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Pierson is an Executive Recruiter on the Market Research and Consumer Insights team. While the newest on the team, Pierson is already a step above the rest in his deep understanding of the Market Research Industry and has been highly successful in finding clients their ideal match. With his warm personality and drive to provide results, he is highly sought after in the market research space. Pierson’s best skill is his ability to connect with all, no matter the differences; he loves a good conversation! Pierson spends his free time coaching basketball, designing clothes, and hanging with his German Shepherd.  

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Watch CBS News

New college grads face a cooling job market. Here's where the jobs are.

By Aimee Picchi

Edited By Alain Sherter

May 21, 2024 / 5:10 PM EDT / CBS News

After earning their college degrees this month, new graduates are understandably eager to land their first job and start making their education pay off. But that could pose more of a challenge this year than in 2023.

Hiring for freshly minted college grads is forecast to decline 6% from a year earlier, according to a recent survey of more than 200 employers from the National Association of Colleges and Employers, a group representing college career services employees.

Data from payroll services provider Gusto also shows that the new grad hiring rate — the share of recent graduates who are hired in a given month — is now about 6%, down from a recent peak of 10% in 2021. Still, the hiring rate is about level from a year earlier, with Gusto principal economist Liz Wilke telling CBS MoneyWatch that the job market for new grads is relatively stable. 

40% underemployed

Securing that first job out of college may be a rite of passage, but it can also be nerve-racking for young adults who need to pay for groceries and make the rent. And about 4 in 10 recent college grads are currently "underemployed," meaning they're working in a job that doesn't require a college degree, according to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

"We know that the first job out of college is incredibly important when setting the course for the rest of a person's career," Wilke said. "However, not every college graduate is going to enter a booming job market, and some are not afforded the option of being picky."

According to Gusto, the top five industries currently hiring new college grads are legal, nonprofits, arts and entertainment, health care, and social assistance and construction.

"New grads with skills that are applicable to these industries are likely to see increased interest in their resumes," Wilke noted.

Some industries are planning to cut back on the number of new hires from the class of 2024, the National Association of Colleges and Employers found in its survey. Among them are computer and electronics manufacturers, with those businesses projecting a decline of about 12% in hires of new grads, while financial firms expect an almost 15% drop, the group found. 

Technology companies have slashed thousands of jobs in recent months as they shift toward artificial intelligence. Yet new grads who know how to work with artificial intelligence may have an edge, Wilke said.

"AI skills are something [businesses] are seeking from this younger cohort of workers," she added. "Business owners believe that since this younger generation has 'come of age' with this technology, that they are better equipped to figure out how to best put it into practice."

Employers say the modest pullback in hiring comes after an extremely tight labor market in the years after the pandemic, when workers were harder to come by and they weren't seeing as many resumes. 

"It's easier now than it was last year," Chris Jones, the founder of tutoring company Planting Seeds Academic Solutions, which is now in the process of hiring about 40 workers, many of them recent college grads, for its summer camps. "We're getting 50 to 100 applicants per opening," compared with 20 to 30 applicants in 2021 to 2022, a time when he said many applicants didn't want to work in person.

Samuel Clark, the CEO of Broadway Crew, which provides staffing and support for Broadway shows, said he thinks hiring has returned to a more "normal" pace.

"A year ago it was really, really difficult, I was pulling my hair out and paying them an absurd amount of money to make sure they'd be there on time," Clark told CBS MoneyWatch. "Now the power dynamic is coming back in the middle."

For new college grads who are looking for work, Clark said his advice is to hustle, but he noted that landing that first job can be difficult. "Sometimes it's really hard and you have to take the slings and arrows," he added. 

What new grads want in a job

As for what new grads want in their first jobs, they're looking for hybrid roles with some in-person and some remote days, Vicki Salemi, a career expert at job site Monster, told CBS New York. And they're very interested in learning about a job's salary, with particular fears of ending up underemployed, she added.

"They want to talk about salary on the job interview," Salemi said. "They might not even pursue the job if salary isn't discussed in the interview."

That's especially important in high-cost cities like New York, which Gusto found is the top metro area for hiring the class of 2024, representing 10% of all new grad hires. The average new grad's starting salary in New York is $64,134, which equates to only $28,500 in other cities when adjusted for the cost of living, Gusto found. 

"Our report shows New York as being the most popular city for new grads, but last on the list in terms of affordability," Wilke said. "People this age should consider what cities they see themselves ending up in and jobs those cities have to offer."

Aimee Picchi is the associate managing editor for CBS MoneyWatch, where she covers business and personal finance. She previously worked at Bloomberg News and has written for national news outlets including USA Today and Consumer Reports.

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Is College Worth It?

1. labor market and economic trends for young adults, table of contents.

• Labor force trends and economic outcomes for young adults
• Economic outcomes for young men
• Economic outcomes for young women
• Wealth trends for households headed by a young adult
• The importance of a four-year college degree
• Getting a high-paying job without a college degree
• Do Americans think their education prepared them for the workplace?
• Is college worth the cost?
• Acknowledgments
• The American Trends Panel survey methodology
• Current Population Survey methodology
• Survey of Consumer Finances methodology

A majority of the nation’s 36 million workers ages 25 to 34 have not completed a four-year college degree. In 2023, there were 19 million young workers who had some college or less education, including those who had not finished high school.

The overall number of employed young adults has grown over the decades as more young women joined the workforce. The number of employed young adults without a college degree peaked around 1990 at 25 million and then started to fall, as more young people began finishing college .

This chapter looks at the following key labor market and economic trends separately for young men and young women by their level of education:

Labor force participation

• Individual earnings

Household income

• Net worth 1

When looking at how young adults are doing in the job market, it generally makes the most sense to analyze men and women separately. They tend to work in different occupations and have different career patterns, and their educational paths have diverged in recent decades.

In 1970, almost all young men whose highest educational attainment was a high school diploma (98%) were in the labor force, meaning they were working or looking for work. By 2013, only 88% of high school-educated young men were in the labor force. Today, that share is 87%.

Similarly, 96% of young men whose highest attainment was some college education were in the labor force in 1970. Today, the share is 89%.

By comparison, labor force participation among young men with at least a bachelor’s degree has remained relatively stable these past few decades. Today, 94% of young men with at least a bachelor’s degree are in the labor force.

The long-running decline in the labor force participation of young men without a bachelor’s degree may be due to several factors, including declining wages , the types of jobs available to this group becoming less desirable, rising incarceration rates and the opioid epidemic . 2

Looking at labor force and earnings trends over the past several decades, it’s important to keep in mind broader forces shaping the national job market.

The Great Recession officially ended in June 2009, but the national job market recovered slowly . At the beginning of the Great Recession in the fourth quarter of 2007, the national unemployment rate was 4.6%. Unemployment peaked at 10.4% in the first quarter of 2010. It was not until the fourth quarter of 2016 that unemployment finally returned to its prerecession level (4.5%).

Studies suggest that things started to look up for less-skilled workers around 2014. Among men with less education, hourly earnings began rising in 2014 after a decade of stagnation. Wage growth for low-wage workers also picked up in 2014. The tightening labor markets in the last five years of the expansion after the Great Recession improved the labor market prospects of “vulnerable workers” considerably.

The COVID-19 pandemic interrupted the tight labor market, but the COVID-19 recession and recovery were quite different from the Great Recession in their job market impact. The more recent recession was arguably more severe, as the national unemployment rate reached 12.9% in the second quarter of 2020. But it was short – officially lasting two months, compared with the 18-month Great Recession – and the labor market bounced back much quicker. Unemployment was 3.3% before the COVID-19 recession; three years later, unemployment had once again returned to that level.

Full-time, full-year employment

Since the Great Recession of 2007-09, young men without a four-year college degree have seen a significant increase in the average number of hours they work.

• Today, 77% of young workers with a high school education work full time, full year, compared with 69% in 2011.
• 83% of young workers with some college education work full time, full year, compared with 70% in 2011.

The share of young men with a college degree who work full time, year-round has remained fairly steady in recent decades – at about 80% – and hasn’t fluctuated with good or bad economic cycles.

Annual earnings

Annual earnings for young men without a college degree were on a mostly downward path from 1973 until roughly 10 years ago (with the exception of a bump in the late 1990s). 3

Earnings have been increasing modestly over the past decade for these groups.

• Young men with a high school education who are working full time, full year have median earnings of $45,000 today, up from $39,300 in 2014. (All figures are in 2022 dollars.)
• The median earnings of young men with some college education who are working full time, full year are $50,000 today, similar to their median earnings in 2014 ($49,100).

It’s important to note that median annual earnings for both groups of noncollege men remain below their 1973 levels.

Median earnings for young men with a four-year college degree have increased over the past 10 years, from $67,500 in 2014 to $77,000 today.

Unlike young men without a college degree, the earnings of college-educated young men are now above what they were in the early 1970s. The gap in median earnings between young men with and without a college degree grew significantly from the late 1970s to 2014. In 1973, the typical young man with a degree earned 23% more than his high school-educated counterpart. By 2014, it was 72% more. Today, that gap stands at 71%. 4

Household income has also trended up for young men in the past 10 years, regardless of educational attainment.

This measure takes into account the contributions of everyone in the household. For this analysis, we excluded young men who are living in their parents’ home (about 20% of 25- to 34-year-old men in 2023).

• The median household income of young men with a high school education is $75,200 today, up from $63,800 in 2014. This is slightly lower than the highpoint reached around 2019.
• The median household income of young men with some college education is $92,200 today, up from $81,100 in 2014. This is close to the 2022 peak of $93,800.

The median household income of young men with at least a bachelor’s degree has also increased from a low point of $118,700 in 2014 after the Great Recession to $145,000 today.

The gap in household income between young men with and without a college degree grew significantly between 1980 and 2014. In 1980, the median household income of young men with at least a bachelor’s degree was about 38% more than that of high school graduates. By 2014, that gap had widened to 86%.

Over the past 10 years, the income gap has fluctuated. In 2023, the typical college graduate’s household income was 93% more than that of the typical high school graduate.

The 2001 recession and Great Recession resulted in a large increase in poverty among young men without a college degree.

• In 2000, among young men living independently of their parents, 8% of those with a high school education were in poverty. Poverty peaked for this group at 17% around 2011 and has since declined to 12% in 2023.
• Among young men with some college education, poverty peaked at 12% around 2014, up from 4% in 2000. Poverty has fallen for this group since 2014 and stands at 8% as of 2023.
• Young men with a four-year college degree also experienced a slight uptick in poverty during the 2001 recession and Great Recession. In 2014, 6% of young college graduates were in poverty, up from 4% in 2000. Poverty among college graduates stands at 5% in 2023.

Labor force trends for young women are very different than for young men. There are occupational and educational differences between young women and men, and their earnings have followed different patterns.

Unlike the long-running decline for noncollege young men, young women without a college degree saw their labor force participation increase steadily from 1970 to about 1990.

By 2000, about three-quarters of young women with a high school diploma and 79% of those with some college education were in the labor force.

Labor force participation has also trended upward for college-educated young women and has consistently been higher than for those with less education.

After rising for decades, labor force participation for young women without a college degree fell during the 2001 recession and the Great Recession. Their labor force participation has increased slightly since 2014.

As of 2023, 69% of young women with a high school education were in the labor force, as were 78% of young women with some college education. Today’s level of labor force participation for young women without a college degree is slightly lower than the level seen around 2000.

The decline in labor force participation for noncollege women partly reflects the declining labor force participation for mothers with children under 18 years of age . Other research has suggested that without federal paid parental and family leave benefits for parents, some women with less education may leave the labor force after having a baby.

In contrast, labor force participation for young women with a college degree has fully recovered from the recessions of the early 2000s. Today, 87% of college-educated young women are in the labor force, the highest estimate on record.

Young women without a college degree have steadily increased their work hours over the decades. The past 10 years in particular have seen a significant increase in the share of employed noncollege women working full time, full year (with the exception of 2021).

• In 2023, 69% of employed young women with a high school education worked full time, full year, up from 56% in 2014. This share is the highest it’s ever been.
• In 2023, 65% of employed women with some college worked full time, full year, up from 58% in 2014. This is among the highest levels ever.

The trend in the share working full time, full year has been similar for young women with college degrees. By 2023, 78% of these women worked full time, full year, the highest share it’s ever been.

Unlike young men, young women without a college education did not see their earnings fall between 1970 and 2000.

The 2001 recession and Great Recession also did not significantly impact the earnings of noncollege young women. In the past 10 years, their median earnings have trended upward.

• For young women with a high school diploma, median earnings reached $36,000 in 2023, up from $30,900 in 2014.
• For those with some college, median earnings rose to $40,000 in 2023 from $37,700 in 2014.

For young women with a college degree, median earnings rose steadily from the mid-1980s until the early 2000s. By 2003, they reached $62,100, but this declined to $55,200 by 2014. In the past 10 years, the median earnings of college-educated young women have risen, reaching $65,000 in 2023.

In the mid-1980s, the typical young woman with a college degree earned about 48% more than her counterpart with a high school diploma. The pay gap among women has widened since then, and by 2014, the typical college graduate earned 79% more than the typical high school graduate. The gap has changed little over the past 10 years.

Noncollege young women living independently from their parents have experienced large household income gains over the past 10 years, measured at the median.

• In 2023, young women with a high school diploma had a median household income of $61,600, up from $48,100 in 2014.
• The pattern is similar for young women with some college education. Their median income rose to $75,200 in 2023 from $64,600 in 2014.

The median household income for young women with a four-year college degree is significantly higher than it is for their counterparts without a degree. College-educated young women have made substantial gains in the past 10 years.

The income gap between young women with and without a college degree has widened over the decades. In 1980, the median household income of young women with a college degree was 50% higher than that of high school-educated women. By 2014, the income gap had grown to 139%. Today, the household income advantage of college-educated women stands at 121% ($136,000 vs. $61,600).

Poverty trends for young women mirror those for young men, although young women are overall more likely to be in poverty than young men. The past 10 years have resulted in a steep reduction in the share of noncollege women in poverty.

• Today, 21% of young women with a high school diploma are living in poverty. This is down from 31% in 2014.
• 15% of young women with some college education live in poverty, compared with 21% in 2014.
• Young women with a college degree are consistently far less likely than either group to be living in poverty (5% in 2023).

Along with young adults’ rising incomes over the past 10 years, there’s been a substantial increase in their wealth. This part of our analysis does not look at men and women separately due to limitations in sample size.

In 2022, households headed by a young high school graduate had a median net worth of $30,700, up from $12,700 in 2013. Those headed by a young adult with some college education had a median net worth of $52,900, up from $15,700 in 2013.

The typical wealth level of households headed by a young college graduate was $120,200 in 2022, up from $46,600 in 2013.

There has not been any significant narrowing of the wealth gap between young high school graduate and young college graduate households since 2013.

Wealth increased for Americans across age groups over this period due to several factors. Many were able to save money during the pandemic lockdowns. In addition, home values increased, and the stock market surged.

• Most of the analysis in this chapter is based on the Annual Social and Economic Supplement collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. Information on net worth is based on a Federal Reserve survey, which interviews fewer households. Due to this smaller sample size, the net worth of households headed by a young adult cannot be broken out by gender and education. ↩
• Bureau of Labor Statistics data indicates that the labor force participation rate for men ages 25 to 54 has been declining since 1953. ↩
• This analysis looks at the earnings of employed adults working full time, full year. This measure of earnings is not uncommon. For example, the National Center for Education Statistics publishes a series on the annual earnings of 25- to 34-year-olds working full time, full year. ↩
• Other studies using hourly wages rather than annual earnings find that the college wage premium has narrowed. For example, researchers at the San Francisco Federal Reserve report that the college wage gap peaked in the mid-2010s but declined by just 4 percentage points to about 75% in 2022. ↩

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The effect of the job market on the economy.

May 6, 2024

2024 Investment Outlook

Capitalizing on today’s market opportunities to meet your financial goals.

Key takeaways

The U.S. job market expanded in April for the 40th consecutive month, but at a slower pace.

175,000 new jobs were added in April, the lowest monthly jobs number so far in 2024.

The unemployment rate remains below 4% and wage gains are still above average, but the pace of wage growth is slowing.

With summer approaching, signs have emerged of a possible U.S. labor market slowdown. Job openings have modestly declined in recent months. 1 The April Employment Situation Summary from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics shows payroll employment growth slowed from previous months. April saw the creation of 175,000 new jobs, modestly below expectations, and a possible sign of slower economic growth.2 Nevertheless, job layoff activity appears stable and worker’s wage gains remain solid.

April also represented the 40th consecutive month of payroll employment growth. The unemployment rate rose slightly, to 3.9%, but unemployment has remained below 4% for 28 consecutive months, the longest month-to-month stretch of below 4% unemployment since 1967 to 1970. 2

Signs of what might be a cooling job market came on the heels of the first quarter Gross Domestic Product (GDP) release showing the economy growing at a modest 1.6% annualized rate. 3 Recent data appears to indicate tapering economic growth, which could have an impact on Federal Reserve (Fed) monetary policy. Investors continue to anticipate the Fed lowering the federal funds target rate it controls later this year, which would reverse monetary policy pursued in 2022 and 2023. During that time, the Fed raised rates from near 0% to more than 5%. The Fed has held rates steady since July 2023, and recently indicated that rate cuts may not be imminent, though further rate hikes appear unlikely.

How might the Fed react to the most recent trends as it determines future interest rate moves? Does today’s job market provide any guidance for investors as they set expectations going forward?

Slowing job growth

In the first four months of 2024, non-farm payrolls grew by an average of 245,500 jobs per month, slightly below 2023’s average. However, April’s 175,000 new jobs represented 2024’s slowest month for job creation. 4

The most notable April job gains occurred in health care, social assistance, transportation and warehousing, and retail. 1

April’s 3.9% unemployment rate was consistent with recent months’ readings, when unemployment ranged from 3.7% to 3.9%. 2 Unemployment is only marginally higher than the most recent low of 3.4% reached in April 2023. There continues to be an unusual imbalance between the number of job openings and the availability of individuals seeking employment. At the end of March 2024, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were 8.5 million job openings in the U.S., compared to 6.5 million unemployed persons. That means there are still approximately 1.3 jobs for every unemployed person seeking work. 5 The number of job openings declined modestly in recent months. “It’s slowly headed in the right direction,” says Rob Haworth, senior investment strategy director at U.S. Bank Wealth Management. “Still, the imbalance favors workers, and as a result the fact that we have more job openings than available workers could keep wage pressures elevated.”

“Improving labor participation is one way to address the tightness in the labor market that’s propping up wage gains.”

Matt Schoeppner, senior economist at U.S. Bank

One measure economists watch to forecast potential changes in labor market trends is the weekly new jobless claims report. In the most recent report, issued May 2, 2024, initial jobless claims stood at 208,000. It has lingered in the low 200,000 level for most of 2024. 6 “It shows companies are generally hanging onto their employees,” says Haworth. “At the same time, recent reports show people aren’t leaving jobs at the rate they once were. That signals a slightly softer labor market.”

The labor force participation rate, representing the percentage of the population currently in the workforce, held at 62.7% in April, matching March’s number. 2 Labor force participation is considered a key barometer of the broader economy’s health. The labor force participation rate was higher, at 62.8%, between August and November 2023. 4 “Improving labor participation is one way to address tightness in the labor market that’s propping up wage gains,” says Matt Schoeppner, a senior economist at U.S. Bank.

Watching for the Fed’s response

Signs of slower economic growth have not translated into reduced inflation . The most recent reading of the Consumer Price Index showed inflation at 3.5% for the 12 months ending in March 2024. Inflation has lingered between 3% and 3.7% since June 2023. 7 “The Fed is looking for incremental, month-to-month declines in living costs,” says Haworth. “Even though Fed officials don’t indicate an expectation of inflation reaccelerating, they also don’t appear to be convinced that rate cuts should occur just yet.”

He notes that the Fed is closely monitoring average monthly wage growth, which dropped below 4% for the 12-month period ending in April 2024, to 3.9%. “At that level, it might be close to a tipping point where the markets will begin to again anticipate Fed rate cuts,” says Haworth. “But the Fed may be looking for a more sustained trend.”

Fed Chair Jerome Powell, in early May, said that as a result of recent inflation and labor market trends, “the risks to achieving our employment and inflation goals have moved toward better balance. The economic outlook is uncertain, however, and we remain highly attentive to inflation risks.” Powell indicated the Fed wants to be more confident that inflation is moving in the right direction before it begins cutting the fed funds target rate. 8

According to Schoeppner, the job market’s ongoing strength may complicate the Fed's rate cutting plans . A tight labor market offering more competitive wages has played an important role providing consumers the wherewithal to maintain higher spending levels. That heightens the risk that inflation could persist or even trend higher.

What to expect going forward

Investors continue to closely follow jobs data for signs of a slowdown, which could provide the Fed with the impetus to begin cutting interest rates. Lower rates are considered a way to provide a boost to the economy, which would likely help extend the stock market rally that began in 2023.

Talk with a wealth professional if you have questions about your personal financial circumstances or investment portfolio.

Frequently asked questions

What is the job market.

The job market refers to the marketplace where individuals seek work and employers seek workers. The strength of the job market is considered one important measure of the current health of the broader economy. If more jobs are being created and demand for labor is high, it tends to reaffirm the presence of an expanding economy. By contrast, higher unemployment levels and low job growth (or a decline in job growth) indicate a slowing economy.

Why is the unemployment rate important?

The unemployment rate, reported monthly by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, provides significant insight into the health of the nation’s economy. Generally, the lower the unemployment rate, the stronger the economy is likely to be. The unemployment rate is also one of the mostly closely followed indicators. It’s important to note that the unemployment rate reflects people who are out of work but still seeking employment. It does not reflect others who have stopped looking for work or consider themselves no longer in the labor force.

How does the economy affect unemployment?

When the unemployment rate moves higher, it indicates potential weakening of the economy. Consumers may consider holding back on purchases if they have concerns that they, themselves, could face unemployment in the near future. If that occurs, it can potentially contribute to further economic weakness. When unemployment is low, it’s a good indicator that the economy is strong and expanding.

Related articles

Is the economy at risk of a recession?

The Federal Reserve is focused on fighting inflation with monetary policy intended to slow consumer demand. Does this put the economy at risk of a recession?

How to invest in today’s market

With inflation retreating and interest rate cuts likely coming later this year, how should investors position their portfolios to capitalize on potential opportunities, while guarding against risks?

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Job Openings and Labor Turnover Summary, March 2024,” May 1, 2024.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employment Situation Summary, April 2024,” May 3, 2024.

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Gross Domestic Product, First Quarter 2024 (Advance Estimate), April 25, 2024.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Job Openings and Labor Turnover Summary, March 2024,” May 1, 2024; and “Employment Situation Summary, April 2024,” May 3, 2024.

Source: U.S. Employment and Training Administration.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index Summary, April 2024,” May 15, 2024.

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Suburbanization Problems in the USSR : the Case of Moscow

• Référence bibliographique

Gornostayeva Galina A. Suburbanization Problems in the USSR : the Case of Moscow . In: Espace, populations, sociétés , 1991-2. Les franges périurbaines Peri-urban fringes. pp. 349-357.

DOI : https://doi.org/10.3406/espos.1991.1474

www.persee.fr/doc/espos_0755-7809_1991_num_9_2_1474

• RIS (ProCite, Endnote, ...)

Résumé (fre)

La suburbanisation n'existe pas en URSS au sens des phénomènes décrits dans les villes occidentales. Cependant on observe certains transferts limités d'activités industrielles exigeantes en espace ou polluantes, voire même de centres de recherches, vers les zones suburbaines ou des villes-satellites. Mais ces déconcentrations répondent à une logique de planification administrative. En outre, les Moscovites hésitent à aller habiter dans ces centres d'emploi, de crainte de perdre les privilèges liés à l'autorisation d'habiter Moscou (la propiska) et du fait des communications insuffisantes avec la capitale. Le taux de croissance de la population moscovite reste supérieur à celui du reste de l'oblast. Par contre le développement de datchas de seconde résidence est très important dans l'oblast de Moscou, en particulier aux alentours des stations de chemin de fer. L'abolition du système de propiska pourrait transformer les datchas les plus proches de Moscou en résidences principales.

Résumé (eng)

The suburbanisation does not exist as such in the USSR with the meaning one has of the phenomena in Western cities. Though one may notice some limited transfers of industrial activities demanding a lot of space or polluting ones, even research centres, towards the suburban areas or satellite-towns. But these déconcentrations correspond to an administrative planification logics. Moreover the Muscovites hesitate before going and living in these employment centres, because they are afraid of loosing the privileges linked with the authorisation to live in Moscow (the propiska) and because of insufficient communications with the capital. The growth rate of the Muscovite population remains higher than this of the remainder of the oblast. To the contrary developing of datchas for second residences is very high in the Moscow oblast, especially in the vicinity of a railway station. The abolishment of the «propiska» system might transform the datchas nearer to Moscow into main residences.

• Economic structure [link]
• Suburbanization of activities [link]
• Suburbanization of population [link]
• Conclusions [link]
• Literature [link]

Liste des illustrations

• Table 1. Employment structure, % [link]
• Table 2. Annual rate of population increase, % [link]
• Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of country-cottages and gardening associations in the Moscow region [link]

Texte intégral

Galina A. GORNOSTAYEVA

Moscow University

Suburbanization Problems

in the USSR :

the Case of Moscow

Suburbanization processes typical to cities in Western Europe, the USA and other countries are not observed in the USSR or they are distorted to such an extent that they may not be compared with existing standards. This states the question how Soviet cities-succeeded in escaping this stage of urban development. In order to answer this question, we should first summarize the main aspects of Western suburbanization.

Firstly, it is well known that the urbanization processes are linked to structural changes in the economy. Thus the transition from the stage of concentration to this of suburbanization is associated with industrialization, and the transition to the third stage - déconcentration - is related with the rapid growth of employment in the non-industrial sphere. Secondly, a suburbanization of economic activities can be distinguished. It applies in the first place to the building and iron- working industry, transports, engineering and chemical works. These are polluting and requiring extensive areas. This suburbanization of industry is caused by the following factors: rising demand for land from firms ; worsening of transport

tions in the inner cities ; demand for lower land costs and taxation levels in suburbs ; rapid growth of road transports; state policies regulating the growth of large cities ; migration of the labour force to the suburban zones. Scientific and educational activities are also transferred from the centre to the suburbs.

The third important aspect of suburbanization applies to the population. In the suburbs two opposite flows of population meet ; one is centripetal, coming from non- metropolitan regions, the other is centrifugal, coming from the central city. The reasons for the migration to the suburbs are as follows : declining living standards in large cities (overcrowding, slow housing renewal, environmental problems, etc.); growth of motorization of the population, development of communications (telephone, telex, fax, computer) ; intensifying decentralization of working places ; lower land prices in the suburbs ; state support for the intensification of real estate development in the suburbs. The above-mentioned factors and reasons for suburbanization are altered in the Soviet cities. Let us explore them, by taking for example the largest one - Moscow.

Economic structure

The employment structure in the USSR reveals sharp differences from those in developed urbanized countries. The USSR is characterized by a high share of employment in agriculture, industry, construction and a low share in the non-industrial sphere (tab. 1).

A correlation analysis of the percentage of urban population and employment in the different spheres of economic activity reveals that the share of urban population in the USSR is higher than in countries with the same percentage of persons employed in agriculture.

TABLE 1. EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE,

Source: personal calculations.

The urbanization processes in the Moscow Capital Region (MCR) are more intensive than in other regions of the USSR. Structural changes are more obvious here : the share of employment in the non-industrial sphere increases more substantially and the percentage of persons employed in industry and agriculture is lower than in the whole country. However the MCR cannot therefore be compared with a metropolitan region in a Western country. Although Moscow is the most advanced agglomeration in the USSR, it lags is far behind the major world cities in terms of development and it is at the very start of the post- industrial stage of its structural and urban transformation.

The structural «anomaly» of the USSR as a whole and of the MCR in particular is explained by the enforced process of industrialization (starting from the thirties) at the expense of the peasantry (thus, there is not only a booming industrial employment in cities, but also worsening living and working conditions in villages and forced collectivization having triggered off the massive rural emigration). As a result, the share of urban population in the USSR is higher than expected, based on changes in the economic structure. While urbanization in the developed countries was due, among

other causes, to an increasing labour efficiency in agriculture, this remained quite low in the USSR. Therefore the employment share in agriculture is overstated in comparison with countries with a similar percentage of urban population, and even this considerable part of the labour force is unable to feed the whole population of the country.

The share of agricultural employment in the mcr increased from 7,4 % to 7,6 °7o between 1980 and 1985 (as a result of Moscow attractiveness and the better living standards in its surrounding villages), whereas it continued to decline in other parts of the Central region. The population growth in villages adjacent to Moscow is especially intensive, though labour efficiency in localities near Moscow is higher than in the other oblasts. In spite of this, Moscow oblast provides only 61 % of milk, 34 °/o of potatoes, 45 % of vegetables and 23 % of meat needed by the population in Moscow city and oblast (Argumen- ty i facty, 1988, N50, p. 3). The structural anomaly is not only related to processes in agricultural sphere but also in industrial sector. As a result of the low economic mobility of socialist firms and of the absence of market relations, the industrial development was extensive,

without significant increases of the labour

productivity.

Thus the employment transfer from the

agricultural to the industrial sector, their

extensive development and their low labour

productivity are intrinsically related with the political definition of productiorfrela- tions and course of structural economic transformation.

Suburbanization of activities

Moscow and Moscow oblast show divergent economic structures and changes (tab. 1). In Moscow the employment share in the non-industrial sphere in Moscow is growing more rapidly, whereas the share of industrial employment is decreasing. In Moscow oblast the part of transport and communication infrastructure, retail trade, administration, housing (presently less developed than in Moscow) is increasing. Some stages in the transformation of activities in the mcr's settlements may be pointed out here. The stage of industrialization and reconstruction after World War II is characterized by the swift industrial development and the active restructuration of the Moscow and Moscow oblast economy. New industries have been built (motor-car and aircraft assembly, machine-tool industry, organic synthesis, etc.), around Moscow research and production potential. Nevertheless, this restructuration is extensive, since traditional industries don't curtail production. It favours the heavy concentration of modern functions in Moscow. There is no transfer of firms outside Moscow. Suburbanization of industrial activities did not occur because of the state owning the means of production and of thé socialist form of production relations. When research and technological progress are slowing down, these firms become inefficient and spatially immobile. The period 1956-1970 is marked by an intensive development of the region scientific sphere and by the rise of « satellite » urban policy. The new centres were specialized in modern branches of machinery and research-engineering activities and were undoubtedly very attractive for the population. Therefore towns like Dubna were growing rapidly. While the aim was to redirect part of Moscow population

growth, they display a quite specific relation with the capital. For instance, Muscovites working in Pushchino cannot reach their job every day because they lack transport facilities. Nevertheless, they don't wish to move and register their passports in the city in which they actually work, since they would have to give up their Moscow registration and then lose all Moscow privileges (see further). These new centres are isolated from information sources in Moscow. Poor telephone communications, lack of computers and telex systems hamper contacts and teamwork with colleagues in the city. It seems that material resources for experimental work in research centres are not sufficient to compensate for lack of information and communications. At the same time, poor transport links with Moscow and the other towns of Moscow oblast isolate the scientists from the higher standard of culture in the centre and from a well developed social infrastructure. An original home-work relation can be observed in Dubna: the Muscovites get the second registration of passports and live there in hostel apartments during 4 or 5 working days, during the weekends they go back to Moscow, where their families are living. The change of functions in Moscow oblast towns is still going on. Inside the towns of the first circle adjacent to Moscow, the share of employment in the non-industrial sectors and transport is growing. Inside the towns of the second circle (suburban zone) these changes lead to an increasing potential of non-industrial, industrial and construction functions. Finally, in the outlying parts of the region the further grovth of construction and industrial functions is observed and the organization potential is intensifying in some towns. The mcr towns display a crawling concen-

tration of the regional most important functions and their extension outside the boundaries of Moscow to the towns of the suburban zone. But the déconcentration of functions in the mcr is not only of natural- economic character. It also results from the state urban policy. Déconcentration is not related to the search for more advantageous sites for firms and institutions as regards to economic or social relations (the availability of cheaper labour force or more comfortable living conditions, etc.), nor is it sustained by the expansion of transport and communication facilities. Thus, this déconcentration is independent from curtailment of any function in central Moscow, whose potential is still growing, and it is also completely inadequate regarding the continuing concentration of population (see below). All this, together with the slow economic and territorial mobility of firms, is an obstacle to the economic restructuration of the region, and to the reorientation of Moscow and its suburbs to non-industrial activities and to progressive scientific and informational work. The mass labour-consuming functions still remain in Moscow and its suburbs, but they are inevitably cut off from modern types of activities.

The idea of alleviating Moscow's development appeared from the very beginning of its rapid growth, since the excessive concentration of population and employment led (as in the other major world cities) to environmental discomfort, worsening of transport, strip-holding of land and other congestion signs. In market economies, the firms react to alterations of economic or social conditions by their mobility: some

of them close, other relocate in more convenient places. In the USSR, the problem of firm transfer (unhealthy or unprofitable firms) becomes unsolvable because of the special type of production relations. Economic and territorial passivity of firms is apparent in the difficulties of erecting industrial buildings and dismantling machinery and equipment, in the low turnover of the means of production. The same problem exist regarding the labour force. Firms transferred to the suburban towns of Moscow oblast are encountering great difficulties in recruiting staff in sufficient numbers and of required skill. The local labour force is rather weak, while the Moscow workers wouldn't leave the capital to follow their firm, because they are afraid of being deprived of passport registration in Moscow. From the social point of view, giving up a Moscow registration is more significant to people than losing their job. The processes going on in the mcr are therefore not quite comparable with those in the Western world. The market economy is more «lively» and replacement of functions has the character of territorial waves. Some functions disappear while new ones emerge. In the mcr, the waves are replaced by stratification. New functions do not replace the old ones, but joining them. At the same time, this process of relative déconcentration of functions overpass the process of stable concentration of population. In the mcr, the modern branches are gravitated closely to Moscow, where skilled workers are retained by their registration advantages. Suburban towns have to be satisfied with commuters or specialists from the outlying regions of the USSR.

Suburbanization of population

The urbanization structure of the region is characterized by the predominance of its main centre - Moscow. The share of the capital in the total Moscow oblast population was as follows: in 1929 - 44,3 Vo, in 1939 - 51,6 %, in 1959 - 54,9 %, in 1979 -54,5 Vo, in 1985 - 57,3 % (Moscow Capital Region, p. 137.). Within the agglomeration, the share of Moscow is still higher, in 1959 it was 75,5 % and in 1985

- 67,3 % (ibid., p. 141), whereas in the highly developed capital regions of the world the agglomeration counts one half or less of the total population and of the economic potential, the second half being concentrated in the suburbs (Gritsay, p. 71). Moreover, the growth rate of Moscow population is higher than that of Moscow oblast (tab . 2).

TABLE 2. ANNUAL RATE OF POPULATION INCREASE,

Migrations are of great importance to the mcr. The internal migration of rural population to the cities is rather substantial, and the immigration flow from the rest of the USSR is not compensated by the decrease of rural population in the mcr. The nearer a town to Moscow, the larger the migration share in its total population increase.

The dynamics of population in the mcr has a specific character. In agglomerations of the developed countries the principle of the «broken glass» summarizes the suburbanization process. When, for some reasons, the centre loses its attractiveness the urban population moves to suburbs in search of higher living standard. In Moscow agglomeration the principle of the «overfilled glass» is operating. People wanting to live in Moscow cannot enter the city and are forced to settle near it. In Moscow immigration undoubtedly prevails over emigration, confirming the extreme territorial differentiation in conditions, level and way of life. As a rule, commuting is oriented from suburbs to Moscow (600 thousand persons come to Moscow and only 200 thousand leave it), but it accounts only for 12-15 % cf the total employment in Moscow's economy. Moreover, these commuters are not Muscovites but potential new inhabitants of the capital (striving for passport registration and domicile in Moscow).

Moscow became the most attractive place for living and an intensive flow of ruined rural residents as well as residents from other regions of the country were rushing -to Moscow. These processes were generated not only by the inception of the country structural economic transformation,

but also by the policy of special privileges for Moscow. These privileges came into being after the establishment of a centralized distribution system. Such a system involves the assignment of a priority level of foodstuffs and manufactured goods to each territory. Moscow was awarded the highest priority level. From the very beginning, better living standards and higher income for certain population categories were established there. In the thirties the artificial differentiation in living standards was confirmed by imposing restrictions to passport registration in the capital, and also by the division of administrative bodies into Moscow and Moscow oblast authorities. In the period 1925-30 dozens of new large firms were located in Moscow, but housing was insufficient at that time. Therefore, a great number of migrants from every corner of the country came to get a job in Moscow and settled in cottages in the nearby countryside. Soon, these settlements in the nearby countryside. Soon, these settlements turned into urban ones. For example, towns like Mytishchi and Luberstsy developed rapidly, and even Muscovites moved there when the railways were electrified. This was clearly the outset of a suburbanization process, but it stopped as soon as the restrictions on passport registration in Moscow were imposed and the social barrier between Moscow and Moscow oblast was established. In the period 1930-40, new industrial developments were banned from Moscow and firms drawn towards the city were located on the outskirts thus causing a rapid growth of the old and new towns. Although the development of cottages as second residence near Moscow started even before the revolution, since the en-

vironmental degradation of Moscow was practically completed at that time, they became the main resorts of those years. They had flourished in the districts with privileged natural conditions and convenient transport services (not further than 2 km from a railway station). In the period 1930-40, this sprawl of leisure housing carried on - cottage settlements expanded into an entire belt of scattered one- storeyed buildings. But at the same time, urban multi-storeyed housing also increased and after World War II these multi- storeyed buildings were found in the cottage settlements of the leisure zone. In the period 1950-60 a network of gardening associations was established. In those

years the most convenient land near Moscow had already been built on. The gardening plots allotted to the Muscovites were located in the remote parts of the mcr, outside the suburban zone, and very frequently they were on improper territories. Because of their remoteness, the difficulties in cultivation and building, the lack of infrastructure, these plots cannot become effective leisure resorts. More frequently Muscovites use them for fruit and vegetable growing.

The desire of the Muscovites for having a second residence in the suburbs can be interpreted as an unfulfilled suburbanization tendency. This desire has the same, mainly environmental, causes as suburbaniza-

tion in Western countries. The cottages within the reach of Moscow's traffic and having access to appropriate infrastructure and amenities, might become the principal residence of Muscovites if passport registration is abolished. The restrictions of passport registration in Moscow fixed in the thirties were devised as an administrative solution against the effects of Moscow's unique attractiveness and not as a means of eliminating the attractiveness itself. For this reason, Moscow became even more attractive, like a forbidden fruit. The consequences were both the concentration of the upper strata of society in the city and the extensive development of industry, resulting in a growing shortage of unskilled labour.

The shortage of regular workers in Moscow is sometimes explained by the increasing number of working places. An adequate planning of the «limiters» (1) system is then put forward as the solution for controlling the growth of Moscow is found in (Glushkova, 1988, p. 43). To be frank, about twenty industrial units and more than one hundred scientific institutions were already created in the seventies alone, in spite of the industrial building ban in Moscow, only a few firms moved outside the city in return. New industrial units easily find staff, since they offer new machinery, relatively good working conditions and higher wages. New scientific and administrative institutions are in a similar position. But the situation is totally different in the old industrial units, with rundown equipment and a high level of manual tasks. Those units suffer from a staff shortage. Moreover, as in any other city, there is a social mobility in Moscow, in most cases improving - from manual up to mental, from unskilled up to highly skilled work. Furthermore, the prestige of a higher education (university) is overestimated in Moscow, whereas the prestige of the manual professions has declined as a result of the stagnation of reinvestments in industry, the high share of manual labour (40 %), and also favouritism and

crowding in the administrative staffs. The attractiveness of an upper class position is therefore overestimated, and social mobility activated. Since Moscow cannot admit free «immigrants» the lower strata of the social structure are vacant and there appears a shortage of unskilled labour force. The lower strata of the social structure were filled in with « limiters ». Available employment in Moscow was not the cause of an organized immigration flow, but represented the only possible way to register the passport there. Roughly half of these people drawn into Moscow's economy left their jobs. «Limiters» get the right to register their passports in Moscow and take up their residence in new houses when their contract expires. They usually quit their job as soon as possible in search of better working conditions (Glushkova, 1988, p. 42). The nature of unskilled work in Moscow and the associated working conditions are so unattractive that it is nearly impossible to find Muscovites willing to perform them.

The institution of passport registration raised many problems. Thus the « limiters » are recruited in social groups not needing most of the advantages of a large city, their psychology and value system differ sharply from native Muscovites. The direct environment of the hostels where «limiters » live, has a pronounced criminal character. Fictitious marriage in order to register the passport in Moscow has become a widespread practice.

Moscow's environmental problems can hardly be solved as long as passport registration exists. The population is literally locked up within the city boundaries. Notwithstanding the environmental stresses, the Moscow privileges prevent the Muscovites from leaving the city. The urban districts not saturated with harmful industrial units are the most prestigious. The social and economic causes of Moscow's extensive growth reveal that its problems are a reflection of the ones facing the USSR. The concentration of economic, social and management functions in Mos-

cow in Soviet times materializes the strong centralism of the particraty and weighs down on the city's development. Low labour efficiency in agriculture and sheer desolation of villages on the one hand, rapid but extensive industrialisation together with forced increasing social attraction of Moscow, confirmed by the restrictions on passport registration, on the other hand, were the key factors of the mcr's polarization during decades. Together with objective factors found in other large cities of the world, subjective factors related to the Soviet political and economic system influence Moscow's growth.

The objective factors are as follows: the diversity of employment in the capital, the emergence of new types of occupations, the concentration of high-skilled and creative labour, the higher living standards, the large educational and cultural opportunities.

The subjective factors are the higher supply level of foodstuff and manufactured goods different than in other regions (the existence of meat-rationing system in many regions of the country and its absence in Moscow establishes a significant threshold not only in terms of supply but also in the outlook of the population); the lack of communications and individual motorized transport (in the rsfsr one counts 47 cars per 1000 urban inhabitants against 560 in the USA) (Argumenty i facty, 1988, N47, p. 2); the craving for joining the upper social classes and for accessing neighbourhoods with a high quality of life; unjustified promotion of upward social mobility releasing «the ground floors» of Moscow's economy; continued growth of employment due to the extensive economic development and the low economic and territorial mobility of firms. Today, the hierarchy of priorities for selecting a residence within the mcr and the whole country is as follows. Food supply comes first. The supply of manufactured

goods, the opportunities to obtain better and larger living quarters and to accede to a prestigious employment with a wage increase, social promotion, well developed consumer services come next. And only at the end of the scale appears the opportunity to fulfil cultural needs and education. Thus, there is a process of «pseudo- urbanization» characteristic of the Soviet economic and social system, superimposed on the process of «natural» urbanization. By natural urbanization we mean the process related to economic development and to the natural difference between rural and urban ways of life. The specificity, the structural changes and the hierarchy of city functions shape the migration flows conditioned by natural urbanization. «Pseudo-urbanization» points to «the scum» of the process, that may complete the economic and socially conditioned urbanization. The «pseudo-urbanization» is generated by a disproportionate development of the country's economic structure (hypertrophie share of industry; economic and political reforms have triggered off a massive flow of the peasantry towards the cities, related not with the rising but with the lowering of labour efficiency in agriculture, with impoverishment of the countryside and hence with the urge towards the centres of relative well-being), and by the territorial inequalities in standards of living, artificially created and maintained by the institution of passports and registration.

The suburbanization of population cannot be observed in the MCR. The centripetal tendencies mentioned above resulted in rapid growth of Moscow and its suburbs, as well as in some stagnation of its periphery. Thus Moscow agglomeration is now in the first stage of development, the stage of «crawling» concentration where centrifugal forces are very weak. This situation will last as long as the barrier in terms of standards of living exists between Moscow and Moscow oblast.

Conclusions

This study has reaffirmed the general lack of suburbanization in the Soviet cities. Some signs of suburbanization like the

transfer of some activities from Moscow to the suburbs, the concentration of population in towns and villages near the central

city and commuting, differ significantly pie and firms will emancipate, only if the from the Western cities. The process of ur- existing political and economic system in banization will take its normal course, peo- the USSR is dismantled.

Argumenty i facty, 1988, N47, p. 2 Argumenty i facty, 1988, N50, p. 3

GLUSHKOVA V.G. Questions of Interrelated Settlement in Moscow and the Moscow Region, Problems of Geography, vol. 131, Moscow, 1988, pp. 40-56.

GRITSAY O.V. Western Europe : Regional Contrasts at the New Stage of Scientific-Technological Progress, Moscow, 1988, 148 p.

Moscow in Figures. 1980, Moscow, 1981, 220 p. Moscow in Figures. 1985, Moscow, 1986, 240 p.

National Economy of Moscow Oblast. 1981-1985, Moscow, 1986, 271 p.

National Economy of the ussr. 1985, Moscow, 1986, 421 p. Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 1987, Geneva, 1987, 960 p.

Moscow Capital Region: Territorial Structure and Natural Environment, Moscow, 1988, 321 p.

(1) Limiters are unskilled workers, hired in an organised way by Moscow firms; after working there for several years of working they get the right to register

their passports and to take up their residence in Moscow.

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Savvino-storozhevsky monastery and museum.

Zvenigorod's most famous sight is the Savvino-Storozhevsky Monastery, which was founded in 1398 by the monk Savva from the Troitse-Sergieva Lavra, at the invitation and with the support of Prince Yury Dmitrievich of Zvenigorod. Savva was later canonised as St Sabbas (Savva) of Storozhev. The monastery late flourished under the reign of Tsar Alexis, who chose the monastery as his family church and often went on pilgrimage there and made lots of donations to it. Most of the monastery’s buildings date from this time. The monastery is heavily fortified with thick walls and six towers, the most impressive of which is the Krasny Tower which also serves as the eastern entrance. The monastery was closed in 1918 and only reopened in 1995. In 1998 Patriarch Alexius II took part in a service to return the relics of St Sabbas to the monastery. Today the monastery has the status of a stauropegic monastery, which is second in status to a lavra. In addition to being a working monastery, it also holds the Zvenigorod Historical, Architectural and Art Museum.

Belfry and Neighbouring Churches

Located near the main entrance is the monastery's belfry which is perhaps the calling card of the monastery due to its uniqueness. It was built in the 1650s and the St Sergius of Radonezh’s Church was opened on the middle tier in the mid-17th century, although it was originally dedicated to the Trinity. The belfry's 35-tonne Great Bladgovestny Bell fell in 1941 and was only restored and returned in 2003. Attached to the belfry is a large refectory and the Transfiguration Church, both of which were built on the orders of Tsar Alexis in the 1650s.  

To the left of the belfry is another, smaller, refectory which is attached to the Trinity Gate-Church, which was also constructed in the 1650s on the orders of Tsar Alexis who made it his own family church. The church is elaborately decorated with colourful trims and underneath the archway is a beautiful 19th century fresco.

Nativity of Virgin Mary Cathedral

The Nativity of Virgin Mary Cathedral is the oldest building in the monastery and among the oldest buildings in the Moscow Region. It was built between 1404 and 1405 during the lifetime of St Sabbas and using the funds of Prince Yury of Zvenigorod. The white-stone cathedral is a standard four-pillar design with a single golden dome. After the death of St Sabbas he was interred in the cathedral and a new altar dedicated to him was added.

Under the reign of Tsar Alexis the cathedral was decorated with frescoes by Stepan Ryazanets, some of which remain today. Tsar Alexis also presented the cathedral with a five-tier iconostasis, the top row of icons have been preserved.

Tsaritsa's Chambers

The Nativity of Virgin Mary Cathedral is located between the Tsaritsa's Chambers of the left and the Palace of Tsar Alexis on the right. The Tsaritsa's Chambers were built in the mid-17th century for the wife of Tsar Alexey - Tsaritsa Maria Ilinichna Miloskavskaya. The design of the building is influenced by the ancient Russian architectural style. Is prettier than the Tsar's chambers opposite, being red in colour with elaborately decorated window frames and entrance.

At present the Tsaritsa's Chambers houses the Zvenigorod Historical, Architectural and Art Museum. Among its displays is an accurate recreation of the interior of a noble lady's chambers including furniture, decorations and a decorated tiled oven, and an exhibition on the history of Zvenigorod and the monastery.

Palace of Tsar Alexis

The Palace of Tsar Alexis was built in the 1650s and is now one of the best surviving examples of non-religious architecture of that era. It was built especially for Tsar Alexis who often visited the monastery on religious pilgrimages. Its most striking feature is its pretty row of nine chimney spouts which resemble towers.

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California Gained 5,200 Nonfarm Payroll Jobs in April 2024

NR No. 24-18 Contact: Loree Levy/Aubrey Henry 916-654-9029 [email protected]

Important Note : The employment data for the month of April 2024 is taken from the survey week including April 12. Data for May is scheduled for release on June 21, 2024.

Unemployment Rate Remains Unchanged for Third Consecutive Month

SACRAMENTO – California’s employers added 5,200 nonfarm payroll jobs 1 in April 2024 and the unemployment rate remained unchanged for a third consecutive month holding steady at 5.3 percent 2 , according to data released by the Employment Development Department (EDD). April’s job gain follows a revised job gain of 18,200 for March 2024.

California's Labor Market, by the Numbers...

• The State’s jobs market expansion entered its 48 th month in April 2024. Since April 2020, California has gained 3,057,800 jobs, which averages out to 63,704 per month.
• The state’s current job growth started in August 2023 and has amounted to a total gain of 200,300 jobs. This reflects a rebound from the slowdown during the prior 10 months as the state economy settled following its dramatic post-pandemic recovery.
• Five of California's 11 industry sectors gained jobs in April with Private Education & Health Services (+11,900) posting the largest month-over gain for the fourth consecutive month.
• Trade, Transportation, and Utilities (+5,100) also showed noticeable growth as above-average gains were seen in the Truck Transportation and the Couriers and Messengers industry groups.
• Construction (-6,000) saw a small reduction in jobs due to lingering stormy weather conditions affecting construction projects across the state. The industry remains up 15,100 jobs over the year.

1. The unemployment rate comes from a separate federal survey of 5,100 California households.

2. The nonfarm payroll job numbers come from a federal survey of 80,000 California businesses.

Data Trends about Jobs in the Economy

Total Nonfarm Payroll Jobs (Comes from a monthly survey of approximately 80,000 California businesses that estimates jobs in the economy – seasonally adjusted)

• Month-over – Total nonfarm jobs in California’s 11 major industries amounted to 17,991,300 in April – a net gain of 5,200 from March. This followed a downward revised (-10,100) month-over gain of 18,200 jobs in March.
• Year-over – Total nonfarm jobs increased by 206,500 (a 1.2 percent increase) from April 2023 to April 2024 compared to the U.S. annual gain of 2,802,000 jobs (a 1.8 percent increase)

California Industries Payroll Jobs by Biggest Month-Over Change

Total Farm Jobs – While the number of jobs in the agriculture industry decreased from by 11,700 from March to a total of 414,700 jobs in April, the agriculture industry did have 30,800 more farm jobs in April 2024 than it did in April a year ago.

Data Trends about Workers in the Economy

Employment and Unemployment in California (Based on a monthly federal survey of 5,100 California households which focuses on workers in the economy)

• Employed – The number of Californians employed in April was 18,319,100, an increase of 5,800 persons from March’s total of 18,313,300, but down 115,100 from the employment total in April 2023.
• Unemployed – The number of unemployed Californians was 1,027,000 in April, a decrease of 5,900 over the month, and up 164,700 in comparison to April 2023. This is the second time in five months the total unemployed has declined.

Employment and Unemployment in California

* Labor force by place of residence, including workers involved in trade disputes.

Unemployment Insurance Claims (Not Seasonally Adjusted)

The following data is from a sample week that includes the 19 th of each month: In related data that figures into the State’s unemployment rate, there were 411,413 people certifying for Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits during the April 2024 sample week. That compares to 446,130 people in March and 427,741 people in April 2023. Concurrently, 45,136 initial claims were processed in the April 2024 sample week, which was a month-over increase of 4,136 claims from March and a year-over increase of 2,799 claims from April 2023.

Unemployment Insurance Claims (not seasonally adjusted)

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