structural realism essay

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Structural Realism

Structural realism is considered by many realists and antirealists alike as the most defensible form of scientific realism. There are now many forms of structural realism and an extensive literature about them. There are interesting connections with debates in metaphysics, philosophy of physics and philosophy of mathematics. This entry is intended to be a comprehensive survey of the field.

1. Introduction

2. the best of both worlds, 3.1 kantian esr, 3.2 esr and ramsey sentences, 4.1 osr and group theory, 4.2 osr and quantum field theory, 4.3 osr and spacetime physics, 5. objections to structural realism, 6. other structuralisms, other internet resources, related entries.

Scientific realism is the view that we ought to believe in the unobservable entities posited by our most successful scientific theories. It is widely held that the most powerful argument in favour of scientific realism is the no-miracles argument, according to which the success of science would be miraculous if scientific theories were not at least approximately true descriptions of the world. While the underdetermination argument is often cited as giving grounds for scepticism about theories of unobservable entities, arguably the most powerful arguments against scientific realism are based on the history of radical theory change in science. The best-known of these arguments, although not necessarily the most compelling of them, is the notorious pessimistic meta-induction, according to which reflection on the abandonment of theories in the history of science motivates the expectation that our best current scientific theories will themselves be abandoned, and hence that we ought not to assent to them.

Structural realism was introduced into contemporary philosophy of science by John Worrall in 1989 as a way to break the impasse that results from taking both arguments seriously, and have “the best of both worlds” in the debate about scientific realism. With respect to the case of the transition in nineteenth-century optics from Fresnel's elastic solid ether theory to Maxwell's theory of the electromagnetic field, Worrall argues that:

There was an important element of continuity in the shift from Fresnel to Maxwell—and this was much more than a simple question of carrying over the successful empirical content into the new theory. At the same time it was rather less than a carrying over of the full theoretical content or full theoretical mechanisms (even in “approximate” form) … There was continuity or accumulation in the shift, but the continuity is one of form or structure, not of content. (1989, 117)

According to Worrall, we should not accept standard scientific realism, which asserts that the nature of the unobservable objects that cause the phenomena we observe is correctly described by our best theories. However, neither should we be antirealists about science. Rather, we should adopt structural realism and epistemically commit ourselves only to the mathematical or structural content of our theories. Since there is (says Worrall) retention of structure across theory change, structural realism both (a) avoids the force of the pessimistic meta-induction (by not committing us to belief in the theory's description of the furniture of the world) and (b) does not make the success of science (especially the novel predictions of mature physical theories) seem miraculous (by committing us to the claim that the theory's structure, over and above its empirical content, describes the world).

Worrall's paper has been widely cited and has spawned an extensive literature in which various varieties of structural realism are advocated. These contemporary debates recapitulate the work of some of the greatest philosophers of science. Worrall says he found his structural realism in Henri Poincaré (1905, 1906) whose structuralism was combined with neo-Kantian views about the nature of arithmetic and group theory, and with conventionalism about the geometry of space and time. (The prevalence of Kantian themes in the literature on structural realism is discussed further below; for more on Poincaré see Giedymin 1982, Gower 2000 and Zahar 1994, 2001.) Ernan McMullin (1990) argues that Pierre Duhem was a realist about the relations found in laws but not about explanations in terms of an ontology. According to Worrall (1989), Barry Gower (2000) and Elie Zahar (2001), Duhem too was a kind of structural realist, though there are passages in Duhem that more readily lend themselves to an instrumentalist interpretation. Gower's (2000) historical survey of structural realism also discusses how structuralism figures in the thought of Ernst Cassirer, Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap and Bertrand Russell. Stathis Psillos (1999) has explored the connections between structuralism and the Ramsey-sentence approach to scientific theory as it figured in the development of Carnap's philosophy from logical positivism to ontologically relativist empiricism. Other important pioneers of structuralism about science include Arthur Eddington (see French 2003), Grover Maxwell (see Ladyman 1998 and 3.1 below) and Hermann Weyl (see Ryckman 2005).

Ladyman (1998) distinguished epistemic and ontic forms of structural realism, and many of those who have taken up structural realism have been philosophers of physics who have developed the latter. Others have made it clear that their structural realism is a purely epistemological refinement of scientific realism. On the other hand, Bas van Fraassen (1997, 2006, 2008) defends an empiricist and non-realist form of structuralism about science, motivated by an illuminating reconstruction of the origins of structuralism in the debate about the epistemology of physical geometry in the nineteenth century, and more generally in the progressive mathematisation of science. Yet more kinds of structuralism now abound in contemporary analytic philosophy. These include causal structuralism concerning the individuation of properties, mathematical structuralism concerning the nature of mathematical objects, and structuralism about laws and dispositions. The relationship between structural realism and these views is a matter for further work. While many realists and antirealists alike are agreed that the most viable form of scientific realism is structural realism, many others continue to defend other forms of scientific realism. This article reviews the issues and provides a guide for further reading.

Scientific realism became dominant in philosophy of science after the demise of the forms of antirealism about science associated with the logical positivists, namely semantic instrumentalism, according to which theoretical terms are not to be interpreted as referring to anything, and theoretical reductionism, according to which theoretical terms are disguised ways of referring to observable phenomena. These forms of antirealism rely upon discredited doctrines about scientific language, such as that it can be divided into theoretical and observational parts, and that much of it should not be taken literally. Bas van Fraassen (1980) revitalised the debate about scientific realism by proposing his constructive empiricism as an alternative. His antirealism is sceptical rather than dogmatic, and does not depend on the distinction between theoretical and observational terms. He allows that terms such as ‘sub-atomic particle’ and ‘particle too small to see’ are perfectly meaningful and should be taken literally (note that the former term is theoretical and the latter term is not but both purportedly refer to unobservable entities). On the other hand, he holds that it is perfectly rational to remain agnostic about whether there are any such particles because he argues that to accept the best scientific theories we have only requires believing that they are empirically adequate, in the sense of correctly describing the observable world, rather than believing that they are true simpliciter. (For more on constructive empiricism see Monton 2007.)

How then are we to decide whether to believe in the full theoretical truth of scientific theories, including what they say about unobservable entities such as electrons and black holes, or whether to believe instead merely that our best scientific theories are empirically adequate? Van Fraassen argues that since the latter belief is logically weaker and yet as empirically contentful as the former belief it is natural for an empiricist to go only as far as belief in empirical adequacy. On the other hand, many philosophers are moved by the fact that belief in only the empirical adequacy of our best scientific theories leaves us unable to explain the phenomena that they describe. Inference to the best explanation is widely believed to be an important form of reasoning in science, and the production of explanations of the world is often supposed to be one of the main successes of science. When the target of explanation becomes science itself and its history of empirical success as a whole, we arrive at the no-miracles argument famously presented by Hilary Putnam as follows: “The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle” (1975, 73).

The no-miracles argument is elaborated in terms of specific features of scientific methodology and practice. Richard Boyd (1985, for example) argues that in explaining the success of science, we need to explain the overall instrumental success of scientific methods across the history of science. Alan Musgrave (1988) says that the only version of the no-miracles argument that might work is one appealing to the novel predictive success of theories. Some realists, such as Psillos (1999), have gone so far as to argue that only theories which have enjoyed novel predictive success ought to be considered as falling within the scope of arguments for scientific realism.

Colin Howson (2000), P.D. Magnus and Craig Callender (2004), and Peter Lipton (2004) have recently argued that the no-miracles argument is flawed because in order to evaluate the claim that it is probable that theories enjoying empirical success are approximately true we have to know what the relevant base rate is, and there is no way we can know this. Magnus and Callender argue that “wholesale” arguments that are intended to support realism (or antirealism) about science as a whole (rather than “retail” arguments that are applied to a specific theory) are only taken seriously because of our propensity to engage in the ‘base rate fallacy’ of evaluating probabilities without knowing all the relevant information. They think we ought to abandon the attempt to defend scientific realism in general rather than on a case-by-case basis.

When it comes to wholesale arguments against scientific realism, perhaps the most influential until recently was the underdetermination argument, according to which the existence of empirical equivalents to our best scientific theories implies that we should withhold epistemic commitment to them. This is often dismissed by realists as generating doubt about unobservables that is no more worrying than doubting other minds or the external world. They argue that since scientists find ways of choosing between empirically equivalent rivals, philosophers ought not to make too much of merely in-principle possibilities that are irrelevant to scientific practice (see Laudan and Leplin 1991, 1993, and Kukla 1998). (Kyle Stanford (2006) defends an underdetermination argument called ‘the problem of unconceived alternatives’ with reference to the history of science, so perhaps not all underdetermination arguments are a priori and theoretical.)

The power of the arguments against scientific realism from theory change is that, rather than being a priori and theoretical, they are empirically based and their premises are based on data obtained by examining the practice and history of science. Ontological discontinuity in theory change seems to give us grounds not for mere agnosticism but for the positive belief that many central theoretical terms of our best contemporary science will be regarded as non-referring by future science. So-called ‘pessimistic meta-inductions’ about theoretical knowledge take many forms and are probably almost as ancient as scepticism itself. They have the basic form:

Proposition p is widely believed by most contemporary experts, but p is like many other hypotheses that were widely believed by experts in the past and are disbelieved by most contemporary experts. We have as much reason to expect p to befall their fate as not, therefore we should at least suspend judgement about p if not actively disbelieve it.

More precisely, Larry Laudan (1981) gave a very influential argument with the following structure:

• There have been many empirically successful theories in the history of science which have subsequently been rejected and whose theoretical terms do not refer according to our best current theories.
• Our best current theories are no different in kind from those discarded theories and so we have no reason to think they will not ultimately be replaced as well.

So, by induction we have positive reason to expect that our best current theories will be replaced by new theories according to which some of the central theoretical terms of our best current theories do not refer, and hence we should not believe in the approximate truth or the successful reference of the theoretical terms of our best current theories.

The most common realist response to this argument is to restrict realism to theories with some further properties (usually, maturity, and novel predictive success) so as to cut down the inductive base employed in (i) (see Psillos 1996). Moreover Peter Lewis (2001), Marc Lange (2002) and Magnus and Callender (2004) regard the pessimistic meta-induction as a fallacy of probabilistic reasoning. However, there are arguments from theory change that are not probabilistic. Note first that there are several cases of mature theories which enjoyed novel predictive success, notably the ether theory of light and the caloric theory of heat. If their central theoretical terms do not refer, the realist's claim that approximate truth explains empirical success will no longer be enough to establish realism, because we will need some other explanation for the success of the caloric and ether theories. If this will do for these theories then it ought to do for others where we happened to have retained the central theoretical terms, and then we do not need the realist's preferred explanation that such theories are true and successfully refer to unobservable entities.

Laudan's paper was also intended to show that the successful reference of its theoretical terms is not a necessary condition for the novel predictive success of a theory (1981, 45), and there are counter-examples to the no-miracles argument.

• Successful reference of its central theoretical terms is a necessary condition for the approximate truth of a theory.
• There are examples of theories that were mature and had novel predictive success but whose central theoretical terms do not refer.
• So there are examples of theories that were mature and had novel predictive success but which are not approximately true.
• Approximate truth and successful reference of central theoretical terms is not a necessary condition for the novel-predictive success of scientific theories

So, the no-miracles argument is undermined since, if approximate truth and successful reference are not available to be part of the explanation of some theories' novel predictive success, there is no reason to think that the novel predictive success of other theories has to be explained by realism.

There are two common (not necessarily exclusive) responses to this:

(I) Develop an account of reference according to which the abandoned theoretical terms are regarded as successfully referring after all.

Realists developed causal theories of reference to account for continuity of reference for terms like ‘atom’ or ‘electron’, even though the theories about atoms and electrons have undergone significant changes. The difference with the terms ‘ether’ and ‘caloric’ is that they are no longer used in modern science. However, as C.L. Hardin and Alexander Rosenberg (1982) argue, the causal theory of reference may be used to defend the claim that terms like ‘ether’ referred to whatever causes the phenomena responsible for the terms' introduction. This is criticized by Laudan (1984) as making the reference of theoretical terms a trivial matter, since as long as some phenomena prompt the introduction of a term it will automatically successfully refer to whatever is the relevant cause (or causes). Furthermore, this theory radically disconnects what a theorist is talking about from what she thinks she is talking about. For example, Aristotle or Newton could be said to be referring to geodesic motion in a curved spacetime when, respectively, they talked about the natural motion of material objects, and the fall of a body under the effect of the gravitational force.

(II) Restrict realism to those parts of theories that play an essential role in the derivation of subsequently observed (novel) predictions, and then argue that the terms of past theories which are now regarded as non-referring were non-essential and hence that there is no reason to deny that the essential terms in current theories will be retained. Philip Kitcher says that: “[n]o sensible realist should ever want to assert that the idle parts of an individual practice, past or present, are justified by the success of the whole” (1993, 142).

The most detailed and influential response to the argument from theory change is due to Psillos (1999), who combines strategies (I) and (II). Hasok Chang (2002), Kyle Stanford (2002 and 2003), Mohammed Elsamahi (2005) and Timothy Lyons (2006) criticize Psillos's account. Other responses include Kitcher's (1993) model of reference according to which some tokens of theoretical terms refer and others do not. Christina McLeish (2005) criticizes Kitcher's theory by arguing that there are no satisfactory grounds for making the distinction between referring and non-referring tokens. McLeish (2006) argues that abandoned theoretical terms like ‘ether’ partially refer and partially fail to refer. Juha Saatsi (2005) denies premise (a) and claims that there can be approximate truth of the causal roles postulated by a scientific theory without its central terms necessarily successfully referring (see also Chakravartty, 1998).

There is no consensus among those defending standard realism in the face of theory change. The argument from theory change threatens scientific realism because if what science now says is correct, then the ontologies of past scientific theories are far from accurate accounts of the furniture of the world. If that is so even though they were predictively successful, then the success of our best current theories does not mean they have got the nature of the world right either. The structuralist solution to this problem is to give up the attempt to learn about the nature of unobservable entities from science. The metaphysical import of successful scientific theories consists in their giving correct descriptions of the structure of the world. Theories can be very different and yet share all kinds of structure. The task of providing an adequate theory of approximate truth that fits the history of science and directly addresses the problem of ontological continuity has hitherto defeated realists, but a much more tractable problem is to display the structural commonalities between different theories. Hence, a form of realism that is committed only to the structure of theories might not be undermined by theory change. Gerhard Schurz (2009) proves a structural correspondence theorem showing that successive theories that share empirical content also share theoretical content. (McArthur (2011) argues that structural realism eliminates both theory change in science and scientific discovery.)

There are numerous examples of continuity in the mathematical structure of successive scientific theories. Indeed Niels Bohr and others explicitly applied the methodological principle known as the ‘correspondence principle’, according to which quantum-mechanical models ought to mathematically reduce to classical models in the limit of large numbers of particles, or the limit of Planck's constant becoming arbitrarily small. There are many cases in quantum mechanics where the Hamiltonian functions that represent the total energy of mechanical systems imitate those of classical mechanics, but with variables like those that stand for position and momentum replaced by Hermitian operators. Simon Saunders (1993a) discusses the structural continuities between classical and quantum mechanics and also shows how much structure Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy have in common. Harvey Brown (1993) explains the correspondence between Special Relativity and classical mechanics. Jonathan Bain and John Norton (2001) discuss the structural continuity in descriptions of the electron, as does Angelo Cei (2004). Votsis (2011) considers examples of continuity and discontinuity in physics. Robert Batterman (2002) discusses many examples of limiting relationships between theories, notably the renormalization group approach to critical phenomena, and the relationship between wave and ray optics. Holger Lyre (2004) extends Worrall's original example of the continuity between wave optics and electromagnetism by considering the relationship between Maxwellian electrodynamics and Quantum Electrodynamics. Saunders (2003c and d) also criticises Tian Cao (1997) for underestimating the difficulties with a non-structuralist form of realism in the light of the history of quantum field theory.

The most minimal form of structuralism focuses on empirical structure, and as such is best thought of as a defence of the cumulative nature of science in the face of Kuhnian worries about revolutions (following Post 1971). See Katherine Brading's and Elaine Landry's (2006) ‘minimal structuralism’, and Otavio Bueno's (1999, 2000) and van Fraassen's (2006, 2007, 2008) structural empiricism (Ryckman 2005 calls the latter “instrumental structuralism”).

3. Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR)

Structural realism is often characterised as the view that scientific theories tell us only about the form or structure of the unobservable world and not about its nature. This leaves open the question as to whether the natures of things are posited to be unknowable for some reason or eliminated altogether. Hence, Ladyman (1998) raised the question as to whether Worrall's structural realism is intended as a metaphysical or epistemological modification of standard scientific realism. Worrall's paper is ambiguous in this respect. That he has in mind only an epistemic constraint on realism—commitment to the structure of our best scientific theories but agnosticism about the rest of the content—is suggested by his citation of Poincaré who talks of the redundant theories of the past capturing the “true relations” between the “real objects which Nature will hide forever from our eyes” (1905, 161). So one way of thinking about structural realism is as an epistemological modification of scientific realism to the effect that we only believe what scientific theories tell us about the relations entered into by unobservable objects, and suspend judgement as to the nature of the latter. (ESR is called ‘restrictive structural realism’ by Psillos 2001.) There are various forms this might take. (See French and Ladyman 2011.)

• We cannot know the individuals that instantiate the structure of the world but we can know their properties and relations.
• We cannot know the individuals or their intrinsic/non-relational properties but we can know their first-order relational properties.
• We cannot know the individuals, their first-order properties or relations, but we can know the second-order structure of their relational properties. Russell (1927) and Carnap (1928) took this extreme view and argued that science only tells us about purely logical features of the world.

Psillos (2001) refers to the “upward path” to structural realism as beginning with empiricist epistemological principles and arriving at structural knowledge of the external world. The “downward” path is to arrive at structural realism by weakening standard scientific realism as suggested by Worrall. Both paths are criticized by Psillos. Russell (1927) was led along the upward path by three epistemological principles: firstly, the claim that we only have direct access to our percepts (Ayer's ‘egocentric predicament’); secondly, the principle that different effects have different causes (which is called the Helmholtz-Weyl Principle by Psillos); and thirdly, that the relations between percepts have the same logico-mathematical structure as the relations between their causes. This led him to the claim that science can only describe the world up to isomorphism, and hence to (3) above since according to him we know only the (second-order) isomorphism class of the structure of the world and not the (first-order) structure itself. Russell's upward path is defended by Votsis (2005).

Mauro Dorato argues for ESR on the grounds that structural realism needs entity realism to be plausible (1999, 4). Most defenders of ESR assume that there must be individual objects and properties that are ontologically prior to relational structure. Matteo Morganti differs from other epistemic structural realists by arguing for agnosticism about whether there is a domain of individuals over and above relational structure.

As mentioned above, Poincaré's structuralism had a Kantian flavour. In particular, he thought that the unobservable entities postulated by scientific theories were Kant's noumena or things in themselves. He revised Kant's view by arguing that the latter can be known indirectly rather than not at all because it is possible to know the relations into which they enter. Poincaré followed the upward path to structural realism, beginning with the neo-Kantian goal of recovering the objective or intersubjective world from the world from the subjective world of private sense impressions: “what we call objective reality is… what is common to many thinking beings and could be common to all; … the harmony of mathematical laws” (1906, 14). However, he also followed the downward path to structural realism arguing that the history of science can be seen as cumulative at the level of relations rather than objects. For example, between Carnot's and Clausius' thermodynamics the ontology changes but the Second Law of Thermodynamics is preserved. While Worrall never directly endorses the Kantian aspect of Poincaré's thought, Zahar's structural realism is explicitly a form of Kantian transcendental idealism according to which science can never tell us more than the structure of the noumenal world; the nature of the entities and properties of which it consists are epistemically inaccessible to us (as in (2) above). Michaela Massimi (2011) develops a neo-Kantian perspective on structural realism.

Frank Jackson (1998), Rae Langton (1998) and David Lewis (2009) also advocate views similar to ESR. Jackson refers to ‘Kantian physicalism’ (1998: 23–24), Langton to ‘Kantian Humility’, and Lewis to ‘Ramseyan Humility’. Peter Unger (2001) also argues that our knowledge of the world is purely structural and that qualia are the non-structural components of reality. Jackson argues that science only reveals the causal / relational properties of physical objects, and that “we know next to nothing about the intrinsic nature of the world. We know only its causal cum relational nature” (1998: 24). Langton argues that science only reveals the extrinsic properties of physical objects, and both then argue that their intrinsic natures, and hence the intrinsic nature of the world, are epistemically inaccessible. Jackson points out that this inference can be blocked if the natures of objects and their intrinsic properties are identified with their relational or extrinsic properties, but argues that this makes a mystery of what it is that stands in the causal relations. Lewis' structuralism is based on the centrality he gives to the Ramsey sentence reconstruction of scientific theories that is the subject of the next section.

A position called structural realism, that amounts to an epistemological gloss on traditional scientific realism, was advocated by Grover Maxwell (1962, 1970a, 1970b, 1972). Maxwell wanted to make scientific realism compatible with “concept empiricism” about the meaning of theoretical terms, and he also wanted to explain how we can have epistemic access to unobservable entities. The problem as Maxwell saw it was that theories talk about all sorts of entities and processes with which we are not ‘acquainted’. How, he wondered, can we then know about and refer to them and their properties? The answer that he gave, following Russell, was that we can know about them by description, that is we can know them via their structural properties. In fact, he argues, this is the limit of our knowledge of them, and the meanings of theoretical terms are to be understood purely structurally. The way that Maxwell explicates the idea that the structure of the theory exhausts the cognitive content of its theoretical terms, is to consider the Ramsey sentence of the theory (Ramsey 1929). Ramsey's method allows the elimination of theoretical terms from a theory by replacing them with existentially quantified predicate variables (or names in the case of the influential Lewis 1970). If one replaces the conjunction of assertions of a first-order theory with its Ramsey sentence, the observational consequences of the theory are carried over, but direct reference to unobservables is eliminated.

If we formalise a theory in a first-order language: ∏( O 1 ,…, O n ; T 1 ,…, T m ), where the O s are the observational terms and the T s are the theoretical terms, then the corresponding Ramsey sentence is ∃ t 1 ,…, t m ∏( O 1 ,…, O n ; t 1 ,…, t m ). Thus the Ramsey sentence only asserts that there are some objects, properties and relations that have certain logical features, satisfying certain implicit definitions. It is a higher-order description, but ultimately connects the theoretical content of the theory with observable behaviour. However, it is a mistake to think that the Ramsey sentence allows us to eliminate theoretical entities, for it still states that these exist. It is just that they are referred to not directly, by means of theoretical terms, but by description, that is via variables, connectives, quantifiers and predicate terms whose direct referents are (allegedly) known by acquaintance. Thus Maxwell (and Russell) claimed that knowledge of the unobservable realm is limited to knowledge of its structural rather than intrinsic properties, or, as is sometimes said, limited to knowledge of its higher-order properties. It is arguable that this is the purest structuralism possible, for the notion of structure employed refers to the higher-order properties of a theory, those that are only expressible in purely formal terms.

This is an epistemological structural realism meant to vindicate and not to revise the ontological commitments of scientific realism. On this view the objective world is composed of unobservable objects between which certain properties and relations obtain; but we can only know the properties and relations of these properties and relations, that is, the structure of the objective world. However, there are serious difficulties with this view which were originally raised by Newman in 1928 and which have been recently discussed by Demopoulos and Friedman (1989). The basic problem is that structure is not sufficient to uniquely pick out any relations in the world. Suppose that the world consists of a set of objects whose structure is W with respect to some relation R , about which nothing else is known. Any collection of things can be regarded as having structure W provided there is the right number of them. This is because according to the extensional characterisation of relations defined on a domain of individuals, every relation is identified with some set of subsets of the domain. The power set axiom entails the existence of every such subset and hence every such relation.

As Demopoulos and Friedman point out, if ∏ is consistent, and if all its purely observational consequences are true, then the truth of the corresponding Ramsey sentence follows as a theorem of second-order logic or set theory (provided the initial domain has the right cardinality—and if it does not then consistency implies that there exists one that does). The formal structure of a relation can easily be obtained with any collection of objects provided there are enough of them, so having the formal structure cannot single out a unique referent for this relation; in order to do so we must stipulate that we are talking about the intended relation, which is to go beyond the structural description. “Thus on this view, only cardinality questions are open to discovery!” (1989, 188); everything else will be known a priori.

This leads Demopoulos and Friedman to conclude that reducing a theory to its Ramsey sentence is equivalent to reducing it to its empirical consequences, and thus that: “Russell's realism collapses into a version of phenomenalism or strict empiricism after all: all theories with the same observational consequences will be equally true” (1985, 635). Similarly, Jane English (1973) argued, though on the basis of different considerations, that any two Ramsey sentences that are incompatible with one another cannot have all their observational consequences in common. Hence it seems that if we treat a theory just as its Ramsey sentence then the notion of theoretical equivalence collapses onto that of empirical equivalence. (Demopoulos 2003 argues that similar considerations show that structural empiricism also collapses truth to empirical adequacy; he also discusses the relationship between Newman's problem and Putnam's Paradox. Votsis 2003 argues that the conclusion of the Newman argument doesn't undermine ESR after all. Gordon Solomon 1989 defends Richard Braithwaite's claim that Eddington's structuralism (see 4.1 below) is vulnerable to Newman's argument.)

Jeffery Ketland (2004) argues in detail that the Newman objection trivialises the Ramsey sentence formulation of ESR. Worrall and Zahar (2001) argue that the cognitive content of a theory is exhausted by its Ramsey sentences but that, while the Ramsey sentence only expresses the empirical content of the theory, the notion of empirical content in play here is sufficient for a form of realism. In his 2007 paper, Worrall sets out an account and defense of epistemic structural realism and responds to objections that have been raised to it, including the Newman problem. Cruse (2005) and Melia and Saatsi (2006) defend the Ramsey sentence approach against model-theoretic arguments by questioning the assumption that all predicates which apply to unobservables must be eliminated in favour of bound variables. Mixed predicates such as ‘extended’ are those that apply to both observable and unobservable objects. The Newman objection does not go through if mixed predicates are not Ramsified, because a model of the Ramsey sentence will not necessarily be one in which what is claimed regarding the mixed properties and relations holds. In response, Demopoulos (2008) points out that the Ramsey sentence of a theory with mixed predicates where the latter are not Ramsified will be true provided the original theory is satisfied—hence the claim that the content of the Ramsey sentence is merely the observational content of the original theory plus a cardinality claim is still true when mixed predicates are considered. Melia and Saatsi (2006) also argue that intensional notions, such as naturalness and causal significance, may be applied to properties to save the Ramsey sentence formulation of ESR from triviality. (This recalls the defence of Russell's structuralism against Newman discussed in Hochberg 1994.) Demopoulos also raises two problems with this strategy: firstly, even non-natural relations can have significant claims made about them in a theory, and secondly, the cognitive significance of unramsified theories is independent of a commitment to ‘real’ or ‘natural’ relations. Hence, Demopoulos insists that the Ramsey sentence of a theory and the theory itself are importantly different (see also Psillos 2006b). Peter Ainsworth (2009) gives a clear and accessible account of the Newman problem and the responses that have been given to it. In his (2011) Demopoulos argues that there are three very different views in the work of Russell, Ramsey, and Carnap respectively, which have in common versions of a core structuralist thesis that he identifies. All the accounts he considers make use of Ramsey sentences; Demopoulos investigates the logical properties of the Ramsey sentence and arrives at an argument against the structuralist thesis. Friedman (2011) argues that Carnap’s account of theoretical terms involving the Ramsey sentence approach is not vulnerable to the Newman problem. The relationship between Friedman's views on the relativized a priori and structural realism is interrogated in Ivanova (2011).

Versions of ESR that employ the Ramsey sentence of a theory and the distinction between observational and theoretical terms are embedded in the so-called syntactic view of theories that adopts first-order quantificational logic as the appropriate form for the representation of physical theories. According to Zahar (1994, 14) the continuity in science is in the intension rather than the extension of its concepts. He argues that if we believe that the mathematical structure of theories is fundamentally important for ontology, then we need a semantics for theories that addresses the representative role of mathematics directly. Such an account of scientific representation is allegedly found in the so-called ‘semantic’ or ‘model-theoretic’ approach associated primarily with Patrick Suppes, Fred Suppe, Ron Giere and Bas van Fraassen (see da Costa and French 2003). The relationship between structuralism and the semantic view is discussed by van Fraassen (1997, 2008), and Thomson-Jones (2011). Chris Pincock (2011) criticises structural realism on the basis of an analysis of the role of mathematics in scientific representation. Ladyman (1998), and Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue that the Newman problem does not arise for ontic structural realism since it eschews an extensional understanding of relations.

Ladyman (1998) argues that in general epistemological forms of structural realism do not significantly improve the prospects of standard scientific realism and that hence structural realism should be thought of as metaphysically rather than merely epistemically revisionary. Structural realism is supposed to help with the problem of theory change. As Maxwell himself pointed out, his structural realism is a purely semantic and epistemological theory. The Ramsey sentence picks out exactly the same entities as the original theory. It does not dispense with reference, but it makes that reference a function of the (place of the theoretical terms in the) overall structure of the theory, as manifested in the Ramsey sentence. The problem of ontological discontinuity is left untouched by simply adopting Ramsification. In fact, it seems even worse if contextualism about the meaning of theoretical terms is adopted. Cei and French (2006) and Cruse (2005) also argue, on different grounds, that Ramsification is of no help to the structural realist.

4. Ontic Structural Realism (OSR)

Worrall's position in his 1989 paper is not explicitly an epistemic one, and other comments suggest a different view: “On the structural realist view what Newton really discovered are the relationships between phenomena expressed in the mathematical equations of his theory” (1989, 122). If the continuity in scientific change is of “form or structure”, then perhaps we should abandon commitment to even the putative reference of theories to objects and properties, and account for the success of science in other terms. Others who have contributed to structural realism have more explicitly signalled a significant departure from traditional realist metaphysics. For example, Howard Stein:

[O]ur science comes closest to comprehending ‘the real’, not in its account of ‘substances’ and their kinds, but in its account of the ‘Forms’ which phenomena ‘imitate’ (for ‘Forms’ read ‘theoretical structures’, for ‘imitate’, ‘are represented by’). (1989, 57).

A crude statement of ESR is the claim that all we know is the structure of the relations between things and not the things themselves, and a corresponding crude statement of OSR is the claim that there are no ‘things’ and that structure is all there is (this is called ‘radical structuralism’ by van Fraassen 2006).

OSR has attracted most sympathy among some philosophers of physics and physicists. This is natural since, while Worrall's motivation for introducing structural realism was solely the need for a realist response to the pessimistic meta-induction, French and Ladyman introduced OSR to describe a form of structural realism motivated by two further problems:

• identity and individuality of quantum particles and spacetime points, and entanglement;
• scientific representation, in particular the role of models and idealisations in physics.

Their concern with (a) followed that of many of the pioneers of structuralism in twentieth-century philosophy of science including Cassirer, Eddington and Weyl. (Russell's and Carnap's versions of structuralism were more directly motivated by epistemological and semantic problems than by ontological issues arising from physics.) French did seminal work on the identity and individuality of quantum particles with Michael Redhead (who also wrote a classic paper on theories and models (1980) and later endorsed structural realism as a way of interpreting quantum field theory (1999)). More recently it has become more widespread to advocate OSR as a response to contemporary physics as a whole (for example, see Tegmark 2007). Among others who have defended versions of OSR are Jonathan Bain (2003 and 2004), Michael Esfeld (2004) and Esfeld and Lam (2008), Aharon Kantorovich (2003), Holgar Lyre (2004), Gordon McCabe (2007) and John Stachel (2002 and 2006). Saunders and David Wallace have deployed structuralism to solve the problem of how macroscopic objects with more or less determinate properties can be recovered from the Everett interpretation of quantum states (the so-called preferred basis problem) (Saunders 1993b, 1995, and Wallace 2003). OSR is also further elaborated in Ladyman and Ross (2007) and defended against various criticisms in French and Ladyman (2011). Quantum gravity and structuralism is discussed by an outstanding collection of philosophers and physicists in Rickles, French and Saatsi (2006).

Ontic structural realists argue that what we have learned from contemporary physics is that the nature of space, time and matter are not compatible with standard metaphysical views about the ontological relationship between individuals, intrinsic properties and relations. On the broadest construal OSR is any form of structural realism based on an ontological or metaphysical thesis that inflates the ontological priority of structure and relations. The attempt to make this precise splinters OSR into different forms (three of these are discussed in Ainsworth (2010) and he argues against two of them), and all of the following claims have been advocated by some defenders of OSR at some time:

(1) Eliminativism: there are no individuals (but there is relational structure)

This view is associated with French and Ladyman. The term ‘eliminative structural realism’ comes from Psillos (2001). It is criticised on the grounds that there cannot be relations without relata. This objection has been made by various philosophers including Cao (2003b), Dorato (1999), Psillos (2001, 2006), Busch (2003), Morganti (2004) and Chakravartty (1998, 2003) who says: “one cannot intelligibly subscribe to the reality of relations unless one is also committed to the fact that some things are related” (1998, 399). In other words, the question is, how can you have structure without individuals, or, in particular, how can we talk about a group without talking about the elements of a group? Even many of those sympathetic to the OSR of French and Ladyman have objected that they cannot make sense of the idea of relations without relata (see 2004, Esfeld and Lam 2008, Lyre 2004, and Stachel 2006).

However, there are at least two ways to make sense of the idea of a relation without relata:

(I) The idea of a universal. For example, when we refer to the relation referred to by ‘larger than’, it is because we have an interest in its formal properties that are independent of the contingencies of its instantiation. To say that all that there is are relations and no relata, is perhaps to follow Plato and say that the world of appearances is not properly thought of as part of the content of knowledge. (See Esfeld and Lam 2008: 5, and the opening epigram in Psillos 2006.) This Platonic version of OSR is perhaps what Howard Stein has in mind:

… if one examines carefully how phenomena are ‘represented’ by the quantum theory… then… interpretation in terms of ‘entities’ and ‘attributes’ can be seen to be highly dubious… I think the live problems concern the relation of the Forms … to phenomena, rather than the relation of (putative) attributes to (putative) entities … (Stein 1989, 59).

(II) The relata of a given relation always turn out to be relational structures themselves on further analysis. As Stachel puts it, “it's relations all the way down” (although he denies the claim, 2006). See, Ladyman and Ross (2007) and Saunders (2003d, 129). The idea that there may be no fundamental level to reality is discussed in Schaffer (2003).

In any case, eliminativism does not require that there be relations without relata, just that the relata not be individuals. French and Krause (2006) argue that quantum particles and spacetime points are not individuals but that they are objects in a minimal sense, and they develop a non-classical logic according to which such non-individual objects can be the values of first-order variables, but ones for which the law of identity, ‘for all x , x is identical to x ’, does not hold (but neither does ‘ x is not identical to x ’). There is no unanimity about the difference between individuals, objects and entities among philosophers but one neutral way of putting the issue is to ask whether there are only individual objects in the logical sense of object as the value of a first-order variable, or whether there are individuals in some more substantive sense (for example, being subject to laws of identity, or being substances). Jonathan Bain (2013) argues that critics of radical ontic structural realism have implicitly relied on a set-theoretic notion of structure and that a category theoretic formulation of ontic structural realism is useful in explicating the structure of physical theories, in particular, general relativity.

(2) There are relations (or relational facts) that do not supervene on the intrinsic and spatio-temporal properties of their relata.

The interpretation of entangled states in quantum mechanics in terms of strongly non-supervenient relations goes back to Cleland (1984). However, the idea that there could be relations which do not supervene on the non-relational properties of their relata runs counter to a deeply entrenched way of thinking among some philosophers. The standard conception of structure is either set theoretic or logical. Either way it is often assumed that a structure is fundamentally composed of individuals and their intrinsic properties, on which all relational structure supervenes. The view that this conceptual structure reflects the structure of the world is called “particularism” by Paul Teller (1989) and “exclusive monadism” by Dipert (1997). It has been and is endorsed by many philosophers, including, for example, Aristotle and Leibniz.

Spatio-temporal relations are often exempted from this prescription since the idea that the position of an object is intrinsic to it is associated with a very strong form of substantivalism. Hence, the standard view is that the relations between individuals other than their spatio-temporal relations supervene on the intrinsic properties of the relata and their spatio-temporal relations. This is David Lewis's Humean supervenience:

[A]ll there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another … We have geometry: a system of external relations of spatio temporal distance between points (of spacetime, point matter, aether or fields or both). And at these points we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated … All else supervenes on that (1986, x).

Tim Maudlin argues against Lewis's Humean Supervenience on the basis of quantum entanglement and argues that this means the end of ontological reductionism, and abandoning the combinatorial conception of reality that comes from thinking of the world as made of building blocks, each of which exists independently of the others (1998, 59) and: “The world is not just a set of separately existing localized objects, externally related only by space and time” (60). Similarly, advocates of OSR such as Esfeld, French and Ladyman emphasise that the non-supervenient relations implied by quantum entanglement undermine the ontological priority conferred on individuals in most traditional metaphysics. Some relations are at least ontologically on a par with individuals so that either relations are ontologically primary or neither is ontologically primary or secondary. (Esfeld 2004 and Oliver Pooley 2006 hold the latter view but Esfeld goes further and claims that if there are intrinsic properties they are ontologically secondary and derivative of relational properties (see below).)

(3) Individual objects have no intrinsic natures.

On this view, individual objects of a particular kind are qualitatively identical. They are not individuated by an haecceity or primitive thisness. Classical particles can be and often are so regarded. Classical particles could be so regarded because if a principle of impenetrability is adhered to, no two such particles ever have all the same spatio-temporal properties. The bundle theory of individuation was developed by empiricists to account for the individuation of physical objects while only quantifying over properties that are within the reach of natural science. This is a standard metaphysical position that implies nothing so radical as any version of OSR. Its interest lies in the fact that on this view it would seem that the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), restricted so that identity involving properties are not in its scope, must be true. If so there are some properties (perhaps including spatio-temporal properties) that distinguish each thing from every other thing, and the identity and individuality of physical objects can be reduced to other facts about them.

The problem is with Quantum Mechanics for it seems there are entangled quantum states of many particles that attribute exactly the same intrinsic and relational properties to each of them. For example, the famous singlet state of two fermions, such as electrons, attributes to the pair the relation that their spins in any given direction are opposite to each other, but does not attribute a definite spin in any direction to either particle alone. Given that they may also be attributed exactly the same spatial wavefunction, as when they are both in the first orbit of an atom, for example, then such particles would seem to violate PII. This leads to a dilemma that was articulated by Steven French and Michael Redhead (1988); either quantum particles are not individuals, or they are individuals but the principle of individuation that applies to them must make reference to some kind of empirically transcendent haecceity, bare particularity or the like.

Katherine Brading and Alexander Skyles (2012) consider the plausibility of arguing for structural realism on the basis of this underdetermination. Saunders argues that there is no underdetermination (see (5) below). The appeal to this metaphysical underdetermination is criticised by Chakravartty 2003, who argues that it cannot be significant since it also obtains in the case of everyday objects. Morganti (2004) argues in favour of transcendental individuation, and also points out that if quantum mechanics is not complete and there are hidden variables as in Bohm theory, the quantum particles may be individuated by their intrinsic and spatio-temporal properties after all.

(4) There are individual entities but they don't have any irreducible intrinsic properties.

Michael Esfeld (2004) rejects (1) and claims that:

(a) relations require relata

but denies that:

(b) these things must have intrinsic properties over and above the relations in which they stand.

As mentioned above Esfeld holds that there are things and relations but neither is ontologically primary or secondary. On this view, all the properties of individual objects are relations to other objects. This view is called ‘moderate structural realism’ by Esfeld (and Esfeld and Lam 2008, 2010 and see also their 2012). It avoids the problems with (1) above, and incorporates (2) and (3). Any version of (4) that is combined with (3) arguably makes individual entities ontologically dependent on relational structure (see (6) below).

Benacerraf (1965) argues that there cannot be objects possessing only structural properties. The idea of such objects is denounced as ‘mysticism’ by Dummett (1991), and criticised in the context of structural realism by Busch (2003). These objections go back to Russell:

…it is impossible that the ordinals should be, as Dedekind suggests, nothing but the terms of such relations as constitute a progression. If they are to be anything at all, they must be intrinsically something; they must differ from other entities as points from instants, or colours from sounds. What Dedekind intended to indicate was probably a definition by means of the principle of abstraction…But a definition so made always indicates some class of entities having… a genuine nature of their own (1903, p. 249).

On the other hand, D.W. Mertz (1996) defends ‘network instance realism’ and rejects the ‘tyranny of the monadic’ arguing that individuated relation instances are ontologically fundamental.

(5) Facts about the identity and diversity of objects are ontologically dependent on the relational structures of which they are part.

Saunders (2003a, 2003b and 2006) argues that there is a weakened form of PII (discussed by Quine 1976) that is satisfied even by electrons in the singlet state described above. The notion of ‘weak discernibility’ applies to objects that satisfy some irreflexive relation (a relation such that x R x does not obtain for every x ). The relation of having opposite spin that is had by electrons in the singlet state is clearly such an irreflexive relation and Saunders argues that, since by Leibniz's law, the holding of an irreflexive relation a R b entails the existence of distinct relata a and b , then the electrons are individuals, even though in so far as they are individuals it is the relations among them that account for this.

This runs counter to the usual way of thinking according to which there are individuals in spacetime whose existence is independent of each other and that facts about the identity and diversity of these individuals are determined independently of their relations to each other (Stachel 2006 calls this ‘intrinsic individuality’). It is widely held that relations between individuals cannot individuate those same individuals: “relations presuppose numerical diversity and so cannot account for it”. The argument is that without distinct individuals that are metaphysically prior to the relations, there is nothing to stand in the irreflexive relations that are supposed to confer individuality on the relata. The issue was famously discussed by Russell (1911), and see also MacBride (2006). Ladyman and Ross (2007), Saunders (2006) and Stachel (2006) argue that facts about the identity and diversity of fermions are not intrinsic obtain only in virtue of the relations into which they enter. On this view the individuality of quantum particles is ontologically on a par with, or secondary to the relational structure of which they are parts. Stachel (2006) calls this ‘contextual individuality’ and he extends this to spacetime points (see 4.3 below).

Leitgeb and Ladyman (2008) note that in the case of mathematical structures there is nothing to rule out the possibility that the identity and diversity of objects in a structure is a primitive feature of the structure as a whole that is not accounted for by any other facts about it. Ladyman (2007) also discusses such primitive contextual individuality. One important question so far not discussed is whether on the contextualist view the identity and diversity of the objects depends on the whole structure or just part of it. The relationship between OSR and PII is assessed in Ainsworth (2011). Ladyman, Linnebo, and Richard Pettigrew (2013) present some relevant results in philosophical logic.

(6) There are no subsistent objects and relational structure is ontologically subsistent.

This claim is associated with quantum holism and holism more generally (see Horgan and Potrc 2000 and 2002). As mentioned above this is arguably implied by the conjunction of (3) and (4), and also by (5). The basic idea of ontological subsistence is that of being able to exist without anything else existing. The notions of ontological dependence and ontological subsistence are often employed in discussions of structuralism but are in need of clarification (see Linnebo 2008). Kerry McKenzie (forthcoming) uses Fine's recent analyses of ontological dependence to argue against eliminativist OSR and in favour of moderate structural realism based on a case study from particle physics.

(7) Individual objects are constructs

French (1999) and French and Ladyman (2003a) maintain that individuals have only a heuristic role. Poincaré similarly argued that “the gross matter which is furnished us by our sensations was but a crutch for our infirmity” (1898, 41). Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue that objects are pragmatic devices used by agents to orient themselves in regions of spacetime, and to construct approximate representations of the world. Anyone who defends eliminativism as in (1) above must similarly offer a non- ad hoc account of the point and value of reference to and generalization over objects in science. For example, cognitive science may show that we are not able to think about certain domains without hypostatising individuals as the bearers of structure. This is as yet mere speculation and a subject for further study.

The articles in Landry and Rickles (eds.) (2012) explore some of the above issues. See McKenzie's (2013) review of the collection. See also the collection Bokulich and Bokulich (eds.) (2011). Joanna Wolff (2012) considers the relationship between objects and structures, arguing that the former are not reducible to the latter and suggesting that a form of ontic structural realism may be defended in terms of the claim that objects are ontologically dependent on structures.

Group theory was first developed to describe symmetry. A symmetry is a transformation of some structure or object which leaves it unchanged in some respect. A group of symmetry transformations is a mathematical object which consists of the set of transformations, including the identity transformation and the inverse of each transformation, and the operation of composing them, where the result of two composed transformations is itself in the original set. Mathematical objects can be characterised in terms of which symmetry transformations leave them unchanged or invariant.

The founders of structuralism shared an appreciation of the importance of group theory in the ontology of physics. Cassirer held that the possibility of talking of ‘objects’ in a context is the possibility of individuating invariants (1944). Similarly, Max Born says: “Invariants are the concepts of which science speaks in the same way as ordinary language speaks of ‘things’, and which it provides with names as if they were ordinary things” (1953, 149), and: “The feature which suggests reality is always some kind of invariance of a structure independent of the aspect, the projection” (149). He goes so far as to say: “I think the idea of invariant is the clue to a relational concept of reality, not only in physics but in every aspect of the world.” (144). Eddington says: “What sort of thing is it that I know? The answer is structure . To be quite precise it is structure of the kind defined and investigated in the mathematical theory of groups” (1939, 147). Poincaré understands group structure in Kantian terms as a pure form of the understanding.

The idea then is that we have various representations of some physical structure which may be transformed or translated into one another, and then we have an invariant state under such transformations which represents the objective state of affairs. The group structure is primary and the group representations constructed from this structure have a derivative status. Representations are extraneous to physical states but they allow our empirical knowledge of them. Objects are picked out by the identification of invariants with respect to the transformations relevant to the context. Thus, on this view, elementary particles are hypostatisations of sets of quantities that are invariant under the symmetry groups of particle physics.

For example, one of the most fundamental distinctions between kinds of particles is that between fermions and bosons. This was described group theoretically by Weyl and Wigner in terms of the group of permutations, and the former's approach to relativity theory was similarly group-theoretic. In the case of quantum mechanics Weyl asserts that: “All quantum numbers, with the exception of the so-called principal quantum number, are indices characterising representations of groups.” (1931, xxi) The central point of philosophical relevance here is that the mathematical idea of invariance is taken by Weyl to characterise the notion of objectivity. It is this that liberates physics from the parochial confines of a particular coordinate system. For Weyl appearances are open only to intuition (in the Kantian sense of subjective perception) and therefore agreement is obtained by giving objective status only to those relations that are invariant under particular transformations.

Weyl's views have recently been revived by Sunny Auyang (1995) in an explicitly neo-Kantian project which attempts to solve the problem of objectivity in quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. Auyang seeks to extract the “primitive conceptual structure” in physical theories and she too finds it in what she calls the “representation-transformation-invariant structure”. This is essentially group-theoretic structure. Auyang, like Born and Weyl, thinks that such invariant structure under transformations is what separates an objective state of affairs from its various representations, or manifestations to observers under different perceptual conditions. According to her events are individuated structurally.

Ryckman (2005) describes the history of relativity theory and Weyl's role in it. Ryckman argues that the work of Eddington and Weyl was profoundly influenced by the phenomenology of Husserl. The latter also seems to have understood objectivity in terms of invariance. (Ryckman calls Kantian structural realism “transcendental structuralism”. OSR is what he calls ‘transcendent structuralism’.) Group theory in the development of structuralism deserves further historical analysis. It played a crucial role in epistemological reflections on geometry in relation to Klein's Erlanger programme (Birkhoff and Bennett 1988). French (1998, 1999, 2000) and Castellani (1998) have explored the ontological representation of the fundamental objects of physics in terms of sets of group-theoretic invariants by Cassirer, Eddington, Schrödinger, Weyl, Wigner, Piron, Jauch and others. On the other hand, Roberts (2011) criticizes the idea that structure can be understood as group structure in the context of quantum physics.

Cassirer rejected the Aristotelian idea of individual substances on the basis of physics, and argued that the metaphysical view of the ‘material point’ as an individual object cannot be sustained in the context of field theory. He offers a structuralist conception of the field:

The field is not a ‘thing’, it is a system of effects ( Wirkungen ), and from this system no individual element can be isolated and retained as permanent, as being ‘identical with itself’ through the course of time. The individual electron no longer has any substantiality in the sense that it per se est et per se concipitur ; it ‘exists’ only in its relation to the field, as a ‘singular location’ in it (1936, 178).

In gauge quantum field theories, which are our best contemporary physical theories of all the forces other than gravity, each theory is associated with a different symmetry group, and the unification of theories was achieved by looking for theoretical structures with the relevant combined symmetry. (For example, the unitary group U(1) for quantum electrodynamics, U(2) for the unified electroweak theory and SU(3)/ Z(3) for the strong interaction.) Lyre argues for OSR in the interpretation of quantum field theory. He argues that “the traditional picture of spatiotemporally fixed object-like entities is undermined by the ontology of gauge theories in various ways and that main problems with traditional scientific realism…can be softened by a commitment to the structural content of gauge theories, in particular to gauge symmetry groups” (2004, 666). He goes on to note that his favoured interpretation of gauge theories (in terms of non-separable holonomies) is one according to which the fundamental objects are ontologically secondary to structure because the objects of a theory are members of equivalence classes under symmetry transformations and no further individuation of objects is possible. Similarly, Kantorovich (2003) argues that the symmetries of the strong force are ontologically prior to the particles that feel that force, namely the hadrons, and likewise for the symmetries of the so-called ‘grand unification’ of particle physics in the standard model. Cao in his book on quantum field theory sometimes sounds like an ontic structural realist, because he denies that the structures postulated by field theories must be “ontologically supported by unobservable entities” (Cao 1997, 5). However, in his (2003a) he explicitly criticises OSR and argues for a version of ESR in the context of a discussion of quantum field theory.

Critics of OSR may argue that the claim of metaphysical underdetermination in the case of non-relativistic many particle quantum mechanics is resolved by the shift to quantum field theory. This is especially plausible when it comes to quantum field theory in a curved spacetime since in that context, “a useful particle interpretation of states does not, in general, exist” (Wald 1984, 47, quoted in Stachel 2006, 58). See also Malament (1996) and Clifton and Halvorson (2002), who show that there is a fundamental conflict between relativistic quantum field theory and the existence of localisable particles. There are so called unitarily inequivalent representations of quantum field theories and Howard (2001) argues that this poses a problem for structural realism, and French (2012) replies.

Field quantities are usually attributed to space-time points or regions. The problem of individuality now concerns whether fields themselves are individuals, or whether they are the properties of spacetime points. In the latter case the problem becomes whether the spacetime points are individuals. This last question is bound up with the debate about substantivalism in the foundations of General Relativity.

There has been much dispute about whether General Relativity supports relationism or substantivalism about spacetime. The main problem for the latter is the general covariance of the field equations of General Relativity: any spacetime model and its image under a diffeomorphism (a infinitely differentiable, one-one and onto mapping of the model to itself) are in all observable respects equivalent to one another; all physical properties are expressed in terms of generally covariant relationships between geometrical objects. In other words, since the points of spacetime are entirely indiscernible one from another, it makes no difference if we swap their properties around so long as the overall structure remains the same. This is made more apparent by the so-called ‘hole argument’ which shows that if diffeomorphic models are regarded as physically distinct then there is a breakdown of determinism. Substantivalists cannot just bite the bullet and accept this since, as John Earman and John Norton (1987) argue, the question of determinism ought to be settled on empirical/physical grounds and not a priori ones.

There have been a variety of responses to this problem. Lewis (1986) and Carol Brighouse (1994) suggest accepting haecceitism about spacetime points, but argue that it should not worry us that haecceitistic determinism, that is determinism with respect to which points end up with which metrical properties, fails. Melia (1999) also criticises the notion of determinism employed by Earman and Norton. Nonetheless most philosophers of physics seem to have concluded that if spacetime points do have primitive identity then the substantivalist who is committed to them must regard the failure of haecceitistic determinism as a genuine failure of determinism. Hence, others have sought to modify the substantivalism.

Robert DiSalle (1994) suggests that the correct response to the hole argument is that the structure of spacetime be accepted as existent despite its failure to supervene on the reality of spacetime points. A similar view has been proposed by Carl Hoefer, who argues that the problems for spacetime substantivalism turn on the “ascription of primitive identity to space-time points” (1996, 11). Hence, it seems that the insistence on interpreting spacetime in terms of an ontology of underlying entities and their properties is what causes the problems for realism about spacetime. This is a restatement of the position developed by Stein (1968) in his famous exchange with Grünbaum, according to which spacetime is neither a substance, not a set of relations between substances, but a structure in its own right. Similarly, Oliver Pooley (2007) argues that eliminativism about individual spacetime points can be avoided without any tension with General Relativity, if it is accepted that the facts about their identity and diversity is grounded in relations they bear to each other. His sophisticated substantivalism allows that spacetime points be individuated relationally and not independently of the metric field. This means embracing contextual individuality grounded in relational structure. See also Cassirer who says: “To such a [spacetime] point also no being in itself can be ascribed; it is constituted by a definite aggregate of relations and consists in this aggregate.” (1936, 195)

The analogy between the debate about substantivalism, and the debate about whether quantum particles are individuals was first explicitly made by Ladyman (1998), but others such as Stachel (2002) and Saunders (2003a and 2003b) have elaborated it. However, Pooley (2006) argues that there is no such analogy, or at least not a very deep one, in part because he thinks that there is no metaphysical underdetermination in GR. According to him the standard formulations of the theory are ontologically committed to the metric field, and the latter is most naturally interpreted as representing “spacetime structure” (8).

Others who have discussed structural realism and spacetime include, Dorato (2000) who discusses spacetime and structural realism but rejects OSR, Esfeld and Lam (2008 and 2012) who argue for moderate ontic structural realism about spacetime, and Bain (2003), who says that: “Conformal structure, for instance, can be realised on many different types of ‘individuals’: manifold points, twisters or multivectors …What is real, the spacetime structuralist will claim, is the structure itself and not the manner in which alternative formalisms instantiate it” (25).

As explained above, there are many different forms of structural realism and correspondingly, many different objections have been leveled against it. Obviously, ESR and OSR attract very different kinds of objections. Different forms of structural realism and different forms of objections to it are also reviewed in Frigg and Votsis (2011). (1) Structural realism collapses into standard realism.

Psillos (1995) argues that any form of structural realism must presuppose a distinction between the form and content of a theory, and/or a distinction between our ability to know the structure and our ability to know the nature of the world. Both these distinctions are illusory according to Psillos because the scientific revolution banished mysterious forms and substances that might not be fully describable in structural terms. For Psillos, properties in mature science are defined by the laws in which they feature, and “the nature and the structure of a physical entity form a continuum” (1995). Hence, for Psillos, structural realism is either false or collapses into traditional realism. (This is the response of Richard Braithwaite (1940, 463) to Eddington's structuralism.) Similarly, David Papineau argues that “restriction of belief to structural claims is in fact no restriction at all” (Papineau 1996, 12), hence structural realism gains no advantage over traditional realism with the problem of theory change because it fails to make any distinction between parts of theories that should and should not enjoy our ontological commitment. Kyle Stanford (2003, 570) also argues that we cannot distinguish the structural claims of theories from their claims about content or natures.

(2) Isn't structure also lost in theory change?

Many people's first response to structural realism is to point out that mathematical structure is often lost in theory change too (see, for example, Chakravartty 2004, 164, Stanford 2003, 570–572). The realist is claiming that we ought to believe what our best scientific theories say about the furniture of the world in the face of the fact that we have inductive grounds for believing this will be radically revised, whereas the structural realist is only claiming that theories represent the relations among, or structure of, the phenomena and in most scientific revolutions the empirical content of the old theory is recovered as a limiting case of the new theory. As Post claimed, there simply are no ‘Kuhn-losses’, in the sense of successor theories losing all or part of the well confirmed empirical structures of their predecessors (1971, 229). In sum, we know that well-confirmed relations among phenomena must be retained by future theories. This goes beyond mere belief in the empirical adequacy of our theories if we suppose that the relations in question are genuine modal relations rather than extensional generalizations about concrete actual phenomena. However, Newman (2010) argues that structuralism cannot deal with the pessimistic meta-induction.

(3) Structural realism is too metaphysically revisionary.

The considerations from physics do not logically compel us to abandon the idea of a world of distinct ontologically subsistent individuals with intrinsic properties. The identity and individuality of quantum particles could be grounded in each having a primitive thisness, and the same could be true of spacetime points. Physics does seem to tell us that certain aspects of such a world would be unknowable. The epistemic structural realist thinks that all we can know is structure, but it is the structure of an unknowable realm of individuals. An epistemic structural realist may insist in a Kantian spirit that there being such objects is a necessary condition for our empirical knowledge of the world. It may be argued that it is impossible to conceive of relational structures without making models of them in terms of domains of individuals. Certainly, the structuralist faces a challenge in articulating her views to contemporary philosophers schooled in modern logic and set theory, which retains the classical framework of individual objects, and where a structure is just a particular set, namely a set of objects, and a set of relations, where the latter are thought of extensionally as just sets of ordered pairs (or more generally n -tuples in the case of n -place relations).

Psillos (2001) argues that OSR is not ‘worked out’ as a metaphysics, and that a strong burden of proof is on those who would abandon traditional metaphysics (see also Chakravartty (2004) and Morganti (2011). However, it is far from clear that OSR's rivals are ‘worked out’ in any sense that OSR isn't. There in no general agreement among philosophers that any of the metaphysical theories of, say, universals is adequate, and arguably metaphysical categories inherited from the ancient Greeks are not appropriate for contemporary science. Naturalists argue that we should reject metaphysical doctrines if they are not supported by science. Michael Esfeld (2004, 614–616) argues against any gap between epistemology and metaphysics. Similarly Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue for a kind of verificationism in metaphysics.

In sum, structuralists may agree with what Ernan McMullin says:

[I]maginability must not be made the test for ontology. The realist claim is that the scientist is discovering the structures of the world; it is not required in addition that these structures be imaginable in the categories of the macroworld. (1984, 14)

(4) Structuralists can't account for causation.

Busch (2003), Psillos (2006a) and Chakravartty (2003) all argue that individual objects are central to productive rather than Humean conceptions of causation and hence to any genuine explanation of change. Objects it is alleged provide the ‘active principle’ of change and causation. French (2006) replies to this charge invoking the idea of Ladyman (1998 and 2004) and French and Ladyman (2003) of modal structure, by which is meant the relationships among phenomena that pertain to necessity, possibility, potentiality, and probability. Ladyman and Ross (2007) defend a version of OSR according to which science describes the objective modal structure of the world, where the latter is ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not supervening on the intrinsic properties of a set of individuals. They argue that causal structure is the pragmatically essential proxy for it in the special sciences (but not necessarily in fundamental physics). (Ladyman (2008) considers the causal exclusion argument in this context.) Nora Berenstain and Ladyman (2012) argue that a commitment to natural necessity is implicit in arguments for scientific realism and that realists including structural realists should be anti-Humean and believe in objective modal structure. See also Esfeld (2009) and for a Humean take on structural realism, Lyre (2010). The structure of dispositions described by Mumford (2004) and Psillos's (2003) idea of nomological structure are cognate to the idea of modal structure. Giere (1986) first suggested that a form of structural realism was the result of conjoining modal realism with constructive empiricism. There is a forthcoming special issue of Synthese dedicated to examining the relationship between structuralism and causation. See also the 'final section' of articles on single modality and causality in structural realism in Landry and Rickles (2012).

(5) Without positing knowledge of individual objects we cannot explain why certain properties and relations tend to cohere.

This objection is due to Chakravartty (2003) who points out that certain properties tend to be found together, for example, negative charge and a certain rest mass, and then asks ‘coincidence or object?’. French (2006) replies arguing that for a structuralist objects just are literally coincidences and nothing more. Once again the challenge for the critic of structuralism is to show that more than the minimal logical notion of an object is required.

(6) Structural realism only applies to physics.

Gower (2000) argues that structural realism seems less natural a position when applied to theories from outside of physics. Mark Newman (2005) argues that structural realism only applies to the mathematical sciences in therefore cannot account for retention of theoretical commitments across theory change in, for example, biology. On the other hand, Harold Kincaid (2008) and Ross (2008) defend structural realist approaches to the social sciences, as do Ladyman and Ross (2007). French (2011) considers the implications of ontic structural realism for the ontology of biology.

(7) Structural Realism collapses the distinction between the mathematical and the physical.

Many structuralists are motivated by the thought that if mathematics describes its domain only up to isomorphism, if in other words, it only describes the structure of the domain, once the scientific description of the world becomes largely mathematical, then scientific knowledge too becomes structural knowledge. However, it may then be argued that if only the structure of mathematical theories is relevant to ontology in mathematics, and only structural aspects of the mathematical formalism of physical theories are relevant to ontology in physics, then there is nothing to distinguish physical and mathematical structure. Van Fraassen argues that the heart of the problem with OSR is this:

It must imply: what has looked like the structure of something with unknown qualitative features is actually all there is to nature . But with this, the contrast between structure and what is not structure has disappeared. Thus, from the point of view of one who adopts this position, any difference between it and ‘ordinary’ scientific realism also disappears. It seems then that, once adopted , it is not be called structuralism at all! For if there is no non-structure, there is no structure either. But for those who do not adopt the view, it remains startling: from an external or prior point of view, it seems to tell us that nature needs to be entirely re-conceived. (2006, pp. 292-293)

The essence of van Fraassen's objection here is that the difference between mathematical (uninstantiated/abstract) structure, and physical (instantiated/concrete) structure cannot itself be explained in purely structural terms. There is an analogy here with the theory of universals and the problem of exemplification. A similar complaint is made by Cao (2003a and 2003b). Esfeld (2013) uses this objection in the context of the interpretation of quantum mechanics to pose a dilemma for ontic structural realism.

Saunders (2003d) points out that there is no reason to think that ontic structural realists are committed to the idea that the structure of the world is mathematical. Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue that no account can be given of what makes the world-structure physical and not mathematical. On the other hand, Tegmark (2007) explicitly embraces a Pythagorean form of OSR.

There are two versions of mathematical structuralism: a realist view according to which mathematical structures exist independently of their concrete instantiations; and an eliminativist position according to which statements about mathematical structures are disguised generalisations about their instantiations that exemplify them (see Shapiro 1997, 149–50.) For an excellent survey see Reck and Price (2000). The most well known advocates of realist structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics are Parsons (1990), Resnik (1997) and Shapiro (1997). Recent critiques include Hellman (2005) and MacBride (2005). The relationship between ontic structural realism and ante rem structuralism has been explored by Psillos (2006a), Busch (2003), French (2006), Pooley (2006a), Leitgeb and Ladyman (2008), Ladyman (2007)

Informational structural realism in the context of the foundations of computer science is defended by Floridi (2008). Structuralism has also become popular in metaphysics recently in the form of causal essentialism. This is the doctrine that the causal relations that properties bear to other properties exhaust their natures. See Shoemaker (1980) and Hawthorne (2001). Steven Mumford (2004) adopts a structuralist theory of properties. Alexander Bird's (2007) theory of dispositions is in some ways structuralist. Anjan Chakravartty's (2007) deploys dispositional essentialism in the defence of scientific realism. Michael Esfeld (2011) discusses structuralism about powers. Finally, Verity Harte (2002) discusses an interesting Platonic form of structuralism. Alistair Isaac (forthcoming) argues for structural realism for secondary qualities.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up this entry topic at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Bain, J. Towards structural realism .
• Dawid, R. Scientific realism in the age of string theory .
• Votsis, Ioannis, A bibliography of work on structural realism .

algebra | identity: of indiscernibles | physics: holism and nonseparability | quantum theory: identity and individuality in | quantum theory: quantum field theory | scientific realism

Acknowledgments

The author is very grateful for comments on previous drafts of this entry to Ralf Bader, Katherine Brading, Jacob Busch, Anjan Chakravartty, Michael Esfeld, Katherine Hawley, Steven French, Øystein Linnebo, and Stathis Psillos. The editors would like to thank Christopher von Bülow and Gintautas Miliauskas for carefully reading this entry and identifying numerous typographical errors.

Copyright © 2014 by James Ladyman < James . Ladyman @ bristol . ac . uk >

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12 Structural Realism

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Chapter 12 conveys structural realism. Structural realism focuses on how the distribution of capabilities at the level of the international system impacts its propensity for conflict. States face a situation of self-help and can be expected to engage in power balancing for their own protection. The principal idea about war put forward by structural realism is that bipolarity is better than multipolarity. A system with two leading states, as opposed to three or more, will be less prone to break down into highly destructive conflict. Under bipolarity, the two leading states can be expected to match and monitor the efforts of each other. Thus war becomes less likely than in the relatively more chaotic world of multipolarity. Two structural realist theories are identified: an initial version and one that focuses on hegemonic stability.

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Perspectives on Structural Realism

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Traditional Theories of International Relations

The Retrogressive Impact of Contemporary Realism on International Theory

International Relations Theory and the Puzzle of China-Russia Alignment

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Book Title : Perspectives on Structural Realism

Editors : Andrew K. Hanami

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403981707

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Topics : International Relations , Political Science , Military and Defence Studies

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The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: a Review Essay Author(S): Dale C

Review: The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay Author(s): Dale C. Copeland Source: International Security , Vol. 25, No. 2 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 187-212 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626757 . Accessed: 07/10/2011 01:24

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http://www.jstor.org The Constructivist Dale C. Copeland Challenge to Structural Realism A Review Essay

Alexander Wendt,Social Theoryof International Politics,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999F 1999 Press, For more than a de- cade realism,by mostaccounts the dominant paradigm in internationalrela- tions theory,has been under assault by the emergingparadigm of constructivism.One groupof realists-thestructural (or neo-/systemic)real- istswho drawinspiration from Kenneth Waltz 's seminal Theory of International Politics'-hasbeen a particulartarget for constructivist arrows. Such realists contendthat anarchy and thedistribution of relative power drive most of what goes on in worldpolitics. Constructivists counter that structural realism misses whatis oftena moredeterminant factor, namely, the intersubjectively shared ideas thatshape behavior by constituting the identities and interestsof actors. Througha seriesof influentialarticles, Alexander Wendt has providedone ofthe most sophisticated and hard-hittingconstructivist critiques of structural realism.2 Social Theoryof InternationalPolitics provides the firstbook-length statementof his unique brand of constructivism.3 Wendt goes beyond the more

Dale C. Copelandis AssociateProfessor in theDepartment of Government and ForeignAffairs, University ofVirginia. He is theauthor of The Originsof Major War (Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press, 2000).

For theirvaluable commentson earlierdrafts of this essay,I thankSpencer Bakich,Eric Cox, John Duffield,Kelly Erickson,Mark Haas, JeffreyLegro, Len Schoppa, and Dennis Smith. Portionsof thisessay were drawn from"Integrating Realism and Constructivism,"paper presentedat the an- nual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, September 1998. For insightfulcomments on thatpaper, I thankMichael Barnett,Miriam Fendius Elman, lain Johnston,Andrew Kydd, Randall Schweller,Jennifer Sterling-Folker, and Alexander Wendt.

1. KennethN. Waltz, Theoryof International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). 2. See, interalia, Alexander Wendt,"The Agent-StructureProblem in InternationalRelations The- ory,"International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Constructionof Power Politics,"International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425; Wendt,"Collective IdentityFormation and the International State,"American Political Science Reviezv, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June1994), pp. 384-396; and Wendt,"Con- structingInternational Politics," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81. 3. AlexanderWendt, Social Theoryof International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1999). Referencesto Wendt's book are given in the text,enclosed in parentheses.

InternationalSecurity, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall2000), pp. 187-212 ? 2000by thePresident and Fellowsof Harvard College and theMassachusetts Institute of Technology.

187 InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 188

moderate constructivistpoint thatshared ideas must be considered alongside materialforces in any empiricalanalysis. Instead he seeks to challenge the core neorealistpremise that anarchy forcesstates into recurrentsecurity competi- tions. According to Wendt, whether a system is conflictualor peaceful is a functionnot of anarchyand power but of the shared culturecreated through discursivesocial practices.Anarchy has no determinant"logic," only different culturalinstantiations. Because each actor's conceptionof self(its interestsand identity)is a product of the others' diplomatic gestures,states can reshape structureby process; throughnew gestures,they can reconstituteinterests and identities toward more other-regardingand peaceful means and ends. If Wendt is correct,and "anarchy is what states make of it," then realism has been dealt a crushingblow: States are not condemned by theiranarchic situa- tion to worryconstantly about relativepower and to fall into tragicconflicts. They can act to alterthe intersubjectiveculture that constitutes the system,so- lidifyingover time the non-egoisticmind-sets needed forlong-term peace. NotwithstandingWendt's importantcontributions to internationalrelations theory,his critiqueof structuralrealism has inherentflaws. Most important,it does not adequately address a criticalaspect of the realistworldview: the prob- lem of uncertainty.For structuralrealists, it is states' uncertaintyabout the presentand especially the futureintentions of othersthat makes the levels and trends in relative power such fundamental causal variables. Contrary to Wendt's claim thatrealism must smuggle in stateswith differentlyconstituted intereststo explain why systemssometimes fall into conflict,neorealists argue that uncertaintyabout the other's present interests-whether the other is driven by securityor nonsecuritymotives-can be enough to lead security- seeking states to fight.This problem is exacerbatedby the incentivesthat ac- tors have to deceive one another,an issue Wendt does not address. Yet even when states are fairlysure that the other is also a securityseeker, theyknow thatit mightchange its spots later on. States must thereforeworry about any decline in theirpower, lest the otherturn aggressive after achieving superiority.Wendt's building of a systemic constructivisttheory-and his bracketingof unit-levelprocesses-thus presentshim with an ironicdilemma. It is the very mutabilityof polities as emphasized by domestic-levelconstruc- tivists-that states may change because of domestic processes independentof internationalinteraction-that makes prudentleaders so concernedabout the future.If diplomacy can have only a limitedeffect on another's characteror re- gime type, then leaders must calculate the other's potential to attack later should it acquire motivesfor expansion. In such an environmentof futureun- The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism | 189

certainty,levels and trendsin relativepower will thus act as a key constraint on state behavior. The problem of uncertaintycomplicates Wendt's effortsto show that anar- chy has no particularlogic, but only threedifferent ideational instantiationsin history-as Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian cultures,depending on the level of actor compliance to certainbehavioral norms. By differentiatingthese cul- tures in terms of the degree of cooperative behavior exhibited by states, Wendt's analysis reinforcesthe very dilemma underpinningthe realistargu- ment. If the other is acting cooperatively,how is one to know whetherthis reflectsits peaceful character,or is just a facade masking aggressive desires? Wendt's discussion of the differentdegrees of internalizationof the threecul- turesonly exacerbatesthe problem.What drivesbehavior at the lower levels of internalizationis preciselywhat is not shared between actors-their privatein- centives to comply for short-termselfish reasons. This suggests that the neorealistand neoliberal paradigms,both of which emphasize the role of un- certaintywhen internalizationis low or nonexistent,remain strongcompeti- tors to constructivismin explaining changing levels of cooperation through history.And because Wendt provides littleempirical evidence to support his view in relationto these competitors,the debate over which paradigm pos- sesses greaterexplanatory power is still an open one. The firstsection of thisessay outlinesthe essentialelements of Wendt'sargu- ment against the backdrop of the general constructivistposition. The second considers some of the book's contributionsversus existingtheories within the liberal,constructivist, and realistparadigms. The thirdoffers an extended cri- tique of Wendt's argumentagainst structuralrealism.

Overview:Constructivism and Wendt'sArgument

Three elementsmake constructivisma distinctform of internationalrelations theorizing.First, global politics is said to be guided by the intersubjectively shared ideas, norms,and values held by actors. Constructivistsfocus on the intersubjectivedimension of knowledge, because theywish to emphasize the social aspect of human existence-the role of shared ideas as an ideational structureconstraining and shaping behavior.4This allows constructiviststo

4. See Audie Klotz and Cecilia Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?Positivist Leanings vs. InterpretivistMeanings," paper presentedat the annual meetingof the InternationalStudies Asso- ciation,Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 1998,pp. 4-5; JeffreyCheckel, "The ConstructivistTurn in InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 190

pose this structureas a causal force separate fromthe material structureof neorealism. Second, the ideational structurehas a constitutiveand not just regulative effecton actors.That is, the structureleads actorsto redefinetheir interests and identitiesin the process of interacting(they become "socialized" by process). Thus unlike rationalisttheories such as neorealism and neoliberalism,which hold interestand identitiesconstant in orderto isolate (respectively)the causal roles of power and internationalinstitutions, constructivism considers how ideational structuresshape the very way actors definethemselves-who they are, theirgoals, and the roles theybelieve they should play.5 Third,ideational structuresand actors ("agents") co-constituteand co-deter- mine each other.Structures constitute actors in terms of their interestsand identities,but structuresare also produced,reproduced, and alteredby the dis- cursivepractices of agents. This elementallows constructiviststo challengethe determinacyof neorealism.Structures are not reifiedobjects that actors can do nothingabout, but to which they must respond. Rather structuresexist only throughthe reciprocalinteraction of actors. This means that agents, through acts of social will, can change structures.They can therebyemancipate them- selves from dysfunctionalsituations that are in turn replicatingconflictual practices.6

InternationalRelations Theory,"Vol. 50, No. 2 (January1998), pp. 324-348; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivismin World Politics,"European Journal of International Relations , Vol. 3, No. 3 (September1997), pp. 319-363; and Martha Finnemore ,National Interests in InternationalSociety (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1996), chap. 1. 5. See Nicholas G. Onuf, Worldof Our Making (Columbia: Universityof South Carolina Press, 1989),chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms ReconstitutingInterests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanc- tions against South Africa,"International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?"p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and VolkerRittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1997), pp. 158-167; PeterJ. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security,"in Katzenstein,ed., TheCultutre of National Security: Norms and Identityin WorldPolitics (New York:Co- lumbia UniversityPress, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson,Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein,"Norms, Identity,and Culture in National Security,"in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutionsand InternationalOrder," in Ernst-OttoCzempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changesand TheoreticalChallenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore,National Interests in InternationalSociety, chap. 1; JohnGerard Ruggie, Constructingthe WorldPolity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "AmericanIdentity and Neutral Rightsfrom Independence to the War of 1812,"International Orga- nization,Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997),pp. 207-243; and the special issue of SecurityStudies on the or- igins of national interests,Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivistdebate and forfurther references, see the special issue of InternationalOr- ganization,Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998). 6. See Ted Hopf , "The Promise of Constructivismin InternationalRelations Theory," International Security,Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 172-173; Wendt,"Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism I 191

For constructivists,therefore, it is criticalto recognize thatan actor's reality at any point in timeis historicallyconstructed and contingent.It is the product of human activity-historicalsocial practices-and thus can, at least in theory, be transcendedby instantiatingnew social practices.This process of cultural change may be slow; afterall, agents are sometimes going up against thou- sands of years of socialization. But even the most embedded structurescan be altered by acts of will (and the requisite social mobilization). The neorealist presumptionthat thereare universal laws of internationalpolitics that work across space and time,driven by the given realityof structure,must therefore be discarded or at least highlyqualified.7 Social Theoryof InternationalPolitics moves beyond this core constructivist framework.For Wendt, constructivismin its differentstrands is simulta- neously too extremeand too limited in its attack on neorealism. It is too ex- treme when it claims that it is "ideas all the way down," namely,that all aspects of human realityare shaped by socialization throughdiscursive prac- tices.8Material forcesdo existand may have independentcausal effectson ac- torbehavior. Moreover, the state is a real, self-organizedactor thathas certain basic interestsprior to its interactionwith otherstates. Yet accordingto Wendt, constructivismis too limited when it simply tests ideas as causal factors against realistvariables like power and interest,without exploring the degree to which these apparent "material" variables are really constituted by ideational processes. If much of what scholars take to be materialcauses is ac-

Wendt, "Collective IdentityFormation and the InternationalState"; Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," pp. 338-340; BradleyS. Klein, StrategicStudies and WorldOrder (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1994), chaps. 1-2; ChristianReus-Smit, "The ConstitutionalStructure of Interna- tional Societyand the Nature of FundamentalInstitutions," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 555-589; and Finnemore,National Interests in InternationalSociety, chap. 1. 7. See Peter L. Bergerand Thomas Luchmann, The Social Constructionof Reality (New York: An- chor, 1966), p. 60; Richard K. Ashley, "The Povertyof Neorealism," in Robert 0. Keohane, ed., Neorealismand Its Critics(New York:Columbia UniversityPress, 1986),pp. 255-300; Wendt,"Anar- chy Is What StatesMake of It," p. 410; JamesDer Derian, "Introduction:Critical Investigations," in Der Derian, ed., InternationalTheory (New York:New YorkUniversity Press, 1995),pp. 4-9; Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authorityas a Power Resource,"International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Au- tumn1997), pp. 591-622; and Rey Koslowski and FriedrichV. Kratochwil,"Understanding Change in InternationalPolitics: The Soviet Empire 's Demise and the InternationalSystem," International Organization,Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247. 8. In earlier work, Wendt himselfcomes close to this more extremeconstructivist line. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 401; and Wendt, "ConstructingInternational Politics," p. 73. On the idea that materialstructures gain theirmeaning only throughdiscursive practices, see Bukovansky,"American Identity,"p. 218; Finnemore,National Interests in InternationalSociety, pp. 6, 128; and David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-StructureDebate?" InternationalOrga- nization,Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 473, 461. InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 192

tuallythe productof historicalsocial practices,then realism explains farless in internationalrelations than is commonlyassumed. Social Theoryof International Politics is a complex work of both social philoso- phy and social science ,one thatjustifies multiple readings to absorb its subtle- ties.9Its core argument,however, can be summarized as follows. The book's targetis Waltzian neorealism.The overarchinggoal is to do forconstructivism what Waltz did forrealism, namely, the building of a parsimonious systemic theorythat reveals the overarchingconstraining and shaping forceof struc- ture-this time from an ideational perspective. (Thus the title's twist on Waltz's masterwork-"Social Theory of InternationalPolitics.") As with neorealism,Wendt's argumentis founded on the notion thatstates are the primaryactors in world politics. States are self-organizedunits con- structed from within by the discursive practices of individuals and social groups. As units that exist in the collectiveknowledge of many individuals, theyare not dependent on the thoughtsof any one person. Moreover,as self- organized entities,each possesses a "corporate" identityas a sovereign actor, an identitynot tied to interactionwith otherstates.10 Even more controversial forextreme constructivists, Wendt also suggests thatstates possess certaines- sential needs that arise from their nature as self-organizedpolitical units: needs for physical survival, autonomy,economic well-being,and collective self-esteem-namely,the group's need to feelgood about itself(see chap. 5, es- pecially pp. 207-209, 224-226, 235-236). Wendtargues thatit is only with this startingpoint-the state as a "pre-so- cial" actor with certainbasic needs-that we can see the impact of interaction at the systemlevel on the interestsand identitiesof states.If stateswere solely a productof interaction,there would be no independentthings upon which in- teractioncould have its effect.Moreover, the state could never act as a free- willed agent employingrational deliberationto change its situation;it would be littlemore than a cultural automaton (pp. 198, 74, 125-130, 179-182, 244). Wendt also contends,contrary to more extremeconstructivists, that the state, at least initially,has a tendencyto be egoisticin its relationswith others. Wendt acknowledges thatmembers of groups,as social identitytheory has shown, al-

9. For a recentdiscussion of the more philosophical aspects of the book, see the essays by Robert 0. Keohane, Stephen D. Krasner,Roxanne Lynn Doty, Hayward R. Alker,and Steve Smith,and Wendt's reply,in Reviewof International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (January2000), pp. 123-180. 10. Going beyond his previous work,and borrowingfrom James D. Fearon, Wendt also includes anotherform of identitythat is intrinsicto the state-its "type" identityas a particularform of sov- ereignactor (e.g., being a "democracy,"a "fascist"state, etc.). See Fearon,"What Is Identity(As We Now Use the Word)?" unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago , 1997. The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism | 193

most always show favoritismtoward each otherwhen dealing with members of the out-group.This means thatin the initialstages of a state-to-stateinterac- tion,egoistic self-helpbehavior is likely to be exhibited(pp. 306, 322-323).11 Wendt's apparent concessions to the neorealistparadigm, however,do not mean that egoistic orientationswill always be dominant, that states cannot learn to be more other-regardingand cooperative. Drawing from symbolic interactionism,Wendt argues thatinteraction with otherstates can lead actors to significantredefinitions of self.In the process of interacting,two states,des- ignated as "Ego" and "Alter,"take on certainroles and cast the otherin corre- sponding counter-roles.Such role-takingand alter-casting,depending on the type of behavior exhibited(egoistic vs. other-regarding,militaristic vs. cooper- ative), can lead to one of two results:a reproductionof initiallyegoistic con- ceptions of self and other, or a transformationof the shared ideational structureto one thatis more collectiveand other-regarding(pp. 327-336). The critical point for Wendt is that a structurehas no reality apart from its instantiationin process. Structure,he stresses,"exists, has effects,and evolves onlybecause of agents and theirpractices" (p. 185, emphasis in original;see also p. 313). Hence, if egoistic and militaristicconceptions of self and other con- tinue,it is only because of the interactivepractices that sustain those concep- tions. Likewise, discursive practices are the source of any transformationin interestsand identities.By casting the otherin a nonegoisticlight, and acting toward it froman other-regardingstandpoint, actors can begin to build collec- tive identitiesthat include the otheras part of the definitionof self (chap. 7, es- pecially pp. 336-342, 368-369). The book begins its sustained critiqueof neorealismin chapter3. Wendtar- gues thatbehind Waltz's explicitmodel of internationalpolitics, emphasizing anarchyand the distributionof materialcapabilities as primarycausal factors, lies an implicitmodel focusing on the distributionof interestsacross states. That is, neorealism cannot explain variationsin internationaloutcomes with- out implicitlyinvoking different types of states-some of which seek only to maintainwhat theyhave (status quo states) and some thatseek to change the systemthrough force (revisionist states). Systems consisting of only status quo states constitute"one kind of anarchy,"while systemswith revisioniststates constituteanother. Foreshadowing his later discussion, Wendt suggests that status quo states should be relativelypeaceful (anarchies of a Lockean or per- haps Kantian kind), while revisioniststates will be conflictual,with states al-

11. On social identitytheory, see JonathanMercer, "Anarchy and Identity,"International Organiza- tion,Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 229-252. InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 194

ways on the edge of elimination (anarchy with a Hobbesian culture). This argumentimplies thatanarchy, as a mere absence of centralauthority, has no one "logic." Rather the way a particularanarchy and distributionof power plays itselfout will depend criticallyon the distributionof interestsin the sys- tem-"what states want" (p. 106, emphasis in original).12 Waltz's neorealismis thereforeunderspecified: A hidden variable,the distri- bution of interests(status quo vs. revisionist),is doing most of the explaining. Any materialstructure, in fact,will have no effectexcept insofaras it interacts withthe ideational structurethat is the distributionof interests.Concrete inter- ests, moreover,are not simply given by the system.Socialized beliefs about what kinds of objectivesare worthpursuing or avoiding will shape each state's actual interests.So while individuals and states may have certainbasic needs (such as needs forsurvival, esteem, and autonomy),how these needs are mani- festin particularactors will be a productof social discursivepractices (pp. 113- 135). Building on this foundation,in chapter6 Wendt lays out what he calls the three"cultures of anarchy" that have characterizedat various times the past two thousand years of internationalrelations. In each culture,states play cer- tain types of roles vis-a-vis each other, complete with specific behavioral norms.In a Hobbesian culture,which accordingto Wendtdominated world af- fairsuntil the seventeenthcentury, states cast each other in the role of "en- emy": The otheris a threateningadversary thatwill observe no limitson the use of violence. Violence must thereforebe employed as a basic tool for sur- vival. In a Lockean culture,which has characterizedthe modern state system since the Treatyof Westphaliain 1648,states view each otheras rivals thatmay use violence to advance theirinterests, but that are required to refrainfrom eliminatingeach other.In a Kantian culture,which has emerged only recently in relationsbetween democracies,states play the role of friends,that is, states do not use forceto settledisputes and work as a team against securitythreats (pp. 258, 260-262, 279-280, 298-299). The behavioral normsfor each cultureare known by the actors and are thus "shared" to at least a minimal degree (a minimal requirementfor a culture). These norms,however, can be internalizedto threedegrees. In the firstdegree,

12. Wendt'sargument here extendsearlier work by Randall L. Schweller,Andrew Moravcsik,and ArthurA. Stein. See Schweller,"Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What SecurityDilemma?" Security Studies,Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996),pp. 90-121; Moravcsik,"Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theoryof InternationalPolitics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513- 555; and Stein,Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choicein InternationalRelations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1990). The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism | 195

consistentwith neorealism, compliance to the normis solely a functionof coer- cion: The actor complies because of the threatof punishmentfounded on the relative superiorityof the other actors. In the second degree, closer to the neoliberal view, actors conformto the norm not because they see it as legiti- mate, but merelybecause they thinkit is in theirself-interest. Acceptance at both the firstand second degrees is thereforepurely instrumental,and when the costs and benefitsof complyingchange, behavior should also change. At the thirdlevel, consistentwith constructivistlogic, stateshave internalizedthe behavioral normsas legitimate,as part of who theyare. They identifywith the other's expectations,incorporating the other within their cognitive bound- aries. Only at thislevel does the normreally "construct" states by shaping their core interestsand identitiesas actors (chap. 6, passim, especially p. 250). Given that there are three formsof culture,depending on the norms fol- lowed by the actors, and three degrees of internalizationof these norms, Wendt portraysinternational systems as being in any one of nine possible modes at any particulartime. On the horizontalaxis, moving fromleft to right, is the "degree of cooperation" representedby the Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian culturesrespectively. On the verticalaxis, frombottom to top, are the three "degrees of internalization"(see Figure 4, p. 254). This three-by-three grid offerssome advantages. It allows us to see conflictualHobbesian systems as a productof shared internalizedideas at the thirddegree (a social construc- tion) and not just as a product of materialforces (the realistview). Moreover, high degrees of cooperation (a Kantian culture)can be a product of pure self- interestedcompliance resultingfrom the threatof punishment(first degree) or the simple benefitsof cooperation (second degree). Conflictdoes not confirm realism,just as cooperationdoes not confirmliberalism or constructivism.It all depends on the degree of internalization-whythe actorsacted in a conflictual or cooperative fashion, why they treated each other as enemies, rivals, or friends. Wendt's key assertionis that the culturein which states findthemselves at any point in time depends on the discursive social practicesthat reproduce or transformeach actor's view of self and other.Anarchy is what states make of it. A Hobbesian systemwill be sustained only if actors continueto act toward each otherin egoistic,militaristic ways. Such a cultureis not the inevitablere- sult of anarchy and the material distributionof power, as neorealistswould have it. Rather,because egoistic,violent mind-sets are maintainedonly by ego- istic and violent processes, a cultureof realpolitikcan become a self-fulfilling prophecy.If actors gesturedifferently, showing thatthey are casting the other in a less self-centeredmanner, then over timea Hobbesian culturecan move to InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 196

a Lockean and possibly Kantian form.We must never forget,Wendt reminds us, that culturesare not reifiedgivens, but products of historicalsocial pro- cesses. Today's "common sense" about internationalrelations-that it is a self- help world of egoisticstates-is itselfa productof historicallycontingent ideas and not a true reflectionof the intrinsicnature of states (pp. 296-297). By en- gaging in new practices,states can instantiatenew ideational structuresthat help actors transcendcollective-action problems and historicalmistrust. The constructivistmove of regardingegoism as always an ongoing product of the social process helps us see that self-interestis not some eternalgiven driving actor behavior,but an ongoing product of the system.As Wendt asserts, "If self-interestis not sustained by practice,it will die out" (p. 369).

Wendt'sConstructivist Challenge

The nexttwo subsectionsconsider some of the implicationsof Social Theoryfor the threemost importantapproaches in internationalrelations theory: liberal- ism, constructivism,and structuralrealism. My focus is on the strengthsand weaknesses of the argumentagainst structuralrealism, given this theory'sim- portance as the primaryand constanttarget of Wendt's analysis.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF WENDT S ARGUMENT The contributionsof Social Theoryto modern liberalism are significant.The book cuts against the grain of recentliberal and neoliberal developments by drawing inspirationfrom traditional "idealist" argumentsof the interwarpe- riod. Wendt offersa socially scientificunderpinning for the idealist claim that diplomacy can fundamentallychange the way states thinkabout themselves and others.Recent liberal theory focuses on the impactof domestic-levelforces in the formationof state preferences.13Neoliberal institutionalismadopts real- ist assumptions about rational actors with exogenous preferencesto consider how institutionsfurther cooperation by solving problemsof informationalun- certainty.14Against liberalism,Wendt poses the causal and constitutiverole of systemicideational structureon the preferencesof states,independent of do-

13. See Moravcsik's summary,"Taking PreferencesSeriously." 14. Robert 0. Keohane, AfterHegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the WorldPolitical Economy (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen D. Krasner,ed., InternationalRegines (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1983); Hasenclever,Mayer, and Rittberger,Theories of Inter- nationalRegimes; and VolkerRittberger, ed., RegimeTheory and InternationalRelations (Oxford: Ox- fordUniversity Press, 1993). The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism | 197

mestic-levelprocesses.15 Against neoliberal institutionalism,Wendt's work challenges the assumption of exogenous preferencesparticularly the assump- tion of egoistic,absolute gains-maximizingstates. If egoism is sustained only by process,as Wendt claims, then new, more other-regardingpractices can re- shape the shared ideational environment,moving states to levels of coopera- tion not explained by neoliberalism. The book also pushes the constructivistparadigm to a new level of sophisti- cation. Strong constructivistswill be frustratedby Wendt's acceptance that states and individuals have basic needs thatare independentof social interac- tion,by his assertionthat these actorsare predisposed by natureto be egoistic (at least initially),and by his view thatstates are indeed actors with corporate identitiesthat exist prior to interaction.Yet Wendt shows convincinglythat withoutthese baselines, social processes at the internationallevel would have nothingto act upon. The extremeconstructivist position-that it is ideas all the way down-leaves the theoristwith all structureand no agents. Indeed, if ac- tors were to be wholly constitutedby structure,then the constructivistpro- gram would fall apart. Agents would be purely puppets of the ideational environmentin which theyfind themselves-in George HerbertMead's terms, each would exist simply as a socially conditioned "Me," without the free- willed "I" capable of resistingthe socialization process.16In such a situation, thereis no possibilityfor transformation of the structurethrough the actions of agents. The systemwould continuallyreproduce itself, and change across time resultingfrom discursive practiceswould be impossible-except throughex- ogenous materialshocks outside of the model.17 Wendt's critiqueof neorealismoffers three main contributions.First, he goes beyond liberal and constructivisttheorists who treatpower and interestsas factorscovered by realism,and who thenseek simplyto show that"ideas mat- ter" as a separate causal force.Such theorists,by not asking whetherpower and interestsare constitutedby social interaction,give away too much to real- ism; they are reduced to performingmop-up operations for phenomena not explained by "realist"variables. Wendt shows thatto the extentthat ostensibly material variables such as power and interestare actually shaped by social

15. In doing so, Wendt is also challengingdomestic-level constructivists. 16. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self,and Society(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1934), chap. 3. On Mead's significantinfluence on Wendt's thinking,see Social Thieoryof International Poli- tics,pp. 327-336, 170-171, 264-265; and Wendt,"Anarchy Is What States Make of It." 17. On the conditionsfor change in collectiveideas, see JeffreyW. Legro, "The Transformationof Policy Ideas," AmericanJournal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July2000), pp. 419-432. InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 198

practices,they should more properlybe consideredideational variables consis- tentwith a constructivistview of world politics. Second, Wendt helps improve all systemictheorizing-whether neorealist, neoliberal, or constructivist-byproviding the most rigorous philosophical justificationyet produced fortreating the stateas an actor.Most systemictheo- ristsview the state-as-actorassertion as a reasonable assumption forthe pur- poses of theorybuilding, and go no further.This leaves them vulnerable to unit-leveltheorists who counterthat only individuals and social groups exist, and that thereforeprocesses within the state must be the theoreticalfocus. Wendt demonstratesthat the state is a real self-organizingentity that, being held in the collective memories of many individuals, is dependent for exis- tence on no particularactor (just as othersocial groups are, forthat matter). Third,and most important,with his claim that"anarchy is what statesmake of it,"Wendt offers the boldest critiqueof realismin the field.Against the real- ist assertionthat anarchy forces states to worryconstantly about survival and thereforeabout relativepower, Wendt seeks to show that spirals of hostility, arms racing,and war are not inevitablein an anarchicsystem. If statesfall into such conflicts,it is a resultof theirown social practices,which reproduceegois- tic and militaristicmind-sets. Anarchy does not compel themto be conflictual. It is an emptyvessel with no inherentlogic (p. 249). To explain behavior and outcomes, this vessel must be filled with varying interestsand identities- status quo or revisioniststates whose characteristicsare at least in part a func- tion of internationalinteraction. Such an analysis helps to overcome the pessi- mism inherentin many realistarguments.18 If states can transcendtheir past

18. The primarytarget here is Waltz,Theory of International Politics, but also implicitlyoffensive re- alists such as JohnJ. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of InternationalInstitutions," International Security,Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory:Offensive Real- ism and the Expansion of War Aims," SecurityStudies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensiverealist camp of structuralrealism are typicallyless pessimistic,because theybelieve thatcertain forms of soft-linediplomacy can mitigate,although not eliminate,the se- curitydilemma. See especiallyCharles L. Glaser,"Realists as Optimists:Cooperation as Self-Help," InternationalSecurity, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones,"Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay,"International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998),pp. 157-182; Rob- ertJervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism,and Cooperation: Understandingthe Debate," InternationalSe- curity,Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Originsof Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1987); and StephenVan Evera, Causes of War:The Structureof Power and theRoots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensiverealists, which Wendtdoes not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jonesand Steven E. Miller, "Preface,"in Michael E. Brown,Lynn-Jones, and Miller,eds., Perilsof Anarchy: Contemporary Real- ism and InternationalSecurity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restatingthe RealistCase: An Introduction,"Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv- xx; and Jervis,"Realism, Neoliberalism,and Cooperation," pp. 48-50. The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism I 199

realpolitik mind-sets by instantiatingnew, more other-regardingpractices, then hope forthe futurecan be restored.

WEAKNESSES OF WENDT S ARGUMENT AGAINST STRUCTURAL REALISM Wendt's critique of structural realist theory suffers from problems of misspecificationand incompleteness.Although it is true thatstates trainedto thinkaggressively are more likelyto be aggressive,Wendt's point thatrealism cannot explain behavior and outcomes withoutimplicitly relying on a hidden variable-the distributionof interests-goes too far.It is based on a misunder- standing of how structuralrealist argumentsare set up to make predictions. Structuralrealists are not nafve. Like all theorists-whether liberal, con- structivist,or classical realist-they recognize that states may exist that,be- cause of domestic-or individual-levelpathologies, have interestsextending far beyond mere security.Such states tend to destabilize a system,because they are constantlyseeking opportunities to expand throughforce. Yet structuralre- alists build theirtheories from the startingassumption that all statesin the sys- tem are presentlyonly securityseekers, that they have no nonsecuritymotives forwar. The reason forbeginning with this assumption is straightforward.It is easy to show thatstates with pathological unit-level characteristics are oftenaggres- sive. But if realistscan explain why systemsmay move fromcooperation to conflict,depending on the materialconditions, even when all states are secu- rityseekers, then the paradigm offersa powerfulbaseline fortheory develop- ment. By withstandingthe hardestpossible deductive test,realism shows the tragedyof world politics-that good states may do bad things,even against other good states. The initial assumption of a system of securityseekers can thenbe relaxed to demonstratehow systemswill be even more conflictualonce states with unit-levelpathologies are introduced. To show how purelysecurity-seeking states can stillconflict, structural real- ists point to prudent leaders' uncertaintyabout two temporal dimensions- first,the presentintentions of the other,and second, and even more critical,the futureintentions of the other.19Both of these dimensionsare at the heartof the realist understanding of the security dilemma . In a two-actor security di-

19. For ease of exposition,below I use the terms "intentions"and "motives" largely synony- mously.Although intentionsis the more commonlyused term,motives more accuratelycaptures what is at stake,namely, whether states differ in theircore reasons foracting -ither forsecurity or nonsecurityobjectives. See Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of MilitaryStrategy: Ex- panding and Refiningthe Spiral and DeterrenceModels," WorldPolitics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (July1992), pp. 497-538. InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 200

lemma, statesA and B are both seeking only theirown survival. But given the difficultyof seeing the other's motives (the "problemof otherminds"), stateA worriesthat B currentlyharbors nonsecurity motives for war. Hence, ifB takes steps only forits own security,these steps may be misinterpretedby A as prep- arationsfor aggression. State A's counterefforts,in turn,will likelybe misinter- preted by B as moves to aggression, sparking a spiral of mistrust and hostility.20 Even more intractablefor systemicrealists is the problem of futureinten- tions. Even when states A and B are both fairlycertain that the otheris pres- entlya securityseeker, they have reason to worrythat the othermight change its spots some years later as a resultof a change of leadership,a revolution,or simply a change of heart resultingfrom an increase in its power.21The fear here is not that the present"distribution of interests"contains states with in- nately aggressive intentions,but that the future system will contain such states. In short,systemic realists understand that inherentlyaggressive states are possible. But theydo not requirethe systemin the presentmoment to contain such states forit to stillfall into conflict.Contrary to Wendt's claim, therefore, anarchyand distributionsof power can have effectsthat do not depend on as- sumptionsabout the real, currentdistribution of interests(even if the possibil- ity of evil states down the road is important).Realism only needs states to be uncertainabout the presentand futureinterests of the other,and in anarchies of great powers, such uncertaintymay oftenbe profound. The question of uncertaintyis criticalto understandingthe differencesbe- tween structuralrealism and constructivism,and where Wendt's analysis misses the mark. Consider firstuncertainty regarding the other's presentin- tentions.Wendt is aware thatthis kind of uncertaintychallenges his point that

20. See, interalia, RobertJervis, "Cooperation under the SecurityDilemma," WorldPolitics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January1978), pp. 167-214; and Charles L. Glaser,"The SecurityDilemma Revisited,"World Politics,Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201. As Andrew Kydd notes, uncertaintyover the other's motivesis an essentialcomponent of any structuralrealist argument drawn fromthe secu- ritydilemma. Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing:Why Security-SeekersDo Not FightEach Other," SecurityStudies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 125-126. 21. Robert Jervis ,Perception and Misperceptionin InternationalPolitics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1976), p. 62; RobertJervis and RobertJ. Art, "The Meaning of Anarchy,"in Art and Jervis,eds., InternationalPolitics: Enduring Concepts and ContemporaryIssues (Boston: Little, Brown,1985), p. 3; and Mearsheimer,"False Promiseof InternationalInstitutions," p. 10. Defensive realiststend to put more emphasis on uncertaintyabout presentintentions, whereas offensivereal- ists stressthe problemof futureintentions and the consequent need to increase power as a hedge against futurethreats. Compare especially defensive realists such as Glaser, "Realists as Opti- mists,"and Walt,Origins of Alliances, to offensiverealists such as Mearsheimer,"False Promise of InternationalInstitutions." The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism | 201

the currentdistribution of interestsdrives the way anarchyplays itselfout. He counters that, at least in the modern environment,the "problem of other minds" is not much of a problem. States today can indeed learn a great deal about what the otheris doing and thinking.That knowledge may not be "100 percentcertain," Wendt argues, "but no knowledge is that" (p. 281, emphasis in original). To assume a worst-casescenario and to treatthe other as hostile may be more dangerous than adopting a conciliatorypolicy, because it creates a self-fulfillingprophecy of mutual mistrust(pp. 281, 107-109, 360). This counterargumenthas serious flaws. In essence, it is an effortto assume away the problem-that therereally is no problem of otherminds-and it is weak on three grounds. First,Wendt's view that states typicallyknow a lot about the other's motives is an unsupported empirical statementbased only on a reading of the contemporarysituation. Even if it were truefor the major- ity of states today-and it certainlydoes not capture the realitybetween the states that count, such as the United States and China-his point cannot be retrofittedinto the previous five centuriesthat constitute the focus of Wendt's analysis. In sum, if uncertaintyabout presentintentions was rampantduring these fivehundred years, it (along with shiftsin relativepower) may explain a great deal about changes in conflictand cooperation over time. Second, Wendt's view is inconsistentwith his recognitionthat states often do have difficultylearning about the other.The very problem Ego and Alter have in firstcommunicating is that"behavior does not speak foritself." It must be interpreted,and "many interpretationsare possible" (p. 330). This point is reinforcedby Wendt's epistemologicalpoint of departure:that the ideas held by actorsare "unobservable" (chap. 2). Because leaders cannotobserve directly what the otheris thinking,they are resignedto making inferencesfrom its be- havior. Yet in security affairs,as Wendt acknowledges, mistakes in infer- ences-assuming the other is peaceful when in fact it has malevolent intentions-could prove "fatal" (p. 360). Wendt accepts that the problem facingrational states "is making sure that they perceive other actors, and other actors' perception of them, correctly" (p. 334, emphasis in original). Yet the book provides no mechanism through which Ego and Altercan increasetheir confidence in the correctnessof theires- timatesof the other's type. Simply describinghow Ego and Alter shape each other's sense of self and otheris not enough.22Rational choice models, using

22. Consider Wendt's statementthat "Ego's ideas about Alter,right or zorong,are not merelypas- sive perceptionsof somethingthat exists independentof Ego, but activelyand on-goinglyconsti- tutiveof Alter's role vis-a-visEgo" (p. 335, emphasis added). His subsequent discussion offersno insightsinto how Ego would be able to learn thatits ideas about Alterwere indeed rightor wrong. InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 202

assumptionsconsistent with structuralrealism, do much betterhere. In games of incompleteinformation, where states are unsure about the other's type,ac- tions by security-seekingactors that would be too costlyfor greedy actors to adopt can help states reduce theiruncertainty about presentintentions, thus moderatingthe securitydilemma.23 Wendt cannot simplyargue thatover time statescan learn a greatdeal about otherstates. It is what is not "shared,"at least in thearea of intentions,that remains the core stumblingblock to cooperation. Third,Wendt's position that the problem of other minds is not much of a problem ignores a fundamentalissue in all social relations,but especially in thosebetween states,namely, the problemof deception.In makingestimates of the other's presenttype, states have reason to be suspicious of its diplomatic gestures-the othermay be tryingto deceive them.Wendt's analysis is rooted in the theoryof symbolicinteractionism, but he does not discuss one criticalas- pect of thattradition: the idea of "impressionmanagement." Actors in theirre- lations exploit the problem of otherminds fortheir own ends. On the public stage, theypresent images and play roles thatoften have littleto do with their true beliefs and interestsbackstage.24 In laying out his dramaturgicalview of Ego and Alter co-constitutingeach other's interestsand identities,Wendt assumes that both Ego and Alter are making genuine effortsto express theirtrue views and to "cast" the other in roles thatthey believe in. But deceptive actorswill stage-managethe situation to createimpressions that serve theirnarrow ends, and otheractors, especially in world politics,will understandthis.25 Thus a prudentsecurity-seeking Ego will have difficultydistinguishing between two scenarios:whether it and Alter do indeed share a view of each otheras peaceful,or whetherAlter is just pre- tendingto be peaceful in orderto make Ego thinkthat they share a certaincon-

23. See JamesD. Fearon,"Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414; Glaser,"Realists as Optimists";Andrew Kydd, "Game Theoryand the Spiral Model," WorldPolitics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400; Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," pp. 139-147; and Dale C. Copeland, "Trade Expectationsand the Outbreak of Peace: Detente 1970-74 and the End of the Cold War 1985-91," SecurityStudies, Vol. 9, Nos. 1/2 (Autumn 1999-Winter2000), pp. 15-58. When discussing game theory,Wendt's book considers only games of complete information,in which actors are certainabout the other's preferencesand type (pp. 106-107, 148, 159-160, 167, 183, 315). 24. See especially Erving Goffman,The Presentationof Self in EverydayLife (Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), chap. 6. 25. These actions are what game theoristswould call effortsat "strategicmisrepresentation." On the instrumentalmanipulation of normsfor self-interested reasons, see Paul Kowertand JeffreyW. Legro, "Norms, Identity,and Their Limits: A TheoreticalReprise," in Katzenstein,Culture of Na- tionalSecurity, pp. 492-493. The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism | 203

ception of the world, when in fact they do not.26Wendt's analysis offersno basis for saying when peaceful gestures should be taken at face value, and when theyshould be discounted as deceptions.27When we considerthe impli- cations of a Hitleritestate deceiving othersto achieve a position of militarysu- periority,we understand why great powers in historyhave tended to adopt postures of prudent mistrust. The problemof futureintentions-which Wendt'sbook does not discuss-is even more intractable.The problem is rooted in the possibilityof domestic changes in the other that occur despite effortsto maintain cooperative rela- tions. Wendt bracketsoff domestic processes to focus on the effectof interac- tion between states. This approach fails to consider the implicationof liberal and domestic-constructivistarguments on the conclusionsof Wendt's systemic constructivism.States do not forma conceptionof themselvesonly throughin- teraction with other states. Socialization processes internal to a state can change the state's identityand interestsindependently of such interaction. Wendt capturesthis point in his discussion of the fourforms of identity:"cor- porate," "type," "role," and "collective." The firsttwo develop throughpro- cesses withinthe state,reflecting the self-organizingaspect of the unit,and do not requirethe recognitionof otherstates fortheir meaning.28 Role and collec- tive identities,on the otherhand, are constitutedonly throughinteraction be- tween states.29 These distinctionshave profoundimplications for the potentialimpact of se- curitydilemmas in Wendt's framework.If the nature of the other's domestic regimecan change independentlyof internationalinteraction, then even when Ego is confidentthat Alter is currentlya securityseeker, it must worrythat Al- termight become pathologically hostile later on. This worrywill be particularly

26. This problemis especially perniciousin Wendt'sLockean and Kantian worlds,where statesdo seem to be followingnorms of self-restraint.But even in a Hobbesian world, it is highlylikely that Ego may believe thatAlter is an "enemy" even when Alter does not accept this assessment. It is not enough forWendt to say thatthey both intersubjectivelyshare the view thatthe otheris an en- emy (pp. 260-263). In fact,in a spiralingsecurity dilemma, thereare two separate beliefsthat do not overlap: Ego thinksAlter is an aggressive enemy,when Alter knows that it is not; and Alter likewise thinksEgo is an aggressiveenemy, when Ego knows thatit is not. Again, it is what is not shared-the uncertaintyin the system-that is problematic. 27. Costly signaling games in rationalchoice game theoryagain provide a mechanismby which states can evaluate valid versus potentiallydeceptive gestures. 28. See Wendt,Social Theoryof International Politics, pp. 224-233; and Wendt,"Collective Identity Formation." 29. For Wendt'searlier twofold distinction between corporateand role identities,see Wendt,"Col- lective IdentityFormation." InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 204

intenseif Ego faces an exogenous decline in relativepower that would leave Alterpreponderant later, should it acquire nonsecuritymotives forwar.30 This discussion reveals a deep irony in the constructivisttake on interna- tional relations.It is constructivism'svery emphasis on the mutabilityof inter- ests and identities,when takendown to the domesticlevel, thatreinforces why anarchyforces states to be on guard. States know that diplomacy alone will rarelybe enough to ensure thelong-term peaceful natureof the other(consider the difficultiesthat Washington faces today in stabilizingRussia's democratic institutions).This problem is heightenedby a fact of which Wendt is aware: thatdomestic processes are typicallyfar more "dense" than internationalones (pp. 2, 13,21,27-28, 107-108). Wendtbelieves thatthis fact makes his argument for a systemicconstructivism a "hard case." But he overlooks the more pro- found point: that the independence of domestic processes undermineshis ef- fortto show thatmaterial structures do not constrainand shape statebehavior except by way of ideas risingthrough international interaction. If states know thatthe natureof the otheris mostlya functionof its own domesticprocesses, thenthey must pay greatattention to theirpresent and futurematerial capabil- ity,in orderto guard against a situationin which the otherbecomes aggressive later on.31Thus domestic-levelconstructivism reinforces the value of a sys- temicrealist view of world politics,at least as a baseline startingpoint forthe- ory building. Reinforcingthe dilemma of changingfuture intentions is the criticaldiffer- ence between a systemicrealist conception of structureand Wendt's notion. Wendt stresses repeatedly that structureis always a functionof interaction: thatstructure exists, has effects,and evolves only because of agents and their practices.Structures cannot be considered given realitiesindependent of pro- cess. This is the mistake of actors reifyingstructures and then forgettingthat theyare historicallycontingent, that they are sustained or transformedonly by human activity(pp. 150, 185-186,313, 340, 364, 368). In previous work,Wendt takes Waltz to task for his statementthat internationalstructures, like eco- nomic markets,"are formedby the coaction of theirunits." If this is so, and

30. See Dale C. Copeland, The Originsof Major War(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 2000), chaps. 1-2; Van Evera, Causes of War,chap. 5; and JackS. Levy,"Declining Power and the Preven- tive Motive forWar, WorldPolitics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107. 31. This problem is reinforcedby the factthat intentions can change "overnight"(as a resultof a coup or revolution,for example), whereas significantchanges in relativepower take many years to effect.Allowing oneselfto fallbehind in power,hoping thatthe otherwill always stay peaceful,is thus fraughtwith risks. The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism | 205

structuresare not exogenously given but are generated and sustained by coaction,then actors can set about changingthe structuresthat reinforce com- petitiveand violent behavior.32 The problem here is thatWaltz's economic analogy does not really capture what systemicrealists mean by "structure."For such realists,structure is a functionof the potentialfor coaction among units. In anarchy,states have to worry more about what the other might do tomorrowor in ten years than about what it is presentlydoing or has done in the past. The economic markets of Waltz's analogy,it is true,are not generateduntil there is buyingand selling activity.This is simplybecause marketsare designed to improve the utilityof individual actors versus the noncooperative outcome, and no improvement can be made unless thereis exchange (thatis, interaction).Structures in inter- national politicsare different.The actors are not tryingto increasetheir utility per se, but to avoid harm.Hence presentand past interactionis not the core is- sue; the potential of others to do harm in the futureis. This means, among other things,that actors in anarchy must worry about exogenous decline in theirmaterial basis forsurvival, and the probabilitythat the otherwill be ag- gressive aftersuch decline.33 The distinctionbetween Wendt's focus on structureas the coaction (interac- tion) of units,and a realistfocus on structureas the potentialfor coaction,is neithersemantic nor trivial.It reflectsa fundamentallydifferent conception of the role of timein internationalpolitics. For Wendtand otherconstructivists, it is the past thatmatters-how interactionsand gesturesin the historicalprocess have socialized actors toward certain conceptions of self and other.Realists certainlydo not dismiss the ways thatpast interactionshape currentbeliefs.34 Most fundamentally,however, realism is a forward-lookingtheory. States are rational maximizersof theirsecurity over the foreseeablefuture. Hence they remain constantlyvigilant for any changes in their external situation that mightdamage theirchances forsurvival later.Reduce to fivewords, then,the

32. Wendt,"Anarchy Is What StatesMake of It," pp. 401-402,406-407,410; and Waltz,Theory of In- ternationalPolitics, p. 91. 33. Note thatactors here are not automaticallyassuming "worst case," namely,that policies must reflectthe mere possibilitythat the othermight later aggress. Rathersecurity maximizers, if they are rational,will always calculate accordingto theprobabilities of certainundesirable things coming to pass. Given uncertainty,however, estimates of these probabilitieswill oftenbe high.Cf. Stephen G. Brooks,"Dueling Realisms," InternationalOrganization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445- 477. For a model of rationaldecisionmaking that develops this defensiverealist notion, see Cope- land, Originsof Major War,chap. 2. 34. As noted, realistsemploy costly signaling models to show how actors can rationallyupdate theirestimates of the other's characterand motives,based on its past behavior. InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 206

divide between constructivismand systemicrealism is all about past socializa- tion versus futureuncertainty.35 This analysis has a straightforwardimplication: There is no need forany in- teractionin the present or past for a constrainingstructure to exist. Power structures-the relative distributionof materialresources-are not generated by social practices (even if practices can sometimes change the distribution over time). Structuresexist by the mere presence of the other,and its potential to do harm in the future-its potential to "coact" by invading, if you will. Hence, in anarchy,even when a statehas no relationswith the other,even ifthe otherdoes not know thatthe state exists,the state is forcedby the situationto contemplatefuture scenarios in which the othercould do it harm.When scouts returnedto ancientAssyria with the firstreports on the Egyptianempire and its phenomenal resources,Assyrian leaders would have been imprudentnot to have at least consideredthe possibilityof an Egyptianinvasion. No interaction was required for Egypt's relative power to have a constrainingeffect on As- syria's behavior.36 The pernicious issue of uncertaintyhelps us evaluate the value of Wendt's discussion of the three"cultures" of anarchyand theirthree degrees of inter- nalization. Wendt uses his three-by-threegrid in chapter 6-Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultureson the horizontal axis, and first,second, and thirddegrees of internalizationon the vertical-as a visual tool to show that interactioncan socialize states away from conflictualto more cooperative formsof behavior.States in each of the nine boxes, he argues, share at least a basic notion of what the behavioral norms are in the system.In termsof the question of presentand futureintentions, however, there are two problems. First,Wendt assumes thata state knows not only which of the nine boxes it is in, but which box the otheris in. If Ego, forexample, knows that it is in the top rightbox, where it follows and has deeply internalizedthe Kantian norm of not using violence to settledisputes, it may stillbe uncertainabout Alter's

35. This does not mean thatconstructivism does not deal with the problem of uncertainty.But it does so by looking at how socialized notions of self and other shape actors' views of the future possibilities.The causal storyremains one of historicaldiscursive practices molding currentmind- sets; actors see the futureonly throughthe strongfilter of past socialization. See Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett,eds., SecurityCommunities (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1998), chaps. 1, 2, 13. The realistview of the futurefocuses on the thingsthat might occur independentof an actor's past interactionwith the other.So while realistsaccept thathistorical interaction can re- duce uncertaintyabout the other's characterand motives, they argue that prudent actors can never ignore the many exogenous determinantsof the other's futurebehavior. The securitydi- lemma can be moderated,but never eliminated. 36. Note thatthis is not even a "firstcontact," because Egypt does not yet know of Assyria's exis- tence. Cf. Wendt,"Anarchy Is What States Make of It," pp. 403-407. The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism | 207

true disposition. If Alter is followingthe norm in termsof its behavior,does thisreflect its stronginternalized belief in the norm(third degree), or just its in- duced compliance because of fear of punishmentor loss of benefitsshould it defect(first or second degrees)? For Ego, this question is critical,because if Al- ter is only conformingto the norm for fear of punishmentor expectationof benefits,Ego has everyreason to fearthat Alter's behavior will not be so coop- erative should the materialconditions that shape costs and benefitschange.37 Yet Wendt does not explain how states are supposed to know whether the otherhas deeply internalizeda norm or not. Thus we are stillin the dark as to how state uncertaintyabout presentand futureintentions is to be overcome. This problem is compounded by the factthat the threecultures, as Wendt lays themout, are distinguishedfrom each otherin termsof behavioral norms. Which culture a system is in at any point in time, as Wendt's discussion re- veals, is known only by the degree to which states follow,in termsof theirex- ternalbehavior, the norms Wendt specifies:in a Hobbesian culture,whether theyobserve no limitsin theirviolence; in Lockean, whetherthey use violence but refrainfrom killing one another;and in Kantian,whether they do not use violence to settledisputes (p. 258; see also pp. 260-261, 268, 279-280, 283-284, 298-299). Thus in his three-by-threegrid (Figure 4, p. 254), the horizontalaxis, which details the three cultures,is defined by the degree of "cooperation," with Hobbesian culturesshowing the most conflictualbehavior and Kantian the most cooperative.Wendt thus uses behavioral/outcomemeasures to clas- sifythe changes in the world systemover time.In the seventeenthcentury, the systemmoved froma Hobbesian to a Lockean culture,he argues,because even though many states were being eliminated prior to that time,few were after (pp. 279, 284, 323). Yet when the systemexperiences large-scale warfare, Wendt sees thiseither as an indicationof a Hobbesian cultureor a sign thatthe system is shiftingback into one (pp. 259-260, 270, 279, 314). That Wendtuses behavior to defineculture is also shown by the factthat states could be in a Kantian cul- ture even if they are only at the firstand second degrees of internalization- thatis, even ifthey comply with the behavioral normnot to use violence to set- tle a dispute only because of fear of punishment and narrow self-interest (pp. 303-306).

37. See Wendt,Social Theoryof International Politics, pp. 303-305,where he notes thatKantian coop- erative behavior at the firstand second degrees is purely instrumental.States are treatingeach otheras "friends"only in form,not in substance: "For egoisticstates friendshipmight be nothing more than a hat theytry on each morningfor their own reasons,one thatthey will take offas soon as the costs outweigh the benefits,but until thathappens theywill be friendsin facteven if not in principle" (p. 305). InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 208

If behavioral compliance defines the culture one is in, leaders are thrown rightback into the problem of other minds that underpins the securitydi- lemma. They are forcedto rely on inferences,in the formof probabilisticesti- mates,of the other's truemotives and strategicobjectives based on the other's behavior. But inferencesare a weak substitute for direct knowledge. The chances formisinterpretation within anarchic systems-perceiving the other's actions as reflectinghostile motives,even if theyare not intended thatway- remain high. Wendt's practiceof measuring cultureby the level of cooperativebehavior exhibitedby states also poses a methodological problem. In essence, Wendt collapses the thing he wants to explain-why the systemhas apparentlybe- come more cooperativeover time-into the causal factorhe wants to triumph, namely,the instantiationof new ideas about selfand otherthrough interaction. This makes it hard to know what would falsifyhis argument.Whenever be- havior turns conflictual,Wendt can argue that the culture has become Hobbesian; whenever the behavior becomes more cooperative,the system is moving toward a Lockean or a Kantian culture. The deeper problem here is Wendt's willingness to call any systemwhere statesknow and follownorms at the firstand second degrees of internalization a "culture."States at these levels are actingonly because theyare compelled by coercivethreats (the firstdegree) or seeking to maximize theirnet benefits(the second degree). Wendtargues thatas long as theyshare at least a basic knowl- edge of the behavioral norms,they share a culture.This is an extremelythin definitionof culture,one having nothing necessarilyto do with the typical constructivistemphasis on actors' interestsand identities.Indeed the term"in- ternalization"is a misnomerfor these firstand second degrees. At these levels, thereis no need forany internalizationof the behavioral norm,but only some knowledge thatthe norm exists.By Wendt's definition,therefore, an opportu- nisticstate that joins a collectivesecurity system just to buy time for a secret militarybuildup is "sharing"in a Kantian culturesimply by virtueof knowing the normnot to use violence. If the term"culture" is to be used forany knowl- edge of phenomenon X thattwo actors have in common,whether or not they incorporatethis knowledge into theirvalue systems,then cultureserves little value in social scientificanalysis-it means almost everything,and therefore nothing. Even more important,however, Wendt's explanationsof behavior at the first and second degrees are drivenprecisely by what is not shared between the ac- tors.As Wendt notes forthe firstdegree in the Hobbesian world, a state com- plies "only because [it] is forced to, directly or by the threat of certain, The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism | 209

immediate punishment."Its behavior "is purely externallyrather than inter- nally driven." Thus "it is privatemeanings plus materialcoercion rather than culturewhich does most of the explanatorywork" (p. 269). One mightadd that in these scenarios,it is privatemeanings and materialincentives that do essen- tiallyall the explanatorywork. Given this,and given the factthat actors are not internalizingthe normbut only at most knowingof its existence,what value is gained by calling the firstand second degrees "cultures"? The above analysis indicatesthat Wendt's three-by-threegrid is not a frame- work of three cultures and three degrees of internalization.Rather it is a typologythat shows on the horizontalaxis the dependent variable to be ex- plained-the degree of cooperative behavior in a system at any particular time-and on the vertical axis the three main ways this variable can be ex- plained: by the effectof threatsand punishments(coercion in realistliterature); by potentialexternal benefits of cooperation (neoliberalarguments); or by the internalizationthrough interaction of interestsand identitiesthat shape the way actorsview strategiesand outcomes (the constructivistview). Shiftingto a focus on the degree of cooperativebehavior in a system,and what factorsex- plain it,allows us to see the real potentialvalue of Wendt's constructivistargu- ment.Only at his "thirddegree" is his culturalexplanation operating, and such an explanation can be posed against the primary realist and neoliberal counterexplanationsthat involve self-interestedactors calculating the costs, benefits,and risksof action. Then when we see a shiftin the level of coopera- tion,we do not automaticallyassume a shiftin "culture."Instead we look for evidence that could confirmor refutethe threealternative theories. This recastingof Wendt's framework,however, shows us how farhe has to go empiricallyto convince us of his thesis.Even if we accept thatthe interna- tional systemhas become more cooperative over the last two decades, Wendt has provided littleevidence thatthis cooperationreflects an increasinglydeep internalizationof other-regardingvalues. Moreover,he must show thatthis in- creasingstability is not simplythe resultof a self-interestedadjustment by the remaininggreat powers to the realityof nuclear weapons, thebenefits of global trade, and a reconnaissance revolution that has made surprise attacks less viable.38

38. Wendt's empiricaltask is complicatedby his assertionthat the recentshift to cooperationwas furtheredby such "master variables" as interdependenceand common fate (pp. 344-353). These variables are largelymaterial in nature-depending as they do on globalization,increased trade, and the destructivequalities of modern weaponry (especially nuclear weapons). Wendtlays out a two-stageprocess toward cooperation: Initially,states respond to the externalconditions out of self-interest,but later they may move beyond this to more other-regardingstances (pp. 345-346, InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 210

The problemis even more pronounced with regardto Wendt's abilityto ex- plain the shiftsin relative cooperation over the last five hundred years. Be- cause behavioral changes do not necessarilymean culturalchanges, it is up to Wendtto show thatconflictual periods were the resultof the internalizationof conflictualinterests and identities,and not adjustmentsinduced by changing externalconditions. To do so, he must plunge into the documents,which ulti- matelyare the only means to reveal why the actorsdid what theydid. Staying at the realm of behavior makes it impossible to sortout whetherrealism, liber- alism,or constructivismprovides thebest explanationfor the resultsobserved.

Social Theoryof InternationalPolitics provides an importantstarting point for furtherdebate and constructivistempirical analysis, but only a startingpoint. Wendthas not shown thatanarchy tied to changingdistributions of power has no logic, only that constructivistvariables can perhaps, under certaincondi- tions, moderate actors' level of uncertaintyabout others' intentions.Yet constructivismis inherentlyan argumentabout how the past shapes the way actors understandtheir present situation. By its very nature-its focus on his- torical process-constructivismhas trouble analyzing how rational,prudent leaders deal withthe perniciousproblem of futureuncertainty. And thisuncer- taintyis given by the human condition.Human beings are not born with the abilityto read the minds of otheractors, and theyhave only limitedmeans for foreseeingthe future.Moreover, human beings, as constructivistsemphasize, are mutable-they can be changed throughinteraction. Yet if much of this in- teractiontakes place at the domesticlevel and is independentof diplomaticin- teraction,then prudentstates must be worried.They know thatthe othermay become aggressive despite all diplomaticefforts to instantiateother-regarding values and to communicatetheir own nonaggressiveintentions. The material distributionof power then becomes criticalto theircalculations. It represents the other's potentialto do harm in the future.Hence, ifpower trendsare nega- tive, a declining state must worry that the other will turn aggressive afterit achieves preponderance,even if it seems peaceful rightnow. The task ahead lies in testing the propositions that fall out of Wendt's constructivistargument. In explaining variations in the level of cooperation

350, 360-361; see also pp. 303 and 311). Yet Wendt offerslittle evidence that cooperationbetween moderngreat powers such as the United States,China, and Russia has gone beyond thisself-inter- ested firststep. The ConstructivistChallenge to StructuralRealism | 211

over the past two millennia, there are three main competing arguments- Wendt's systemic constructivism,systemic realism, and neoliberalism-to which we could add a fourth,namely, a more domestic constructivistargu- ment (one that shades into unit-levelliberalism). Systemic constructivism (or what mightbe called "neoconstructivism")focuses on interstateinteractions as the source fornew, or reproduced,conceptions of selfand other,which in turn affectstate propensitiesto fall into conflictualor cooperative behavior. Sys- temic realism predictschanges in the levels of cooperationbased on changes and trendsin the distributionof materialpower over time,set against a base- line of actor uncertaintyabout the future. Neoliberalism, accepting the neorealistfoundation of rational actors worried about the future,stresses the role of institutionsas mechanismsthat reduce the uncertaintythat can lead to conflict.Finally, domestic constructivistsand unit-level liberals emphasize changes withinparticular states that alter aggregated state interests and identi- ties. When domesticprocesses produce stateswith motivesbeyond mere secu- rity,we should expect more conflictualbehavior, all thingsbeing equal. None of these positions needs to rejectthe causal factorshighlighted by the alternativeapproaches. Indeed, as I have argued, systemicrealists recognize the domesticconstructivist/liberal point thatinternal processes can change the nature of the opponent over time,and they use it to show how a system of purelysecurity-seeking states can stillfall into conflictand war. But instead of tryingto collapse these differenttheories into one model of "culture,"as Social Theorydoes, we need to recognize that each of these approaches focuses on separate and oftenindependent causal variables. In this way, we can see that egoistic and militaristicmind-sets are sustained and transformednot only by internationalinteraction, as Wendtclaims. They may be, but how oftenand to what extentis a question for empirical analysis. And because Wendt's book does not offersuch an analysis, the debate is still very much an open one. Sometimesegoism and militarismwill be caused by domestic processes alone (e.g., if an aggressive ideology triumphsthrough revolution). Sometimes they will resultfrom prudent fears of the future,especially during periods of dy- namic change in the relativepower balance. Sometimesthey will reflecta lack of institutionalmechanisms for learning about the otherstate, and thus ratio- nal misjudgmentsabout the other's type. Although the road ahead forWendt's neoconstructivismis still long, Social Theoryof International Politics provides a solid constructivistvehicle fortravel- ing it. The book allows scholars to differentiateclearly between trulymaterial and ideational explanations,and between accounts thatemphasize the role of states as actors and those that incorporatetransnational forces and divisions InternationalSecurity 25:2 | 212

withinpolities. It has reinforcedthe importanceof diplomacy as a tool forre- ducing high levels of misunderstandingthat can impede cooperation.Yet by bracketing off domestic processes, Wendt has overlooked the irony of constructivism:that the mutabilityof human ideational structuresat the do- mesticlevel reinforcesleaders' greatuncertainty about futureintentions at the interstatelevel. The securitydilemma, with all its implications,is real and per- vasive. It cannotbe talked away throughbetter discursive practices. It mustbe faced.

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The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay

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Dale C. Copeland; The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay. International Security 2000; 25 (2): 187–212. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560499

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Classical and Structural Realism Compare & Contrast Essay

One of the main challenges of assessing the actual significance of a particular development in the domain of international relations (IR) has to do with the abundance of many different theories of IR, which provide their own unique insights into the inquired subject matter. Therefore, it is crucially important for political scientists to be aware of what accounts for the qualitative aspects of these theories, and of what makes their practical deployment circumstantially appropriate.

Probably the most notable among the theories of IR are Realism and Post-structuralism. The logic behind this suggestion is that; whereas, Realism is undeniably the most ‘long-lasting’ and academically refined of these theories, Poststructuralism does appear to be the most unconventional of them, which in turn is often taken as the indication of this particular theory’s consistency with the discourse of post-modernity.

In this paper, I will compare/contrast the main conceptual provisions of the earlier mentioned theories, while promoting the idea that, even though some of the Post-structuralist assumptions about the actual nature of politics are indeed rather insightful, it is specifically the Realist outlook on the deployment of power in IR, which should be considered the ultimately legitimate one.

As the theory of IR, Realism is based upon three major conceptual premises:

• States are the only legitimate subjects of international relations. As Jervis (1998) noted, “Realism has many versions, but the assumptions that states can be considered the main actors and that they focus in the first instance on their own security are central to most” (p. 980). In its turn, this implies that dynamics in the world’s geopolitical arena should be seen reflective of the sporadic interflow of energetic potentials between the countries.
• As a system, the domain of IR exists in the state of never-ending anarchy. This Realist postulate refers to the absence of any higher authority in the world of international politics, capable of settling disputes between the nation-states.
• While adopting one or another geopolitical stance, the countries are primarily driven by the considerations of self-interest. Consequently, this presupposes that they exist in the state of fierce competition with each other for territory and natural resources.

The latter provision implies that the actual purpose of just about country’s existence is solely concerned with political/economic expansion, maintenance of political stability within, and destabilization of competing states. Partially, this explains the logic behind the Realist practice of applying the ancient principle of Cui bono (to whose benefit?) , when it comes to defining the significance of a particular political development.

Realists believe that this type of developments is innately interest-driven. Essentially the same can be said about Realists’ insistence that it is inappropriate assessing political developments in terms of being ‘ethical’ or ‘unethical’ – in the ‘Realist’ world, the appropriateness/inappropriateness of one or another course of geopolitical action, undertaken by a particular country, is assessed through the Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest’ principle.

The above-mentioned helps to explain the particulars of the Realist conceptualisation of power in IR, as such that ‘comes out of the gun’s barrel’, on the one hand, and serves as the main indication of the affiliated country’s varying measure of ‘evolutionary fitness’, on the other.

Thus, it is not only that Realism recognises power, as the instrument of geopolitics, but it also promotes the idea that the foremost objective of just about any nation-state is to continue becoming ever more empowered, in the social, economic, and military senses of this word.

Defining the conceptual essence of Post-structuralism represents a rather difficult task. One of the reasons for this is that, due to having emerged as the response to structuralism (the theory concerned with emphasising the phenomenological/semiotic aspects of international relations); Post-structuralism opposes many of the long-established conventions of IR, as something that has a value of its own. As Sayin and Ates (2012) noted,

Poststructuralism is not a freestanding discipline and occurs inside a large context of social thinking. Poststructuralism seeks to unsettle the things established, and by its own specific methods and ways, it tries to make re-reading on a lot of things about the social life, the state, and international relations (p. 13).

Moreover, there are no universally recognised criteria for defining the conceptual essence of Post-structuralism, “Post-structuralism itself is hard to define; thus, there appear to be many post-structuralisms, each accompanied by its own particular set of theoretical and empirical concerns” (Murdoch 2005, p. 2). Nevertheless, it is still possible to outline some of this theory’s most fundamental tenets.

For example, Post-structuralists insist that the functioning of just about any social/geopolitical entity is the subject to systemic analysis, which in turn presupposes that within the domain of international relations, there are no ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ variables – all the variables are ‘interdependent’ (Edkins 1999). The discursive implication of this is quite clear – the quality of the relationship between the integral elements within a particular political system, defines this system’s structural subtleties more than anything else does.

Another notable characteristic of Post-structuralism is that its proponents make a deliberate point in refusing to assess the political developments in the world within some rigidly constructed theoretical framework. According to Merlingen (2013), “The central commitment that makes post-structuralists‘ post’ is their rejection of the scientific aspirations of structuralism… Poststructuralists mistrust all systematisers and systematisations” (par. 11).

The reason for this is that, according to the proponents of Post-structuralism, just about every positivist theory of IR is based upon the unverified sets of axioms, which serve the purpose of helping the rich and powerful to justify the continuation of their hegemonic dominance.

Post-structuralists are also known for their claim that, even though the currently dominant socio-cultural discourse (post-modernity) does define the innate quality of the on-going developments in the arena of international politics, it does not predetermine these developments’ eventual outcome. In its turn, this naturally prompts the proponents of Post-structuralism to assume that the continuation of counter-cultural discourses is the necessary precondition for humanity to remain on the path of a continual advancement.

As a result, Post-structuralists deny objectivity to just about any positivist notion in the field of IR, especially if it appears to serve the purpose legitimising the currently prevalent hegemonic discourse, “They (Post-structuralists) remain opposed to the essentialist individualism typical of liberalism and sceptical of its political corollaries such as international human rights policies” (Merlingen 2013, par. 13).

Moreover, Post-structuralists also believe that the very notion of ‘statehood’, in the traditional sense of this word, has grown hopelessly outdated. Such their belief is based upon the assumption that the exponential progress in the field of IT naturally results in more and more people becoming increasingly aware of the oppressive nature of the conventional forms of political governance, closely affiliated with the notion in question.

Hence, the Post-structuralist conceptualisation of power, as something extrapolated by the IR-subject’s ability to challenge the soundness of the mainstream discourses on the issues of socio-political and economic importance (Weldes 2000).

Because information technologies continue to advance rather rapidly, this increases the competitiveness of the power-aspiring non-state actors in the domain of international relations. What it means is that it is only the matter of time before the concept of ‘statehood’ ceases to be reflective of people’s unconscious anxieties, in regards to the notion of ‘national borders’.

Therefore, while referring to power, Post-structuralists, in fact, refer to the potential capacity of many counter-cultural discourses to attain the mainstream status, which in turn must result in disrupting the geopolitical balance of on this planet.

As it was implied in the Introduction, the Realist account of power in world politics is in many respects superior to the Post-structuralist one – despite the sophisticate sounding of the latter. The fact that there is too much complexity to the Post-structuralist conceptualisations of power/IR is exactly what undermines the overall validity of Post-structuralism.

The reason for this is that it makes this theory quite inconsistent with the so-called principle of Occam’s Razor – there is no need to resort to the complex (phenomenological) explanations of a particular phenomenon, for as long as many of the simplistic (positivist) ones are available (Riesch 2010). Predictably enough, this has a negative effect on the theory’s ability to represent any practical value.

For example, when assessed within the discursive framework of Post-structuralism, the fact that the realities of a contemporary living in the West appear ever more affected by the emergence and subsequent proliferation of different social movements (such as the one concerned with the protection of animal rights, for example), indicates that the forms of governance (power) in today’s world become ever more ‘subnational’ and ‘transnational’.

In its turn, this can be interpreted as something that confirms the validity of the Post-structuralist idea that, as time goes on, the factor of ethics influences the IR-dynamics to an ever further extent. As Walker (1993) pointed out,

A ‘busier’ intersection (between ethics and IR) is no indication of an escape from the routines through which attempts to speak of ethics are either marginalised or trivialised. These routines emerge from the way claims about ethical possibility are already constitutive of theories of international relations (p. 79).

This, of course, implies that exercising power in the domain of IR very often means creating public discourses, “The political governance of modern society requires a range of actors, practices and discourses to be mobilized across diverse socio-spatial domains. Political forces can only govern by influencing or co-opting domains in civil society that they do not directly control” (Murdoch 2005, p. 43).

In this respect, the continual proliferation of the so-called non-governmental organisations (NGOs) will appear to be yet additional indication that, as time goes on, the sub-national agents of quasi-governmental authority become ever more empowered, in the sense of being able to exert much influence on the process of governmental decision-making.

As it can be seen above, the Post-structuralist account of power in IR, which stresses out the quasi-sovereign status of social movements/NGOs, is indeed logically sound. Yet, it is much too ‘excessive’, in the ontological sense of this word.

After all, the Realist theory of IR provides us with the much simpler straight-down-to–the-point explanation, as to the actual significance of social movements/NGOs – they are nothing but the instruments that help to advance the geopolitical expansion-agenda of the world’s most powerful countries while allowing the latter to remain within the boundaries of the international law.

The validity of this statement can be illustrated, in regards to the fact that, as of recent, many high-ranking officials from the U.S. Department of State do not even try to make any secret of keeping most of the world’s best-known NGOs on a payroll. Because NGOs ‘know no borders’, this makes it utterly convenient for the U.S. to use them, when it comes to overthrowing the ‘non-cooperative’ governments in other countries.

The Ukraine’s ‘democratic’ revolutions of 2004 and 2014, which served the geopolitical interests of the U.S., exemplify the soundness of this suggestion perfectly well, because there is plenty of evidence now that it was namely due to the activities of ‘independent’ NGOs in this country that the mentioned upheavals did take place (Wilson 2006). This, of course, shows that contrary to the Post-structuralist point of view, there is nothing too illusive/phenomenological about the deployment of power.

The superiority of the Realist conceptualisation of power can also be illustrated, in regards to the fact that, as opposed to what it appears to be the case with the Post-structuralist one, it correlates well with the cause-effect principle of dialectical reasoning, which in turn defines the workings of the surrounding social and natural environment.

The logic behind this suggestion is perfectly apparent – Realists assume that there is always an interest-driven motive to just about every development in the world of international and domestic politics. In its turn, this empowers Realists rather substantially, within the context of how they go about defining the factual significance of historical events.

For example, according to such well-known proponents of Post-structuralism as Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes, the revolutionary events of 1968 in Paris signified the beginning of the era when people’s existential aspirations have a direct effect of the practically deployed methods of governing, to which these people are subjected (Paipais 2015).

Nevertheless, even if we assume that the mentioned idea is indeed thoroughly valid; it can still hardly be referred to as such that pinpoints the main triggering-factor behind the events in question. In this regard, the Realist theory of IR is much different. Instead of speculating about what were the phenomenological causes of the mentioned events, it seeks to identify the potential beneficiary.

Given the fact that the French ‘revolution’ of 1968 occurred in the aftermath of the government’s decision to cancel the country’s NATO-membership, and to demand from the Federal Reserve to convert France’s reserves of USD into gold, this task will not prove particularly challenging (Martin 2013).

Thus, there can be only a few doubts as to the fact that the Realist take on the deployment of power is not only fully consistent with the principle of Occam’s Razor, but it is also much more practically useful, as compared to that of Post-structuralists. This could not be otherwise – being essentially phenomenological, the Post-structuralist theory of IR is quite incapable of recognizing the qualitative patterns within the domain of geopolitics.

After all, admitting that it is indeed possible to distinguish these patterns, would contradict this theory’s main premise that there is just too much uncertainty in the world of politics, and that it is rather impossible to predict the quintessential quality of political developments in the future. Yet, while deprived of such ability, just about any sociological theory can no longer be referred in terms of ‘theory’ per se .

The legitimacy of this suggestion is especially apparent nowadays when due to the continual popularisation of the discourse of relativity, more and more people grow increasingly aware that there can be no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ scientific theories, but only the useful and useless ones.

Even though Realists are often accused of applying an utterly simplistic approach, when it comes to addressing the IR-related issues, there can be only a few doubts that such their approach is thoroughly systemic, which in turn means that Realism continues to represent much value, as a discursively sound theory of IR.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about Post-structuralism – due to its lack of methodological systemeness, this specific theory of IR promotes a number of clearly misleading assumptions, as to the origins of power in the arena of international relations. The most notable of them has to do with the Post-structuralist belief that in the near future, nation-states will cease to be considered the only legitimate subjects of the international law.

However, as it was shown earlier in regards to the Realist conceptualisation of the actual role of social movements/NGOs in the world of politics, this belief can be hardly considered very insightful. After all, the recent geopolitical developments, concerned with the rise of Russia and China as the West’s most powerful rivals, suggest that it is much too early to put away with the conventional outlook on what the notion of ‘statehood’ stands for.

If this was not the case, the on-going confrontation between the U.S. and Russia would not be marked by the calls (on both sides) to strengthen the sense of ‘national solidarity’ in citizens. We would also not be witnessing the process of both countries being gradually turned into nothing short of the ideological dictatorships – despite the fact the U.S. and Russia adhere to the democratic principles of governance.

Yet, this is exactly what is happening today – contrary to the Post-structuralist insistence that the role of officially endorsed ideologies (as the sources of power) in IR is rather neglectful, “Poststructuralism was the first theoretical movement to reject the entire notion of ideology, viewing it as totalistic, essentialist and methodologically and theoretically obsolete” (Malesevic & MacKenzie 2002, p. 87).

This, of course, undermines the discursive soundness of Post-structuralism even further, as a theory that does not take into account the most recent IR-related developments.

Apparently, the Post-structuralist outlook on the deployment of power in world politics could only make sense during the 20 th century’s nineties, when Fukuyama’s idea of the ‘end of history’ (due to the ‘depletion of meaning’) was at the peak of its popularity. Nowadays, however, this outlook can be deemed neither insightful nor practically valuable – something that calls for its eventual delegitimation.

The same cannot be said about the Realist conceptualisation of power in the domain of IR – despite its extensive historical legacy, the theory of Realism continues to provide many valuable clues, as to what are the actual driving forces behind the currently observable dynamics in the world of politics. This once again substantiates the validity of the paper’s initial thesis, in regards to the discussed subject matter.

As it was shown earlier, there is indeed much rationale in singling out specifically the Realist account of power in IR, as the most conceptually and methodologically sound one. In its turn, this implies that the alternative theories of IP (such as Constructivist, Structuralist, Post-structuralist, etc.) can be discussed in terms of ‘discursive decoys’.

That is, their actual role may be concerned with diverting people’s attention from the fact that, just as it used to be the case hundreds and even thousands of years ago, the political developments in the world continue to remain interest-driven/state-sponsored (Realist). Even though this conclusion does appear rather speculative, it is certainly not irrational.

It is also fully appropriate to conclude that the analytical insights contained in this paper, imply that it is only the matter of time, before the Post-structuralist perspective on power in politics will be deprived of the remains of its former legitimacy. That is, unless this planet turns ‘unipolar’ again, in the geopolitical sense of this word. Such a scenario, however, is rather unlikely.

I believe that the provided concluding remarks correlate well with the paper’s initial thesis. Apparently, there is indeed a good reason to think that, in terms of its ability to serve as a practical asset in the field of IR, the theory of Realism even today remains largely unsurpassable. This will continue to be the case into the future.

Edkins, J. 1999, Poststructuralism and international relations: bringing the political back in , Boulder, Lynne Rienner.

Jervis, R. 1998, ‘Realism in the study of world politics’, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 971-991.

Malesevic, S. & MacKenzie, I. 2002, Ideology after Poststructuralism: experiences of identity in a globalising world , Pluto Press, London.

Martin, G. 2013, General de Gaulle’s Cold War: challenging American hegemony , 1963-68., Berghahn Books, New York.

Merlingen, M. 2013, Is Poststructuralism a useful IR theory? What about its relationship to historical Materialism? E-International Relations. Web.

Murdoch, J. 2005, Post-structuralist geography: a guide to relational space , SAGE Publications Inc., London.

Paipais, V. 2015, ‘Ethics and politics after post-structuralism: Levinas, Derrida, Nancy’, Contemporary Political Theory, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 216-219.

Riesch, H. 2010, ‘Simple or simplistic? Scientists’ views on Occam’s Razor’, Theoria , vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 75-90.

Sayin, Y. & Ates, D. 2012, ‘Poststructuralism and the analysis of international relations’, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations , vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 12-25.

Weldes, J. 2000, ‘Poststructuralism and international relations: bringing the political back in / Navigating modernity: Postcolonialism, identity, and international relations”, The American Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. 3, pp. 764-765.

Wilson, A. 2006, ‘Ukraine’s orange revolution, NGOs and the role of the West’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs , vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 21-32.

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IvyPanda. (2019, June 2). Classical and Structural Realism. https://ivypanda.com/essays/classical-and-structural-realism/

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Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Classical and Structural Realism." June 2, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/classical-and-structural-realism/.

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