essay about virtues in life

Inner Strength For Life – The 12 Master Virtues

Our journey of growth in life can be described as a journey of developing both insights and also virtues (qualities of mind and heart). This article maps out what are the main qualities to develop, and what particular strengths or gifts are gained from each of them.

Developing virtues is not about being better than others, but about developing the potential of our own heart and mind. The philosophers of ancient Greece , Buddha , the Yogis, and the Positive Psychology movement all value the cultivation of certain personal qualities. In this essay I attempt to systematize these core strengths into 12 “buckets” or “power virtues”, as many of them share common features.

Each of these virtues, rather than being an inborn personal trait, are habits  and states of mind  that can be consciously cultivated using a systematic approach.

There are many books written about each of these virtues. In this post I can only cover a brief introduction of each, and suggest some further reading. Finally, I have separated them into virtues of mind and heart only for the sake of exposition – in truth there is great overlap between both.

Let us begin by talking about the need to develop virtues holistically.

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What is a Virtue

Balanced self-development, tranquility, virtues list, parting thoughts.

A virtue is a positive character trait that is consider a foundation for living well, and a key ingredient to greatness.

For some, the word “virtue” may have a bit of a Victorian puritanism associated with it. This is not my understanding of it, nor is this the spirit of this article.

Rather, a virtue is a personal asset , a shield to protect us from difficulty, trouble, and suffering. Each virtue is a special sort of “power” that enables us to experience a level of well-being that we wouldn’t be able to access otherwise. Indeed, “virtue”comes from the latin virtus (force, worth, power).

Let’s take the virtue of equanimity as an example.

Developing equanimity protects us from suffering through the ups and downs of life, and saves us from the pain of being criticized, wronged, or left behind. It unlocks a new level of well-being: the emotional stability of knowing we will always be ok.

The same is true for every virtue discussed in this essay.

We all have certain personal qualities more naturally developed than the others. And our tendency is often to double-down on the virtues that we already have, rather than developing  complementary virtues . For instance, people who are good at self-discipline may focus on getting even better at that, and overlook the need to develop the opposing virtue of flexibility.

There is no doubt that we need to play our strengths . But when we focus solely on our strengths and use them to overcompensate our weaknesses, the result is often not good. We can become victims of our own blessings.

Let’s take the case of a person whose natural strength is compassion and kindness. In certain relationships, this might be abused by other people (directly or indirectly). Dealing with this situation by becoming kinder would not be wise. Instead, the opposing virtue of self-assertiveness (the courage of setting boundaries), is to be exercised.

Here are some other examples of virtues that are incomplete (and potentially harmful) in isolation:

• Tranquility without joy and energy is stale;
• Detachment and equanimity without love can be cold;
• Trust without wisdom can be blind;
• Morality without humility can be self-righteous;
• Love without wisdom can cause harm to oneself;
• Focus and courage without love and wisdom is just blind power.

It took me years to get to this precious insight – and I’ll probably need a lifetime to learn how to implement it. 😉

Funnily enough, afterwards I discovered that this was already a concept praised by the Stoics. In Stoicism, it is called anacoluthia , the mutual entailment of virtues.

The point is: we need to focus on our strengths, but we also need to pay attention to the virtues we lack the most. Any development in these areas, however small, has the potential to be life-changing. I go deeper into this topic here .

Have a look at your current strengths. What complementary virtues might you be overlooking?

Best Virtues of Mind

“Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one’s courage.” – Anais Nin

Related qualities: boldness, fearlessness, decisiveness, leadership, assertiveness, confidence, magnanimity.

Courage says: “The consequences of this action might be painful for me, but it’s the right thing to do. I’ll do it.”

Courage is the ability to hold on to the feeling “I need to do this”, ignore the fear mongering thoughts, and take action. For a few, it is the absence of fear; for most, it’s the willingness to act despite fear.

Examples: It takes courage to expose yourself, to try something new, to change directions, to take a risk, to let go of an attachment, to say “I was wrong”, to have a difficult conversation, to trust yourself. Its manifestations are many, both in small and big things in life.

Without courage we feel powerless. Because we know what we want to do, or what we need to do, but we lack the boldness to take action. We default to the easy way out, the path of least resistance. It might feel comfortable now, but in the long term it doesn’t make us happy.

Recommended book: Daring Greatly (Brené Brown)

“The more tranquil a man becomes, the greater his success, his influence, his power for good. Calmness of mind is one of the beautiful jewels of wisdom.” – James Allen

Related qualities: serenity, calmness, non-reactivity, gentleness, peace, acceptance.

Tranquility says:  “There is no need to stress. All is well.”

Tranquility involves keeping your mind and heart calm, like the ocean’s depth. You take your time to perceive what’s going on and act purposefully, without agitation, without hurry, and without overreacting. On a deeper level, it means to diminish rumination, worries, and useless thinking.

Examples:  Taking a deep breath before answering an email or phone call, or before responding to the hurtful behavior of someone else. Being ok with the fact that things are often not going to go as we expect. Not brooding about the past or worrying too much about the future. Shunning busyness in favor of a more purposeful living. Not living in fight-or-flight mode.

Without tranquility we expend more energy than what’s really needed. We experience a constant feeling of stress, anxiety, or agitation in the back of our minds. And sometimes we may be fooling ourselves thinking we are being “active” or “productive”.

Recommended book: The Path to Tranquility (Dalai Lama)

“Success is going from failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm.” -Winston Churchill

Related qualities: energy, enthusiasm, passion, vitality, zeal, perseverance, willpower, determination, discipline, self-control, resolution, mindfulness, steadfastness, tenacity, grit.

Diligence says: “I am committed to this work / habit / path. I will continue it no matter what , even in the face of challenges, discouragement, and tiredness.”

Some may say that it is the most essential virtue for success in any field – career, art, sports or business. It is about making a decision once, in something that is good for you, and then keeping it up despite adversities and mood fluctuations.

Examples: Deciding to stop smoking and never again lighting acigarette. Deciding that I will meditate every day and keeping that up, like a perfect habit chain. Showing up to train / study / work in your passion project day after day, regardless of how you feel. Always getting up as soon as you fall. Having an unbreakable, almost stubborn, determination. Treating challenges like energy bars.

Without diligence we can’t accomplish anything meaningful. We can’t properly take care of our health, finances, mind, or relationships. We give up on everything too soon. We can’t create good habits, break bad habits, or manifest the things we want in our lives. We are a victim of circumstances, social/familial conditioning, and genetics.

Recommended books: The Willpower Instinct (Kelly McGonigal), Grit  (Angela Duckworth), Power of Habit (Charles Duhhig)

“The powers of the mind are like the rays of the sun – when they are concentrated they illumine.” – Swami Vivekananda

Related qualities: concentration, one-pointedness, depth, contemplation, essentialism, meditation, orderliness.

Focus says: “I will ignore distractions, ignore the thousand different trivial things, and put all my energy in the most important thing. I will keep going deeper into what really matters. I can tame my own mind.”

Focus, the ability to control your attention, is the core skill of meditation . It involves bringing your mind, moment after moment, to dwell where you want it to dwell, rather than being pulled by the gravity of all the noise going on inside and outside of you.

Examples:  Bringing your mind again and again to your breathing or mantra , during meditation. Cutting down on social media, TV and gossip. Learning to say “no” to 90% of good  opportunities, so you can say yes to the 10% of  great  opportunities. Staying on your chosen path and not chasing the next shiny thing.

Without focus  our energy is dissipated and our progress in any field is limited (like moving one mile in ten directions, rather than ten miles in a single direction). Focus, together with motivation and diligence, is a type of fire, and as such it needs to be balanced with more water-like virtues.

Recommended book: Essentialism (Greg McKeown)

“Happy is the man who can endure the highest and lowest fortune. He who has endured such vicissitudes with equanimity has deprived misfortune of its power.” – Seneca the Younger

Related qualities: balance, temperance, patience, forbearance, tolerance, acceptance, resilience, fortitude.

Equanimity says: “In highs and lows, victory and defeat, pleasure and pain, gain or loss – I keep evenness of temper. Nothing can mess me up.”

It is the ability to accept the present moment without emotional reaction, without agitation. It’s being unfuckwithable  , imperturbable.

Examples:  Not going into despair when we miss an opportunity, or lose some money. Not feeling elated when praised, or discouraged when criticized. Not taking offense from other people. Not indulging in emotional reactions to gain or loss, whatever shape they take. Being modest in success, and gracious in defeat.

Without equanimity , life is an emotional roller-coaster. We are attached to the highs, which brings pain because they are short-lived. And we are uncomfortable (perhaps even fearful) with the lows – which  also brings pain, because they can’t be fully avoided.

Recommended book: Letters from a Stoic (Seneca), Dhammapada (Buddha)

“A great man is always willing to be little.” – Ralph Waldo Emerson

Related qualities: modesty, humbleness, discretion, egolessness, lack of conceit, simplicity, prudence, respect.

Humility says: “There are many things that I don’t know. Every person I meet is my teacher in something.”

Humility is letting go of the desire to feel superior to other people, either by means of wealth, fame, intelligence, beauty, titles, or influence. It’s about not comparing yourself with others, to be either superior or inferior. In the words of C.S. Lewis, True humility is not about thinking less of yourself; it is thinking of yourself less . In the deepest sense, humility is about transcending the ego.

This virtue is especially needed for overachievers and “successful people”.

Examples: Accepting your own mistakes. Learning to see virtue and good in others. Not dwelling on vanity and feelings of inflated self-importance. Being genuinely happy with other people’s successes. Accepting the uncertainty of life, and how small we are.

Without humility , we live stuck in an ego trap which prevents us from growing beyond the confines of our self-interests, and also poisons our relationships.

Recommended books: Ego is the Enemy (Ryan Holiday),  Humility: An Unlikely Biography of America’s Greatest Virtue

“Always do what is right. It will gratify half of mankind and astound the other.” – Mark Twain

Related qualities: character, justice, honor, truthfulness, sincerity, honesty, responsibility, reliability, morality, righteousness, ethics, idealism, loyalty, dignity.

Integrity says: “I will do what is right, according to my conscience, even if nobody is looking. I will choose thoughts and words based on my values, not on personal gains. I will be radically honest and authentic, with myself and others.”

Like many virtues, integrity is about choosing what is best , rather than what is easy . It invites us to resist instant gratification in favor of a higher type of satisfaction – that of doing the right thing. It’s not about being moralistic, but about being congruent to our own conscience and values, in all our actions.

Examples: Refusing to distort the truth in order to gain personal benefits. Sticking to our words. Acting as though all our real intentions were publicly visible by others. Letting go of the “but I can get away with it” thinking. Not promising what you know you cannot fulfill.

Without integrity , we are not perceived as trustable or genuine. We make decisions that favor a short term gain but are likely to bring disastrous consequences in the long run.

Recommended books: Lying (Sam Harris), Yoga Morality (Georg Feuerstein)

“Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom” – Aristotle

Related qualities: intelligence, discernment, insight, understanding, knowledge, transcendence, perspective, discrimination, contemplation, investigation, clarity, vision.

Wisdom says: “Let me contemplate deeply on this. Let me understand it from the inside out. Let me know myself.”

Unlike the other virtues listed so far, wisdom it is not something that you can directly practice. Rather, it is the result of contemplation, introspection, study, and experience. It unveils the other virtues, informs them, and makes their practice easier. It points out the truth behind the surface, and the connection among things.

Without wisdom , we don’t really know what we are doing. Life is small, often confusing, and there might be a sense of purposelessness.

Recommended books: This depends on your taste for traditional and philosophy ( here is my list). Or you can also join my Practical Wisdom Newsletter .

Best Virtues of Heart

“You have to trust in something – your gut, destiny, life, karma, whatever.” – Steve Jobs

Related qualities: optimism, faith, openness, devotion, hope.

Trust says: “There is something larger than me. Life flows better when I trust resources larger than my own, and when I see purpose in random events.”

Trust is not a whimsical expectation that things will happen according to your preference; but rather a faith that things will happen in favor of your greater good. As Tony Robbins says, it is the attitude that life is happening for you , not to you .

Examples: Not dwelling on negative interpretations of what has happened in your life. Trusting that there is something good to be learned or gained from any situation. Having the feeling that if you keep true to your path, things will eventually work out ok.

Without trust , life can feel lonely, scary, or unfair. You are on your own, in the midst of random events, in a cold and careless universe.

Recommended book: Radical Acceptance (Tara Brach)

“Remain cheerful, for nothing destructivecan piece through the solid wall of cheerfulness.” – Sri Chinmoy

Related qualities: contentment, cheerfulness, satisfaction, gratitude, humor, appreciation.

Joy says: “I am cheerful, content, happy, and grateful. There is always something good in anything that happens. I feel well in my own skin, without depending on anything else.”

The disposition for joy is something that can be consciously cultivated. It is often the result of good vitality in the body, peace of mind, and an attitude of appreciation. It is also a natural consequence of a deep meditation practice , and the letting go of clinging.

Examples: Feeling good as a result of the positive states you have cultivated in your body (health), mind (peace), and heart (gratitude).

Without joy we are unhappy, cranky, gloomy, pessimistic, bored, neurotic.

Recommended books: The How of Happiness (Sonja Lyubomirsky), The Book of Joy (Dalai Lama et ali)

“The tighter you squeeze, the less you have.” – Zen Saying

Related qualities: dispassion, non-attachment, forgiveness, letting go, moderation, flexibility, frugality.

Detachment says: “I interact with things, I experience things, but I do not own them. Everything passes. I can let them be, and let them go.”

Learning how to let go is one of the most important things in overcoming suffering. It doesn’t mean that we live life less intensely; rather, we do what we are called to do with zest, and then we step back and watch what happens, without anxiety. It doesn’t mean we don’t love, play, work, or seek with intensity; but rather that we are detached from the results, knowing that we have full control only over the effort we make.

At the deepest level, detachment is a disillusionment with external desires and goals, and there is the realization that the only reliable source of happiness is internal. It also involves not holding onto any particular state.

Examples: Not being anxious about what the future brings. Letting go when things need to go. “Opening the hand” of your mind and allowing things to flow as they will. Having the feeling of not needing  anything .

Without detachment,  we suffer loss again and again. We can be manipulated. The mind is an open field for worries, fear, and insecurity.

Recommended books: Letting Go (David R. Hawkins),  Everything Arises, Everything Falls Away (Ajahn Chah)

Check also my online course on the topic:  Letting Go, Letting Be .

“The more you lose yourself in something bigger than yourself, the more energy you will have.” – Norman Vincent Peale

Related qualities: love, compassion, friendliness, service, generosity, sacrifice, selflessness, cooperation, nonviolence, consideration, tact, sensitivity.

Kindness says: “I feel others as myself, and take pleasure in doing good for them, in giving and serving. I wish everyone well. The well-being of others is my well-being.”

Kindness and related virtues (love, compassion, consideration) is the core “social virtue”. It invites us to expand our sense of well-being to include others as well. It gives us the ability to put ourselves in another person’s shoes, and feel what they feel as if it is happening to us, and if appropriate do something about it. The result is the experience of the “helper’s high”, a mix of dopamine and oxytocin.

At it’s most basic level, this virtue tell us to do unto others as you would have them do unto you . At the deepest level, it says “We are all one”.

Examples: Offering a word of encouragement or advice. Listening without judgment. Helping someone in need, directly or indirectly. Teaching. Assuming the best in others. Volunteering. Doing something for someone who can never repay you.

Without kindness , we cannot build any true human connection, and we fail to experience a happiness that is larger than ourself.

Recommended books: The Power of Kindness (Pierro Ferrucci), Awakening Loving-Kindness (Pema Chodron)

Here is the full list of virtues. The ones that are very similar are grouped together.

• Acceptance. Letting go.
• Contentment. Joyfulness.
• Confidence. Boldness. Courage. Assertiveness.
• Forgiveness. Magnanimity. Clemency.
• Honesty. Authenticity. Truthfulness. Sincerity. Integrity.
• Kindness. Generosity. Compassion. Empathy. Friendliness.
• Loyalty. Trustworthiness. Reliability.
• Perseverance. Determination. Purposefulness. Tenacity.
• Willpower. Self-control. Fortitude. Self-discipline.
• Loyalty. Commitment. Responsibility.
• Caringness. Consideration. Support. Service.
• Cooperation. Unity.
• Humility. Simplicity.
• Creativity. Imagination.
• Detachment.
• Wisdom. Thoughtfulness. Insight.
• Dignity. Honor. Respect.
• Energy. Motivation. Zest. Enthusiasm. Passion.
• Resilience. Grit. Tolerance. Patience.
• Excellence.
• Orderliness. Purity. Clarity.
• Prudence. Awareness. Tactfulness. Preparedness.
• Temperance. Balance. Moderation.
• Justice. Fairness.
• Trust. Faith. Hope. Optimism.
• Calmnes. Serenity. Centeredness. Peace.
• Grace. Elegance. Gentleness.
• Flexibility. Adaptability.

Developing these virtues is a life-long process. We’ll probably never be perfect at them. But the more we cultivate them, the better our life becomes. And, chances are, simply reading about these virtues has already enlivened them in you.

One simple way of cultivating these virtues is to focus on a single virtue each week (or month), and look daily for opportunities to put that chosen quality into practice. Keep asking yourself throughout the day, “What does it mean to be [virtue]?”

However, if you want to develop them more systematically, with practical exercises and support, consider joining my Intermediate Meditation Course . In this online program, besides learning 10 different types of meditation, you will find lessons focused on developing 10 different character strengths/virtues.

Another option is to work in person with me as your coach .

Every step taken on developing these virtues is valuable. By developing them we grow as a person, expand our awareness, and have better tools to live a happy and meaningful life.

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Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.

This is not to say that only virtue ethicists attend to virtues, any more than it is to say that only consequentialists attend to consequences or only deontologists to rules. Each of the above-mentioned approaches can make room for virtues, consequences, and rules. Indeed, any plausible normative ethical theory will have something to say about all three. What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental. Rather, virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them.

We begin by discussing two concepts that are central to all forms of virtue ethics, namely, virtue and practical wisdom. Then we note some of the features that distinguish different virtue ethical theories from one another before turning to objections that have been raised against virtue ethics and responses offered on its behalf. We conclude with a look at some of the directions in which future research might develop.

1.2 Practical Wisdom

2.1 eudaimonist virtue ethics, 2.2 agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, 2.3 target-centered virtue ethics, 2.4 platonistic virtue ethics, 3. objections to virtue ethics, 4. future directions, other internet resources, related entries, 1. preliminaries.

In the West, virtue ethics’ founding fathers are Plato and Aristotle, and in the East it can be traced back to Mencius and Confucius. It persisted as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-American philosophy in the late 1950s. It was heralded by Anscombe’s famous article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (Anscombe 1958) which crystallized an increasing dissatisfaction with the forms of deontology and utilitarianism then prevailing. Neither of them, at that time, paid attention to a number of topics that had always figured in the virtue ethics tradition—virtues and vices, motives and moral character, moral education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of what sorts of persons we should be and how we should live.

Its re-emergence had an invigorating effect on the other two approaches, many of whose proponents then began to address these topics in the terms of their favoured theory. (One consequence of this has been that it is now necessary to distinguish “virtue ethics” (the third approach) from “virtue theory”, a term which includes accounts of virtue within the other approaches.) Interest in Kant’s virtue theory has redirected philosophers’ attention to Kant’s long neglected Doctrine of Virtue , and utilitarians have developed consequentialist virtue theories (Driver 2001; Hurka 2001). It has also generated virtue ethical readings of philosophers other than Plato and Aristotle, such as Martineau, Hume and Nietzsche, and thereby different forms of virtue ethics have developed (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003, 2011a).

Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take a “neo-Aristotelian” or eudaimonist form (see section 2), almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are arête (excellence or virtue), phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing). (See Annas 2011 for a short, clear, and authoritative account of all three.) We discuss the first two in the remainder of this section. Eudaimonia is discussed in connection with eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics in the next.

A virtue is an excellent trait of character. It is a disposition, well entrenched in its possessor—something that, as we say, goes all the way down, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. A significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing and does not cheat. If such actions are done merely because the agent thinks that honesty is the best policy, or because they fear being caught out, rather than through recognising “To do otherwise would be dishonest” as the relevant reason, they are not the actions of an honest person. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. The honest person recognises “That would be a lie” as a strong (though perhaps not overriding) reason for not making certain statements in certain circumstances, and gives due, but not overriding, weight to “That would be the truth” as a reason for making them.

An honest person’s reasons and choices with respect to honest and dishonest actions reflect her views about honesty, truth, and deception—but of course such views manifest themselves with respect to other actions, and to emotional reactions as well. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplores dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed through deception rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased (as appropriate) when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on. Given that a virtue is such a multi-track disposition, it would obviously be reckless to attribute one to an agent on the basis of a single observed action or even a series of similar actions, especially if you don’t know the agent’s reasons for doing as she did (Sreenivasan 2002).

Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal (Athanassoulis 2000). Most people who can truly be described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can truly be described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spots—little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones, may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent.

Further, it is not easy to get one’s emotions in harmony with one’s rational recognition of certain reasons for action. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. Following (and adapting) Aristotle, virtue ethicists draw a distinction between full or perfect virtue and “continence”, or strength of will. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.

Describing the continent as “falling short” of perfect virtue appears to go against the intuition that there is something particularly admirable about people who manage to act well when it is especially hard for them to do so, but the plausibility of this depends on exactly what “makes it hard” (Foot 1978: 11–14). If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts—say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help—then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her character—the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of others—then it is not.

Another way in which one can easily fall short of full virtue is through lacking phronesis —moral or practical wisdom.

The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts and feels as she should. These are commonly accepted truisms. But it is equally common, in relation to particular (putative) examples of virtues to give these truisms up. We may say of someone that he is generous or honest “to a fault”. It is commonly asserted that someone’s compassion might lead them to act wrongly, to tell a lie they should not have told, for example, in their desire to prevent someone else’s hurt feelings. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid. So it would appear that generosity, honesty, compassion and courage despite being virtues, are sometimes faults. Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good person—or, if it is still held to be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! How have we arrived at such an odd conclusion?

The answer lies in too ready an acceptance of ordinary usage, which permits a fairly wide-ranging application of many of the virtue terms, combined, perhaps, with a modern readiness to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or inclination, not by rational choice. If one thinks of generosity or honesty as the disposition to be moved to action by generous or honest impulses such as the desire to give or to speak the truth, if one thinks of compassion as the disposition to be moved by the sufferings of others and to act on that emotion, if one thinks of courage as mere fearlessness or the willingness to face danger, then it will indeed seem obvious that these are all dispositions that can lead to their possessor’s acting wrongly. But it is also obvious, as soon as it is stated, that these are dispositions that can be possessed by children, and although children thus endowed (bar the “courageous” disposition) would undoubtedly be very nice children, we would not say that they were morally virtuous or admirable people. The ordinary usage, or the reliance on motivation by inclination, gives us what Aristotle calls “natural virtue”—a proto version of full virtue awaiting perfection by phronesis or practical wisdom.

Aristotle makes a number of specific remarks about phronesis that are the subject of much scholarly debate, but the (related) modern concept is best understood by thinking of what the virtuous morally mature adult has that nice children, including nice adolescents, lack. Both the virtuous adult and the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends. A virtuous adult is not, of course, infallible and may also, on occasion, fail to do what she intended to do through lack of knowledge, but only on those occasions on which the lack of knowledge is not culpable. So, for example, children and adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken. Such ignorance in small children is rarely, if ever culpable. Adults, on the other hand, are culpable if they mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint. They are also culpable if their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is mistaken. It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him.

Quite generally, given that good intentions are intentions to act well or “do the right thing”, we may say that practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation—the capacity to recognise, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom.

One is that it characteristically comes only with experience of life. Amongst the morally relevant features of a situation may be the likely consequences, for the people involved, of a certain action, and this is something that adolescents are notoriously clueless about precisely because they are inexperienced. It is part of practical wisdom to be wise about human beings and human life. (It should go without saying that the virtuous are mindful of the consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not?)

The second is the practically wise agent’s capacity to recognise some features of a situation as more important than others, or indeed, in that situation, as the only relevant ones. The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, with their under-developed virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or benevolence or justice.

These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well.

2. Forms of Virtue Ethics

While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central and practical wisdom required, they differ in how they combine these and other concepts to illuminate what we should do in particular contexts and how we should live our lives as a whole. In what follows we sketch four distinct forms taken by contemporary virtue ethics, namely, a) eudaimonist virtue ethics, b) agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, c) target-centered virtue ethics, and d) Platonistic virtue ethics.

The distinctive feature of eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics is that they define virtues in terms of their relationship to eudaimonia . A virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues, the eudaimonist claims, precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia .

The concept of eudaimonia , a key term in ancient Greek moral philosophy, is standardly translated as “happiness” or “flourishing” and occasionally as “well-being.” Each translation has its disadvantages. The trouble with “flourishing” is that animals and even plants can flourish but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings. The trouble with “happiness” is that in ordinary conversation it connotes something subjectively determined. It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy. If I think I am happy then I am—it is not something I can be wrong about (barring advanced cases of self-deception). Contrast my being healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was flourishing but be wrong. In this respect, “flourishing” is a better translation than “happiness”. It is all too easy to be mistaken about whether one’s life is eudaimon (the adjective from eudaimonia ) not simply because it is easy to deceive oneself, but because it is easy to have a mistaken conception of eudaimonia , or of what it is to live well as a human being, believing it to consist largely in physical pleasure or luxury for example.

Eudaimonia is, avowedly, a moralized or value-laden concept of happiness, something like “true” or “real” happiness or “the sort of happiness worth seeking or having.” It is thereby the sort of concept about which there can be substantial disagreement between people with different views about human life that cannot be resolved by appeal to some external standard on which, despite their different views, the parties to the disagreement concur (Hursthouse 1999: 188–189).

Most versions of virtue ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. This supreme good is not conceived of as an independently defined state (made up of, say, a list of non-moral goods that does not include virtuous activity) which exercise of the virtues might be thought to promote. It is, within virtue ethics, already conceived of as something of which virtuous activity is at least partially constitutive (Kraut 1989). Thereby virtue ethicists claim that a human life devoted to physical pleasure or the acquisition of wealth is not eudaimon , but a wasted life.

But although all standard versions of virtue ethics insist on that conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia , further links are matters of dispute and generate different versions. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient—what is also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck. For Plato and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia (Annas 1993).

According to eudaimonist virtue ethics, the good life is the eudaimon life, and the virtues are what enable a human being to be eudaimon because the virtues just are those character traits that benefit their possessor in that way, barring bad luck. So there is a link between eudaimonia and what confers virtue status on a character trait. (For a discussion of the differences between eudaimonists see Baril 2014. For recent defenses of eudaimonism see Annas 2011; LeBar 2013b; Badhwar 2014; and Bloomfield 2014.)

Rather than deriving the normativity of virtue from the value of eudaimonia , agent-based virtue ethicists argue that other forms of normativity—including the value of eudaimonia —are traced back to and ultimately explained in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents.

It is unclear how many other forms of normativity must be explained in terms of the qualities of agents in order for a theory to count as agent-based. The two best-known agent-based theorists, Michael Slote and Linda Zagzebski, trace a wide range of normative qualities back to the qualities of agents. For example, Slote defines rightness and wrongness in terms of agents’ motivations: “[A]gent-based virtue ethics … understands rightness in terms of good motivations and wrongness in terms of the having of bad (or insufficiently good) motives” (2001: 14). Similarly, he explains the goodness of an action, the value of eudaimonia , the justice of a law or social institution, and the normativity of practical rationality in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents (2001: 99–100, 154, 2000). Zagzebski likewise defines right and wrong actions by reference to the emotions, motives, and dispositions of virtuous and vicious agents. For example, “A wrong act = an act that the phronimos characteristically would not do, and he would feel guilty if he did = an act such that it is not the case that he might do it = an act that expresses a vice = an act that is against a requirement of virtue (the virtuous self)” (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Her definitions of duties, good and bad ends, and good and bad states of affairs are similarly grounded in the motivational and dispositional states of exemplary agents (1998, 2004, 2010).

However, there could also be less ambitious agent-based approaches to virtue ethics (see Slote 1997). At the very least, an agent-based approach must be committed to explaining what one should do by reference to the motivational and dispositional states of agents. But this is not yet a sufficient condition for counting as an agent-based approach, since the same condition will be met by every virtue ethical account. For a theory to count as an agent-based form of virtue ethics it must also be the case that the normative properties of motivations and dispositions cannot be explained in terms of the normative properties of something else (such as eudaimonia or states of affairs) which is taken to be more fundamental.

Beyond this basic commitment, there is room for agent-based theories to be developed in a number of different directions. The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities. For Slote what matters are this particular agent’s actual motives and dispositions . The goodness of action A, for example, is derived from the agent’s motives when she performs A. If those motives are good then the action is good, if not then not. On Zagzebski’s account, by contrast, a good or bad, right or wrong action is defined not by this agent’s actual motives but rather by whether this is the sort of action a virtuously motivated agent would perform (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Appeal to the virtuous agent’s hypothetical motives and dispositions enables Zagzebski to distinguish between performing the right action and doing so for the right reasons (a distinction that, as Brady (2004) observes, Slote has trouble drawing).

Another point on which agent-based forms of virtue ethics might differ concerns how one identifies virtuous motivations and dispositions. According to Zagzebski’s exemplarist account, “We do not have criteria for goodness in advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness” (Zagzebski 2004: 41). As we observe the people around us, we find ourselves wanting to be like some of them (in at least some respects) and not wanting to be like others. The former provide us with positive exemplars and the latter with negative ones. Our understanding of better and worse motivations and virtuous and vicious dispositions is grounded in these primitive responses to exemplars (2004: 53). This is not to say that every time we act we stop and ask ourselves what one of our exemplars would do in this situations. Our moral concepts become more refined over time as we encounter a wider variety of exemplars and begin to draw systematic connections between them, noting what they have in common, how they differ, and which of these commonalities and differences matter, morally speaking. Recognizable motivational profiles emerge and come to be labeled as virtues or vices, and these, in turn, shape our understanding of the obligations we have and the ends we should pursue. However, even though the systematising of moral thought can travel a long way from our starting point, according to the exemplarist it never reaches a stage where reference to exemplars is replaced by the recognition of something more fundamental. At the end of the day, according to the exemplarist, our moral system still rests on our basic propensity to take a liking (or disliking) to exemplars. Nevertheless, one could be an agent-based theorist without advancing the exemplarist’s account of the origins or reference conditions for judgments of good and bad, virtuous and vicious.

The touchstone for eudaimonist virtue ethicists is a flourishing human life. For agent-based virtue ethicists it is an exemplary agent’s motivations. The target-centered view developed by Christine Swanton (2003), by contrast, begins with our existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as elaborate as an entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits involve.

A complete account of virtue will map out 1) its field , 2) its mode of responsiveness, 3) its basis of moral acknowledgment, and 4) its target . Different virtues are concerned with different fields . Courage, for example, is concerned with what might harm us, whereas generosity is concerned with the sharing of time, talent, and property. The basis of acknowledgment of a virtue is the feature within the virtue’s field to which it responds. To continue with our previous examples, generosity is attentive to the benefits that others might enjoy through one’s agency, and courage responds to threats to value, status, or the bonds that exist between oneself and particular others, and the fear such threats might generate. A virtue’s mode has to do with how it responds to the bases of acknowledgment within its field. Generosity promotes a good, namely, another’s benefit, whereas courage defends a value, bond, or status. Finally, a virtue’s target is that at which it is aimed. Courage aims to control fear and handle danger, while generosity aims to share time, talents, or possessions with others in ways that benefit them.

A virtue , on a target-centered account, “is a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way” (Swanton 2003: 19). A virtuous act is an act that hits the target of a virtue, which is to say that it succeeds in responding to items in its field in the specified way (233). Providing a target-centered definition of a right action requires us to move beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the actions that follow from it. This is because a single action context may involve a number of different, overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose. But love for my family might make a different use of my time and attention. In order to define right action a target-centered view must explain how we handle different virtues’ conflicting claims on our resources. There are at least three different ways to address this challenge. A perfectionist target-centered account would stipulate, “An act is right if and only if it is overall virtuous, and that entails that it is the, or a, best action possible in the circumstances” (239–240). A more permissive target-centered account would not identify ‘right’ with ‘best’, but would allow an action to count as right provided “it is good enough even if not the (or a) best action” (240). A minimalist target-centered account would not even require an action to be good in order to be right. On such a view, “An act is right if and only if it is not overall vicious” (240). (For further discussion of target-centered virtue ethics see Van Zyl 2014; and Smith 2016).

The fourth form a virtue ethic might adopt takes its inspiration from Plato. The Socrates of Plato’s dialogues devotes a great deal of time to asking his fellow Athenians to explain the nature of virtues like justice, courage, piety, and wisdom. So it is clear that Plato counts as a virtue theorist. But it is a matter of some debate whether he should be read as a virtue ethicist (White 2015). What is not open to debate is whether Plato has had an important influence on the contemporary revival of interest in virtue ethics. A number of those who have contributed to the revival have done so as Plato scholars (e.g., Prior 1991; Kamtekar 1998; Annas 1999; and Reshotko 2006). However, often they have ended up championing a eudaimonist version of virtue ethics (see Prior 2001 and Annas 2011), rather than a version that would warrant a separate classification. Nevertheless, there are two variants that call for distinct treatment.

Timothy Chappell takes the defining feature of Platonistic virtue ethics to be that “Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good” (2014). Chappell follows Iris Murdoch in arguing that “In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego” (Murdoch 1971: 51). Constantly attending to our needs, our desires, our passions, and our thoughts skews our perspective on what the world is actually like and blinds us to the goods around us. Contemplating the goodness of something we encounter—which is to say, carefully attending to it “for its own sake, in order to understand it” (Chappell 2014: 300)—breaks this natural tendency by drawing our attention away from ourselves. Contemplating such goodness with regularity makes room for new habits of thought that focus more readily and more honestly on things other than the self. It alters the quality of our consciousness. And “anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity, and realism is to be connected with virtue” (Murdoch 1971: 82). The virtues get defined, then, in terms of qualities that help one “pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is” (91). And good agency is defined by the possession and exercise of such virtues. Within Chappell’s and Murdoch’s framework, then, not all normative properties get defined in terms of virtue. Goodness, in particular, is not so defined. But the kind of goodness which is possible for creatures like us is defined by virtue, and any answer to the question of what one should do or how one should live will appeal to the virtues.

Another Platonistic variant of virtue ethics is exemplified by Robert Merrihew Adams. Unlike Murdoch and Chappell, his starting point is not a set of claims about our consciousness of goodness. Rather, he begins with an account of the metaphysics of goodness. Like Murdoch and others influenced by Platonism, Adams’s account of goodness is built around a conception of a supremely perfect good. And like Augustine, Adams takes that perfect good to be God. God is both the exemplification and the source of all goodness. Other things are good, he suggests, to the extent that they resemble God (Adams 1999).

The resemblance requirement identifies a necessary condition for being good, but it does not yet give us a sufficient condition. This is because there are ways in which finite creatures might resemble God that would not be suitable to the type of creature they are. For example, if God were all-knowing, then the belief, “I am all-knowing,” would be a suitable belief for God to have. In God, such a belief—because true—would be part of God’s perfection. However, as neither you nor I are all-knowing, the belief, “I am all-knowing,” in one of us would not be good. To rule out such cases we need to introduce another factor. That factor is the fitting response to goodness, which Adams suggests is love. Adams uses love to weed out problematic resemblances: “being excellent in the way that a finite thing can be consists in resembling God in a way that could serve God as a reason for loving the thing” (Adams 1999: 36).

Virtues come into the account as one of the ways in which some things (namely, persons) could resemble God. “[M]ost of the excellences that are most important to us, and of whose value we are most confident, are excellences of persons or of qualities or actions or works or lives or stories of persons” (1999: 42). This is one of the reasons Adams offers for conceiving of the ideal of perfection as a personal God, rather than an impersonal form of the Good. Many of the excellences of persons of which we are most confident are virtues such as love, wisdom, justice, patience, and generosity. And within many theistic traditions, including Adams’s own Christian tradition, such virtues are commonly attributed to divine agents.

A Platonistic account like the one Adams puts forward in Finite and Infinite Goods clearly does not derive all other normative properties from the virtues (for a discussion of the relationship between this view and the one he puts forward in A Theory of Virtue (2006) see Pettigrove 2014). Goodness provides the normative foundation. Virtues are not built on that foundation; rather, as one of the varieties of goodness of whose value we are most confident, virtues form part of the foundation. Obligations, by contrast, come into the account at a different level. Moral obligations, Adams argues, are determined by the expectations and demands that “arise in a relationship or system of relationships that is good or valuable” (1999: 244). Other things being equal, the more virtuous the parties to the relationship, the more binding the obligation. Thus, within Adams’s account, the good (which includes virtue) is prior to the right. However, once good relationships have given rise to obligations, those obligations take on a life of their own. Their bindingness is not traced directly to considerations of goodness. Rather, they are determined by the expectations of the parties and the demands of the relationship.

A number of objections have been raised against virtue ethics, some of which bear more directly on one form of virtue ethics than on others. In this section we consider eight objections, namely, the a) application, b) adequacy, c) relativism, d) conflict, e) self-effacement, f) justification, g) egoism, and h) situationist problems.

a) In the early days of virtue ethics’ revival, the approach was associated with an “anti-codifiability” thesis about ethics, directed against the prevailing pretensions of normative theory. At the time, utilitarians and deontologists commonly (though not universally) held that the task of ethical theory was to come up with a code consisting of universal rules or principles (possibly only one, as in the case of act-utilitarianism) which would have two significant features: i) the rule(s) would amount to a decision procedure for determining what the right action was in any particular case; ii) the rule(s) would be stated in such terms that any non-virtuous person could understand and apply it (them) correctly.

Virtue ethicists maintained, contrary to these two claims, that it was quite unrealistic to imagine that there could be such a code (see, in particular, McDowell 1979). The results of attempts to produce and employ such a code, in the heady days of the 1960s and 1970s, when medical and then bioethics boomed and bloomed, tended to support the virtue ethicists’ claim. More and more utilitarians and deontologists found themselves agreed on their general rules but on opposite sides of the controversial moral issues in contemporary discussion. It came to be recognised that moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, and judgement informed by experience— phronesis in short—is needed to apply rules or principles correctly. Hence many (though by no means all) utilitarians and deontologists have explicitly abandoned (ii) and much less emphasis is placed on (i).

Nevertheless, the complaint that virtue ethics does not produce codifiable principles is still a commonly voiced criticism of the approach, expressed as the objection that it is, in principle, unable to provide action-guidance.

Initially, the objection was based on a misunderstanding. Blinkered by slogans that described virtue ethics as “concerned with Being rather than Doing,” as addressing “What sort of person should I be?” but not “What should I do?” as being “agent-centered rather than act-centered,” its critics maintained that it was unable to provide action-guidance. Hence, rather than being a normative rival to utilitarian and deontological ethics, it could claim to be no more than a valuable supplement to them. The rather odd idea was that all virtue ethics could offer was, “Identify a moral exemplar and do what he would do,” as though the university student trying to decide whether to study music (her preference) or engineering (her parents’ preference) was supposed to ask herself, “What would Socrates study if he were in my circumstances?”

But the objection failed to take note of Anscombe’s hint that a great deal of specific action guidance could be found in rules employing the virtue and vice terms (“v-rules”) such as “Do what is honest/charitable; do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable” (Hursthouse 1999). (It is a noteworthy feature of our virtue and vice vocabulary that, although our list of generally recognised virtue terms is comparatively short, our list of vice terms is remarkably, and usefully, long, far exceeding anything that anyone who thinks in terms of standard deontological rules has ever come up with. Much invaluable action guidance comes from avoiding courses of action that would be irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet, tactless, arrogant, unsympathetic, cold, incautious, unenterprising, pusillanimous, feeble, presumptuous, rude, hypocritical, self-indulgent, materialistic, grasping, short-sighted, vindictive, calculating, ungrateful, grudging, brutal, profligate, disloyal, and on and on.)

(b) A closely related objection has to do with whether virtue ethics can provide an adequate account of right action. This worry can take two forms. (i) One might think a virtue ethical account of right action is extensionally inadequate. It is possible to perform a right action without being virtuous and a virtuous person can occasionally perform the wrong action without that calling her virtue into question. If virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for right action, one might wonder whether the relationship between rightness/wrongness and virtue/vice is close enough for the former to be identified in terms of the latter. (ii) Alternatively, even if one thought it possible to produce a virtue ethical account that picked out all (and only) right actions, one might still think that at least in some cases virtue is not what explains rightness (Adams 2006:6–8).

Some virtue ethicists respond to the adequacy objection by rejecting the assumption that virtue ethics ought to be in the business of providing an account of right action in the first place. Following in the footsteps of Anscombe (1958) and MacIntyre (1985), Talbot Brewer (2009) argues that to work with the categories of rightness and wrongness is already to get off on the wrong foot. Contemporary conceptions of right and wrong action, built as they are around a notion of moral duty that presupposes a framework of divine (or moral) law or around a conception of obligation that is defined in contrast to self-interest, carry baggage the virtue ethicist is better off without. Virtue ethics can address the questions of how one should live, what kind of person one should become, and even what one should do without that committing it to providing an account of ‘right action’. One might choose, instead, to work with aretaic concepts (defined in terms of virtues and vices) and axiological concepts (defined in terms of good and bad, better and worse) and leave out deontic notions (like right/wrong action, duty, and obligation) altogether.

Other virtue ethicists wish to retain the concept of right action but note that in the current philosophical discussion a number of distinct qualities march under that banner. In some contexts, ‘right action’ identifies the best action an agent might perform in the circumstances. In others, it designates an action that is commendable (even if not the best possible). In still others, it picks out actions that are not blameworthy (even if not commendable). A virtue ethicist might choose to define one of these—for example, the best action—in terms of virtues and vices, but appeal to other normative concepts—such as legitimate expectations—when defining other conceptions of right action.

As we observed in section 2, a virtue ethical account need not attempt to reduce all other normative concepts to virtues and vices. What is required is simply (i) that virtue is not reduced to some other normative concept that is taken to be more fundamental and (ii) that some other normative concepts are explained in terms of virtue and vice. This takes the sting out of the adequacy objection, which is most compelling against versions of virtue ethics that attempt to define all of the senses of ‘right action’ in terms of virtues. Appealing to virtues and vices makes it much easier to achieve extensional adequacy. Making room for normative concepts that are not taken to be reducible to virtue and vice concepts makes it even easier to generate a theory that is both extensionally and explanatorily adequate. Whether one needs other concepts and, if so, how many, is still a matter of debate among virtue ethicists, as is the question of whether virtue ethics even ought to be offering an account of right action. Either way virtue ethicists have resources available to them to address the adequacy objection.

Insofar as the different versions of virtue ethics all retain an emphasis on the virtues, they are open to the familiar problem of (c) the charge of cultural relativity. Is it not the case that different cultures embody different virtues, (MacIntyre 1985) and hence that the v-rules will pick out actions as right or wrong only relative to a particular culture? Different replies have been made to this charge. One—the tu quoque , or “partners in crime” response—exhibits a quite familiar pattern in virtue ethicists’ defensive strategy (Solomon 1988). They admit that, for them, cultural relativism is a challenge, but point out that it is just as much a problem for the other two approaches. The (putative) cultural variation in character traits regarded as virtues is no greater—indeed markedly less—than the cultural variation in rules of conduct, and different cultures have different ideas about what constitutes happiness or welfare. That cultural relativity should be a problem common to all three approaches is hardly surprising. It is related, after all, to the “justification problem” ( see below ) the quite general metaethical problem of justifying one’s moral beliefs to those who disagree, whether they be moral sceptics, pluralists or from another culture.

A bolder strategy involves claiming that virtue ethics has less difficulty with cultural relativity than the other two approaches. Much cultural disagreement arises, it may be claimed, from local understandings of the virtues, but the virtues themselves are not relative to culture (Nussbaum 1993).

Another objection to which the tu quoque response is partially appropriate is (d) “the conflict problem.” What does virtue ethics have to say about dilemmas—cases in which, apparently, the requirements of different virtues conflict because they point in opposed directions? Charity prompts me to kill the person who would be better off dead, but justice forbids it. Honesty points to telling the hurtful truth, kindness and compassion to remaining silent or even lying. What shall I do? Of course, the same sorts of dilemmas are generated by conflicts between deontological rules. Deontology and virtue ethics share the conflict problem (and are happy to take it on board rather than follow some of the utilitarians in their consequentialist resolutions of such dilemmas) and in fact their strategies for responding to it are parallel. Both aim to resolve a number of dilemmas by arguing that the conflict is merely apparent; a discriminating understanding of the virtues or rules in question, possessed only by those with practical wisdom, will perceive that, in this particular case, the virtues do not make opposing demands or that one rule outranks another, or has a certain exception clause built into it. Whether this is all there is to it depends on whether there are any irresolvable dilemmas. If there are, proponents of either normative approach may point out reasonably that it could only be a mistake to offer a resolution of what is, ex hypothesi , irresolvable.

Another problem arguably shared by all three approaches is (e), that of being self-effacing. An ethical theory is self-effacing if, roughly, whatever it claims justifies a particular action, or makes it right, had better not be the agent’s motive for doing it. Michael Stocker (1976) originally introduced it as a problem for deontology and consequentialism. He pointed out that the agent who, rightly, visits a friend in hospital will rather lessen the impact of his visit on her if he tells her either that he is doing it because it is his duty or because he thought it would maximize the general happiness. But as Simon Keller observes, she won’t be any better pleased if he tells her that he is visiting her because it is what a virtuous agent would do, so virtue ethics would appear to have the problem too (Keller 2007). However, virtue ethics’ defenders have argued that not all forms of virtue ethics are subject to this objection (Pettigrove 2011) and those that are are not seriously undermined by the problem (Martinez 2011).

Another problem for virtue ethics, which is shared by both utilitarianism and deontology, is (f) “the justification problem.” Abstractly conceived, this is the problem of how we justify or ground our ethical beliefs, an issue that is hotly debated at the level of metaethics. In its particular versions, for deontology there is the question of how to justify its claims that certain moral rules are the correct ones, and for utilitarianism of how to justify its claim that all that really matters morally are consequences for happiness or well-being. For virtue ethics, the problem concerns the question of which character traits are the virtues.

In the metaethical debate, there is widespread disagreement about the possibility of providing an external foundation for ethics—“external” in the sense of being external to ethical beliefs—and the same disagreement is found amongst deontologists and utilitarians. Some believe that their normative ethics can be placed on a secure basis, resistant to any form of scepticism, such as what anyone rationally desires, or would accept or agree on, regardless of their ethical outlook; others that it cannot.

Virtue ethicists have eschewed any attempt to ground virtue ethics in an external foundation while continuing to maintain that their claims can be validated. Some follow a form of Rawls’s coherentist approach (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003); neo-Aristotelians a form of ethical naturalism.

A misunderstanding of eudaimonia as an unmoralized concept leads some critics to suppose that the neo-Aristotelians are attempting to ground their claims in a scientific account of human nature and what counts, for a human being, as flourishing. Others assume that, if this is not what they are doing, they cannot be validating their claims that, for example, justice, charity, courage, and generosity are virtues. Either they are illegitimately helping themselves to Aristotle’s discredited natural teleology (Williams 1985) or producing mere rationalizations of their own personal or culturally inculcated values. But McDowell, Foot, MacIntyre and Hursthouse have all outlined versions of a third way between these two extremes. Eudaimonia in virtue ethics, is indeed a moralized concept, but it is not only that. Claims about what constitutes flourishing for human beings no more float free of scientific facts about what human beings are like than ethological claims about what constitutes flourishing for elephants. In both cases, the truth of the claims depends in part on what kind of animal they are and what capacities, desires and interests the humans or elephants have.

The best available science today (including evolutionary theory and psychology) supports rather than undermines the ancient Greek assumption that we are social animals, like elephants and wolves and unlike polar bears. No rationalizing explanation in terms of anything like a social contract is needed to explain why we choose to live together, subjugating our egoistic desires in order to secure the advantages of co-operation. Like other social animals, our natural impulses are not solely directed towards our own pleasures and preservation, but include altruistic and cooperative ones.

This basic fact about us should make more comprehensible the claim that the virtues are at least partially constitutive of human flourishing and also undercut the objection that virtue ethics is, in some sense, egoistic.

(g) The egoism objection has a number of sources. One is a simple confusion. Once it is understood that the fully virtuous agent characteristically does what she should without inner conflict, it is triumphantly asserted that “she is only doing what she wants to do and hence is being selfish.” So when the generous person gives gladly, as the generous are wont to do, it turns out she is not generous and unselfish after all, or at least not as generous as the one who greedily wants to hang on to everything she has but forces herself to give because she thinks she should! A related version ascribes bizarre reasons to the virtuous agent, unjustifiably assuming that she acts as she does because she believes that acting thus on this occasion will help her to achieve eudaimonia. But “the virtuous agent” is just “the agent with the virtues” and it is part of our ordinary understanding of the virtue terms that each carries with it its own typical range of reasons for acting. The virtuous agent acts as she does because she believes that someone’s suffering will be averted, or someone benefited, or the truth established, or a debt repaid, or … thereby.

It is the exercise of the virtues during one’s life that is held to be at least partially constitutive of eudaimonia , and this is consistent with recognising that bad luck may land the virtuous agent in circumstances that require her to give up her life. Given the sorts of considerations that courageous, honest, loyal, charitable people wholeheartedly recognise as reasons for action, they may find themselves compelled to face danger for a worthwhile end, to speak out in someone’s defence, or refuse to reveal the names of their comrades, even when they know that this will inevitably lead to their execution, to share their last crust and face starvation. On the view that the exercise of the virtues is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia , such cases are described as those in which the virtuous agent sees that, as things have unfortunately turned out, eudaimonia is not possible for them (Foot 2001, 95). On the Stoical view that it is both necessary and sufficient, a eudaimon life is a life that has been successfully lived (where “success” of course is not to be understood in a materialistic way) and such people die knowing not only that they have made a success of their lives but that they have also brought their lives to a markedly successful completion. Either way, such heroic acts can hardly be regarded as egoistic.

A lingering suggestion of egoism may be found in the misconceived distinction between so-called “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” virtues. Those who have been insulated from the ancient tradition tend to regard justice and benevolence as real virtues, which benefit others but not their possessor, and prudence, fortitude and providence (the virtue whose opposite is “improvidence” or being a spendthrift) as not real virtues at all because they benefit only their possessor. This is a mistake on two counts. Firstly, justice and benevolence do, in general, benefit their possessors, since without them eudaimonia is not possible. Secondly, given that we live together, as social animals, the “self-regarding” virtues do benefit others—those who lack them are a great drain on, and sometimes grief to, those who are close to them (as parents with improvident or imprudent adult offspring know only too well).

The most recent objection (h) to virtue ethics claims that work in “situationist” social psychology shows that there are no such things as character traits and thereby no such things as virtues for virtue ethics to be about (Doris 1998; Harman 1999). In reply, some virtue ethicists have argued that the social psychologists’ studies are irrelevant to the multi-track disposition (see above) that a virtue is supposed to be (Sreenivasan 2002; Kamtekar 2004). Mindful of just how multi-track it is, they agree that it would be reckless in the extreme to ascribe a demanding virtue such as charity to people of whom they know no more than that they have exhibited conventional decency; this would indeed be “a fundamental attribution error.” Others have worked to develop alternative, empirically grounded conceptions of character traits (Snow 2010; Miller 2013 and 2014; however see Upton 2016 for objections to Miller). There have been other responses as well (summarized helpfully in Prinz 2009 and Miller 2014). Notable among these is a response by Adams (2006, echoing Merritt 2000) who steers a middle road between “no character traits at all” and the exacting standard of the Aristotelian conception of virtue which, because of its emphasis on phronesis, requires a high level of character integration. On his conception, character traits may be “frail and fragmentary” but still virtues, and not uncommon. But giving up the idea that practical wisdom is the heart of all the virtues, as Adams has to do, is a substantial sacrifice, as Russell (2009) and Kamtekar (2010) argue.

Even though the “situationist challenge” has left traditional virtue ethicists unmoved, it has generated a healthy engagement with empirical psychological literature, which has also been fuelled by the growing literature on Foot’s Natural Goodness and, quite independently, an upsurge of interest in character education (see below).

Over the past thirty-five years most of those contributing to the revival of virtue ethics have worked within a neo-Aristotelian, eudaimonist framework. However, as noted in section 2, other forms of virtue ethics have begun to emerge. Theorists have begun to turn to philosophers like Hutcheson, Hume, Nietzsche, Martineau, and Heidegger for resources they might use to develop alternatives (see Russell 2006; Swanton 2013 and 2015; Taylor 2015; and Harcourt 2015). Others have turned their attention eastward, exploring Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions (Yu 2007; Slingerland 2011; Finnigan and Tanaka 2011; McRae 2012; Angle and Slote 2013; Davis 2014; Flanagan 2015; Perrett and Pettigrove 2015; and Sim 2015). These explorations promise to open up new avenues for the development of virtue ethics.

Although virtue ethics has grown remarkably in the last thirty-five years, it is still very much in the minority, particularly in the area of applied ethics. Many editors of big textbook collections on “moral problems” or “applied ethics” now try to include articles representative of each of the three normative approaches but are often unable to find a virtue ethics article addressing a particular issue. This is sometimes, no doubt, because “the” issue has been set up as a deontologicial/utilitarian debate, but it is often simply because no virtue ethicist has yet written on the topic. However, the last decade has seen an increase in the amount of attention applied virtue ethics has received (Walker and Ivanhoe 2007; Hartman 2013; Austin 2014; Van Hooft 2014; and Annas 2015). This area can certainly be expected to grow in the future, and it looks as though applying virtue ethics in the field of environmental ethics may prove particularly fruitful (Sandler 2007; Hursthouse 2007, 2011; Zwolinski and Schmidtz 2013; Cafaro 2015).

Whether virtue ethics can be expected to grow into “virtue politics”—i.e. to extend from moral philosophy into political philosophy—is not so clear. Gisela Striker (2006) has argued that Aristotle’s ethics cannot be understood adequately without attending to its place in his politics. That suggests that at least those virtue ethicists who take their inspiration from Aristotle should have resources to offer for the development of virtue politics. But, while Plato and Aristotle can be great inspirations as far as virtue ethics is concerned, neither, on the face of it, are attractive sources of insight where politics is concerned. However, recent work suggests that Aristotelian ideas can, after all, generate a satisfyingly liberal political philosophy (Nussbaum 2006; LeBar 2013a). Moreover, as noted above, virtue ethics does not have to be neo-Aristotelian. It may be that the virtue ethics of Hutcheson and Hume can be naturally extended into a modern political philosophy (Hursthouse 1990–91; Slote 1993).

Following Plato and Aristotle, modern virtue ethics has always emphasised the importance of moral education, not as the inculcation of rules but as the training of character. There is now a growing movement towards virtues education, amongst both academics (Carr 1999; Athanassoulis 2014; Curren 2015) and teachers in the classroom. One exciting thing about research in this area is its engagement with other academic disciplines, including psychology, educational theory, and theology (see Cline 2015; and Snow 2015).

Finally, one of the more productive developments of virtue ethics has come through the study of particular virtues and vices. There are now a number of careful studies of the cardinal virtues and capital vices (Pieper 1966; Taylor 2006; Curzer 2012; Timpe and Boyd 2014). Others have explored less widely discussed virtues or vices, such as civility, decency, truthfulness, ambition, and meekness (Calhoun 2000; Kekes 2002; Williams 2002; and Pettigrove 2007 and 2012). One of the questions these studies raise is “How many virtues are there?” A second is, “How are these virtues related to one another?” Some virtue ethicists have been happy to work on the assumption that there is no principled reason for limiting the number of virtues and plenty of reason for positing a plurality of them (Swanton 2003; Battaly 2015). Others have been concerned that such an open-handed approach to the virtues will make it difficult for virtue ethicists to come up with an adequate account of right action or deal with the conflict problem discussed above. Dan Russell has proposed cardinality and a version of the unity thesis as a solution to what he calls “the enumeration problem” (the problem of too many virtues). The apparent proliferation of virtues can be significantly reduced if we group virtues together with some being cardinal and others subordinate extensions of those cardinal virtues. Possible conflicts between the remaining virtues can then be managed if they are tied together in some way as part of a unified whole (Russell 2009). This highlights two important avenues for future research, one of which explores individual virtues and the other of which analyses how they might be related to one another.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Bibliography on Virtue Ethics (in PDF, listed alphabetically), and Bibliography on Virtue Ethics (in PDF, listed chronologically), by Jörg Schroth.

Aristotle | character, moral | character, moral: empirical approaches | consequentialism | ethics: deontological | moral dilemmas

Acknowledgments

Parts of the introductory material above repeat what was said in the Introduction and first chapter of On Virtue Ethics (Hursthouse 1999).

Copyright © 2022 by Rosalind Hursthouse Glen Pettigrove < glen . pettigrove @ glasgow . ac . uk >

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Ethics and Virtue

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• Ethical Decision Making

For many of us, the fundamental question of ethics is, "What should I do?" or "How should I act?" Ethics is supposed to provide us with "moral principles" or universal rules that tell us what to do. Many people, for example, read passionate adherents of the moral principle of utilitarianism: "Everyone is obligated to do whatever will achieve the greatest good for the greatest number." Others are just as devoted to the basic principle of Immanuel Kant: "Everyone is obligated to act only in ways that respect the human dignity and moral rights of all persons."

Moral principles like these focus primarily on people's actions and doings. We "apply" them by asking what these principles require of us in particular circumstances, e.g., when considering whether to lie or to commit suicide. We also apply them when we ask what they require of us as professionals, e.g., lawyers, doctors, or business people, or what they require of our social policies and institutions. In the last decade, dozens of ethics centers and programs devoted to "business ethics", "legal ethics", "medical ethics", and "ethics in public policy" have sprung up. These centers are designed to examine the implications moral principles have for our lives.

But are moral principles all that ethics consists of? Critics have rightly claimed that this emphasis on moral principles smacks of a thoughtless and slavish worship of rules, as if the moral life was a matter of scrupulously checking our every action against a table of do's and don'ts. Fortunately, this obsession with principles and rules has been recently challenged by several ethicists who argue that the emphasis on principles ignores a fundamental component of ethics--virtue. These ethicists point our that by focusing on what people should do or how people should act, the "moral principles approach" neglects the more important issue--what people should be. In other words, the fundamental question of ethics is not "What should I do?" but "What kind of person should I be?"

According to "virtue ethics", there are certain ideals, such as excellence or dedication to the common good, toward which we should strive and which allow the full development of our humanity. These ideals are discovered through thoughtful reflection on what we as human beings have the potential to become.

"Virtues" are attitudes, dispositions, or character traits that enable us to be and to act in ways that develop this potential. They enable us to pursue the ideals we have adopted. Honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, fidelity, integrity, fairness, self-control, and prudence are all examples of virtues.

How does a person develop virtues? Virtues are developed through learning and through practice. As the ancient philosopher Aristotle suggested, a person can improve his or her character by practicing self-discipline, while a good character can be corrupted by repeated self-indulgence. Just as the ability to run a marathon develops through much training and practice, so too does our capacity to be fair, to be courageous, or to be compassionate.

Virtues are habits. That is, once they are acquired, they become characteristic of a person. For example, a person who has developed the virtue of generosity is often referred to as a generous person because he or she tends to be generous in all circumstances. Moreover, a person who has developed virtues will be naturally disposed to act in ways that are consistent with moral principles. The virtuous person is the ethical person.

At the heart of the virtue approach to ethics is the idea of "community". A person's character traits are not developed in isolation, but within and by the communities to which he or she belongs, including family, church, school, and other private and public associations. As people grow and mature, their personalities are deeply affected by the values that their communities prize, by the personality traits that their communities encourage, and by the role models that their communities put forth for imitation through traditional stories, fiction, movies, television, and so on. The virtue approach urges us to pay attention to the contours of our communities and the habits of character they encourage and instill.

The moral life, then, is not simply a matter of following moral rules and of learning to apply them to specific situations. The moral life is also a matter of trying to determine the kind of people we should be and of attending to the development of character within our communities and ourselves.

This article appeared originally in Issues in Ethics V1 N3 (Spring 1988)

List Of 100 Virtues To Live By With Examples

As our world grows more complex, and we must confront hundreds of minuscule moral choices in any given week, how do we begin to define our characters?

Who we are is determined by how we choose to move through the world. Our choices define us, but how do we make those choices?

What influences our thoughts and actions?

Our good character is defined by certain virtues that we value as our moral code.

However, knowing what those virtues are and why they are important is key to developing your personal operating system for life.  

What are virtues, and why do we need them? 

Aristotle's list of virtues, the definitive list of virtues, examples of virtues.

Virtues are the cornerstone of ethics and morality, impacting how we navigate our relationships with others and ourselves.

Living in alignment with these virtues affords us a more fulfilling life, one in which we intrinsically value the worth of humanity.

A life of virtue means making the conscious choice to love and respect the world around you. 

Virtues are important for a number of reasons.

These traits help us navigate the uncertain waters of moral obligation, and bring us closer together as social beings.

Here are a few reasons why we ought to define our character by virtuous traits: 

• To live more compassionately
• To be in tune with others
• To live without guilt or shame
• To navigate difficult circumstances 
• To make decisions that we are proud of

To help you figure out your moral code, we've put together a virtues list of 100 words and their meanings .

Let's begin with one of the most famous lists of virtues.

Philosophers have sought to understand the complicated arena of morality for hundreds of years. There are as many theories on how to live an ethical life as there are years spent attempting to understand it. 

However, Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics is an excellent place to start when tackling the concept of living morally. He boils down these truths into 12 virtues to live by. 

1. Courage- To not define yourself by fear, but to live bravely. 

2. Temperance- To live in moderation and not seek joy from material wealth. 

3. Liberality- To not restrict oneself but to live freely. 

4. Magnificence- To be charismatic and move in style. 

5. Magnanimity- To possess a spirit of generosity. 

6. Ambition- To have a healthy pride in what one does.

7. Patience- To be of good temper. To have a calm manner of being. 

8. Friendliness- To be social and receptive to forming relationships. 

9. Truthfulness- To live honestly and with candor. 

10. Wit- To find humor in the world and express it with joy. 

11. Modesty- To regulate one’s ego. 

12. Justice- To be guided by truth and a moral sense of right and wrong. 

While Aristotle gives us a simple list of good virtues, the recipe for living well isn't always simple. His moral virtues list sketches out an outline of his more complex philosophical musings on ethics.

You don’t have to scour the philosophy section of your library to understand and value essential virtues. We have gathered an additional list of virtues and their definitions you can aspire to which will bring more balance to your life. 

13. Acceptance – To be able to come to terms with what you cannot change. 

14. Accountability – To hold yourself to what you say and to take ownership for what you have done. 

15. Appreciation – To recognize the good you have been given and value the work of others. 

16. Assertiveness – To take your place and take up space. 

17. Authenticity – To be true to oneself, your spirit, and your nature. 

18. Beauty – To possess pleasurable traits, physically and otherwise. 

19. Caring – To show concern for your fellow man. 

20. Certitude –  To have conviction in what you believe. 

21. Charity – To live with a spirit of giving. To love others through that spirit.

22. Courage –  Mental and moral fortitude in the face of fear and uncertainty. 

23. Cleanliness – The practice of being clean, keeping yourself, and the areas you inhabit in a clean state. 

24. Commitment – To fulfill one’s agreements, to make a pledge regarding the future. 

25. Compassion – The ability to empathize with the pain of others and to possess a desire to help alleviate that pain. 

26. Confidence – To believe in one’s own potential for success. 

27. Consideration – To think cautiously and pragmatically about your choices.  

28. Contentment – To find happiness and fulfillment in your current state of being. 

29. Cooperation – To work together in order to achieve together. 

30. Courtesy – To consider the needs of others while making decisions for oneself. 

31. Creativity – The power to conceive new ideas. 

32. Decisiveness – The ability to effectively and quickly make choices and decisions. 

33. Detachment – To be able to experience your emotions without allowing them to control or overwhelm you. 

34. Determination – To be committed to achieving something difficult. 

35. Devotion – A sense of loyalty and commitment. 

36. Dignity – To possess self-control and a sense of honor. 

37. Diligence – The intersection of persistence and care. 

38. Discernment – The ability to analyze a difficult scenario and make a conscious decision as a result of your analysis. 

39. Empathy – To be able to understand the feelings and emotional worlds of others. 

40. Endurance – The ability to find strength and move forward in a continuous state of difficulty. 

41. Enthusiasm – Excitement for something or someone you enjoy. To take an active interest in them. 

42. Excellence- To be of the highest quality. 

43. Fairness – To give equal weight to the treatment of people. 

44. Faith – To have a strong belief in something. 

45. Fidelity – Continuous faith in something or loyalty to someone or something. 

46. Flexibility – A willingness to change or take part in a change. 

47. Forbearance – A sense of restraint or self-control. 

48. Forgiveness – To be able to forgive or able to be forgiven. 

49. Fortitude – Strength or courage amidst adversity . 

50. Generosity – To lack selfishness, and possess the qualities of kindness and a giving spirit. 

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185 Words Of Encouragement: Quotes And Thoughts To Boost You Up

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29 Humility Quotes To Awaken Your Best Self

51. Gentleness – A quiet demeanor without malice. 

52. Grace – To offer forgiveness before it is asked for. 

53. Gratitude – To be thankful or to give thanks.  

54. Helpfulness – The desire to help and follow through on that intention. 

55. Honesty – To be truthful and trustworthy. 

56. Honor – To respect what you believe to be right and good, and live through those beliefs. 

57. Hope – To desire certain outcomes and believe in the potential of them coming true. 

58. Humanity – To be in touch with your human nature. 

59. Humility – To not believe yourself above others. 

60. Idealism – A certain attitude that believes in the highest quality of living, especially in terms of living honestly and morally. 

61. Independence  – The ability to be alone and fulfilled with oneself. To be able to operate independently of others. 

62. Initiative – The ability to take charge without waiting for others to do so. 

63. Integrity – The ability to adhere to one’s moral code or sense of right and wrong. 

64. Joyfulness- To be full of joy. To give and receive joy. 

65. Kindness – The quality of being considerate and open to others. 

66. Love- The strongest form of continued admiration and affection. 

67. Loyalty – To be devoted and have a strong sense of allegiance to another person or idea. 

68. Mercy – To be compassionate towards someone who has caused harm or pain. 

69. Mindfulness- To be conscious of your presence, your surroundings, and your effect on them. 

70. Moderation – To be reasonable in all measures. To avoid passing limitations set for a good purpose. 

71. Openness – The state of being open to others without restriction. 

72. Optimism- To have a sense of hope and excitement for the future. 

73. Peacefulness – A state of calm and acceptance. To be tranquil. 

74. Perceptiveness- The ability to analyze with a sense of keenness or intuition. 

75. Perseverance – To be persistent in your actions despite the threat of fear and failure. 

76. Purity – The lack of adulteration, to be free from immorality. 

77. Purposefulness – To possess a sense of purpose. To move with reason. 

78. Reliability – To be accountable for your promises and stay true to commitment. 

79. Resilience – An ability to recover from hardship. To be able to move forward from a state of pain. 

80. Respect – To have admiration for those with great abilities, in terms of their achievements or character. 

81. Responsibility – A sense of duty when wielding power or purpose. To be responsible for someone or something. 

82. Reverence – A deep sense of respect towards a person or thing. 

83. Righteousness – To be morally good and right in your actions. To possess good character and make justifiable choices. 

84. Sacrifice – The willingness to give up that which is important to you for the sake of others. 

85. Self-discipline – The ability to regulate oneself and control your actions despite feelings of weakness. To continue on the just and right path despite the temptation to stray. 

86. Serenity – To be at peace with oneself and others. 

87. Service – The act of using your skills, privilege, time, and kindness towards helping others. 

88. Simplicity – To be in a natural state or a state of ease. To discard unnecessary complications. 

89. Sincerity – To say what you mean without pretense. To speak and take action without deceit. 

90. Steadfastness – To be unwavering in one's choices. To be resolute. 

91. Strength- The ability to persevere under pressure. 

92. Tact- The ability to deal with difficult issues with sensitivity towards the parties involved. 

93. Thoughtfulness- The ability to think through your actions and how they will affect others. 

94. Tolerance – To respect the choices, behaviors, and states of being of others when they do not align with your personal beliefs. 

95. Trust – A steadfast belief in someone or something. 

96. Understanding – The ability to be sympathetic in your comprehension of others. 

97. Unity – The state of being one. To join together to create a whole. 

98. Wisdom – To possess good judgment, character, and knowledge due to experience. 

99. Wonder – The mixture of admiration, awe, and curiosity towards something unknown or unfamiliar. Something that is often beautiful or sublime. 

100. Zeal- To be enthusiastic in your pursuits. 

These types of virtues can be applied to many different practices.

Here are a few examples of these virtues in action: 

• Listening compassionately to a friend after they have had a difficult day. 
• Donating food to a local food bank. 
• Writing a short story. 
• Studying a period of history. 
• Taking time every day to meditate. 
• Showing sensitivity to a delicate matter someone reveals to you.
• Being present to appreciate nature and beauty.
• Following through on a difficult or boring project.
• Listening patiently to an older person.
• Showing up on time.
• Choosing to be happy and positive.
• Believing in yourself and your abilities.

How will you use this list of virtues?

It is not always easy to live by our moral codes . These virtues are a guide rather than a strict set of rules. They provide a framework for living but not directions.

We all could work on improving some of the virtues listed here. In our culture today, we value certain virtues over others, making it even more difficult to know where to focus our energies.

For example, we are often rewarded for the virtue of ambition rather than compassion. Both are important, but everything in life requires balance and regular calibration.

Take time with this virtues list to find where you could use more balance. Write down specific actions you can take to improve these areas of your life. Then make a plan to implement the actions.

May your virtuous life bring you peace and contentment and serve as a beacon to others searching for a life of integrity.

1 thought on “List Of 100 Virtues To Live By With Examples”

Thanks for compiling this information; I was looking for a list of Virtues to live by; I I believe these are gifts that we have already received. I need to use them during our daily activities until they become part of our behavior and character.

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Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems

Rebecca L. Walker and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems , Oxford University Press, 2007, 319pp., $85.00 (hbk), ISBN 978199271658.

Reviewed by David Carr, University of Edinburgh

As is now familiar, a virtue ethical approach to ethics and moral philosophy, for the most part drawing on Aristotle, was revived around the middle of the last century. As the editors to this new collection of essays on virtue ethics also note, this revival was probably mainly inspired by the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe who used virtue ethical ideas mainly as a stick to beat the dominant ethical theories of the day, utilitarianism and (Kantian) deontology. Anscombe's own observations were fairly programmatic and she wrote little on virtue herself; but many philosophers were quick to pursue her pioneering suggestions and over the course of the past half-century, virtue ethics has developed into a potent third force in contemporary ethics and moral philosophy -- and is now commonly regarded as a serious rival to Kantian ethics of duty and utilitarian ethics of utility. It has also, as philosophical theories are apt to do, greatly diversified over the years: there are almost as many approaches to virtue ethics as there are virtue ethicists, and just as much disagreement between them about the ethical character and status of virtue. Elsewhere, I have identified a number of distinct varieties of virtue ethics: these include the mainstream Aristotelian (eudaemonistic) virtue ethics of (apparently) Anscombe, Peter Geach and Philippa Foot; the moral realist virtue ethics of John MacDowell; the idealist or social constructivist account of Alasdair MacIntyre; the 'sentimentalist' (to use the term adopted in this book) approach of Michael Slote; and the 'pluralist' theory of Christine Swanton.

But the theoretical questions raised by these different perspectives have no less significant practical implications -- since it is generally considered by its advocates to be a virtue of virtue ethics that it is directly addressed to down-to-earth developmental issues concerning the cultivation and formation of human character. For Aristotle (criticizing the moral hyper-rationalism of Plato), the acquisition of virtue is a profoundly practical matter and as well showing much interest in the mechanics of character formation, he is also greatly exercised by the significance of such qualities for effective public, civic and political life and participation. It is in this sprit that the editors have brought together thirteen essays by scholars working in a variety of professional fields: Nel Noddings on caring in education; Edmund Pelegrino on medical professionalism; Jeffery Blustein on doctoring and self-forgiveness; Jennifer Ralden on professional virtue in psychiatry; Annette Baier on trust in medicine; Rosalind Hursthouse on environmental ethics; Rebecca Walker on ethical treatment of animals; Peter Koller on virtue and law; Christine Swanton on virtue and role ethics in business; Lawrence Blum on race and virtue; Nancy Sherman on anger and virtue in a military context; Michael Slote on virtue and famine; and Philip Ivanhoe on virtue and filial piety (in Confucian thought). All of these essays raise interesting questions and issues; however, I shall not attempt to address them all in the space of this short review.

Further to this, indeed, the editors mildly complain that the practical implications of virtue ethics have been hitherto rather neglected in the literature. In the event, however, there is rather more in this field than the editors (and contributors) acknowledge or have recognised. For a start, substantial work has been done in educational philosophy by a number of orthodox virtue ethicists and a major collection of essays on virtue ethics and education (containing essays by some of the contributors to this volume, and favourably reviewed by another) appeared a few years ago under the editorship of this reviewer and an Amsterdam colleague (Carr and Steutel 1999). Again, there has been a fair amount of virtue ethical work on professional and other wider public and social issues: Raja Halwani's recent collection on sex and ethics (2007), for example, explicitly sets out to address sexual morality from a virtue ethical and/or theoretical direction. All the same, the appearance of additional work in this general field might well be welcomed. That said, in so far as the stated aim of this collection is to show how public and professional issues might be usefully addressed from a distinctively virtue ethical -- as opposed to a deontological or utilitarian -- perspective, it may yet be asked how well it succeeds in doing so. In relation to this question, it may first be noted that the editorial introduction devotes some attention to a common distinction between virtue theory and virtue ethics. According to this distinction, in so far as any and all discussions of virtue might fall under the rubric of virtue theory, virtue theory has a wider scope than virtue ethics. For whereas Kantian and utilitarian accounts which regard the development or cultivation of virtues as of some (motivational) moral importance would count as theories of virtue, they are yet not virtue ethical accounts in so far as they do not -- unlike (allegedly) Aristotle's view -- give ethical primacy to the cultivation of dispositional (aretaic) qualities over (deontic) principles.

To be sure, as with most such philosophical distinctions, things are not quite so clear cut and there are cases where we might be hard put to know whether a particular account was virtue ethical or not: but there is enough broad direction here to rule out certain accounts as virtue ethical, since some (Kant's or Mill's say) would define a virtue in terms of obedience to independently established ethical principles rather than understanding qualities of character as somehow (virtue ethically) prior to any and all determinations of such principles. However, while the editors of this volume clearly see this distinction as significant for the general direction of this collection, they are not at all resolute in maintaining it: on the one hand, they recognise the difficulty of strictly observing any such distinction, but on the other they are also emphatic that 'not anything goes' in virtue ethics. But such apparent indecision about whether or not it matters whether a theory is virtue ethical arguably creates something of a dilemma here: either the distinction does matter for the distinctive identity of the collection, in which case accounts of virtue from other ethical perspectives would need to be ruled out as lacking the relevant virtue ethical character; or it doesn't matter, in which case this may be little more than a general collection of essays on practical ethics under a somewhat misleading trades description. In the event, it seems to me that this collection is significantly caught on the second horn of this dilemma: it is not an especially virtue ethics-focused collection, a significant proportion of the contributors are not virtue ethicists, and one rather suspects -- given the rather loose grasp that some contributors seem to have on the idea of a virtue as such -- that some of them do not have much real interest in virtues at all.

Indeed, there can hardly be a better case in point here than the leading article by Nel Noddings. Noddings is a highly regarded writer on ethics and education, but she is not a virtue ethicist -- and (whatever she has chosen to say here) she has previously opposed any virtue ethical interpretation of her favoured topic of care in debate with virtue ethicists such as Michael Slote. The main direction from which she has been influenced would seem to be Hume rather than Aristotle, and it is revealing that she apparently thinks (p. 59) that virtue ethics sides with care ethics in rejecting moral principles (when it is quite clear that the great champions of virtue ethics from Aristotle through Aquinas to (say) Geach and MacIntyre take various kinds of (fixed and other) principles very seriously indeed). As she has repeatedly argued, her care ethics is focused primarily on the quality of human relationships and association (and of institutions) rather than upon the development of individual dispositions, and she is not much (at least ethically) concerned -- as much mainstream virtue ethics is -- with goals of individual development and perfection. From this viewpoint, on the assumption that this volume is about the public and professional significance of virtue ethics, it may be said that there are several educational philosophers of international reputation who might have better served to show how key virtue ethical concepts might be given distinctive and significant application to education and teaching. It is also clear (as the editors admit) that other contributions to this volume -- irrespective of any other merits -- either do not take a virtue ethical perspective (such as Peter Koller on law and morality), or have only tenuous or tangential connections to virtue ethics.

To be sure, while such departures from the avowed editorial intent of this volume may well disappoint the expectations of some readers, it does not detract from the overall high academic and professional standard of the contributions to this volume -- most of which are well turned and have something of general applied ethical significance to say. Moreover, a proportion of the essays do seem to be fairly on professed editorial target. Indeed, despite the fact that her virtue ethical connections are not exactly impeccable (given her well known Kantian leanings), Nancy Sherman's insightful exploration of the place of anger in (specifically military) virtue meets the general aims of this volume about as well as could be wished. As might also be expected, some of the key figures of contemporary virtue ethics who are represented in the volume -- perhaps particularly Hursthouse, Slote and Swanton -- also offer relevant chapters that do engage directly with aspects of the distinctive contribution of virtue ethics to problems of applied and professional ethics. That said, some of these and other essays in this collection also raise -- in what also seem to me fairly problematic ways -- at least two crucial issues about how virtue could or should be understood in contexts of applied ethics.

The first of these is an issue of some potential conceptual inflation involved in the idea of suggesting or inventing 'new' virtues. One place in which this issue arises is in Hursthouse's essay in which, for various reasons, she suggests the development of a new virtue of respect for nature. (This suggestion is also connected in various ways with her apparent rejection of eudaimonistic foundations for virtue -- which also seems to me mistaken: the fact that we do not use eudaimonistic reasons to dissuade children from being cruel to animals does not invalidate the Aristotelian appeal to human flourishing to explain why -- at another more theoretical level -- we value virtue.)   But Hursthouse's new virtue is also supplemented in this work by (at least) Blustein's self-forgiveness and Blum's respect for blackness. To cut a long story short, however, I think that all of these 'new' virtues involve some confusion between virtues as such and particular problems or topics to which (old) virtues may be addressed. There may perhaps be Aristotelian excesses and defects in taking a person's racial background into account in some contexts, but the virtue that gets it right is not respecting blackness, but justice . Indeed, in so far as Blum's 'respecting blackness' is not something we should always morally expect, even in the presence of blackness, there would seem to be not just confusion but also some dangerous absurdity in regarding it as a virtue.

The second (not unrelated) problematic issue raised in several places in this work concerns the relationship between the familiar virtues of ordinary human moral association and so-called virtues of 'role' -- specifically required in this or that professional or vocational context -- that may sometimes appear to conflict with ordinary moral virtues. This problem is brought into sharp relief by the examples of some contributors (for instance, by Radden's suggestion that psychiatrists may be drawn to 'feign virtue' as a means to helping the recovery of patients) and it is directly addressed by Christine Swanton, who argues that role virtues are nevertheless reconcilable with 'prototype' virtues, in so far as the former are in the last resort accountable to the standards of the latter. Once again, despite the ingenuity of Swanton's case, one may doubt whether this is the right thing to say. Clearly, there are conflicts between prototype virtues and what a particular professional role requires as right conduct. It is professionally right for soldiers to obey orders without question (at any rate in the heat of battle), which means that it may -- from a military standpoint -- be professionally right to kill people or endanger the lives of civilians; but it is hardly virtuous to do so. So, while one might well wish (along with Swanton) to bring business or other professional practice more in line with 'regular' virtue, it might be a better move here simply to deny that role virtues are virtues in anything other than some secondary or derivative sense. Once more, the problem may be that regarding the standards required for the successful prosecution of this or that professional role as expressive of genuine virtue is just unnecessarily and unhelpfully inflationary. In the context of education and teaching, it is professionally desirable that teachers should behave honestly, fairly and with self-control; but the best sort of teacher is arguably not the one who feigns honesty, fairness and self-control but the one who actually is honest, fair and self-controlled. From the virtue ethical viewpoint, the aim of professional ethics should be to produce virtuous teachers rather than practitioners of 'role virtues'.

While space precludes further detailed comment on individual contributions to this collection, this should not be taken to imply that any essays not mentioned are of little or no interest. On the contrary, there is work here of potential interest to a range of professional and public fields of concern. As already indicated, however, I would not regard this volume as a particularly well-focused or coherent collection of essays on the practical application of virtue ethics as such. Indeed, I am inclined to wonder whether a newcomer to virtue ethics would get a very good sense from this volume of the distinctive character and basic themes of virtue ethics -- and, from this viewpoint, the editors might have better devoted the space given to résumés of contributors' essays to some more detailed stage-setting of the basic form, themes and wider literature of (Aristotelian and/or other) virtue ethics. However, as a general collection of contemporary work on applied ethics -- or even perhaps of virtue theory -- the collection fares rather better, and contains much of respectable quality and of general interest to scholars working in a fair range of applied ethical fields.

Carr, D. and Steutel, J. (eds) (1999) Virtue Ethics and Moral Education , London: Routledge.

Halwani, R. (ed) (2007) Sex and Ethics: Essays on Sexuality, Virtue and the Good Life , Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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The Importance of Virtue Ethics

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Personal development, professional conduct, societal well-being.

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Living the Virtues in Everyday Life

Leading a virtuous life sounds like something that is just for the superreligious people out there. But it is really something each one of us can aim for. God gives us the awesome gifts of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. Plus there are a ton of other virtues that we can develop on our own.

For example, there are the virtues of temperance, prudence, courage, and justice. These virtues came from classic Western philosophy (think Plato and Aristotle) and were repackaged by Church heavyweights such as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas so that they connected with the Christian faith. These four virtues are known as the cardinal virtues because they are critical to forming our moral values and guiding our behavior. In addition to the cardinal virtues, there are many other virtues that we can develop. Check out Isaiah 11:2 and Galatians 5:22-23 for more. You’ll find many places on the Internet that list virtues that are recognized in different cultures. Wikipedia’s entry on "virtue" lists 100 virtues that are commonly recognized in Western culture.

Once you’ve had a chance to look at all the different virtues out there, you begin to see that there is quite a range to choose from. Did you know that good humor is a virtue? Imagination and curiosity are also virtues. All of a sudden, leading a virtuous life might not seem half bad. Who wouldn’t want to be creative, happy, courageous, trustworthy, or focused? We might not label these things as “virtues” or make them top priority, but the fact is, most of us live the virtues every day. Even something as small as being tactful or friendly is virtuous.

The upshot is that leading a virtuous life is not just for the superreligious (if there even is such a thing). It’s for you and me and for all people who want to be true to themselves. Living the virtues helps us be real and go after our dreams. Living the virtues helps us be more aware of the people around us and help them when we can. Living the virtues helps us see the beauty in the world, especially in nature, and moves us to care for these as the precious gifts they are. Living the virtues helps us get more in tune with God.

Spend some time looking over the virtues, especially the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. Read Chapter 13 of Saint Paul’s letter to the Corinthians in which he talks about what love means in our lives. Think about the virtues that you are already living in your life and what you’d like to develop. Above all, practice random acts of virtue whenever you have the chance!

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Virtues of My Life

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A charming look at a reader’s many moods

Elisa Gabbert’s essays in “Any Person Is the Only Self” are brimming with pleasure and curiosity about a life with books.

Tell people you read and write for a living, and they picture a ghostly creature, an idea only incidentally appended to a body. What they often fail to understand is that the life of the mind is also a physical life — a life spent lugging irksomely heavy volumes around on the Metro and annotating their margins with a cramping hand. The poet, essayist and New York Times poetry columnist Elisa Gabbert is rare in grasping that reading is, in addition to a mental exercise, a movement performed in a particular place.

“If I remember anything about a book, I also remember where I read it — what room, what chair,” she writes in her charming new essay collection, “ Any Person Is the Only Self .” Writing, too, proves spatial: “I think essays, like buildings, need structure and mood. The first paragraph should function as a foyer or an antechamber, bringing you into the mood.”

The 16 delightfully digressive pieces in this collection are all moods that involve books in one way or another. But they are not just about the content of books, although they are about that, too: They are primarily about the acts of reading and writing, which are as much social and corporeal as cerebral.

In the first essay — the foyer — Gabbert writes about the shelf of newly returned books at her local library. “The books on that shelf weren’t being marketed to me,” she writes. “They weren’t omnipresent in my social media feeds. They were very often old and very often ugly. I came to think of that shelf as an escape from hype.” The haphazard selections on the shelf were also evidence of other people — the sort of invisible but palpable community of readers that she came to miss so sharply during the pandemic.

In another essay, she learns of a previously unpublished story by one of her favorite authors, Sylvia Plath, who makes frequent appearances throughout this book. Fearing that the story will disappoint her, Gabbert puts off reading it. As she waits, she grows “apprehensive, even frightened.”

There are writers who attempt to excise themselves from their writing, to foster an illusion of objectivity; thankfully, Gabbert is not one of them. On the contrary, her writing is full of intimacies, and her book is a work of embodied and experiential criticism, a record of its author’s shifting relationships with the literature that defines her life. In one piece, she rereads and reappraises books she first read as a teenager; in another, she and her friends form a “Stupid Classics Book Club,” to tackle “all the corny stuff from the canon that we really should have read in school but never had.”

Gabbert is a master of mood, not polemic, and accordingly, her writing is not didactic; her essays revolve around images and recollections rather than arguments. In place of the analytic pleasures of a robustly defended thesis, we find the fresh thrills of a poet’s perfected phrases and startling observations. “Parties are about the collective gaze, the ability to be seen from all angles, panoramically,” she writes in an essay about fictional depictions of parties. She describes the photos in a book by Rachael Ray documenting home-cooked meals — one of the volumes on the recently returned shelf — as “poignantly mediocre.” Remarking on a listicle of “Books to Read by Living Women (Instead of These 10 by Dead Men),” Gabbert wonders, “Since when is it poor form to die?”

“Any Person Is the Only Self” is both funny and serious, a winning melee of high and low cultural references, as packed with unexpected treasures as a crowded antique shop. An academic text on architecture, the Austrian poet Rainer Maria Rilke, a rare memory disorder whose victims recall every aspect of their autobiographies in excruciatingly minute detail, “Madame Bovary,” YouTube videos about people who work as professional cuddlers, a psychological study about whether it is possible to be sane in an insane asylum — all these feature in Gabbert’s exuberant essays. She is a fiercely democratic thinker, incapable of snobbery and brimming with curiosity.

Perhaps because she is so indefatigably interested, she gravitates toward writers who see literature as a means of doubling life, allowing it to hold twice as much. Plath confessed in her journals that she wrote in an attempt to extend her biography beyond its biological terminus: “My life, I feel, will not be lived until there are books and stories which relive it perpetually in time.” The very act of keeping a diary, then, splits the self in two.

Plath once insisted that bad things could never happen to her and her peers because “we’re different.” Gabbert asks “Different why?” and concludes that everyone is different: “We are we , not them. Any person is the only self.” But that “only” is, perhaps counterintuitively, not constrained or constricted. Walt Whitman famously wrote that his only self comprised “multitudes,” and Gabbert echoes him when she reflects, “If there is no one self, you can never be yourself, only one of your selves.” And indeed, she is loath to elevate any of her many selves over any of the others. When she rereads a book that she loved in her adolescence, she thinks she was right to love it back then. “That self only knew what she knew,” she writes. “That self wasn’t wrong .” Both her past self and her present self have an equal claim to being Elisa Gabbert, who is too fascinated by the world’s manifold riches to confine herself to a single, limited life.

Becca Rothfeld is the nonfiction book critic for The Washington Post and the author of “All Things Are Too Small: Essays in Praise of Excess.”

Any Person Is the Only Self

By Elisa Gabbert

FSG Originals. 230 pp. $18, paperback.

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The Importance of Values and Virtues

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Values are the main beliefs of a person, which can either be their lifetime goal or represent their preferred behavior. These features have a significant impact on the way a person acts and their attitude. To further illustrate this concept in a more detailed manner, I will refer to a couple of the values I follow, while depicting a situation when I have broken them. Afterward, I will depict a situation where I happened to have broken them.

For my example, I will use two out of the ten motivational values listed by Schwartz and his colleagues. Said values may be differentiated by referring to two pairs of opposite dimensions: conservation and openness to change, self-transcendence, and self-enhancement (Lecture 2, n. d.). I am a strong supporter of benevolence and universalism; unfortunately, there was one case when I failed to follow these values that I consider to be important.

One day, my friend needed my help with a project for her job assignment. Unfortunately, due to a conflict that had happened before it, I instantly declined the request. During that time, I had no regard for the possible outcome of the event. However, as expected, my reluctance to help my friend with the project resulted in her losing the opportunity to get a raise at her job.

By doing so, I had broken the two aforementioned virtues: benevolence and universalism. My friend’s well-being at the time did not matter to me, as it normally would have, thus, violating benevolence (Lecture 2, n. d.). Since our conflict mattered more to me than the possible outcome of my not helping my friend, I had no regard for universalism at the time. This, in turn, is a prime example of a conflict between two opposite dimensions: self-transcendence versus self-enhancement. I have chosen power and hedonism (pleasing my hurt feelings and putting my friend in a fragile position) over benevolence and universalism.

The aforementioned situation raises the question of how I would support these values. Understandably, the conflict makes my claim quite questionable, as I had failed to follow my beliefs in that case. Fortunately, a few weeks after the conflict, I experienced two situations, where I used the opportunity to uphold these values. These two events, in a way, helped me redeem myself after what had happened.

One day, I came across a situation where my coworker needed my help in creating some contracts for his assignment. While I had some errands to finish myself, I couldn’t decline the request, so I agreed. Although my colleague’s assignment was quite hard, I successfully finished it. This, in turn, resulted in him getting an impressive raise. By doing so, I managed to uphold one of the two values: benevolence.

One week later, my coworkers and I were at a group meeting with our boss. The goal of the meeting was to brainstorm some ideas for our future project. One of my colleagues suggested an idea that I did not like, for I found it quite ridiculous. As she was sitting by the same desk next to me, she asked me if I had any ideas. Having heard my idea, my coworker told me that it was too dangerous for the future of the company and provided a reasonable explanation for this opinion. Thus, I chose not to suggest my idea to protect the company and uphold another value: universalism.

The importance of values can be defined by the role they play in one’s life. They represent realistic goals that help a person navigate through their life. Moreover, values assist people in differentiating right from wrong and help them make ethical decisions. In the two aforementioned situations, I successfully followed my two values: universalism and benevolence. These two beliefs will assist me in becoming a better person and prevent me from making the wrong decisions.

Lecture 2 – Values, Virtues and Character. (n. d.) PowerPoint.

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IvyPanda. (2023, April 10). The Importance of Values and Virtues. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-importance-of-values-and-virtues/

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IvyPanda . (2023) 'The Importance of Values and Virtues'. 10 April.

IvyPanda . 2023. "The Importance of Values and Virtues." April 10, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-importance-of-values-and-virtues/.

1. IvyPanda . "The Importance of Values and Virtues." April 10, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-importance-of-values-and-virtues/.

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IvyPanda . "The Importance of Values and Virtues." April 10, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-importance-of-values-and-virtues/.

Who Will Lead Us?

America's neglect of civic virtue and rising tribalism have led to fewer and fewer broadly respected figures in public life.

“Are you ready to do your duty for Rome?”

From its first line, the most important scene in Gladiator , the winner of the Academy Award for Best Picture in 2000, explores the citizen’s responsibility in a republic. This is a timeless subject; indeed, the scene can help us understand, 2,000 years after the film’s setting, what civic duty means in America and why our country seems to be developing fewer and fewer leaders with public virtue .

Much has been written in recent years about how political polarization and tribalism have inflamed our politics , turning debates radioactive and making elections seem existential. But we’ve failed to appreciate how this era’s animosity has all but erased serious conversations about a common good, duty, and what we need in public servants.

Polarization and Virtue

The good emperor of Gladiator , Marcus Aurelius, informs his devious, intemperate son Commodus that he will not ascend to the throne. The aged emperor begins not with an apology or political calculations but with “duty for Rome,” the unpleasant but necessary responsibilities the father and son have as citizens in that moment. Sometimes, the good leader explains, we must do the unhappy job assigned to us because that job must be done for the common good.

What follows is a description of two competing visions of virtue in the public square. One—that of Marcus Aurelius—is about justice, judgment, self-control, and fortitude. It would be familiar to Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, and our own Founders. This model fosters personal attributes that enable us to think and act well on behalf of others. That is, it leads us to become better individuals who can then better contribute to society.

In the film, Commodus knows he lacks these qualities, so he offers up his own strengths as a second, very different set of virtues: ambition, resourcefulness, loyalty, and a certain sort of courage. We see why the father cannot let his son rule. At the core of his son’s system is selfishness not selflessness: Commodus’s principles are not public virtues; they are means to empower himself and his friends to do as they choose.

The virtue of Marcus Aurelius only makes sense when the community believes in and is committed to a common good. The “common good” doesn’t mean that everyone agrees on everything; it doesn’t require uni-party government or the abolition of debate. But it does mean that citizens recognize their interdependence and their shared interests. Public virtue in this context means prioritizing and then working to advance those things that benefit the entire community (like health, security, opportunity, justice, and human flourishing). It also means that, when there are disagreements about what the common good requires, we behave in ways that facilitate the community’s discernment: We focus on the goal; we engage in constructive, civil, honest debate; we elevate public interest above personal gain; and we see our opponents as fellow citizens united in a joint effort.

This sense of virtue fades fast, however, when we no longer embrace a common good. As we break into political or ideological teams and see those who disagree not as fellow citizens but as permanent opponents or enemies, concepts like accommodation, prudence, curiosity, forbearance, and integrity appear counterproductive. If the goal is to dominate, if there is no expectation of future cooperation across differences, then we will prize loyalty to the tribe and look to win by any means necessary. Justice is no longer impartial, treating all the community’s citizens equally; justice, instead, serves our friends and hurts our enemies. There is no common cause; there are our interests and their interests. In this antagonistic world, Commodus’s virtues suddenly make sense. Ambition for our team, loyalty to our teammates, and resourcefulness in pursuit of our aims.

These two very different models of virtue will produce two very different types of leaders. When we recognize and work toward a common good, we will naturally develop and then elevate individuals known for fairness, courage, decency, and prudence. If tribalism predominates, we will identify and celebrate those who think about team first, who help our side no matter what, and who aggressively fight the other side.

Last week’s Trump verdict, accordingly, brought out smug satisfaction on one side, and bitter claims of lawfare on the other. But in keeping with America’s trend toward the virtues of Commodus, almost no one seems interested in actually fostering the habits necessary to improve our public life.

Putting Virtue to the Test

During the other Trump investigation—the one related to the withholding of classified documents—it was learned that President Biden may have done something similar. Robert K. Hur, a former federal prosecutor with stellar academic and professional credentials, was asked by US Attorney General Merrick Garland to temporarily leave his private law practice to take on the thankless task of investigating a sitting president. Hur, demonstrating an understanding of republican duty, agreed. A year later, Hur, in his submission to Garland and in a follow-up hearing before a House committee, described his charge, process, findings, and ultimate decision not to recommend President Biden’s prosecution. His thorough, evenhanded approach and judicious conclusion seemed to strike many political actors as antiquated or naïve at best, incomprehensible at worst. This is the consequence of our loss of common-good reasoning; the price for giving up the virtue of Marcus Aurelius for the creed of Commodus.

How we treat those demonstrating civic virtue determines what kind of leaders, and therefore what kind of nation, we will have.

It is important to understand the nature of the criticism aimed at Hur. Had he and his team poorly collected evidence or strayed from their assignment—that is, failed in their duty—they would have deserved blame. But in the congressional hearing and broader public square, he was criticized, strikingly, in Commodus’s terms. To many observers, Hur was insufficiently loyal to a tribe, insufficiently ambitious to secure a political win. Such critics only saw the investigation through the lens of personal and team interests. Truth, justice, sound judgment, and the public good were afterthoughts. Some supporters of President Biden breezed past the incriminating evidence (i.e., recordings of Biden admitting he had classified material) and only saw a gratuitous attack on their leader by someone angling for a federal judgeship. They charged Hur with a political hit job. Similarly, some of President Biden’s opponents saw Hur as a deep-state partner of a Department of Justice (“ part of the Praetorian Guard ” for the swamp) that absolved Biden while prosecuting Trump for similar acts. These camps were unable to decipher Hur because they only know the language of partisan wins and losses. Hur’s example of civic virtue came across as an ancient tongue requiring translation.

Putting this incident in a slightly broader context: We have two presidents who appear to have acted criminally with classified information. Law-breaking is virtually always wrong, but in a republic like ours, these specific actions are doubly so. If national secrets are compromised, the entire community is endangered. That is the antithesis of working toward the common good. Just as bad, these important but temporary leaders abused their public authority. They used their high office and its trappings to take and conceal secret documents, behaving as though they deserved privileges denied to their fellow citizens.

The proper national response (if we appreciated republican principles like duty, equality, justice, and the common good) should have been straightforward. Considering the serious allegations against these men, we should have courageously and fairly determined what course of action, even if unpopular, advances justice and the public interest. In his report and testimony, Hur followed this path, gathering facts, sticking to his official charge and the rules governing it, and presenting a conclusion based on sound, prudential judgment. He was tasked with an unpleasant job, one that his nation needed to be done. Regardless of whether one agrees entirely with the conclusion, he arrived at it responsibly. It says more about the zeitgeist than about Hur that the dominant narratives about his work seldom touched on such themes.

Fostering Leaders of Virtue

But is this episode really worse than any of the hundreds of other instances of tribalism and polarization in contemporary American public life? Yes, for two reasons. First, underlying the Biden and Trump investigations is a national security matter that is receiving insufficient attention. Russia, China, and other international adversaries are eager to exploit the lax handling of sensitive information. We must address that Biden and Trump, as well as other top officials such as Hillary Clinton , Sandy Berger , and David Petraeus , have played fast and loose with national secrets. This episode should have been understood as a moment to assess how we grant security clearances, improve the training of public officials, strengthen the oversight of classified documents, and toughen penalties for negligence and willful misconduct. But none of that has happened; instead, we’ve focused on which party gained an advantage. This shouldn’t be about political wins or losses but the nation’s security.

Second, America desperately needs virtuous public leaders, those who are honest and honorable, selfless and non-tribal, and committed to service and the public good. We seem to have forgotten that there is not an endless supply of such leaders. They are not an abundantly, naturally occurring phenomenon. We must identify those with these skills and dispositions. We must foster their development and celebrate them when they serve admirably. If we do none of those things and instead cheer demagogues and partisans, each seat of authority will be filled by a Commodus, not a Marcus Aurelius.

Indeed, because we’ve neglected civic virtue, there are fewer and fewer broadly respected figures in public life. Imagine—God forbid—that the nation needed, today, to appoint a commission to study a disaster, something along the lines of the groups that investigated the attacks of 9/11 or the Challenger accident or that wrote A Nation At Risk . It would be difficult to find 12 prominent national public officials admired by left and right alike for their smarts, wisdom, experience, integrity, and judgment. Because we seldom talk about these attributes anymore, we are failing to cultivate such leaders. And that calls into question our ability to find the next generation of fair judges and level-headed administrators and to collaboratively develop solutions for the most complicated, contentious issues in public life.

I’ve gotten to know Rob Hur a bit over the last few years through our joint service on a board. He is intelligent, experienced, diligent, and honorable. But are such qualities still prized in the public square? There was a time when figures with these characteristics were called to do an unpleasant task, did it admirably, and—with reputations burnished—were asked to do even more for their country. The most famous example is probably John Adams, who, as a young lawyer, defended the British soldiers accused of murdering civilians during the Boston Massacre. That service was deeply unpopular, but it was eventually recognized as an act of honor. Adams later served as a top American diplomat, vice president, and president. But there are more recent examples, Republican US Senator Howard Baker went against party interest, firmly pursuing the Watergate allegations that led to President Richard Nixon’s resignation. Baker later became his party’s Senate Majority Leader and White House Chief of Staff to the next elected Republican president. Democratic US Senator Joe Lieberman publicly broke with his party’s leader, President Bill Clinton, for the latter’s shameful conduct during the scandals of his second term. Lieberman was later selected as the vice-presidential nominee on the next Democratic ticket.

Unfortunately, however, too many courageous, independent, service-oriented public figures today find retirement—chosen or forced—is the reward for doing an unpleasant job well. That must end. How we treat those demonstrating civic virtue determines what kind of leaders, and therefore what kind of nation, we will have. We cannot cure this problem overnight. But we can and should do two things now. First, we need journalists and commentators to stop shining the spotlight on those who follow Commodus’s path. Yes, some officials will look for every opportunity to insult opponents, wage partisan warfare, and advance personal interests. But that doesn’t mean we need to pay them so much attention. Instead, focus more on highly effective but quiet public servants and those, like Hur, who demonstrate a commitment to the common good.

Second, public virtue must once again become a central part of the teaching of civics. Of course, history and constitutional structure are essential, but our Framers continuously noted the importance of virtue in the maintenance of a republic. George Washington wrote in his farewell address , “Virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government.” John Adams wrote , “The only foundation of a free Constitution is pure virtue” and “public virtue is the only foundation of republics.” Benjamin Rush argued , “Without virtue there can be no liberty.” Benjamin Franklin wrote , “Only a virtuous people are capable of freedom.” James Madison wrote , “To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.” And Samuel Adams argued , “He therefore is the truest friend of the liberty of his country who tries most to promote its virtue.”

If we want Americans to appreciate civic virtue, we must explain that it was central to our founding and celebrate public officials who live up to its demands.

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More From Forbes

The fallacy of work-life balance.

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For decades, the term “work-life balance” has been touted as the ideal state that all professionals should strive for—a harmonious equilibrium between the demands of work and the joys of life.

But this notion is deeply flawed—a myth that sets us up for perpetual dissatisfaction. Perhaps it is time for leaders to discard the fallacy of work-life balance and embrace a more realistic approach to integrating work and life.

The Myth of Balance

The concept of work-life balance emerged in the 1980s, popularized by the women’s liberation movement, which rightfully sought better working conditions, including maternity leave and flexible work schedules.

While these objectives were crucial, the idea of balance itself became an oversimplified solution to a complex problem. It suggests a binary relationship between work and life, as if they are two opposing forces that need to be balanced on a scale. In reality, work and life are not distinct entities—they are deeply intertwined.

A 2022 Gallup report reveals that 60% of people are emotionally detached at work, and an additional 19% are downright miserable. This pervasive detachment highlights a fundamental issue: striving for balance is unrealistic and insufficient.

The idea of balance implies that we can evenly distribute our energy and attention between work and life, leading to a perfect state of equilibrium. However, life is inherently unpredictable and dynamic, filled with fluctuations that defy such neat compartmentalization.

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Consider the case of Nicole, whose story, though harrowing, is all too common. In 2017, Nicole faced a series of devastating personal tragedies, including the loss of a child and her sibling’s suicide attempt. Simultaneously, she dealt with a toxic work environment that demanded emotional stoicism and punished vulnerability.

The pursuit of balance in such a scenario is absurd; what Nicole needed was not balance but support and understanding from her workplace. In the end, Nicole chose to voluntarily leave her senior executive role. It was this high-profile organization’s loss, one that could easily have been avoided. Nowadays, Nicole is flourishing at a different, high-profile company that fully understands her needs.

The American Psychological Association's research demonstrates that stress from juggling work and life is a significant contributor to declining mental health. The APA’s annual “Stress in America” survey consistently finds that work is a top source of stress, often compounded by the pressures of home life. The expectation to balance these seamlessly only exacerbates the problem.

In her book Overwhelmed: Work, Love, and Play When No One Has the Time , Brigid Schulte explores how the pursuit of balance often leaves people feeling more harried and less fulfilled. She argues for a more fluid approach to managing our time and energy, one that acknowledges the ebbs and flows of daily life.

Schulte’s research highlights that those who view their time more holistically—seeing work and life as integrated rather than separate—report higher levels of satisfaction and well-being.

Or consider the approach taken by companies like Patagonia and SAS Institute. These organizations have long recognized the importance of supporting employees’ overall well-being rather than just offering flexible work hours.

Patagonia, for instance, encourages employees to take breaks and spend time outdoors, integrating their love for nature with their professional responsibilities.

SAS Institute, known for its employee-friendly policies, provides extensive health and wellness programs, emphasizing the holistic health of its workforce. These initiatives have been shown to improve employee satisfaction, productivity, and innovation.

A New Approach to Integration

Arianna Huffington’s book Thrive delves into the importance of redefining success beyond the traditional metrics of money and power. She advocates for the Third Metric—well-being, wisdom, wonder, and giving. Huffington argues that true fulfillment comes from integrating these elements into our lives rather than trying to balance them against our work.

As leaders, we are responsible for nurturing our team members’ whole selves, encouraging and coaching them to simply “be their best” as the situation warrants.

It involves providing the tools and support they need to manage both work and life effectively. It’s about creating a culture where individuals feel valued and respected, where their well-being is a priority, and where they are encouraged to develop their skills and pursue meaningful work.

It means recognizing that every individual’s needs are different and adapting leadership styles to meet those diverse needs.

In my work (and life), I’ve found that the pursuit of work-life balance is a misguided endeavor that sets unrealistic expectations and neglects the complex realities of our lives. Leaders must have a rethink.

By shifting our focus from balance to integration, we can create workplaces that support the full spectrum of our employees’ lives, fostering environments where people can truly thrive. It’s time to let go of the myth of work-life balance and embrace a more holistic, sustainable approach to work and life.

My research suggests leaders ought to help people to bloom, not balance, in both work and life. Do you bloom?

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Guest Essay

My Life in the Brat Pack, Reconsidered

By Andrew McCarthy

Mr. McCarthy’s forthcoming documentary is “Brats.”

When I was a very young man, I became very successful very quickly in a string of movies. It was the 1980s, and I was in the right place at the right time as a cultural shift was taking place.

It’s difficult to imagine now, but Hollywood was not always as enamored of the young as it is today. But seemingly overnight the focus of films shifted. No longer would the auteurs of the ’70s dictate the type of entertainment we would watch. Hollywood had discovered the purchasing power of a young audience and refocused its moneymaking tractor beam directly on it.

I and a cluster of other young actors were the beneficiaries of this redirection, and our careers quickly flourished — surprising no one more than us. There were some in the old guard who resented this upheaval, and when a disparaging article in New York magazine appeared lumping a group of us young actors together as the Brat Pack, many in Hollywood snickered with satisfaction. We had been put in our place, brought down to size.

People had been eager to get a handle on this cultural realignment, and the catchy turn of phrase caught fire. The nod to the Rat Pack placed us on a historical Hollywood continuum while reducing us by stripping away our individuality. My career and those of a half dozen others were forever branded. As the magazine put it: “This is the Hollywood ‘Brat Pack.’ It is to the 1980s what the Rat Pack was to the 1960s — a roving band of famous young stars on the prowl for parties, women and a good time.”

We hated the tag. We were now members of a club none of us wished to join. I felt that I lost control of the narrative of my career overnight. I tried to shrug off the Brat Pack label, hoping it would fade. But I didn’t understand something.

While I might have felt the term was pejorative and diminishing, the young people of my generation loved it. Being in the Brat Pack meant that I was one of the ultimate cool kids, the ones you wanted to hang out with, to emulate; we were the ones you admired.

There has never been a precise accounting of which actors constituted the Brat Pack, but that is largely beside the point. The Brat Pack was always more of an idea than any fixed reality. And it put a stamp on a generation.

For years, the disconnect between what I experienced and what the public felt made for an uneasy alliance. The Brat Pack label preceded me into every room I entered. I dragged it behind me like the carcass of youth. Then a few years ago, I wrote a book about that time and discovered something had happened while I wasn’t looking. I had grown not only to accept the Brat Pack label but also to regard it with deep affection. It turns out, I had been peering through the wrong end of the telescope, and when I spun it around, the view was expansive.

People approached me on the street for decades to quote lines from those films or to express how much they meant to them. Many people spoke about their own youth in relation to those films. Those are the people who taught me the most. I eventually came to understand that I and the other members of the Brat Pack represented that thrilling transitional time when life was a blank slate to be written on, when possibility was just a step over the horizon. We had become the avatars of youth for a certain generation.

During that heady and confusing time in the ’80s, the great French film director Claude Chabrol said to me, “My dear boy, the truth today is not the truth tomorrow.” For so long I didn’t understand what he meant, but perhaps now I do. Something that had cast such a long shadow over me, that I felt had obscured my identity and even clouded who I had perceived myself to be, had transformed into something like a blessing. It was a gift I could offer others by merely accepting their affection.

I began to wonder about the experience of other Brat Pack members, most of whom I hadn’t seen in decades. Had their perspective on the events of so long ago shifted in a similar fashion? I had the notion that since the Brat Pack came into existence entirely because of its relation to film, I might film the encounters .

A few of the pack were reluctant to participate, but with the majority who did, our reunions were sweet. Gone was the competitive and anxious edge of youth. What remained was a survivor’s recognition and mutual affection.

But something else happened during those meetings: By reviving and sharing experiences of our long-frozen past, so much of the detritus of that time was revealed to be a phantom that fell away, allowing the Brat Pack to be re-experienced in the present. The truth of the past had yielded to the truth of today. No longer an ancient albatross, the Brat Pack had been transformed by time into something to be celebrated by us as the cultural touchstone it was, a thing to be looked on at last with a shared and bemused affection — re-examined and embraced with something akin to wonder.

Andrew McCarthy is an actor, writer and director.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

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5 Kant's Virtues

• Published: March 1998
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Kant's ethics is often but wrongly criticized for neglecting the virtues or offering a poor account of them. He in fact offers a rich and careful account, and a plausible reading of his theory of action shows that it is neither too inward nor too individualistic. In particular, maxims of virtue are ‘not objects of introspection’ (Kant denies that we have adequate self‐knowledge) and ‘not constructed by ascription’ (their relation to action is too indeterminate). Rather, Kant sees maxims of virtue as ‘prescriptions’, which can be used to guide virtuous action, but may provide no way of showing whether virtue has been achieved.

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