr. Nixon’s administration. One of his first decisions in the White House was to hire Henry Kissinger as his national security adviser. Even Mr. Kissinger — a Harvard professor who had consulted for Nelson Rockefeller, a rival of Mr. Nixon’s — was surprised by the decision.

Yet Mr. Kissinger helped balance Mr. Nixon’s strident anti-Communist Cold War posturing and kept allies and enemies guessing about his intent. Mr. Nixon’s seemingly wild card tactics boosted the credibility of his threats. He is often remembered today for balance of power, for realpolitik and for moving to end America’s involvement in Vietnam, but he is remembered more for opening ties with Communist China.

It took Mr. Nixon to go to Beijing. Is it truly so imponderable that it could take Mr. Trump to go to Beirut or even Tehran?

You can apply Mr. Trump’s two-positions-at-once approach to various other hot spots. Take Israel. In his recent interview, he reiterated that he would “protect Israel” if war broke out with Iran but also said that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “rightfully has been criticized for what took place on Oct. 7.”

He said the Jewish state should “get the job done” in Gaza but also concluded that Israel has managed to lose the public relations battle in this war. You can imagine Mr. Trump, as president, unreservedly supporting Israel in its military campaign in Gaza. But you can equally imagine him speaking in far harsher terms against Mr. Netanyahu than President Biden has, perhaps in pursuit of a cease-fire.

Or take Mr. Trump’s language around Russia and NATO. Last winter, Mr. Trump caused outrage when he said that he’d be willing to let Russia “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO countries that don’t spend enough on their defense.

In his Time interview, Mr. Trump said of that earlier comment, “When I say things like that, that’s said as a point of negotiation.”

The criticism around his NATO and Russia comments presupposes that Mr. Trump, the consummate negotiator, would simply remove his greatest point of leverage (membership in the body) out of the gate. The global impression of Mr. Trump as Vladimir Putin’s pawn — and an admirer of autocrats like Mr. Kim — only incentivizes him to surprise in the other direction.

In a second term, there would also be the promise that Mr. Trump would at last attempt to prove the technocrats and Washington bureaucrats wrong — the experts he fired and flouted, the prestige financiers who have mocked him and the lawyers who have tried to imprison him.

Consider what the mere possibility of a Trump win in November plausibly inspired in recent weeks: France is taking up the mantle of independent European defense , and Israel’s offers in negotiations with Hamas have gotten more reasonable .

If Mr. Trump wins in November, he will almost certainly read a life’s worth of vindication into how he does business and the value of his ability to be in two places at once. The uncertainty that comes with his style is poised to once again give him power over America’s soft and hard power in global affairs.

Maybe Mr. Trump can continue to surprise and achieve what Mr. Nixon aspired to. His gravestone in Yorba Linda, Calif., contains a line from his first Inaugural Address: “The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker.”

Curt Mills is the executive director of The American Conservative.

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