essay about virtues in life

Inner Strength For Life – The 12 Master Virtues

Our journey of growth in life can be described as a journey of developing both insights and also virtues (qualities of mind and heart). This article maps out what are the main qualities to develop, and what particular strengths or gifts are gained from each of them.

Developing virtues is not about being better than others, but about developing the potential of our own heart and mind. The philosophers of ancient Greece , Buddha , the Yogis, and the Positive Psychology movement all value the cultivation of certain personal qualities. In this essay I attempt to systematize these core strengths into 12 “buckets” or “power virtues”, as many of them share common features.

Each of these virtues, rather than being an inborn personal trait, are habits and states of mind that can be consciously cultivated using a systematic approach.

There are many books written about each of these virtues. In this post I can only cover a brief introduction of each, and suggest some further reading. Finally, I have separated them into virtues of mind and heart only for the sake of exposition – in truth there is great overlap between both.

Let us begin by talking about the need to develop virtues holistically.

Jump to section

What is a Virtue

Balanced self-development, tranquility, virtues list, parting thoughts.

A virtue is a positive character trait that is consider a foundation for living well, and a key ingredient to greatness.

For some, the word “virtue” may have a bit of a Victorian puritanism associated with it. This is not my understanding of it, nor is this the spirit of this article.

Rather, a virtue is a personal asset , a shield to protect us from difficulty, trouble, and suffering. Each virtue is a special sort of “power” that enables us to experience a level of well-being that we wouldn’t be able to access otherwise. Indeed, “virtue”comes from the latin virtus (force, worth, power).

Let’s take the virtue of equanimity as an example.

Developing equanimity protects us from suffering through the ups and downs of life, and saves us from the pain of being criticized, wronged, or left behind. It unlocks a new level of well-being: the emotional stability of knowing we will always be ok.

The same is true for every virtue discussed in this essay.

We all have certain personal qualities more naturally developed than the others. And our tendency is often to double-down on the virtues that we already have, rather than developing complementary virtues . For instance, people who are good at self-discipline may focus on getting even better at that, and overlook the need to develop the opposing virtue of flexibility.

There is no doubt that we need to play our strengths . But when we focus solely on our strengths and use them to overcompensate our weaknesses, the result is often not good. We can become victims of our own blessings.

Let’s take the case of a person whose natural strength is compassion and kindness. In certain relationships, this might be abused by other people (directly or indirectly). Dealing with this situation by becoming kinder would not be wise. Instead, the opposing virtue of self-assertiveness (the courage of setting boundaries), is to be exercised.

Here are some other examples of virtues that are incomplete (and potentially harmful) in isolation:

Tranquility without joy and energy is stale;
Detachment and equanimity without love can be cold;
Trust without wisdom can be blind;
Morality without humility can be self-righteous;
Love without wisdom can cause harm to oneself;
Focus and courage without love and wisdom is just blind power.

It took me years to get to this precious insight – and I’ll probably need a lifetime to learn how to implement it. 😉

Funnily enough, afterwards I discovered that this was already a concept praised by the Stoics. In Stoicism, it is called anacoluthia , the mutual entailment of virtues.

The point is: we need to focus on our strengths, but we also need to pay attention to the virtues we lack the most. Any development in these areas, however small, has the potential to be life-changing. I go deeper into this topic here .

Have a look at your current strengths. What complementary virtues might you be overlooking?

Best Virtues of Mind

“Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one’s courage.” – Anais Nin

Related qualities: boldness, fearlessness, decisiveness, leadership, assertiveness, confidence, magnanimity.

Courage says: “The consequences of this action might be painful for me, but it’s the right thing to do. I’ll do it.”

Courage is the ability to hold on to the feeling “I need to do this”, ignore the fear mongering thoughts, and take action. For a few, it is the absence of fear; for most, it’s the willingness to act despite fear.

Examples: It takes courage to expose yourself, to try something new, to change directions, to take a risk, to let go of an attachment, to say “I was wrong”, to have a difficult conversation, to trust yourself. Its manifestations are many, both in small and big things in life.

Without courage we feel powerless. Because we know what we want to do, or what we need to do, but we lack the boldness to take action. We default to the easy way out, the path of least resistance. It might feel comfortable now, but in the long term it doesn’t make us happy.

Recommended book: Daring Greatly (Brené Brown)

“The more tranquil a man becomes, the greater his success, his influence, his power for good. Calmness of mind is one of the beautiful jewels of wisdom.” – James Allen

Related qualities: serenity, calmness, non-reactivity, gentleness, peace, acceptance.

Tranquility says: “There is no need to stress. All is well.”

Tranquility involves keeping your mind and heart calm, like the ocean’s depth. You take your time to perceive what’s going on and act purposefully, without agitation, without hurry, and without overreacting. On a deeper level, it means to diminish rumination, worries, and useless thinking.

Examples: Taking a deep breath before answering an email or phone call, or before responding to the hurtful behavior of someone else. Being ok with the fact that things are often not going to go as we expect. Not brooding about the past or worrying too much about the future. Shunning busyness in favor of a more purposeful living. Not living in fight-or-flight mode.

Without tranquility we expend more energy than what’s really needed. We experience a constant feeling of stress, anxiety, or agitation in the back of our minds. And sometimes we may be fooling ourselves thinking we are being “active” or “productive”.

Recommended book: The Path to Tranquility (Dalai Lama)

“Success is going from failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm.” -Winston Churchill

Related qualities: energy, enthusiasm, passion, vitality, zeal, perseverance, willpower, determination, discipline, self-control, resolution, mindfulness, steadfastness, tenacity, grit.

Diligence says: “I am committed to this work / habit / path. I will continue it no matter what , even in the face of challenges, discouragement, and tiredness.”

Some may say that it is the most essential virtue for success in any field – career, art, sports or business. It is about making a decision once, in something that is good for you, and then keeping it up despite adversities and mood fluctuations.

Examples: Deciding to stop smoking and never again lighting acigarette. Deciding that I will meditate every day and keeping that up, like a perfect habit chain. Showing up to train / study / work in your passion project day after day, regardless of how you feel. Always getting up as soon as you fall. Having an unbreakable, almost stubborn, determination. Treating challenges like energy bars.

Without diligence we can’t accomplish anything meaningful. We can’t properly take care of our health, finances, mind, or relationships. We give up on everything too soon. We can’t create good habits, break bad habits, or manifest the things we want in our lives. We are a victim of circumstances, social/familial conditioning, and genetics.

Recommended books: The Willpower Instinct (Kelly McGonigal), Grit (Angela Duckworth), Power of Habit (Charles Duhhig)

“The powers of the mind are like the rays of the sun – when they are concentrated they illumine.” – Swami Vivekananda

Related qualities: concentration, one-pointedness, depth, contemplation, essentialism, meditation, orderliness.

Focus says: “I will ignore distractions, ignore the thousand different trivial things, and put all my energy in the most important thing. I will keep going deeper into what really matters. I can tame my own mind.”

Focus, the ability to control your attention, is the core skill of meditation . It involves bringing your mind, moment after moment, to dwell where you want it to dwell, rather than being pulled by the gravity of all the noise going on inside and outside of you.

Examples: Bringing your mind again and again to your breathing or mantra , during meditation. Cutting down on social media, TV and gossip. Learning to say “no” to 90% of good opportunities, so you can say yes to the 10% of great opportunities. Staying on your chosen path and not chasing the next shiny thing.

Without focus our energy is dissipated and our progress in any field is limited (like moving one mile in ten directions, rather than ten miles in a single direction). Focus, together with motivation and diligence, is a type of fire, and as such it needs to be balanced with more water-like virtues.

Recommended book: Essentialism (Greg McKeown)

“Happy is the man who can endure the highest and lowest fortune. He who has endured such vicissitudes with equanimity has deprived misfortune of its power.” – Seneca the Younger

Related qualities: balance, temperance, patience, forbearance, tolerance, acceptance, resilience, fortitude.

Equanimity says: “In highs and lows, victory and defeat, pleasure and pain, gain or loss – I keep evenness of temper. Nothing can mess me up.”

It is the ability to accept the present moment without emotional reaction, without agitation. It’s being unfuckwithable , imperturbable.

Examples: Not going into despair when we miss an opportunity, or lose some money. Not feeling elated when praised, or discouraged when criticized. Not taking offense from other people. Not indulging in emotional reactions to gain or loss, whatever shape they take. Being modest in success, and gracious in defeat.

Without equanimity , life is an emotional roller-coaster. We are attached to the highs, which brings pain because they are short-lived. And we are uncomfortable (perhaps even fearful) with the lows – which also brings pain, because they can’t be fully avoided.

Recommended book: Letters from a Stoic (Seneca), Dhammapada (Buddha)

“A great man is always willing to be little.” – Ralph Waldo Emerson

Related qualities: modesty, humbleness, discretion, egolessness, lack of conceit, simplicity, prudence, respect.

Humility says: “There are many things that I don’t know. Every person I meet is my teacher in something.”

Humility is letting go of the desire to feel superior to other people, either by means of wealth, fame, intelligence, beauty, titles, or influence. It’s about not comparing yourself with others, to be either superior or inferior. In the words of C.S. Lewis, True humility is not about thinking less of yourself; it is thinking of yourself less . In the deepest sense, humility is about transcending the ego.

This virtue is especially needed for overachievers and “successful people”.

Examples: Accepting your own mistakes. Learning to see virtue and good in others. Not dwelling on vanity and feelings of inflated self-importance. Being genuinely happy with other people’s successes. Accepting the uncertainty of life, and how small we are.

Without humility , we live stuck in an ego trap which prevents us from growing beyond the confines of our self-interests, and also poisons our relationships.

Recommended books: Ego is the Enemy (Ryan Holiday), Humility: An Unlikely Biography of America’s Greatest Virtue

“Always do what is right. It will gratify half of mankind and astound the other.” – Mark Twain

Related qualities: character, justice, honor, truthfulness, sincerity, honesty, responsibility, reliability, morality, righteousness, ethics, idealism, loyalty, dignity.

Integrity says: “I will do what is right, according to my conscience, even if nobody is looking. I will choose thoughts and words based on my values, not on personal gains. I will be radically honest and authentic, with myself and others.”

Like many virtues, integrity is about choosing what is best , rather than what is easy . It invites us to resist instant gratification in favor of a higher type of satisfaction – that of doing the right thing. It’s not about being moralistic, but about being congruent to our own conscience and values, in all our actions.

Examples: Refusing to distort the truth in order to gain personal benefits. Sticking to our words. Acting as though all our real intentions were publicly visible by others. Letting go of the “but I can get away with it” thinking. Not promising what you know you cannot fulfill.

Without integrity , we are not perceived as trustable or genuine. We make decisions that favor a short term gain but are likely to bring disastrous consequences in the long run.

Recommended books: Lying (Sam Harris), Yoga Morality (Georg Feuerstein)

“Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom” – Aristotle

Related qualities: intelligence, discernment, insight, understanding, knowledge, transcendence, perspective, discrimination, contemplation, investigation, clarity, vision.

Wisdom says: “Let me contemplate deeply on this. Let me understand it from the inside out. Let me know myself.”

Unlike the other virtues listed so far, wisdom it is not something that you can directly practice. Rather, it is the result of contemplation, introspection, study, and experience. It unveils the other virtues, informs them, and makes their practice easier. It points out the truth behind the surface, and the connection among things.

Without wisdom , we don’t really know what we are doing. Life is small, often confusing, and there might be a sense of purposelessness.

Recommended books: This depends on your taste for traditional and philosophy ( here is my list). Or you can also join my Practical Wisdom Newsletter .

Best Virtues of Heart

“You have to trust in something – your gut, destiny, life, karma, whatever.” – Steve Jobs

Related qualities: optimism, faith, openness, devotion, hope.

Trust says: “There is something larger than me. Life flows better when I trust resources larger than my own, and when I see purpose in random events.”

Trust is not a whimsical expectation that things will happen according to your preference; but rather a faith that things will happen in favor of your greater good. As Tony Robbins says, it is the attitude that life is happening for you , not to you .

Examples: Not dwelling on negative interpretations of what has happened in your life. Trusting that there is something good to be learned or gained from any situation. Having the feeling that if you keep true to your path, things will eventually work out ok.

Without trust , life can feel lonely, scary, or unfair. You are on your own, in the midst of random events, in a cold and careless universe.

Recommended book: Radical Acceptance (Tara Brach)

“Remain cheerful, for nothing destructivecan piece through the solid wall of cheerfulness.” – Sri Chinmoy

Related qualities: contentment, cheerfulness, satisfaction, gratitude, humor, appreciation.

Joy says: “I am cheerful, content, happy, and grateful. There is always something good in anything that happens. I feel well in my own skin, without depending on anything else.”

The disposition for joy is something that can be consciously cultivated. It is often the result of good vitality in the body, peace of mind, and an attitude of appreciation. It is also a natural consequence of a deep meditation practice , and the letting go of clinging.

Examples: Feeling good as a result of the positive states you have cultivated in your body (health), mind (peace), and heart (gratitude).

Without joy we are unhappy, cranky, gloomy, pessimistic, bored, neurotic.

Recommended books: The How of Happiness (Sonja Lyubomirsky), The Book of Joy (Dalai Lama et ali)

“The tighter you squeeze, the less you have.” – Zen Saying

Related qualities: dispassion, non-attachment, forgiveness, letting go, moderation, flexibility, frugality.

Detachment says: “I interact with things, I experience things, but I do not own them. Everything passes. I can let them be, and let them go.”

Learning how to let go is one of the most important things in overcoming suffering. It doesn’t mean that we live life less intensely; rather, we do what we are called to do with zest, and then we step back and watch what happens, without anxiety. It doesn’t mean we don’t love, play, work, or seek with intensity; but rather that we are detached from the results, knowing that we have full control only over the effort we make.

At the deepest level, detachment is a disillusionment with external desires and goals, and there is the realization that the only reliable source of happiness is internal. It also involves not holding onto any particular state.

Examples: Not being anxious about what the future brings. Letting go when things need to go. “Opening the hand” of your mind and allowing things to flow as they will. Having the feeling of not needing anything .

Without detachment, we suffer loss again and again. We can be manipulated. The mind is an open field for worries, fear, and insecurity.

Recommended books: Letting Go (David R. Hawkins), Everything Arises, Everything Falls Away (Ajahn Chah)

Check also my online course on the topic: Letting Go, Letting Be .

“The more you lose yourself in something bigger than yourself, the more energy you will have.” – Norman Vincent Peale

Related qualities: love, compassion, friendliness, service, generosity, sacrifice, selflessness, cooperation, nonviolence, consideration, tact, sensitivity.

Kindness says: “I feel others as myself, and take pleasure in doing good for them, in giving and serving. I wish everyone well. The well-being of others is my well-being.”

Kindness and related virtues (love, compassion, consideration) is the core “social virtue”. It invites us to expand our sense of well-being to include others as well. It gives us the ability to put ourselves in another person’s shoes, and feel what they feel as if it is happening to us, and if appropriate do something about it. The result is the experience of the “helper’s high”, a mix of dopamine and oxytocin.

At it’s most basic level, this virtue tell us to do unto others as you would have them do unto you . At the deepest level, it says “We are all one”.

Examples: Offering a word of encouragement or advice. Listening without judgment. Helping someone in need, directly or indirectly. Teaching. Assuming the best in others. Volunteering. Doing something for someone who can never repay you.

Without kindness , we cannot build any true human connection, and we fail to experience a happiness that is larger than ourself.

Recommended books: The Power of Kindness (Pierro Ferrucci), Awakening Loving-Kindness (Pema Chodron)

Here is the full list of virtues. The ones that are very similar are grouped together.

Acceptance. Letting go.
Contentment. Joyfulness.
Confidence. Boldness. Courage. Assertiveness.
Forgiveness. Magnanimity. Clemency.
Honesty. Authenticity. Truthfulness. Sincerity. Integrity.
Kindness. Generosity. Compassion. Empathy. Friendliness.
Loyalty. Trustworthiness. Reliability.
Perseverance. Determination. Purposefulness. Tenacity.
Willpower. Self-control. Fortitude. Self-discipline.
Loyalty. Commitment. Responsibility.
Caringness. Consideration. Support. Service.
Cooperation. Unity.
Humility. Simplicity.
Creativity. Imagination.
Detachment.
Wisdom. Thoughtfulness. Insight.
Dignity. Honor. Respect.
Energy. Motivation. Zest. Enthusiasm. Passion.
Resilience. Grit. Tolerance. Patience.
Excellence.
Orderliness. Purity. Clarity.
Prudence. Awareness. Tactfulness. Preparedness.
Temperance. Balance. Moderation.
Justice. Fairness.
Trust. Faith. Hope. Optimism.
Calmnes. Serenity. Centeredness. Peace.
Grace. Elegance. Gentleness.
Flexibility. Adaptability.

Developing these virtues is a life-long process. We’ll probably never be perfect at them. But the more we cultivate them, the better our life becomes. And, chances are, simply reading about these virtues has already enlivened them in you.

One simple way of cultivating these virtues is to focus on a single virtue each week (or month), and look daily for opportunities to put that chosen quality into practice. Keep asking yourself throughout the day, “What does it mean to be [virtue]?”

However, if you want to develop them more systematically, with practical exercises and support, consider joining my Intermediate Meditation Course . In this online program, besides learning 10 different types of meditation, you will find lessons focused on developing 10 different character strengths/virtues.

Another option is to work in person with me as your coach .

Every step taken on developing these virtues is valuable. By developing them we grow as a person, expand our awareness, and have better tools to live a happy and meaningful life.

Spread Meditation:

← Previous post
Next Post →

Shifting from anxious living to fearless living, optimism, gratitude, and contentment as a solution to anxiety 🙏🏻🙃😌, anxiety feeds on itself… but so does courage 😉💪🏻.

Become Calm, Centered, Focused.

Make the world a better place, one mind at a time.

Home — Essay Samples — Philosophy — Ethics — The Importance of Virtue Ethics

The Importance of Virtue Ethics

Categories: Ethics

About this sample

Words: 656 |

Published: Mar 20, 2024

Words: 656 | Page: 1 | 4 min read

Personal development, professional conduct, societal well-being.

Cite this Essay

To export a reference to this article please select a referencing style below:

Let us write you an essay from scratch

450+ experts on 30 subjects ready to help
Custom essay delivered in as few as 3 hours

Get high-quality help

Dr. Karlyna PhD

Verified writer

Expert in: Philosophy

+ 120 experts online

By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy . We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email

No need to pay just yet!

Related Essays

3 pages / 1226 words

6 pages / 2770 words

2 pages / 717 words

2 pages / 973 words

Remember! This is just a sample.

You can get your custom paper by one of our expert writers.

121 writers online

Still can’t find what you need?

Browse our vast selection of original essay samples, each expertly formatted and styled

Related Essays on Ethics

"Traveling Through The Dark" is a poem written by William Stafford that explores the complex themes of life and death, responsibility, and the consequences of our actions. The poem tells the story of a man who encounters a dead [...]

Animal testing has been a controversial topic for many years, with strong arguments on both sides. However, the practice of using animals for testing purposes is not only ethically questionable but also scientifically [...]

In the pantheon of legal narratives, few have resonated with the profound impact and timeless relevance as Reginald Rose's "Twelve Angry Men." Within this microcosm of a jury deliberation room, each juror represents a facet of [...]

Drug addiction is a complex and pervasive issue that affects millions of individuals worldwide. It not only harms the individual struggling with addiction but also has far-reaching consequences for their families, communities, [...]

“Rules and criteria for ethical judgement are all very well, but when conflicts are finely balanced, we simply express our preferences.”The concept of moral justification in ethics examples has been a topic of discussion for [...]

Life is a precious gift that is often taken for granted. Every day, we are bombarded with news stories of violence, tragedy, and loss, leaving us to question the value of a human life. What is the worth of a life? Is it measured [...]

Get Your Personalized Essay in 3 Hours or Less!

We use cookies to personalyze your web-site experience. By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .

Instructions Followed To The Letter
Deadlines Met At Every Stage
Unique And Plagiarism Free

Entertainment
Environment
Information Science and Technology
Social Issues

Home Essay Samples Life Courage

Courage as One of the Most Important Virtues

*minimum deadline

Cite this Essay

To export a reference to this article please select a referencing style below

Forgiveness

Related Essays

Need writing help?

You can always rely on us no matter what type of paper you need

*No hidden charges

100% Unique Essays

Absolutely Confidential

Money Back Guarantee

By clicking “Send Essay”, you agree to our Terms of service and Privacy statement. We will occasionally send you account related emails

You can also get a UNIQUE essay on this or any other topic

Thank you! We’ll contact you as soon as possible.

Table of Contents
Random Entry
Chronological
Editorial Information
About the SEP
Editorial Board
How to Cite the SEP
Special Characters
Advanced Tools
Support the SEP
PDFs for SEP Friends
Make a Donation
SEPIA for Libraries
Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

Friends PDF Preview
Author and Citation Info
Back to Top

Aristotle’s Ethics

Aristotle conceives of ethical theory as a field distinct from the theoretical sciences. Its methodology must match its subject matter—good action—and must respect the fact that in this field many generalizations hold only for the most part. We study ethics in order to improve our lives, and therefore its principal concern is the nature of human well-being. Aristotle follows Socrates and Plato in taking the virtues to be central to a well-lived life. Like Plato, he regards the ethical virtues (justice, courage, temperance and so on) as complex rational, emotional and social skills. But he rejects Plato’s idea that to be completely virtuous one must acquire, through a training in the sciences, mathematics, and philosophy, an understanding of what goodness is. What we need, in order to live well, is a proper appreciation of the way in which such goods as friendship, pleasure, virtue, honor and wealth fit together as a whole. In order to apply that general understanding to particular cases, we must acquire, through proper upbringing and habits, the ability to see, on each occasion, which course of action is best supported by reasons. Therefore practical wisdom, as he conceives it, cannot be acquired solely by learning general rules. We must also acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional, and social skills that enable us to put our general understanding of well-being into practice in ways that are suitable to each occasion.

1. Preliminaries

2. the human good and the function argument, 3.1 traditional virtues and the skeptic, 3.2 differences from and affinities to plato, 4. virtues and deficiencies, continence and incontinence, 5.1 ethical virtue as disposition, 5.2 ethical theory does not offer a decision procedure, 5.3 the starting point for practical reasoning, 6. intellectual virtues, 8. pleasure, 9. friendship, 10. three lives compared, a. single-authored overviews, b. anthologies, c.1 the chronological order of aristotle’s ethical treatises, c.2 the methodology and metaphysics of ethical theory, c.3 the human good and the human function, c.4 the nature of virtue and accounts of particular virtues, c.5 practical reasoning, moral psychology, and action, c.6 pleasure, c.7 friendship, c.8 feminism and aristotle, c.9 aristotle and contemporary ethics, d. bibliographies, primary literature, secondary literature, other internet resources, related entries.

Aristotle wrote two ethical treatises: the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics . He does not himself use either of these titles, although in the Politics (1295a36) he refers back to one of them—probably the Eudemian Ethics —as “ ta êthika ”—his writings about character. The words “ Eudemian ” and “ Nicomachean ” were added later, perhaps because the former was edited by his friend, Eudemus, and the latter by his son, Nicomachus. In any case, these two works cover more or less the same ground: they begin with a discussion of eudaimonia (“happiness”, “flourishing”), and turn to an examination of the nature of aretê (“virtue”, “excellence”) and the character traits that human beings need in order to live life at its best. Both treatises examine the conditions in which praise or blame are appropriate, and the nature of pleasure and friendship; near the end of each work, we find a brief discussion of the proper relationship between human beings and the divine.

Though the general point of view expressed in each work is the same, there are many subtle differences in organization and content as well. Clearly, one is a re-working of the other, and although no single piece of evidence shows conclusively what their order is, it is widely assumed that the Nicomachean Ethics is a later and improved version of the Eudemian Ethics . (Not all of the Eudemian Ethics was revised: its Books IV, V, and VI re-appear as V, VI, VII of the Nicomachean Ethics .) Perhaps the most telling indication of this ordering is that in several instances the Nicomachean Ethics develops a theme about which its Eudemian cousin is silent. Only the Nicomachean Ethics discusses the close relationship between ethical inquiry and politics; only the Nicomachean Ethics critically examines Solon’s paradoxical dictum that no man should be counted happy until he is dead; and only the Nicomachean Ethics gives a series of arguments for the superiority of the philosophical life to the political life. The remainder of this article will therefore focus on this work. [Note: Page and line numbers shall henceforth refer to this treatise.]

A third treatise, called the Magna Moralia (the “Big Ethics”) is included in complete editions of Aristotle’s works, but its authorship is disputed by scholars. It ranges over topics discussed more fully in the other two works and its point of view is similar to theirs. (Why, being briefer, is it named the Magna Moralia ? Because each of the two papyrus rolls into which it is divided is unusually long. Just as a big mouse can be a small animal, two big chapters can make a small book. This work was evidently named “big” with reference to its parts, not the whole.) A few authors in antiquity refer to a work with this name and attribute it to Aristotle, but it is not mentioned by several authorities, such as Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, whom we would expect to have known of it. Some scholars hold that it is Aristotle’s earliest course on ethics—perhaps his own lecture notes or those of a student; others regard it as a post-Aristotelian compilation or adaption of one or both of his genuine ethical treatises.

Although Aristotle is deeply indebted to Plato’s moral philosophy, particularly Plato’s central insight that moral thinking must be integrated with our emotions and appetites, and that the preparation for such unity of character should begin with childhood education, the systematic character of Aristotle’s discussion of these themes was a remarkable innovation. No one had written ethical treatises before Aristotle. Plato’s Republic , for example, does not treat ethics as a distinct subject matter; nor does it offer a systematic examination of the nature of happiness, virtue, voluntariness, pleasure, or friendship. To be sure, we can find in Plato’s works important discussions of these phenomena, but they are not brought together and unified as they are in Aristotle’s ethical writings.

The principal idea with which Aristotle begins is that there are differences of opinion about what is best for human beings, and that to profit from ethical inquiry we must resolve this disagreement. He insists that ethics is not a theoretical discipline: we are asking what the good for human beings is not simply because we want to have knowledge, but because we will be better able to achieve our good if we develop a fuller understanding of what it is to flourish. In raising this question—what is the good?—Aristotle is not looking for a list of items that are good. He assumes that such a list can be compiled rather easily; most would agree, for example, that it is good to have friends, to experience pleasure, to be healthy, to be honored, and to have such virtues as courage at least to some degree. The difficult and controversial question arises when we ask whether certain of these goods are more desirable than others. Aristotle’s search for the good is a search for the highest good, and he assumes that the highest good, whatever it turns out to be, has three characteristics: it is desirable for itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and all other goods are desirable for its sake.

Aristotle thinks everyone will agree that the terms “ eudaimonia ” (“happiness”) and “ eu zên ” (“living well”) designate such an end. The Greek term “ eudaimon ” is composed of two parts: “ eu ” means “well” and “ daimon ” means “divinity” or “spirit”. To be eudaimon is therefore to be living in a way that is well-favored by a god. But Aristotle never calls attention to this etymology in his ethical writings, and it seems to have little influence on his thinking. He regards “ eudaimon ” as a mere substitute for eu zên (“living well”). These terms play an evaluative role, and are not simply descriptions of someone’s state of mind.

No one tries to live well for the sake of some further goal; rather, being eudaimon is the highest end, and all subordinate goals—health, wealth, and other such resources—are sought because they promote well-being, not because they are what well-being consists in. But unless we can determine which good or goods happiness consists in, it is of little use to acknowledge that it is the highest end. To resolve this issue, Aristotle asks what the ergon (“function”, “task”, “work”) of a human being is, and argues that it consists in activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue (1097b22–1098a20). One important component of this argument is expressed in terms of distinctions he makes in his psychological and biological works. The soul is analyzed into a connected series of capacities: the nutritive soul is responsible for growth and reproduction, the locomotive soul for motion, the perceptive soul for perception, and so on. The biological fact Aristotle makes use of is that human beings are the only species that has not only these lower capacities but a rational soul as well. The good of a human being must have something to do with being human; and what sets humanity off from other species, giving us the potential to live a better life, is our capacity to guide ourselves by using reason. If we use reason well, we live well as human beings; or, to be more precise, using reason well over the course of a full life is what happiness consists in. Doing anything well requires virtue or excellence, and therefore living well consists in activities caused by the rational soul in accordance with virtue or excellence.

Aristotle’s conclusion about the nature of happiness is in a sense uniquely his own. No other writer or thinker had said precisely what he says about what it is to live well. But at the same time his view is not too distant from a common idea. As he himself points out, one traditional conception of happiness identifies it with virtue (1098b30–1). Aristotle’s theory should be construed as a refinement of this position. He says, not that happiness is virtue, but that it is virtuous activity . Living well consists in doing something, not just being in a certain state or condition. It consists in those lifelong activities that actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul.

At the same time, Aristotle makes it clear that in order to be happy one must possess others goods as well—such goods as friends, wealth, and power. And one’s happiness is endangered if one is severely lacking in certain advantages—if, for example, one is extremely ugly, or has lost children or good friends through death (1099a31–b6). But why so? If one’s ultimate end should simply be virtuous activity, then why should it make any difference to one’s happiness whether one has or lacks these other types of good? Aristotle’s reply is that one’s virtuous activity will be to some extent diminished or defective, if one lacks an adequate supply of other goods (1153b17–19). Someone who is friendless, childless, powerless, weak, and ugly will simply not be able to find many opportunities for virtuous activity over a long period of time, and what little he can accomplish will not be of great merit. To some extent, then, living well requires good fortune; happenstance can rob even the most excellent human beings of happiness. Nonetheless, Aristotle insists, the highest good, virtuous activity, is not something that comes to us by chance. Although we must be fortunate enough to have parents and fellow citizens who help us become virtuous, we ourselves share much of the responsibility for acquiring and exercising the virtues.

3. Methodology

A common complaint about Aristotle’s attempt to defend his conception of happiness is that his argument is too general to show that it is in one’s interest to possess any of the particular virtues as they are traditionally conceived. Suppose we grant, at least for the sake of argument, that doing anything well, including living well, consists in exercising certain skills; and let us call these skills, whatever they turn out to be, virtues. Even so, that point does not by itself allow us to infer that such qualities as temperance, justice, courage, as they are normally understood, are virtues. They should be counted as virtues only if it can be shown that actualizing precisely these skills is what happiness consists in. What Aristotle owes us, then, is an account of these traditional qualities that explains why they must play a central role in any well-lived life.

But perhaps Aristotle disagrees, and refuses to accept this argumentative burden. In one of several important methodological remarks he makes near the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics , he says that in order to profit from the sort of study he is undertaking, one must already have been brought up in good habits (1095b4–6). The audience he is addressing, in other words, consists of people who are already just, courageous, and generous; or, at any rate, they are well on their way to possessing these virtues. Why such a restricted audience? Why does he not address those who have serious doubts about the value of these traditional qualities, and who therefore have not yet decided to cultivate and embrace them?

Addressing the moral skeptic, after all, is the project Plato undertook in the Republic : in Book I he rehearses an argument to show that justice is not really a virtue, and the remainder of this work is an attempt to rebut this thesis. Aristotle’s project seems, at least on the surface, to be quite different. He does not appear to be addressing someone who has genuine doubts about the value of justice or kindred qualities. Perhaps, then, he realizes how little can be accomplished, in the study of ethics, to provide it with a rational foundation. Perhaps he thinks that no reason can be given for being just, generous, and courageous. These are qualities one learns to love when one is a child, and having been properly habituated, one no longer looks for or needs a reason to exercise them. One can show, as a general point, that happiness consists in exercising some skills or other, but that the moral skills of a virtuous person are what one needs is not a proposition that can be established on the basis of argument.

This is not the only way of reading the Ethics , however. For surely we cannot expect Aristotle to show what it is about the traditional virtues that makes them so worthwhile until he has fully discussed the nature of those virtues. He himself warns us that his initial statement of what happiness is should be treated as a rough outline whose details are to be filled in later (1098a20–22). His intention in Book I of the Ethics is to indicate in a general way why the virtues are important; why particular virtues—courage, justice, and the like—are components of happiness is something we should be able to better understand only at a later point.

In any case, Aristotle’s assertion that his audience must already have begun to cultivate the virtues need not be taken to mean that no reasons can be found for being courageous, just, and generous. His point, rather, may be that in ethics, as in any other study, we cannot make progress towards understanding why things are as they are unless we begin with certain assumptions about what is the case. Neither theoretical nor practical inquiry starts from scratch. Someone who has made no observations of astronomical or biological phenomena is not yet equipped with sufficient data to develop an understanding of these sciences. The parallel point in ethics is that to make progress in this sphere we must already have come to enjoy doing what is just, courageous, generous and the like. We must experience these activities not as burdensome constraints, but as noble, worthwhile, and enjoyable in themselves. Then, when we engage in ethical inquiry, we can ask what it is about these activities that makes them worthwhile. We can also compare these goods with other things that are desirable in themselves—pleasure, friendship, honor, and so on—and ask whether any of them is more desirable than the others. We approach ethical theory with a disorganized bundle of likes and dislikes based on habit and experience; such disorder is an inevitable feature of childhood. But what is not inevitable is that our early experience will be rich enough to provide an adequate basis for worthwhile ethical reflection; that is why we need to have been brought up well. Yet such an upbringing can take us only so far. We seek a deeper understanding of the objects of our childhood enthusiasms, and we must systematize our goals so that as adults we have a coherent plan of life. We need to engage in ethical theory, and to reason well in this field, if we are to move beyond the low-grade form of virtue we acquired as children.

Read in this way, Aristotle is engaged in a project similar in some respects to the one Plato carried out in the Republic . One of Plato’s central points is that it is a great advantage to establish a hierarchical ordering of the elements in one’s soul; and he shows how the traditional virtues can be interpreted to foster or express the proper relation between reason and less rational elements of the psyche. Aristotle’s approach is similar: his “function argument” shows in a general way that our good lies in the dominance of reason, and the detailed studies of the particular virtues reveal how each of them involves the right kind of ordering of the soul. Aristotle’s goal is to arrive at conclusions like Plato’s, but without relying on the Platonic metaphysics that plays a central role in the argument of the Republic . He rejects the existence of Plato’s forms in general and the form of the good in particular; and he rejects the idea that in order to become fully virtuous one must study mathematics and the sciences, and see all branches of knowledge as a unified whole. Even though Aristotle’s ethical theory sometimes relies on philosophical distinctions that are more fully developed in his other works, he never proposes that students of ethics need to engage in a specialized study of the natural world, or mathematics, or eternal and changing objects. His project is to make ethics an autonomous field, and to show why a full understanding of what is good does not require expertise in any other field.

There is another contrast with Plato that should be emphasized: In Book II of the Republic , we are told that the best type of good is one that is desirable both in itself and for the sake of its results (357d–358a). Plato argues that justice should be placed in this category, but since it is generally agreed that it is desirable for its consequences, he devotes most of his time to establishing his more controversial point—that justice is to be sought for its own sake. By contrast, Aristotle assumes that if A is desirable for the sake of B , then B is better than A (1094a14–16); therefore, the highest kind of good must be one that is not desirable for the sake of anything else. To show that A deserves to be our ultimate end, one must show that all other goods are best thought of as instruments that promote A in some way or other. Accordingly, it would not serve Aristotle’s purpose to consider virtuous activity in isolation from all other goods. He needs to discuss honor, wealth, pleasure, and friendship in order to show how these goods, properly understood, can be seen as resources that serve the higher goal of virtuous activity. He vindicates the centrality of virtue in a well-lived life by showing that in the normal course of things a virtuous person will not live a life devoid of friends, honor, wealth, pleasure, and the like. Virtuous activity makes a life happy not by guaranteeing happiness in all circumstances, but by serving as the goal for the sake of which lesser goods are to be pursued. Aristotle’s methodology in ethics therefore pays more attention than does Plato’s to the connections that normally obtain between virtue and other goods. That is why he stresses that in this sort of study one must be satisfied with conclusions that hold only for the most part (1094b11–22). Poverty, isolation, and dishonor are normally impediments to the exercise of virtue and therefore to happiness, although there may be special circumstances in which they are not. The possibility of exceptions does not undermine the point that, as a rule, to live well is to have sufficient resources for the pursuit of virtue over the course of a lifetime.

Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue (1103a1–10): those that pertain to the part of the soul that engages in reasoning (virtues of mind or intellect), and those that pertain to the part of the soul that cannot itself reason but is nonetheless capable of following reason (ethical virtues, virtues of character). Intellectual virtues are in turn divided into two sorts: those that pertain to theoretical reasoning, and those that pertain to practical thinking (1139a3–8). He organizes his material by first studying ethical virtue in general, then moving to a discussion of particular ethical virtues (temperance, courage, and so on), and finally completing his survey by considering the intellectual virtues (practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, etc.).

All free males are born with the potential to become ethically virtuous and practically wise, but to achieve these goals they must go through two stages: during their childhood, they must develop the proper habits; and then, when their reason is fully developed, they must acquire practical wisdom ( phronêsis ). This does not mean that first we fully acquire the ethical virtues, and then, at a later stage, add on practical wisdom. Ethical virtue is fully developed only when it is combined with practical wisdom (1144b14–17). A low-grade form of ethical virtue emerges in us during childhood as we are repeatedly placed in situations that call for appropriate actions and emotions; but as we rely less on others and become capable of doing more of our own thinking, we learn to develop a larger picture of human life, our deliberative skills improve, and our emotional responses are perfected. Like anyone who has developed a skill in performing a complex and difficult activity, the virtuous person takes pleasure in exercising his intellectual skills. Furthermore, when he has decided what to do, he does not have to contend with internal pressures to act otherwise. He does not long to do something that he regards as shameful; and he is not greatly distressed at having to give up a pleasure that he realizes he should forego.

Aristotle places those who suffer from such internal disorders into one of three categories: (A) Some agents, having reached a decision about what to do on a particular occasion, experience some counter-pressure brought on by an appetite for pleasure, or anger, or some other emotion; and this countervailing influence is not completely under the control of reason. (1) Within this category, some are typically better able to resist these counter-rational pressures than is the average person. Such people are not virtuous, although they generally do what a virtuous person does. Aristotle calls them “continent” ( enkratês ). But (2) others are less successful than the average person in resisting these counter-pressures. They are “incontinent” ( akratês ). (The explanation of akrasia is a topic to which we will return in section 7.) In addition, (B) there is a type of agent who refuses even to try to do what an ethically virtuous agent would do, because he has become convinced that justice, temperance, generosity and the like are of little or no value. Such people Aristotle calls evil ( kakos , phaulos ). He assumes that evil people are driven by desires for domination and luxury, and although they are single-minded in their pursuit of these goals, he portrays them as deeply divided, because their pleonexia —their desire for more and more—leaves them dissatisfied and full of self-hatred.

It should be noticed that all three of these deficiencies—continence, incontinence, vice—involve some lack of internal harmony. (Here Aristotle’s debt to Plato is particularly evident, for one of the central ideas of the Republic is that the life of a good person is harmonious, and all other lives deviate to some degree from this ideal.) The evil person may wholeheartedly endorse some evil plan of action at a particular moment, but over the course of time, Aristotle supposes, he will regret his decision, because whatever he does will prove inadequate for the achievement of his goals (1166b5–29). Aristotle assumes that when someone systematically makes bad decisions about how to live his life, his failures are caused by psychological forces that are less than fully rational. His desires for pleasure, power or some other external goal have become so strong that they make him care too little or not at all about acting ethically. To keep such destructive inner forces at bay, we need to develop the proper habits and emotional responses when we are children, and to reflect intelligently on our aims when we are adults. But some vulnerability to these disruptive forces is present even in more-or-less virtuous people; that is why even a good political community needs laws and the threat of punishment. Clear thinking about the best goals of human life and the proper way to put them into practice is a rare achievement, because the human psyche is not a hospitable environment for the development of these insights.

5. The Doctrine of the Mean

Aristotle describes ethical virtue as a “ hexis ” (“state” “condition” “disposition”)—a tendency or disposition, induced by our habits, to have appropriate feelings (1105b25–6). Defective states of character are hexeis (plural of hexis ) as well, but they are tendencies to have inappropriate feelings. The significance of Aristotle’s characterization of these states as hexeis is his decisive rejection of the thesis, found throughout Plato’s early dialogues, that virtue is nothing but a kind of knowledge and vice nothing but a lack of knowledge. Although Aristotle frequently draws analogies between the crafts and the virtues (and similarly between physical health and eudaimonia ), he insists that the virtues differ from the crafts and all branches of knowledge in that the former involve appropriate emotional responses and are not purely intellectual conditions.

Furthermore, every ethical virtue is a condition intermediate (a “golden mean” as it is popularly known) between two other states, one involving excess, and the other deficiency (1106a26–b28). In this respect, Aristotle says, the virtues are no different from technical skills: every skilled worker knows how to avoid excess and deficiency, and is in a condition intermediate between two extremes. The courageous person, for example, judges that some dangers are worth facing and others not, and experiences fear to a degree that is appropriate to his circumstances. He lies between the coward, who flees every danger and experiences excessive fear, and the rash person, who judges every danger worth facing and experiences little or no fear. Aristotle holds that this same topography applies to every ethical virtue: all are located on a map that places the virtues between states of excess and deficiency. He is careful to add, however, that the mean is to be determined in a way that takes into account the particular circumstances of the individual (1106a36–b7). The arithmetic mean between 10 and 2 is 6, and this is so invariably, whatever is being counted. But the intermediate point that is chosen by an expert in any of the crafts will vary from one situation to another. There is no universal rule, for example, about how much food an athlete should eat, and it would be absurd to infer from the fact that 10 lbs. is too much and 2 lbs. too little for me that I should eat 6 lbs. Finding the mean in any given situation is not a mechanical or thoughtless procedure, but requires a full and detailed acquaintance with the circumstances.

It should be evident that Aristotle’s treatment of virtues as mean states endorses the idea that we should sometimes have strong feelings—when such feelings are called for by our situation. Sometimes only a small degree of anger is appropriate; but at other times, circumstances call for great anger. The right amount is not some quantity between zero and the highest possible level, but rather the amount, whatever it happens to be, that is proportionate to the seriousness of the situation. Of course, Aristotle is committed to saying that anger should never reach the point at which it undermines reason; and this means that our passion should always fall short of the extreme point at which we would lose control. But it is possible to be very angry without going to this extreme, and Aristotle does not intend to deny this.

The theory of the mean is open to several objections, but before considering them, we should recognize that in fact there are two distinct theses each of which might be called a doctrine of the mean. First, there is the thesis that every virtue is a state that lies between two vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency. Second, there is the idea that whenever a virtuous person chooses to perform a virtuous act, he can be described as aiming at an act that is in some way or other intermediate between alternatives that he rejects. It is this second thesis that is most likely to be found objectionable. A critic might concede that in some cases virtuous acts can be described in Aristotle’s terms. If, for example, one is trying to decide how much to spend on a wedding present, one is looking for an amount that is neither excessive nor deficient. But surely many other problems that confront a virtuous agent are not susceptible to this quantitative analysis. If one must decide whether to attend a wedding or respect a competing obligation instead, it would not be illuminating to describe this as a search for a mean between extremes—unless “aiming at the mean” simply becomes another phrase for trying to make the right decision. The objection, then, is that Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, taken as a doctrine about what the ethical agent does when he deliberates, is in many cases inapplicable or unilluminating.

A defense of Aristotle would have to say that the virtuous person does after all aim at a mean, if we allow for a broad enough notion of what sort of aiming is involved. For example, consider a juror who must determine whether a defendant is guilty as charged. He does not have before his mind a quantitative question; he is trying to decide whether the accused committed the crime, and is not looking for some quantity of action intermediate between extremes. Nonetheless, an excellent juror can be described as someone who, in trying to arrive at the correct decision, seeks to express the right degree of concern for all relevant considerations. He searches for the verdict that results from a deliberative process that is neither overly credulous nor unduly skeptical. Similarly, in facing situations that arouse anger, a virtuous agent must determine what action (if any) to take in response to an insult, and although this is not itself a quantitative question, his attempt to answer it properly requires him to have the right degree of concern for his standing as a member of the community. He aims at a mean in the sense that he looks for a response that avoids too much or too little attention to factors that must be taken into account in making a wise decision.

Perhaps a greater difficulty can be raised if we ask how Aristotle determines which emotions are governed by the doctrine of the mean. Consider someone who loves to wrestle, for example. Is this passion something that must be felt by every human being at appropriate times and to the right degree? Surely someone who never felt this emotion to any degree could still live a perfectly happy life. Why then should we not say the same about at least some of the emotions that Aristotle builds into his analysis of the ethically virtuous agent? Why should we experience anger at all, or fear, or the degree of concern for wealth and honor that Aristotle commends? These are precisely the questions that were asked in antiquity by the Stoics, and they came to the conclusion that such common emotions as anger and fear are always inappropriate. Aristotle assumes, on the contrary, not simply that these common passions are sometimes appropriate, but that it is essential that every human being learn how to master them and experience them in the right way at the right times. A defense of his position would have to show that the emotions that figure in his account of the virtues are valuable components of any well-lived human life, when they are experienced properly. Perhaps such a project could be carried out, but Aristotle himself does not attempt to do so.

He often says, in the course of his discussion, that when the good person chooses to act virtuously, he does so for the sake of the “ kalon ”—a word that can mean “beautiful”, “noble”, or “fine” (see for example 1120a23–4). This term indicates that Aristotle sees in ethical activity an attraction that is comparable to the beauty of well-crafted artifacts, including such artifacts as poetry, music, and drama. He draws this analogy in his discussion of the mean, when he says that every craft tries to produce a work from which nothing should be taken away and to which nothing further should be added (1106b5–14). A craft product, when well designed and produced by a good craftsman, is not merely useful, but also has such elements as balance, proportion and harmony—for these are properties that help make it useful. Similarly, Aristotle holds that a well-executed project that expresses the ethical virtues will not merely be advantageous but kalon as well—for the balance it strikes is part of what makes it advantageous. The young person learning to acquire the virtues must develop a love of doing what is kalon and a strong aversion to its opposite—the aischron , the shameful and ugly. Determining what is kalon is difficult (1106b28–33, 1109a24–30), and the normal human aversion to embracing difficulties helps account for the scarcity of virtue (1104b10–11).

It should be clear that neither the thesis that virtues lie between extremes nor the thesis that the good person aims at what is intermediate is intended as a procedure for making decisions. These doctrines of the mean help show what is attractive about the virtues, and they also help systematize our understanding of which qualities are virtues. Once we see that temperance, courage, and other generally recognized characteristics are mean states, we are in a position to generalize and to identify other mean states as virtues, even though they are not qualities for which we have a name. Aristotle remarks, for example, that the mean state with respect to anger has no name in Greek (1125b26–7). Though he is guided to some degree by distinctions captured by ordinary terms, his methodology allows him to recognize states for which no names exist.

So far from offering a decision procedure, Aristotle insists that this is something that no ethical theory can do. His theory elucidates the nature of virtue, but what must be done on any particular occasion by a virtuous agent depends on the circumstances, and these vary so much from one occasion to another that there is no possibility of stating a series of rules, however complicated, that collectively solve every practical problem. This feature of ethical theory is not unique; Aristotle thinks it applies to many crafts, such as medicine and navigation (1104a7–10). He says that the virtuous person “sees the truth in each case, being as it were a standard and measure of them” (1113a32–3); but this appeal to the good person’s vision should not be taken to mean that he has an inarticulate and incommunicable insight into the truth. Aristotle thinks of the good person as someone who is good at deliberation, and he describes deliberation as a process of rational inquiry. The intermediate point that the good person tries to find is

determined by logos (“reason”, “account”) and in the way that the person of practical reason would determine it. (1107a1–2)

To say that such a person “sees” what to do is simply a way of registering the point that the good person’s reasoning does succeed in discovering what is best in each situation. He is “as it were a standard and measure” in the sense that his views should be regarded as authoritative by other members of the community. A standard or measure is something that settles disputes; and because good people are so skilled at discovering the mean in difficult cases, their advice must be sought and heeded.

Although there is no possibility of writing a book of rules, however long, that will serve as a complete guide to wise decision-making, it would be a mistake to attribute to Aristotle the opposite position, namely that every purported rule admits of exceptions, so that even a small rule-book that applies to a limited number of situations is an impossibility. He makes it clear that certain emotions (spite, shamelessness, envy) and actions (adultery, theft, murder) are always wrong, regardless of the circumstances (1107a8–12). Although he says that the names of these emotions and actions convey their wrongness, he should not be taken to mean that their wrongness derives from linguistic usage. He defends the family as a social institution against the criticisms of Plato ( Politics II.3–4), and so when he says that adultery is always wrong, he is prepared to argue for his point by explaining why marriage is a valuable custom and why extra-marital intercourse undermines the relationship between husband and wife. He is not making the tautological claim that wrongful sexual activity is wrong, but the more specific and contentious point that marriages ought to be governed by a rule of strict fidelity. Similarly, when he says that murder and theft are always wrong, he does not mean that wrongful killing and taking are wrong, but that the current system of laws regarding these matters ought to be strictly enforced. So, although Aristotle holds that ethics cannot be reduced to a system of rules, however complex, he insists that some rules are inviolable.

We have seen that the decisions of a practically wise person are not mere intuitions, but can be justified by a chain of reasoning. (This is why Aristotle often talks in term of a practical syllogism, with a major premise that identifies some good to be achieved, and a minor premise that locates the good in some present-to-hand situation.) At the same time, he is acutely aware of the fact that reasoning can always be traced back to a starting point that is not itself justified by further reasoning. Neither good theoretical reasoning nor good practical reasoning moves in a circle; true thinking always presupposes and progresses in linear fashion from proper starting points. And that leads him to ask for an account of how the proper starting points of reasoning are to be determined. Practical reasoning always presupposes that one has some end, some goal one is trying to achieve; and the task of reasoning is to determine how that goal is to be accomplished. (This need not be means-end reasoning in the conventional sense; if, for example, our goal is the just resolution of a conflict, we must determine what constitutes justice in these particular circumstances. Here we are engaged in ethical inquiry, and are not asking a purely instrumental question.) But if practical reasoning is correct only if it begins from a correct premise, what is it that insures the correctness of its starting point?

Aristotle replies: “Virtue makes the goal right, practical wisdom the things leading to it” (1144a7–8). By this he cannot mean that there is no room for reasoning about our ultimate end. For as we have seen, he gives a reasoned defense of his conception of happiness as virtuous activity. What he must have in mind, when he says that virtue makes the goal right, is that deliberation typically proceeds from a goal that is far more specific than the goal of attaining happiness by acting virtuously. To be sure, there may be occasions when a good person approaches an ethical problem by beginning with the premise that happiness consists in virtuous activity. But more often what happens is that a concrete goal presents itself as his starting point—helping a friend in need, or supporting a worthwhile civic project. Which specific project we set for ourselves is determined by our character. A good person starts from worthwhile concrete ends because his habits and emotional orientation have given him the ability to recognize that such goals are within reach, here and now. Those who are defective in character may have the rational skill needed to achieve their ends—the skill Aristotle calls cleverness (1144a23–8)—but often the ends they seek are worthless. The cause of this deficiency lies not in some impairment in their capacity to reason—for we are assuming that they are normal in this respect—but in the training of their passions.

Since Aristotle often calls attention to the imprecision of ethical theory (see e.g. 1104a1–7), it comes as a surprise to many readers of the Ethics that he begins Book VI with the admission that his earlier statements about the mean need supplementation because they are not yet clear ( saphes ). In every practical discipline, the expert aims at a mark and uses right reason to avoid the twin extremes of excess and deficiency. But what is this right reason, and by what standard ( horos ) is it to be determined? Aristotle says that unless we answer that question, we will be none the wiser—just as a student of medicine will have failed to master his subject if he can only say that the right medicines to administer are the ones that are prescribed by medical expertise, but has no standard other than this (1138b18–34).

It is not easy to understand the point Aristotle is making here. Has he not already told us that there can be no complete theoretical guide to ethics, that the best one can hope for is that in particular situations one’s ethical habits and practical wisdom will help one determine what to do? Furthermore, Aristotle nowhere announces, in the remainder of Book VI, that we have achieved the greater degree of accuracy that he seems to be looking for. The rest of this Book is a discussion of the various kinds of intellectual virtues: theoretical wisdom, science ( epistêmê ), intuitive understanding ( nous ), practical wisdom, and craft expertise. Aristotle explains what each of these states of mind is, draws various contrasts among them, and takes up various questions that can be raised about their usefulness. At no point does he explicitly return to the question he raised at the beginning of Book VI; he never says, “and now we have the standard of right reason that we were looking for”. Nor is it easy to see how his discussion of these five intellectual virtues can bring greater precision to the doctrine of the mean.

We can make some progress towards solving this problem if we remind ourselves that at the beginning of the Ethics , Aristotle describes his inquiry as an attempt to develop a better understanding of what our ultimate aim should be. The sketchy answer he gives in Book I is that happiness consists in virtuous activity. In Books II through V, he describes the virtues of the part of the soul that is rational in that it can be attentive to reason, even though it is not capable of deliberating. But precisely because these virtues are rational only in this derivative way, they are a less important component of our ultimate end than is the intellectual virtue—practical wisdom—with which they are integrated. If what we know about virtue is only what is said in Books II through V, then our grasp of our ultimate end is radically incomplete, because we still have not studied the intellectual virtue that enables us to reason well in any given situation. One of the things, at least, towards which Aristotle is gesturing, as he begins Book VI, is practical wisdom. This state of mind has not yet been analyzed, and that is one reason why he complains that his account of our ultimate end is not yet clear enough.

But is practical wisdom the only ingredient of our ultimate end that has not yet been sufficiently discussed? Book VI discusses five intellectual virtues, not just practical wisdom, but it is clear that at least one of these—craft knowledge—is considered only in order to provide a contrast with the others. Aristotle is not recommending that his readers make this intellectual virtue part of their ultimate aim. But what of the remaining three: science, intuitive understanding, and the virtue that combines them, theoretical wisdom? Are these present in Book VI only in order to provide a contrast with practical wisdom, or is Aristotle saying that these too must be components of our goal? He does not fully address this issue, but it is evident from several of his remarks in Book VI that he takes theoretical wisdom to be a more valuable state of mind than practical wisdom.

It is strange if someone thinks that politics or practical wisdom is the most excellent kind of knowledge, unless man is the best thing in the cosmos. (1141a20–22)

He says that theoretical wisdom produces happiness by being a part of virtue (1144a3–6), and that practical wisdom looks to the development of theoretical wisdom, and issues commands for its sake (1145a8–11). So it is clear that exercising theoretical wisdom is a more important component of our ultimate goal than practical wisdom.

Even so, it may still seem perplexing that these two intellectual virtues, either separately or collectively, should somehow fill a gap in the doctrine of the mean. Having read Book VI and completed our study of what these two forms of wisdom are, how are we better able to succeed in finding the mean in particular situations?

The answer to this question may be that Aristotle does not intend Book VI to provide a full answer to that question, but rather to serve as a prolegomenon to an answer. For it is only near the end of Book X that he presents a full discussion of the relative merits of these two kinds of intellectual virtue, and comments on the different degrees to which each needs to be provided with resources. In X.7–8, he argues that the happiest kind of life is that of a philosopher—someone who exercises, over a long period of time, the virtue of theoretical wisdom, and has sufficient resources for doing so. (We will discuss these chapters more fully in section 10 below.) One of his reasons for thinking that such a life is superior to the second-best kind of life—that of a political leader, someone who devotes himself to the exercise of practical rather than theoretical wisdom—is that it requires less external equipment (1178a23–b7). Aristotle has already made it clear in his discussion of the ethical virtues that someone who is greatly honored by his community and commands large financial resources is in a position to exercise a higher order of ethical virtue than is someone who receives few honors and has little property. The virtue of magnificence is superior to mere liberality, and similarly greatness of soul is a higher excellence than the ordinary virtue that has to do with honor. (These qualities are discussed in IV.1–4.) The grandest expression of ethical virtue requires great political power, because it is the political leader who is in a position to do the greatest amount of good for the community. The person who chooses to lead a political life, and who aims at the fullest expression of practical wisdom, has a standard for deciding what level of resources he needs: he should have friends, property, and honors in sufficient quantities to allow his practical wisdom to express itself without impediment. But if one chooses instead the life of a philosopher, then one will look to a different standard—the fullest expression of theoretical wisdom—and one will need a smaller supply of these resources.

This enables us to see how Aristotle’s treatment of the intellectual virtues does give greater content and precision to the doctrine of the mean. The best standard is the one adopted by the philosopher; the second-best is the one adopted by the political leader. In either case, it is the exercise of an intellectual virtue that provides a guideline for making important quantitative decisions. This supplement to the doctrine of the mean is fully compatible with Aristotle’s thesis that no set of rules, no matter how long and detailed, obviates the need for deliberative and ethical virtue. If one chooses the life of a philosopher, one should keep the level of one’s resources high enough to secure the leisure necessary for such a life, but not so high that one’s external equipment becomes a burden and a distraction rather than an aid to living well. That gives one a firmer idea of how to hit the mean, but it still leaves the details to be worked out. The philosopher will need to determine, in particular situations, where justice lies, how to spend wisely, when to meet or avoid a danger, and so on. All of the normal difficulties of ethical life remain, and they can be solved only by means of a detailed understanding of the particulars of each situation. Having philosophy as one’s ultimate aim does not put an end to the need for developing and exercising practical wisdom and the ethical virtues.

In VII.1–10 Aristotle investigates character traits—continence and incontinence—that are not as blameworthy as the vices but not as praiseworthy as the virtues. (We began our discussion of these qualities in section 4.) The Greek terms are akrasia (“incontinence”; literally: “lack of mastery”) and enkrateia (“continence”; literally “mastery”). An akratic person goes against reason as a result of some pathos (“emotion”, “feeling”). Like the akratic, an enkratic person experiences a feeling that is contrary to reason; but unlike the akratic, he acts in accordance with reason. His defect consists solely in the fact that, more than most people, he experiences passions that conflict with his rational choice. The akratic person has not only this defect, but has the further flaw that he gives in to feeling rather than reason more often than the average person.

Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of akrasia: impetuosity ( propeteia ) and weakness ( astheneia ). The person who is weak goes through a process of deliberation and makes a choice; but rather than act in accordance with his reasoned choice, he acts under the influence of a passion. By contrast, the impetuous person does not go through a process of deliberation and does not make a reasoned choice; he simply acts under the influence of a passion. At the time of action, the impetuous person experiences no internal conflict. But once his act has been completed, he regrets what he has done. One could say that he deliberates, if deliberation were something that post-dated rather than preceded action; but the thought process he goes through after he acts comes too late to save him from error.

It is important to bear in mind that when Aristotle talks about impetuosity and weakness, he is discussing chronic conditions. The impetuous person is someone who acts emotionally and fails to deliberate not just once or twice but with some frequency; he makes this error more than most people do. Because of this pattern in his actions, we would be justified in saying of the impetuous person that had his passions not prevented him from doing so, he would have deliberated and chosen an action different from the one he did perform.

The two kinds of passions that Aristotle focuses on, in his treatment of akrasia , are the appetite for pleasure and anger. Either can lead to impetuosity and weakness. But Aristotle gives pride of place to the appetite for pleasure as the passion that undermines reason. He calls the kind of akrasia caused by an appetite for pleasure “unqualified akrasia ”—or, as we might say, akrasia “full stop”; akrasia caused by anger he considers a qualified form of akrasia and calls it akrasia “with respect to anger”. We thus have these four forms of akrasia : (A) impetuosity caused by pleasure, (B) impetuosity caused by anger, (C) weakness caused by pleasure (D) weakness caused by anger. It should be noticed that Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia is heavily influenced by Plato’s tripartite division of the soul in the Republic . Plato holds that either the spirited part (which houses anger, as well as other emotions) or the appetitive part (which houses the desire for physical pleasures) can disrupt the dictates of reason and result in action contrary to reason. The same threefold division of the soul can be seen in Aristotle’s approach to this topic.

Although Aristotle characterizes akrasia and enkrateia in terms of a conflict between reason and feeling, his detailed analysis of these states of mind shows that what takes place is best described in a more complicated way. For the feeling that undermines reason contains some thought, which may be implicitly general. As Aristotle says, anger “reasoning as it were that one must fight against such a thing, is immediately provoked” (1149a33–4). And although in the next sentence he denies that our appetite for pleasure works in this way, he earlier had said that there can be a syllogism that favors pursuing enjoyment: “Everything sweet is pleasant, and this is sweet” leads to the pursuit of a particular pleasure (1147a31–30). Perhaps what he has in mind is that pleasure can operate in either way: it can prompt action unmediated by a general premise, or it can prompt us to act on such a syllogism. By contrast, anger always moves us by presenting itself as a bit of general, although hasty, reasoning.

But of course Aristotle does not mean that a conflicted person has more than one faculty of reason. Rather his idea seems to be that in addition to our full-fledged reasoning capacity, we also have psychological mechanisms that are capable of a limited range of reasoning. When feeling conflicts with reason, what occurs is better described as a fight between feeling-allied-with-limited-reasoning and full-fledged reason. Part of us—reason—can remove itself from the distorting influence of feeling and consider all relevant factors, positive and negative. But another part of us—feeling or emotion—has a more limited field of reasoning—and sometimes it does not even make use of it.

Although “passion” is sometimes used as a translation of Aristotle’s word pathos (other alternatives are “emotion” and “feeling”), it is important to bear in mind that his term does not necessarily designate a strong psychological force. Anger is a pathos whether it is weak or strong; so too is the appetite for bodily pleasures. And he clearly indicates that it is possible for an akratic person to be defeated by a weak pathos —the kind that most people would easily be able to control (1150a9–b16). So the general explanation for the occurrence of akrasia cannot be that the strength of a passion overwhelms reason. Aristotle should therefore be acquitted of an accusation made against him by J.L. Austin in a well-known footnote to his paper, “A Plea For Excuses”. Plato and Aristotle, he says, collapsed all succumbing to temptation into losing control of ourselves—a mistake illustrated by this example:

I am very partial to ice cream, and a bombe is served divided into segments corresponding one to one with the persons at High Table: I am tempted to help myself to two segments and do so, thus succumbing to temptation and even conceivably (but why necessarily?) going against my principles. But do I lose control of myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the morsels from the dish and wolf them down, impervious to the consternation of my colleagues? Not a bit of it. We often succumb to temptation with calm and even with finesse. (1957: 24, fn 13 [1961: 146])

With this, Aristotle can agree: the pathos for the bombe can be a weak one, and in some people that will be enough to get them to act in a way that is disapproved by their reason at the very time of action.

What is most remarkable about Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia is that he defends a position close to that of Socrates. When he first introduces the topic of akrasia , and surveys some of the problems involved in understanding this phenomenon, he says (1145b25–8) that Socrates held that there is no akrasia , and he describes this as a thesis that clearly conflicts with the appearances ( phainomena ). Since he says that his goal is to preserve as many of the appearances as possible (1145b2–7), it may come as a surprise that when he analyzes the conflict between reason and feeling, he arrives at the conclusion that in a way Socrates was right after all (1147b13–17). For, he says, the person who acts against reason does not have what is thought to be unqualified knowledge; in a way he has knowledge, but in a way does not.

Aristotle explains what he has in mind by comparing akrasia to the condition of other people who might be described as knowing in a way, but not in an unqualified way. His examples are people who are asleep, mad, or drunk; he also compares the akratic to a student who has just begun to learn a subject, or an actor on the stage (1147a10–24). All of these people, he says, can utter the very words used by those who have knowledge; but their talk does not prove that they really have knowledge, strictly speaking.

These analogies can be taken to mean that the form of akrasia that Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity always results from some diminution of cognitive or intellectual acuity at the moment of action. The akratic says, at the time of action, that he ought not to indulge in this particular pleasure at this time. But does he know or even believe that he should refrain? Aristotle might be taken to reply: yes and no. He has some degree of recognition that he must not do this now, but not full recognition. His feeling, even if it is weak, has to some degree prevented him from completely grasping or affirming the point that he should not do this. And so in a way Socrates was right. When reason remains unimpaired and unclouded, its dictates will carry us all the way to action, so long as we are able to act.

But Aristotle’s agreement with Socrates is only partial, because he insists on the power of the emotions to rival, weaken or bypass reason. Emotion challenges reason in all three of these ways. In both the akratic and the enkratic, it competes with reason for control over action; even when reason wins, it faces the difficult task of having to struggle with an internal rival. Second, in the akratic, it temporarily robs reason of its full acuity, thus handicapping it as a competitor. It is not merely a rival force, in these cases; it is a force that keeps reason from fully exercising its power. And third, passion can make someone impetuous; here its victory over reason is so powerful that the latter does not even enter into the arena of conscious reflection until it is too late to influence action.

Supplementary Document: Alternate Readings of Aristotle on Akrasia

Aristotle frequently emphasizes the importance of pleasure to human life and therefore to his study of how we should live (see for example 1099a7–20 and 1104b3–1105a16), but his full-scale examination of the nature and value of pleasure is found in two places: VII.11–14 and X.1–5. It is odd that pleasure receives two lengthy treatments; no other topic in the Ethics is revisited in this way. Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics is identical to Book VI of the Eudemian Ethics ; for unknown reasons, the editor of the former decided to include within it both the treatment of pleasure that is unique to that work (X.1–5) and the study that is common to both treatises (VII.11–14). The two accounts are broadly similar. They agree about the value of pleasure, defend a theory about its nature, and oppose competing theories. Aristotle holds that a happy life must include pleasure, and he therefore opposes those who argue that pleasure is by its nature bad. He insists that there are other pleasures besides those of the senses, and that the best pleasures are the ones experienced by virtuous people who have sufficient resources for excellent activity.

Book VII offers a brief account of what pleasure is and is not. It is not a process but an unimpeded activity of a natural state (1153a7–17). Aristotle does not elaborate on what a natural state is, but he obviously has in mind the healthy condition of the body, especially its sense faculties, and the virtuous condition of the soul. Little is said about what it is for an activity to be unimpeded, but Aristotle does remind us that virtuous activity is impeded by the absence of a sufficient supply of external goods (1153b17–19). One might object that people who are sick or who have moral deficiencies can experience pleasure, even though Aristotle does not take them to be in a natural state. He has two strategies for responding. First, when a sick person experiences some degree of pleasure as he is being restored to health, the pleasure he is feeling is caused by the fact that he is no longer completely ill. Some small part of him is in a natural state and is acting without impediment (1152b35–6). Second, Aristotle is willing to say that what seems pleasant to some people may in fact not be pleasant (1152b31–2), just as what tastes bitter to an unhealthy palate may not be bitter. To call something a pleasure is not only to report a state of mind but also to endorse it to others. Aristotle’s analysis of the nature of pleasure is not meant to apply to every case in which something seems pleasant to someone, but only to activities that really are pleasures. All of these are unimpeded activities of a natural state.

It follows from this conception of pleasure that every instance of pleasure must be good to some extent. For how could an unimpeded activity of a natural state be bad or a matter of indifference? On the other hand, Aristotle does not mean to imply that every pleasure should be chosen. He briefly mentions the point that pleasures compete with each other, so that the enjoyment of one kind of activity impedes other activities that cannot be carried out at the same time (1153a20–22). His point is simply that although some pleasures may be good, they are not worth choosing when they interfere with other activities that are far better. This point is developed more fully in Ethics X.5.

Furthermore, Aristotle’s analysis allows him to speak of certain pleasures as “bad without qualification” (1152b26–33), even though pleasure is the unimpeded activity of a natural state. To call a pleasure “bad without qualification” is to insist that it should be avoided, but allow that nonetheless it should be chosen in constraining circumstances. The pleasure of recovering from an illness, for example, is bad without qualification—meaning that it is not one of the pleasures one would ideally choose, if one could completely control one’s circumstances. Although it really is a pleasure and so something can be said in its favor, it is so inferior to other goods that ideally one ought to forego it. Nonetheless, it is a pleasure worth having—if one adds the qualification that it is only worth having in undesirable circumstances. The pleasure of recovering from an illness is good, because some small part of oneself is in a natural state and is acting without impediment; but it can also be called bad, if what one means by this is that one should avoid getting into a situation in which one experiences that pleasure.

Aristotle indicates several times in VII.11–14 that merely to say that pleasure is a good does not do it enough justice; he also wants to say that the highest good is a pleasure. Here he is influenced by an idea expressed in the opening line of the Ethics : the good is that at which all things aim. In VII.13, he hints at the idea that all living things imitate the contemplative activity of god (1153b31–2). Plants and non-human animals seek to reproduce themselves because that is their way of participating in an unending series, and this is the closest they can come to the ceaseless thinking of the unmoved mover. Aristotle makes this point in several of his works (see for example De Anima 415a23–b7), and in Ethics X.7–8 he gives a full defense of the idea that the happiest human life resembles the life of a divine being. He conceives of god as a being who continually enjoys a “single and simple pleasure” (1154b26)—the pleasure of pure thought—whereas human beings, because of their complexity, grow weary of whatever they do. He will elaborate on these points in X.8; in VII.11–14, he appeals to his conception of divine activity only in order to defend the thesis that our highest good consists in a certain kind of pleasure. Human happiness does not consist in every kind of pleasure, but it does consist in one kind of pleasure—the pleasure felt by a human being who engages in theoretical activity and thereby imitates the pleasurable thinking of god.

Book X offers a much more elaborate account of what pleasure is and what it is not. It is not a process, because processes go through developmental stages: building a temple is a process because the temple is not present all at once, but only comes into being through stages that unfold over time. By contrast, pleasure, like seeing and many other activities, is not something that comes into existence through a developmental process. If I am enjoying a conversation, for example, I do not need to wait until it is finished in order to feel pleased; I take pleasure in the activity all along the way. The defining nature of pleasure is that it is an activity that accompanies other activities, and in some sense brings them to completion. Pleasure occurs when something within us, having been brought into good condition, is activated in relation to an external object that is also in good condition. The pleasure of drawing, for example, requires both the development of drawing ability and an object of attention that is worth drawing.

The conception of pleasure that Aristotle develops in Book X is obviously closely related to the analysis he gives in Book VII. But the theory proposed in the later Book brings out a point that had received too little attention earlier: pleasure is by its nature something that accompanies something else. It is not enough to say that it is what happens when we are in good condition and are active in unimpeded circumstances; one must add to that point the further idea that pleasure plays a certain role in complementing something other than itself. Drawing well and the pleasure of drawing well always occur together, and so they are easy to confuse, but Aristotle’s analysis in Book X emphasizes the importance of making this distinction.

He says that pleasure completes the activity that it accompanies, but then adds, mysteriously, that it completes the activity in the manner of an end that is added on. In the translation of W.D. Ross, it “supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age” (1174b33). It is unclear what thought is being expressed here, but perhaps Aristotle is merely trying to avoid a possible misunderstanding: when he says that pleasure completes an activity, he does not mean that the activity it accompanies is in some way defective, and that the pleasure improves the activity by removing this defect. Aristotle’s language is open to that misinterpretation because the verb that is translated “complete” ( teleein ) can also mean “perfect”. The latter might be taken to mean that the activity accompanied by pleasure has not yet reached a sufficiently high level of excellence, and that the role of pleasure is to bring it to the point of perfection. Aristotle does not deny that when we take pleasure in an activity we get better at it, but when he says that pleasure completes an activity by supervening on it, like the bloom that accompanies those who have achieved the highest point of physical beauty, his point is that the activity complemented by pleasure is already perfect, and the pleasure that accompanies it is a bonus that serves no further purpose. Taking pleasure in an activity does help us improve at it, but enjoyment does not cease when perfection is achieved—on the contrary, that is when pleasure is at its peak. That is when it reveals most fully what it is: an added bonus that crowns our achievement.

It is clear, at any rate, that in Book X Aristotle gives a fuller account of what pleasure is than he had in Book VII. We should take note of a further difference between these two discussions: In Book X, he makes the point that pleasure is a good but not the good. He cites and endorses an argument given by Plato in the Philebus : If we imagine a life filled with pleasure and then mentally add wisdom to it, the result is made more desirable. But the good is something that cannot be improved upon in this way. Therefore pleasure is not the good (1172b23–35). By contrast, in Book VII Aristotle strongly implies that the pleasure of contemplation is the good, because in one way or another all living beings aim at this sort of pleasure. Aristotle observes in Book X that what all things aim at is good (1172b35–1173a1); significantly, he falls short of endorsing the argument that since all aim at pleasure, it must be the good.

Book VII makes the point that pleasures interfere with each other, and so even if all kinds of pleasures are good, it does not follow that all of them are worth choosing. One must make a selection among pleasures by determining which are better. But how is one to make this choice? Book VII does not say, but in Book X, Aristotle holds that the selection of pleasures is not to be made with reference to pleasure itself, but with reference to the activities they accompany.

Since activities differ with respect to goodness and badness, some being worth choosing, others worth avoiding, and others neither, the same is true of pleasures as well. (1175b24–6)

Aristotle’s statement implies that in order to determine whether (for example) the pleasure of virtuous activity is more desirable than that of eating, we are not to attend to the pleasures themselves but to the activities with which we are pleased. A pleasure’s goodness derives from the goodness of its associated activity. And surely the reason why pleasure is not the criterion to which we should look in making these decisions is that it is not the good. The standard we should use in making comparisons between rival options is virtuous activity, because that has been shown to be identical to happiness.

That is why Aristotle says that what is judged pleasant by a good man really is pleasant, because the good man is the measure of things (1176a15–19). He does not mean that the way to lead our lives is to search for a good man and continually rely on him to tell us what is pleasurable. Rather, his point is that there is no way of telling what is genuinely pleasurable (and therefore what is most pleasurable) unless we already have some other standard of value. Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure thus helps confirm his initial hypothesis that to live our lives well we must focus on one sort of good above all others: virtuous activity. It is the good in terms of which all other goods must be understood. Aristotle’s analysis of friendship supports the same conclusion.

The topic of Books VIII and IX of the Ethics is friendship. Although it is difficult to avoid the term “friendship” as a translation of “ philia ”, and this is an accurate term for the kind of relationship he is most interested in, we should bear in mind that he is discussing a wider range of phenomena than this translation might lead us to expect, for the Greeks use the term, “ philia ”, to name the relationship that holds among family members, and do not reserve it for voluntary relationships. Although Aristotle is interested in classifying the different forms that friendship takes, his main theme in Books VIII and IX is to show the close relationship between virtuous activity and friendship. He is vindicating his conception of happiness as virtuous activity by showing how satisfying are the relationships that a virtuous person can normally expect to have.

His taxonomy begins with the premise that there are three main reasons why one person might like someone else. (The verb, “ philein ”, which is cognate to the noun “ philia ”, can sometimes be translated “like” or even “love”—though in other cases philia involves very little in the way of feeling.) One might like someone because he is good, or because he is useful, or because he is pleasant. And so there are three bases for friendships, depending on which of these qualities binds friends together. When two individuals recognize that the other person is someone of good character, and they spend time with each other, engaged in activities that exercise their virtues, then they form one kind of friendship. If they are equally virtuous, their friendship is perfect. If, however, there is a large gap in their moral development (as between a parent and a small child, or between a husband and a wife), then although their relationship may be based on the other person’s good character, it will be imperfect precisely because of their inequality.

The imperfect friendships that Aristotle focuses on, however, are not unequal relationships based on good character. Rather, they are relationships held together because each individual regards the other as the source of some advantage to himself or some pleasure he receives. When Aristotle calls these relationships “imperfect”, he is tacitly relying on widely accepted assumptions about what makes a relationship satisfying. These friendships are defective, and have a smaller claim to be called “friendships”, because the individuals involved have little trust in each other, quarrel frequently, and are ready to break off their association abruptly. Aristotle does not mean to suggest that unequal relations based on the mutual recognition of good character are defective in these same ways. Rather, when he says that unequal relationships based on character are imperfect, his point is that people are friends in the fullest sense when they gladly spend their days together in shared activities, and this close and constant interaction is less available to those who are not equal in their moral development.

When Aristotle begins his discussion of friendship, he introduces a notion that is central to his understanding of this phenomenon: a genuine friend is someone who loves or likes another person for the sake of that other person. Wanting what is good for the sake of another he calls “good will” ( eunoia ), and friendship is reciprocal good will, provided that each recognizes the presence of this attitude in the other. Does such good will exist in all three kinds of friendship, or is it confined to relationships based on virtue? At first, Aristotle leaves open the first of these two possibilities. He says:

it is necessary that friends bear good will to each other and wish good things for each other, without this escaping their notice, because of one of the reasons mentioned. (1156a4–5)

The reasons mentioned are goodness, pleasure, and advantage; and so it seems that Aristotle is leaving room for the idea that in all three kinds of friendships, even those based on advantage and pleasure alone, the individuals wish each other well for the sake of the other.

But in fact, as Aristotle continues to develop his taxonomy, he does not choose to exploit this possibility. He speaks as though it is only in friendships based on character that one finds a desire to benefit the other person for the sake of the other person.

Those who wish good things to their friends for the sake of the latter are friends most of all, because they do so because of their friends themselves, and not coincidentally. (1156b9–11)

When one benefits someone not because of the kind of person he is, but only because of the advantages to oneself, then, Aristotle says, one is not a friend towards the other person, but only towards the profit that comes one’s way (1157a15–16).

In such statements as these, Aristotle comes rather close to saying that relationships based on profit or pleasure should not be called friendships at all. But he decides to stay close to common parlance and to use the term “friend” loosely. Friendships based on character are the ones in which each person benefits the other for the sake of other; and these are friendships most of all. Because each party benefits the other, it is advantageous to form such friendships. And since each enjoys the trust and companionship of the other, there is considerable pleasure in these relationships as well. Because these perfect friendships produce advantages and pleasures for each of the parties, there is some basis for going along with common usage and calling any relationship entered into for the sake of just one of these goods a friendship. Friendships based on advantage alone or pleasure alone deserve to be called friendships because in full-fledged friendships these two properties, advantage and pleasure, are present. It is striking that in the Ethics Aristotle never thinks of saying that the uniting factor in all friendships is the desire each friend has for the good of the other.

Aristotle does not raise questions about what it is to desire good for the sake of another person. He treats this as an easily understood phenomenon, and has no doubts about its existence. But it is also clear that he takes this motive to be compatible with a love of one’s own good and a desire for one’s own happiness. Someone who has practical wisdom will recognize that he needs friends and other resources in order to exercise his virtues over a long period of time. When he makes friends, and benefits friends he has made, he will be aware of the fact that such a relationship is good for him. And yet to have a friend is to want to benefit someone for that other person’s sake; it is not a merely self-interested strategy. Aristotle sees no difficulty here, and rightly so. For there is no reason why acts of friendship should not be undertaken partly for the good of one’s friend and partly for one’s own good. Acting for the sake of another does not in itself demand self-sacrifice. It requires caring about someone other than oneself, but does not demand some loss of care for oneself. For when we know how to benefit a friend for his sake, we exercise the ethical virtues, and this is precisely what our happiness consists in.

Aristotle makes it clear that the number of people with whom one can sustain the kind of relationship he calls a perfect friendship is quite small (IX.10). Even if one lived in a city populated entirely by perfectly virtuous citizens, the number with whom one could carry on a friendship of the perfect type would be at most a handful. For he thinks that this kind of friendship can exist only when one spends a great deal of time with the other person, participating in joint activities and engaging in mutually beneficial behavior; and one cannot cooperate on these close terms with every member of the political community. One may well ask why this kind of close friendship is necessary for happiness. If one lived in a community filled with good people, and cooperated on an occasional basis with each of them, in a spirit of good will and admiration, would that not provide sufficient scope for virtuous activity and a well-lived life? Admittedly, close friends are often in a better position to benefit each other than are fellow citizens, who generally have little knowledge of one’s individual circumstances. But this only shows that it is advantageous to be on the receiving end of a friend’s help. The more important question for Aristotle is why one needs to be on the giving end of this relationship. And obviously the answer cannot be that one needs to give in order to receive; that would turn active love for one’s friend into a mere means to the benefits received.

Aristotle attempts to answer this question in IX.11, but his treatment is disappointing. His fullest argument depends crucially on the notion that a friend is “another self”, someone, in other words, with whom one has a relationship very similar to the relationship one has with oneself. A virtuous person loves the recognition of himself as virtuous; to have a close friend is to possess yet another person, besides oneself, whose virtue one can recognize at extremely close quarters; and so, it must be desirable to have someone very much like oneself whose virtuous activity one can perceive. The argument is unconvincing because it does not explain why the perception of virtuous activity in fellow citizens would not be an adequate substitute for the perception of virtue in one’s friends.

Aristotle would be on stronger grounds if he could show that in the absence of close friends one would be severely restricted in the kinds of virtuous activities one could undertake. But he cannot present such an argument, because he does not believe it. He says that it is “finer and more godlike” to bring about the well being of a whole city than to sustain the happiness of just one person (1094b7–10). He refuses to regard private life—the realm of the household and the small circle of one’s friends—as the best or most favorable location for the exercise of virtue. He is convinced that the loss of this private sphere would greatly detract from a well-lived life, but he is hard put to explain why. He might have done better to focus on the benefits of being the object of a close friend’s solicitude. Just as property is ill cared for when it is owned by all, and just as a child would be poorly nurtured were he to receive no special parental care—points Aristotle makes in Politics II.2–5—so in the absence of friendship we would lose a benefit that could not be replaced by the care of the larger community. But Aristotle is not looking for a defense of this sort, because he conceives of friendship as lying primarily in activity rather than receptivity. It is difficult, within his framework, to show that virtuous activity towards a friend is a uniquely important good.

Since Aristotle thinks that the pursuit of one’s own happiness, properly understood, requires ethically virtuous activity and will therefore be of great value not only to one’s friends but to the larger political community as well, he argues that self-love is an entirely proper emotion—provided it is expressed in the love of virtue (IX.8). Self-love is rightly condemned when it consists in the pursuit of as large a share of external goods—particularly wealth and power—as one can acquire, because such self-love inevitably brings one into conflict with others and undermines the stability of the political community. It may be tempting to cast Aristotle’s defense of self-love into modern terms by calling him an egoist, and “egoism” is a broad enough term so that, properly defined, it can be made to fit Aristotle’s ethical outlook. If egoism is the thesis that one will always act rightly if one consults one’s self-interest, properly understood, then nothing would be amiss in identifying him as an egoist.

But egoism is sometimes understood in a stronger sense. Just as consequentialism is the thesis that one should maximize the general good, whatever the good turns out to be, so egoism can be defined as the parallel thesis that one should maximize one’s own good, whatever the good turns out to be. Egoism, in other words, can be treated as a purely formal thesis: it holds that whether the good is pleasure, or virtue, or the satisfaction of desires, one should not attempt to maximize the total amount of good in the world, but only one’s own. When egoism takes this abstract form, it is an expression of the idea that the claims of others are never worth attending to, unless in some way or other their good can be shown to serve one’s own. The only underived reason for action is self-interest; that an act helps another does not by itself provide a reason for performing it, unless some connection can be made between the good of that other and one’s own.

There is no reason to attribute this extreme form of egoism to Aristotle. On the contrary, his defense of self-love makes it clear that he is not willing to defend the bare idea that one ought to love oneself alone or above others; he defends self-love only when this emotion is tied to the correct theory of where one’s good lies, for it is only in this way that he can show that self-love need not be a destructive passion. He takes it for granted that self-love is properly condemned whenever it can be shown to be harmful to the community. It is praiseworthy only if it can be shown that a self-lover will be an admirable citizen. In making this assumption, Aristotle reveals that he thinks that the claims of other members of the community to proper treatment are intrinsically valid. This is precisely what a strong form of egoism cannot accept.

We should also keep in mind Aristotle’s statement in the Politics that the political community is prior to the individual citizen—just as the whole body is prior to any of its parts (1253a18–29). Aristotle makes use of this claim when he proposes that in the ideal community each child should receive the same education, and that the responsibility for providing such an education should be taken out of the hands of private individuals and made a matter of common concern (1337a21–7). No citizen, he says, belongs to himself; all belong to the city (1337a28–9). What he means is that when it comes to such matters as education, which affect the good of all, each individual should be guided by the collective decisions of the whole community. An individual citizen does not belong to himself, in the sense that it is not up to him alone to determine how he should act; he should subordinate his individual decision-making powers to those of the whole. The strong form of egoism we have been discussing cannot accept Aristotle’s doctrine of the priority of the city to the individual. It tells the individual that the good of others has, in itself, no valid claim on him, but that he should serve other members of the community only to the extent that he can connect their interests to his own. Such a doctrine leaves no room for the thought that the individual citizen does not belong to himself but to the whole.

In Book I Aristotle says that three kinds of lives are thought to be especially attractive: one is devoted to pleasure, a second to politics, and a third to knowledge and understanding (1095b17–19). In X.6–9 he returns to these three alternatives, and explores them more fully than he had in Book I. The life of pleasure is construed in Book I as a life devoted to physical pleasure, and is quickly dismissed because of its vulgarity. In X.6, Aristotle concedes that physical pleasures, and more generally, amusements of all sorts, are desirable in themselves, and therefore have some claim to be our ultimate end. But his discussion of happiness in Book X does not start from scratch; he builds on his thesis that pleasure cannot be our ultimate target, because what counts as pleasant must be judged by some standard other than pleasure itself, namely the judgment of the virtuous person. Amusements will not be absent from a happy life, since everyone needs relaxation, and amusements fill this need. But they play a subordinate role, because we seek relaxation in order to return to more important activities.

Aristotle turns therefore, in X.7–8, to the two remaining alternatives—politics and philosophy—and presents a series of arguments to show that the philosophical life, a life devoted to theoria (contemplation, study), is best. Theoria is not the process of learning that leads to understanding; that process is not a candidate for our ultimate end, because it is undertaken for the sake of a further goal. What Aristotle has in mind when he talks about theoria is the activity of someone who has already achieved theoretical wisdom. The happiest life is lived by someone who has a full understanding of the basic causal principles that govern the operation of the universe, and who has the resources needed for living a life devoted to the exercise of that understanding. Evidently Aristotle believes that his own life and that of his philosophical friends was the best available to a human being. He compares it to the life of a god: god thinks without interruption and endlessly, and a philosopher enjoys something similar for a limited period of time.

It may seem odd that after devoting so much attention to the practical virtues, Aristotle should conclude his treatise with the thesis that the best activity of the best life is not ethical. In fact, some scholars have held that X.7–8 are deeply at odds with the rest of the Ethics ; they take Aristotle to be saying that we should be prepared to act unethically, if need be, in order to devote ourselves as much as possible to contemplation. But it is difficult to believe that he intends to reverse himself so abruptly, and there are many indications that he intends the arguments of X.7–8 to be continuous with the themes he emphasizes throughout the rest of the Ethics . The best way to understand him is to take him to be assuming that one will need the ethical virtues in order to live the life of a philosopher, even though exercising those virtues is not the philosopher’s ultimate end. To be adequately equipped to live a life of thought and discussion, one will need practical wisdom, temperance, justice, and the other ethical virtues. To say that there is something better even than ethical activity, and that ethical activity promotes this higher goal, is entirely compatible with everything else that we find in the Ethics .

Although Aristotle’s principal goal in X.7–8 is to show the superiority of philosophy to politics, he does not deny that a political life is happy. Perfect happiness, he says, consists in contemplation; but he indicates that the life devoted to practical thought and ethical virtue is happy in a secondary way. He thinks of this second-best life as that of a political leader, because he assumes that the person who most fully exercises such qualities as justice and greatness of soul is the man who has the large resources needed to promote the common good of the city. The political life has a major defect, despite the fact that it consists in fully exercising the ethical virtues, because it is a life devoid of philosophical understanding and activity. Were someone to combine both careers, practicing politics at certain times and engaged in philosophical discussion at other times (as Plato’s philosopher-kings do), he would lead a life better than that of Aristotle’s politician, but worse than that of Aristotle’s philosopher.

But his complaint about the political life is not simply that it is devoid of philosophical activity. The points he makes against it reveal drawbacks inherent in ethical and political activity. Perhaps the most telling of these defects is that the life of the political leader is in a certain sense unleisurely (1177b4–15). What Aristotle has in mind when he makes this complaint is that ethical activities are remedial: they are needed when something has gone wrong, or threatens to do so. Courage, for example, is exercised in war, and war remedies an evil; it is not something we should wish for. Aristotle implies that all other political activities have the same feature, although perhaps to a smaller degree. Corrective justice would provide him with further evidence for his thesis—but what of justice in the distribution of goods? Perhaps Aristotle would reply that in existing political communities a virtuous person must accommodate himself to the least bad method of distribution, because, human nature being what it is, a certain amount of injustice must be tolerated. As the courageous person cannot be completely satisfied with his courageous action, no matter how much self-mastery it shows, because he is a peace-lover and not a killer, so the just person living in the real world must experience some degree of dissatisfaction with his attempts to give each person his due. The pleasures of exercising the ethical virtues are, in normal circumstances, mixed with pain. Unalloyed pleasure is available to us only when we remove ourselves from the all-too-human world and contemplate the rational order of the cosmos. No human life can consist solely in these pure pleasures; and in certain circumstances one may owe it to one’s community to forego a philosophical life and devote oneself to the good of the city. But the paradigms of human happiness are those people who are lucky enough to devote much of their time to the study of a world more orderly than the human world we inhabit.

Although Aristotle argues for the superiority of the philosophical life in X.7–8, he says in X.9, the final chapter of the Ethics , that his project is not yet complete, because we can make human beings virtuous, or good even to some small degree, only if we undertake a study of the art of legislation. The final section of the Ethics is therefore intended as a prolegomenon to Aristotle’s political writings. We must investigate the kinds of political systems exhibited by existing Greek cities, the forces that destroy or preserve cities, and the best sort of political order. Although the study of virtue Aristotle has just completed is meant to be helpful to all human beings who have been brought up well—even those who have no intention of pursuing a political career—it is also designed to serve a larger purpose. Human beings cannot achieve happiness, or even something that approximates happiness, unless they live in communities that foster good habits and provide the basic equipment of a well-lived life.

The study of the human good has therefore led to two conclusions: The best life is not to be found in the practice of politics. But the well being of whole communities depends on the willingness of some to lead a second-best life—a life devoted to the study and practice of the art of politics, and to the expression of those qualities of thought and passion that exhibit our rational self-mastery.

appearances: phainomena
beautiful: kalon
clear: saphes
complete (verb, also: to perfect): telein
condition: hexis
continence (literally: mastery): enkrateia
continent: enkratês
disposition: hexis
emotion: pathos
evil: kakos , phaulos
excellence: aretê
feeling: pathos
fine: kalon
flourishing: eudaimonia
friendship: philia ; philein (the verb cognate to the noun “ philia ”, can sometimes be translated “like” or even “love”)
function: ergon
good will: eunoia
happiness: eudaimonia
happy: eudaimon
impetuosity: propeteia
incontinence (literally: lack of mastery): akrasia
incontinent: akratês
intuitive understanding: nous
live well: eu zên
practical wisdom: phronêsis
science: epistêmê
standard: horos
state: hexis
task: ergon
virtue: aretê
weakness: astheneia
work: ergon

C. Studies of Particular Topics

Kenny 1978, 1979, 1992; Rowe 1971.

Barnes 1980; Berryman 2019; J.M. Cooper 1999 (ch. 12); Frede 2012; Heinaman (ed.) 1995; Irwin 1988b; Karbowski 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2019; Kontos 2011; Kraut 1998; McDowell 1995; Nussbaum 1985, 1986 (chs 8–9); Reeve 1992 (ch. 1), 2012b; Roche 1988b, 1992; Scott 2015; Segvic 2002; Shields 2012a; Zingano 2007b.

Annas 1993 (ch. 18); Barney 2008; Broadie 2005, 2007a; Charles 1999; Clark 1975 (14–27, 145–63); J.M. Cooper 1986 (chs 1, 3), 1999 (chs 9, 13); Curzer 1991; Gadamer 1986; Gerson 2004; Gomez-Lobo 1989; Heinaman 2002, 2007; Irwin 2012; Keyt 1978; Korsgaard 1986a, 1986b; Kraut 1979a, 1979b, 1989, 2002 (ch. 3); Lawrence 1993, 1997, 2001; G.R. Lear 2000; J. Lear 2000; MacDonald 1989; Natali 2010; Nussbaum 1986 (chs 11, 12); Purinton 1998; Reeve 1992 (chs 3, 4); Roche 1988a; Santas 2001 (chs 6–7); Scott 1999, 2000; Segvic 2004; Suits 1974; Van Cleemput 2006; Wedin 1981; N. White 2002, 2006; S. White 1992; Whiting 1986, 1988; Wielenberg 2004; Williams 1985 (ch. 3).

Brickhouse 2003; Brown 1997; Brunschwig 1996; Clark 1975 (84–97); N. Cooper 1989; Curzer 1990, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2005, 2012; Di Muzio 2000; Gardiner 2001; Gottlieb 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2009; Halper 1999; Hardie 1978; Hursthouse 1988; Hutchinson 1986; Irwin 1988a; Jimenez 2020; Kraut 2002 (ch. 4), 2012, 2013; Leunissen 2012, 2013, 2017; Lorenz 2009; McKerlie 2001; Pakaluk 2004; Pearson 2006, 2007; Peterson 1988; Russell 2012a; Santas 2001 (ch. 8); Scaltsas 1995; Schütrumpf 1989; Sherman 1989, 1997; Sim 2007; Taylor 2004; Telfer 1989–90; Tuozzo 1995; Whiting 1996; Young 1988; Yu 2007.

Broadie 1998; Charles 1984, 2007; Coope 2012; J. Cooper 1986 (ch. 1), 1999 (chs 10, 11, 19); Dahl 1984; Destrée 2007; Engberg-Pedersen 1983; Fortenbaugh 1975; Gottlieb, 2021; Gröngross 2007; Hursthouse 1984; Kontos 2018; Kontos 2021; Kraut 2006a; Lorenz 2006; McDowell 1996a, 1996b, 1998; McKerlie 1998; Meyer 1993; Milo 1966; Moss 2011, 2012; Natali (ed.) 2009; Nussbaum 1986 (ch. 10); Olfert 2017; Pakaluk & Pearson (eds.) 2010; Pickavé & Whiting 2008; Politis 1998; Reeve 1992 (ch. 2), 2013; Segvic 2009a; Sherman 2000; Taylor 2003b; Walsh 1963; Zingano 2007a.

Gosling &Taylor 1982 (chs 11–17); Gottlieb 1993; Natali (ed.) 2009; Owen 1971; Pearson 2012; Rorty 1974; Taylor 2003a, 2003b; Urmson 1967; Warren 2009; Wolfsdorf 2013 (ch. 6).

Annas 1977, 1993 (ch. 12); Brewer 2005; J.M. Cooper 1999 (chs 14, 15); Hitz 2011; Kahn 1981; Milgram 1987; Nehamas 2010; Pakaluk 1998; Pangle 2003; Price 1989 (chs 4–7); Rogers 1994; Schollmeier 1994; Sherman 1987; Stern-Gillet 1995; Walker 2014; Whiting 1991.

Freeland 1998; Karbowski 2014a; Modrak 1994; Ward (ed.) 1996.

Bielskis 2020; Broadie 2006; Chappell (ed.) 2006; Garver 2006; Gill (ed.) 2005; Kraut 2018; LeBar 2013; MacIntyre 1999; Peters 2014; Russell 2012b; Stohr 2003, 2009; Wiggins 2009.

Lockwood 2005.

2012, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , Robert C. Bartlett, and Susan D. Collins (eds/trans.), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
2000, Nicomachean Ethics , Roger Crisp (ed./trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511802058
1999, Nicomachean Ethics , Terence H. Irwin (ed./trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. With Introduction, Notes, and Glossary. Second edition.
2014, Nicomachean Ethics , C.D.C. Reeve, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
1984, Nicomachean Ethics , W.D. Ross (trans.), revised by J.O. Urmson, in The Complete Works of Aristotle , The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 2, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
2002, Nicomachean Ethics , Christopher Rowe (trans.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, With philosophical introduction and commentary by Sarah Broadie.
2013, Eudemian Ethics , (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy), Brad Inwood and Raphael Woolf (eds./trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139043281
2011, Eudemian Ethics , (Oxford World’s Classics), Anthony Kenny (ed./trans.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1984, Eudemian Ethics , J. Solomon (trans.), in The Complete Works of Aristotle , The Revised Oxford Translation, volume 2, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1952, Eudemian Ethics , H. Rackham (trans.), in the Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle, vol. 20, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
1992, Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics: Books I, II, and VIII , M.J. Woods (trans.), Second edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Annas, Julia, 1977, “Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism”, Mind , 86: 532–54. doi:10.1093/mind/LXXXVI.344.532
–––, 1993, The Morality of Happiness , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195096525.001.0001
Anton, John P. & Anthony Preus (eds.), 1991, Aristotle’s Ethics: Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy , vol. 5, Albany, NY: The State University of New York Press, 1991.
Austin, J. L., 1957 [1961], “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 57: 1–30. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/57.1.1
Barnes, Jonathan, 1980, “Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics”, Revue Internationale de la Philosophie , 34(133/134): 490–511.
Barnes, Jonathan, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (eds.), 1977, Articles on Aristotle , vol. 2, Ethics and Politics , London: Duckworth, 1977.
Barney, Rachel, 2008, “Aristotle’s Argument for a Human Function”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 34(Summer): 293–322.
Bartlett, Robert C. & Susan D. Collins (eds.), 1999, Action and Contemplation , Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Berryman, Sylvia, 2019, Aristotle on the Sources of Ethical Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bielskis, Andrius, Eleni Leontsinia, and Kelvin Knight (eds.), 2020, Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Aristotelianism: Modernity, Conflict, and Politics , London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Bobonich, Christopher and Pierre Destree (eds.), 2007, Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus , Leiden: Brill.
Bostock, David, 2000, Aristotle’s Ethics , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brewer, Talbot, 2005, “Virtues We Can Share: Friendship and Aristotelian Ethical Theory”, Ethics , 115(4): 721–758. doi:10.1086/430489
Brickhouse, Thomas C., 2003, “Does Aristotle Have a Consistent Account of Vice?” Review of Metaphysics , 57(1): 3–23.
Broadie, Sarah, 1991, Ethics with Aristotle , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195085604.001.0001
–––, 1998, “Interpreting Aristotle’s Directions”, in Gentzler 1998: 291–306.
–––, 2005, “On the Idea of the Summum Bonum ”, in Gill 2005: 41–58 (ch. 2). Reprinted in Broadie 2007b: 135–152 (ch. 9).
–––, 2006, “Aristotle and Contemporary Ethics”, in Kraut 2006: 342–361. Reprinted in Broadie 2007b: 113–134. doi:10.1002/9780470776513.ch16
–––, 2007a, “What Should We Mean by ‘The Highest Good’?”, in Broadie 2007b: 153–165 (ch. 10).
–––, 2007b, Aristotle and Beyond: Essays on Metaphysics and Ethics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511551086
Brown, Lesley, 1997, “What is the Mean Relative to Us in Aristotle’s Ethics?” Phronesis , 42: 77–93.
Brunschwig, Jacques, 1996, “The Aristotelian Theory of Equity”, in Michael Frede & Gisela Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought , Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 115–155.
Burger, Ronna, 2008, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates: on the Nicomachean Ethics , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Chappell, Timothy (ed.), 2006, Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Charles, David, 1984, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action , London: Duckworth.
–––, 1999, “Aristotle on Well-Being and Intellectual Contemplation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 73: 205–223.
–––, 2007, “Aristotle’s Weak Akrates: What does her Ignorance Consist in?”, in Bobonich and Destree 2007: 139–166.
Clark, Stephen R.L., 1975, Aristotle’s Man: Speculations upon Aristotelian Anthropology , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245162.001.0001
Coope, Ursula, 2012, “Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?” Phronesis , 57(2): 142–163. doi:10.1163/156852812X628998
Cooper, John M., 1986, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle , Indianapolis: Hackett.
–––, 1999, Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cooper, Neil, 1989, “Aristotle’s Crowning Virtue”, Apeiron , 22(3): 191–205. doi:10.1515/APEIRON.1989.22.3.191
Curzer, Howard J., 1990, “A Great Philosopher’s Not So Great Account of Great Virtue: Aristotle’s Treatment of ‘Greatness of Soul’”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 20(4): 517–537.
Curzer, Howard J., 1991, “The Supremely Happy Life in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ”, Apeiron , 24(1): 47–69. doi:10.1515/APEIRON.1991.24.1.47
–––, 1995, “Aristotle’s Account of the Virtue of Justice”, Apeiron , 28(3): 207–238. doi:10.1515/APEIRON.1995.28.3.207
–––, 1996, “A Defense of Aristotle’s Doctrine that Virtue Is a Mean”, Ancient Philosophy , 16(1): 129–138. doi:10.5840/ancientphil199616116
–––, 1997, “Aristotle’s Account of the Virtue of Temperance in Nicomachean Ethics III 10–11”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 35(1): 5–25. doi:10.1353/hph.1997.0008
–––, 2005, “How Good People Do Bad Things: Aristotle on the Misdeeds of the Virtuous”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 28(Summer): 233–272.
–––, 2012, Aristotle and the Virtues , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693726.001.0001
Dahl, Norman O., 1984, Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of Will , Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Destrée, Pierre, 2007, “Aristotle on the Causes of Akrasia”, in Bobonich and Destree 2007: 139–166.
Di Muzio, Gianluca, 2000, “Aristotle on Improving One’s Character”, Phronesis , 45(3): 205–219. doi:10.1163/156852800510180
Engberg-Pedersen, Troels, 1983, Aristotle’s Theory of Moral Insight , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Engstrom, Stephen and Jennifer Whiting (eds.), 1996, Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fortenbaugh, W.W., 1975, Aristotle on Emotion , London: Duckworth.
Frede, Dorothea, 2012, “The Endoxon Mystique: What Endoxa Are and What They are Not”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 43(Winter): 185–216.
Freeland, Cynthia (ed.), 1998, Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle , University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 1986, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy , New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Gardiner, Stephen M., 2001, “Aristotle’s Basic and Non-Basic Virtues”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 20(Summer): 261–295.
Garver, Eugene, 2006, Confronting Aristotle’s Ethics: Ancient and Modern Morality , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Gauthier, R.A. & J.Y. Jolif, 1958–9, Aristote: L’Ethique à Nicomaque , 3 vols. Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain.
Gentzler, Jyl (ed.), 1998, Method in Ancient Philosophy , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gerson, Lloyd, 2004, “Platonism in Aristotle’s Ethics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 27(Winter): 217–48.
Gill, Christopher (ed.), 2005, Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity: Issues in Ancient and Modern Ethics , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gomez-Lobo, Alfonso, 1989, “The Ergon Inference”, Phronesis , 34(1): 170–84. doi:10.1163/156852889X00116
Gosling, J.C.B. & C.C.W. Taylor, 1982, The Greeks on Pleasure , Oxford: Clarendon Press, Chapters 11–17. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246664.001.0001
Gottlieb, Paula, 1991, “Aristotle and Protagoras: The Good Human Being as the Measure of Goods”, Apeiron , 24(1): 25–45. doi:10.1515/APEIRON.1991.24.1.25
–––, 1993, “Aristotle’s Measure Doctrine and Pleasure”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 75(1): 31–46. doi: 10.1515/agph.1993.75.1.31
–––, 1994a, “Aristotle’s ‘Nameless’ Virtues”, Apeiron , 27(1): 1–15. doi:10.1515/APEIRON.1994.27.1.1
–––, 1994b, “Aristotle on Dividing the Soul and Uniting the Virtues”, Phronesis , 39(3): 275–290. doi:10.1163/156852894321052081
–––, 1996, “Aristotle’s Ethical Egoism”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 77(1): 1–18. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1996.tb00155.x
–––, 2009, The Virtue of Aristotle’s Ethics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511581526
–––, 2021, Aristotle on Thought and Feeling , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gröngross, Gösta, 2007, “Listening to Reason in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 32(Summer): 251–272.
Hall, Edith, 2019, Aristotle’s Way: How Ancient Wisdom Can Change Your Life , London: The Bodley Head.
Halper, Edward, 1999, “The Unity of the Virtues in Aristotle”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 17: 115–144.
Hardie, W.F.R., 1978, “ Magnanimity in Aristotle’s Ethics”, Phronesis , 78(1): 63–79. doi:10.1163/156852878X00226
–––, 1980, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory , second edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246329.001.0001
Heinaman, Robert (ed.), 1995, Aristotle and Moral Realism , Boulder, CO: Westview.
–––, 2002, “The Improvability of Eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 23: 99–145.
–––, 2007, “Eudaimonia as an Activity in Nicomachean Ethics I.8–12”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 33(Winter): 221–254.
Hitz, Zena, 2011, “Aristotle on Self-Knowledge and Friendship” Philosophers’ Imprint , 11(12): 1–28. [ Hitz 2011 available online ]
Hursthouse, Rosalind, 1984, “Acting and Feeling in Character: Nicomachean Ethics 3.1”, Phronesis , 29(3): 252–266. doi:10.1163/156852884X00030
–––, 1988, “Moral Habituation”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 6: 201–219.
Hutchinson, D.S., 1986, The Virtues of Aristotle , London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Irwin, Terence H., 1988a, “Disunity in the Aristotelian Virtues”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , Supplementary Volume 1988: 61–78.
–––, 1988b, Aristotle’s First Principles , Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0198242905.001.0001
–––, 2012, “Conceptions of Happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics ”, in Shields 2012b: 495–428
Jimenez, Marta, 2020, Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kahn, Charles H., 1981, “Aristotle and Altruism”, Mind , 90(357): 20–40. doi:10.1093/mind/XC.357.20
Karbowski, Joseph, 2014a, “Aristotle on the Rational Abilities of Women”, Apeiron , 47(4): 435–460. doi:10.1515/apeiron-2013-0061
–––, 2014b, “ Endoxa , Facts, and the Starting Points of the Nicomachean Ethics ”, in Karen Margrethe Nielsen and Devon Henry (eds.), Bridging the Gap Between Aristotle’s Science and Ethics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511846397.007
–––, 2015a, “Is Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics Quasi-Mathematical?” Apeiron , 48(3): 368–386. doi:10.1515/apeiron-2014-0046
–––, 2015b, “ Phainomena as Witnesses and Examples: The Methodology of Eudemian Ethics I.6” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 49: 193–225.
–––, 2019, Aristotle’s Method in Ethics: Philosophy in Practice , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kenny, Anthony, 1978, The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of The Relationship between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle , Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245544.001.0001
–––, 1979, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will , New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
–––, 1992, Aristotle on the Perfect Life , Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240174.001.0001
Keyt, David, 1978, “Intellectualism in Aristotle”, Paideia , 7: 138–157.
Kontos, Pavlos, 2011, Aristotle’s Moral Realism Reconsidered: Phenomenological Ethics , New York: Routledge.
–––, (ed.), 2018, Evil in Aristotle , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 2021, Aristotle on the Scope of Practical Reason: Spectators, Legislators, Hopes, and Evils , New York: Routledge.
Korsgaard, Christine M., 1986a, “Aristotle on Function and Virtue”, History of Philosophy Quarterly , 3(3): 259–279.
–––, 1986b, “Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value”, Ethics , 96(3): 486–505. doi:10.1086/292771
Kraut, Richard, 1979a, “Two Conceptions of Happiness”, Philosophical Review , 88(2): 167–197. doi:10.2307/2184505
–––, 1979b, “The Peculiar Function of Human Beings”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 9(3): 53–62. doi:10.1080/00455091.1979.10716263
–––, 1989, Aristotle on the Human Good , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
–––, 1998, “Aristotle on Method and Moral Education”, in Gentzler 1998: 271–290.
–––, 2002, Aristotle: Political Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2006a, “Doing Without Morality: Reflections on the Meaning of Dein in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 30(Summer): 169–200.
––– (ed.), 2006b, The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Ethics , Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. doi:10.1002/9780470776513
–––, 2012, “Aristotle on Becoming Good: Habituation, Reflection, and Perception”, in Shields 2012b: 529–557.
–––, 2013, “An Aesthetic Reading of Aristotle’s Ethics”, in Verity Harte and Melissa Lane (eds.), Politeia: Essays in Honour of Malcolm Schofield , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 231–250. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139096843.016
–––, 2018, The Quality of Life: Aristotle Revised , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lawrence, Gavin, 1993, “Aristotle and the Ideal Life”, Philosophical Review , 102(1): 1–34. doi:10.2307/2185651
–––, 1997, “Nonaggregatability, Inclusiveness, and the Theory of Focal Value: Nicomachean Ethics I.7 1097b16–20”, Phronesis , 42(1): 32–76. doi:10.1163/156852897321163409
–––, 2001, “The Function of the Function Argument”, Ancient Philosophy , 21(2): 445–475. doi:10.5840/ancientphil200121227
Lear, Gabriel Richardson, 2000, Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lear, Jonathan, 2000, Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
LeBar, Mark, 2013, The Value of Living Well , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199931118.001.0001
Leunissen, Mariska, 2012, “Aristotle on Natural Character and Its Implications for Moral Development”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 50(4): 507–530. doi:10.1353/hph.2012.0062
–––, 2013, “’Becoming good starts with nature’Aristotle on the Heritability and Advantages of Good Natural Character”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 44: 99–128.
–––, 2017, From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle , New York: Oxford University Press.
Lockwood, Thornton C., 2005 “A Topical Bibliography of Scholarship on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics : 1880 to 2004”, Journal of Philosophical Research , 30: 1–116. doi:10.5840/jpr20053048
Lorenz, Hendrik, 2006, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle , Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199290636.001.0001
–––, 2009, “Virtue of Character in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 37(Winter): 177–212.
MacDonald, Scott, 1989, “Aristotle and the Homonymy of the Good”, Archiv Für Geschichte der Philosophie , 71(2): 150–174. doi:10.1515/agph.1989.71.2.150
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1999, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues , Chicago: Open Court.
McDowell, John, 1995, “Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics”, Heinaman 1995: 201–208. Reprinted in McDowell 2009: 23–40 (ch. 2).
–––, 1996a, “Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle’s Ethics”, Engstrom & Whiting 1996: 19–35. Reprinted in McDowell 2009: 41–58 (ch. 3).
–––, 1996b, “Incontinence and Practical Wisdom in Aristotle”, in Sabina Lovibond & Stephen G. Williams (eds.), Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 167–197. Reprinted in McDowell 2009: 59–76 (ch. 4).
–––, 1998, “Some Issues in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology”, in Mind, Value, and Reality , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 23–49.
–––, 2009, The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McKerlie, Dennis, 1998, “Aristotle and Egoism”, Southern Journal of Philosophy , 36(4): 531–555. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1998.tb01769.x
–––, 2001, “Aristotle’s Theory of Justice”, Southern Journal of Philosophy , 39(1): 119–141. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2001.tb01809.x
Meyer, Susan Sauvé, 1993, Aristotle on Moral Responsibility , Oxford: Blackwell.
Milgram, Elijah, 1987, “Aristotle on Making Other Selves”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 17(2): 361–376. doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10716441
Miller, Jon (ed.), 2011, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Milo, Ronald D., 1966, Aristotle on Practical Knowledge and Weakness of Will , The Hague: Mouton.
Modrak, Deborah, 1994, “Aristotle: Women, Deliberation, and Nature”, in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 207–22.
Moss, Jessica, 2011, “‘Virtue Makes the Goal Right’ Virtue and Phronesis in Aristotle’s Ethics”, Phronesis , 56(3): 204–261. doi:10.1163/156852811X575907
–––, 2012, Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656349.001.0001
Natali, Carlo (ed.), 2009, Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, Book VII , (Symposia Aristotelia), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2010, “ Posterior Analytics and the Definition of Happiness in NE I”, Phronesis , 55(4): 304–324. doi:10.1163/156852810X523905
Nehamas, Alexander, 2010, “Aristotelian Philia , Modern Friendship”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 39: 213–47.
Nussbaum, Martha C., 1985, “The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy , 1: 151–201. Reprinted in her Love’s Knowledge , New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 54–105. doi:10.1163/2213441785X00102
–––, 1986, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olfert, Christiana, 2017, Aristotle on Practical Truth , New York: Oxford University Press.
Owen, G.E.L., 1971, “Aristotelian Pleasures”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 72: 135–152. Reprinted in his, Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy , M. Nussbaum (ed.), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 334–46.
Pakaluk, Michael, 1998, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX , (Clarendon Aristotle Series), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
–––, 2004, “The Meaning of Aristotelian Magnanimity”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 26(Summer): 241–276.
–––, 2005, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pakaluk, Michael and Giles Pearson (eds.), 2010, Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546541.001.0001
Pangle, Lorraine Smith, 2003, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511498282
Pearson, Giles, 2006, “Aristotle on Acting Unjustly without Being Unjust”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 30(Summer): 211–234.
–––, 2007, “Phronesis as a Mean in the Eudemian Ethics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 32(Summer): 273–296.
–––, 2012, Aristotle on Desire , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139161770
Peters, Julia, 2014, Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective , New York: Routlege.
Peterson, Sandra, 1988, “ ’Horos’ (limit) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ”, Phronesis , 33(1): 233–250. doi:10.1163/156852888X00180
Pickavé, Martin and Jennifer Whiting, 2008, “Nicomachean Ethics 7.3 on Akratic Ignorance”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 34(Summer): 323–372.
Polansky, Ronald (ed.), 2014, The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CCO9781139022484
Politis, Vasilis, 1998, “Aristotle’s Advocacy of Non-Productive Action”, Ancient Philosophy , 18(2): 353–379. doi:10.5840/ancientphil199818238
Price, A.W., 1989, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle , New York: Oxford University Press, Chapters 4–7. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248996.001.0001
–––, 2011, Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle , Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609611.001.0001
Purinton, Jeffrey S., 1998, “Aristotle’s Definition of Happiness (NE I.7 1098a16–18)”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 16: 259–298.
Reeve, C.D.C., 1992, Practices of Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235651.001.0001
–––, 2012a, Action, Contemplation, and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
–––, 2012b, “Aristotle’s Philosophical Method”, in Shields 2012b: 150–170.
–––, 2013, Aristotle on Practical Wisdom: Nicomachean Ethics VI , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Roche, Timothy D., 1988a, “ Ergon and Eudaimonia in Nicomachean Ethics I: Reconsidering the Intellectualist Interpretation”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 26(2): 175–194. doi:10.1353/hph.1988.0034
–––, 1988b, “On the Alleged Metaphysical Foundation of Aristotle’s Ethics”, Ancient Philosophy , 8(1): 49–62. doi:10.5840/ancientphil19888120
––– (ed.), 1988c, Aristotle’s Ethics , The Southern Journal of Philosophy , Spindel Conference, Supplement 27(S1).
–––, 1992, “In Defense of an Alternative View of the Foundation of Aristotle’s Moral Theory”, Phronesis , 37(1): 46–84. doi:10.1163/156852892321052650
Rogers, Kelly, 1994, “Aristotle on Loving Another For His Own Sake”, Phronesis , 39(3): 291–302. doi:10.1163/156852894321052090
Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg, 1974, “The Place of Pleasure in Aristotle’s Ethics”, Mind , 83(332): 481–93. doi:10.1093/mind/LXXXIII.332.481
––– (ed.), 1980, Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics , Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rowe, C.J., 1971, The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics—a Study in the Development of Aristotle’s Thought , Cambridge: Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, suppl. no. 3.
Russell, Daniel C., 2012a, “Aristotle’s Virtues of Greatness”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , Supplementary Volume 2012, Virtue and Happiness: Essays in Honour of Julia Annas , pp. 115–147.
–––, 2012b, Happiness for Humans , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583683.001.0001
Santas, Gerasimos, 2001, Goodness and Justice: Plato, Aristotle, and the Moderns , Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Scaltsas, Theodore, 1995, “Reciprocal Justice in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 77(3): 248–262. doi:10.1515/agph.1995.77.3.248
Schollmeier, Paul, 1994, Other Selves: Aristotle on Personal and Political Friendship , Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Schütrumpf, Eckart, 1989, “Magnanimity, Mεγαλοψυχία , and the System of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 71(1): 10–22. doi:10.1515/agph.1989.71.1.10
Scott, Dominic, 1999, “Aristotle on Well-Being and Intellectual Contemplation: Primary and Secondary Eudaimonia”, Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume , 73: 225–242.
–––, 2000, “Aristotle on Posthumous Fortune”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 18(Summer): 211–230.
–––, 2015, Levels of Argument: A Comparative Study of Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199249640.001.0001
Segvic, Heda, 2002, “Aristotle’s Metaphysics of Action”, Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse / Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy , 5: 23–53. Reprint in Segvic 2009b: 111–143 (ch. 5).
–––, 2004, “Aristotle on the Varieties of Goodness”, Apeiron , 37: 151–176. Reprinted in Segvic 2009b: 89–110 (ch. 4).
–––, 2009a, “Deliberation and Choice in Aristotle”, in Segvic 2009b: 144–171. Also appeared in Pakaluk and Pearson 2010: 159–186. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546541.003.0008
–––, 2009b, From Protagoras to Aristotle: Essays in Ancient Moral Philosophy , Myles Burnyeat (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sherman, Nancy, 1987, “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 47(4): 589–613. doi:10.2307/2107230
–––, 1989, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue , Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0198239173.001.0001
–––, 1997, Making a Virtue of Necessity: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511624865
––– (ed.), 1999, Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays , Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
–––, 2000, “Is the Ghost of Aristotle Haunting Freud’s House?” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy , 16(1): 63–81. doi:10.1163/2213441700X00079
Shields, Christopher, 2012a, “Goodness is Meant in Many Ways”, in G. Rudebusch and J. Hardy (eds.) Grundlagen der Antiken Ethik / Foundations of Ancient Ethics , Goettingen: Vanderhoek & Ruprecht, pp. 185–199.
Shields, Christopher (ed.), 2012b, The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195187489.001.0001
Sim, May (ed.), 1995, The Crossroads of Norm and Nature , Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
–––, 2007, Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511497841
Stern-Gillet, Suzanne, 1995, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship , Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Stohr, Karen, 2003, “Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue”, Journal of Ethics , 7(4): 339–363. doi:10.1023/A:1026111711649
–––, 2009, “Minding Others’ Business”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 90(1): 116–139. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01331.x
Suits, Bernard, 1974, “Aristotle on the Function of Man: Fallacies, Heresies and other Entertainments”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 4(1): 23–40. doi:10.1080/00455091.1974.10716919
Taylor, C.C.W., 1988, “Urmson on Aristotle on Pleasure”, in J. Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik, and C. C. W. Taylor (eds.), Human Agency: Language, Duty, and Value. Philosophical Essays in Honor of J. O. Urmson , Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 120–132. Reprinted in Taylor 2008: 107–120 (ch. 7).
–––, 2003a, “Pleasure: Aristotle’s Response to Plato”, in Robert Heinaman (ed.), Plato and Aristotle’s Ethics , Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 1–20.
–––, 2003b, “Aristotle on the Practical Intellect”, (in German, trans. R. May, with the assistance of A. W. Müller), in T. Buchheim, H. Flashar, and R. A. H. King (eds.), Kann man heute noch etwas anfangen mit Aristoteles? , Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, pp. 142–162. Reprinted (in English) in Taylor 2008: 204–222 (ch. 12).
–––, 2004, “Wisdom and Courage in the Protagoras and the Nicomachean Ethics”, (in Italian, trans. S. Casertano), in G. Casertano (ed.), Il Protagora di Platone: struttura e problematiche , Naples: Loffredo Editore, Naples, pp. 716–728. Reprinted (in English) in Taylor 2008: 281–294 (ch. 16).
–––, 2008, Pleasure, Mind, and Soul: Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226399.001.0001
Telfer, Elizabeth, 1989–90, “The Unity of Moral Virtues in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 91: 35–48.
Tuozzo, Thomas M., 1995, “Contemplation, the Noble, and the Mean: The Standard of Moral Virtue in Aristotle’s Ethics”, Apeiron , special issue Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean , 28(4): 129–154. doi:10.1515/APEIRON.1995.28.4.129.
Urmson, J.O., 1967, “Aristotle on Pleasure”, in J.M.E. Moravcsik (ed.), Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays , Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, pp. 323–33.
–––, 1987, Aristotle’s Ethics , Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Van Cleemput, 2006, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia in Nicomachean Ethics I”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 30(Summer): 127–158.
Walker, Matthew D., 2014, “Aristotle on the Utility and Choiceworthiness of Friends”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 96(2): 151–182. doi:10.1515/agph-2014-0008
Walsh, James, 1963, Aristotle’s Conception of Moral Weakness , New York: Columbia University Press.
Ward, Julie K. (ed.), 1996, Feminism and Ancient Philosophy , New York: Routledge.
Warren, James, 2009, “Aristotle on Speusippus on Eudoxus on Pleasure”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 36(Summer): 249–282.
Wedin, Michael V., 1981, “Aristotle on the Good for Man”, Mind , 90(358): 243–62. doi:10.1093/mind/XC.358.243
White, Nicholas P., 2002, Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198250592.001.0001
–––, 2006, A Brief History of Happiness , Malden, ME: Blackwell.
White, Stephen. A., 1992, Sovereign Virtue , Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Whiting, Jennifer, 1986, “Human Nature and Intellectualism in Aristotle”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 68(1): 70–95. doi:10.1515/agph.1986.68.1.70
–––, 1988, “Aristotle’s Function Argument: A Defense”, Ancient Philosophy , 8(1): 33–48. doi:10.5840/ancientphil19888119
–––, 1991, “Impersonal Friends”, Monist , 74(1): 3–29. doi:10.5840/monist19917414
–––, 1996, “Self-Love and Authoritative Virtue: Prolegomenon to a Kantian Reading of Eudemian Ethics VIII.3”, in Engstrom & Whiting 1996: 162–99.
Wielenberg, Erik J., 2004, “Egoism and Eudaimonia -Maximization in the Nicomachean Ethics ”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 26: 277–295.
Wiggins, David, 2009, “What is the Order Among the Varieties of Goodness? A Question Posed by von Wright; and a Conjecture Made by Aristotle”, Philosophy , 84(2): 175–200. doi:10.1017/S0031819109000308
Williams, Bernard, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Chapter 3.
Wolfsdorf, David, 2013, Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy , Chapter 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511667510
Young, Charles M., 1988, “Aristotle on Temperance” Philosophical Review , 97(4): 521–542. doi:10.2307/2185414
Yu, Jiyuan, 2007, The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue , New York: Routledge.
Zingano Marco, 2007a, “Akrasia and the Method of Ethics”, in Bobonich and Destree 2007: 167–192
–––, 2007b, “Aristotle and the Problems of Method in Ethics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 32(Summer): 297–330.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Athenian Constitution , ed. Kenyon. (Greek)
Athenian Constitution , ed. H. Rackham. (English)
Economics , (Greek)
Economics , (English)
Eudemian Ethics , (Greek)
Eudemian Ethics , (English)
Metaphysics , (Greek)
Metaphysics , (English)
Nicomachean Ethics , ed. J. Bywater. (Greek)
Nicomachean Ethics , ed. H. Rackham. (English)
Poetics , (English)
Politics , (Greek)
Politics , (English)
Rhetoric , ed. W. D. Ross. (Greek)
Rhetoric , ed. J. H. Freese. (English)
Virtues and Vices , ed. I. Bekker. (Greek)
Virtues and Vices , ed. H. Rackham. (English)
Nikomachische Ethik , in German, translated by Eugen Rolfes, Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1911, at the Projekt Gutenberg-DE

Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

Info about mirror sites

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

24/7 writing help on your phone

To install StudyMoose App tap and then “Add to Home Screen”

Virtue: Ethics and Virtuous Life

Save to my list

Remove from my list

Virtue: Ethics and Virtuous Life. (2016, Dec 13). Retrieved from https://studymoose.com/virtue-ethics-and-virtuous-life-essay

"Virtue: Ethics and Virtuous Life." StudyMoose , 13 Dec 2016, https://studymoose.com/virtue-ethics-and-virtuous-life-essay

StudyMoose. (2016). Virtue: Ethics and Virtuous Life . [Online]. Available at: https://studymoose.com/virtue-ethics-and-virtuous-life-essay [Accessed: 11 Sep. 2024]

"Virtue: Ethics and Virtuous Life." StudyMoose, Dec 13, 2016. Accessed September 11, 2024. https://studymoose.com/virtue-ethics-and-virtuous-life-essay

"Virtue: Ethics and Virtuous Life," StudyMoose , 13-Dec-2016. [Online]. Available: https://studymoose.com/virtue-ethics-and-virtuous-life-essay. [Accessed: 11-Sep-2024]

StudyMoose. (2016). Virtue: Ethics and Virtuous Life . [Online]. Available at: https://studymoose.com/virtue-ethics-and-virtuous-life-essay [Accessed: 11-Sep-2024]

The Importance of Speaking Truthfully and Being Virtuous Pages: 2 (464 words)
The Virtuous Woman of Proverbs 31:25: Strong and Joyful Pages: 4 (1200 words)
Vanity: A Virtuous Path to Self-Confidence and Success Pages: 2 (595 words)
Ethical Values: Cornerstones of a Virtuous Society Pages: 2 (600 words)
Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics And Its Probes On Torture Pages: 7 (1989 words)
Utilitarianism, deontological, and virtue theory ethics Pages: 4 (1055 words)
Virtue Ethics: Exploring Its Foundations and Implications Pages: 4 (1013 words)
Utilitarianism Deontological Duty-Based And Virtue-Based Ethics Pages: 4 (1128 words)
Ethical Theories: Utilitarianism, Deontology, Virtue Ethics Pages: 4 (1188 words)
Virtue Ethics in The Time Of Aristotle Pages: 6 (1620 words)

👋 Hi! I’m your smart assistant Amy!

Don’t know where to start? Type your requirements and I’ll connect you to an academic expert within 3 minutes.

Thomas Aquinas College is unique among American colleges and universities, offering a faithfully Catholic education comprised entirely of the Great Books and classroom discussions.

Our Campuses
Mission and History
College Guide Reviews
Faculty & Staff Directory
News & Press
Events Calendar
News Archive
College E-Letter
The Aquinas Review

Truth, and nothing less, sets men free; and because truth is both natural and supernatural, the College’s curriculum aims at both natural and divine wisdom.

The Great Books
The Discussion Method
Program Objectives
Teaching Faculty
Lecture & Concert Series
St. Bernardine Library (CA)
Dolben Library (NE)

The intellectual tradition and moral teachings of the Catholic Church infuse the whole life of Thomas Aquinas College, illuminating the curriculum and the community alike.

New England
Prayer Requests
Faith in Action Blog
California Chapel
New England Chapel

Do you enjoy grappling with complex questions? Are you willing to engage in discussions about difficult concepts, with the truth as your ultimate goal?

Apply to the College
High School Summer Program
Visit & Connect
Send Me Information
Tuition & Fees
How to Apply for Financial Aid
Financial Aid Calculator

There is always something to do at TAC — something worthwhile, something fulfilling, and something geared toward ever-greater spiritual and intellectual growth.

Beyond the Classroom
Beaches, Mountains & More
Online Payments
Student Forms & Documents
Parent Gateway

Nothing speaks more to the versatility of the College’s academic program than the good that our alumni are doing throughout the Church and the world.

Career Services
Alumni Association
Alumni Portal
Arts & Media
Law & Public Policy
Priesthood / Religious Life

Dominic Andres (’24) on Imitation in the Moral Life

A member of Thomas Aquinas College’s newest graduating class, Dominic Andres (CA’24) appeared on Annunciation Press’s radio show The Virtuous Life last week to speak about his first published work, a philosophical essay on choosing virtuous role models.

Mr. Andres conceived the idea for his essay, Imitation in the Moral Life , while writing his Senior Thesis last year about the nature of music and how it imitates the passions. “I had the topic of imitation on my mind,” he says. “I knew I wanted to write something to be published that would be interesting to a lot of people, but still had a philosophical focus.”

Mr. Andres’ essay, which appears on Catholic Exchange, reflects primarily on how imitating virtuous role models leads to growth in virtue. “A man becomes virtuous not only by being told what virtue is but also by seeing it practiced (and practicing it himself),” writes Mr. Andres. “Role models make understandable, achievable, and desirable virtues which were previously obscure, difficult, and unpleasant.”

Intrigued by his treatment of imitation in art and virtue, “The Virtuous Life” host Patricia Oedy-Murray inquired about all aspects of the essay and asked Mr. Andres to delve deeper into many of the ideas presented. They discussed the difference between good and bad imitations of creation, how virtues may be observed in anyone, and the easiest path to growing in virtue by imitation.

“The best way to learn virtue is to surround yourself with it as much as possible,” advises Mr. Andres on the show. “It is best to surround yourself with good people and activities geared toward virtue. Make the majority of what you do the pursuit of excellence, whether that be in academics, sports, or media consumption.”

10 Examples of Virtues and Traits That Shape Integrity

About the Author

Bayu Prihandito is the founder of Life Architekture , a Certified Psychology Consultant and Life Coach for Men . Bayu empowers his clients to navigate life's challenges with clarity, confidence, fulfillment, and true meaning. His expertise has been featured in CNN, Fortune, Vice, Daily Mail, Metro, Cosmopolitan and many more.

Understanding Virtues: Unpacking the Basics

What are virtues, the pillars of virtue: ethics and morality, a comprehensive list of virtues and their meanings, wisdom and knowledge, courage and bravery, humanity and love, justice and fairness, transcendence, living a virtuous life: applications and challenges, examples in daily life, common pitfalls on the path to virtue, staying true to your virtues, final thoughts.

Frequently Asked Questions

Key Takeaways

Understanding and embodying virtues offers a solid grounding for personal development and making positive choices in life.
Practicing virtues such as courage, kindness, and wisdom enriches our lives and strengthens our relationships with others.
Maintaining commitment to virtues through daily actions, and overcoming challenges with integrity, promotes a fulfilling, meaningful life.

Virtues are those qualities that form the foundation of ethical and moral life. They are practical guides that shape our actions, decisions, and relationships. By turning our attention to virtues, we work towards personal growth and a more meaningful, fulfilling life.

In a world filled with choices and challenges, understanding and embracing virtues can guide us toward positive decisions and behaviors . Whether it's:

Acting with courage in the face of adversity
Exercising patience during trying times
Showing kindness to those around us

virtues enrich our lives and the lives of others. This conversation is more than just academic; it's about taking those steps to become the best version of ourselves.

Virtues are the essence of our character and the guiding principles of our lives. They are qualities that embody our highest ethical and moral standards , guiding us to act rightly and justly.

Historically, philosophers like Aristotle have defined virtues as a midpoint between two extremes – a balance that is often challenging to achieve but crucial for self-improvement and societal well-being. For example, courage is a virtue that lies between recklessness and cowardice, guiding us to face fears without tipping over into foolhardiness.

Virtues shape our attitudes , inform our decisions, and influence our interactions with others. They represent our moral values in action, giving life to the principles we hold dear.

The concepts of virtues, ethics, and morality are intricately connected, each playing a significant role in guiding our behavior and decision-making.

Ethics refers to the rules or standards governing your personal conduct.
Morality , on the other hand, is the set of beliefs about what is right and wrong, shaped by our cultural, societal, and personal values.
Virtues stand as the pillars that support both ethical and moral frameworks. They are the qualities that enable us to live up to the ethical standards we set for ourselves and the moral values we believe in.

For instance, honesty is not just a virtue; it's a fundamental ethical requirement in relationships and professions. Similarly, the virtue of compassion comes from the moral principle of empathy and understanding towards others .

At the core of a well-lived life are the virtues of wisdom and knowledge, which guide us to understand the world around us and within us.

Curiosity fuels our desire to learn more, pushing us beyond our comfort zones and leading us to new discoveries.
Creativity is our ability to think outside the box, offering new perspectives and solutions to the challenges we face.
Open-mindedness invites us to be receptive to new ideas, opinions, and experiences, enriching our understanding and promoting a culture of learning and growth.

Together, these virtues form the foundation for a life filled with exploration, innovation, and self-improvement.

a courageous man at the top of the mountain

Stepping into the unknown requires courage and bravery , virtues that empower us to confront fears and obstacles head-on.

Determination is the dedication to reach our goals which helps us overcome setbacks and keep moving forward.
Resilience is the ability to bounce back from failure, which teaches us that every challenge is an opportunity for growth.
Bravery is more than just heroic acts; it's about making tough decisions in the face of uncertainty.

These virtues inspire us to take risks, embrace our vulnerabilities, and pursue our passions with unwavering courage.

The virtues of humanity and love remind us of the importance of connection, compassion, and kindness.

Kindness is the simple act of being friendly, generous, and considerate, which can brighten someone's day and create ripples of positivity.
Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of another, and fosters a sense of belonging and mutual support.
Love , in its many forms , is what binds us together, creating meaningful relationships and enriching our lives.

By practicing these virtues, we contribute to a more compassionate and loving world, where everyone feels valued and connected.

managers discussing about company policies, virtues and integrity

Justice and fairness are the essential threads that hold societies together.

Fairness , the equitable treatment of all individuals, encourages a sense of trust and security within our communities.
Leadership , the ability to guide and inspire others towards a common goal, is grounded in the virtue of justice, ensuring that actions and decisions are made with fairness and integrity.
Teamwork , the collaborative effort to achieve a shared goal, relies on justice to ensure that every member's contribution is valued and respected.

These virtues drive us to create a more equitable world, where every individual has the opportunity to thrive.

Temperance is the virtue that teaches us the value of moderation and self-control. In a world teeming with distractions and excesses, the practice of self-control helps us maintain focus and discipline in our pursuits.

Prudence , or wise judgment, allows us to make decisions that align with our long-term goals and values, rather than succumbing to fleeting desires.
Modesty reminds us to approach life with humility and respect for others, valuing substance over superficiality.

Together, these virtues of temperance guide us towards a balanced, meaningful life, characterized by thoughtful choices and self-respect.

Transcendence lifts us beyond the mundane, connecting us with something greater than ourselves.

Spirituality , whether rooted in religion or a personal sense of connection with the universe, provides a sense of purpose and direction.
Gratitude , the acknowledgment of the good in our lives, cultivates a positive outlook and strengthens our relationships.
Hope instills in us the confidence to face challenges with a belief in a better tomorrow.

These virtues inspire us to rise above our limitations, fostering a deep sense of fulfillment and connection with the world around us.

Living a virtuous life isn't just about understanding what virtues are; it's about putting them into practice in our everyday lives.

Consider the virtue of patience during a frustrating situation at work, allowing for thoughtful communication rather than reactionary responses.
Or, imagine employing courage to stand up for someone in need, even when it's uncomfortable.
Virtues like kindness can manifest in simple acts, such as helping a neighbor or sharing a word of encouragement.

Every decision, action, and interaction offers an opportunity to embody virtues, making them tangible expressions of our values and character.

On the journey to leading a life enriched with virtues, we are bound to encounter obstacles. A common challenge is the temptation to choose the easier path over the right one, especially when faced with difficult decisions.

Besides, societal pressures can lead us to compromise our virtues in favor of conformity or acceptance . Recognizing these pitfalls as part of the human experience is the first step towards overcoming them. By reflecting on our core values and seeking guidance from mentors from Life Architekture , we can navigate these challenges with integrity and strength.

Maintaining a commitment to virtuous living, particularly in complex situations, requires determination and vigilance. Here are a few tips to help stay aligned with your virtues:

Cultivate self-awareness by regularly reflecting on your actions and decisions.
Surround yourself with individuals who embody the virtues you admire and aspire to, as they can offer inspiration and accountability.
Setting clear personal and moral goals can provide direction and motivation.
Practice self-compassion and understand that the pursuit of virtue is a lifelong journey filled with learning and growth.

Exploring the list of virtues isn't just an academic exercise; it's a roadmap for personal development and a guide to living a meaningful life. As we've seen, these virtues are actionable qualities that can significantly impact our decisions, relationships, and sense of fulfillment. At Life Architekture, we're dedicated to supporting you on this exciting journey, offering transformational coaching and resources to help you cultivate a life rich in virtue.

How do virtues impact daily life?

Virtues guide actions, decision-making, and interactions on a day-to-day basis, encouraging us to live in alignment with our best selves and maintain healthy relationships.

Can virtues change over time?

While the core essence of virtues remains consistent, the way they manifest in our lives can evolve as we grow and face different life circumstances.

Why is self-reflection important in practicing virtues?

Self-reflection helps us to recognize when we are living up to our virtues and when we might need to adjust our actions or attitudes to realign with our values.

How can we encourage others to practice virtues?

By embodying virtues in our own actions and treating others with compassion and understanding, we can inspire those around us to also embrace a virtuous lifestyle.

What are common obstacles to living virtuously?

Common obstacles include societal pressures, personal biases, and the challenge of balancing short-term desires with long-term values.

Published February 25, 2024

Updated February 25, 2024

Life Architekture Blog

Mindfulness
Relationships
Emotional Intelligence
Personal Development
Quotes & Affirmations

Quick Links

Testimonials
Legal Notice
Privacy Policy
Refund Policy
Terms of Service

Items in your cart

Your cart is empty

Choosing a selection results in a full page refresh.

Positive Psychology

Moral Virtues and Character Strengths Across the Life Span

What matters most may change with age and circumstance..

Posted January 28, 2023 | Reviewed by Vanessa Lancaster

What Is Positive Psychology?
Take our Optimism Test
Find counselling near me
The moral virtues and character strengths that matter the most evolve over a lifespan.
We should not expect attributes that support academic or work performance to apply equally well to other tasks and situations.
It is important to recognize the fluid and dynamic nature of virtues and character strengths to flourish in life.

During the summer of 2005, Martin Seligman convened a meeting of the world’s leading experts in the emerging field of positive psychology. Held at the University of Pennsylvania, Seligman dubbed the meeting the Medici II Conference. The goal was to explore ways to build the science of positive psychology, focusing on research on the three pillars of positive psychology – positive experience, positive individual traits, and positive institutions.

I was fortunate to be part of this gathering of the minds of positive psychology that included (besides Seligman) Chris Peterson, Mihaly (Mike) Csikszentmihalyi, and Ed Diener. Peterson and Seligman had recently published their now classic book on the classification of character strengths. 1 Csikszentmihalyi, was famous for the concept of flow. 2 Diener was among the world’s leading experts on happiness . Together with about a dozen other psychologists and frequent guest speakers, we spent the summer of 2005 charting the path for the future of positive psychology.

Peterson and Seligman’s classification of positive values into six moral virtues ( wisdom , courage, justice, humanity, temperance, and transcendence) and 24 character strengths (distributed across the six virtues) caught my interest. At West Point, a positive character is one of four pillars of excellence deemed fundamental to success as an Army officer, along with intellectual, physical, and military competence.

As our discussions unfolded that summer, I began to design ways to empirically study the role of moral virtues and character strengths in cadet performance, adaptability, and resilience . This launched what is approaching a 20-year research program in character science within the context of a service academy and the military more generally.

This research program has yielded interesting results. West Point cadets show a different profile of character strengths compared to non-military affiliated college students. 3 A collaboration with Angela Duckworth has demonstrated that grit is an important predictor of cadet success. 4 Psychological hardiness is linked to success both among cadets and, later, as Army officers. 5 A five-year longitudinal study of cadet character, completed in collaboration with Tufts psychologist Rich Lerner has produced dozens of empirical studies that explore a myriad of ways that character plays out in this context. 6

This research also has provided more general insights into the role of virtues and character in human performance and resilience. Perhaps the most important of these insights is that character is multidimensional. With 24 individual character strengths distributed across six moral virtues, it is clear that to live a full and meaningful life people must learn to match their virtues and character strengths to the conditions they face at any given point in time. Even if virtues and strengths are trait like, people can learn when, where, and how to use them. I call this the character toolbox analogy.

Just like an actual toolbox, not every job can be completed with a hammer. Grit is important for accomplishing difficult and long-term goals , but other character strengths rise in importance in other situations, such as forming genuine and lasting social relationships. Cadets who excel at West Point must be more than gritty. They also need social intelligence , curiosity, integrity, and kindness (just to name a few strengths). Importantly, they need to be agile in their ability to match particular character strengths to particular situations.

I suspect that the virtues and strengths of the greatest importance to us also shift and evolve across our lifespan. In early adulthood, virtues and strengths that support task mastery and performance may dominate. The character strengths that help a cadet graduate from West Point or a student complete medical school and a residency may differ from those virtues and strengths most relevant in late adulthood.

Later in life, finding a sense of meaning and purpose in life may be more important than getting that next promotion or publishing another journal article. In my own case, early in my career , I leaned heavily on grit and self-regulation to achieve career goals. Nowadays, grit and self-regulation – while still relevant and important at times – take a backseat to the virtues of humanity and transcendence.

This adds up to the point that human virtues and strengths represent a dynamic force in our lives. Virtues and strengths develop over the lifespan – they are not etched in stone once formed. Moreover, situations and conditions change, both day-to-day and over the long term. Changes in work, marital, social, or health status will influence what specific virtues and strengths matter the most. Finally, people change over time. As discussed, those attributes that matter most when you are 25 may differ from those that matter most at age 55 or 75.

To flourish in life, it is thus important to recognize the fluid and dynamic nature of virtues and character strengths. Learn what tools are in your strengths toolbox. Do not rely excessively on a particular attribute. Cultivate a systematic approach to flexibly employing your virtues and strengths. And do not be surprised that the virtues and strengths you hold most dear evolve over time and place.

Note: The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

1. Peterson, C. and Seligman, M. E. P., Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification (Oxford University Press, 2004).

2. Csikszentmihalyi, M. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience . United Kingdom: HarperCollins, 2009.

3. Matthews, M. D., Eid, J., Kelly, D. R., Bailey, J. K. S., & Peterson, C. (2006). Character strengths and virtues of developing military leaders: An international comparison. Military Psychology, 18 (Supplemental Issue), pp S57-S68.

4. Duckworth, A. L., Quirk, A., Gallop, R., Hoyle, R. H., Kelly, D. R., & Matthews, M. D. (2019). Cognitive and noncognitive predictors of success. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116 (47), 23499-23504. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1910510116

5. Bartone, P. T., Kelly, D. R., & Matthews, M. D. (2013). Hardiness predicts adaptability in military leaders. International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 21 , 200-210.

6. For example, Murray, E. D., Schaefer, H.S., Callina, K. S., Powers, J. J., Matthews, M. D., Burchard, B. M., Ryan, D. M., & Lerner, R. L. (2021). Training character: Character attributes and performance profiles among cadets at the United States Military Academy. Journal of Positive Psychology . https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2019.1689414

Michael D. Matthews, Ph.D. , is a professor of engineering psychology at the United States Military Academy. He is the author of Head Strong: How Psychology is Revolutionizing War and co-author of The Character Edge: Leading and Winning with Integrity.

Find a Therapist
Find a Treatment Center
Find a Psychiatrist
Find a Support Group
Find Online Therapy
International
New Zealand
South Africa
Switzerland
Asperger's
Bipolar Disorder
Chronic Pain
Eating Disorders
Passive Aggression
Personality
Goal Setting
Stopping Smoking
Low Sexual Desire
Relationships
Child Development
Self Tests NEW
Therapy Center
Diagnosis Dictionary
Types of Therapy

It’s increasingly common for someone to be diagnosed with a condition such as ADHD or autism as an adult. A diagnosis often brings relief, but it can also come with as many questions as answers.

Emotional Intelligence
Gaslighting
Affective Forecasting
Neuroscience

What is virtue and why does it matter?

Contemporary education has become too technocratic and divorced from virtue. This is a disservice to students because it robs them of what a classical education provides: the tools students need to succeed, not just academically and professionally, but in the deep and abiding sense of being able to flourish as free and good human beings. It is therefore important that we put virtue back into the heart of education. To do that, however, we must be clear about what virtue is and why it matters.

The concept of virtue is most commonly traced back to classical Greek and Roman society, but is important to note that ancient Buddhist, Chinese, Hindu, Jewish, and Islamic traditions also placed virtue at the center of their account of the good life and society, and thus understood a proper education to focused on its cultivation. Though I typically refer to virtue in its more familiar European or Western context, we must remember that the concept is far more universally applicable.

When Plato and Aristotle discuss virtue, the Greek term they use is arete , which is best translated as “excellence.” Virtue, in its broadest sense, is an excellent quality of a thing that allows it to perform its function well. The virtue of a knife, for instance, is its excellent quality of sharpness because this is what allows a knife to cut well (dullness, by contrast, is a bad quality of a knife).

Obviously human beings are far more complex than knives, and yet we still have a characteristic function, which is to know and understand reality and to decide how best to organize our lives in light of this understanding. Human virtues, then, are stable dispositions of thought, action, and feeling that enable us to do this well. When we discuss virtues, we are either talking about good habits of mind that allow us to think, judge, reflect, and deliberate well, or good habits of desire that allow us to want and take our pleasure in what is truly good for us and for society.

Virtues are habits, or stable character traits. An honest man is one who tells the truth reliably, not just every now and again. And that means that he: (1) knows the value and importance of honesty; (2) tells the truth easily in a wide range of circumstances and finds it difficult to lie; and (3) is pleased by being honest and pained by the thought of being dishonest.

Virtues, as habits, are similar to but distinct from skills. Like skills, the cultivation of virtue requires training, discipline, and the acquisition of knowledge. Think of a bricklayer. He has a habit of knowledge. Put in a variety of novel circumstances, he will know how to use the relevant materials of his trade to execute his craft well. How does one acquire such a habit of knowledge? Not simply by reading a book or listening to a lecture or memorizing rules, but by practice . A master craftsman must learn his craft from another master. He must be trained over time to develop the habits of his craft under someone who already possesses them. No one is born knowing how to lay bricks—in fact, the task is quite difficult and mastery takes a long time.

Something similar is true with virtue. Unfortunately, we are not born just, honest, wise, or courageous, nor will we naturally develop these traits as we will naturally learn to walk or jump. Virtues must also be acquired, and it is the task of a proper education over time to acquire them, and children need virtuous examples to imitate. While virtue always involves knowledge first and foremost, it also involves the deliberate shaping of our faculties of perception, imagination, feeling, and desire. Virtue is a transformation of the whole person, and unlike skill, it is not ordered to the production of some specific work, but to human flourishing quite generally. Virtue, therefore, cannot be reduced to skill. To see why not, consider that an excellent grammarian can exercise her skill by displaying bad grammar in a malformed sentence and explaining what is wrong with it. But a just person cannot exercise her justice by stealing, cheating, or committing murder. Virtue is obviously a deeper, more personal transformation.

The Greeks understood that to have a flourishing society they needed to create good citizens, citizens who not only display civic virtues, such as civility, friendliness, and justice, but personal virtues, like courage, wisdom, and self-control. A proper education, which had the cultivation of virtue at its core, was ultimately a political imperative. The Greek conception of paideia was the process by which one formed an ideal type of person, someone who would embody Greek values and be equipped to realize and reproduce them in society. There is no possible discussion of education as the mere transmission of information or useful skills for the sake of work. A proper education is concerned with making young people into noble and free persons—with developing and shaping their potential so that they can flourish, both as individuals, and more crucially, as citizens in a flourishing society. The Greeks recognized that we do not flourish apart and alone, but together in common associations.

There are obstacles to the reintegration of knowledge and virtue, but it is first crucial to see what is at stake as we think creatively about how to move forward. A democracy is only as good as its citizens, and we need citizens who are not simply knowledgeable and skilled, but who have the civic and individual virtues that are necessary for society to flourish, who are honest, just, generous, civil, resourceful, self-controlled, and wise. The cultivation of these character traits should be at the heart of education.

Jennifer Frey is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of South Carolina. She earned a B.A. in philosophy and medieval studies (with a classics minor) at Indiana University, in Bloomington, Indiana. She earned her Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh. Prior to teaching at UofSC, she was a junior fellow in the Society of the Liberal Arts at the University of Chicago and Collegiate Assistant…

Exit Interview: Kathleen Porter-Magee, Superintendent of Partnership Schools

Philanthropy wrestles with civics education

When was American education’s best decade? And how can we tell?

University of Notre Dame

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Home ›
Reviews ›

Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons

Noell Birondo and S. Stewart Braun (eds.), Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons , Routledge, 2017, 210pp., $150.00 (hbk), ISBN 9781138231733.

Reviewed by Jason Kawall, Colgate University

According to the editors, Noell Birondo and S. Stewart Braun,

The main aims of this book are . . . to foster a greater appreciation for the multiplicity of reasons surrounding the concept of the virtues and to shed light on what is presumably the paradigm case, of an individual agent responding to an array of potential reasons, often in diverse circumstances and contexts. (2-3)

While the virtues are often treated as allowing agents to recognize and respond appropriately to reasons, Birondo and Braun note that there are broader connections and questions concerning the relationship between reasons and the virtues that warrant examination: for example, are there distinctive kinds of reasons to become a certain kind of person, rather than simply reasons to act or respond in certain ways? Upon what reasons can agents act appropriately while developing the virtues, and can we simply will to act upon some reasons and not others?

The current volume consists of ten chapters intended to explore the relationship(s) between virtues and reasons, divided into three parts, with a short introductory essay by Birondo and Braun. As they note in their introduction, the volume is very wide-ranging, and

By addressing a diverse set of questions on the connections between virtues and reasons, the papers here do not offer a sustained treatment of one or two core issues; instead, the papers that we have collected here form, together, a kind of kaleidoscope of issues surrounding the notion of virtue's reasons. (2)

While each of the chapters mentions reasons, and some include extended discussion of such (in varying contexts), it is virtue theory and character that truly serve to unify the volume. With respect to reasons, there is significant discussion of work by John McDowell and Robert Audi, but little overall engagement with the broader, extensive recent literature on the topic. That said, however, the chapters in this volume tend to be of a very high quality -- and some are truly excellent, with the potential to shape future discussion in the area. Given that the chapters in this volume are so diverse, with widely varying topics and approaches, I will focus on providing overviews of each, rather than attempting to provide a unified, thematic discussion.

Part I, "Reasons, Character, and Agency", consists of four papers. While there are few connections linking them, each chapter is strong and raises interesting issues in its own right. Garrett Cullity's "Moral Virtues and Responsiveness for Reasons" is extremely dense and detailed; to be honest, I've read this chapter several times and remain uncertain whether I entirely grasp all of it. In the first part of the chapter Cullity provides criteria for the application of various aretaic terms to traits and dispositions, but also to actions and other entities. These criteria vary quite significantly -- for example, whether an action is honest depends solely on the aim of the action, whereas whether an action is kind depends on its aim, but also its motive, and the manner in which it is performed. In the later parts of his paper Cullity develops a unique taxonomy of the virtues. Moral virtues are characterized by responding appropriately to morally relevant reasons, and for each response there is the reason for the response, the object of the response, and the response itself. Cullity proposes a corresponding threefold set of categories of virtue: those characterized by good responsiveness to particular reasons , those involving responding well to particular objects , and those that involve responding well to a variety of different objects or reasons; Cullity distinguishes further subcategories of each. This is the barest sketch of Cullity's chapter, and omits a great deal -- the chapter rewards multiple readings. Still, I worry that the tremendous detail, including many qualifications and exceptions to his various proposals might limit the use of Cullity's taxonomy by others.

Justin Oakley's "Remote Scenarios and Warranted Virtue Attributions" is a thoughtful, lucid paper addressing the following issue: how does the behaviour (actual or counterfactual) of agents in unlikely or remote scenarios affect our epistemic justification for attributing virtues or vices to them? For example, how would an agent's counterfactual behaviour when caught on-board a ship during a severe storm affect our justification in attributing courage to her? A highly demanding answer would hold that all such remote circumstances are relevant -- if a person would act poorly under extreme conditions, then we should not attribute courage (or other relevant virtues) to her. Robert Adams defends what Oakley refers to as a 'probabilistic' approach, where the relevance of behaviour in remote situations is a function of how likely an agent is to find herself in such circumstances. Similarly, in a given remote situation, the more likely an agent is to act well compared to a second agent, the more justified we are in attributing the relevant virtue to her. Oakley argues, plausibly, that we need to further qualify the probabilistic approach in at least two ways. First, the reason(s) why an agent is likely to act in a certain way (in a given scenario) are relevant -- is it the result of training and reflection, or mere luck? Second, we need to consider whether the agent (in actual circumstances) would approve of her actions and the reasons for them in remote scenarios. A committed utilitarian might, under extreme circumstances, leave his spouse to assist an aid group instead. While such circumstances might be unlikely, if the utilitarian would now approve of his reasons and actions under the extreme conditions, this would be relevant to our attributions of such virtues as loyalty.

In "Vice, Reasons, and Wrongdoing", Damian Cox defends a form of 'vice ethics'. Where virtue ethics defines right action in terms of virtues, vice ethics defines wrongness -- and rightness -- in terms of vices. Cox argues that reasons to avoid vicious action are typically pro tanto while reasons to perform virtuous actions are typically only prima facie . He further suggests that we can treat actions as supererogatory (most virtuous actions), merely permissible (actions that are neither virtuous nor vicious), or wrong (most vicious actions). And more precisely, with respect to right action, Cox suggests

(R) An action is right iff it is the least vicious of available actions.

(W) An action is wrong iff it is not the least vicious of available actions. (55)

Often there will be multiple actions available to an agent that are equally free of vice; all would be right. Cox develops the proposal effectively, and it certainly warrants discussion in the literature. Still, some questions arise. Consider two agents in similar circumstances making charitable donations. One merely gives five dollars without any vicious motives, while the other gives several thousand dollars, almost entirely out of generosity, but also with the hint of a vain desire to impress some friends; the generosity would have been sufficient to motivate the action. On Cox's proposal, the agent merely giving five dollars acts rightly, while the far more generous donation is wrong because of the incidental vicious motive; it would not be among the least vicious actions available. As such, trace amounts of vice could implausibly render otherwise excellent actions wrong.

"Can Virtue Be Codified? An Inquiry on the Basis of Four Conceptions of Virtue" by Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu is the final paper of part I. Tsu argues against McDowell's well-known "uncodifiability thesis", according to which the requirements and reasons of the virtues cannot be codified into rules. After drawing attention to the complexity and ambiguity of the uncodifiability thesis (e.g. what counts as a rule?), Tsu presents four conceptions of the relationship between virtues and rules. On the particularist conception, there are not even broad generalizations that hold between virtues and rules; on the prima facie conception, any rules would only roughly capture the basic content of virtues, and would have many exceptions. According to the pro tanto conception, pro tanto rules determine what a virtuous agent should do, while "in cases of moral conflicts . . . it takes practical wisdom or judgment to determine which rule 'outweighs' which" (80). Finally, according to the absolute conception, virtuous agents act in accordance with a (or a set of) absolute, exceptionless moral principle(s); this need not involve mechanical rule-following -- we can demonstrate judgment in applying the principle(s). Tsu argues that McDowell focuses on the first two conceptions, but that the absolute and pro tanto conceptions would allow for the codifiability of the reasons of virtue, and are in fact more attractive than the rival conceptions. This is another strong chapter -- though many of the objections raised by Tsu to particularist and prima facia conceptions rely on particular features of McDowell's view that need not be embraced by all those endorsing the uncodifiability thesis.

Part II, "Reasons and Virtues in Development", is the most unified section of the volume, consisting of three chapters addressing how non-virtuous agents can develop the virtues. Ramon Das considers how such agents can act rightly despite lacking the virtues. Emer O'Hagan addresses how agents might effectively and appropriately aim at developing their own virtues. And Audi addresses the nature and place of role-modeling in the development of the virtues.

In "Virtue, Reason, and Will" Das argues that two tempting positions for virtue ethicists -- holding that right action either requires acting from good motives or reasons, or (more strongly) requires acting from firm, stable virtues -- are implausibly demanding. After all, both would seem beyond the ability of anyone who is not already virtuous -- we can't simply will ourselves to have good motives. Das suggests that we need to more carefully distinguish good motives and good reasons. Broadly, Das sees motives as (paradigmatically) desires that are involuntary, while normative reasons are cognitive and capable of producing motives. Das argues that an agent might recognize a normative reason to help a person and as a result choose to help her (voluntarily) despite the lack of an antecedent desire or motive to do so. Das provides some admittedly brief remarks in defence of this view, and in turn argues that we would be best to move away from distinctively virtue-ethical approaches to right action requiring good motives or virtues. Das concludes by arguing against Dan Russell's proposal that we sharply distinguish between right action (a form of action evaluation) and what an agent ought to do (a matter of action guidance); this proposal would undermine concerns that ordinary people cannot act rightly given standard virtue ethics. Das's critique of Russell's proposal is compelling -- particularly in arguing that if we sharply distinguish between right action and what an agent ought to do, the normative significance of rightness becomes highly unclear. This is a strong chapter, developing Das's previous, influential critiques of virtue ethics in new ways.

In her "Self-Knowledge and the Development of Virtue" O'Hagan carefully explores how agents might intentionally develop the virtues, focusing on the ways in which a morally refined self-knowledge could shape their sensitivity to virtuous reasons. O'Hagan begins by noting constraints upon the reasons for which agents might act while developing the virtues. For example, they cannot (typically) perform an action because it would be the kind thing to do and would improve their character. Rather, they would need to perform the action out of a concern for the well-being of the person they would help. The latter reflects a nascent kindness; the former a potentially problematic concern with their own virtue. O'Hagan then considers how we might shape the reasons upon which we act. She agrees with Audi that we cannot directly will ourselves to act (or not) on a given reason or set of reasons. But O'Hagan argues that our ability to direct our attention through self-knowledge and self-awareness provides us with rich indirect control over the reasons for which we act; there is no need to see ourselves as limited in this regard. For example, we might learn that people tend to overlook morally salient reasons when they are in a great hurry. This knowledge could ground a concern to reflect and pay greater attention when feeling time-pressured, allowing us to recognize reasons we might otherwise miss, and providing an important form of control over the reasons for which we act.

The final paper of Part II is Audi's insightful and wide-ranging "Aretaic Role Modeling, Justificatory Reasons, and the Diversity of the Virtues". Audi first explores the nature of role-modeling of both moral and intellectual virtues, drawing attention to often-overlooked issues (e.g. distinguishing between role-modeling as such and providing commentary upon what one is doing to a learner). He then turns to arguing that reasons are explanatorily prior to virtues -- actions from virtue must be performed for an appropriate reason (132), and role-modeling virtues requires an appreciation or responsiveness to reasons on the part of both the agent and a learner (133). If there were not prior reasons to which virtuous agents were responsive, what would explain and justify their actions? In the second half of his paper, Audi explores a wide range of virtues, with an eye towards shedding light on both intellectual and moral virtues, as well as 'cross-over' virtues that are both (such as sensitivity and consistency). Audi draws attention to the rich breadth and variety of virtues, which in turn impacts how these virtues can be successfully role-modeled. I cannot do justice here to the full range of issues addressed by Audi in this paper; there is a tremendous amount of substance and insightful reflection concerning the virtues and their development.

The final section, Part III, "Specific Virtues for Finite Rational Agents", consists of three chapters. Here again, the individual chapters are rich and rewarding, even while there are not strong thematic connections between them.

Reasons pluralists argue that there are rationally incomparable, and thereby incommensurable, kinds of reasons. A familiar worry for such views is that we would too frequently lack practical rational guidance because we so often face incomparable sets of reasons. In his "Practical Wisdom: A Virtue for Resolving Conflicts among Practical Reasons", Andrés Luco defends reasons pluralism by proposing an "Override Principle" that can apply in (many) such cases of conflict. Luco's override principle states that when we face sets of incomparable reasons, then set A overrides set B if (i) a certain action is necessary for promoting some good associated with set A, and (ii) not acting on set B would not result in the loss of any goods associated with set B (153). We would thus have a principle of practical reason that could allow us, in a wide range of cases, to rationally endorse an action, even when faced with incomparable kinds of reasons. The majority of the chapter involves Luco considering how the override principle might be applied to such decisions as whether to pursue a career in philosophy (largely grounded in self-regarding reasons) or instead to pursue a career that would help others as much as possible, as recommended by effective altruists (grounded in impartial reasons). Luco's discussion is compelling as he notes the complexities of applying the override principle. Still, while Luco arrives at plausible answers for various test scenarios, it is perhaps unclear to what extent the override principle is in fact driving these answers, and to what extent Luco is instead appealing to other factors and intuitions and then "applying" the override principle in an ad hoc fashion to capture the desired results.

The final two chapters are by the volume's editors. Braun's chapter on "The Virtue of Modesty and the Egalitarian Ethos" provides an attractive, irenic account of modesty. He first distinguishes three broad approaches to modesty in the literature: Julia Driver's influential 'ignorance' view (that requires an underestimate of the agent's own talents and achievements), perspectival views (that require seeing one's accomplishments from some particular perspective -- perhaps recognizing the roles of luck or opportunity), and de-emphasis views (that require downplaying or directing attention away from one's accomplishments). Braun's engagement with these approaches leads to his own "Egalitarian" account: "A modest agent is an agent that is disposed to act in a manner consistent with attempts to avoid establishing or endorsing distinctions in social or civic standing, ranking, or respect, which are applicable to herself, both at an institutional level and at a local community level" (176-7). As Braun notes, modesty seems to involve an unwillingness to treat oneself as more worthy than others; the egalitarian account captures this unwillingness, and the embrace of social equality could explain why modesty is a moral virtue. Certain questions do arise -- for example, if a rejection of distinctions in social ranking underlies modesty, wouldn't activism and social protest against hierarchies count as paradigmatic instances of modesty? If not, why not? Still Braun's approach seems very promising and worthy of further development.

The volume closes with Birondo's "Virtue and Prejudice: Giving and Taking Reasons". Birondo addresses a familiar worry for eudaimonistic virtue ethics: that their foundational appeal to human nature (in determining what constitutes flourishing) is bound to be problematic. Birondo focuses his attention on a recent version of the worry presented by Jesse Prinz. Broadly, Prinz argues that if eudaimonists hold that a proper understanding of eudaimonia can only be achieved by those who are themselves virtuous, problematic circularities will arise. On the other hand, if eudaimonists embrace an external standard of eudaimonia that can be identified without possession of the virtues, this standard cannot be justified -- there is too much cultural variation in conceptions of flourishing and there is no non-question-begging way of determining which of these conceptions are superior to others; we cannot justify any antecedent, universal human nature that could ground eudaimonia and the virtues. In replying to Prinz, Birondo draws stark attention to the ways in which critics of virtue ethics often ignore relevant literature and responses by virtue ethicists. According to Birondo's own response to Prinz, we must recognize that our understandings of human nature and eudaimonia are works in progress across different cultures. Birondo argues for an internalist account of eudaimonia, where the nature of eudaimonia is determined by the virtuous, but where ordinary folk can still understand this conception. He further stresses that we need to be open to both taking and giving reasons across cultures to improve and refine our conceptions of virtue and eudaimonia over time; there is no foundational appeal to an antecedently identified human nature. This is a sharp paper that effectively defends a plausible, pluralist form of eudaimonism.

Overall, this is a strong collection of insightful and often thought-provoking papers. There are, of course, some limitations; most prominently, while there are suggestive and interesting contributions to understanding the connections between reasons and virtues, the chapters vary significantly in the depth of their engagement with such issues. But understood as a wide-ranging contribution to the leading-edge literature on virtue theory and character, the volume stands up very well.

Essay on Values for Students and Children

500+ words essay on values.

Importance of Values

For an individual, values are most important. An individual with good values is loved by everyone around as he is compassionate about others and also he behaves ethically.

Values Help in Decision Making

A person is able to judge what is right and what is wrong based on the values he imbibes. In life at various steps, it makes the decision-making process easier. A person with good values is always likely to make better decisions than others.

Values Can Give Direction to Our Life

In life, Values give us clear goals. They always tell us how we should behave and act in different situations and give the right direction to our life. In life, a person with good values can take better charge.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Values Can Build Character

If a person wants a strong character, then he has to possesses good values such as honesty , loyalty, reliability, efficiency, consistency, compassion, determination, and courage. Values always help in building our character.

Values Can Help in Building a Society

If u want a better society then people need to bear good values. Values play an important role in society. They only need to do their hard work, with compassion, honesty, and other values. Such people will help in the growth of society and make it a much better place to live.

Characteristics of Values

Values are always based on various things. While the basic values remain the same across cultures and are intact since centuries some values may vary. Values may be specific to a society or age. In the past, it was considered that women with good moral values must stay at home and not voice their opinion on anything but however, this has changed over time. Our culture and society determine the values to a large extent. We imbibe values during our childhood years and they remain with us throughout our life.

Family always plays the most important role in rendering values to us. Decisions in life are largely based on the values we possess. Values are permanent and seldom change. A person is always known by the values he possesses. The values of a person always reflect on his attitude and overall personality.

The Decline of Values in the Modern Times

While values are of great importance and we are all aware of the same unfortunately people these days are so engrossed in making money and building a good lifestyle that they often overlook the importance of values. At the age when children must be taught good values, they are taught to fight and survive in this competitive world. Their academics and performance in other activities are given importance over their values.

Parents , as well as teachers, teach them how to take on each other and win by any means instead of inculcating good sportsman spirit in them and teaching them values such as integrity, compassion, and patience. Children always look up to their elders as their role models and it is unfortunate that elders these days have a lack of values. Therefore the children learn the same.

In order to help him grow into a responsible and wise human being, it is important for people to realize that values must be given topmost priority in a child’s life because children are the future of the society. There can be nothing better in a society where a majority of people have good values and they follow the ethical norms.

Customize your course in 30 seconds

Which class are you in.

Travelling Essay
Picnic Essay
Our Country Essay
My Parents Essay
Essay on Favourite Personality
Essay on Memorable Day of My Life
Essay on Knowledge is Power
Essay on Gurpurab
Essay on My Favourite Season
Essay on Types of Sports

Download the App

141 Virtue Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

🏆 best virtue topic ideas & essay examples, 💡 simple & easy virtue essay titles, 🔎 interesting topics to write about virtue, 📌 most interesting virtue topics to write about, 🥇 good research topics about virtue.

Aristotle vs. Socrates: The Main Difference in the Concept of Virtue One of the main principles on which the ethical school is based is the notion of virtue as the representation of the moral perfectness of a man.
Plato and Aristotle’s Views of Virtue in Respect to Education Arguably, Plato and Aristotle’s views of education differ in that Aristotle considers education as a ‘virtue by itself’ that every person must obtain in order to have ‘happiness and goodness in life’, while Plato advocates […]
Virtue Theory, Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics The foundation of utilitarianism theory is in the principle of utility. On the other hand, the theory of deontology embraces the concept of duty.
Niccolo Machiavelli’s Virtue and Fortuna Machiavelli provided opportunities to scholars and readers to understand a political system purged of irrelevant influences of ethics in order to comprehend the basis of politics in useful use of power. Machiavelli introduced another principle […]
Courage as an Important Virtue in Life Described by Maya Angelou as the most important of all the virtues because without courage you cannot practice any other virtue consistently”, it is composed of different types, including physical courage, moral courage, social courage, […]
Consequentialist, Deontological, and Virtue Ethics: Ethical Theories Ethical principles are rooted in the ethical theories, and ethicists, when trying to explain a particular action, usually refer to the principles, rather than theories.
Meno’s Question About the Virtue: Response of Socrates This is not the only question Meno asks but in all the cases, he fails to begin by defining the basis of his questions.
Aristotle’s Virtue Theory vs. Buddha’s Middle Path The purpose of this paper is to review each of the two theories and develop a comparison between them. This term is in contrast to the paths of extremities described by eternalism and annihilationism that […]
Abortion and Virtue Ethics Those who support the right of a woman to an abortion even after the final trimester makes the assertion that the Constitution does not provide any legal rights for a child that is still within […]
Examining “The Golden Rule” and Virtue Ethics The ethical issue in this particular case is whether or not Alice should report the apparent mistake in Mark’s nutritional report to the company or whether she should tell Mark that she looked through the […]
Moral Virtues of Stoicism and Early Christianity Early Christians’ demonstration of virtue which includes humility, selflessness, and mercy, also reflects Jesus’s teachings on being meek and merciful to inherit the kingdom of God.
Cardinal Virtues in The Epic of Gilgamesh The Epic of Gilgamesh enables the reader to identify the cardinal virtues that could be valued in the ancient world. The author of this poem highlights the importance of fortitude through the words of Enkidu […]
Philosophy: Aristotle on Moral Virtue Both virtue and vice build one’s character and therefore can contribute to the view of happiness. Therefore, character education leads to happiness that is equal to the amount of wisdom and virtue.
The Confucian Ideal Person: An Introspective on Virtue and Goodness However, merely being able to relate to nature is not enough to become a truly Confucian ideal of a person; according to the postulates of the teacher, one has to reach the state of a […]
Virtue and Stoic Ethics in Criminal Justice The lack of ethical grounds for the behavior of criminal justice officials makes the application of the law unreliable. As an employee of a juvenile correctional colony, I will be guided by the principles of […]
The Importance of Values and Virtues To further illustrate this concept in a more detailed manner, I will refer to a couple of the values I follow, while depicting a situation when I have broken them.
Philosophy: Is Patriotism a Virtue? Hence, in the above context, patriotism is the feeling that arises from the concerns of the safety of the people of a nation.
Moral Virtue and Its Essence in Human Society Thus, moral virtues serve to reconcile individuals’ knowledge of right and wrong with their actions and ways of living. Therefore, moral virtues allow people to live in peace and assist each other to advance while […]
Natural Law Theory and Virtue Ethics Theory The second step in virtue ethics theory is to look at the agent of the action. Under virtue ethics theory, the action is wrong because it falls to the extreme of excess, and Jones indulges […]
Act Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics: Pros and Cons Therefore, act utilitarianism is better than virtue ethics since it is clear, concise, and focuses on the majority. Virtue ethics’ strengths can be utilized to enhance the act-utilitarianism theory.
Theories of Ethics: Virtue, Teleological and Deontological Theory In other words, the shooting might be ethically indefensible due to the lack of adherence to one’s virtues since it is the latter elements which make someone ethical or unethical.
“Virtue Ethics and Adultery” by Raja Halwani In my opinion, that in the context of marriage and adultery, there is a connection between love and sex. According to Halwani, adultery is permissible in situations where the partner does not demonstrate fidelity, including […]
Without Faith, There Can Be No True Virtue? It relates to the author of integrity and the dishonest virtue that occurs where there is no faith in God even if the qualities of an individual are the best.
Generosity as a Learned Virtue The analysis of this study is aimed at studying the perception of generosity and trying to find out if generosity can be learned or it is just an inborn character trait.
Knightly Virtue in “Sir Gawain and the Green Knight” Poem Sir Gawain and the Green Knight is an epic poem where the protagonist illustrates knightly virtues through overcoming the trials sent to him by the Green Knight.
Moral Virtue and Its Relation to Happiness Furthermore, Aristotle believed that moral virtue is the primary means to happiness and the most important of all things that are really good for people.
Leadership: Character, Competencies, and Virtues Therefore, this paper will analyze the relationship between personality and leadership and how it affects the work of other people and the company as a whole.
Ethics, Prosperity, and Society: Virtue Ethics and Utilitarianism First, due to the heated argument of the superior on duty, they might take out their anger on the trainee, in which case the trainee might be told to either resolve the issue personally or […]
Confidential Data Access: Kantian and Virtue Ethics Governmental agencies reassured the public that all the information is encrypted, but the authors of the article state that there was a place to use confidential documents.
Communication Skills and Caring Virtues in Nursing Eventually, I realized that the issue had to be addressed as a healthcare issue and consulted several resources in order to determine the medication to use as the means of keeping my memory functioning properly. […]
Virtue Ethics and Private Morality It can tentatively be characterized as an approach that emphasizes virtues and moral character, as opposed to approaches that emphasize the importance of duties and rules or the consequences of actions.
Researching the Concept of Moral Virtue As known from The Nicomachean Ethics, some teachers can be rocks that are doomed to fall, and there is no possibility of them changing that fact.
Elon Mask: Biography and Main Virtues Elon Musk believes that the more time a person has and the smaller his plan, the weaker progress he will achieve. Musk is admired for the many positive traits he brings to his work.
The Concept of Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics The essence of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is that virtue lies in between two extremes, none of which is virtuous on its own.
Global Economic Justice: The Natural Law and Virtue Ethics Theories The concept of global economic justice presupposes distribution of recourses on account of people’s needs, allowing to avoid the situation when the most significant part of the planet’s resources is concentrated in the hands of […]
Humility as a Divine Virtue of a Religious Person These words of wisdom imply that the success of learning is not to elevate a person’s ego, but rather teach them humility through enhancing their understanding of the world.
Virtue Ethics in Institutional Review Boards Virtue ethics is of the view that resolution of the challenges is dependent on the character of the people making the decisions.
Act Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics The theory greatly neglects and ignores the happiness of individual because everyone is on the run to be accepted morally to the society and tend to make individuals do what tends to make them happy.
Virtue and Its Importance in Current Realities Even though Aristotle and Confucius wrote in 300s BC and 400s BC, respectively, the topic of virtue is not archaic; on the contrary, it refers directly to modern realities. This concept reflects a fundamental attitude […]
Organizational Virtue: An Empirical Study of Customers and Employees The initial results of the study were based on the examination of the relationships between the main organizational virtues and other variables through correlation analysis.
Happiness in Arts: Happiness Through Virtue This way, the premise of the Marble statue resembles that of the portrait of Antisthenes, namely, that happiness is the greatest good and it can be attained by nurturing goodness.
Virtues of the Modern Secular State The purpose of this paper is to examine the secular virtues promoted by the state in the 21st century. Therefore, the ideas of the secular state and the Christian worldview intersect with the notion of […]
Modern Secular State and Its Main Virtues Morality is the principal condition for the emergence of the community as well as the grounds for a prosperous society regardless of the time.
MacIntyre’s After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory Nevertheless, it is possible in the case if the efforts of a secular state and the religious community are combined for finding a compromise between the governmental needs and the Biblical wisdom.
Hutcheson on Ideas of Beauty and Virtue Review As for the actual proof of its discernment, Hutcheson does not provide it in An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.
Healthcare Virtue and Values It is the dispositional aspect of character. It involves a mixture of emotion and decision made by the individual.
Ethical Virtues and Vices Thus, virtues are crucial in the lives of individuals as they lead to productive, ethical, and good behaviors. Ethical vices refer to immoral behaviors that lower the integrity of a person and society.
Virtue Ethics: One Way to Resolve an Ethical Dilemma Other members of the usability team argue that although there was a clear loophole that the external members can choose to exploit so that they can be released from the work that they need to […]
Wu Zetian and the Ideals of Feminine Virtue Overall, her actions and character provided a contrast to the behavior of women typical for imperial China, and she was equally admired and criticized.
Virtue Ethics: Kantianism and Utilitarianism Despite the strengths and theoretical significance of both approaches, the theories of Aristotle and Aquinas suggest more flexibility and breadth in ethics interpretation as compared to rule-based theories.
Character Strengths and Virtues System Views The issues addressed by this project are related to the nature, structure, degree of integrity, dependence on cultural conditions, values, as well as opportunities and ways of developing the character in the most successful way.
Aristotle’s and Socrates’ Account of Virtue This is manifested in their teachings where Aristotle speaks of virtue as finding a balance between two extremes while Socrates says that virtue is the desire for one to do well in one’s life.
Greek Manly Virtue in Epic Literature & Philosophy Thus, the manly virtue of ancient Greeks was an attribute of the male and female parts of the society that was implemented since childhood and related to the norms of ethics and aesthetics.
Desdemona as a Symbol of Christian Virtues She chooses to stay patient when the very light of her life, Othello, accuses her of being a woman of foul character and strikes her.
Plato’s “Meno”: On the Nature of Virtue In 95c, the author assumes that Sophists are also not qualified to teach virtue, due to the fact that one of the respected philosophers is quite critical about those who make some promises and believes […]
Aristotle’s – The Ethics of Virtue Ethics is not a theory of discipline since our inquiry as to what is good for human beings is not just gathering knowledge, but to be able to achieve a unique state of fulfillment in […]
Five Moral Principles of ACA vs. Seven Virtues of Christian Counseling It is clear, however, that the ACA principles advocate a higher degree of autonomy while Christian counseling suggests that the counselor should suffer from the client, not just feel for them.
Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics Analysis When faced with the option of an apple of a muffin, a good person would choose the apple, because the part of the soul that desired the muffin would be controlled by self-control, the part […]
Virtue Ethics for Dilemmas in Nursing Using this approach in the context of the dilemma in question gives a possibility to analyze the ability of the nurse to reason morally and to exercise the virtue of telling the truth.
The Virtue of Courage in Theories and Experience The teachings of the old and the wise seemed buried in the annals of yesteryears. This is courage in the truest sense of the word because it leads to many other virtues.
Plato and Socrates on the Ideal Leader’s Virtues In the context of a community, different factors contribute to the definition of this ultimate success. This is important, as people in the community will stand a chance to achieve the higher statuses that they […]
Difference Between Social Contract, Utilitarianism, Virtue and Deontology This essay gives a description of the differences in how ethical contractarianism, utilitarianism, virtue, and deontological ethics theories address ethics and morality.
Noble Cause Corruption and Virtue Ethics The answer lies in the purpose and the implied public image of the police. The role of the policeman is to uphold the law dictated by the government and the constitution of the country.
Lethal Autonomous Weapons and Virtue Theory Due to the nature of technology, people are taken out of the loop of the operation of these technologies. Due to the automation of machines and their ability to change their code to adapt to […]
Utilitarianism, Kantianism, Virtue Ethics, Egoism Quote: The amanagers of a corporation must take responsibility to fulfil their duties to their stockholders and to the public’. According to this normative theory, the utility can be described as anything that is related […]
Ethical Naturalism in Hursthouse’s “On Virtue Ethics” Thus, Hursthouse’s approach to discussing the ethically relevant aspects in the life of human beings with the focus on ethical naturalism is convincing because the philosopher assumes the difference in people who can be good […]
Oprah Winfrey’s Leadership Traits and Virtues This trait underscores the ability of a leader to create a vision on his or her intentions and communicate the same to the individuals involved in making the vision a success.
Mattel Inc.’s Ethical Framework and Virtues However, if it had incorporated the virtue of honesty in its safety and quality codes, the chances are that the product recalls would not have occurred.
Virtue Ethics, Utilitarianism, and Deontology Utilitarianism relates to the concept of value in that the quality of something which is good is measured by the value attached to it.
Ethics in Leadership: Role, Conduct and Virtues It is important to know whether the actions of leaders are right or bad. The leader must have the moral right to act and that those actions must be for the well-being of others.
Ethics: Egoism, Utilitarianism, Care and Virtue It is necessary to note that it is benign most of the time, but the issue is that such behavior may not be liked by other members of society, and it can lead to numerous […]
Virtue Meeting and Live Events Comparison The meeting being of five employees from all over the country, delivery of the context of the meeting is crucial. The next difference is on code of dressing, where in the live events, it is […]
Philosophy Terms: Justice, Happiness, Power and Virtue Socrates argues that autocratic leadership is an important structure of ensuring that the rule of law is followed and that the common good of all societal members is enhanced.
Price Gouging and Virtue: “Justice” by Michael Sandel If one summarizes the information from the book, the virtue can be defined as a somewhat vague idealistic image of the “good” of the correct way of living.
Virtue Ethics and Moral Goods for Society This essay focuses on strengths and or, weaknesses of trying to propose moral goods for a society based on human rights, universal natural law, and claims of Christian faith.
Is Virtue Ethics Dead in Modern Organizations? In fact, the environment of the global economy often contributes to the evolution of the phenomenon of CSR and the adoption of new responsibilities by the staff due to the cultures fusion.
“Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917” by Matthew Frye Jacobson In his own words, Jacobson argues that the country’s “trumpeted greatness” during the Reconstruction and World War I periods was influenced by “the dollars, the labor, and, not least, the very image, of the many […]
Socrates on Death and Virtue This is the purification that comes from the separation of the soul and body. The hindrance to the realization of the true virtue is corrupted by the body and its elements.
Utilitarian, Libertarian, Deontological, and Virtue Ethics Perspectives In deontology, morality is judged through examining the nature of the actions and the will of the individuals to do the right thing.
Business Ethics: Applying Virtue Theory On the price fixing case in question, we are not informed of the character of the major companies that engaged in this action.
Aristotle’s Definition of Virtue In particular, he writes that virtue is “a state that decides, consisting in a mean, relative to us, which is defined by reference to a reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference […]
The Knight Without Blemish and Without Reproach: The Color of Virtue Although there is no actual rhyme in the given piece, the way it is structured clearly shows that this is a poem; for instance, the line “At the head sat Bishop Baldwin as Arthur’s guest […]
Divergence Between False and True Virtue The last days of the Socrates refers to a sequence of four conversations by Plato that illustrates the demise as well as the testing of the Socrates.
Consequentialistic and Virtue Ethics Wang & Zhang notes that, “the textile industries in the Eastern countries and specifically in China have raised a lot of disputes with the Western countries”. Secondly, the production of cheap textiles by industries in […]
Healthcare Systems Marketing Elements: Sociocultural Factors, Beliefs, and Virtues of a Society In any kind of a business organization, it is very important to have good and healthy relationships with all stakeholders from the employers to employees to customers and all other parties involved in the business […]
Important Virtues in Human Life: Plato’s Protagoras and Hesiod’s Works and Days Plato and Hesiod tried to evaluate the ideas of justice in their worlds and the ways of how people prefer to use their possibilities and knowledge using the story of Prometheus; Plato focused on the […]
Aristotle’s Ideas on Civic Relationships: Happiness, the Virtues, Deliberation, Justice, and Friendship On building trust at work, employers are required to give minimum supervision to the employees in an effort to make the latter feel a sense of belonging and responsibility.
Machiavelli and a Notion of Virtue as an Innovation The character qualities that a person has are important to themselves and the people who they are in charge of. Machiavelli wrote about this a long time ago and so, many people of the modern […]
Montesquieu Practice of Virtue in Ancient Republic The virtue of balancing private and public interests in a republic can more or less be understood in the context of Aristotelian moderation.
The Virtue of Moving Forward in “A Rose for Emily” by William Faulkner The misery of those who are unable to accept the reality and to get free from the influence of the past is the main theme of William Faulkner’s short story “A Rose for Emily”, where […]
What Human Virtue Means as Explained in Plato’s Book
Euthanasia: Perspective From Theory of Personality Virtue
Using the VIA Classification to Advance a Psychological Science of Virtue
Consequentialism, Non- Consequentialism, Virtue Ethics and Care Ethics
Virtue Ethics and Its Understanding of Moral Life
The Strengths and Weaknesses of Virtue Ethics
Why the Enlightenment Project Had to Fail According to After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre
East Meets West: Universal Ethic of Virtue for Global Business
The Virtue Theory and the Ethical Issue of Climate Change
Aristotle and Virtue: How People View the Virtue of Forgiveness
Civility and Civic Virtue in Contemporary America
Difference Between Virtue Ethics, Kantian and Utilitarianism
Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue Adam Smith and the Economy of the Passions
Aristotle’s Concept and Definition of Happiness and Virtue
Utilitarianism, Deontology, and Virtue Theory
Forms, Immortal Soul, and Defining Virtue in Phaedo and Meno by Plato
Comparing Confucius’ and Aristotle’s Perspectives on Virtue
How Aristotle Understands the Human Being Through Virtue Ethics
Aristotle and Citizenship Intellectual Virtue
The Relationship Between Desire and Virtue
Courage, Virtue, and the Immortality of the Soul: According to Socrates
War Theory, Utilitarianism, and Virtue Ethics
Analyzing Preference for Virtue Ethics Theory
Aristotole’s View That Virtue Is the Ability to Know Good and Do Good
Dialogue Between Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates on Virtue and Vice in Daily Life
The Meaning and Impact of Virtue From the Perspective of Plato
Changing Attitudes Toward Virtue in Ancient Greece
Civic Virtue, the American Founding, and Federalism
Catholic Social Teachings and Virtue Ethics
Virtue: Comparing the Views of Confucius and Aristotle
Can Individual Virtue Survive Corporate Pressure
Dante and Melville: Flawed Virtue, Truth and Justice
Virtue Ethics and the Great Role Model of Folklore and Language
Virtue and the Political Thinking of Niccolo Machiavelli
Virtue Theory, Utilitarianism, and Deontological Ethics: Differences & Similarities
Ancient Greece and Changing Attitudes Regarding Virtue
Businesses Are Completely Incompatible With Virtue Ethics
Modern Human Behavior and Theory of Classical Virtue
The Philosophical and Moral Component of Virtue Ethics
Analyzing the Style and Virtue of the Declaration of Independence
Divine Command Theory, Deontology, and Virtue Ethics
The Topic Animal Rights in Society as Discussed in the Virtue Theory
Why Ethics and Virtue Are Important in Leadership
Benjamin Franklin and the Virtue of Humility
Theology Topics
Moral Development Essay Topics
Honesty Essay Ideas
Ethical Dilemma Titles
Forgiveness Essay Ideas
Tolerance Essay Ideas
Bible Questions
Moral Dilemma Paper Topics
Chicago (A-D)
Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2024, March 2). 141 Virtue Essay Topic Ideas & Examples. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/virtue-essay-topics/

"141 Virtue Essay Topic Ideas & Examples." IvyPanda , 2 Mar. 2024, ivypanda.com/essays/topic/virtue-essay-topics/.

IvyPanda . (2024) '141 Virtue Essay Topic Ideas & Examples'. 2 March.

IvyPanda . 2024. "141 Virtue Essay Topic Ideas & Examples." March 2, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/virtue-essay-topics/.

1. IvyPanda . "141 Virtue Essay Topic Ideas & Examples." March 2, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/virtue-essay-topics/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "141 Virtue Essay Topic Ideas & Examples." March 2, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/virtue-essay-topics/.

Find Your Educational Consultant
Review Our Catalogs
Catholic Resources
Catholic Teens
Making Moral Choices

Living the Virtues in Everyday Life

Leading a virtuous life sounds like something that is just for the superreligious people out there. But it is really something each one of us can aim for. God gives us the awesome gifts of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. Plus there are a ton of other virtues that we can develop on our own.

For example, there are the virtues of temperance, prudence, courage, and justice. These virtues came from classic Western philosophy (think Plato and Aristotle) and were repackaged by Church heavyweights such as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas so that they connected with the Christian faith. These four virtues are known as the cardinal virtues because they are critical to forming our moral values and guiding our behavior. In addition to the cardinal virtues, there are many other virtues that we can develop. Check out Isaiah 11:2 and Galatians 5:22-23 for more. You’ll find many places on the Internet that list virtues that are recognized in different cultures. Wikipedia’s entry on "virtue" lists 100 virtues that are commonly recognized in Western culture.

Once you’ve had a chance to look at all the different virtues out there, you begin to see that there is quite a range to choose from. Did you know that good humor is a virtue? Imagination and curiosity are also virtues. All of a sudden, leading a virtuous life might not seem half bad. Who wouldn’t want to be creative, happy, courageous, trustworthy, or focused? We might not label these things as “virtues” or make them top priority, but the fact is, most of us live the virtues every day. Even something as small as being tactful or friendly is virtuous.

The upshot is that leading a virtuous life is not just for the superreligious (if there even is such a thing). It’s for you and me and for all people who want to be true to themselves. Living the virtues helps us be real and go after our dreams. Living the virtues helps us be more aware of the people around us and help them when we can. Living the virtues helps us see the beauty in the world, especially in nature, and moves us to care for these as the precious gifts they are. Living the virtues helps us get more in tune with God.

Spend some time looking over the virtues, especially the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. Read Chapter 13 of Saint Paul’s letter to the Corinthians in which he talks about what love means in our lives. Think about the virtues that you are already living in your life and what you’d like to develop. Above all, practice random acts of virtue whenever you have the chance!

Sign in through your institution

Browse content in Arts and Humanities
Browse content in Archaeology
Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
Archaeology by Region
Archaeology of Religion
Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
Biblical Archaeology
Contemporary and Public Archaeology
Environmental Archaeology
Historical Archaeology
History and Theory of Archaeology
Industrial Archaeology
Landscape Archaeology
Mortuary Archaeology
Prehistoric Archaeology
Underwater Archaeology
Zooarchaeology
Browse content in Architecture
Architectural Structure and Design
History of Architecture
Residential and Domestic Buildings
Theory of Architecture
Browse content in Art
Art Subjects and Themes
History of Art
Industrial and Commercial Art
Theory of Art
Biographical Studies
Byzantine Studies
Browse content in Classical Studies
Classical History
Classical Philosophy
Classical Mythology
Classical Numismatics
Classical Literature
Classical Reception
Classical Art and Architecture
Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
Greek and Roman Papyrology
Greek and Roman Epigraphy
Greek and Roman Law
Greek and Roman Archaeology
Late Antiquity
Religion in the Ancient World
Social History
Digital Humanities
Browse content in History
Colonialism and Imperialism
Diplomatic History
Environmental History
Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
Historical Geography
History by Period
History of Emotions
History of Agriculture
History of Education
History of Gender and Sexuality
Industrial History
Intellectual History
International History
Labour History
Legal and Constitutional History
Local and Family History
Maritime History
Military History
National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
Oral History
Political History
Public History
Regional and National History
Revolutions and Rebellions
Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
Social and Cultural History
Theory, Methods, and Historiography
Urban History
World History
Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
Language Learning (Specific Skills)
Language Teaching Theory and Methods
Browse content in Linguistics
Applied Linguistics
Cognitive Linguistics
Computational Linguistics
Forensic Linguistics
Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
History of English
Language Evolution
Language Reference
Language Acquisition
Language Variation
Language Families
Lexicography
Linguistic Anthropology
Linguistic Theories
Linguistic Typology
Phonetics and Phonology
Psycholinguistics
Sociolinguistics
Translation and Interpretation
Writing Systems
Browse content in Literature
Bibliography
Children's Literature Studies
Literary Studies (Romanticism)
Literary Studies (American)
Literary Studies (Asian)
Literary Studies (European)
Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
Literary Studies (Modernism)
Literary Studies - World
Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
Literary Studies (19th Century)
Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
Literary Studies (African American Literature)
Literary Studies (British and Irish)
Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
Literary Studies (History of the Book)
Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
Literary Studies (War Literature)
Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
Mythology and Folklore
Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
Browse content in Media Studies
Browse content in Music
Applied Music
Dance and Music
Ethics in Music
Ethnomusicology
Gender and Sexuality in Music
Medicine and Music
Music Cultures
Music and Media
Music and Religion
Music and Culture
Music Education and Pedagogy
Music Theory and Analysis
Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
Musicology and Music History
Performance Practice and Studies
Race and Ethnicity in Music
Sound Studies
Browse content in Performing Arts
Browse content in Philosophy
Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
Epistemology
Feminist Philosophy
History of Western Philosophy
Metaphysics
Moral Philosophy
Non-Western Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Perception
Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Law
Philosophy of Religion
Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
Practical Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
Browse content in Religion
Biblical Studies
Christianity
East Asian Religions
History of Religion
Judaism and Jewish Studies
Qumran Studies
Religion and Education
Religion and Health
Religion and Politics
Religion and Science
Religion and Law
Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
Religious Studies
Browse content in Society and Culture
Cookery, Food, and Drink
Cultural Studies
Customs and Traditions
Ethical Issues and Debates
Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
Sports and Outdoor Recreation
Technology and Society
Travel and Holiday
Visual Culture
Browse content in Law
Arbitration
Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
Commercial Law
Company Law
Browse content in Comparative Law
Systems of Law
Competition Law
Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
Government Powers
Judicial Review
Local Government Law
Military and Defence Law
Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
Construction Law
Contract Law
Browse content in Criminal Law
Criminal Procedure
Criminal Evidence Law
Sentencing and Punishment
Employment and Labour Law
Environment and Energy Law
Browse content in Financial Law
Banking Law
Insolvency Law
History of Law
Human Rights and Immigration
Intellectual Property Law
Browse content in International Law
Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
Public International Law
IT and Communications Law
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
Law and Politics
Law and Society
Browse content in Legal System and Practice
Courts and Procedure
Legal Skills and Practice
Legal System - Costs and Funding
Primary Sources of Law
Regulation of Legal Profession
Medical and Healthcare Law
Browse content in Policing
Criminal Investigation and Detection
Police and Security Services
Police Procedure and Law
Police Regional Planning
Browse content in Property Law
Personal Property Law
Restitution
Study and Revision
Terrorism and National Security Law
Browse content in Trusts Law
Wills and Probate or Succession
Browse content in Medicine and Health
Browse content in Allied Health Professions
Arts Therapies
Clinical Science
Dietetics and Nutrition
Occupational Therapy
Operating Department Practice
Physiotherapy
Radiography
Speech and Language Therapy
Browse content in Anaesthetics
General Anaesthesia
Clinical Neuroscience
Browse content in Clinical Medicine
Acute Medicine
Cardiovascular Medicine
Clinical Genetics
Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
Dermatology
Endocrinology and Diabetes
Gastroenterology
Genito-urinary Medicine
Geriatric Medicine
Infectious Diseases
Medical Toxicology
Medical Oncology
Pain Medicine
Palliative Medicine
Rehabilitation Medicine
Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
Rheumatology
Sleep Medicine
Sports and Exercise Medicine
Community Medical Services
Critical Care
Emergency Medicine
Forensic Medicine
Haematology
History of Medicine
Browse content in Medical Skills
Clinical Skills
Communication Skills
Nursing Skills
Surgical Skills
Browse content in Medical Dentistry
Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
Paediatric Dentistry
Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
Surgical Dentistry
Medical Ethics
Medical Statistics and Methodology
Browse content in Neurology
Clinical Neurophysiology
Neuropathology
Nursing Studies
Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
Gynaecology
Occupational Medicine
Ophthalmology
Otolaryngology (ENT)
Browse content in Paediatrics
Neonatology
Browse content in Pathology
Chemical Pathology
Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
Histopathology
Medical Microbiology and Virology
Patient Education and Information
Browse content in Pharmacology
Psychopharmacology
Browse content in Popular Health
Caring for Others
Complementary and Alternative Medicine
Self-help and Personal Development
Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
Cell Biology
Molecular Biology and Genetics
Reproduction, Growth and Development
Primary Care
Professional Development in Medicine
Browse content in Psychiatry
Addiction Medicine
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
Forensic Psychiatry
Learning Disabilities
Old Age Psychiatry
Psychotherapy
Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
Epidemiology
Public Health
Browse content in Radiology
Clinical Radiology
Interventional Radiology
Nuclear Medicine
Radiation Oncology
Reproductive Medicine
Browse content in Surgery
Cardiothoracic Surgery
Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
General Surgery
Neurosurgery
Paediatric Surgery
Peri-operative Care
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
Surgical Oncology
Transplant Surgery
Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
Vascular Surgery
Browse content in Science and Mathematics
Browse content in Biological Sciences
Aquatic Biology
Biochemistry
Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
Developmental Biology
Ecology and Conservation
Evolutionary Biology
Genetics and Genomics
Microbiology
Molecular and Cell Biology
Natural History
Plant Sciences and Forestry
Research Methods in Life Sciences
Structural Biology
Systems Biology
Zoology and Animal Sciences
Browse content in Chemistry
Analytical Chemistry
Computational Chemistry
Crystallography
Environmental Chemistry
Industrial Chemistry
Inorganic Chemistry
Materials Chemistry
Medicinal Chemistry
Mineralogy and Gems
Organic Chemistry
Physical Chemistry
Polymer Chemistry
Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
Theoretical Chemistry
Browse content in Computer Science
Artificial Intelligence
Computer Architecture and Logic Design
Game Studies
Human-Computer Interaction
Mathematical Theory of Computation
Programming Languages
Software Engineering
Systems Analysis and Design
Virtual Reality
Browse content in Computing
Business Applications
Computer Security
Computer Games
Computer Networking and Communications
Digital Lifestyle
Graphical and Digital Media Applications
Operating Systems
Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
Atmospheric Sciences
Environmental Geography
Geology and the Lithosphere
Maps and Map-making
Meteorology and Climatology
Oceanography and Hydrology
Palaeontology
Physical Geography and Topography
Regional Geography
Soil Science
Urban Geography
Browse content in Engineering and Technology
Agriculture and Farming
Biological Engineering
Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
Electronics and Communications Engineering
Energy Technology
Engineering (General)
Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
History of Engineering and Technology
Mechanical Engineering and Materials
Technology of Industrial Chemistry
Transport Technology and Trades
Browse content in Environmental Science
Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
Environmental Sustainability
Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
History of Science and Technology
Browse content in Materials Science
Ceramics and Glasses
Composite Materials
Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
Nanotechnology
Browse content in Mathematics
Applied Mathematics
Biomathematics and Statistics
History of Mathematics
Mathematical Education
Mathematical Finance
Mathematical Analysis
Numerical and Computational Mathematics
Probability and Statistics
Pure Mathematics
Browse content in Neuroscience
Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
Development of the Nervous System
Disorders of the Nervous System
History of Neuroscience
Invertebrate Neurobiology
Molecular and Cellular Systems
Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
Neuroscientific Techniques
Sensory and Motor Systems
Browse content in Physics
Astronomy and Astrophysics
Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
Biological and Medical Physics
Classical Mechanics
Computational Physics
Condensed Matter Physics
Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
History of Physics
Mathematical and Statistical Physics
Measurement Science
Nuclear Physics
Particles and Fields
Plasma Physics
Quantum Physics
Relativity and Gravitation
Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
Browse content in Psychology
Affective Sciences
Clinical Psychology
Cognitive Psychology
Cognitive Neuroscience
Criminal and Forensic Psychology
Developmental Psychology
Educational Psychology
Evolutionary Psychology
Health Psychology
History and Systems in Psychology
Music Psychology
Neuropsychology
Organizational Psychology
Psychological Assessment and Testing
Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
Psychology Professional Development and Training
Research Methods in Psychology
Social Psychology
Browse content in Social Sciences
Browse content in Anthropology
Anthropology of Religion
Human Evolution
Medical Anthropology
Physical Anthropology
Regional Anthropology
Social and Cultural Anthropology
Theory and Practice of Anthropology
Browse content in Business and Management
Business Ethics
Business Strategy
Business History
Business and Technology
Business and Government
Business and the Environment
Comparative Management
Corporate Governance
Corporate Social Responsibility
Entrepreneurship
Health Management
Human Resource Management
Industrial and Employment Relations
Industry Studies
Information and Communication Technologies
International Business
Knowledge Management
Management and Management Techniques
Operations Management
Organizational Theory and Behaviour
Pensions and Pension Management
Public and Nonprofit Management
Social Issues in Business and Management
Strategic Management
Supply Chain Management
Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
Criminal Justice
Criminology
Forms of Crime
International and Comparative Criminology
Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
Development Studies
Browse content in Economics
Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
Asian Economics
Behavioural Finance
Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
Economic History
Economic Systems
Economic Methodology
Economic Development and Growth
Financial Markets
Financial Institutions and Services
General Economics and Teaching
Health, Education, and Welfare
History of Economic Thought
International Economics
Labour and Demographic Economics
Law and Economics
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
Microeconomics
Public Economics
Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
Welfare Economics
Browse content in Education
Adult Education and Continuous Learning
Care and Counselling of Students
Early Childhood and Elementary Education
Educational Equipment and Technology
Educational Strategies and Policy
Higher and Further Education
Organization and Management of Education
Philosophy and Theory of Education
Schools Studies
Secondary Education
Teaching of a Specific Subject
Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
Teaching Skills and Techniques
Browse content in Environment
Applied Ecology (Social Science)
Climate Change
Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
Management of Land and Natural Resources (Social Science)
Natural Disasters (Environment)
Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Social Science)
Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
Sustainability
Browse content in Human Geography
Cultural Geography
Economic Geography
Political Geography
Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
Communication Studies
Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
Browse content in Politics
African Politics
Asian Politics
Chinese Politics
Comparative Politics
Conflict Politics
Elections and Electoral Studies
Environmental Politics
Ethnic Politics
European Union
Foreign Policy
Gender and Politics
Human Rights and Politics
Indian Politics
International Relations
International Organization (Politics)
Irish Politics
Latin American Politics
Middle Eastern Politics
Political Behaviour
Political Economy
Political Institutions
Political Methodology
Political Communication
Political Philosophy
Political Sociology
Political Theory
Politics and Law
Politics of Development
Public Policy
Public Administration
Qualitative Political Methodology
Quantitative Political Methodology
Regional Political Studies
Russian Politics
Security Studies
State and Local Government
UK Politics
US Politics
Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
African Studies
Asian Studies
East Asian Studies
Japanese Studies
Latin American Studies
Middle Eastern Studies
Native American Studies
Scottish Studies
Browse content in Research and Information
Research Methods
Browse content in Social Work
Addictions and Substance Misuse
Adoption and Fostering
Care of the Elderly
Child and Adolescent Social Work
Couple and Family Social Work
Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
Emergency Services
Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
International and Global Issues in Social Work
Mental and Behavioural Health
Social Justice and Human Rights
Social Policy and Advocacy
Social Work and Crime and Justice
Social Work Macro Practice
Social Work Practice Settings
Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
Welfare and Benefit Systems
Browse content in Sociology
Childhood Studies
Community Development
Comparative and Historical Sociology
Disability Studies
Economic Sociology
Gender and Sexuality
Gerontology and Ageing
Health, Illness, and Medicine
Marriage and the Family
Migration Studies
Occupations, Professions, and Work
Organizations
Population and Demography
Race and Ethnicity
Social Theory
Social Movements and Social Change
Social Research and Statistics
Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
Sociology of Religion
Sociology of Education
Sport and Leisure
Urban and Rural Studies
Browse content in Warfare and Defence
Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
Land Forces and Warfare
Military Administration
Military Life and Institutions
Naval Forces and Warfare
Other Warfare and Defence Issues
Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
Weapons and Equipment

Virtues and Vices: and other essays in moral philosophy

Cite Icon Cite
Permissions Icon Permissions

This collection of essays, written between 1957 and 1977, contains discussions of the moral philosophy of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and some modern philosophers. It presents virtues and vices rather than rights and duties as the central concepts in moral philosophy. Throughout, the author rejects contemporary anti‐ naturalistic moral philosophies such as emotivism and prescriptivism, but defends the view that moral judgements may be hypothetical rather than (as Kant thought) categorical imperatives. The author also applies her moral philosophy to the current debates on euthanasia and abortion, the latter discussed in relation to the doctrine of the double effect. She argues against the suggestion, on the part of A. J. Ayer and others, that free will actually requires determinism. In a final essay, she asks whether the concept of moral approval can be understood except against a particular background of social practices.

Personal account

Sign in with email/username & password
Get email alerts
Save searches
Purchase content
Activate your purchase/trial code
Add your ORCID iD

Institutional access

Sign in with username/password
Recommend to your librarian
Institutional account management
Get help with access

Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:

IP based access

Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.

Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institutionâ€™s website and Oxford Academic.

Click Sign in through your institution.
Select your institution from the list provided, which will take you to your institution's website to sign in.
When on the institution site, please use the credentials provided by your institution. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.
Following successful sign in, you will be returned to Oxford Academic.

If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institutionâ€™s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.

Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.

Society Members

Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:

Sign in through society site

Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see â€˜Sign in through society siteâ€™ in the sign in pane within a journal:

Click Sign in through society site.
When on the society site, please use the credentials provided by that society. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.

If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.

Sign in using a personal account

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.

A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.

Viewing your signed in accounts

Click the account icon in the top right to:

View your signed in personal account and access account management features.
View the institutional accounts that are providing access.

Signed in but can't access content

Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.

For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.

Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.

Month:	Total Views:
October 2022	18
October 2022	17
October 2022	14
October 2022	7
October 2022	1
October 2022	133
October 2022	141
October 2022	8
October 2022	11
October 2022	26
October 2022	20
October 2022	4
October 2022	1
October 2022	3
October 2022	2
October 2022	5
October 2022	5
October 2022	3
October 2022	3
October 2022	5
October 2022	1
November 2022	103
November 2022	125
November 2022	3
November 2022	1
November 2022	2
November 2022	1
November 2022	11
November 2022	6
November 2022	6
November 2022	2
November 2022	15
November 2022	4
November 2022	4
November 2022	3
November 2022	7
November 2022	2
November 2022	19
December 2022	17
December 2022	1
December 2022	1
December 2022	9
December 2022	87
December 2022	6
December 2022	6
December 2022	2
December 2022	3
December 2022	38
December 2022	8
December 2022	1
December 2022	4
December 2022	5
December 2022	6
January 2023	3
January 2023	54
January 2023	13
January 2023	5
January 2023	3
January 2023	9
January 2023	18
January 2023	8
January 2023	146
January 2023	2
January 2023	2
January 2023	20
January 2023	3
January 2023	2
January 2023	22
January 2023	2
January 2023	8
January 2023	6
January 2023	5
January 2023	14
January 2023	4
February 2023	17
February 2023	8
February 2023	5
February 2023	1
February 2023	2
February 2023	17
February 2023	170
February 2023	16
February 2023	60
February 2023	2
February 2023	118
February 2023	10
February 2023	5
February 2023	9
February 2023	6
February 2023	6
March 2023	10
March 2023	3
March 2023	285
March 2023	15
March 2023	11
March 2023	7
March 2023	32
March 2023	16
March 2023	7
March 2023	10
March 2023	8
March 2023	1
March 2023	5
March 2023	59
March 2023	1
March 2023	186
March 2023	24
March 2023	25
March 2023	11
March 2023	1
April 2023	10
April 2023	2
April 2023	153
April 2023	28
April 2023	3
April 2023	2
April 2023	16
April 2023	6
April 2023	6
April 2023	12
April 2023	2
April 2023	15
April 2023	8
April 2023	190
April 2023	2
April 2023	12
April 2023	27
April 2023	6
April 2023	3
April 2023	8
May 2023	7
May 2023	111
May 2023	12
May 2023	16
May 2023	2
May 2023	5
May 2023	26
May 2023	9
May 2023	2
May 2023	1
May 2023	6
May 2023	25
May 2023	5
May 2023	2
May 2023	2
May 2023	11
May 2023	16
May 2023	135
May 2023	6
May 2023	1
June 2023	9
June 2023	8
June 2023	10
June 2023	8
June 2023	7
June 2023	7
June 2023	15
June 2023	8
June 2023	7
June 2023	28
June 2023	7
June 2023	9
June 2023	10
June 2023	11
June 2023	7
June 2023	8
June 2023	4
June 2023	7
June 2023	9
June 2023	7
June 2023	52
July 2023	10
July 2023	4
July 2023	11
July 2023	9
July 2023	5
July 2023	5
July 2023	7
July 2023	4
July 2023	13
July 2023	77
July 2023	5
July 2023	5
July 2023	4
July 2023	7
July 2023	4
July 2023	5
July 2023	18
July 2023	4
July 2023	10
August 2023	8
August 2023	6
August 2023	4
August 2023	7
August 2023	7
August 2023	1
August 2023	6
August 2023	3
August 2023	34
August 2023	2
August 2023	35
August 2023	2
August 2023	15
August 2023	9
August 2023	1
August 2023	1
August 2023	4
August 2023	1
September 2023	1
September 2023	5
September 2023	3
September 2023	3
September 2023	1
September 2023	3
September 2023	7
September 2023	144
September 2023	13
September 2023	3
September 2023	1
September 2023	29
September 2023	4
September 2023	1
September 2023	2
September 2023	1
September 2023	1
October 2023	25
October 2023	3
October 2023	9
October 2023	8
October 2023	1
October 2023	2
October 2023	9
October 2023	17
October 2023	9
October 2023	6
October 2023	7
October 2023	3
October 2023	34
October 2023	27
October 2023	10
October 2023	234
October 2023	6
October 2023	8
October 2023	9
October 2023	123
November 2023	1
November 2023	4
November 2023	132
November 2023	14
November 2023	6
November 2023	9
November 2023	19
November 2023	10
November 2023	5
November 2023	14
November 2023	22
November 2023	5
November 2023	136
November 2023	5
November 2023	1
November 2023	14
November 2023	9
November 2023	12
November 2023	2
November 2023	6
November 2023	14
December 2023	7
December 2023	12
December 2023	11
December 2023	3
December 2023	9
December 2023	8
December 2023	5
December 2023	3
December 2023	48
December 2023	91
December 2023	2
December 2023	3
December 2023	2
December 2023	3
December 2023	3
January 2024	19
January 2024	6
January 2024	15
January 2024	9
January 2024	10
January 2024	2
January 2024	9
January 2024	49
January 2024	15
January 2024	4
January 2024	8
January 2024	4
January 2024	1
January 2024	6
January 2024	120
February 2024	24
February 2024	5
February 2024	1
February 2024	18
February 2024	33
February 2024	14
February 2024	4
February 2024	37
February 2024	6
February 2024	13
February 2024	4
February 2024	308
February 2024	5
February 2024	10
February 2024	72
February 2024	12
February 2024	4
February 2024	168
February 2024	6
February 2024	11
February 2024	8
March 2024	26
March 2024	12
March 2024	48
March 2024	17
March 2024	343
March 2024	12
March 2024	6
March 2024	8
March 2024	8
March 2024	6
March 2024	12
March 2024	2
March 2024	42
March 2024	7
March 2024	6
March 2024	9
March 2024	6
March 2024	194
March 2024	10
March 2024	10
March 2024	9
April 2024	150
April 2024	2
April 2024	15
April 2024	13
April 2024	2
April 2024	18
April 2024	35
April 2024	13
April 2024	2
April 2024	15
April 2024	12
April 2024	9
April 2024	62
April 2024	30
April 2024	88
April 2024	11
April 2024	15
April 2024	9
April 2024	3
April 2024	1
May 2024	6
May 2024	7
May 2024	11
May 2024	1
May 2024	1
May 2024	230
May 2024	2
May 2024	22
May 2024	22
May 2024	12
May 2024	1
May 2024	28
May 2024	146
May 2024	2
May 2024	7
May 2024	3
May 2024	6
May 2024	9
June 2024	6
June 2024	1
June 2024	15
June 2024	4
June 2024	10
June 2024	5
June 2024	107
June 2024	8
June 2024	1
June 2024	11
June 2024	4
June 2024	10
June 2024	7
June 2024	4
June 2024	7
June 2024	6
June 2024	17
June 2024	2
June 2024	74
June 2024	5
June 2024	4
July 2024	8
July 2024	9
July 2024	2
July 2024	13
July 2024	15
July 2024	13
July 2024	44
July 2024	5
July 2024	4
July 2024	16
July 2024	6
July 2024	3
July 2024	3
July 2024	7
July 2024	7
July 2024	9
July 2024	2
July 2024	12
July 2024	72
July 2024	2
July 2024	1
August 2024	4
August 2024	4
August 2024	5
August 2024	3
August 2024	45
August 2024	4
August 2024	5
August 2024	6
August 2024	108
August 2024	4
August 2024	5
August 2024	8
August 2024	6
August 2024	10
August 2024	15
August 2024	2
August 2024	8
August 2024	3
August 2024	14
September 2024	1
September 2024	13
September 2024	1
September 2024	2
September 2024	3
September 2024	13
September 2024	1

About Oxford Academic
Publish journals with us
University press partners
What we publish
New features
Open access
Rights and permissions
Accessibility
Advertising
Media enquiries
Oxford University Press
Oxford Languages
University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

Cookie settings
Cookie policy
Privacy policy
Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

Here is your short essay on ‘Virtues’

What is virtue.

Virtue is the habit of doing moral good. It is also the habit of abstaining from doing moral evil. In this way virtue is an indication of good character.

Image Source: shannonmcfadden.files.wordpress.com

According to Aristotle, “Virtue is a permanent state of mind, formed with the concurrence of the will and based upon an ideal of what is best in actual life, an ideal fixed by reason.” In this way, virtue is an acquired quality. It is an acquired disposition, the quality of obeying moral law. The nature of virtue will become even more evident from an analysis of the relations it bears to duty, character, habit and value.

Virtue and duty:

Virtue is created by the habit of fulfilling duty. A person given to uninterrupted fulfilment of duty has a sterling character and the virtue of duty fulfilment Thus the fulfilment of duty is intimately related to virtue but the difference between duty and virtue should not be forgotten on this account Duty implies external activity and is a part of conduct Virtue implies internal excellence, being a quality of character. In brief, duty is the external manifestation of virtue, the latter being the internal aspect of duty. The existence of one proves the existence of the other.

Virtue and Character:

It is evident from the above exposition that virtue and character are intimately related. Virtue indicates good character as vice is a sign of bad character. Virtue is the superiority of character, vice its defect a virtuous person endeavours for the development and manifestation of the complete self and controuls the baser passions. A person in vice is the slave of base passions and he does not distinguish between moral and immoral. Thus, virtue is as much a quality of character as vice is its defect Virtue and habit

Moral activities come from virtue but if an individual has done some good activity he cannot be called virtuous on the strength of it actually virtue is die habit of doing good work. In the words of Aristotle, Virtue is “a state apt to exercise deliberate choice being in the relative mean, determined by reason and as die man of practical wisdom would determine it the morality of an action depends upon the goodness of its will. The habit of such good volition is virtue. Virtue is the adoption of the Golden mean

Aristotle treats virtue as the habit of choosing the mean or middle path. According to him, a prudent act is moral. Excess is invariably bad. Intelligent people always adopt the golden mean in respect of any and everything. This habit in choice is virtue.

In this way, the virtuous person adopts the middle path in personal as well as social conduct for example he is neither a coward nor a rash man who invites dangers, he is instead brave and enterprising. He neither runs from difficulties nor wilfully creates them, but faces them adamantly. In this way a virtuous person is neither extravagant nor stringent.

He is liberal and he also conducts himself in a manner befitting his nature. This mean is right everyone but mean for everyone will be different proportionate to his capability. For example, bravery on the part of soldier may be mischief for an ordinary citizen.

In a general way, Aristotle’s theory is a supremely practical theory but it cannot be applied in all circumstances. Muirhead has said quite correctly, “Moderation in all things may be as much of a vice as immoderation in one and all.”

Virtue is knowledge :

Virtue is knowledge, at least for Socrates it is so. This statement means that most immoral activities are the result of ignorance. If some person possesses the knowledge of good he will not stop to evil doings. Thus it is as natural for a good work to take shape when there is knowledge as it is for it to take shape when there is virtue.

Thus knowledge is actually virtue. Ignorance is vice. No person consciously commits crimes. At the base of every bad work there is some ignorance. Plato, too has supported the opinion of Socrates. And many Indian thinkers have presented similar opinions.

Virtue is also a habit:

But, in actual fact a man cannot be virtuous by mere knowledge as long as he is not in the habit of performing good activities, and habit does not necessarily result from mere knowledge. Here, some people can say that if some person indulges in immoral deed even while understanding good then it means that some part of his personality is still ignorant but the use of such language is an indication of the ignorance of human psychology.

Besides the power of comprehension man has affective and volitional aspects too. This volitional aspect is often beyond the control of man’s intellectual aspect one has to inculcate the habit of controlling it this habit is virtue. Knowledge is, not action without which there can be no question of morality.

Thus, it is necessary for virtue that knowledge be converted into action. Accordingly, Mackenzie was correct in asserting that, “Virtue is a kind of knowledge as well as a kind of habit.” Actually, ethics implies that a man is capable of both good and bad, and is responsible for both. To believe that bad activities originate in ignorance is to relieve man of his responsibility in respect of them. Thus Socratic opinion is partially true.

Virtue and Happiness:

Some ethical philosophers have treated happiness as invariably conjoined to virtue. Happiness is a state of harmony of reason and sentience. Integral self realisation produces happiness. In this way, a virtuous person gets happiness inevitably. He finds happiness in doing good work and abstains from bad work.

Thus, a life of virtue is a life of happiness. Aristotle has unflinchingly supported this opinion. According to him happiness is the result of a proper use of reason. Thus, a rational person is always happy. It should here be noted that virtue itself is not happiness nor happiness itself a virtue. Happiness is an indication of virtue.

No one can doubt the intimate relation between happiness and virtue but virtue alone is not enough for happiness. May be in a lesser degree, but happiness does depend upon good results besides good volitions. As Aristotle rightly maintains, happiness necessitates too the external instruments along with virtue.

Actually, happiness is an indication of self realisation. The higher the self realisation the more will be the happiness. But self realisation is in as much need of external successes and good results as it is of virtue.

Virtue and value:

Virtue is intrinsic value. Virtues are needed for the achievement of values. In this way, virtue and value are intimately related but this is no reason for forgetting the differences between value and virtue. Value certainly requires virtue. But values are instrumental too. Virtues are subjective but values are objective also.

Virtue and Society:

Virtue is relative to time and place :

Virtues keep on changing according to traditions and customs. Thus virtues are relative to time and space. For example, in medieval Rajasthan emphasis was placed upon virile virtues. Today more emphasis is directed to non-violence, sacrifices, love, etc., or the sublime virtues.

Virtues are relative to a person’s status and role:

Different people in society occupy different status and they have different roles to concur to their respective status. Virtues are relative not only to time and place but they also change with the status and roles of person.

In this way, in society different people, men, women, young, old, rich, poor, etc., exhibit some difference in qualities, however slight As with duties of an individual which are determined by his status and role in society, so with virtues which also are determined by his status and role in society.

Ethos of Society:

It would be in keeping with the context of society and virtue to delineate upon the ethos of society. Ethos or conduct includes customs, dogmas, conventions etc. In this way every society has an ethos on the basis of which the life of that society proceeds. This conduct is the morality of the individuals in society.

Broadly has been very emphatic on this notion. According to him, an individual’s dutifulness is evinced by his concurring with the conduct of society, and in it his morality. An individual’s virtues are determined by the laws of society, institutions, ideals, patterns of conduct, dogmas and traditions, etc. All these taken together comprise the ethos of society. Bradley has gone to the extent of saying that it is immoral to pursue a moral level above the ethos of society.

But this opinion of Bradley’s places excessive emphasis upon the social aspect of ethics and virtue, besides the social aspect, ethics also has an individual aspect which is more important than the social. It is, of course, correct that every individual should attain the moral level of the ethos of his society but it would be even better to transcend that level. Secondly, the ethos of society is 110 permanent notion. It keeps on changing and the moral thinking of individuals is important addition to its change.

Related Essays:

Short Essay on the Concept of Technological Gap and Trade in International Trade
3 Important Steps You Must Follow While Preparing Your Speech
Useful Notes on Classification of Law (According to Holland)
What are the Subject-matters of a Valid Wakf?

Privacy Overview

Cookie	Duration	Description
cookielawinfo-checkbox-analytics	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Analytics".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-functional	11 months	The cookie is set by GDPR cookie consent to record the user consent for the cookies in the category "Functional".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-necessary	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookies is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Necessary".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-others	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Other.
cookielawinfo-checkbox-performance	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Performance".
viewed_cookie_policy	11 months	The cookie is set by the GDPR Cookie Consent plugin and is used to store whether or not user has consented to the use of cookies. It does not store any personal data.

IMAGES

The Virtuous Life Importance
Virtues in Social Life Essay Example
80 List of Virtues to Help You Live Your Best Life
Aristotle's Philosophy of Virtue Formation Free Essay Example
why are virtues require for good life. in essay..,
Virtues and Values

VIDEO

10 Lines on Good Values || Essay on Good Values in English || Good Values Essay Writing
Virtue: Virtue George Herbert
10 Lines Essay on Moral Values//English Essay/Moral Values
STOIC PHILOSOPHY
Zodiac's Comfort Foods #shorts #zodiac
The Zodiac's Social Butterflies #shorts #zodiac

COMMENTS

The Virtuous Life Importance
The Virtuous Life Importance Essay. Aristotle tells us the highest human good must meet the following two criteria: it is complete, meaning it is desirable solely for its own sake, and it is self-sufficient, meaning it lacks nothing. Among the suggestions he considers for what might be the highest good, including wealth, honor, and pleasure ...
The 12 Virtues: What Are They And Why Do They Matter ...
Courage. "Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage.". - Anais Nin. Related qualities: boldness, fearlessness, decisiveness, leadership, assertiveness, confidence, magnanimity. Courage says: "The consequences of this action might be painful for me, but it's the right thing to do. I'll do it.".
Courage as an Important Virtue in Life Essay
Courage is an essential virtue that is traditionally sought after and lauded as a crucial quality. Described by Maya Angelou as the most important of all the virtues because without courage you can't practice any other virtue consistently", it is composed of different types, including physical courage, moral courage, social courage, spiritual courage, emotional courage, and intellectual ...
My Personal Values in Life: [Essay Example], 773 words
Body Paragraph 1: Personal Value 1. One of my core values is respect. I define respect as treating others with dignity, kindness, and consideration, regardless of their background or beliefs. I learned the importance of respect from my parents, who instilled this value in me from a young age. In college, I have practiced respect by listening ...
The Importance of Virtue Ethics: [Essay Example], 656 words
Ethics, virtue ethics is a prominent and influential approach that focuses on the moral character of individuals and the virtues they embody. Unlike other ethical theories that prioritize rules, consequences, or duties, virtue ethics emphasizes the development of virtuous traits and the cultivation of moral excellence. This essay will explore the significance of virtue ethics in contemporary ...
The Importance of Values and Virtues
The importance of values can be defined by the role they play in one's life. They represent realistic goals that help a person navigate through their life. Moreover, values assist people in differentiating right from wrong and help them make ethical decisions. In the two aforementioned situations, I successfully followed my two values ...
Courage as One of the Most Important Virtues
This essay offers a heartfelt exploration of courage through personal experiences, reflections, and famous quotes. The writer provides a solid definition of courage and its multifaceted manifestations. ... Relevance of Virtue Among Other Goods in Life Essay "Wealth does not bring about excellence (virtue), but excellence (virtue) makes wealth ...
Modern Moral Philosophy and the Virtues
Also provides an introduction to virtue ethics. The following topics are discussed: the ancient roots of virtue ethics; the nature of virtue ethics; the good of the virtuous agent; the demandingness of morality; universality tradition, and practice; community and gender; practical reason, moral knowledge, and moral education.
Aristotle's Ethics
He vindicates the centrality of virtue in a well-lived life by showing that in the normal course of things a virtuous person will not live a life devoid of friends, honor, wealth, pleasure, and the like. ... John P. & Anthony Preus (eds.), 1991, Aristotle's Ethics: Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 5, Albany, NY: The State University ...
Virtue: Ethics and Virtuous Life Free Essay Example
Essay, Pages 8 (1921 words) Views. 2695. Virtue is the key to a meaningful and happy life. According to ancient philosophers, Socrates and Aristotle, developing virtue is vital in order to lead a successful, fulfilling life. Though both men differ in their interpretations of a "good life," they both agree that the supreme life is one of ...
Dominic Andres ('24) on Imitation in the Moral Life
"Role models make understandable, achievable, and desirable virtues which were previously obscure, difficult, and unpleasant." Intrigued by his treatment of imitation in art and virtue, "The Virtuous Life" host Patricia Oedy-Murray inquired about all aspects of the essay and asked Mr. Andres to delve deeper into many of the ideas presented.
10 Examples of Virtues and Traits That Shape Integrity
Acting with courage in the face of adversity. Exercising patience during trying times. Showing kindness to those around us. virtues enrich our lives and the lives of others. This conversation is more than just academic; it's about taking those steps to become the best version of ourselves.
How to Achieve a Good Life?
To achieve good life based on observance of moral principles demands strict observance and application of ethics in everything. Complete observance of ethics yields virtues that make life good in any community. The goodness of a person cannot result from material wealth, but it emerges from the good moral qualities that one has achieved in life ...
Moral Virtues and Character Strengths Across the Life Span
Peterson and Seligman's classification of positive values into six moral virtues ( wisdom, courage, justice, humanity, temperance, and transcendence) and 24 character strengths (distributed ...
What is virtue and why does it matter?
Virtues are habits, or stable character traits. An honest man is one who tells the truth reliably, not just every now and again. And that means that he: (1) knows the value and importance of honesty; (2) tells the truth easily in a wide range of circumstances and finds it difficult to lie; and (3) is pleased by being honest and pained by the ...
How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues
Abstract. Contains 14 specially commissioned papers on aspects of virtue ethics, and a substantial introduction that also serves as an introduction to virtue ethics. Topics covered include the practical application of the theory, ancient views, partiality, Kant, utilitarianism, human nature, natural and artificial virtues, virtues and the good ...
Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons
According to the editors, Noell Birondo and S. Stewart Braun, The main aims of this book are . . . to foster a greater appreciation for the multiplicity of reasons surrounding the concept of the virtues and to shed light on what is presumably the paradigm case, of an individual agent responding to an array of potential reasons, often in diverse circumstances and contexts.
Essay on Values for Students and Children
500+ Words Essay on Values. Values are the positive teachings provided to help us and tread the right path in life. Every parent wants his child to imbibe these. These can even be referred to as good qualities. A person who imbibes good values grows on to become a responsible individual and he is capable of demarcating right and wrong.
141 Virtue Essay Topic Ideas & Examples
Act Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics: Pros and Cons. Therefore, act utilitarianism is better than virtue ethics since it is clear, concise, and focuses on the majority. Virtue ethics' strengths can be utilized to enhance the act-utilitarianism theory. The Confucian Ideal Person: An Introspective on Virtue and Goodness.
Living the Virtues in Everyday Life
Living the virtues helps us be more aware of the people around us and help them when we can. Living the virtues helps us see the beauty in the world, especially in nature, and moves us to care for these as the precious gifts they are. Living the virtues helps us get more in tune with God. Spend some time looking over the virtues, especially the ...
Virtues and Vices: and other essays in moral philosophy
This collection of essays, written between 1957 and 1977, contains discussions of the moral philosophy of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and some modern philosophers. It presents virtues and vices rather than rights and duties as the central concepts in moral philosophy. Throughout, the author rejects contemporary anti ...
Here is your short essay on 'Virtues'
According to Aristotle, "Virtue is a permanent state of mind, formed with the concurrence of the will and based upon an ideal of what is best in actual life, an ideal fixed by reason.". In this way, virtue is an acquired quality. It is an acquired disposition, the quality of obeying moral law. The nature of virtue will become even more ...

Inner Strength For Life – The 12 Master Virtues

What is a Virtue

Best Virtues of Mind

Best Virtues of Heart

Related Posts

The Importance of Virtue Ethics

Table of contents

Cite this Essay

Related Essays

Still can’t find what you need?

Related Essays on Ethics

Related Topics

Get Your Personalized Essay in 3 Hours or Less!

Courage as One of the Most Important Virtues

Cite this Essay

Related Essays

Bibliography

Aristotle’s Ethics

1. Preliminaries

3. Methodology

5. The Doctrine of the Mean

Further Reading

C. Studies of Particular Topics

Support SEP

Virtue: Ethics and Virtuous Life

Dominic Andres (’24) on Imitation in the Moral Life

10 Examples of Virtues and Traits That Shape Integrity

About the Author

Recent posts

Table of Contents

Understanding Virtues: Unpacking the Basics

Key Takeaways

How do virtues impact daily life?

Can virtues change over time?

Why is self-reflection important in practicing virtues?

How can we encourage others to practice virtues?

What are common obstacles to living virtuously?

Life Architekture Blog

Quick Links

Items in your cart

Moral Virtues and Character Strengths Across the Life Span

What is virtue and why does it matter?

Related Content

Exit Interview: Kathleen Porter-Magee, Superintendent of Partnership Schools

Philanthropy wrestles with civics education

When was American education’s best decade? And how can we tell?

Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons

Essay on Values for Students and Children

Importance of Values

Values Help in Decision Making

Values Can Give Direction to Our Life

Values Can Build Character

Values Can Help in Building a Society

Characteristics of Values

The Decline of Values in the Modern Times

Customize your course in 30 seconds

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Download the App

141 Virtue Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

Living the Virtues in Everyday Life

Related Links

Sign in through your institution

Virtues and Vices: and other essays in moral philosophy

Personal account

Institutional access

IP based access

Society Members

Sign in through society site

Sign in using a personal account

Viewing your signed in accounts

Signed in but can't access content

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Here is your short essay on ‘Virtues’

Virtue and duty:

Virtue and Character:

Virtue is knowledge :

Virtue is also a habit:

Virtue and Happiness:

Virtue and value:

Virtue and Society: